Re: Consciousness is information?

2009-06-13 Thread David Nyman
On Apr 24, 4:39 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Any content of consciousness can be an illusion. Consciousness itself cannot, because without consciousness there is no more illusion at all. - just catching up with the thread, but I feel compelled to comment that this is beautifully

When is this?

2009-06-15 Thread David Nyman
Forgive me in advance if this has been covered adequately before in the list, but the following occurs to me with respect to 'Bostrom' style assessments of where I should expect my 'current' OM to be situated with respect to the total population of OMs in which I exist. Presumably, I should

Re: When is this?

2009-06-15 Thread David Nyman
2009/6/16 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com: Forgive me in advance if this has been covered adequately before in the list, but the following occurs to me with respect to 'Bostrom' style assessments of where I should expect my 'current' OM to be situated with respect to the total

Dreams and Machines

2009-07-16 Thread David Nyman
With Bruno and his mighty handful engaged in the undodgeable (though constantly dodged) task of working towards an elementary grasp of the technical underpinnings of COMP, and patently lacking the fortitude of these valorous Stakhanovites, I have been spending my time lurking, reading and musing.

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-17 Thread David Nyman
On 17 July, 08:08, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: But taking a more platonic view, abstract concepts also exist. And if this is so, could we not just as well say that our conscious subjective experience is formed from particular configurations of these platonically existing

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-17 Thread David Nyman
, was the beginning of it all? And it is this ... Existence that multiplied itself For sheer delight of being And plunged into numberless trillions of forms So that it might Find Itself Innumerably - Original Message - From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com To: everything-list

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-22 Thread David Nyman
2009/7/22 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Ma connection at home is no functioning. As a linguistic aside, Bruno has cleverly expressed the above statement in perfect Glaswegian (i.e. the spoken tongue of Glasgow, Scotland - my home town). Other well-known examples are: Is'arra marra on yer

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-22 Thread David Nyman
2009/7/19 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: In your view, Bruno (or David, or anyone else who has an opinion), what kinds of things actually exist? What does it mean to say that something exists? This is naturally the $64k question for this list - or any other, for that matter (pun

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-22 Thread David Nyman
On 22 July, 16:01, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Ma connection at home is again functioning. I am happy to have solved   the problem rather quickly. On 22 Jul 2009, at 13:54, David Nyman wrote: 2009/7/22 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: You thought you could make fun

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-22 Thread David Nyman
to attribute to it above, and that this is a sufficient basis for deriving the knowable and provable aspects of 'what is RITSIAR' whilst at least being able to refer in some sense to its deeper unknowablility. David On 22 Jul 2009, at 17:56, David Nyman wrote: 2009/7/19 Rex Allen rexallen

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-22 Thread David Nyman
' (RITSTWIR? No - I can't take any more acronymical realities!) So I can't be any *more* 'present' or 'personal' than this background is, nor can I 'know' any more or any differently than is constituted by my 'way-of-being' in terms of this selfsame foundational reality. David David Nyman wrote

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-23 Thread David Nyman
abstract worlds etc) that emerge from them. The terminology, however, remains elusive. David David Nyman wrote: 2009/7/23 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: If I understand you correctly, this is similar to the explication of I by Thomas Metzinger in his book The Ego Tunnel.  He

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-23 Thread David Nyman
in such a foundational personal presence. This is what, I think, rescues the intuition of the One from a mere functionless substrate: it stands for the foundational intuition of a continuously present and personal whole, prior to any notions of differentiation whatsoever. David David Nyman wrote: 2009/7/23

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-23 Thread David Nyman
On 23 July, 05:38, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote: You have written about it, and at least two of its properties, and so it is not completely ineffable, yes? So I think it is effable even if it is exceedingly difficult to describe fully. What I'm having trouble believing is that it

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-23 Thread David Nyman
On 19 July, 20:37, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You are close to the UDA, which we discuss since years here ... All the problem is there. But once you look closely, you can see the beginning of the reason why law-and-order realities win against dream-logic realities. This is

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-23 Thread David Nyman
? And it is this ... Existence that multiplied itself For sheer delight of being And plunged into numberless trillions of forms So that it might Find Itself Innumerably - Original Message - From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2009 8:38

Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-23 Thread David Nyman
- Original Message - From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2009 8:38 PM Subject: Dreams and Machines With Bruno and his mighty handful engaged in the undodgeable (though constantly dodged) task Well said

Dreaming On

2009-07-26 Thread David Nyman
Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and machines. Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis of my understanding of the main points that have emerged thus far. I hope this will be helpful

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-27 Thread David Nyman
, but I think we're still broadly in agreement, as before :-) David David Nyman wrote: Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and machines.  Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-27 Thread David Nyman
On 27 July, 12:25, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: Hopefully, by the end of this conversation without end I will know in what sense I am real!! Don't count on it ;-) D On 27/07/2009, at 11:40 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote: Hi Kim, RITSIAR means real in the sense that I am

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-27 Thread David Nyman
approach, and specifically in the way it seeks to resolve the 0-1-3-person conundrums that - even if it turns out to be unsupportable as a whole - would remain a core feature of any successor theory. David On 26 Jul 2009, at 16:52, David Nyman wrote: Thanks to everyone who responded to my

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-27 Thread David Nyman
On 27 July, 12:25, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: Could somebody kindly tell me/explain to me what RITSIAR means? I cannot find any explanation of this in the threads which mention it. On a (slightly) more serious note, to the best of my recollection the expression 'real in the

Re: Seven Step Series

2009-07-27 Thread David Nyman
On 27 July, 09:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: ... yet, the shadows of braids and links(*) appear somehow in the two matter hypostases, and this in a context where space (not juts time) has to be a self-referential context, in that weak sense, such work seems to go in the right

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-27 Thread David Nyman
prejudice, and on the basis of the above, flatly erroneous. To say the least, any such relation is moot, absent a radically deeper insight into the mind-body problem. David Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Jul 2009, at 16:52, David Nyman wrote: Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-27 Thread David Nyman
Marchal wrote: On 26 Jul 2009, at 16:52, David Nyman wrote: Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and machines.  Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis of my understanding of the main

Re: Seven Step Series

2009-07-27 Thread David Nyman
jungle. But could we try grandma's version again? Even heroic failure would teach us something. David On 27 Jul 2009, at 16:25, David Nyman wrote: On 27 July, 09:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: ... yet, the shadows of braids and links(*) appear somehow in the two matter

Re: Seven Step Series

2009-07-28 Thread David Nyman
this heroic failure can help the grandma a little bit, Yes, it helps when we go more slowly and step by step, so that the ignoramus can keep up. David On 28 Jul 2009, at 02:56, David Nyman wrote: 2009/7/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Actually, the real axiom is a self-duplicability principle

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-28 Thread David Nyman
- in the Wittgensteinian sense - on what they *are*. David David Nyman wrote: 2009/7/27 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com That's a bit of a straw man you're refuting.  I've never heard anyone claim that the mind is the brain.   The materialist claim is that the mind is what the brain does, i.e. the mind

Re: Seven Step Series

2009-07-29 Thread David Nyman
I've always accepted in its essentials) of who I am - so who David On 28 Jul 2009, at 13:38, David Nyman wrote: Actually, I do follow the first six steps of the UD reasoning; my own 'beam me up, Scotty' reasoning had led me to similar conclusions. So, no problem with this.  But I do have

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-29 Thread David Nyman
into that. John Mikes On Mon, Jul 27, 2009 at 7:34 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/7/27 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com That's a bit of a straw man you're refuting.  I've never heard anyone claim that the mind is the brain.   The materialist claim

Re: Seven Step Series

2009-07-29 Thread David Nyman
; of French claret (cask), 1707; of honey (a cask), 1585; of pork (a cask), 1800; of soldiers (a band or company); of tobacco, 1886; of wine (a cask). Fascinating. Is any of the above relevant to your meaning? David On 29 Jul 2009, at 16:09, David Nyman wrote: 2009/7/28 Bruno Marchal marc

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-29 Thread David Nyman
the option of inventing a totally new vocabulary, but I would despair of holding anyone's attention in the attempt (and probably not even my own). David David Nyman wrote: ... In my various ramblings, I've tried to cut the whole Gordian knot of what can coherently be said to exist

Re: Seven Step Series

2009-07-30 Thread David Nyman
when I ask your brain a question it's your hands that reply? That might explain a lot! David ;-) On 29 Jul 2009, at 19:15, David Nyman wrote: On 29 July, 17:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Gosh, David, you are a champion for the difficult questions. Merci maitre, but I really

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-30 Thread David Nyman
of ONE to itself. I don'tgo for reflexive: that requires and observer and so we just have met Mr Homunculus. I hope to return to this post with smarter reflections some time. John Mikes On Wed, Jul 29, 2009 at 11:52 AM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/7/28 John Mikes jami

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-30 Thread David Nyman
2009/7/30 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com: [[sound of footsteps]]] Please allow me to introduce myself ... Avaunt, ye blood-sucking fiend! Van Helsing (retd.) On 27 July, 14:17, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 July, 12:25, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote: Could

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-30 Thread David Nyman
2009/7/30 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: It seems to me that the primary meaning of to exist is to be conscious. But what causes conscious experience? Well, I'm beginning to think that nothing causes it. Our conscious experience is fundamental, uncaused, and irreducible. Why do we think

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-30 Thread David Nyman
2009/7/30 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Unless an argument is put forward for Platonism being preferable to materialism, it doesn't get off the ground. But surely it's already up in the air? David On 28 July, 00:34, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: AFAICS, until these 'under

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-31 Thread David Nyman
that everything else is forgotten. So that, if you like, is the 'appearance' of mindlessness. David On 30 July, 23:55, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/7/30 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Cart before the horse: Why should anyone believe in an ontological gap that isn't backed

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-31 Thread David Nyman
On 31 July, 11:43, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: There are many bad solutions too. Finding a good solution means having an exat grasp of the problem, not saying in some vague way that mind and matter are different things. Do elaborate. It would be really helpful to have an exactly stated

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-31 Thread David Nyman
2009/7/31 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: I don't see that the electron's experiential aspect contributes in any way to my experience of electrons. And, in a easier to visualize vein, the same goes for chairs. Maybe there's something that it's like to be a chair, but this is irrelevant to

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-31 Thread David Nyman
2009/7/31 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: So yes, I've no doubt that one can explain consciousness by pointing to some more fundamental process that you infer from the contents of our conscious experience. But since this more fundamental substrate in turn requires an explanation, your net

Re: Dreaming On

2009-07-31 Thread David Nyman
her what she meant. David I comment on Rex's post, as quoted by David, and then I comment David's post. On 30 Jul 2009, at 22:34, David Nyman wrote: 2009/7/30 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: It seems to me that the primary meaning of to exist is to be conscious. Hmm.. I do

Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-07-31 Thread David Nyman
I note that the recent posts by Peter Jones - aka the mysterious 1Z, and the originator of the curiously useful 'real in the sense I am real' or RITSIAR - occurred shortly after my taking his name in vain. Hmm... Anyway, this signalled the resumption of a long-running debate about the

Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-02 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Is the physics account of life incomplete or wrong? I'm not claiming this.  Do you consider life to have been eliminated? No I dont. In my piece I defined computation as an arbitrary - though humanly useful - interpretative model imposed on,

Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-02 Thread David Nyman
humanly. We can speculate about reality's 'human' type aspects of partial hints we can humanly approach and make a pars pro toto dream of it - we are wrong for sure. Have a healthy mountain-climb in Scottland John M On Fri, Jul 31, 2009 at 5:39 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-09 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/7 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: If it isn;t RITSIAR, it cannot be generating me. Mathematical proofs only prove mathematical existence, not onltolgical existence. For a non-Platonist , 23 exists mathematically, but is not RITSIAR. The same goes for the UD Is an atom RITSIAR? Is a

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-09 Thread David Nyman
these specific positions where they are resorted to. If you are prepared to confront what has actually been said, specifically and point for point, we may make progress, but otherwise I fear we shan''t get much further. David On 30 July, 23:55, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/7

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-10 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Bruno, I'm broadly in agreement with your comments, and merely re-emphasise a few points below on which I'm being a stickler. Also, I have some further comments and questions on step 8. In this light it becomes self-evident that any and all

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-10 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: But strictly speaking (I am also a stickler), the first person can never identify herself to *any* representation, she share this with the 0-person ONE, or the non differentiate (arithmetical) truth. The knower does not know who he is. Relatively to

Re: Against Physics

2009-08-10 Thread David Nyman
On 9 Aug, 07:41, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, just a few general points on your posts. The various 'existence' arguments I've been putting forward recently are intended precisely to show how our first-person world of meaning and intention is embedded in a more general environment

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-11 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/11 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Asap. I am busy. Too much things to do. Hope I will find some windows ... No problem Bruno - whenever you have a moment to spare. David Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Against Physics

2009-08-11 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/11 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: You speak as if though we have a choice as to how we behave!  This I can't see at all. Whether our behavior is caused subatomic particles or arithmetic, or is completely uncaused, there is no room for libertarian free will. Whether will is free,

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-11 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/11 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Bruno, thanks for your detailed responses which I will peruse closely. Meanwhile, I finally managed to locate on FOR an apparently coherent summary of the MGA (which I understand to be the essence of UDA-8). Here is my understanding of it: The MGA

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-12 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/12 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: The solution then seems obviously to be to throw one or other of these supposed causal principles out, i.e.: 1) either it is the case that consciousness simply supervenes on particular physical activities whose computational status is irrelevant;

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-12 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/12 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I will not stickle on that point :) Can we say that? Sure - why be pointilleux about it? Now, is the ONE a person? I still don't know if that make sense (in machine's theology). Who knows? I suspect we need to interview the One. Maybe Oprah? D

Re: Against Physics

2009-08-13 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/13 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: Causality.  Causality.  Causalty.  Hmmm. So really I am arguing against causal explanations.  I think this the core of my current argument.  The feeling that something is happening *NOW* is just another example of qualia I think.  The certainty of

Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-13 Thread David Nyman
Colin's recent interesting (not to say impassioned!) posts have - yet again - made me realise the fundamental weakness of my grasp of some of the discussions that involve Turing emulation - or emulability - on the list. So I offer myself once more as lead ignoramus in stimulating some feedback

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-13 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: A good summary, David.  However, there are some other possibilities. Physics as now conceived is based on real and complex numbers. It can only be approximated digitally.  QM supposes true randomness, which Turing machines can't produce.  Again

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-14 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Hi David, This is a nice post, but you are still putting the horse before the cart. Now I can see that you have not yet grasp the main UDA point. Hope you have no problem with being frank, and a bit undiplomatical, OK? Don't worry Bruno, nothing

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-14 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/14 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I think need to take a hard line on RITSIAR.  I feel that the key lies in what Bruno terms the certainty of the ontological first person (OFP): i.e. the sine qua non of reality as it is uniquely available to us.  Since this is inescapably the foundation of

Re: Against Physics

2009-08-16 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/16 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: So I lean towards the idea that only our conscious experiences are real.  Things obviously exist as contents of conscious experiences. I deeply disagree here. Even to understand a word like content I have to believe in some more basic entities

Re: Against Physics

2009-08-16 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/16 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Here's what I think is the problem with all this: H.  I didn't see anything in your post that seemed like an actual problem for my view. But weren't you were arguing

Re: Against Physics

2009-08-16 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/16 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 5:42 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/16 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com: On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: Here's what I think is the problem with all this:

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-16 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Here we are back on our little theological divergence. I will provide a commentary in terms of my own 'theory', as far as I can. Any references I make to comp in what follows are intended very generally. No doubt there will be obscurities, but I will

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-17 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/17 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Look, I have already said that I am not going to get into an argument about which pixies exist. Forgive me for butting in, but I wonder whether there is a level at which your metaphysical disagreement is perhaps somewhat more resolvable? It might be

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-17 Thread David Nyman
Bruno. How might I take part in such an interview? David Bruno On 17 Aug 2009, at 03:54, David Nyman wrote: 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Here we are back on our little theological divergence. I will provide a commentary in terms of my own 'theory', as far as I can

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-17 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/17 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Yep. I have no problem with any of that Really? Let's see then. The paraphrase condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a statement like unicorns have one horn as a true statement about reality and thus being forced to accept

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-17 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/17 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I am trying to persuade Bruno that his argument has an implict assumption of Platonism that should be made explicit. An  assumption of Platonism as a non-observable background might be justifiiable in the way you suggest, but it does need to be

Re: A Possible Mathematical Structure for Physics

2009-08-17 Thread David Nyman
On 17 Aug, 17:45, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: I've seen John Baez suggest that For a moment I thought you said Joan Baez (I guess I shouldn't have stayed up so late watching Woodstock - the director's cut). Were those really the days? D On 17 Aug, 15:23, ronaldheld

Re: A Possible Mathematical Structure for Physics

2009-08-17 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/18 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com: David Nyman wrote: On 17 Aug, 17:45, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: I've seen John Baez suggest that For a moment I thought you said Joan Baez (I guess I shouldn't have stayed up so late watching Woodstock - the director's cut

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-17 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/18 Jesse Mazer wrote: Peter Jones wrote: Primary matter is very much related to the fact that some theories of physics work and other do not. It won't tell you which ones work, but it will tell you why there is a difference. It solves the white rabbit problem. We don't see logically

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-18 Thread David Nyman
On 18 Aug, 09:55, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Any physcial theory is distinguished from an Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only some possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that is not affected by juggling one theory for

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-18 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/18 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I presume that one could substitute 'computation' for 'unicorn' in the above passage? If so, the human concept that it is 'computation' that gives rise to consciousness could be paraphrased using statements about physical processes in human

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-18 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/18 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: The paraphrase condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a statement like unicorns have one horn as a true statement about reality and thus being forced to accept the existence of unicorns, you could instead paraphrase this in

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-18 Thread David Nyman
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no   doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,   assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of   universal machines (to be

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-18 Thread David Nyman
On 19 Aug, 01:31, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: It seems that your argument uses MGA to conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so Turing-emulable=Turing-emulated.  It seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have a correct argument showing

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-18 Thread David Nyman
On 19 Aug, 01:31, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: It seems that your argument uses MGA to conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so Turing-emulable=Turing-emulated.  It seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have a correct argument showing

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-18 Thread David Nyman
On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: I think you are right that the MGA is at the crux.  But I don't know whether to regard it as proving that computation need not be physically instantiated or as a reductio against the yes doctor hypothesis.  Saying yes to the

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-19 Thread David Nyman
009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware.  The paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that *any* human concept is *eliminable* No,

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-19 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake.  Here's the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism the class of consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper subset of the class of computational

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-19 Thread David Nyman
On 19 Aug, 09:36, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia).   I've also argued this, in a somewhat different form.  Peter's position I think is that 1) and 2) are

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-19 Thread David Nyman
On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I am sorry Peter, but CTM + PM just does not work, and it is a good   news, because if we keep CTM, we get a sort of super generalization of   Darwin idea that things evolve. We still don't have a definite response from Peter as to

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-19 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com: I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware.  The paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that *any* human concept is *eliminable*

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-19 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/19 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: 1) What motivates the assumption of different theoretical postulates of primitiveness, contingency and necessity? Is that question really important? It is a bit a private question. Typical motivation for comp, are that it is very plausible under a

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-19 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware.  The paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that *any* human concept is *eliminable*

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-19 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: It doesn't.  It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language - then this demands that it be *capable

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-19 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com: I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware.  The paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that *any* human concept is

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-20 Thread David Nyman
On 20 Aug, 10:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Aug 2009, at 02:07, David Nyman wrote: 2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com: I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation   is a physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-20 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/20 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: On 20 Aug, 13:30, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 20 Aug, 10:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: But also - just to dispose once and for all of this particular point - I want to be sure that you understand that I'm not arguing

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-20 Thread David Nyman
On 20 Aug, 10:09, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: OK. It's invalid because you can't have computaiton with zero phyiscal activity. But that is **precisely** the conclusion of the reductio that MGA proposes.  MGA claims precisely that - as you say - since it is implausible to

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-20 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/20 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg16244.html and http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg16257.html Thanks, Jesse - I'll take a look. David ...this notion of causal structure isn't totally

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-21 Thread David Nyman
On 21 Aug, 09:37, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Yes, of course you're right - perhaps I didn't phrase my response to Jesse clearly enough.  In my discussion with Peter about Quinean 'eliminative paraphrasing', I was pursuing the same conclusion that you attribute to Dennett as

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-21 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/21 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: My rhetorical question was how do we reach a state of certainty about 'what it is to be' on the basis of 'what it is to describe'. Why do we need certainty? OK. Perhaps: how do we achieve the most inclusive understanding possible? To which my

Re: Emulation and Stuff

2009-08-21 Thread David Nyman
On 21 Aug, 19:04, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Explaining away qua reduction is nto the same as explaining away qua elimination. Well, either way he's explaining away, as you yourself point out below.  But it's a false distinction, as I point out below. But also - just

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-23 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/23 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/8/22 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: That's an interesting question and one that I think relates to the importance of context.  A scan of your brain would capture all the information in the

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-24 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/24 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: 2009/8/24 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com: In the example of the alien brain, as has been pointed out, the context of meaning is to be discovered only in the its own local embodiment of its history and current experience.  In Stathis

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-24 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/24 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: In the example of the alien brain, as has been pointed out, the context of meaning is to be discovered only in the its own local embodiment of its history and current experience.  In Stathis' example of *our* hypothesized observation of the

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-24 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/24 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: 2009/8/24 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com: Having said all this, it is interesting to reconsider your formulation the brain did its thing without us understanding it, creating its own context.  What is it about *being* the brain

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-24 Thread David Nyman
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body problem. I can imagine that your consciousness supervene on something uncomputable in the universe. But we

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-24 Thread David Nyman
category. David 2009/8/24 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com: Having said all this, it is interesting to reconsider your formulation the brain did its thing without us understanding it, creating its own context.  What is it about *being* the brain that causes this context to be self-referentially

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