On 22 January 2014 09:45, LizR wrote:
> I think I said the fl;ashlight wasn't needed, so it isn't there, and so
> nothing moves it around. The pigeonholes stand for states of consciousness,
> so they perceive what it would illuminate, which is their own contents. But
> they can perceive those wit
On 23 January 2014 08:39, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Let us take the WM-duplication. Suppose that the guy in Helsinki is told
> that the "randomly chosen unique flaslight sequence will illuminate W
> "just" after the duplication (if this makes sense). Should he decide that
> P(W) = 1 and P(M) = 0? Is t
On 23 January 2014 21:18, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> The question then arises: Could the intuition of such a "multiplex" of
> random momentary filterings possibly give an adequate account of the
> myriad, ordered experiential trajectories of each and every one of "us"?
>
>
> I can't see how *that* ra
On 25 January 2014 09:21, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Maybe the difference in intuition is because she doesn't think about it in
> Hoyle's "universalist" way, although ISTM this is implicit in the heuristic
> (i.e. the "guy" is the unique and non-simultaneous "owner" of the
> experiences in all the pi
On 28 January 2014 18:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
That's because the theory prevents the truth about it from being accessed.
> The theory of comp is blind to its blindness, and demands to be refuted
> only by those wearing blindfolds. To test fairly, you would have to take
> off the blindfold, but
On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is that
>> any and all behaviour associated with consciousness - including, crucially,
>> the articulation of our very thoughts and beliefs about conscious phenomena
>> - can at leas
On 30 January 2014 05:00, meekerdb wrote:
But you have explained it well. And it's not at all clear to me that
> Bruno's computational theory avoids this paradox. It seems there will
> still, in the UD computation, be a closed account of the physical
> processes. No doubt it will be computatio
On 30 January 2014 15:13, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
In my view the whole UD can be as logically consistent as it wants to be
> but still has no connection with the actual observable reality of our
> universe...
I'm afraid I don't seem to share your enviable certainty on the range of
possibilities th
On 30 January 2014 02:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events possibly be
>> linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of explanation? To
>> put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute certainty "the fact
>> that I am conscious" I
On 30 January 2014 16:33, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not really. Somehow, you conflate levels and points of view. It is a sin of
> reductionism :)
> You do the "mistake" of those who deny compatibilistic free-will.
>
> Of course we are at the crux of the mind-body problem.
>
Bruno, my dear and much-va
t of my post that you then accused me of
> not providing!
>
> Sorry for trying to help!
> :-)
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:55:00 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 30 January 2014 15:13, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>&
rom Bruno's comp, from pure static arithmetic?
>
> How does actual movement emerge from Bruno's comp, from pure static
> arithmetic?
>
> If you can't explain it your statements are just statements of faith...
>
> Edgar
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 30, 2014
On 31 January 2014 13:28, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Imagine we are experiencing all the possible
> moments, "eternally", right "now". Would things appear any difference
> from the perspective of any of these moments?
>
Interesting question. Depends what you mean by "we", I guess, and also what
you me
On 31 January 2014 01:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
The "we" of individual human beings relies on physical consistency because
> that is a common sensory experience of the animal>organism>substance
> context. The substance context however relies on the "we" of the Absolute
> context. The biological c
On 31 January 2014 18:30, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> OK. But you could also start by saying something like the POPJ assumes by
> default a primitively-physical basis).
>
> Especially that it is certainly arguable that comp does not solve it to
> our *entire* satisfaction yet.
>
OK. Actually
On 1 February 2014 09:54, Bruno Marchal wrote:
My poor car followed the schroedinger equation without effort, but at a
> higher level, it tooks her a lot of effort to climb some steep roads. Well,
> she died through such effort, actually.
>
RIP :-(
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On 1 February 2014 12:13, Craig Weinberg wrote:
No. The UD has no output. It is a non stopping program. "everything
>> physical and theological" appears through its intensional activity.
>>
>
>
> "Appears" = output.
>
I think I see the confusion here. Remember that in comp, as in any TOE, we
beg
On 1 February 2014 07:05, LizR wrote:
Everything we observe takes place in a manner that can be placed within a
> space-time continuum such that a "god's eye" view (or the relevant
> equations) would see it as static. But of course *we* don't see it like
> that.
>
> This appears to be the source
On 1 February 2014 15:44, Craig Weinberg wrote
Neither comp nor any other TOE can consistently make reference to input or
>> output extrinsic to itself,
>>
>
> Unless, like mine, your TOE makes I/O (unified as a sensory-motive dipole
> 'sense') the foundation of Everything.
>
So are you saying,
On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
If you don't see how my 'theory' automatically trumps any logical objection
> then you don't understand my theory fully.
That is truly hilarious Craig! I cannot help being reminded of Luther's
admonition that "To be a Christian, you must pluck out
On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I must have lost the thread. This Google Groups format is always burying
> threads for me. If I can find it, I'll definitely reply.
I see you use gmail, like me. Why don't you just filter messages from this
group to a gmail folder? Then gmail mana
On 1 February 2014 18:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Eh, I've had formatting issues in the past when I try to respond through
> Gmail.
>
Try using rich formatting and just interpolate your answers, snipping as
necessary. It works really well for me.
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On 1 February 2014 18:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't expect anything and I'm not looking for anything. I'm explaining
> why logic is theoretical representation rather than aesthetic presentation,
> and that the distinction between the two is the key to solving the hard
> problem of consciousne
On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I get around that with perceptual relativity. When flying over a city, it
> doesn't look like there are millions of conscious entities - not because
> their behavior is limited to a set of rules, but because your vantage point
> amplifies the insens
On 1 February 2014 21:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Found it!
>
> On Friday, January 31, 2014 11:45:24 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 31 January 2014 01:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> The "we" of individual human beings relies on physical consi
On 1 February 2014 20:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, February 1, 2014 2:53:30 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 1 February 2014 16:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> I get around that with perceptual relativity. When flying over a city, it
>>&g
luctance to confront the real difficulties faced by your type of theory
makes further discussion too frustrating to sustain, at least for me. Sorry
if that seems harsh, but there it is. Over and out.
David
On 2 Feb 2014 02:20, "Craig Weinberg" wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, Februar
r than avoid those difficulties.
Thus far I see little evidence that you do much more than underestimate
them or blithely wave them away.
David
On 2 Feb 2014 03:49, "Craig Weinberg" wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, February 1, 2014 6:30:52 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>&g
Me too :) I may get a bit tetchy about your logic but I can still
appreciate the visuals!
David
On 2 February 2014 11:51, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jan 31, 2014 at 10:01 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 31, 2014 3:54:54 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>>>
>>> Like, wow
On 2 February 2014 03:42, LizR wrote:
To answer the question about the frogs. We imagine we are an "extended
> frog" because of memory; without it we really would be stuck in the present
> moment, a series of individual isolated moments - and completely unable to
> function, of course. (If you ha
On 2 February 2014 05:40, LizR wrote:
Phew. At least it isn't just me who has this reaction. Maybe Craig and
> Edgar can get together and form a church whose motto is "I am right, and if
> you don't realise that it's because your little brain can't grasp my
> magnificent theory."
>
> They could c
On 2 February 2014 03:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It's because you don't listen, and then project that quality onto me. It's
> very common I've found. Not everyone is that way though. I have many
> productive conversations with people also. That would be hard to explain if
> it was my fault.
It's
On 2 February 2014 19:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota the
> significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so easy to disarm it
> as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-
On 2 February 2014 19:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
What do you mean by "laying claim to conscious phenomena"? In what way does
> a brain or body lay claim to conscious phenomena?
Let me restate it then. Bodies, insofar as they are the manifestations with
which we interact (own brains and bodies in
On 2 February 2014 19:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
You see little because you want to be right. There is more to see, but you
> will have to change your mind to see it.
I presume you aren't implying that I will have to change my mind so that I
want to be wrong?
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On 2 February 2014 19:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> After all, Craig, if it were that simple wouldn't it be rather likely that
>> someone other than yourself might have noticed this?
>>
> This is where you reveal that you are really only interested in humbling
> me, and are willing to resort to the
On 1 February 2014 09:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> It would seem so. But POPJ can still bite panpsychism, I think, although
> this doesn't seem to be widely recognised. My post to Craig elaborates on
> this.
>
> I am afraid he is too much vague to be really bitten. but you can put him
> in the corn
.
I would certainly be interested to hear how your theory tackles this
problem, if in fact we've now succeeded in establishing just what it is.
David
On Sunday, February 2, 2014 7:43:33 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 2 February 2014 19:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> What d
ousness had to evolve as a necessary side-effect. It is
> also consistent with the world being causally closed and eliminates
> the paradox that David Nyman sees.
>
Does it? You still haven't explained why bodies emit utterances that appear
to refer to this putative epiphenomenon. Or are
On 3 February 2014 19:18, meekerdb wrote:
My view is that it is not physically undetectable. We just don't know how
> to detect it yet. In Bruno's theory a computer whose program is Lobian is
> conscious. How would we detect that? By querying the computer. By
> studying it's program. Will
On 3 February 2014 21:25, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 February 2014 02:26, David Nyman wrote:
> > On 3 February 2014 12:06, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
> >
> >> If consciousness is epiphenomenal I don't see how that diminishes its
> >> importance in a
On 3 February 2014 05:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> But of course he must still elucidate the psycho-physical principles he
>> seeks, in order to build a bridge from the relation of acquaintance to that
>> of function and I don't think even he would claim to have achieved that
>> beyond some specul
" the extrinsic
simultaneity is intrinsically broken by the discrete perspective of each
momentary frog. If so, one could then see Hoyle's heuristic as a frog's eye
view of the experiential consequences of this broken simultaneity.
David
>
>
> On 3 February 2014 03:19, David Ny
On 3 February 2014 23:08, meekerdb wrote:
I think that when we can "build a general AI to specification" that will
> be the end of the "hard problem" of consciousness.
Do you mean FAPP, or do you personally take the view that there is no
remainder problem of consciousness (to coin an alternati
On 3 February 2014 23:08, meekerdb wrote:
Sometimes a problem hangs around a long time because people have a
> prejudice that the answer must take a certain form. People thought about
> gravity in terms of "What is it about things that makes some of them want
> to go down and others go up?" The
/www.graemesfantasybookreview.com/2010/07/flux-michael-moorcockbarrington-bayley_07.html
>
>
>
> On 4 February 2014 12:12, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 2 February 2014 18:53, LizR wrote:
>>
>> I will come back on this when I have time
>>>
>>
>> Tha
On 3 February 2014 23:42, meekerdb wrote:
That's hard to say. I think conscious thought will be found to a class of
> thoughts and there will be degrees of consciousness and it will be
> complicated and the "Hard Problem" will be seen to have been overly
> simplistic. It may have an answer, like
On 4 February 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Why? You agree that there is still one way causal link. That is
> > consciousness is a necessary side, and real, effect of the brain
> activity.
> > So why a body could not refer to it meaningfully?
>
> It's not that which would be meaningles
On 3 February 2014 20:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
That machine epistemology extends beyond mathematics need not imply that
> extension is aesthetic or experiential, any more than any emergent property
> implies an army of conscious agents causing the emergence.
You are quite right to say that a p
On 4 February 2014 13:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Because silicon happens to have been disallowed for biological experience.
> Silicon and carbon are symbols and signs of the footprint of experiences,
> not the causes of them. I suggest that we stop thinking in terms of forms
> in space or function
On 4 February 2014 13:57, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
We can refer to our conscious states because the base phenomena on which
> our conscious states supervene cause our vocal cords to move in a
> particular way. But it is wrong to say, except in a loose way of speaking,
> that our conscious state
On 4 February 2014 14:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 9:19:51 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 4 February 2014 13:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>> Because silicon happens to have been disallowed for biological
>>> experie
On 4 February 2014 10:14, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> But perhaps we should rather think of the frog focus as continuing to be
> fundamentally panoptic (i.e. encompassing all the frog perspectives) except
> that "down there" the extrinsic simultaneity is intrinsically broken by the
> discrete perspect
On 4 February 2014 17:32, meekerdb wrote:
I don't think there's anything wrong with criticizing a theory on something
> other than "it's own terms". I think Craig might accept Bruno's argument
> as valid but regard it as a reductio against saying "yes" to the doctor. I
> have criticized it for
On 4 February 2014 18:45, meekerdb wrote:
No a reductio ad absurdum is showing that the premises lead to conclusions
> that are absurd, i.e. that it is more likely the premises are false than
> that the conclusion is true. This is somewhat a matter of judgement as to
> what counts as absurd. A
On 4 February 2014 18:04, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 12:57:45 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 4 February 2014 17:32, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>> I don't think there's anything wrong with criticizing a theory on
>>> somethi
On 4 February 2014 20:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 2:56:05 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 4 February 2014 18:04, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 12:57:45 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
On 4 February 2014 17:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 10:51:02 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> On 4 February 2014 14:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, February 4, 2014 9:19:51 AM UTC-5, David Ny
On 2 July 2012 15:06, John Clark wrote:
> Not on a third person description of bodies nor on a third person
> description of first person experiences, only on the first person
> experience.
>
> The only first person experience I know directly is my own
For heaven's sake re-read your own stateme
On 2 July 2012 17:50, John Clark wrote:
*And one nanosecond after the copying when one receives sensory impulses
that originated in Moscow and the other receives sensory impulses that
originated in Washington neither would be in precisely the first-person
position they were in before.*
What do
On 3 July 2012 08:09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I'm pretty sure John understands the argument but he prefers to give
> primacy to the objective/third-person viewpoint. The first-person
> viewpoint involves an assumption that I am a single person travelling
> through time in the forward direction
On 5 July 2012 08:25, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The proof if by absurdo. Suppose there is an algorithm, or even just a God
> capable of predicting the specific outcome among "1)" and "2)". Suppose it
> is "1)", then the guy in Moscow refutes it, and comp invites us to listen
> to him. If it is "2), t
On 5 July 2012 18:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
*But we can already justify the relative indeterminacy of the relative
> first person perspective, from what is an entirely deterministic background.
> *
Hoyle wan't necessarily assuming comp (and nor do I when talking in this
way). But the point whic
On 6 July 2012 10:27, Bruno Marchal wrote:
*In which structure is that relative-frequency defined, and to whom does it
apply? How can we verify it?*
*
*
The structure, if you like, is the total state of knowledge of the "knower"
(as you have characterised it in a post to Brent) which ex hypothes
On 6 July 2012 18:01, Bruno Marchal wrote:
*I am sure your analysis might help to better apprehend consciousness, and
> can perhaps better handle the amnesia situation. But you have not (yet)
> convinced me that it has to be termed into a new form of *assumed at the
> outset* indeterminacy. The p
On 6 July 2012 22:55, Stephen P. King wrote:
We have to be very careful about this "assumed from the onset" stuff! Yes,
> it is necessary to assume things even for the sake of discussion of ideas,
> but to assume that they are de facto primitive and/or a priori is often a
> fatal mistake.
Let m
On 11 July 2012 09:55, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Even the phisical TOE is part of this second world. there are no countries,
> no cars, no persons, no electrons outside of the world of the mind.
> Outside of the mind there is only mathematics. And this math has been
> anthropically selected by t
On 11 July 2012 09:55, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
but is in this second world of shared conscience created from the mind
> where we find any meaning.
>
Alberto, do you mean "conscience" in the sense of the inner ethical or
moral sense, or sentience per se, i.e. "consciousness"? Forgive me if I
ha
On 11 July 2012 21:17, meekerdb wrote:
*But it isn't uniquely characterized by that. I don't even know what
> "irreducibly synthetic" means. I know what "synthetic" means; it means
> made (synthesized) of something else, it means artificial, not natural??
> But in any case "the subject", the fi
On 30 July 2012 13:11, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If we are removing ourselves from the object of our study we must remove
>> all things that are implied. It is the observer that acts, not the object
>> alone. All of the properties, such as reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry,
>> do freeze and cease
On 31 July 2012 11:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With comp, I argue that arithmetical truth is simpler and can explain why
> the numbers (or better the person associated to those numbers) construct
> ideas of time and space, and why they can believe in some genuine way in
> them, and be deluded in bel
On 31 July 2012 10:08, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Materialism is a monism but has a hidden dualism that is converted back
> into monism by the process of avoiding delicate questions, for example the
> nature of perceptions and the nature of the suppossedly "external"
> phenomenons that they affirm
On 9 January 2013 18:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
* David Nyman's heuristic makes me think that they could be zombie, but I
> am not sure this can work with comp.*
Don't forget that we are speaking only of a heuristic, or guide for
thought. The idea is to evaluate what consequences might follow, fo
On 10 January 2013 15:31, Bruno Marchal wrote:
*I am still not sure this does not simply add a layer of difficulty,
> because it is not clear (to me) what can possibly be such a sampling.*
>
Well, as I've said, there need be no mystery about it - it's just a way of
examining one's thinking about
On 5 February 2014 09:33, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Thanks for the nice summaries too, in some of your post.
I hope I didn't garble them too badly :)
David
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On 5 February 2014 06:31, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Of course I know I am conscious. I could say, what a silly question!
>
> If I declare that I am conscious this action is entirely explainable
> in physical terms. I am also actually conscious, but that's not why
> I'm saying it, since conscious
On 14 February 2014 15:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal
> machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities of
> computations.
Do you mean "fooled"?
David
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On 15 February 2014 10:25, LizR wrote:
Yes, I wonder that. I generally assume people arguing on a forum like this
> are rational (ish) and hence that they intend what they say and when they
> keep avoiding questions it's because they don't want to answer them, and
> when they're rude and arrogant
On 15 February 2014 02:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If that is so (and I agree that it is, since I am not a physical
> eliminativist) it is still consistent with the physical processes still
> being *sufficient* to produce consciousness. It would only not be
> sufficient if some further ingredi
On 15 February 2014 13:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I have another theory of intelligence, which is that kids are intelligent
> (= can change their mind and learn), and adults are stupid (= can no more
> change their minds).
>
Yes, and indeed I have noticed that there is a great deal of social and
p
On 15 February 2014 18:39, Bruno Marchal wrote:
That's why the wise man and the universal machine remain silent in case
> like that.
>
> Oops.
>
:)
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On 15 February 2014 18:41, Craig Weinberg wrote:
To extend your metaphor, in my view, since the characters in a drama can
> build an LCD screen as part of the show, but an LCD screen can't build a
> show as part of its function, it makes more sense that the drama is
> fundamental and that from an
On 15 February 2014 18:32, Craig Weinberg wrote:
You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just because
> awareness is special, but because it is ontologically perpendicular to the
> possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy awareness result in a doll.
Does that then
-- Forwarded message --
From: David Nyman
Date: 15 February 2014 23:45
Subject: RE: Better Than the Chinese Room
To: Craig Weinberg
Can you give me a principled distinction between reproducing and copying?
David
Sent from my Windows Phone
--
From
On 16 February 2014 12:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Copy and self-copy are different, for machines too, but in the case under
>> study, this does not entail any observable difference, and if you are
>> right, it means that the copy doll will be a zombie.
>>
>
> The reproduction of the amoeba's body
On 16 February 2014 03:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
The difference between the movie and the conscious entity is that the
> movie has meaning to an external observer, while the conscious entity
> creates its own observer and hence its own meaning.
>
Yes, that's what I said. OK, I think I've go
On 16 February 2014 14:06, Craig Weinberg wrote:
If there were some way to copy a fully developed body so that it lived, it
> would still not be a copy of the original, but just a new original that
> reminds us of the copy from the outside perspective.
Ah, but then you would be faced with the q
On 16 February 2014 09:39, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> If the foregoing is to make any sense, we are forced to the view that all
> references to such dramatis personae are, in the end, merely a manner of
> speaking, and that consequently *all* such gross or macroscopic references
> are, strictly speak
On 16 February 2014 18:10, meekerdb wrote:
But that's the ambiguity I see. When you ask the H-man, "Where do you
> think you will be?" he has to provide some interpretation to the word
> "you". My immediate, intuitive thought was, "I expect to be in both
> places." Which depends on what is mea
On 16 February 2014 19:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why not being agnostic, especially that you have admitted not having
> studied computer science.
>
> Why being negative on something that you ignore?
>
Because he "understands" that comp cannot possibly be true.
David
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On 16 February 2014 17:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Ah, but then you would be faced with the questions posed by the UDA/MWI
>> arguments, because there would then be two conscious "originals" who
>> claimed equal possession of the same history to that point. That is all you
>> need for the duplicati
On 16 February 2014 17:42, meekerdb wrote:
I don't disagree, but I think this formulation leaves "meaning" as
> mysterious and one may ask why consciousness creates meaning. I think
> meaning comes from being able to act in the world to realize values. And
> it doesn't require consciousness, at
On 16 February 2014 16:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 16 Feb 2014, at 15:32, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 16 February 2014 09:39, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
> From "thought cannot act on matter" we arrive at "thought cannot refer to
> matter"
4 21:38, "Craig Weinberg" wrote:
>
>
> On Sunday, February 16, 2014 2:09:13 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 16 February 2014 19:05, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Why not being agnostic, especially that you have admitted not having
>>> studied
yours rather than yet again straying from the subject.
David
On Sunday, February 16, 2014 2:18:54 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 16 February 2014 17:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> Ah, but then you would be faced with the questions posed by the UDA/MWI
>>> arguments, becaus
On 17 February 2014 00:07, meekerdb wrote:
> Sure, but in taking this view, which is legitimate in its own terms,
> you're in danger of turning step 3 into gibberish just to make a point. But
> the point you make here is precisely not the point of step 3. That point is
> that *anyone whomsoever*,
On 17 February 2014 00:12, meekerdb wrote:
I don't think so. We know where the values of the Mars Rover are encoded
> and how they affect its behavior and we know how we could change them.
> That's about as good as reductionism gets.
But now aren't you just substituting value as an epiphenomen
On 17 February 2014 00:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
You don't suggest that I can't understand comp, but you suggest that I am
> impervious to reasoned argument about it...why would that be the case if I
> understood comp as you seem to think it deserves to be understood?
You said that I understood
On 17 February 2014 01:39, meekerdb wrote:
I and I would agree with Stathis - except for the "merely". I think Bruno
> was right when he observed that "epi" doesn't mean anything in this
> context. Stathis doesn't think that consciousness is separable from the
> physics; it's just talking about
On 17 February 2014 01:35, meekerdb wrote:
> Well then, facing duplication, would your expectation change to that of
> personally experiencing a simultaneous two-valued outcome? And if the
> answer is yes, does that imply that you would reject MWI as a possibility
> because (I presume) you have n
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