subject:"A test for solipsism"

Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-25 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 22 Oct 2012, at 22:55, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/22/2012 4:12 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/22/2012 3:13 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 C3PO would be a phylosophical zombie. It would not?


 Hi Alberto,

C3PO did refer to itself (in the Star Wars movies) , so no, it  
would not be.




Hi Alberto,

After reading my own post again and thinking a bit more, I  
realized that we could never be sure if C3PO was or was not a p- 
zombie! It seems that p-zombiehood is just as 1p definite and 3p  
mysterious, or indefinite, as consciousness! The point is that 1p  
content can not be shared. We can represent what it might be and  
speculate endlessly about it, but we can never know it, other than  
the 1p content that we have of our own. Our discussion in Everything  
list seems to revolve around various different ideas that center on  
speculations about 1p.



But you agree that your own 1p is not a speculation, OK?

Put in another way you agree that you are not a zombie, OK?

About C3P0, I don't think that the ability to refer to oneself is  
enough to have 1p, you need universality, or sub-universality  
(perhaps).  Even multiple self- reference don't lead to universality  
(despite + and * does!).
Royer, a student of John Case, wrote a beautiful book on the  
combination of control structure and below and above sub-universality  
(a cousin of the notion of universality)


Concerning C3P0, the consciousness might be the "trivial" one of the  
universal mind (the mind of the unspecified universal machine, with  
indeterminacy = all pieces of computations), or a genuinely self- 
referring program relatively to our most probable own computations. If  
I remember well, C3P0, was a genuine companion of some sort.


1p is not a speculation on oneself. Any 3p is, strictly speaking.

And if we are not solipsist, it is a quasi axiom for at least us the  
humans, but I extend it for many animals, and remain open and cautious  
for everything else.


Zombie-like questioning happens in real life, when some people come  
back from comatose state, about which different people disagree if the  
person was conscious or not, and then when they witnessed or pretended  
that they were conscious, or that they got moment of consciousness.


Absence of behavior is not a guaranty of absence of consciousness, as  
the notion of dream illustrates.


Zombie can exist, logically, because presence of behavior is also not  
a guaranty of presence of consciousness, for short period, and the  
notion of long period is vague.


Some musician, which by circumstances have to play the same musics  
repetitively, and can have their bad days, can "play like a zombie",  
thinking about something else and letting the "automatic pilot" to  
drive the show. Many people drive their cars like that. They are not p- 
zombie, as they have still a consciousness, even if still in  
dreamland, but they are zombie with respect to their behavior. Is the  
automatic pilot completely unconscious? I bet in some case. Non  
anticipated event, in such case, can awake them to reality.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 22 Oct 2012, at 21:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

C3PO would be a phylosophical zombie. It would not?

If you assume non-comp, or just non-strong AI.

Bruno

2012/10/22 Stephen P. King
On 10/22/2012 3:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno and Roger,

What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie
from a person that does not see the world external to it as anything
other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact?

--
Onward!

Stephen

Hi Stephan,

That sounds like autism to me.

Roger

Hi Roger,

I was trying to demonstrate that the closest real example of a p-
zombie is an autistic person, but they almost never act "normally".
I think that the p-zombie idea is nonsensical.

--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-22 Thread Stephen P. King


On 10/22/2012 4:12 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/22/2012 3:13 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 C3PO would be a phylosophical zombie. It would not?


 Hi Alberto,

C3PO did refer to itself (in the Star Wars movies) , so no, it 
would not be.




Hi Alberto,

After reading my own post again and thinking a bit more, I realized 
that we could never be sure if C3PO was or was not a p-zombie! It seems 
that p-zombiehood is just as 1p definite and 3p mysterious, or 
indefinite, as consciousness! The point is that 1p content can not be 
shared. We can represent what it might be and speculate endlessly about 
it, but we can never know it, other than the 1p content that we have of 
our own. Our discussion in Everything list seems to revolve around 
various different ideas that center on speculations about 1p.


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-22 Thread Stephen P. King


On 10/22/2012 3:13 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 C3PO would be a phylosophical zombie. It would not?


 Hi Alberto,

C3PO did refer to itself (in the Star Wars movies) , so no, it 
would not be.




2012/10/22 Stephen P. King >


On 10/22/2012 3:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote:



Hi Bruno and Roger,

 What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie
from a person that does not see the world external to it as
anything
other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact?

--
Onward!

Stephen

Hi Stephan,

That sounds like autism to me.

Roger

Hi Roger,

I was trying to demonstrate that the closest real example of a
p-zombie is an autistic person, but they almost never act
"normally". I think that the p-zombie idea is nonsensical.


--



--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-22 Thread Alberto G. Corona

 C3PO would be a phylosophical zombie. It would not?

2012/10/22 Stephen P. King 

> On 10/22/2012 3:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>> 
>>
>> Hi Bruno and Roger,
>>
>>  What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie
>> from a person that does not see the world external to it as anything
>> other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact?
>>
>> --
>> Onward!
>>
>> Stephen
>>
>> Hi Stephan,
>>
>> That sounds like autism to me.
>>
>> Roger
>>
>>  Hi Roger,
>
> I was trying to demonstrate that the closest real example of a
> p-zombie is an autistic person, but they almost never act "normally". I
> think that the p-zombie idea is nonsensical.
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
>
> --
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>
>


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Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-22 Thread Stephen P. King


On 10/22/2012 3:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote:



Hi Bruno and Roger,

 What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie
from a person that does not see the world external to it as anything
other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact?

--
Onward!

Stephen

Hi Stephan,

That sounds like autism to me.

Roger


Hi Roger,

I was trying to demonstrate that the closest real example of a 
p-zombie is an autistic person, but they almost never act "normally". I 
think that the p-zombie idea is nonsensical.



--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 21 Oct 2012, at 14:25, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

You say

"No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves  
like

a human, or like a conscious entity. "

My problem is that the definition is an absurdity to begin with.
If he has no mind, he could not know what a red light means.


Well, there are already robots capable of stopping at a red signals.  
So they have a mind. Good. That's the strong AI thesis (implied by  
comp).





He could not know anything. So he could never behave as a
real person would unless the response was instinctual.


That's the idea of a what a zombie can be, for some people. Some  
people agree that a computer can imitate a brain, but still not  
emulate the consciousness, or inner life usually associated to owner  
of brain. So they agree with MEC-BEH (behavioral mechanism) but not  
with comp. They are logically forced to accept the existence of  
zombie. Craig, here, seems to accept that consequence, but dismiss a  
little bit the zombie idea by calling them

puppet.



Note that you may be right, you could never know
if you married a zombie, but that does not follow
from the p-zombie definition. The definition is an absurdity.


In logic everything can follow from an absurdity. The notion of zombie  
is a philosophical concept. It can be absurd in some theory, and not  
in another theory. If you believe in MEC-BEH, but not in COMP, you are  
forced to accept the existence of zombie. If you believe that the  
notion of zombie is absurd (as most of us do here) then you are forced  
to accept comp, or to believe that MEC-BEH is wrong, which is akin in  
the belief in magic, as we have not yet find anything non Turing  
emulable, or recoverable by first person indeterminacy, in nature.


Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/21/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-20, 10:11:25
Subject: Re: A test for solipsism




On 20 Oct 2012, at 12:38, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that
a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia
are what the senses tell you.


Yes. Qualia are the subjective 1p view, sometimes brought by  
percepts, and supposed to be treated by the brain.

And yes a zombie as no qualia, as a qualia needs consciousness.












The mind then transforms
what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red
is what the body gives you, the sensation of red
is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind
also can recall past sensations of red to compare
it with and give it a name "red", which a real
person can identify as eg a red traffic light
and stop. A zombie would not stop




No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves  
like a human, or like a conscious entity.
By definition, if you marry a zombie, your will never been aware of  
that, your whole life.





(I am not allowing
the fact that red and green lights are in different
positions).
That would be a test of zombieness.


There exists already detector of colors, smells, capable of doing  
finer discrimination than human.
I have heard about a machine testing old wine better than human  
experts.



Machines evolve quickly. That is why the non-comp people are  
confronted with the idea that zombie might be logically possible for  
them.



Bruno











Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/20/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51
Subject: Re: A test for solipsism

On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig
believes about the p-zombie.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

"A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
perception is a hypothetical being
that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that
it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a
zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel
any pain though it behaves
exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from
the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."

My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say
that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in
typing the first part of this sentence.

Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you.
But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists,
without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they
might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is
no solipsist.
There is no test for solipsism, nor f

Re: Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-22 Thread Roger Clough



Hi Bruno and Roger, 

What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie 
from a person that does not see the world external to it as anything 
other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact? 

--  
Onward! 

Stephen

Hi Stephan,

That sounds like autism to me.

Roger

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Re: Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-21 Thread Roger Clough




WHOEVER:  Hi Bruno and Roger, 

What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie from a a 
person that does not see the world external to it as anything other than an 
internal panorama with which it cannot interact? 


BRUNO: Nobody can distinguish a p-zombie from a human, even if that human is 
solipsist, even a very special sort of solipsist like the one you describe.  


Bruno 

ROGER: Previously I deduced that a p-zombie (or any zombie without a brain)
would be an absurdity (not be able, as required, to act as a real person) 
because 
any being without a brain could not know anything. It would not know
what to do in any event -- and as far as conversing with it, it could
not understand language. You'd also find it bumping into walls.






http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-21 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 Oct 2012, at 19:47, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/20/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Oct 2012, at 12:38, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that
a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia
are what the senses tell you.


Yes. Qualia are the subjective 1p view, sometimes brought by  
percepts, and supposed to be treated by the brain.

And yes a zombie as no qualia, as a qualia needs consciousness.







The mind then transforms
what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red
is what the body gives you, the sensation of red
is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind
also can recall past sensations of red to compare
it with and give it a name "red", which a real
person can identify as eg a red traffic light
and stop. A zombie would not stop



No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves  
like a human, or like a conscious entity.
By definition, if you marry a zombie, your will never been aware of  
that, your whole life.




(I am not allowing
the fact that red and green lights are in different
positions).
That would be a test of zombieness.


There exists already detector of colors, smells, capable of doing  
finer discrimination than human.
I have heard about a machine testing old wine better than human  
experts.


Machines evolve quickly. That is why the non-comp people are  
confronted with the idea that zombie might be logically possible  
for them.


Bruno


Hi Bruno and Roger,

What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie  
from a a person that does not see the world external to it as  
anything other than an internal panorama with which it cannot  
interact?


Nobody can distinguish a p-zombie from a human, even if that human is  
solipsist, even a very special sort of solipsist like the one you  
describe.


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-21 Thread Roger Clough

Hi Bruno Marchal 

 You say 

"No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves like  
a human, or like a conscious entity. "

My problem is that the definition is an absurdity to begin with.
If he has no mind, he could not know what a red light means.
He could not know anything. So he could never behave as a 
real person would unless the response was instinctual. 

Note that you may be right, you could never know
if you married a zombie, but that does not follow
from the p-zombie definition. The definition is an absurdity.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/21/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-20, 10:11:25 
Subject: Re: A test for solipsism 

On 20 Oct 2012, at 12:38, Roger Clough wrote: 

Hi Bruno Marchal  

In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that  
a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia 
are what the senses tell you. 

Yes. Qualia are the subjective 1p view, sometimes brought by percepts, and 
supposed to be treated by the brain. 
And yes a zombie as no qualia, as a qualia needs consciousness. 

The mind then transforms 
what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red 
is what the body gives you, the sensation of red  
is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind 
also can recall past sensations of red to compare 
it with and give it a name "red", which a real 
person can identify as eg a red traffic light 
and stop. A zombie would not stop  

No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves like a human, 
or like a conscious entity.  
By definition, if you marry a zombie, your will never been aware of that, your 
whole life.  

(I am not allowing 
the fact that red and green lights are in different 
positions).  
That would be a test of zombieness. 

There exists already detector of colors, smells, capable of doing finer 
discrimination than human. 
I have heard about a machine testing old wine better than human experts. 

Machines evolve quickly. That is why the non-comp people are confronted with 
the idea that zombie might be logically possible for them. 

Bruno 

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net  
10/20/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  

- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51  
Subject: Re: A test for solipsism  

On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote:  
> Hi Bruno Marchal  
>  
> Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig  
> believes about the p-zombie.  
>  
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie  
>  
> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and  
> perception is a hypothetical being  
> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that  
> it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a  
> zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel  
> any pain though it behaves  
> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from  
> the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."  
>  
> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say  
> that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,  
> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in  
> typing the first part of this sentence.  
Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you.  
But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists,  
without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they  
might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is  
no solipsist.  
There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition,  
almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p  
features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory  
which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable,  
and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to  
some theory.  
Bruno  

>  
>  
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net  
> 10/17/2012  
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  
>  
>  
> - Receiving the following content -  
> From: Bruno Marchal  
> Receiver: everything-list  
> Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36  
> Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of  
> overlycomplexcomputations ?  
>  
>  
>  
>  
> On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:  
>  
>  
> On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:  
>  
> Hi Stephen P. King  
>  
> Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that  
> consciousness, arises at (or above ?)  
> th

Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-20 Thread meekerdb

On 10/20/2012 5:48 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

2012/10/20 Roger Clough mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>>

Hi Bruno Marchal

In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that
a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia
are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms
what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red
is what the body gives you, the sensation of red
is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind
also can recall past sensations of red to compare
it with and give it a name "red", which a real
person can identify as eg a red traffic light
and stop. A zombie would not stop (I am not allowing
the fact that red and green lights are in different
positions).
That would be a test of zombieness.

Interestingly, my father began to drive in 1926 in Texas. He was red-green color blind,
and he couldn't tell a red traffic light from a green one. And in those days there was no
convention as to the order of the lights and there were no yellow lights. So he had to be
very careful approaching any signal light. Of course he soon memorized the position of
the red and green lights in the small town where he grew up. Later, I think in the 1940's
there became a convention of putting the red lights above the green with the yellow in
between. Still later, in the '50's, they standardized the spectrum of lights so that the
colors did look different even to red-green color blind people. But through all this, I
believe my father was a real person.

Brent

Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-20 Thread Stephen P. King


On 10/20/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Oct 2012, at 12:38, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that
a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia
are what the senses tell you.


Yes. Qualia are the subjective 1p view, sometimes brought by percepts, 
and supposed to be treated by the brain.

And yes a zombie as no qualia, as a qualia needs consciousness.







The mind then transforms
what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red
is what the body gives you, the sensation of red
is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind
also can recall past sensations of red to compare
it with and give it a name "red", which a real
person can identify as eg a red traffic light
and stop. A zombie would not stop



No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves like 
a human, or like a conscious entity.
By definition, if you marry a zombie, your will never been aware of 
that, your whole life.




(I am not allowing
the fact that red and green lights are in different
positions).
That would be a test of zombieness.


There exists already detector of colors, smells, capable of doing 
finer discrimination than human.

I have heard about a machine testing old wine better than human experts.

Machines evolve quickly. That is why the non-comp people are 
confronted with the idea that zombie might be logically possible for them.


Bruno


Hi Bruno and Roger,

What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie from a 
a person that does not see the world external to it as anything other 
than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact?


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-20 Thread Bruno Marchal

ough it behaves
exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from  
the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."


My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say  
that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in  
typing the first part of this sentence.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/17/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of  
overlycomplexcomputations ?





On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
say that intuiton does. But that just seems
to be a conjecture of his.


ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


Hi Roger,

IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of  
the content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...




So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the  
existence of p-zombie?



Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-20 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 Oct 2012, at 12:38, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that
a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia
are what the senses tell you.


Yes. Qualia are the subjective 1p view, sometimes brought by percepts,  
and supposed to be treated by the brain.

And yes a zombie as no qualia, as a qualia needs consciousness.







The mind then transforms
what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red
is what the body gives you, the sensation of red
is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind
also can recall past sensations of red to compare
it with and give it a name "red", which a real
person can identify as eg a red traffic light
and stop. A zombie would not stop



No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves like  
a human, or like a conscious entity.
By definition, if you marry a zombie, your will never been aware of  
that, your whole life.




(I am not allowing
the fact that red and green lights are in different
positions).
That would be a test of zombieness.


There exists already detector of colors, smells, capable of doing  
finer discrimination than human.

I have heard about a machine testing old wine better than human experts.

Machines evolve quickly. That is why the non-comp people are  
confronted with the idea that zombie might be logically possible for  
them.


Bruno







Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/20/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51
Subject: Re: A test for solipsism

On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig
> believes about the p-zombie.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
>
> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
> perception is a hypothetical being
> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that
> it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a
> zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel
> any pain though it behaves
> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from
> the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."
>
> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say
> that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in
> typing the first part of this sentence.
Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you.
But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists,
without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they
might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is
no solipsist.
There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition,
almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p
features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory
which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable,
and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to
some theory.
Bruno



>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/17/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
> Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of
> overlycomplexcomputations ?
>
>
>
>
> On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>
> On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>
> Hi Stephen P. King
>
> Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
> consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
> the level of noncomputability. He just seems to
> say that intuiton does. But that just seems
> to be a conjecture of his.
>
>
> ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/16/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> Hi Roger,
>
> IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the
> content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...
>
>
>
> So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the
> existence of p-zombie?
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
> Groups "Everything List" group.
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Re: Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-20 Thread Alberto G. Corona

Roger
Different Qualia are a result fo different phisical effect in the senses.
So a machine does not need to have qualia to distinguish between phisical
effectds. It only need sensors that distinguish between them.

A sensor can detect a red light and the attached computer can stop a car.
With no problems.

http://www.gizmag.com/mercedes-benz-smart-stop-system/13122/


2012/10/20 Roger Clough 

>  Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that
> a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia
> are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms
> what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red
> is what the body gives you, the sensation of red
> is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind
> also can recall past sensations of red to compare
> it with and give it a name "red", which a real
> person can identify as eg a red traffic light
> and stop. A zombie would not stop (I am not allowing
> the fact that red and green lights are in different
> positions).
> That would be a test of zombieness.
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/20/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51
> Subject: Re: A test for solipsism
>
> On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote:
> > Hi Bruno Marchal
> >
> > Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig
> > believes about the p-zombie.
> >
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
> >
> > "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
> > perception is a hypothetical being
> > that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that
> > it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a
> > zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel
> > any pain though it behaves
> > exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from
> > the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."
> >
> > My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say
> > that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
> > which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in
> > typing the first part of this sentence.
> Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you.
> But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists,
> without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they
> might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is
> no solipsist.
> There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition,
> almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p
> features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory
> which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable,
> and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to
> some theory.
> Bruno
>
>
>
> >
> >
> > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> > 10/17/2012
> > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> >
> >
> > - Receiving the following content -
> > From: Bruno Marchal
> > Receiver: everything-list
> > Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
> > Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of
> > overlycomplexcomputations ?
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
> >
> > Hi Stephen P. King
> >
> > Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
> > consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
> > the level of noncomputability. He just seems to
> > say that intuiton does. But that just seems
> > to be a conjecture of his.
> >
> >
> > ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
> > 10/16/2012
> > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> >
> >
> > Hi Roger,
> >
> > IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the
> > content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...
> >
> >
> >
> > So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the
> > existence of p-zombie?
> >
> >
> > Bruno
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
> > Groups "Everything List" group.
> > To post to

Re: RE: RE: A test for solipsism

2012-10-20 Thread Roger Clough

Hi William R. Buckley  

Thank you for reminding me that materialists 
do believe that there is a mind identical to or
in some fashion related to the brain.  Since I
see no possibility that one substance (mind)
can act on another substance (brain), I
don't take their concept of mind seriously,
but I have remember that many (most) people
believe in the materialist view of mind. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/20/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: William R. Buckley  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-19, 08:42:36 
Subject: RE: RE: A test for solipsism 


> Hi William R. Buckley 
>  
> You can speak to a potential test subject, 
> but it can only reply if it indeed has a mind. 

This is an assumption you make. 

> This is the Turing test, the results of which are not  
> certain. But it is the only test I can think of unless  
> you want to get into the Chinese room argument, etc. 
>  
> If it does not reply, it's a zombie. 

Another assumption. In this case, you can talk to me and  
I will refuse to reply. That make me a zombie? 

> But just to be certain, 
> if it does, as a Turing test, I would ask a series of questions 
> a zombie (someone without a mind) would probably not know, 
> such as 
>  
> 1) what color are your eyes ? 
> 2) What color are my eyes ? 
> 3) What is your mother's name ? 
> 4) How many fingers am I holding up ? 
> 5) What color is a plenget ? 
> 6) Who are you going to vote for in the upcoming election? 
> 7) What is your birth date? 
> 8) Where were you born? 
> 9) How tall am I ? 
> 10) Am I taller than you are ? 
> 10) Do you prefer vanillaberries to Mukle pudding ? 

If one is able to fabricate (lie) with perfect recall (remembering  
all the lies), then one need not know anything in order to give you  
answer to all questions. 

Your thought process is muddled, Mr. Clough. 

wrb 

> etc. 
>  
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/19/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>  
>  
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: William R. Buckley 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-10-18, 21:36:39 
> Subject: RE: A test for solipsism 
>  
>  
> Just because the individual holds the position that he/she is the 
> only living entity in all the universe does not imply that such a 
> person (the solipsist) is incapable of carrying on a conversation, 
> even if that conversation is with an illusion. 
>  
> For instance, I have no logical reason to believe that you, Roger 
> Clough, exist. You may in fact exist, and you may in fact be a 
> figment of my imagination; logically, I cannot tell the difference. 
>  
> Yet, I can exchange written dialog with you, in spite of any belief 
> I may hold regarding your existence in the physical universe. 
>  
> wrb 
>  
>  
> > -Original Message- 
> > From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- 
> > l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough 
> > Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:13 AM 
> > To: everything-list 
> > Subject: A test for solipsism 
> > 
> > Hi Bruno Marchal 
> > 
> > Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig 
> > believes about the p-zombie. 
> > 
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie 
> > 
> > "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and 
> > perception is a hypothetical being 
> > that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it 
> > lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is 
> > poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain 
> > though it behaves 
> > exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from 
> the 
> > stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)." 
> > 
> > My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say 
> that 
> > if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, 
> > which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in 
> typing 
> > the first part of this sentence. 
> > 
> > 
> > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> > 10/17/2012 
> > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> > 
> > 
> > - Receiving the following content - 
> > From: Bruno Marchal 
> > Receiver: everything-list 
> > Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 
> > Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of 
> > overlycomplexcomputations ? 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> &g

Re: Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-20 Thread Roger Clough

Hi Bruno Marchal 

In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that 
a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia
are what the senses tell you. The mind then transforms
what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red
is what the body gives you, the sensation of red 
is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind
also can recall past sensations of red to compare
it with and give it a name "red", which a real
person can identify as eg a red traffic light
and stop. A zombie would not stop (I am not allowing
the fact that red and green lights are in different
positions). 
That would be a test of zombieness.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/20/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51 
Subject: Re: A test for solipsism 

On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig 
> believes about the p-zombie. 
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie 
> 
> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and 
> perception is a hypothetical being 
> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that 
> it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a 
> zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel 
> any pain though it behaves 
> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from 
> the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)." 
> 
> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say 
> that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, 
> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in 
> typing the first part of this sentence. 
Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you. 
But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists, 
without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they 
might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is 
no solipsist. 
There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition, 
almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p 
features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory 
which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable, 
and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to 
some theory. 
Bruno 



> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/17/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 
> Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of 
> overlycomplexcomputations ? 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> 
> 
> On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> 
> Hi Stephen P. King 
> 
> Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that 
> consciousness, arises at (or above ?) 
> the level of noncomputability. He just seems to 
> say that intuiton does. But that just seems 
> to be a conjecture of his. 
> 
> 
> ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/16/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> Hi Roger, 
> 
> IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the 
> content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... 
> 
> 
> 
> So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the 
> existence of p-zombie? 
> 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
> Groups "Everything List" group. 
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 
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> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> . 
> For more options, visit this group at 
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> . 
> 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

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Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Alberto G. Corona

2012/10/19 Bruno Marchal 

>
> On 19 Oct 2012, at 12:26, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>
> A few discoveries of evolutionary psichology may help. According with EP
> the mind is composed of many functional modules, each one for a different
> purpose. many of them are specific of each specie. Each of these modules is
> the result of the computation of certain areas of the brain. A functional
> module in the mind has´nt to be an area of the brain. Because the model of
> the mid in EP assumes comp, and assumes an specific, testable model for
> mind-brain design (natural selection) it is well suited for issues like
> this.
>
> Severe autists lack a module called "theory of 
> mind<https://www.google.es/search?hl=en&safe=off&sclient=psy-ab&q=pastor+de+iglesia+translate&btnG=#hl=en&safe=off&sclient=psy-ab&q=theory+of+mind+evolutionary+psychology&oq=theory+of+mind+evolutionary+psychology&gs_l=serp.3...271.1229.0.1475.8.6.0.0.0.0.0.0..0.0.les%3Befrsh..0.0...1.1.EVKzs0KV4ko&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_cp.r_qf.&fp=e7c229ce7fe95b92&bpcl=35466521&biw=1241&bih=584>"
> . this module make you compute the mental states of other people. It gather
> information about their gestures, acts etc. It makes people interesting
> object to care about. Autists can learn rationally about the fact that
> other humans are like him, they can learn to take care of them. But they
> are not naturally interested in people. They dont care about if you have a
> mind, because they do not know what means a mind in another being. they
> just experience their own. For them, yuou are robot that they do not
> understand.
>
>
> That is possible, but I would say that "empathy", your module of a "theory
> of mind" is already present for all universal machine knowing that they are
> universal. Autist, in your theory, would be a L¨bian entity with some
> defect in that module, with respect to its local representation/body.
> Possible.
>
> But the theory of mind in the case of an universal machine conscious of
himself lack the  strong perception of another selves that humans have from
the visual clues of the gestures and reactions of others.  The human theory
of mind is not an abstract theory of mind, but a *human *theory of mind,
which evoques mirror feelings like worry, compassion, anger that we would
never have when contemplating a machine. It´s not a philosophical-rational
notion, but a instinctive one. And because this, it does not permits to
fall into solipsism. Unless a robot mimic an human, he can never trigger
this instinctive perception.

In the other side an autist may have the rational theory of mind of an
universal machine, but lack the strong perception of "there are others like
me around". This is a very important difference for practical matter but
also for theoretical ones, since the abstract, rational theory of mind is a
rationalization that builds itself from our instinctive perception of a
soul-mind in others.

>
>
>
> We ask ourselves about the existence of the mind in others because we have
> a innate capacity for perceiving and feeling the mind in other. However, a
> robot without human gestures, without human reactions would not excite our
> theory of mind module, and we would not have the intuitive perception of a
> mind in that cold thing.
>
> However this has nothing to do with the real thing.The theory of mind
> module evolved because it was very important for social life. But this is
> compatible with a reality in with each one of us live in an universe of
> zombies (some of them with postdoc in philosophy, church pastors etc) where
> we have the only soul. Of course I dont belive that. I have the "normal"
> belief. But this is one of the most deep and most widespread beliefs,
> because it is innate and you must fight against it to drop it out. This
> belief save you from a paralizing solipsism. That´s one of the reasons why
> I say "I believe, therefore I can act"
>
>
> I follow you well. I agree. Comp is the inverse of solipsim, as it
> attributes a soul to a larger class of entity than usually thought:
> machines, and even relative numbers in arithmetic.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 2012/10/17 Roger Clough 
>
>> Hi Bruno Marchal
>>
>> Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig
>> believes about the p-zombie.
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
>>
>> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
>> perception is a hypothetical being
>> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it
>> lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is po

Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 19 Oct 2012, at 12:26, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

A few discoveries of evolutionary psichology may help. According  
with EP the mind is composed of many functional modules, each one  
for a different purpose. many of them are specific of each specie.  
Each of these modules is the result of the computation of certain  
areas of the brain. A functional module in the mind has´nt to be an  
area of the brain. Because the model of the mid in EP assumes comp,  
and assumes an specific, testable model for mind-brain design  
(natural selection) it is well suited for issues like this.


Severe autists lack a module called "theory of mind" . this module  
make you compute the mental states of other people. It gather  
information about their gestures, acts etc. It makes people  
interesting object to care about. Autists can learn rationally about  
the fact that other humans are like him, they can learn to take care  
of them. But they are not naturally interested in people. They dont  
care about if you have a mind, because they do not know what means a  
mind in another being. they just experience their own. For them,  
yuou are robot that they do not understand.


That is possible, but I would say that "empathy", your module of a  
"theory of mind" is already present for all universal machine knowing  
that they are universal. Autist, in your theory, would be a L¨bian  
entity with some defect in that module, with respect to its local  
representation/body. Possible.






We ask ourselves about the existence of the mind in others because  
we have a innate capacity for perceiving and feeling the mind in  
other. However, a robot without human gestures, without human  
reactions would not excite our theory of mind module, and we would  
not have the intuitive perception of a mind in that cold thing.


However this has nothing to do with the real thing.The theory of  
mind module evolved because it was very important for social life.  
But this is compatible with a reality in with each one of us live in  
an universe of zombies (some of them with postdoc in philosophy,  
church pastors etc) where we have the only soul. Of course I dont  
belive that. I have the "normal" belief. But this is one of the most  
deep and most widespread beliefs, because it is innate and you must  
fight against it to drop it out. This belief save you from a  
paralizing solipsism. That´s one of the reasons why I say "I  
believe, therefore I can act"


I follow you well. I agree. Comp is the inverse of solipsim, as it  
attributes a soul to a larger class of entity than usually thought:  
machines, and even relative numbers in arithmetic.


Bruno







2012/10/17 Roger Clough 
Hi Bruno Marchal

Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig  
believes about the p-zombie.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

"A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and  
perception is a hypothetical being
that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that  
it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a  
zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel  
any pain though it behaves
exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from  
the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."


My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say  
that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in  
typing the first part of this sentence.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/17/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of  
overlycomplexcomputations ?





On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
say that intuiton does. But that just seems
to be a conjecture of his.


ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


Hi Roger,

IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of  
the content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...




So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the  
existence of p-zombie?



Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 19 Oct 2012, at 11:41, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Russell Standish

Not so. A zombie can't converse with you, a real person can.



By definition a (philosophical) zombie can converse with you. A zombie  
is en entity assumed not having consciousness, nor any private  
subjective life, and which behaves *exactly* like a human being.


Bruno






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/19/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Russell Standish
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-18, 17:48:57
Subject: Re: Re: A test for solipsism


On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 01:58:29PM -0400, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stathis Papaioannou

If a zombie really has a mind it could converse with you.
If not, not.



If true, then you have demonstrated the non-existence of zombies
(zombies, by definition, are indistinguishable from real people).

However, somehow I remain unconvinced by this line of reasoning...

--  



Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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RE: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread William R. Buckley

> Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you.
> 
> But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists,
> without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they
> might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is
> no solipsist.
> 
> There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition,
> almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p
> features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory
> which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable,
> and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to
> some theory.
> 
> Bruno
> 

Bingo!

wrb

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Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig  
believes about the p-zombie.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

"A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and  
perception is a hypothetical being
that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that  
it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a  
zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel  
any pain though it behaves
exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from  
the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."


My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say  
that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in  
typing the first part of this sentence.


Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you.

But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists,  
without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they  
might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is  
no solipsist.


There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition,  
almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p  
features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory  
which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable,  
and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to  
some theory.


Bruno










Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/17/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of  
overlycomplexcomputations ?





On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
say that intuiton does. But that just seems
to be a conjecture of his.


ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


Hi Roger,

  IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the  
content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...




So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the  
existence of p-zombie?



Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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RE: RE: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread William R. Buckley

> Hi William R. Buckley
> 
> You can speak to a potential test subject,
> but it can only reply if it indeed has a mind.

This is an assumption you make.

> This is the Turing test, the results of which are not 
> certain.  But it is the only test I can think of unless 
> you want to get into the Chinese room argument, etc.
> 
> If it does not reply, it's a zombie.

Another assumption.  In this case, you can talk to me and 
I will refuse to reply.  That make me a zombie?

> But just to be certain,
> if it does, as a Turing test, I would ask a series of questions
> a zombie (someone without a mind) would probably not know,
> such as
> 
> 1) what color are your eyes ?
> 2) What color are my eyes ?
> 3) What is your mother's name ?
> 4) How many fingers am I holding up ?
> 5) What color is a plenget ?
> 6) Who are you going to vote for in the upcoming election?
> 7) What is your birth date?
> 8) Where were you born?
> 9) How tall am I ?
> 10) Am I taller than you are ?
> 10) Do you prefer vanillaberries to Mukle pudding ?

If one is able to fabricate (lie) with perfect recall (remembering 
all the lies), then one need not know anything in order to give you 
answer to all questions.

Your thought process is muddled, Mr. Clough.

wrb

> etc.
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/19/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: William R. Buckley
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-18, 21:36:39
> Subject: RE: A test for solipsism
> 
> 
> Just because the individual holds the position that he/she is the
> only living entity in all the universe does not imply that such a
> person (the solipsist) is incapable of carrying on a conversation,
> even if that conversation is with an illusion.
> 
> For instance, I have no logical reason to believe that you, Roger
> Clough, exist. You may in fact exist, and you may in fact be a
> figment of my imagination; logically, I cannot tell the difference.
> 
> Yet, I can exchange written dialog with you, in spite of any belief
> I may hold regarding your existence in the physical universe.
> 
> wrb
> 
> 
> > -Original Message-
> > From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> > l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
> > Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:13 AM
> > To: everything-list
> > Subject: A test for solipsism
> >
> > Hi Bruno Marchal
> >
> > Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig
> > believes about the p-zombie.
> >
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
> >
> > "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
> > perception is a hypothetical being
> > that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it
> > lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is
> > poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain
> > though it behaves
> > exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from
> the
> > stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."
> >
> > My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say
> that
> > if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
> > which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in
> typing
> > the first part of this sentence.
> >
> >
> > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> > 10/17/2012
> > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> >
> >
> > - Receiving the following content -
> > From: Bruno Marchal
> > Receiver: everything-list
> > Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
> > Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of
> > overlycomplexcomputations ?
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
> >
> > Hi Stephen P. King
> >
> > Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
> > consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
> > the level of noncomputability. He just seems to
> > say that intuiton does. But that just seems
> > to be a conjecture of his.
> >
> >
> > ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
> > 10/16/2012
> > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> >
> >
> > Hi Roger,
> >
> > IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the
> > content of consciousness,

Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Alberto G. Corona

A few discoveries of evolutionary psichology may help. According with EP
the mind is composed of many functional modules, each one for a different
purpose. many of them are specific of each specie. Each of these modules is
the result of the computation of certain areas of the brain. A functional
module in the mind has´nt to be an area of the brain. Because the model of
the mid in EP assumes comp, and assumes an specific, testable model for
mind-brain design (natural selection) it is well suited for issues like
this.

Severe autists lack a module called "theory of
mind<https://www.google.es/search?hl=en&safe=off&sclient=psy-ab&q=pastor+de+iglesia+translate&btnG=#hl=en&safe=off&sclient=psy-ab&q=theory+of+mind+evolutionary+psychology&oq=theory+of+mind+evolutionary+psychology&gs_l=serp.3...271.1229.0.1475.8.6.0.0.0.0.0.0..0.0.les%3Befrsh..0.0...1.1.EVKzs0KV4ko&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_cp.r_qf.&fp=e7c229ce7fe95b92&bpcl=35466521&biw=1241&bih=584>"
. this module make you compute the mental states of other people. It gather
information about their gestures, acts etc. It makes people interesting
object to care about. Autists can learn rationally about the fact that
other humans are like him, they can learn to take care of them. But they
are not naturally interested in people. They dont care about if you have a
mind, because they do not know what means a mind in another being. they
just experience their own. For them, yuou are robot that they do not
understand.

We ask ourselves about the existence of the mind in others because we have
a innate capacity for perceiving and feeling the mind in other. However, a
robot without human gestures, without human reactions would not excite our
theory of mind module, and we would not have the intuitive perception of a
mind in that cold thing.

However this has nothing to do with the real thing.The theory of mind
module evolved because it was very important for social life. But this is
compatible with a reality in with each one of us live in an universe of
zombies (some of them with postdoc in philosophy, church pastors etc) where
we have the only soul. Of course I dont belive that. I have the "normal"
belief. But this is one of the most deep and most widespread beliefs,
because it is innate and you must fight against it to drop it out. This
belief save you from a paralizing solipsism. That´s one of the reasons why
I say "I believe, therefore I can act"

2012/10/17 Roger Clough 

> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig believes
> about the p-zombie.
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
>
> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
> perception is a hypothetical being
> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it
> lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked
> with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it
> behaves
> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the
> stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."
>
> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if
> it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing
> the first part of this sentence.
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/17/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
> Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of
> overlycomplexcomputations ?
>
>
>
>
> On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>
> On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>
> Hi Stephen P. King
>
> Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
> consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
> the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
> say that intuiton does. But that just seems
> to be a conjecture of his.
>
>
> ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/16/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> Hi Roger,
>
> IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the
> content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...
>
>
>
> So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the existence
> of p-zombie?
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, s

Re: RE: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Roger Clough

Hi William R. Buckley 

You can speak to a potential test subject, 
but it can only reply if it indeed has a mind. This 
is the Turing test, the results of which are not certain.  
But it is the only test I can think of unless you
want to get into the Chinese room argument, etc.

If it does not reply, it's a zombie. But just to be certain, 
if it does, as a Turing test, I would ask a series of questions 
a zombie (someone without a mind) would probably not know, 
such as 

1) what color are your eyes ? 
2) What color are my eyes ?
3) What is your mother's name ?
4) How many fingers am I holding up ? 
5) What color is a plenget ?
6) Who are you going to vote for in the upcoming election?  
7) What is your birth date?
8) Where were you born?
9) How tall am I ?
10) Am I taller than you are ?
10) Do you prefer vanillaberries to Mukle pudding ?

etc.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/19/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

- Receiving the following content -  
From: William R. Buckley  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-18, 21:36:39 
Subject: RE: A test for solipsism 

Just because the individual holds the position that he/she is the  
only living entity in all the universe does not imply that such a  
person (the solipsist) is incapable of carrying on a conversation,  
even if that conversation is with an illusion. 

For instance, I have no logical reason to believe that you, Roger  
Clough, exist. You may in fact exist, and you may in fact be a  
figment of my imagination; logically, I cannot tell the difference. 

Yet, I can exchange written dialog with you, in spite of any belief  
I may hold regarding your existence in the physical universe. 

wrb 

> -Original Message- 
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- 
> l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough 
> Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:13 AM 
> To: everything-list 
> Subject: A test for solipsism 
>  
> Hi Bruno Marchal 
>  
> Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig 
> believes about the p-zombie. 
>  
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie 
>  
> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and 
> perception is a hypothetical being 
> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it 
> lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is 
> poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain 
> though it behaves 
> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the 
> stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)." 
>  
> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that 
> if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you, 
> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing 
> the first part of this sentence. 
>  
>  
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/17/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>  
>  
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 
> Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of 
> overlycomplexcomputations ? 
>  
>  
>  
>  
> On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: 
>  
>  
> On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
>  
> Hi Stephen P. King 
>  
> Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that 
> consciousness, arises at (or above ?) 
> the level of noncomputability. He just seems to 
> say that intuiton does. But that just seems 
> to be a conjecture of his. 
>  
>  
> ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/16/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>  
>  
> Hi Roger, 
>  
> IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the 
> content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... 
>  
>  
>  
> So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the 
> existence of p-zombie? 
>  
>  
> Bruno 
>  
>  
>  
>  
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>  
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
> Groups "Everything List" group. 
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- 
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Re: Re: Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Roger Clough

Hi Russell Standish 

Not so. A zombie can't converse with you, a real person can. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/19/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Russell Standish  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-18, 17:48:57 
Subject: Re: Re: A test for solipsism 


On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 01:58:29PM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: 
> Hi Stathis Papaioannou  
>  
> If a zombie really has a mind it could converse with you. 
> If not, not. 
>  

If true, then you have demonstrated the non-existence of zombies 
(zombies, by definition, are indistinguishable from real people). 

However, somehow I remain unconvinced by this line of reasoning... 

--  

 
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
Principal, High Performance Coders 
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au 
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
 

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RE: A test for solipsism

2012-10-18 Thread William R. Buckley

Just because the individual holds the position that he/she is the 
only living entity in all the universe does not imply that such a 
person (the solipsist) is incapable of carrying on a conversation, 
even if that conversation is with an illusion.

For instance, I have no logical reason to believe that you, Roger 
Clough, exist.  You may in fact exist, and you may in fact be a 
figment of my imagination; logically, I cannot tell the difference.

Yet, I can exchange written dialog with you, in spite of any belief 
I may hold regarding your existence in the physical universe.

wrb


> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Clough
> Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:13 AM
> To: everything-list
> Subject: A test for solipsism
> 
> Hi Bruno Marchal
> 
> Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig
> believes about the p-zombie.
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
> 
> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
> perception is a hypothetical being
> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it
> lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is
> poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain
> though it behaves
> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the
> stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."
> 
> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that
> if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing
> the first part of this sentence.
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/17/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content -
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
> Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of
> overlycomplexcomputations ?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
> 
> 
> On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
> 
> Hi Stephen P. King
> 
> Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
> consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
> the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
> say that intuiton does. But that just seems
> to be a conjecture of his.
> 
> 
> ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/16/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
> 
> 
> Hi Roger,
> 
> IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the
> content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...
> 
> 
> 
> So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the
> existence of p-zombie?
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
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Re: Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-18 Thread Russell Standish

On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 at 01:58:29PM -0400, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Stathis Papaioannou  
> 
> If a zombie really has a mind it could converse with you.
> If not, not.
> 

If true, then you have demonstrated the non-existence of zombies
(zombies, by definition, are indistinguishable from real people).

However, somehow I remain unconvinced by this line of reasoning...

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-18 Thread Roger Clough

Hi Stathis Papaioannou  

If a zombie really has a mind it could converse with you.
If not, not.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/18/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stathis Papaioannou  
Receiver: everything-list@googlegroups.com  
Time: 2012-10-18, 13:26:16 
Subject: Re: A test for solipsism 


On 18/10/2012, at 4:12 AM, "Roger Clough"  wrote: 

> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie 
>  
> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception 
> is a hypothetical being  
> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks 
> conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a 
> sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves  
> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the 
> stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)." 
>  
> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it 
> has no mind, it cannot converse with you, 
> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the 
> first part of this sentence. 

So if you met a computer that behaved in a human-like way you would assume that 
it had a mind? 

-- Stathis Papaioannou 

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Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-18 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



On 18/10/2012, at 4:12 AM, "Roger Clough"  wrote:

> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
> 
> "A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception 
> is a hypothetical being 
> that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks 
> conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a 
> sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves 
> exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the 
> stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."
> 
> My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it 
> has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
> which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the 
> first part of this sentence.

So if you met a computer that behaved in a human-like way you would assume that 
it had a mind?

-- Stathis Papaioannou

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A test for solipsism

2012-10-17 Thread Roger Clough

Hi Bruno Marchal  

Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig believes 
about the p-zombie.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

"A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is 
a hypothetical being 
that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks 
conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a 
sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves 
exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the 
stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."

My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say that if it 
has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in typing the 
first part of this sentence.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/17/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36 
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of 
overlycomplexcomputations ? 




On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: 


On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 

Hi Stephen P. King  

Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that 
consciousness, arises at (or above ?)  
the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to 
say that intuiton does. But that just seems 
to be a conjecture of his. 


ugh, rclo...@verizon.net  
10/16/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen  


Hi Roger, 

IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the content 
of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ... 



So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the existence of 
p-zombie? 


Bruno 




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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