Re: Losing Control

[Richard Ruquist]

Well, then make a testable prediction about something in the mind that is
not otherwise known.


On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 15 Apr 2013, at 19:59, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Not true. GR and QM derived experimental results that were not known to
> science before hand.
> I suggest that comp has to do that otherwise it will remain a curious
> metaphysics
> but not accepted as knowledge.
>
>
> Why? Here we have a theory of how the mind work. Then we show that it has
> empirical and testable consequence.
>
> In fact there is no theories more "scientific" than comp, I mean more
> testable. It says that the physical world is entirely in the head of the
> universal machine, in a precise and constructive sense, so we can compare
> that deducible physics with the observed one.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:21, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>> But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science, how do
>> we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this problem
>>
>>
>>
>> We never know such thing. We can only propose a theory, derive facts, and
>> verify them. If the facts follow the theory, we still don't know if the
>> theory is correct or "responsible", not that it is true.
>> In fact we can only hope that the theory will be refuted, so that we can
>> progress.
>>
>> Now comp, especially in the weak version I propose, (It exists a level
>> such that ...) is a very common assumption, a priori independent of
>> physics, and it provides some explanation of the origin of the physical
>> reality, based on the numbers laws only, so we can love it for its
>> elegance, but in science we never know if a theory is true.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>
>>> Bruno,
>>>
>>> Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.?
>>>
>>>
>>> This is more or less planned for the FOAR list.
>>>
>>> In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the "big truth (about
>>> consciousness and matter)" is in your head. With "you" = any universal
>>> machine.
>>>
>>> So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract its
>>> theory of consciousness and matter.
>>>
>>> To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine found in
>>> her head with the empirical facts.
>>> This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits rather
>>> well up to now.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by
>>> science?
>>>
>>>
>>> ?
>>> Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief, hypothesis,
>>> guess, idea, etc.).
>>>
>>> Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a
>>> physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a stable
>>> pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self-reference, and
>>> this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory rich enough to emulate
>>> a Turing universal machine.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What comes to my mind is consciousness.
>>>
>>>
>>> Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its invariance
>>> for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it is later plausibly
>>> explained in term of some truth that some machine can "know" in some sense,
>>> yet not prove or justify to other machine.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Richard
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>

 On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural
 world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena.


 Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and
 in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital
 substitution.

 I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start
 mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non
 computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him
 that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong.

 Bruno



  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Losing Control

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Apr 2013, at 19:59, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Not true. GR and QM derived experimental results that were not known  
to science before hand.
I suggest that comp has to do that otherwise it will remain a  
curious metaphysics

but not accepted as knowledge.


Why? Here we have a theory of how the mind work. Then we show that it  
has empirical and testable consequence.


In fact there is no theories more "scientific" than comp, I mean more  
testable. It says that the physical world is entirely in the head of  
the universal machine, in a precise and constructive sense, so we can  
compare that deducible physics with the observed one.


Bruno






On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:21, Richard Ruquist wrote:

But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science,  
how do we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this  
problem



We never know such thing. We can only propose a theory, derive  
facts, and verify them. If the facts follow the theory, we still  
don't know if the theory is correct or "responsible", not that it is  
true.
In fact we can only hope that the theory will be refuted, so that we  
can progress.


Now comp, especially in the weak version I propose, (It exists a  
level such that ...) is a very common assumption, a priori  
independent of physics, and it provides some explanation of the  
origin of the physical reality, based on the numbers laws only, so  
we can love it for its elegance, but in science we never know if a  
theory is true.


Bruno






On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,

Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.?


This is more or less planned for the FOAR list.

In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the "big truth  
(about consciousness and matter)" is in your head. With "you" = any  
universal machine.


So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract  
its theory of consciousness and matter.


To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine  
found in her head with the empirical facts.
This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits  
rather well up to now.





That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by  
science?


?
Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief,  
hypothesis, guess, idea, etc.).


Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a  
physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a  
stable pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self- 
reference, and this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory  
rich enough to emulate a Turing universal machine.







What comes to my mind is consciousness.


Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its  
invariance for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it  
is later plausibly explained in term of some truth that some  
machine can "know" in some sense, yet not prove or justify to other  
machine.


Bruno





Richard


On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural
world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena.


Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so  
(and in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of  
digital substitution.


I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the  
start mind and matter and some relation/identification between  
them, in a non computational framework. But you are right, and  
patient, by showing him that he is not valid when arguing that  
comp *has to* be wrong.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Losing Control

[Richard Ruquist]

Not true. GR and QM derived experimental results that were not known to
science before hand.
I suggest that comp has to do that otherwise it will remain a curious
metaphysics
but not accepted as knowledge.


On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:21, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science, how do
> we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this problem
>
>
>
> We never know such thing. We can only propose a theory, derive facts, and
> verify them. If the facts follow the theory, we still don't know if the
> theory is correct or "responsible", not that it is true.
> In fact we can only hope that the theory will be refuted, so that we can
> progress.
>
> Now comp, especially in the weak version I propose, (It exists a level
> such that ...) is a very common assumption, a priori independent of
> physics, and it provides some explanation of the origin of the physical
> reality, based on the numbers laws only, so we can love it for its
> elegance, but in science we never know if a theory is true.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.?
>>
>>
>> This is more or less planned for the FOAR list.
>>
>> In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the "big truth (about
>> consciousness and matter)" is in your head. With "you" = any universal
>> machine.
>>
>> So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract its
>> theory of consciousness and matter.
>>
>> To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine found in
>> her head with the empirical facts.
>> This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits rather well
>> up to now.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by science?
>>
>>
>> ?
>> Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief, hypothesis,
>> guess, idea, etc.).
>>
>> Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a
>> physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a stable
>> pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self-reference, and
>> this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory rich enough to emulate
>> a Turing universal machine.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> What comes to my mind is consciousness.
>>
>>
>> Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its invariance
>> for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it is later plausibly
>> explained in term of some truth that some machine can "know" in some sense,
>> yet not prove or justify to other machine.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Richard
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural
>>> world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena.
>>>
>>>
>>> Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and in
>>> a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital substitution.
>>>
>>> I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start
>>> mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non
>>> computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him
>>> that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
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>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
>>> .
>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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Re: Losing Control

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Apr 2013, at 19:21, Richard Ruquist wrote:

But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science,  
how do we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this  
problem



We never know such thing. We can only propose a theory, derive facts,  
and verify them. If the facts follow the theory, we still don't know  
if the theory is correct or "responsible", not that it is true.
In fact we can only hope that the theory will be refuted, so that we  
can progress.


Now comp, especially in the weak version I propose, (It exists a level  
such that ...) is a very common assumption, a priori independent of  
physics, and it provides some explanation of the origin of the  
physical reality, based on the numbers laws only, so we can love it  
for its elegance, but in science we never know if a theory is true.


Bruno






On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,

Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.?


This is more or less planned for the FOAR list.

In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the "big truth  
(about consciousness and matter)" is in your head. With "you" = any  
universal machine.


So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract  
its theory of consciousness and matter.


To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine  
found in her head with the empirical facts.
This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits rather  
well up to now.





That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by  
science?


?
Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief,  
hypothesis, guess, idea, etc.).


Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a  
physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a  
stable pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self- 
reference, and this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory  
rich enough to emulate a Turing universal machine.







What comes to my mind is consciousness.


Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its  
invariance for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it is  
later plausibly explained in term of some truth that some machine  
can "know" in some sense, yet not prove or justify to other machine.


Bruno





Richard


On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural
world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena.


Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so  
(and in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of  
digital substitution.


I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the  
start mind and matter and some relation/identification between  
them, in a non computational framework. But you are right, and  
patient, by showing him that he is not valid when arguing that comp  
*has to* be wrong.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Losing Control

[Richard Ruquist]

But Bruno, if comp only produces what is already known to science, how do
we know that comp is responsible? String theory has this problem


On Sun, Apr 14, 2013 at 12:25 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.?
>
>
> This is more or less planned for the FOAR list.
>
> In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the "big truth (about
> consciousness and matter)" is in your head. With "you" = any universal
> machine.
>
> So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract its
> theory of consciousness and matter.
>
> To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine found in
> her head with the empirical facts.
> This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits rather well
> up to now.
>
>
>
>
> That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by science?
>
>
> ?
> Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief, hypothesis,
> guess, idea, etc.).
>
> Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a
> physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a stable
> pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self-reference, and
> this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory rich enough to emulate
> a Turing universal machine.
>
>
>
>
>
> What comes to my mind is consciousness.
>
>
> Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its invariance
> for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it is later plausibly
> explained in term of some truth that some machine can "know" in some sense,
> yet not prove or justify to other machine.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Richard
>
>
> On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural
>> world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena.
>>
>>
>> Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and in
>> a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital substitution.
>>
>> I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start
>> mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non
>> computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him
>> that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
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>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
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>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: Losing Control

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Apr 2013, at 15:13, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,

Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.?


This is more or less planned for the FOAR list.

In a nutshell, using some image, comp says that the "big truth (about  
consciousness and matter)" is in your head. With "you" = any universal  
machine.


So you can program a universal machine to look inward, and extract its  
theory of consciousness and matter.


To test comp, it remains to compare the matter part the machine found  
in her head with the empirical facts.
This has been done, to some degree, and thanks to QM, it fits rather  
well up to now.





That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by  
science?


?
Comp is part of science. It is a theory (synonym: belief, hypothesis,  
guess, idea, etc.).


Physical science, seen as TOE, like with physicalism, presupposes a  
physical reality, but if comp is correct, the physical reality is a  
stable pattern emerging from coherence conditions in machines' self- 
reference, and this is reducible to number theory, or to any theory  
rich enough to emulate a Turing universal machine.







What comes to my mind is consciousness.


Comp starts from some assumption on consciousness, (like its  
invariance for digital substitution *at some level*), and then it is  
later plausibly explained in term of some truth that some machine can  
"know" in some sense, yet not prove or justify to other machine.


Bruno





Richard


On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural
world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena.


Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so  
(and in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of  
digital substitution.


I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the  
start mind and matter and some relation/identification between them,  
in a non computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by  
showing him that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be  
wrong.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Losing Control

[Richard Ruquist]

Bruno,

Could you explain by example how comp could be verified.?
That is does comp predict something that is not also predicted by science?
What comes to my mind is consciousness.
Richard


On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 7:05 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural
> world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena.
>
>
> Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and in a
> verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital substitution.
>
> I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start
> mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a non
> computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by showing him
> that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be wrong.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>  --
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Re: Losing Control

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Apr 2013, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


No they don't. An epiphenomenon is an emergent effect. The natural
world is full of complexity and emergent phenomena.


Like arithmetic, from which nature emerge itself, necessarily so (and  
in a verifiable way) if we assume that we have a level of digital  
substitution.


I think you will not convince Craig, because he assumes from the start  
mind and matter and some relation/identification between them, in a  
non computational framework. But you are right, and patient, by  
showing him that he is not valid when arguing that comp *has to* be  
wrong.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, April 11, 2013 8:47:49 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:01 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> > So you are saying that my arm moves at random times like the lottery 
> >> > pays 
> >> > off randomly? How come I can predict when I am about to move my arm 
> and 
> >> > be 
> >> > right every time? 
> >> 
> >> The lottery pays off unpredictably to an outsider, but not necessarily 
> >> randomly. The lottery may itself know what its own outcome is going to 
> be 
> >> and feels that it has chosen it freely. This can be said about any 
> process, 
> >> since there is no way to know whether it is associated with 
> consciousness or 
> >> not. 
> > 
> > 
> > You didn't answer my questions. Instead you are making up an alternate 
> > universe where lotteries are not random but are intentional beings, and 
> > consciousness is an unknowable factor. In the universe where we actually 
> > live though, I can choose what time I want to stand up, and no 
> statistical 
> > regression of ion channel behaviors is going to suggest what time that 
> can 
> > or cannot be. I on the other hand, can predict with 100% accuracy that 
> time 
> > will be. 
>
> A random or deterministic being can also be intentional.


Why would some collection of unintentional activities be associated with an 
intentional feeling?
 

> You assert 
> that it cannot and somewhat arrogantly proclaim that this is 
> self-evident. Can you find any philosopher or scientist who agrees 
> with you in this? 
>

I don't concern myself with who agrees with me. A lot of my ideas and 
perspectives seem to be new. I don't make assertions out of thin air as you 
accuse, I reason that if you follow determinism through from the 
prospective rather than retrospective view, then any hint of intentionality 
would be clearly implausible. It's a s clear as saying that in a two 
dimensional universe, feelings of 'volume' would be implausible. This is 
not a proclamation, it is recognition of an airtight condition from the 
outset which precludes any contrary developments. If you have no 
possibility of free will, then you have no possibility of dreaming of or 
conceiving of any possibility other than determinism - determinism itself 
would be inconceivable as white on white is indiscernible. So you can stop 
claiming that I am asserting this position arrogantly or arbitrarily, I am 
not asserting anything that isn't clearly required by ordinary reason.


> >> Whether or not the scientific world view is wrong, the fact remains 
> that a 
> >> top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level 
> SEEMINGLY 
> >> MAGICALLY. 
> > 
> > 
> > Not if every low level effect was influenced by top level effects to 
> begin 
> > with. 
>
> If this is so then it is undetectable to science. It is like saying 
> that Gravity is due to God pushing objects together, but done in such 
> a way that we can never know it other than through faith. 
>

It doesn't matter what gravity is due to if you yourself have voluntary 
control over it. Our ordinary interaction is all the evidence needed and 
all the evidence that could ever be possible for a universe which seems 
intentional/participatory on the inside and seems automatic/unintentional 
on the outside. They are two orthogonal aspects of the same relativistic 
primal condition. 
 

>
> > Your argument is bizarre as it not only eliminates free will but it 
> > really eliminates the possibility of any form of living organism since 
> cells 
> > would only ever be able to maintain their own homostasis and couldn't 
> ever 
> > gather into a larger whole. 
>
> Why couldn't cells gather into a larger whole? What about all the 
> research on cell-cell interaction? 
>

They do, but not in the universe of your worldview. Cells could not operate 
as cells because they would just be dumb collections of molecules - 
different molecules being replaced all of the time. They could only do what 
is required to maintain chemical equilibrium, which would not allow the 
molecules in the cell to work together as a cell. To do that would require 
genuinely biological intention over and above molecular physics alone.
 

>
> > It eliminates the possibility of powered flight, 
> > since no low level impulse of cells or molecules results in assembling 
> > airplanes. 
>
> The molecules or cells do not have a "low level impulse". Your problem 
> is that you cannot see that the whole can have properties not evident 
> in its parts. 
>

Your problem is that you cannot see that the whole can never have 
properties which are not supported by its parts. If it did, it would not 
really be a whole, but an assembly; a machine.
 

>
> > I repeat. If you think that my view requires non-physical magic, 
> > then you don't understand what I am suggesting. That isn't an opinion, 
> it is 
> > a fact. I am defining all physical conditions of the universe from the 
> start 
> > as the reflected consequences of experi

Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:01 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> > So you are saying that my arm moves at random times like the lottery
>> > pays
>> > off randomly? How come I can predict when I am about to move my arm and
>> > be
>> > right every time?
>>
>> The lottery pays off unpredictably to an outsider, but not necessarily
>> randomly. The lottery may itself know what its own outcome is going to be
>> and feels that it has chosen it freely. This can be said about any process,
>> since there is no way to know whether it is associated with consciousness or
>> not.
>
>
> You didn't answer my questions. Instead you are making up an alternate
> universe where lotteries are not random but are intentional beings, and
> consciousness is an unknowable factor. In the universe where we actually
> live though, I can choose what time I want to stand up, and no statistical
> regression of ion channel behaviors is going to suggest what time that can
> or cannot be. I on the other hand, can predict with 100% accuracy that time
> will be.

A random or deterministic being can also be intentional. You assert
that it cannot and somewhat arrogantly proclaim that this is
self-evident. Can you find any philosopher or scientist who agrees
with you in this?

>> Whether or not the scientific world view is wrong, the fact remains that a
>> top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level SEEMINGLY
>> MAGICALLY.
>
>
> Not if every low level effect was influenced by top level effects to begin
> with.

If this is so then it is undetectable to science. It is like saying
that Gravity is due to God pushing objects together, but done in such
a way that we can never know it other than through faith.

> Your argument is bizarre as it not only eliminates free will but it
> really eliminates the possibility of any form of living organism since cells
> would only ever be able to maintain their own homostasis and couldn't ever
> gather into a larger whole.

Why couldn't cells gather into a larger whole? What about all the
research on cell-cell interaction?

> It eliminates the possibility of powered flight,
> since no low level impulse of cells or molecules results in assembling
> airplanes.

The molecules or cells do not have a "low level impulse". Your problem
is that you cannot see that the whole can have properties not evident
in its parts.

> I repeat. If you think that my view requires non-physical magic,
> then you don't understand what I am suggesting. That isn't an opinion, it is
> a fact. I am defining all physical conditions of the universe from the start
> as the reflected consequences of experiences. Experience doesn't need to
> squeeze into some form or function, it is form and function which are
> nothing but public categories of experience.

You can hold this view but it is still the case that if no apparently
magical effects are observable in experiment that means there is no
top-down effect from consciousness.

>> >> If it is all consistent with physics then it
>> >> isn't a top-down effect.
>> >
>> >
>> > It is the job of physics to be consistent with reality, not the other
>> > way
>> > around.
>>
>> In the above sentence I am not claiming that physics is right, I am not
>> claiming there is no top-down effect, I am just pointing out that IF IT IS
>> ALL CONSISTENT WITH PHYSICS THEN IT ISN'T A TOP-DOWN EFFECT. If you disagree
>> with this then explain how you think the brain could consistently follow the
>> mechanistic rules of physics while at the same time breaking these
>> mechanistic rules due to the top-down action of free will, because that is
>> what you are saying, over and over and over.
>
>
> The same way that the keyboard allows me to send my thoughts to you, matter
> allows me to publicly extend my private intentions. Does the keyboard break
> the laws of physics? No. Does the video screen, computer, or internet break
> the laws of physics? No. Do I break the laws of physics? No, my public and
> private presence are seamless and fluidly interactive ends of the same
> physical-experiential process. The keyboard and screen, like the voluntary
> muscles of our body, exist for no other reason than to provide us with
> direct, voluntary access to our public environment - to control it, not just
> for survival, but for aesthetic preference.

You are missing or deliberately avoiding the point. The keyboard would
be breaking the laws of physics if the keys started moving by
themselves. Similarly with the screen, computer and Internet: there is
always a chain of causation behind their activity, and if this chain
were broken it would appear as if the laws of physics were violated.
And similarly for the brain and any biological system: there is a
chain causality and if this is broken it would look like magic.

>> See, non sequitur. I point out that if you are right chemistry is wrong,
>> you respond with this.
>
>
> It appears that your new strategy is going to be to ignore all arguments and
> assert that y

Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

 
On Thursday, April 11, 2013 2:23:06 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 10:55 PM, Craig Weinberg  
> wrote:
>
> >> >> Muscles and cells follow your intention if they receive input from
> >> >> conscious centres in your brain, but the cells in those centres 
> follow
> >> >> the mechanistic rules that neuroscientists know and love.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > If that were so, then neuroscientists would not need to ask me to move
> >> > my
> >> > arm, they would simply predict when I think I am moving my arm.
> >>
> >> And after that they would predict the lottery numbers.
> >
> >
> > So you are saying that my arm moves at random times like the lottery pays
> > off randomly? How come I can predict when I am about to move my arm and 
> be
> > right every time?
>
> The lottery pays off unpredictably to an outsider, but not necessarily 
> randomly. The lottery may itself know what its own outcome is going to be 
> and feels that it has chosen it freely. This can be said about any process, 
> since there is no way to know whether it is associated with consciousness 
> or not.
>

You didn't answer my questions. Instead you are making up an alternate 
universe where lotteries are not random but are intentional beings, and 
consciousness is an unknowable factor. In the universe where we actually 
live though, I can choose what time I want to stand up, and no statistical 
regression of ion channel behaviors is going to suggest what time that can 
or cannot be. I on the other hand, can predict with 100% accuracy that time 
will be.

>
> >> A top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level
> >> seemingly magically.
> >
> >
> > You only think that because your world view is panmechanistic instead of
> > panpsychic. Since we observe the ordinary top-down control of our own
> > voluntary muscles and some mental capacities, the challenge is not to
> > explain away this fact to preserve an arbitrary attachment to a 
> particular
> > cosmology, but to see that in fact, all that we see as being low and high
> > level are defined by relativistic perception. Low and high are aesthetic
> > perspectives, not objective realities. In reality, low and high can be
> > discerned as separate in some sense and they are united in another 
> sense. Of
> > the two, Top-down is more important, since all bottom up processes are
> > meaningless if a person is in a coma.
>
> Whether or not the scientific world view is wrong, the fact remains that a 
> top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level SEEMINGLY 
> MAGICALLY.
>

Not if every low level effect was influenced by top level effects to begin 
with. Your argument is bizarre as it not only eliminates free will but it 
really eliminates the possibility of any form of living organism since 
cells would only ever be able to maintain their own homostasis and couldn't 
ever gather into a larger whole. It eliminates the possibility of powered 
flight, since no low level impulse of cells or molecules results in 
assembling airplanes. I repeat. If you think that my view requires 
non-physical magic, then you don't understand what I am suggesting. That 
isn't an opinion, it is a fact. I am defining all physical conditions of 
the universe from the start as the reflected consequences of experiences. 
Experience doesn't need to squeeze into some form or function, it is form 
and function which are nothing but public categories of experience.


> >> If it is all consistent with physics then it
> >> isn't a top-down effect.
> >
> >
> > It is the job of physics to be consistent with reality, not the other way
> > around.
>
> In the above sentence I am not claiming that physics is right, I am not 
> claiming there is no top-down effect, I am just pointing out that IF IT IS 
> ALL CONSISTENT WITH PHYSICS THEN IT ISN'T A TOP-DOWN EFFECT. If you 
> disagree with this then explain how you think the brain could consistently 
> follow the mechanistic rules of physics while at the same time breaking 
> these mechanistic rules due to the top-down action of free will, because 
> that is what you are saying, over and over and over.
>

The same way that the keyboard allows me to send my thoughts to you, matter 
allows me to publicly extend my private intentions. Does the keyboard break 
the laws of physics? No. Does the video screen, computer, or internet break 
the laws of physics? No. Do I break the laws of physics? No, my public and 
private presence are seamless and fluidly interactive ends of the same 
physical-experiential process. The keyboard and screen, like the voluntary 
muscles of our body, exist for no other reason than to provide us with 
direct, voluntary access to our public environment - to control it, not 
just for survival, but for aesthetic preference.


> >> Again and again I bring this up and you say
> >> that I misrepresent you, that I haven't understood your theory, while
> >> it is you who have not understood the meaning of your own wor

Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, April 11, 2013 2:57:39 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 1:40 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Wednesday, April 10, 2013 10:03:51 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Craig Weinberg  
> >> wrote: 
> >> 
> >> >> If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological 
> >> >> events 
> >> >> follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also 
> follow 
> >> >> deterministic or probabilistic rules. 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > That's a tautology. If I move my arm, then I am causing improbable 
> >> > neurological events to occur. Muscles, cells, molecules follow my 
> >> > intention 
> >> > rather than their own. The cells are not causing my arm to move - if 
> >> > they 
> >> > were, that would be a spasm. 
> >> 
> >> Muscles and cells follow your intention if they receive input from 
> >> conscious centres in your brain, but the cells in those centres follow 
> >> the mechanistic rules that neuroscientists know and love. 
> > 
> > 
> > If that were so, then neuroscientists would not need to ask me to move 
> my 
> > arm, they would simply predict when I think I am moving my arm. 
>
> And after that they would predict the lottery numbers. 
>

So you are saying that my arm moves at random times like the lottery pays 
off randomly? How come I can predict when I am about to move my arm and be 
right every time?
 

>
> >> "Your 
> >> intentions" are the result of the activity in your brain. "Your 
> >> intentions" do not cause any magical top-down effects. 
> > 
> > 
> > The only magic is the idea that activity in my brain knows about 
> anything 
> > other than activity in my brain. The fact that both of us are now 
> > manipulating our own brain chemistry, striated muscle tissue, 
> fingertips, 
> > and keyboard from the top-down is indisputably obvious. Your brain 
> doesn't 
> > dictate what you will say or do - it is your personal experience which 
> > shapes your brain activity at least as much as your experience is shaped 
> by 
> > it. 
>
> A top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level 
> seemingly magically.


You only think that because your world view is panmechanistic instead of 
panpsychic. Since we observe the ordinary top-down control of our own 
voluntary muscles and some mental capacities, the challenge is not to 
explain away this fact to preserve an arbitrary attachment to a particular 
cosmology, but to see that in fact, all that we see as being low and high 
level are defined by relativistic perception. Low and high are aesthetic 
perspectives, not objective realities. In reality, low and high can be 
discerned as separate in some sense and they are united in another sense. 
Of the two, Top-down is more important, since all bottom up processes are 
meaningless if a person is in a coma.
 

> If it is all consistent with physics then it 
> isn't a top-down effect.


It is the job of physics to be consistent with reality, not the other way 
around.
 

> Again and again I bring this up and you say 
> that I misrepresent you, that I haven't understood your theory, while 
> it is you who have not understood the meaning of your own words. 
>

Seriously, that is your best argument? That I must not know what my own 
words mean since they don't make sense to you?  It may not be your fault. I 
have yet to see someone with the strong panmechanistic view successfully 
question their own own belief, so it is entirely possible that you won't be 
able to do that, barring a life-changing neurological or psychological 
event. Rest assured that I understand precisely my own words and your 
words, and it is you who have not seen more than one side of the argument.


> >> But there is no evidence of a breach in the normal chain of causality 
> >> in the brain or anywhere else. Don't you think it should be obvious 
> >> somewhere after centuries of biological research? 
> > 
> > 
> > I can't help it that you are incapable of understanding my argument. I 
> have 
> > addressed your straw man many times already. 
>
> I am trying to explain to you that you are contradicting yourself. If 
> you agree that the brain functions consistently with physical laws 
> then you have to to agree that consciousness does not directly affect 
> brain behaviour, since there is no place for consciousness in chemical 
> equations. 


There doesn't need to be any place for consciousness in chemical equations, 
just as there doesn't need to be any place for images in the pixels or 
flicker rate on a video screen. When we watch TV, we watch TV programs, not 
pixels turning off and on. This is what the universe is made of - 
perceptual relativity. Existence is a false concept - relevance of sense is 
the universal truth.

This is not to say that consciousness does not exist or is 
> not important, just that it is not directly or separately or top-down 
> causally efficacious. 
>

Then in what sense do you clai

Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 1:40 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, April 10, 2013 10:03:51 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Craig Weinberg 
>> wrote:
>>
>> >> If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological
>> >> events
>> >> follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also follow
>> >> deterministic or probabilistic rules.
>> >
>> >
>> > That's a tautology. If I move my arm, then I am causing improbable
>> > neurological events to occur. Muscles, cells, molecules follow my
>> > intention
>> > rather than their own. The cells are not causing my arm to move - if
>> > they
>> > were, that would be a spasm.
>>
>> Muscles and cells follow your intention if they receive input from
>> conscious centres in your brain, but the cells in those centres follow
>> the mechanistic rules that neuroscientists know and love.
>
>
> If that were so, then neuroscientists would not need to ask me to move my
> arm, they would simply predict when I think I am moving my arm.

And after that they would predict the lottery numbers.

>> "Your
>> intentions" are the result of the activity in your brain. "Your
>> intentions" do not cause any magical top-down effects.
>
>
> The only magic is the idea that activity in my brain knows about anything
> other than activity in my brain. The fact that both of us are now
> manipulating our own brain chemistry, striated muscle tissue, fingertips,
> and keyboard from the top-down is indisputably obvious. Your brain doesn't
> dictate what you will say or do - it is your personal experience which
> shapes your brain activity at least as much as your experience is shaped by
> it.

A top-down effect would result in things happening at the low level
seemingly magically. If it is all consistent with physics then it
isn't a top-down effect. Again and again I bring this up and you say
that I misrepresent you, that I haven't understood your theory, while
it is you who have not understood the meaning of your own words.

>> But there is no evidence of a breach in the normal chain of causality
>> in the brain or anywhere else. Don't you think it should be obvious
>> somewhere after centuries of biological research?
>
>
> I can't help it that you are incapable of understanding my argument. I have
> addressed your straw man many times already.

I am trying to explain to you that you are contradicting yourself. If
you agree that the brain functions consistently with physical laws
then you have to to agree that consciousness does not directly affect
brain behaviour, since there is no place for consciousness in chemical
equations. This is not to say that consciousness does not exist or is
not important, just that it is not directly or separately or top-down
causally efficacious.

> I think that the current scientific position is likely a kind of delusional
> convulsion. a post traumatic nostalgic compensation for the revelations of
> the 20th century. There is no such thing as probability in physics, only an
> appearance of such from a partially informed perspective. There is nothing
> any more classical about biology than there is anything else, as
> photosynthesis already shows quantum effects.
>
> http://qubit-ulm.com/2010/09/quantum-coherence-in-photosynthesis/
>
> Hey, look what else has quantum effects in biology:
>
> http://qubit-ulm.com/2010/10/quantum-effects-in-ion-channels/

You do realise that quantum level effect are crucially important in
the operation of the semiconductors in computers?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 10, 2013 10:03:51 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological 
> events 
> >> follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also follow 
> >> deterministic or probabilistic rules. 
> > 
> > 
> > That's a tautology. If I move my arm, then I am causing improbable 
> > neurological events to occur. Muscles, cells, molecules follow my 
> intention 
> > rather than their own. The cells are not causing my arm to move - if 
> they 
> > were, that would be a spasm. 
>
> Muscles and cells follow your intention if they receive input from 
> conscious centres in your brain, but the cells in those centres follow 
> the mechanistic rules that neuroscientists know and love.


If that were so, then neuroscientists would not need to ask me to move my 
arm, they would simply predict when I think I am moving my arm.
 

> "Your 
> intentions" are the result of the activity in your brain. "Your 
> intentions" do not cause any magical top-down effects. 
>

The only magic is the idea that activity in my brain knows about anything 
other than activity in my brain. The fact that both of us are now 
manipulating our own brain chemistry, striated muscle tissue, fingertips, 
and keyboard from the top-down is indisputably obvious. Your brain doesn't 
dictate what you will say or do - it is your personal experience which 
shapes your brain activity at least as much as your experience is shaped by 
it.
 

>
> >> However, you don't believe that this is the case. So sometimes there 
> must 
> >> be neurological events which are "spontaneous" according to your 
> definition 
> >> - outside the normal causal chain. 
> > 
> > 
> > Spontaneous *IS* the normal causality. It isn't a 'chain'. The entire 
> body 
> > and brain serve a single purpose - to support a particular quality of 
> > participatory experience. If it is not doing that, then the person is 
> dead 
> > or in a coma. Unconsciousness is your causal chain. Consciousness is 
> > intentional self-modification of causality itself. 
>
> But there is no evidence of a breach in the normal chain of causality 
> in the brain or anywhere else. Don't you think it should be obvious 
> somewhere after centuries of biological research? 
>

I can't help it that you are incapable of understanding my argument. I have 
addressed your straw man many times already. 

All chains of causality are normalized in retrospect. Whatever changes are 
associated with voluntary action are the only changes necessary. It's very 
simple, but I can't make you see it. If you arbitrarily draw a line at 
physics, then biology is impossible. If you rule out technology, then human 
flight is impossible. These rules and partitions are fictional.
 

>
> >> Absent this, you return to the default scientific position. 
> > 
> > 
> > The default scientific position is that particles decay after a "random" 
> > duration (i.e. spontaneous), making each event in the cosmos subject to 
> > non-deterministic and unique outcomes. Determinism is an approximate 
> view 
> > from a great distance. This is what Multisense Realism specifically 
> > suggests: Perceptual relativity based on sense attenuation as the sole 
> > universal principle. 
>
> The current scientific position is indeed that reality is not 
> deterministic but probabilistic, with true random events. The many 
> worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics restores determinism, but 
> from the first person perspective reality is still probabilistic. 
> Nevertheless, events at a biological scale appear as "classical". 
>

I think that the current scientific position is likely a kind of delusional 
convulsion. a post traumatic nostalgic compensation for the revelations of 
the 20th century. There is no such thing as probability in physics, only an 
appearance of such from a partially informed perspective. There is nothing 
any more classical about biology than there is anything else, as 
photosynthesis already shows quantum effects.

http://qubit-ulm.com/2010/09/quantum-coherence-in-photosynthesis/

Hey, look what else has quantum effects in biology:

http://qubit-ulm.com/2010/10/quantum-effects-in-ion-channels/

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 10:36 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological events
>> follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also follow
>> deterministic or probabilistic rules.
>
>
> That's a tautology. If I move my arm, then I am causing improbable
> neurological events to occur. Muscles, cells, molecules follow my intention
> rather than their own. The cells are not causing my arm to move - if they
> were, that would be a spasm.

Muscles and cells follow your intention if they receive input from
conscious centres in your brain, but the cells in those centres follow
the mechanistic rules that neuroscientists know and love. "Your
intentions" are the result of the activity in your brain. "Your
intentions" do not cause any magical top-down effects.

>> However, you don't believe that this is the case. So sometimes there must
>> be neurological events which are "spontaneous" according to your definition
>> - outside the normal causal chain.
>
>
> Spontaneous *IS* the normal causality. It isn't a 'chain'. The entire body
> and brain serve a single purpose - to support a particular quality of
> participatory experience. If it is not doing that, then the person is dead
> or in a coma. Unconsciousness is your causal chain. Consciousness is
> intentional self-modification of causality itself.

But there is no evidence of a breach in the normal chain of causality
in the brain or anywhere else. Don't you think it should be obvious
somewhere after centuries of biological research?

>> Absent this, you return to the default scientific position.
>
>
> The default scientific position is that particles decay after a "random"
> duration (i.e. spontaneous), making each event in the cosmos subject to
> non-deterministic and unique outcomes. Determinism is an approximate view
> from a great distance. This is what Multisense Realism specifically
> suggests: Perceptual relativity based on sense attenuation as the sole
> universal principle.

The current scientific position is indeed that reality is not
deterministic but probabilistic, with true random events. The many
worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics restores determinism, but
from the first person perspective reality is still probabilistic.
Nevertheless, events at a biological scale appear as "classical".


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, April 4, 2013 12:55:44 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 3:32 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
> There are, of course, undiscovered scientific facts. If scientists did not 
>>> believe that they would give up science. But Craig is not saying that there 
>>> are processes inside cells that are controlled by as yet undiscovered 
>>> physical effects. What he is saying is that if I decide to move my arm the 
>>> arm will move not due to the well-studied sequence of neurological events, 
>>> but "spontaneously", due to my will.
>>>
>>>  
>> UGH. No. I say that if I move my arm, the arm will move because I AM 
>> whatever sequence of events on whatever level - molecular, biochemical, 
>> physiological, whether well-studied or not. You may not be able to 
>> understand that what I intend is not to squeeze myself into biology, or to 
>> magically replace biology, but to present that the entirety of the physics 
>> of my body intersects with the entirety of the physics of my experience. 
>> The two aesthetics - public bodies in space and private experiences through 
>> time, are an involuted (Ouroboran, umbilical, involuted) Monism. If you 
>> don't understand what that means then you are arguing with a straw man. 
>>
>
> If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological events 
> follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also follow 
> deterministic or probabilistic rules. 
>

That's a tautology. If I move my arm, then I am causing improbable 
neurological events to occur. Muscles, cells, molecules follow my intention 
rather than their own. The cells are not causing my arm to move - if they 
were, that would be a spasm.
 

> However, you don't believe that this is the case. So sometimes there must 
> be neurological events which are "spontaneous" according to your definition 
> - outside the normal causal chain.
>

Spontaneous *IS* the normal causality. It isn't a 'chain'. The entire body 
and brain serve a single purpose - to support a particular quality of 
participatory experience. If it is not doing that, then the person is dead 
or in a coma. Unconsciousness is your causal chain. Consciousness is 
intentional self-modification of causality itself.
 

> Absent this, you return to the default scientific position.
>

The default scientific position is that particles decay after a "random" 
duration (i.e. spontaneous), making each event in the cosmos subject to 
non-deterministic and unique outcomes. Determinism is an approximate view 
from a great distance. This is what Multisense Realism specifically 
suggests: Perceptual relativity based on sense attenuation as the sole 
universal principle.

Craig


>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 3:32 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

There are, of course, undiscovered scientific facts. If scientists did not
>> believe that they would give up science. But Craig is not saying that there
>> are processes inside cells that are controlled by as yet undiscovered
>> physical effects. What he is saying is that if I decide to move my arm the
>> arm will move not due to the well-studied sequence of neurological events,
>> but "spontaneously", due to my will.
>>
>>
> UGH. No. I say that if I move my arm, the arm will move because I AM
> whatever sequence of events on whatever level - molecular, biochemical,
> physiological, whether well-studied or not. You may not be able to
> understand that what I intend is not to squeeze myself into biology, or to
> magically replace biology, but to present that the entirety of the physics
> of my body intersects with the entirety of the physics of my experience.
> The two aesthetics - public bodies in space and private experiences through
> time, are an involuted (Ouroboran, umbilical, involuted) Monism. If you
> don't understand what that means then you are arguing with a straw man.
>

If you ARE the sequence of neurological events and the neurological events
follow deterministic or probabilistic rules then you will also follow
deterministic or probabilistic rules. However, you don't believe that this
is the case. So sometimes there must be neurological events which are
"spontaneous" according to your definition - outside the normal causal
chain. Absent this, you return to the default scientific position.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[meekerdb]

On 4/3/2013 7:33 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Not only is the function of the artificial peptides the same, the patient also feels the 
same. Wouldn't you expect them to feel a bit different?


How do you know?  Maybe they became zombies.

Brent

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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 3:04:50 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Mikes 
> > wrote:
>
>> Dear Stathis,
>> your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in 
>> all facets so here is a condensed opinion:
>>
>
> Yes, these posts are probably getting a bit too long.
>  
>
>> Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit 
>> mechanistic: like us, the (call it:) inanimates are also different no 
>> matter how identical we think they are in those lines we observe by our 
>> instruments and reductionist means. 
>> You ask about Na-ions: well, even atoms/ions are different to a wider 
>> scrutiny than enclosed in our physical sciences. Just  think about the 
>> fission-sequence - unpredictable WHICH one will undergo it next. It maybe 
>> differential within the atomic nucleus, may be in the circumstances and 
>> their so far not established impact on the individual atoms (ions?) leading 
>> to a "next one". We know only a portion of the totality and just think that 
>> everything has been covered. 
>> I am not representing Craig, I make remarks upon your ideas of everything 
>> being predictably identical to its similars. 
>>
>
> As Brent pointed out, there is no way to differentiate between atoms of 
> the same kind to tell which one, for example, will decay. But even if we 
> could, it is a fact that the atoms in a person can come from anywhere and 
> the person is still the same; whereas changing the configuration of the 
> existing atoms in a person can cause drastic changes in the person. This is 
> obvious with no more than casual observation.
>

You aren't an atom so you have no idea if it 'knows where its been'. They 
certainly seem to know a lot about where they are when they are bunched up 
all together. You know where you've been though, and where you've been has 
a profound influence on who you are, so that is a property of some part of 
the universe. Which part is that do you think?
 

>  
>
>> The (so far) "known facts" are neither: not 'known' and not 'facts'. 
>> Characteristics are restricted to yesterday's inventory and many potentials 
>> are not even dreamed of. 
>> We can manipulate a lot of circumstances, but be ready for others that 
>> may show up tomorrow - beyond our control.
>>
>
> There are, of course, undiscovered scientific facts. If scientists did not 
> believe that they would give up science. But Craig is not saying that there 
> are processes inside cells that are controlled by as yet undiscovered 
> physical effects. What he is saying is that if I decide to move my arm the 
> arm will move not due to the well-studied sequence of neurological events, 
> but "spontaneously", due to my will.
>
>  
UGH. No. I say that if I move my arm, the arm will move because I AM 
whatever sequence of events on whatever level - molecular, biochemical, 
physiological, whether well-studied or not. You may not be able to 
understand that what I intend is not to squeeze myself into biology, or to 
magically replace biology, but to present that the entirety of the physics 
of my body intersects with the entirety of the physics of my experience. 
The two aesthetics - public bodies in space and private experiences through 
time, are an involuted (Ouroboran, umbilical, involuted) Monism. If you 
don't understand what that means then you are arguing with a straw man.
 

> He cites as evidence for this the fact that on a fMRI parts of the brain 
> light up "spontaneously" when the subject thinks about something.
>

That and also the fact that when I move my fingers to type, they move and 
letters are typed.
 

>  
>
>> I agree with Craig (in his response to this same long post):
>>
>> "...Nothing is absolutely identical to anything else. Nothing is even 
>>   identical to itself from moment to moment. Identical is a local 
>> approximation contingent upon the comprehensiveness of sense capacities. If 
>> your senses aren't very discerning, then lots of things seem identical"
>>
>> I would add: no TWO events have identical circumstances to face, 
>> even if you do no detect inividual differences in the observed data of 
>> participating entities, the influencing circumstances are different from 
>> instance to instance and call for changes in processes. Bio, or not. 
>>
>> This is one little corner how agnosticism frees up my mind (beware: not 
>> "freezes"!!).
>>
>
> No two things are identical, but they can be close enough to identical for 
> a particular purpose.
>

Exactly! That's my point. Since consciousness can have no particular 
purpose however, it is that which lends all purposes and cannot be 
simulated.
 

> If a part in your car breaks you do not junk the whole car on the grounds 
> that you will not be able to obtain an *identical* part. Rather, you obtain 
> a part that is close enough - within engineering tolerance.
>

Right, but that analogy fails when you consider replacing yourself with 
someone w

Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 10:59:35 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 4/2/2013 6:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>  
>
>
> On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 8:07:48 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>  On 4/2/2013 3:54 PM, John Mikes wrote:
>>  
>> Dear Stathis, 
>> your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in 
>> all facets so here is a condensed opinion:
>>
>>  Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit 
>> mechanistic: like us, the (call it:) inanimates are also different no 
>> matter how identical we think they are in those lines we observe by our 
>> instruments and reductionist means. 
>> You ask about Na-ions: well, even atoms/ions are different to a wider 
>> scrutiny than enclosed in our physical sciences. Just  think about the 
>> fission-sequence - unpredictable WHICH one will undergo it next. It maybe 
>> differential within the atomic nucleus, may be in the circumstances and 
>> their so far not established impact on the individual atoms (ions?) leading 
>> to a "next one". 
>>  
>>
>> That would imply a hidden variable in the atom which determined when it 
>> decayed.  Local hidden variables have been ruled out by numerous 
>> experiments.  Non-local hidden variables (as in Bohm's quantum mechanics) 
>> are not ruled out in non-relativistic experiments but it doesn't appear 
>> possible to extend them to quantum field theory in which the number of 
>> particles is not conserved.
>>
>>  We know only a portion of the totality and just think that everything 
>> has been covered. 
>> I am not representing Craig, I make remarks upon your ideas of everything 
>> being predictably identical to its similars. 
>>
>>  The (so far) "known facts" are neither: not 'known' and not 'facts'. 
>> Characteristics are restricted to yesterday's inventory and many potentials 
>> are not even dreamed of. 
>> We can manipulate a lot of circumstances, but be ready for others that 
>> may show up tomorrow - beyond our control.
>>
>>  I agree with Craig (in his response to this same long post):
>>
>>  "...Nothing is absolutely identical to anything else. Nothing is even   
>> identical to itself from moment to moment. Identical is a local 
>> approximation contingent upon the comprehensiveness of sense capacities. If 
>> your senses aren't very discerning, then lots of things seem identical"
>>  
>>
>> The Schrodinger equation only works if the interchange of two bosons 
>> makes no difference - so it is implicit in the success of quantum mechanics 
>> that they are identical. 
>>
>
> Does being interchangeable necessarily mean identical? 
>
>
> It does if the number of states that count toward the entropy doesn't 
> increase when you consider interchanges.  Cars obey Maxwell-Boltzman 
> statistics, elementary particles don't.
>

If two things have exactly the same, then they are interchangeable in the 
sense of using it for ballast in a ship, but it doesn't make the things 
interchangeable in every way that can be measured, it doesn't make them 
interchangeable in every way that is imaginable, and it certainly does not 
make them identical. Just because microcosmic observations are precisely 
consistent does not mean that all phenomena can be explained in those 
terms. Identical is a myth. There is no identical. A does not = A. The A 
that follows the = can be distinguished from the previous A, both in the 
order in which they were typed and in their relation to the rest of the 
text. The assumption that A = A is an important idea for logic, but it does 
not follow that the cosmos is made of phenomena which follow that narrow 
expectation.
 

>
>  If I am driving in traffic, my car could be exchanged with any other on 
> the road and be observed to behave in the same way, yet my experience is 
> that the car which I am driving is very different from every other car in 
> the universe. If we close our eyes to the reality of subjectivity, then we 
> can't be very surprised when we fail to see how reality could be subjective.
>
>   Similarly the solution changes sign if fermions are interchanged and 
>> that requires that the two fermions be identical.  Otherwise bosons 
>> wouldn't obey bose-einstein statistics and fermions wouldn't obey 
>> fermi-dirac statistics, they would both obey Maxwell-Boltzman statistics - 
>> but experiment shows they don't.
>>
>>   
>>  I would add: no TWO events have identical circumstances to face, 
>> even if you do no detect inividual differences in the observed data of 
>> participating entities, the influencing circumstances are different from 
>> instance to instance and call for changes in processes. Bio, or not. 
>>  
>>
>> But that becomes an all-purpose excuse for anything-goes.  No 
>> generalization is possible, no pattern can be extrapolated.
>>
>
> Not true. Any generalization is permitted as long as it is recognized as 
> such and not mistaken for a literal and exhaustive description of nature. 
>
>
> You mean any generalization at a

Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Mikes  wrote:

> Dear Stathis,
> your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in
> all facets so here is a condensed opinion:
>

Yes, these posts are probably getting a bit too long.


> Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit
> mechanistic: like us, the (call it:) inanimates are also different no
> matter how identical we think they are in those lines we observe by our
> instruments and reductionist means.
> You ask about Na-ions: well, even atoms/ions are different to a wider
> scrutiny than enclosed in our physical sciences. Just  think about the
> fission-sequence - unpredictable WHICH one will undergo it next. It maybe
> differential within the atomic nucleus, may be in the circumstances and
> their so far not established impact on the individual atoms (ions?) leading
> to a "next one". We know only a portion of the totality and just think that
> everything has been covered.
> I am not representing Craig, I make remarks upon your ideas of everything
> being predictably identical to its similars.
>

As Brent pointed out, there is no way to differentiate between atoms of the
same kind to tell which one, for example, will decay. But even if we could,
it is a fact that the atoms in a person can come from anywhere and the
person is still the same; whereas changing the configuration of the
existing atoms in a person can cause drastic changes in the person. This is
obvious with no more than casual observation.


> The (so far) "known facts" are neither: not 'known' and not 'facts'.
> Characteristics are restricted to yesterday's inventory and many potentials
> are not even dreamed of.
> We can manipulate a lot of circumstances, but be ready for others that may
> show up tomorrow - beyond our control.
>

There are, of course, undiscovered scientific facts. If scientists did not
believe that they would give up science. But Craig is not saying that there
are processes inside cells that are controlled by as yet undiscovered
physical effects. What he is saying is that if I decide to move my arm the
arm will move not due to the well-studied sequence of neurological events,
but "spontaneously", due to my will. He cites as evidence for this the fact
that on a fMRI parts of the brain light up "spontaneously" when the subject
thinks about something.


> I agree with Craig (in his response to this same long post):
>
> "...Nothing is absolutely identical to anything else. Nothing is even
>   identical to itself from moment to moment. Identical is a local
> approximation contingent upon the comprehensiveness of sense capacities. If
> your senses aren't very discerning, then lots of things seem identical"
>
> I would add: no TWO events have identical circumstances to face,
> even if you do no detect inividual differences in the observed data of
> participating entities, the influencing circumstances are different from
> instance to instance and call for changes in processes. Bio, or not.
>
> This is one little corner how agnosticism frees up my mind (beware: not
> "freezes"!!).
>

No two things are identical, but they can be close enough to identical for
a particular purpose. If a part in your car breaks you do not junk the
whole car on the grounds that you will not be able to obtain an *identical*
part. Rather, you obtain a part that is close enough - within engineering
tolerance.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[meekerdb]

On 4/2/2013 6:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 8:07:48 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 4/2/2013 3:54 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Stathis,
your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in 
all
facets so here is a condensed opinion:

Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit 
mechanistic:
like us, the (call it:) inanimates are also different no matter how 
identical we
think they are in those lines we observe by our instruments and 
reductionist means.
You ask about Na-ions: well, even atoms/ions are different to a wider 
scrutiny than
enclosed in our physical sciences. Just  think about the fission-sequence -
unpredictable WHICH one will undergo it next. It maybe differential within 
the
atomic nucleus, may be in the circumstances and their so far not 
established impact
on the individual atoms (ions?) leading to a "next one".


That would imply a hidden variable in the atom which determined when it decayed. 
Local hidden variables have been ruled out by numerous experiments.  Non-local

hidden variables (as in Bohm's quantum mechanics) are not ruled out in
non-relativistic experiments but it doesn't appear possible to extend them 
to
quantum field theory in which the number of particles is not conserved.


We know only a portion of the totality and just think that everything has 
been
covered.
I am not representing Craig, I make remarks upon your ideas of everything 
being
predictably identical to its similars.

The (so far) "known facts" are neither: not 'known' and not 'facts'.
Characteristics are restricted to yesterday's inventory and many potentials 
are not
even dreamed of.
We can manipulate a lot of circumstances, but be ready for others that may 
show up
tomorrow - beyond our control.

I agree with Craig (in his response to this same long post):

"...Nothing is absolutely identical to anything else. Nothing is even  
identical to itself from moment to moment. Identical is a local approximation

contingent upon the comprehensiveness of sense capacities. If your senses 
aren't
very discerning, then lots of things seem identical"


The Schrodinger equation only works if the interchange of two bosons makes 
no
difference - so it is implicit in the success of quantum mechanics that 
they are
identical.


Does being interchangeable necessarily mean identical?


It does if the number of states that count toward the entropy doesn't increase when you 
consider interchanges.  Cars obey Maxwell-Boltzman statistics, elementary particles don't.


If I am driving in traffic, my car could be exchanged with any other on the road and be 
observed to behave in the same way, yet my experience is that the car which I am driving 
is very different from every other car in the universe. If we close our eyes to the 
reality of subjectivity, then we can't be very surprised when we fail to see how reality 
could be subjective.


Similarly the solution changes sign if fermions are interchanged and that 
requires
that the two fermions be identical.  Otherwise bosons wouldn't obey 
bose-einstein
statistics and fermions wouldn't obey fermi-dirac statistics, they would 
both obey
Maxwell-Boltzman statistics - but experiment shows they don't.



I would add: no TWO events have identical circumstances to face,
even if you do no detect inividual differences in the observed data of
participating entities, the influencing circumstances are different from 
instance
to instance and call for changes in processes. Bio, or not.


But that becomes an all-purpose excuse for anything-goes.  No 
generalization is
possible, no pattern can be extrapolated.


Not true. Any generalization is permitted as long as it is recognized as such and not 
mistaken for a literal and exhaustive description of nature.


You mean any generalization at all?  Or any generalization that passes all empirical 
tests.  No generalization every needs to be nor is likely to be an exhaustive description 
of nature, the whole point of generalizing is to abstract away particulars.



If your generalization makes consciousness undetectable,


You've never provided any way to detect consciousness.  I and others have proposed that 
the way to detect consciousness is by observing behavior - but you have rejected this 
saying that one would have to observe that the conscious being was produced "organically" 
by growing from a cell - which is just invoking magic.


then that generalization is no good for addressing consciousness, but it may very well 
work for all kinds of precision engineering purposes.



  Yet the success of empiricism and science is evidence that there are 
regularities
in nature and not every event is unique, replication is possible.


But the failures of empiricism and science to bring about a san

Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 8:07:48 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 4/2/2013 3:54 PM, John Mikes wrote:
>  
> Dear Stathis, 
> your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in 
> all facets so here is a condensed opinion:
>
>  Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit 
> mechanistic: like us, the (call it:) inanimates are also different no 
> matter how identical we think they are in those lines we observe by our 
> instruments and reductionist means. 
> You ask about Na-ions: well, even atoms/ions are different to a wider 
> scrutiny than enclosed in our physical sciences. Just  think about the 
> fission-sequence - unpredictable WHICH one will undergo it next. It maybe 
> differential within the atomic nucleus, may be in the circumstances and 
> their so far not established impact on the individual atoms (ions?) leading 
> to a "next one". 
>  
>
> That would imply a hidden variable in the atom which determined when it 
> decayed.  Local hidden variables have been ruled out by numerous 
> experiments.  Non-local hidden variables (as in Bohm's quantum mechanics) 
> are not ruled out in non-relativistic experiments but it doesn't appear 
> possible to extend them to quantum field theory in which the number of 
> particles is not conserved.
>
>  We know only a portion of the totality and just think that everything 
> has been covered. 
> I am not representing Craig, I make remarks upon your ideas of everything 
> being predictably identical to its similars. 
>
>  The (so far) "known facts" are neither: not 'known' and not 'facts'. 
> Characteristics are restricted to yesterday's inventory and many potentials 
> are not even dreamed of. 
> We can manipulate a lot of circumstances, but be ready for others that may 
> show up tomorrow - beyond our control.
>
>  I agree with Craig (in his response to this same long post):
>
>  "...Nothing is absolutely identical to anything else. Nothing is even   
> identical to itself from moment to moment. Identical is a local 
> approximation contingent upon the comprehensiveness of sense capacities. If 
> your senses aren't very discerning, then lots of things seem identical"
>  
>
> The Schrodinger equation only works if the interchange of two bosons makes 
> no difference - so it is implicit in the success of quantum mechanics that 
> they are identical. 
>

Does being interchangeable necessarily mean identical? If I am driving in 
traffic, my car could be exchanged with any other on the road and be 
observed to behave in the same way, yet my experience is that the car which 
I am driving is very different from every other car in the universe. If we 
close our eyes to the reality of subjectivity, then we can't be very 
surprised when we fail to see how reality could be subjective.

Similarly the solution changes sign if fermions are interchanged and that 
> requires that the two fermions be identical.  Otherwise bosons wouldn't 
> obey bose-einstein statistics and fermions wouldn't obey fermi-dirac 
> statistics, they would both obey Maxwell-Boltzman statistics - but 
> experiment shows they don't.
>
>   
>  I would add: no TWO events have identical circumstances to face, 
> even if you do no detect inividual differences in the observed data of 
> participating entities, the influencing circumstances are different from 
> instance to instance and call for changes in processes. Bio, or not. 
>  
>
> But that becomes an all-purpose excuse for anything-goes.  No 
> generalization is possible, no pattern can be extrapolated.
>

Not true. Any generalization is permitted as long as it is recognized as 
such and not mistaken for a literal and exhaustive description of nature. 
If your generalization makes consciousness undetectable, then that 
generalization is no good for addressing consciousness, but it may very 
well work for all kinds of precision engineering purposes.

 

>   Yet the success of empiricism and science is evidence that there are 
> regularities in nature and not every event is unique, replication is 
> possible.
>

But the failures of empiricism and science to bring about a sane and 
sustainable way of life for our species are evidence that we cannot afford 
to assume that regularity is the ultimate truth.

Craig
 

>
> Brent
>
>  
>  This is one little corner how agnosticism frees up my mind (beware: not 
> "freezes"!!).
> John Mikes
>  
>
>  

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Re: Losing Control

[meekerdb]

On 4/2/2013 3:54 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Stathis,
your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in all facets so 
here is a condensed opinion:


Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit mechanistic: like us, 
the (call it:) inanimates are also different no matter how identical we think they are 
in those lines we observe by our instruments and reductionist means.
You ask about Na-ions: well, even atoms/ions are different to a wider scrutiny than 
enclosed in our physical sciences. Just  think about the fission-sequence - 
unpredictable WHICH one will undergo it next. It maybe differential within the atomic 
nucleus, may be in the circumstances and their so far not established impact on the 
individual atoms (ions?) leading to a "next one".


That would imply a hidden variable in the atom which determined when it decayed.  Local 
hidden variables have been ruled out by numerous experiments.  Non-local hidden variables 
(as in Bohm's quantum mechanics) are not ruled out in non-relativistic experiments but it 
doesn't appear possible to extend them to quantum field theory in which the number of 
particles is not conserved.



We know only a portion of the totality and just think that everything has been 
covered.
I am not representing Craig, I make remarks upon your ideas of everything being 
predictably identical to its similars.


The (so far) "known facts" are neither: not 'known' and not 'facts'. Characteristics are 
restricted to yesterday's inventory and many potentials are not even dreamed of.
We can manipulate a lot of circumstances, but be ready for others that may show up 
tomorrow - beyond our control.


I agree with Craig (in his response to this same long post):

"...Nothing is absolutely identical to anything else. Nothing is even identical to 
itself from moment to moment. Identical is a local approximation contingent upon the 
comprehensiveness of sense capacities. If your senses aren't very discerning, then lots 
of things seem identical"


The Schrodinger equation only works if the interchange of two bosons makes no difference - 
so it is implicit in the success of quantum mechanics that they are identical.  Similarly 
the solution changes sign if fermions are interchanged and that requires that the two 
fermions be identical.  Otherwise bosons wouldn't obey bose-einstein statistics and 
fermions wouldn't obey fermi-dirac statistics, they would both obey Maxwell-Boltzman 
statistics - but experiment shows they don't.




I would add: no TWO events have identical circumstances to face,
even if you do no detect inividual differences in the observed data of participating 
entities, the influencing circumstances are different from instance to instance and call 
for changes in processes. Bio, or not.


But that becomes an all-purpose excuse for anything-goes.  No generalization is possible, 
no pattern can be extrapolated.  Yet the success of empiricism and science is evidence 
that there are regularities in nature and not every event is unique, replication is possible.


Brent



This is one little corner how agnosticism frees up my mind (beware: not 
"freezes"!!).
John Mikes


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Re: Losing Control

[John Mikes]

Dear Stathis,
your lengthy reply to Craig is a bit longer than I can manage to reply in
all facets so here is a condensed opinion:

Your position about the 'material' world (atoms, etc.) seems a bit
mechanistic: like us, the (call it:) inanimates are also different no
matter how identical we think they are in those lines we observe by our
instruments and reductionist means.
You ask about Na-ions: well, even atoms/ions are different to a wider
scrutiny than enclosed in our physical sciences. Just  think about the
fission-sequence - unpredictable WHICH one will undergo it next. It maybe
differential within the atomic nucleus, may be in the circumstances and
their so far not established impact on the individual atoms (ions?) leading
to a "next one". We know only a portion of the totality and just think that
everything has been covered.
I am not representing Craig, I make remarks upon your ideas of everything
being predictably identical to its similars.

The (so far) "known facts" are neither: not 'known' and not 'facts'.
Characteristics are restricted to yesterday's inventory and many potentials
are not even dreamed of.
We can manipulate a lot of circumstances, but be ready for others that may
show up tomorrow - beyond our control.

I agree with Craig (in his response to this same long post):

"...Nothing is absolutely identical to anything else. Nothing is even
identical to itself from moment to moment. Identical is a local
approximation contingent upon the comprehensiveness of sense capacities. If
your senses aren't very discerning, then lots of things seem identical"

I would add: no TWO events have identical circumstances to face,
even if you do no detect inividual differences in the observed data of
participating entities, the influencing circumstances are different from
instance to instance and call for changes in processes. Bio, or not.

This is one little corner how agnosticism frees up my mind (beware: not
"freezes"!!).
John Mikes


On Mon, Apr 1, 2013 at 9:03 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Fri, Mar 29, 2013 at 5:04 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> wrote:
>
> >> I find it difficult to understand how you could be thinking about
> >> these things. If I put atoms in the configuration of a duck but as you
> >> claim I don't get a duck, I must have missed something out.
> >
> >
> > Because a duck's life is made of the lives of billions of duck cells,
> and it
> > is a fragment of the lives of all ducks. You are looking along the wrong
> > axis if you want to understand consciousness and feeling - it
> longitudinal
> > through time, not latitudinal across space. You are expecting any set of
> > atoms to have access to the emergent properties of all of biology, but
> that
> > is not necessarily the case at all. An experience can't be built out of
> > unconscious Legos, even if they are moving in some complex
> configuration. If
> > they could, don't you think that we might see some organism evolved to
> > exploit that? Wouldn't it be an obvious survival advantage for an
> organism
> > to carve it's genetic instructions into the sea floor where any future
> > creature could be impregnated just be scanning a their gastropod over a
> > rock?
>
> Organisms do exploit the ability to repair and build parts, including
> brain parts, from inanimate components, since that is a large part of
> what metabolism involves. It took billions of years to evolve this
> mechanism. Other mechanisms that might have been useful, such as
> rifles to kill predators or prey from a distance, did not evolve.
> However, intelligent creatures evolved with the ability to make tools
> to do this. Intelligent creatures have also recently started making
> tools that synthesise the components of life, such as an arbitrary
> nucleotide or peptide sequence.
>
> > It doesn't work that way at all though, does it? Biology only ever uses
> > biological vehicles to carry its instruction set - literal pieces of
> itself
> > as a physically present zygote - no 'information', 'configurations', of
> > generic atoms seem to be capable of coming to life or gaining
> consciousness
> > ab initio.
>
> Biological vehicles are machines that create replacement parts and
> copies of themselves. You are begging the question if you say they are
> not.
>
> >> For if I
> >> didn't miss anything anything out it would be a duck, right?
> >
> >
> > No, I don't think it would in reality. I understand exactly why in theory
> > most people think that it obviously would, but if I'm right about the
> > relation of life, consciousness, and matter, trying to build a living
> > organism from scratch with atoms will likely fail. The molecules need to
> > have been parts of a living cell, in the same way that you can't turn an
> > Amazon tribesman into a civil engineer without having some contact with
> > someone who has participated in Western civilization. There has to be a
> > willing integration of sense and motive.
>
> If you tell an Amazon tribesman that you are going to 

Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, Mar 29, 2013 at 5:04 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> I find it difficult to understand how you could be thinking about
>> these things. If I put atoms in the configuration of a duck but as you
>> claim I don't get a duck, I must have missed something out.
>
>
> Because a duck's life is made of the lives of billions of duck cells, and it
> is a fragment of the lives of all ducks. You are looking along the wrong
> axis if you want to understand consciousness and feeling - it longitudinal
> through time, not latitudinal across space. You are expecting any set of
> atoms to have access to the emergent properties of all of biology, but that
> is not necessarily the case at all. An experience can't be built out of
> unconscious Legos, even if they are moving in some complex configuration. If
> they could, don't you think that we might see some organism evolved to
> exploit that? Wouldn't it be an obvious survival advantage for an organism
> to carve it's genetic instructions into the sea floor where any future
> creature could be impregnated just be scanning a their gastropod over a
> rock?

Organisms do exploit the ability to repair and build parts, including
brain parts, from inanimate components, since that is a large part of
what metabolism involves. It took billions of years to evolve this
mechanism. Other mechanisms that might have been useful, such as
rifles to kill predators or prey from a distance, did not evolve.
However, intelligent creatures evolved with the ability to make tools
to do this. Intelligent creatures have also recently started making
tools that synthesise the components of life, such as an arbitrary
nucleotide or peptide sequence.

> It doesn't work that way at all though, does it? Biology only ever uses
> biological vehicles to carry its instruction set - literal pieces of itself
> as a physically present zygote - no 'information', 'configurations', of
> generic atoms seem to be capable of coming to life or gaining consciousness
> ab initio.

Biological vehicles are machines that create replacement parts and
copies of themselves. You are begging the question if you say they are
not.

>> For if I
>> didn't miss anything anything out it would be a duck, right?
>
>
> No, I don't think it would in reality. I understand exactly why in theory
> most people think that it obviously would, but if I'm right about the
> relation of life, consciousness, and matter, trying to build a living
> organism from scratch with atoms will likely fail. The molecules need to
> have been parts of a living cell, in the same way that you can't turn an
> Amazon tribesman into a civil engineer without having some contact with
> someone who has participated in Western civilization. There has to be a
> willing integration of sense and motive.

If you tell an Amazon tribesman that you are going to put matter
together in the exact form of a jaguar he may well say that you will
get a jaguar, but a tribesman from a neighbouring tribe may say no,
because it will lack the jaguar spirit. You would go with the second
tribesman.

>> So
>> perhaps the atoms in the duck I made lack the capacity of awareness.
>
>
> No, all atoms have the capacity for awareness...they *are* the capacity of
> awareness on the atomic scale. On the human level they appear atomic but
> natively there is only experience. The question if not whether atoms have
> awareness or not is a Red Herring and a straw man. The better question is
> why can't all atoms generate animal quality experiences. The answer to that,
> I think, is that it is the quality of the experience which drives the
> appropriate reflection as a public form. The cell is the footprint of the
> cellular experience through time. The animal body is the corresponding home
> for the animal experience.

Didn't you agree at one point that all atoms of a certain kind are identical?

> Just as these words are the home of my intent to communicate, their
> arrangement is composed directly by my intention (filtered through the
> typos, errors, and constraints of language, grammar, keyboards and fingers,
> brain, etc). These words are not appearing as letters on the screen as a
> result of some biochemical process that happens to enjoy generating letters.
> There is a whole elaborate network and history of inventions which have been
> intentionally designed by people for this very purpose of expressing ideas.
> The words and letters aren't just inert vehicles, they reflect sense back to
> us in a different way - as the other..and that's what you are mistaking for
> consciousness, IMO.

You're answering a different question to the one I posed. Not only is
it common sense, it is also an empirical fact in biology that if you
put the same matter in the same configuration you get something that
functions identically, regardless of the history of the matter, and
regardless of how it is put together. For example, artificial peptides
function the same as natural peptides. Given that their synthesis i

Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 5:51 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> If the right atoms are placed in the right configuration then life or
>> consciousness occurs.
>
>
> You don't know that, you just assume it. It's like saying that if the right
> cars are placed in the right configuration around the right buildings, then
> New York City occurs. It may not work that way at all. You act as if we have
> made living organisms from scratch already.
>
>
>> Your theory does not really add anything: what would it look like if the
>> atoms or the configuration or the universe lack the essential ingredient you
>> claim but had every other physical property unchanged?
>
>
> If by essential ingredient you mean the capacity for awareness, then atoms
> could not 'look like' anything at all. They couldn't seem like anything,
> they couldn't be defined by any property that can be observed in any way.
> Unless I'm missing something...what do you think that things look like if
> nothing can possibly ever see them?

I find it difficult to understand how you could be thinking about
these things. If I put atoms in the configuration of a duck but as you
claim I don't get a duck, I must have missed something out. For if I
didn't miss anything anything out it would be a duck, right? So
perhaps the atoms in the duck I made lack the capacity of awareness.
How is that possible, given that all atoms ultimately came from the
same source? What if I made my duck from atoms sourced from steak,
which I know had the capacity for life at one point? How could I tell
the difference between life-affirming atoms and other atoms? Why is
there no difference in activity between natural and synthetic peptides
such as insulin when used medically if the synthetic one lacks
something?

You make detailed pronouncements about "sense"  and "intention" but
you fail to propose obvious experimental tests for your ideas. A
scientist tries to test his hypothesis by thinking of ways to falsify
it.

>> The person would function identically by any test but you would claim he
>> is not only not conscious but also not living? How would you decide this and
>> how do you know that the people around you haven't been replaced with these
>> unfortunate creatures?
>
>
> Lets say you get a call from a lawyer that your rich uncle has died and
> there is a video will. When you go to the reading of the will, there is a TV
> monitor and your relatives and behind you is a large mirror. As you watch
> the video of your uncle reading his will, you begin to wonder if he is
> actually still alive and watching everyone from behind the mirror. Maybe he
> looks at you and says your name, and looks at others as he reads off their
> ten names.
>
> He could have had a computer generate different video variations of where he
> looks which are played according to how the attorney fills out a seating
> chart on the computer. He could still be dead.
>
> Either way though, it doesn't matter whether you think he is dead or not.
> The reality is that he actually is dead or alive and it makes no difference
> whether his video convinces you one way or another.

Why do you keep raising this example of videos? You interact with the
image in the video, for example by asking it to raise its hand in the
air.

> The whole zombie argument is bogus because you don't know what our actual
> sensitivities tell us subconsciously about other creatures. We can be
> fooled, but that doesn't mean that our only way of feeling that we are in
> the presence of another animal-level consciousness is by some kind of
> logical testing process. You underestimate consciousness. Logic is a much
> weaker epistemology than aesthetics, feeling, and intuition - even though
> all three of them can be misleading.

Can you tell for sure if someone other than yourself is a zombie? It
seems you do believe zombies are possible, since you think that
passing the Turing test is no guarantee that the entity is conscious.
A zombie is an entity that passes the Turing test but is not
conscious. So I ask you again, how can you be sure that people other
than you are not zombies?

>> so the atoms in this artificial cell, being the same type in the same
>> configuration, would follow the same laws of physics and behave in a similar
>> manner.
>
>
> It probably will just be a dead cell.

Which means you must have left something out in making the cell the
way you did, which brings to mind a whole lot of experimental tests to
verify this.

>> Unless there is some essential non-physical ingredient which is missing
>> how could it be otherwise?
>
>
> It's not a non-physical ingredient, it is experience through time.
> Experience is physical.

Which brings to mind a whole lot of experimental tests to verify this.

>> Rome itself would not have played the same role if a dust mote had got
>> into Julius Caesar's eye, so obviously a copy of Rome would not play out the
>> same role. You can't hold the copy to higher standards than the original.
>
>
> Then if

Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, March 26, 2013 8:37:43 PM UTC-4, William R. Buckley wrote:
>
>  
>
>  
>
> *From:* everyth...@googlegroups.com  [mailto:
> everyth...@googlegroups.com ] *On Behalf Of *Stathis 
> Papaioannou
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 26, 2013 8:04 AM
> *To:* everyth...@googlegroups.com 
> *Subject:* Losing Control
>
>  
>
>
>
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Craig Weinberg  
> wrote:
>
> >> If a person is put through a mincer the atoms are all still there, but
> >> in a different arrangement. The way the atoms are arranged is
> >> important for life and consciousness.
> >
> >
> > Sure. If the wrong atoms were replaced in the right arrangement the 
> person
> > could still have the same shaped body but they would be dead. That's 
> beside
> > the point though. The composition and arrangement of atoms are both
> > important for life and consciousness, but nowhere near as important as 
> the a
> > priori possibility of life and consciousness in the universe. Yes,
> > particular private experiences correspond to particular public machines, 
> but
> > that does not mean that public machines are themselves anything more 
> than an
> > experience. Unexperienced machines however, are indistinguishable from
> > nothingness so that does not seem like a plausible source for experience.
>
>  
>
> That an environment supports living systems is certainly more important 
> that the 
>
> living systems that occur; without the former the latter does not exist.
>

I don't see it so much as a question of living systems vs non-living 
systems but a biological quality of experience vs a pre-biological quality 
of experience. Presumably there were billions of years in the universe in 
which no biological processes existed, and in most of the universe 
overwhelmingly biology is absent. In those times and places I do not think 
that there was no presentation of events. I don't think that is even 
physically possible because for atoms to fuse and molecules to interact, 
there must be some capacity for those events to be defined and executed. 

It would be bizarre and unparsimonious if the ways that events are defined 
for biological organisms, through sensory-motor presentation, were not 
directly descended from whatever faculties were used in the pre-biotic 
universe for molecules to find each other, to bond, to grow crystal 
lattices, etc. It is easy to say that gravity and electromagnetism exist 
because it is a "Law of Physics" but ultimately that is a name for 
ignorance. Sightless, numb, unconscious objects have no more chance of 
interacting with each other than a bowling pin has of starting a family. 
Even the obvious sense of matter that we have of not being able to occupy 
the same location at the same time, or to follow a narrative continuity 
through time are not plausible in a dark, silent, intangible 
universeand if they somehow were, there could certainly be no 
possibility for sensation, which would be unnecessary and superfluous in 
this hypothetical unconscious universe, to ever even have the possibility 
to appear arise.

 

>  
>
> So, what are the necessary and sufficient characters of an environment 
> that it 
>
> should consequently support living systems?
>

>From the local perspective, the characteristics are the anthropic 
ecological conditions which we expect - water, air, etc. From the absolute 
perspective, the environment may not be so much a matter of ideal 
conditions as it is of an appropriate opportunity in time. Life is about 
amplifying significance and enriching qualities of privacy. When the time 
is right for life, then the place which is most hospitable reflects that. 
If we wanted to get more supernatural about it, the signature of life may 
have to do more with a concentration of improbable conditions. Life is 
improbable because life is improbability itself. Consciousness and life 
insist on their own agenda - they intentionally control and cheat 
probability, so coincidences might be a good indication of escalating 
teleology. Folk epistemology has always maintained that kind of correlation 
instinctively. All science and philosophy is preceded by shamanic 
divination... interest in pattern recognition of coincidence and 
synchronicity. Watching the cycles of nature looking for signs led to all 
of it - agriculture, medicine, astronomy, etc.

Craig

 
>
>
> If the right atoms are placed in the right configuration then life or 
> consciousness occurs. Your theory does not really add anything: what would 
> it look like if the atoms or the configuration or the universe lack the 
> essential ingredient you claim but had every other physical property 
> unchanged? The person would function identically by any test but you would 
> claim he is not only not conscious but also not living? How would you 
> decide this and how do you know that the people around you haven't been 
> replaced with these unfortunate creatures?
>
> >> Do you think that it is possible to organise the same matter in t

RE: Losing Control

[William R. Buckley]

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Stathis Papaioannou
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 8:04 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Losing Control

 



On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 3:51 AM, Craig Weinberg  > wrote:

>> If a person is put through a mincer the atoms are all still there, but
>> in a different arrangement. The way the atoms are arranged is
>> important for life and consciousness.
>
>
> Sure. If the wrong atoms were replaced in the right arrangement the person
> could still have the same shaped body but they would be dead. That's
beside
> the point though. The composition and arrangement of atoms are both
> important for life and consciousness, but nowhere near as important as the
a
> priori possibility of life and consciousness in the universe. Yes,
> particular private experiences correspond to particular public machines,
but
> that does not mean that public machines are themselves anything more than
an
> experience. Unexperienced machines however, are indistinguishable from
> nothingness so that does not seem like a plausible source for experience.



 

That an environment supports living systems is certainly more important that
the 

living systems that occur; without the former the latter does not exist.

 

So, what are the necessary and sufficient characters of an environment that
it 

should consequently support living systems?

 


If the right atoms are placed in the right configuration then life or
consciousness occurs. Your theory does not really add anything: what would
it look like if the atoms or the configuration or the universe lack the
essential ingredient you claim but had every other physical property
unchanged? The person would function identically by any test but you would
claim he is not only not conscious but also not living? How would you decide
this and how do you know that the people around you haven't been replaced
with these unfortunate creatures?

>> Do you think that it is possible to organise the same matter in the
>> same configuration as an X and not get something that behaves as an X?
>> Could you give an example of such an experiment to make this clear?
>
>
> Until we create a living organism from scratch, we have no reason to
assume
> that any cell can be created externally just by expected chemical means.
It
> may not work that way.

I'm not proposing a technology, I'm proposing that as a thought experiment
the atoms are configured in the form of a cell. You have said that atoms in
cells follow the laws of physics, so the atoms in this artificial cell,
being the same type in the same configuration, would follow the same laws of
physics and behave in a similar manner. Unless there is some essential
non-physical ingredient which is missing how could it be otherwise?

> If you built a city that is materially identical to Rome of 100AD, it will
> not behave as Rome of 400AD. If you put modern people who are genetically
> identical to the population of Rome in 100AD, that city will not replay
its
> role in the history of the world.

Rome itself would not have played the same role if a dust mote had got into
Julius Caesar's eye, so obviously a copy of Rome would not play out the same
role. You can't hold the copy to higher standards than the original.

> Two identical cars come off the assembly line, yet they cannot drive to
the
> same exact places at the same exact time.
>
> If you start seeing the universe as a directly experienced process rather
> than fixed bodies in space, you might begin to see how forms and functions
> can only be subordinate to that which appreciates them.

But if I buy a particular model of car I don't want it to drive to the same
place as the prototype, I want it to have the same power, fuel efficiency,
steering etc. as the prototype. That is also what would be required of a
copy of a person: not that he live out exactly the same life, but that he
respond to similar situations in the same way as the original. As with the
car, you don't need an exhaustive list of all the situations the person will
encounter in order to program this in.

>> We are tied to a particular type of matter but all the matter is all
>> made of the same subatomic particles and it doesn't matter which
>> supernova the atoms were formed in. That is, the matter's history is
>> of no significance whatsoever. The only thing of significance is the
>> matter's type and configuration.
>
>
> Yet we are all made of the same nucleic acids, proteins, etc but our
> personal history is of tremendous significance. How do you explain this
> discrepancy?

It's not a discrepancy. Even people who are genetically identical, or
machines which are physically identical from the factory, end up different
due to different personal histories. What is of no significance whatsoever
is the history of the matter that went into the construction of the person
or machine.

>> Consciousness is not detectable, only the physical pr

Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, Mar 24, 2013 at 5:49 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> Yes, the potential for consciousness must be present in matter, and it
>> is realised when it is arranged in an appropriate way.
>
>
> Why would it be? What does arranging have to do with the possibility of
> experiencing?

If a person is put through a mincer the atoms are all still there, but
in a different arrangement. The way the atoms are arranged is
important for life and consciousness.

>> Why do you
>> think organising the matter is the thing that makes a difference?
>
>
> I don't think that. Sense organizes itself as matter in order to keep track
> of different experiences.

Do you think that it is possible to organise the same matter in the
same configuration as an X and not get something that behaves as an X?
Could you give an example of such an experiment to make this clear?

>> We are indeed at risk from intelligent machines smarter than us, even
>> if they have originally been programmed to help us. As for the rest of
>> what you said, I don't see how it answers the question of why
>> biological but not electronic or mechanical beings can be conscious
>> given that they are made of the same stuff with the same capacity of
>> consciousness.
>
>
> Consciousness is not a mechanism, it is a story of stories. Not every story
> is of the same quality. Matter reflects this, as we are tied to very
> specific kinds of matter to support our lives. The Earth is not made of food
> for us and almost all of the rest of the universe is not made of anything
> that will allow our lives to continue. This is the actual condition of our
> existence, and I think it deserves more consideration than any theory about
> what should or should not develop a human quality of consciousness. The
> other factor is how completely unlike living beings machines actually are.
> They are unlike in ways which have not diminished at all in the history of
> their development.

We are tied to a particular type of matter but all the matter is all
made of the same subatomic particles and it doesn't matter which
supernova the atoms were formed in. That is, the matter's history is
of no significance whatsoever. The only thing of significance is the
matter's type and configuration.

> The two of these clues together, combined with my understanding of
> consciousness as an unbroken story ruled by themes of superlative/heroic
> singularity, leads me to guess that there is actually a very good reason why
> consciousness can't come out of a can - even a monumentally sophisticated
> can. It has to do with symbols vs reality, and map vs territory. I have
> explained this over and over, but just because a stuffed animal looks like a
> bear to you, doesn't mean that it isn't just a nylon bag filled with
> styrofoam. Once you understand that the premise of consciousness as function
> or form is faulty, then you can see why a collection of forms is not going
> to tap into the history of some organism that you happen to be familiar
> with.

But you can't explain why neutrons, protons and electrons in an animal
have the special spark of consciousness but are forbidden from having
this spark in a mechanical or electronic device. This is despite your
claim that it is the substance and not the configuration or function
which is most important. If the substance were the most important then
one would think it is easier to create consciousness by just
collecting together enough of the right substance.

>> The alien would not be able to tell what your concept of "Georgia" was
>> but he would be able to tell what you were actually intending to do,
>> i.e. to drive in a southerly direction until you had reached a
>> particular landmark.
>
>
> There is nothing in neuropeptides or ion channels that signifies a southerly
> direction or a particular landmark. There are only molecules, cells, and
> tissues.  They are incapable of signifying anything, just as a TV set is
> incapable of producing a TV show. This doesn't mean some special
> non-physical thing is going on, it just means that your view of physics is a
> toy model of reality that is a priori inadequate to detect the possibility
> of consciousness.

Of course there is something in the brain that signifies a southerly
direction. What do you think the neurons are there for, to keep your
skull from collapsing?

>> What I can't fathom is how you think that just because there is a lot
>> of complex movement doors open without being pushed, and then say this
>> isn't magic.
>
>
> They are being pushed, by us. We get pushed by them too. It's not magic,
> it's who and what we are. We are the who, why, and when, and our body is the
> reflected public consequence of that: the what, how, and where. The symmetry
> of perceptual relativity is what ultimately defines physics itself.

Consciousness is not detectable, only the physical processes
associated with consciousness are detectable. If the door opens due to
the physical processes associated with consci

Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, March 23, 2013 7:05:59 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sat, Mar 23, 2013 at 12:06 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> It is obviously possible that intentional comes from non-intentional, 
> >> since that is what actually happened. 
> > 
> > 
> > It could not have happened unless the potential for intention was 
> inherently 
> > present from the start. The cosmic recipe book already has a page for it 
> at 
> > t=1. 
>
> Yes, the potential for consciousness must be present in matter, and it 
> is realised when it is arranged in an appropriate way. 


Why would it be? What does arranging have to do with the possibility of 
experiencing?
 

> Why do you 
> think organising the matter is the thing that makes a difference? 
>

I don't think that. Sense organizes itself as matter in order to keep track 
of different experiences. 


> >> If you claim that protons, 
> >> neutrons and electrons are intentional (or have the potential to 
> >> become intentional, which is trivially obvious) then what is your 
> >> objection to machines, which are composed of the same protons, 
> >> neutrons and electrons as people, also being intentional? 
> > 
> > 
> > Because intentionality can only come from within, it cannot be imposed 
> from 
> > an exterior agenda. The recipe for increased human intentionality is a 
> > history of experience over billions of years. Because it is a relative 
> > measure, there always seems to be the same amount of intentionality in 
> the 
> > universe, but each new iteration of it becomes more 'alive' and 
> > 'conscious'...the divide between chance and choice widens, and along 
> with 
> > it, I suggest personal investment, significance, realism, agony and 
> ecstasy, 
> > powers of discernment, strategic focal length, expanded sensory aperture 
> > ranges, etc. 
> > 
> > The machine takes the top slice of the tip of the iceberg, and 
> transplants 
> > it onto an iceberg shaped piece of styrofoam. It is a rootless imitation 
> of 
> > human logic as it is conceived by human logic - devoid of realism, 
> sense, 
> > significance, etc, it has only the superficial trappings of human-like 
> > presence. What it lacks however, can be made up for in other ways. The 
> > styrofoam iceberg can be made as large or small as we like. It can sit 
> in 
> > the desert or outer space. It can do mind numbing calculations for a 
> billion 
> > years without ever getting bored. It is an impersonal organization of 
> > primitive proto-sentience, but that is exactly what makes it a powerful 
> tool 
> > to us instead of a predator/competitor. If it were actually alive and 
> > self-interested, there is little doubt in my mind that we would be 
> > exterminated by such a new player in our ecological niche. Introduce an 
> > all-powerful species into a biome and see what happens. 
>
> We are indeed at risk from intelligent machines smarter than us, even 
> if they have originally been programmed to help us. As for the rest of 
> what you said, I don't see how it answers the question of why 
> biological but not electronic or mechanical beings can be conscious 
> given that they are made of the same stuff with the same capacity of 
> consciousness. 
>

Consciousness is not a mechanism, it is a story of stories. Not every story 
is of the same quality. Matter reflects this, as we are tied to very 
specific kinds of matter to support our lives. The Earth is not made of 
food for us and almost all of the rest of the universe is not made of 
anything that will allow our lives to continue. This is the actual 
condition of our existence, and I think it deserves more consideration than 
any theory about what should or should not develop a human quality of 
consciousness. The other factor is how completely unlike living beings 
machines actually are. They are unlike in ways which have not diminished at 
all in the history of their development. 

The two of these clues together, combined with my understanding of 
consciousness as an unbroken story ruled by themes of superlative/heroic 
singularity, leads me to guess that there is actually a very good reason 
why consciousness can't come out of a can - even a monumentally 
sophisticated can. It has to do with symbols vs reality, and map vs 
territory. I have explained this over and over, but just because a stuffed 
animal looks like a bear to you, doesn't mean that it isn't just a nylon 
bag filled with styrofoam. Once you understand that the premise of 
consciousness as function or form is faulty, then you can see why a 
collection of forms is not going to tap into the history of some organism 
that you happen to be familiar with.


> >> If there is nothing in your brain that will explain your driving to 
> >> Georgia then you won't drive to Georgia. I didn't think even you would 
> >> disagree with that. 
> > 
> > 
> > Yes I would disagree with that. If an alien neuroscientist looked at a 
> human 
> > brain, there is no way to tell what 'Georgia'

Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, Mar 23, 2013 at 12:06 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> It is obviously possible that intentional comes from non-intentional,
>> since that is what actually happened.
>
>
> It could not have happened unless the potential for intention was inherently
> present from the start. The cosmic recipe book already has a page for it at
> t=1.

Yes, the potential for consciousness must be present in matter, and it
is realised when it is arranged in an appropriate way. Why do you
think organising the matter is the thing that makes a difference?

>> If you claim that protons,
>> neutrons and electrons are intentional (or have the potential to
>> become intentional, which is trivially obvious) then what is your
>> objection to machines, which are composed of the same protons,
>> neutrons and electrons as people, also being intentional?
>
>
> Because intentionality can only come from within, it cannot be imposed from
> an exterior agenda. The recipe for increased human intentionality is a
> history of experience over billions of years. Because it is a relative
> measure, there always seems to be the same amount of intentionality in the
> universe, but each new iteration of it becomes more 'alive' and
> 'conscious'...the divide between chance and choice widens, and along with
> it, I suggest personal investment, significance, realism, agony and ecstasy,
> powers of discernment, strategic focal length, expanded sensory aperture
> ranges, etc.
>
> The machine takes the top slice of the tip of the iceberg, and transplants
> it onto an iceberg shaped piece of styrofoam. It is a rootless imitation of
> human logic as it is conceived by human logic - devoid of realism, sense,
> significance, etc, it has only the superficial trappings of human-like
> presence. What it lacks however, can be made up for in other ways. The
> styrofoam iceberg can be made as large or small as we like. It can sit in
> the desert or outer space. It can do mind numbing calculations for a billion
> years without ever getting bored. It is an impersonal organization of
> primitive proto-sentience, but that is exactly what makes it a powerful tool
> to us instead of a predator/competitor. If it were actually alive and
> self-interested, there is little doubt in my mind that we would be
> exterminated by such a new player in our ecological niche. Introduce an
> all-powerful species into a biome and see what happens.

We are indeed at risk from intelligent machines smarter than us, even
if they have originally been programmed to help us. As for the rest of
what you said, I don't see how it answers the question of why
biological but not electronic or mechanical beings can be conscious
given that they are made of the same stuff with the same capacity of
consciousness.

>> If there is nothing in your brain that will explain your driving to
>> Georgia then you won't drive to Georgia. I didn't think even you would
>> disagree with that.
>
>
> Yes I would disagree with that. If an alien neuroscientist looked at a human
> brain, there is no way to tell what 'Georgia' is. There are cells,
> molecules, folded tissues, coordinated activity on every level of
> description, but no Georgia, and no clue on Wednesday of where it planned
> Tuesday to go on Thursday.

The alien would not be able to tell what your concept of "Georgia" was
but he would be able to tell what you were actually intending to do,
i.e. to drive in a southerly direction until you had reached a
particular landmark.

>> I can't fathom how you think all the cells in your body will mobilise
>> when you decide to move your arm without this being either a chain of
>> causation or a seemingly magical event.
>
>
> I know, that's the problem. You can't fathom it. Just witness it. Behold, it
> is happening. You type your comments as sentences>words>letters/keystrokes,
> not as assemblies of twitches, grammar, and disconnected syllables.

What I can't fathom is how you think that just because there is a lot
of complex movement doors open without being pushed, and then say this
isn't magic.

>> You've tried to explain it but
>> all I get is "it just happens spontaneously, and it isn't magic". That
>> does not seem an adequate explanation.
>
>
> It happens spontaneously because you are physically real, except not a body
> in public space, but as a private time in life/consciousness. The relation
> is like an LCD display, twisted into perpendicular polarization dynamically.
> It doesn't matter which end of it you twist, the result is the same. If you
> feel excited from an experience or thought by your choice, you produce
> epinephrine, if someone shoots you up with epinepherine, you feel excited
> and whatever experience you are having becomes an exciting experience.

I'm not sure what that means, but you still haven't explained how you
think doors open without following any physical law and claim this is
not magic.

>> The brain must
>> have a certain tolerance to physical change or it wouldn't be able to
>>

Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, March 22, 2013 4:08:10 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 1:19 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> There is surely a difference between living and non-living, but 
> >> nevertheless it is possible to get living from non-living. 
> > 
> > 
> > Not without the potential for life already present in the universe. If 
> there 
> > was a universe which contained only non-living substances, there would 
> be no 
> > logical possibility for anything like "life". There isn't even a way to 
> > assume that there could be sanity or coherence enough to define any of 
> the 
> > qualities of life. 
>
> The universe did start with only non-living substances, which then 
> became living. Therefore, the non-living had potential to become 
> living. But this is a trivial statement. 
>

It's not a trivial statement. It means that the non-living is only 
temporarily so, and that our physical model of matter is incomplete. We 
don't find the valence shell for the flavor of meat or the color of grass 
in a Carbon atom.
 

>
> >> It is also 
> >> possible to get intentional from non-intentional, which is what you 
> >> disputed. 
> > 
> > 
> > It is also possible that I would accidentally think that you have done 
> > something here other than repeat your assertions. It is meaningless to 
> say 
> > that you can get intention from non-intention, or life from non-life 
> unless 
> > you have some 'how', 'why', and 'where' to back it up. I can say that 
> you 
> > can get real estate from a cartoon too. 
>
> It is obviously possible that intentional comes from non-intentional, 
> since that is what actually happened. 


It could not have happened unless the potential for intention was 
inherently present from the start. The cosmic recipe book already has a 
page for it at t=1.
 

> If you claim that protons, 
> neutrons and electrons are intentional (or have the potential to 
> become intentional, which is trivially obvious) then what is your 
> objection to machines, which are composed of the same protons, 
> neutrons and electrons as people, also being intentional? 
>

Because intentionality can only come from within, it cannot be imposed from 
an exterior agenda. The recipe for increased human intentionality is a 
history of experience over billions of years. Because it is a relative 
measure, there always seems to be the same amount of intentionality in the 
universe, but each new iteration of it becomes more 'alive' and 
'conscious'...the divide between chance and choice widens, and along with 
it, I suggest personal investment, significance, realism, agony and 
ecstasy, powers of discernment, strategic focal length, expanded sensory 
aperture ranges, etc. 

The machine takes the top slice of the tip of the iceberg, and transplants 
it onto an iceberg shaped piece of styrofoam. It is a rootless imitation of 
human logic as it is conceived by human logic - devoid of realism, sense, 
significance, etc, it has only the superficial trappings of human-like 
presence. What it lacks however, can be made up for in other ways. The 
styrofoam iceberg can be made as large or small as we like. It can sit in 
the desert or outer space. It can do mind numbing calculations for a 
billion years without ever getting bored. It is an impersonal organization 
of primitive proto-sentience, but that is exactly what makes it a powerful 
tool to us instead of a predator/competitor. If it were actually alive and 
self-interested, there is little doubt in my mind that we would be 
exterminated by such a new player in our ecological niche. Introduce an 
all-powerful species into a biome and see what happens.


> >> At one level it is correct to 
> >> say your experience influences your behaviour, but all that an 
> >> observer will see is the physical process underlying the experience 
> >> influencing the behaviour. 
> > 
> > 
> > They aren't going to see anything if what is underlying the behavior is 
> > semantic. If I decide to drive to Georgia tomorrow, there is nothing in 
> my 
> > brain that is going to explain my behavior of suddenly driving to 
> Georgia 
> > tomorrow. That influence cannot be reverse engineered from neurology, 
> > unless, perhaps, the entire history of the universe is simulated as 
> well. 
>
> If there is nothing in your brain that will explain your driving to 
> Georgia then you won't drive to Georgia. I didn't think even you would 
> disagree with that. 
>

Yes I would disagree with that. If an alien neuroscientist looked at a 
human brain, there is no way to tell what 'Georgia' is. There are cells, 
molecules, folded tissues, coordinated activity on every level of 
description, but no Georgia, and no clue on Wednesday of where it planned 
Tuesday to go on Thursday.
 

>
> >> If this is not so and some behaviours are 
> >> directly caused by experience without going through the usual chain of 
> >> physical causation then the observer would see something magical 
> >> happening. 
> 

Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 1:19 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> There is surely a difference between living and non-living, but
>> nevertheless it is possible to get living from non-living.
>
>
> Not without the potential for life already present in the universe. If there
> was a universe which contained only non-living substances, there would be no
> logical possibility for anything like "life". There isn't even a way to
> assume that there could be sanity or coherence enough to define any of the
> qualities of life.

The universe did start with only non-living substances, which then
became living. Therefore, the non-living had potential to become
living. But this is a trivial statement.

>> It is also
>> possible to get intentional from non-intentional, which is what you
>> disputed.
>
>
> It is also possible that I would accidentally think that you have done
> something here other than repeat your assertions. It is meaningless to say
> that you can get intention from non-intention, or life from non-life unless
> you have some 'how', 'why', and 'where' to back it up. I can say that you
> can get real estate from a cartoon too.

It is obviously possible that intentional comes from non-intentional,
since that is what actually happened. If you claim that protons,
neutrons and electrons are intentional (or have the potential to
become intentional, which is trivially obvious) then what is your
objection to machines, which are composed of the same protons,
neutrons and electrons as people, also being intentional?

>> At one level it is correct to
>> say your experience influences your behaviour, but all that an
>> observer will see is the physical process underlying the experience
>> influencing the behaviour.
>
>
> They aren't going to see anything if what is underlying the behavior is
> semantic. If I decide to drive to Georgia tomorrow, there is nothing in my
> brain that is going to explain my behavior of suddenly driving to Georgia
> tomorrow. That influence cannot be reverse engineered from neurology,
> unless, perhaps, the entire history of the universe is simulated as well.

If there is nothing in your brain that will explain your driving to
Georgia then you won't drive to Georgia. I didn't think even you would
disagree with that.

>> If this is not so and some behaviours are
>> directly caused by experience without going through the usual chain of
>> physical causation then the observer would see something magical
>> happening.
>
>
> This is the usual physical causation, but it is not a chain. It is one
> physical thing. My will to move my arm is the mobilization of every process,
> every cell, every tissue and organ that we see moving and changing. It's not
> magical, it's ordinary. What is magical is the idea of cells that need some
> physical mechanism satisfied by making my body drive to Georgia.

I can't fathom how you think all the cells in your body will mobilise
when you decide to move your arm without this being either a chain of
causation or a seemingly magical event. You've tried to explain it but
all I get is "it just happens spontaneously, and it isn't magic". That
does not seem an adequate explanation.

>> Yes, although of course evolution cannot directly program a response
>> to a joke. Evolution programs the potential for a brain, which then
>> grows in fantastically complex ways in response to the environment.
>
>
> Except, in, you know, every other species on Earth, where it doesn't do much
> fantastic complex evolving in response to the same environment.

What do you mean by this? The process is the same for every species,
although different species have brains with different capabilities
which will grow and respond differently.

>> What we have as an empirical fact is that certain physical processes
>> A, B, C are associated with experiences a, b, c.
>
>
> Yes.
>
>>
>> There can be no
>> change in a without a change in A, although there can be a change in A
>> without a change in a.
>
>
> No. There can be no change in A without a change in a also. The experiences
> may be not be personal experiences which we can be conscious of whenever we
> want, but they are associated with some kind of experience on some level
> that can be related back to our life.

No, there can be a change in A without a change in a. The brain must
have a certain tolerance to physical change or it wouldn't be able to
work properly. Thousands of neurons can die, for example, with
seemingly little or no change in cognition. On the other hand, your
mind cannot change without your brain changing unless you believe in a
non-physical mind which can work independently of the brain.

>> But the desires, plans and capacities all supervene on dumb physical
>> processes.
>
>
> Why do you assume so? What you think of as physical processes are linear
> moments added together in time. Plans and desires can spawn any number of
> dumb physical processes to satisfy an agenda which dumb but intentional,
> teleological, and sourced

Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, March 21, 2013 9:06:51 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 12:03 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> > To recap then, the difference between non-living and living is only 
> visible 
> > to the living. Biological units are vastly larger and slower, more 
> > vulnerable in a thousand ways than molecular units, but they are a sign 
> of a 
> > nested relation of experiences. The experience that is associated with 
> the 
> > cell (and this is tricky because it is not ultimately 'the cell's 
> > experience', like our lives are not 'our body's experience') has 
> 'leveled 
> > up' from the inorganic, and enjoys a richer, more wonderful/awful range 
> of 
> > sensitivities - which is the purpose of the universe (or at least the 
> half 
> > of the universe that can have a purpose). 
>
> There is surely a difference between living and non-living, but 
> nevertheless it is possible to get living from non-living. 


Not without the potential for life already present in the universe. If 
there was a universe which contained only non-living substances, there 
would be no logical possibility for anything like "life". There isn't even 
a way to assume that there could be sanity or coherence enough to define 
any of the qualities of life.
 

> It is also 
> possible to get intentional from non-intentional, which is what you 
> disputed. 
>

It is also possible that I would accidentally think that you have done 
something here other than repeat your assertions. It is meaningless to say 
that you can get intention from non-intention, or life from non-life unless 
you have some 'how', 'why', and 'where' to back it up. I can say that you 
can get real estate from a cartoon too.


> >> > Laughing at a joke demonstrates that semantic content causes physical 
> >> > responses. Any activity in the brain which relates to anything in the 
> >> > world 
> >> > or the mind has nothing to do with neurochemistry. Physical processes 
> >> > can 
> >> > induce experiences, but only because experiences are a priori part of 
> >> > the 
> >> > cosmos. There is nothing about the physical processes which you 
> >> > recognize 
> >> > which could possibly relate laughter to a joke, or anger to an 
> >> > injustice, 
> >> > etc. There is no way for your physics of the brain to represent 
> anything 
> >> > except the brain. 
> >> 
> >> The claim is that the physics explains all of the physical activity. 
> > 
> > 
> > That's tautological. Economics explains all of the economic activity. 
> That 
> > doesn't mean that a person can be understood by their economic 
> transactions 
> > alone. 
>
> Physics will not explain to an observer your experience since only you 
> know your experience, but it will completely explain your behaviour, 
> since everyone can see your behaviour. 


Only things with eyes can see my behavior. Of things that have eyes, only 
those things who are sized roughly larger than a cockroach and smaller than 
an office building are going to be able to parse my behavior as detectable. 
There is no such thing as "everyone can see X". Likewise, our physics can 
only see those things which our instruments can examine, which is only 
things very much like the instruments themselves. Radiotelescopes don't get 
jokes, they don't comfort the sick, etc.
 

> At one level it is correct to 
> say your experience influences your behaviour, but all that an 
> observer will see is the physical process underlying the experience 
> influencing the behaviour.


They aren't going to see anything if what is underlying the behavior is 
semantic. If I decide to drive to Georgia tomorrow, there is nothing in my 
brain that is going to explain my behavior of suddenly driving to Georgia 
tomorrow. That influence cannot be reverse engineered from neurology, 
unless, perhaps, the entire history of the universe is simulated as well.
 

> If this is not so and some behaviours are 
> directly caused by experience without going through the usual chain of 
> physical causation then the observer would see something magical 
> happening. 
>

This is the usual physical causation, but it is not a chain. It is one 
physical thing. My will to move my arm is the mobilization of every 
process, every cell, every tissue and organ that we see moving and 
changing. It's not magical, it's ordinary. What is magical is the idea of 
cells that need some physical mechanism satisfied by making my body drive 
to Georgia.
 

>
> >> A 
> >> door does not open unless someone or something pushes it, whether it's 
> >> a person, a gust of wind, the reaction from a decaying  radioisotope 
> >> in the wood, or whatever. If the door is a little one inside the brain 
> >> that does NOT mean it opens without any identifiable physical cause. 
> > 
> > 
> > But all physical causes are thought to originate in quantum fluctuations 
> > from within. Those fluctuations are known to be probabilistic and 
> > self-entangling. 
>
> And describable by phy

Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 12:03 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

> To recap then, the difference between non-living and living is only visible
> to the living. Biological units are vastly larger and slower, more
> vulnerable in a thousand ways than molecular units, but they are a sign of a
> nested relation of experiences. The experience that is associated with the
> cell (and this is tricky because it is not ultimately 'the cell's
> experience', like our lives are not 'our body's experience') has 'leveled
> up' from the inorganic, and enjoys a richer, more wonderful/awful range of
> sensitivities - which is the purpose of the universe (or at least the half
> of the universe that can have a purpose).

There is surely a difference between living and non-living, but
nevertheless it is possible to get living from non-living. It is also
possible to get intentional from non-intentional, which is what you
disputed.

>> > Laughing at a joke demonstrates that semantic content causes physical
>> > responses. Any activity in the brain which relates to anything in the
>> > world
>> > or the mind has nothing to do with neurochemistry. Physical processes
>> > can
>> > induce experiences, but only because experiences are a priori part of
>> > the
>> > cosmos. There is nothing about the physical processes which you
>> > recognize
>> > which could possibly relate laughter to a joke, or anger to an
>> > injustice,
>> > etc. There is no way for your physics of the brain to represent anything
>> > except the brain.
>>
>> The claim is that the physics explains all of the physical activity.
>
>
> That's tautological. Economics explains all of the economic activity. That
> doesn't mean that a person can be understood by their economic transactions
> alone.

Physics will not explain to an observer your experience since only you
know your experience, but it will completely explain your behaviour,
since everyone can see your behaviour. At one level it is correct to
say your experience influences your behaviour, but all that an
observer will see is the physical process underlying the experience
influencing the behaviour. If this is not so and some behaviours are
directly caused by experience without going through the usual chain of
physical causation then the observer would see something magical
happening.

>> A
>> door does not open unless someone or something pushes it, whether it's
>> a person, a gust of wind, the reaction from a decaying  radioisotope
>> in the wood, or whatever. If the door is a little one inside the brain
>> that does NOT mean it opens without any identifiable physical cause.
>
>
> But all physical causes are thought to originate in quantum fluctuations
> from within. Those fluctuations are known to be probabilistic and
> self-entangling.

And describable by physics. Radioactive decay is a good example. It is
thought to be truly random when an atom will decay, in that there is
no deterministic formula that can predict this even if we know
everything about the atom and its environment. It could happen in the
next second, it could happen in a billion years. However, it is easy
to calculate accurately what proportion a large collection of such
atoms will decay; much easier than many processes that are
deterministic. Deterministic does not necessarily mean predictable and
random does not necessarily mean unpredictable.

>> If the little door opens in response to a joke it is because the
>> physical manifestations of the joke (sound waves) cause some other
>> physical process which makes it open. It does NOT open because the
>> joke just magically makes it open, which is what would appear to
>> happen if consciousness had a direct causal effect on matter.
>
>
> I understand exactly what you think that I don't understand, but you're
> wasting your time. I understand your position completely. Your view is that
> the joke is merely the decoded set of neurological patterns associated with
> whatever processed vibrations or collisions of the sense organs that have
> introduced the encoded patterns to your body. You think that, like a
> computer, there is a code input and an evolutionarily programmed response
> which generates an output.

Yes, although of course evolution cannot directly program a response
to a joke. Evolution programs the potential for a brain, which then
grows in fantastically complex ways in response to the environment.

> What I am saying is that model could work in theory, but in reality, that is
> not at all what is happening with the nervous system or our awareness. What
> is happening is both simpler and more complex but you have to begin by
> throwing out the assumption that anything is ever decoded by the brain into
> an experience. There is no decoder, and none is possible. That would be like
> installing a flat screen TV inside an abacus, and then building eyes in the
> abacus to see the TV. The abacus would then have to go through this
> meaningless exercise of converting some of its calculations 

Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Thursday, March 21, 2013 2:44:16 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 12:53 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> How could something non-living lead to something living? 
> > 
> > 
> > Non-living and living are just different qualities of experience. Living 
> > systems are nested non-living systems, which gives rise to mortality and 
> > condenses an eternal perceptual frame into a more qualitatively 
> saturated 
> > temporary perceptual frame. 
> > 
> >> 
> >> How could 
> >> something non-computational could lead to something computational? 
> > 
> > 
> > Easily. You have a bunch of junk in your closet, so you organize it. 
> That is 
> > what computation is. A system for organizing experience. 
>
> I'm not sure what you mean with your distinction between living and 
> non-living, but it seems that you can get living from living, 
> computational from non-computational and intentional from 
> non-intentional. If you want to say that the non-living, 
> non-computational and non-intentional already had a dormant form of 
> the quality they were lacking then you could say that but I don't see 
> what it adds. 
>

I think that the distinction is qualitative. To the inorganic world, 
everything is inorganic. The entire molecular level is likely blind to 
meta-molecular (bio-cellular) levels of simplicity. Certain molecules, 
through their own discovery or fate/destiny promoted themselves to a 
genetic sense and motive - or they were promoted--- on the lower levels, I 
suggest that free-will and determinism are not yet very different. Part of 
the promotion is the push toward differentiation. Each level of qualitative 
promotion > more privacy > more temporal caching = broader range of 
sensitivity frequencies > higher quality of sense > more strategic 
foresight > higher quality motive = more degrees of freedom, initiative, 
and creativity.

The key is the idea of higher octaves of simplicity - not just a sleeker 
design but a legitimately higher order based on larger primitives. The cell 
is not a collection of molecules. Molecules don't know what role they play 
in the cell necessarily, but the cell's experiences can now operate through 
molecular experiences. A new top-down conversation has begun - at least 
existentially new...the origin of this conversation is outside of time. It 
runs retro and teleo from eternity.

To recap then, the difference between non-living and living is only visible 
to the living. Biological units are vastly larger and slower, more 
vulnerable in a thousand ways than molecular units, but they are a sign of 
a nested relation of experiences. The experience that is associated with 
the cell (and this is tricky because it is not ultimately 'the cell's 
experience', like our lives are not 'our body's experience') has 'leveled 
up' from the inorganic, and enjoys a richer, more wonderful/awful range of 
sensitivities - which is the purpose of the universe (or at least the half 
of the universe that can have a purpose).


> >> Please show one piece of evidence demonstrating that a physical 
> >> process occurs in the brain that cannot be completely explained as 
> >> caused by another physical process. Note that it isn't good enough to 
> >> point to complex behaviour and say "in there somewhere". 
> > 
> > 
> > Laughing at a joke demonstrates that semantic content causes physical 
> > responses. Any activity in the brain which relates to anything in the 
> world 
> > or the mind has nothing to do with neurochemistry. Physical processes 
> can 
> > induce experiences, but only because experiences are a priori part of 
> the 
> > cosmos. There is nothing about the physical processes which you 
> recognize 
> > which could possibly relate laughter to a joke, or anger to an 
> injustice, 
> > etc. There is no way for your physics of the brain to represent anything 
> > except the brain. 
>
> The claim is that the physics explains all of the physical activity. 


That's tautological. Economics explains all of the economic activity. That 
doesn't mean that a person can be understood by their economic transactions 
alone.
 

> A 
> door does not open unless someone or something pushes it, whether it's 
> a person, a gust of wind, the reaction from a decaying  radioisotope 
> in the wood, or whatever. If the door is a little one inside the brain 
> that does NOT mean it opens without any identifiable physical cause. 
>

But all physical causes are thought to originate in quantum fluctuations 
from within. Those fluctuations are known to be probabilistic and 
self-entangling.
 

> If the little door opens in response to a joke it is because the 
> physical manifestations of the joke (sound waves) cause some other 
> physical process which makes it open. It does NOT open because the 
> joke just magically makes it open, which is what would appear to 
> happen if consciousness had a direct causal effect on matter. 
>

I understand exactly what you think that I don't

Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, March 20, 2013 11:42:38 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 12:53 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> At least you now agree that the atoms in my body could be replaced and 
> >> I would feel the same. What if the atoms were replaced by a person: 
> >> would I still have free will or would I, as you claim for a computer, 
> >> only have the will of the programmer? 
> > 
> > 
> > What do you mean by replacing the atoms with a person? Like the China 
> Brain? 
> > Quintillions of human beings each pretending to act like hydrogen? That 
> > wouldn't work, although you might be able to model chemistry that way. 
>
> No, I meant if a person did the replacing of the atoms in my body. I 
> would then have been created and programmed by that person. Would I 
> still have free will? Would I think I had free will? 
>
>
No, it doesn't matter who does the programming/creating. I think what makes 
the difference is only whether the development is self-directed or not. 
Only something which discovers its own way of growing and learning would be 
able to recover the higher qualities of human-like free will. We can even 
see this in human society - heavy indoctrination and 'schooling' tends to 
shape individuals away from discovering their capacities for freedom. If 
someone has the capacity for free will inherently, then you might be able 
to encourage that institutionally, but it seems unlikely to be very 
successful in that aim overall.

Craig


> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 12:53 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> How could something non-living lead to something living?
>
>
> Non-living and living are just different qualities of experience. Living
> systems are nested non-living systems, which gives rise to mortality and
> condenses an eternal perceptual frame into a more qualitatively saturated
> temporary perceptual frame.
>
>>
>> How could
>> something non-computational could lead to something computational?
>
>
> Easily. You have a bunch of junk in your closet, so you organize it. That is
> what computation is. A system for organizing experience.

I'm not sure what you mean with your distinction between living and
non-living, but it seems that you can get living from living,
computational from non-computational and intentional from
non-intentional. If you want to say that the non-living,
non-computational and non-intentional already had a dormant form of
the quality they were lacking then you could say that but I don't see
what it adds.

>> Please show one piece of evidence demonstrating that a physical
>> process occurs in the brain that cannot be completely explained as
>> caused by another physical process. Note that it isn't good enough to
>> point to complex behaviour and say "in there somewhere".
>
>
> Laughing at a joke demonstrates that semantic content causes physical
> responses. Any activity in the brain which relates to anything in the world
> or the mind has nothing to do with neurochemistry. Physical processes can
> induce experiences, but only because experiences are a priori part of the
> cosmos. There is nothing about the physical processes which you recognize
> which could possibly relate laughter to a joke, or anger to an injustice,
> etc. There is no way for your physics of the brain to represent anything
> except the brain.

The claim is that the physics explains all of the physical activity. A
door does not open unless someone or something pushes it, whether it's
a person, a gust of wind, the reaction from a decaying  radioisotope
in the wood, or whatever. If the door is a little one inside the brain
that does NOT mean it opens without any identifiable physical cause.
If the little door opens in response to a joke it is because the
physical manifestations of the joke (sound waves) cause some other
physical process which makes it open. It does NOT open because the
joke just magically makes it open, which is what would appear to
happen if consciousness had a direct causal effect on matter.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 12:53 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> At least you now agree that the atoms in my body could be replaced and
>> I would feel the same. What if the atoms were replaced by a person:
>> would I still have free will or would I, as you claim for a computer,
>> only have the will of the programmer?
>
>
> What do you mean by replacing the atoms with a person? Like the China Brain?
> Quintillions of human beings each pretending to act like hydrogen? That
> wouldn't work, although you might be able to model chemistry that way.

No, I meant if a person did the replacing of the atoms in my body. I
would then have been created and programmed by that person. Would I
still have free will? Would I think I had free will?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, March 20, 2013 7:32:11 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 1:51 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> You say "it doesn't make sense" that intentional could come from 
> >> unintentional but I don't see that at all, not at all. You claim to 
> >> have an insight that other people don't have. 
> > 
> > 
> > Lots of people have had this insight. You say that intentional could 
> come 
> > from unintentional, but anyone can say that - what reasoning leads you 
> to 
> > that conclusion? What leads an unintentional phenomena to develop 
> > intentions? 
>
> How could something non-living lead to something living?


Non-living and living are just different qualities of experience. Living 
systems are nested non-living systems, which gives rise to mortality and 
condenses an eternal perceptual frame into a more qualitatively saturated 
temporary perceptual frame.
 

> How could 
> something non-computational could lead to something computational? 
>

Easily. You have a bunch of junk in your closet, so you organize it. That 
is what computation is. A system for organizing experience.
 

>
> >> That's right, you can't see consciousness, but you can see if it's 
> >> deterministic in the usual sense. So do you in fact agree, after all 
> >> this argument, that the brain could be deterministic in the usual 
> >> sense? 
> > 
> > 
> > No because some of what the brain does is determined by consciousness 
> which 
> > we are aware of and understand. We could write off every spontaneous 
> change 
> > in brain activity as random, just as we could write off every unexpected 
> > change in the traffic flow of a city as random, but that's just how it 
> would 
> > look if we didn't know about the contribution of conscious people to 
> those 
> > patterns. 
>
> Please show one piece of evidence demonstrating that a physical 
> process occurs in the brain that cannot be completely explained as 
> caused by another physical process. Note that it isn't good enough to 
> point to complex behaviour and say "in there somewhere". 
>

Laughing at a joke demonstrates that semantic content causes physical 
responses. Any activity in the brain which relates to anything in the world 
or the mind has nothing to do with neurochemistry. Physical processes can 
induce experiences, but only because experiences are a priori part of the 
cosmos. There is nothing about the physical processes which you recognize 
which could possibly relate laughter to a joke, or anger to an injustice, 
etc. There is no way for your physics of the brain to represent anything 
except the brain.


> >> >> So you claim that if the hydrogen atoms in my body were replaced 
> with 
> >> >> other hydrogen atoms I would stop being conscious? 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > No, I think all hydrogen represents the same experience and capacity 
> for 
> >> > experience. 
> >> 
> >> So their history is irrelevant: 
> > 
> > 
> > No, their history is crucially important - it's just the same for every 
> > atom. 
>
> Could you explain this? 
>

It means that it isn't enough that hydrogen is shaped like we think 
hydrogen should be shaped, or that it reacts the way we think that it 
should react. What matters is that it knows how to be hydrogen - that it 
has a continuous history dating back to the creation of hydrogen. The atom 
is just one presentation of hydrogen, the deeper reality is a collection of 
capacities to interact with the universe - possibly to generate spacetime.
 

>
> >> all the atoms in my body could be 
> >> replaced with atoms specially imported from the Andromeda Galaxy and I 
> >> would feel just the same. 
> > 
> > 
> > Yes, but they could not be replaced with tiny sculptures of hydrogen or 
> > simulations of hydrogen. It has to be genuine hydrogen. 
>
> At least you now agree that the atoms in my body could be replaced and 
> I would feel the same. What if the atoms were replaced by a person: 
> would I still have free will or would I, as you claim for a computer, 
> only have the will of the programmer? 
>

What do you mean by replacing the atoms with a person? Like the China 
Brain? Quintillions of human beings each pretending to act like hydrogen? 
That wouldn't work, although you might be able to model chemistry that way. 

Craig


>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 1:51 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> You say "it doesn't make sense" that intentional could come from
>> unintentional but I don't see that at all, not at all. You claim to
>> have an insight that other people don't have.
>
>
> Lots of people have had this insight. You say that intentional could come
> from unintentional, but anyone can say that - what reasoning leads you to
> that conclusion? What leads an unintentional phenomena to develop
> intentions?

How could something non-living lead to something living? How could
something non-computational could lead to something computational?

>> That's right, you can't see consciousness, but you can see if it's
>> deterministic in the usual sense. So do you in fact agree, after all
>> this argument, that the brain could be deterministic in the usual
>> sense?
>
>
> No because some of what the brain does is determined by consciousness which
> we are aware of and understand. We could write off every spontaneous change
> in brain activity as random, just as we could write off every unexpected
> change in the traffic flow of a city as random, but that's just how it would
> look if we didn't know about the contribution of conscious people to those
> patterns.

Please show one piece of evidence demonstrating that a physical
process occurs in the brain that cannot be completely explained as
caused by another physical process. Note that it isn't good enough to
point to complex behaviour and say "in there somewhere".

>> >> So you claim that if the hydrogen atoms in my body were replaced with
>> >> other hydrogen atoms I would stop being conscious?
>> >
>> >
>> > No, I think all hydrogen represents the same experience and capacity for
>> > experience.
>>
>> So their history is irrelevant:
>
>
> No, their history is crucially important - it's just the same for every
> atom.

Could you explain this?

>> all the atoms in my body could be
>> replaced with atoms specially imported from the Andromeda Galaxy and I
>> would feel just the same.
>
>
> Yes, but they could not be replaced with tiny sculptures of hydrogen or
> simulations of hydrogen. It has to be genuine hydrogen.

At least you now agree that the atoms in my body could be replaced and
I would feel the same. What if the atoms were replaced by a person:
would I still have free will or would I, as you claim for a computer,
only have the will of the programmer?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Wednesday, March 20, 2013 4:03:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 12:04 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> All I am saying is that you should start with something that is not 
> >> already loaded with your conclusion, then reach your conclusion 
> >> through argument. If I "intend" to do something I do it because I want 
> >> to do it. On the face of it, I could want to do it and do it whether 
> >> my brain is determined or random. You can make the case that this is 
> >> impossible, but you have to actually make the case, not sneak it into 
> >> the definition. 
> > 
> > 
> > I'm not trying to sneak anything into the definition. The case that I 
> make 
> > is that while it could be locally true that a given person could 
> > theoretically want something intentionally even if their brain were 
> > completely driven by unintentional influences, it doesn't make sense 
> that 
> > there could be any such thing as 'intentional' if the entire universe 
> were 
> > driven exclusively by unintentional influences. It is like saying that a 
> dog 
> > could think that it is a cat if cats exist, but if you define the 
> universe 
> > as having no cats, then there can be no such thing as cat-anything. No 
> > thoughts about cats, no cat-like feelings, no pictures of cats, etc. In 
> an 
> > unintentional universe, intention is inconceivable in every way. 
>
> You say "it doesn't make sense" that intentional could come from 
> unintentional but I don't see that at all, not at all. You claim to 
> have an insight that other people don't have. 
>

Lots of people have had this insight. You say that intentional could come 
from unintentional, but anyone can say that - what reasoning leads you to 
that conclusion? What leads an unintentional phenomena to develop 
intentions?
 

>
> >> We are talking about third person observable determinism only. 
> > 
> > 
> > Who is? 
>
> We are, because this is the normal sense of "determinism" and I 
> thought this is how you have been using it all along. It's possible 
> that you don't disagree with me at all if you were not actually 
> talking about this. 
>

Third person always appears unintentional, but it is no more of a reality 
than the first person experience of intention. That's what I am saying 
about the symmetry of private and public perceptual relativity. The 
universe seems intentional on the inside, unintentional on the outside. 
>From a cosmic perspective, they are two sides of the same coin.
 

>
> >> The 
> >> brain could be third person observable deterministic and still 
> >> conscious. 
> > 
> > 
> > The third person view always seems unintentional (deterministic-random). 
> > That goes along with it being a public body in space. You can't see 
> > intentions from third person. 
>
> That's right, you can't see consciousness, but you can see if it's 
> deterministic in the usual sense. So do you in fact agree, after all 
> this argument, that the brain could be deterministic in the usual 
> sense? 
>

No because some of what the brain does is determined by consciousness which 
we are aware of and understand. We could write off every spontaneous change 
in brain activity as random, just as we could write off every unexpected 
change in the traffic flow of a city as random, but that's just how it 
would look if we didn't know about the contribution of conscious people to 
those patterns.
 

>
> >> So you claim that if the hydrogen atoms in my body were replaced with 
> >> other hydrogen atoms I would stop being conscious? 
> > 
> > 
> > No, I think all hydrogen represents the same experience and capacity for 
> > experience. 
>
> So their history is irrelevant: 


No, their history is crucially important - it's just the same for every 
atom.
 

> all the atoms in my body could be 
> replaced with atoms specially imported from the Andromeda Galaxy and I 
> would feel just the same. 
>

Yes, but they could not be replaced with tiny sculptures of hydrogen or 
simulations of hydrogen. It has to be genuine hydrogen.

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Losing Control

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Mar 2013, at 00:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/19/2013 3:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg > wrote:



I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit.


My terms are:

Super-Personal Intentional  
(Intuition)

 |
 |
 |
unintentional (determinism) +--  
unintentional

(random)
 |
 |
 |
   Sub-Personal Intentional  
(Instinct)



+ = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference)
The x axis = Impersonal

I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition
of "intentional" in the common sense does not normally include
"neither determined nor random". You should start with the normal
definition then show that it could be neither determined nor random.
It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts
their conclusion into the definition of the terms.


As a diagram of different action it implies there are, in each  
quadrant, actions that are both "Intentional" and "unintentional".  
As I said there's no point in arguing with someone who contradicts  
himself.


I would say that is the method of the scientist. To make one people  
contradicting himself. Then the one contradicted will change its mind  
and learn something ... unless it is a literary philosopher, which  
will repeat again and again the contradictory statements. In that  
case, there is no point in continuing the discussion indeed.


Bruno






Brent




So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is
deterministic from a third person perspective could be  
conscious, or

do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third
person perspective could not possibly be conscious?


Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory- 
motor
participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level  
that we

assume.
What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as  
droplets

of
water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but  
not at

all
as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale  
emblem,

not
the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much  
faster or

much
slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is  
little

hope
of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with
perceptual
relativity rather than quant dimension.
I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain  
could

be deterministic and still be conscious.


What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is  
consciousness can
have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic  
to us.

Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual.

If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test
then that's as good as saying that the brain could be  
deterministic. A

computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also
say without fear of contradiction that it is "not actually,  
cosmically

deterministic, only habitual."


This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is
microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a  
whole is

again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole.

I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is
between a brain, a cloud and a computer.


A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public  
representation of

an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public
representation of microbiological experiences.

A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public  
representation of some
scale of experience - could be geological, galactic,  
molecular...who knows.


A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign  
agency for
its own motives. The objects each have their own history and  
nature, so that
they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common  
denominator
range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't  
speak the
same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because  
that's all

they can do.

The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated
civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The  
cloud is more

like farmland, passively cycling through organic phases.

I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any
difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday  
by a
fantastically improbably whirlwind? I'd still feel basically the  
same,

though I might have some issues if I learned of my true origin.




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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 12:04 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> All I am saying is that you should start with something that is not
>> already loaded with your conclusion, then reach your conclusion
>> through argument. If I "intend" to do something I do it because I want
>> to do it. On the face of it, I could want to do it and do it whether
>> my brain is determined or random. You can make the case that this is
>> impossible, but you have to actually make the case, not sneak it into
>> the definition.
>
>
> I'm not trying to sneak anything into the definition. The case that I make
> is that while it could be locally true that a given person could
> theoretically want something intentionally even if their brain were
> completely driven by unintentional influences, it doesn't make sense that
> there could be any such thing as 'intentional' if the entire universe were
> driven exclusively by unintentional influences. It is like saying that a dog
> could think that it is a cat if cats exist, but if you define the universe
> as having no cats, then there can be no such thing as cat-anything. No
> thoughts about cats, no cat-like feelings, no pictures of cats, etc. In an
> unintentional universe, intention is inconceivable in every way.

You say "it doesn't make sense" that intentional could come from
unintentional but I don't see that at all, not at all. You claim to
have an insight that other people don't have.

>> We are talking about third person observable determinism only.
>
>
> Who is?

We are, because this is the normal sense of "determinism" and I
thought this is how you have been using it all along. It's possible
that you don't disagree with me at all if you were not actually
talking about this.

>> The
>> brain could be third person observable deterministic and still
>> conscious.
>
>
> The third person view always seems unintentional (deterministic-random).
> That goes along with it being a public body in space. You can't see
> intentions from third person.

That's right, you can't see consciousness, but you can see if it's
deterministic in the usual sense. So do you in fact agree, after all
this argument, that the brain could be deterministic in the usual
sense?

>> So you claim that if the hydrogen atoms in my body were replaced with
>> other hydrogen atoms I would stop being conscious?
>
>
> No, I think all hydrogen represents the same experience and capacity for
> experience.

So their history is irrelevant: all the atoms in my body could be
replaced with atoms specially imported from the Andromeda Galaxy and I
would feel just the same.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 8:09:47 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 10:01 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 6:19:22 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: 
> >> 
> >> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg  
> >> wrote: 
> >> 
> >> >> I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > My terms are: 
> >> > 
> >> > Super-Personal Intentional 
> (Intuition) 
> >> >  | 
> >> >  | 
> >> >  | 
> >> > unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional 
> >> > (random) 
> >> >  | 
> >> >  | 
> >> >  | 
> >> >Sub-Personal Intentional 
> (Instinct) 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) 
> >> > The x axis = Impersonal 
> >> 
> >> I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition 
> >> of "intentional" in the common sense does not normally include 
> >> "neither determined nor random". 
> > 
> > 
> > Whose definition are you claiming doesn't include that? Why is that 
> > arbitrary and unsupported assertion not an 'argument' but my thorough 
> > diagram is less than a 'definition'? 
> > 
> > 
> >> You should start with the normal 
> >> definition 
> > 
> > 
> > Fuck that, and fuck normal. 
> > 
> >> 
> >> then show that it could be neither determined nor random. 
> >> It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts 
> >> their conclusion into the definition of the terms. 
> > 
> > 
> > It is not a problem. All definitions are terms reflecting conclusions. 
> You 
> > don't have to agree with my terms, but there is no basis to assert that 
> > there is some objective normalcy which they fail to fulfill. My terms 
> are a 
> > plausible definition of the actual phenomena we are discussing, and that 
> is 
> > the only consideration that I intend to recognize. 
>
> All I am saying is that you should start with something that is not 
> already loaded with your conclusion, then reach your conclusion 
> through argument. If I "intend" to do something I do it because I want 
> to do it. On the face of it, I could want to do it and do it whether 
> my brain is determined or random. You can make the case that this is 
> impossible, but you have to actually make the case, not sneak it into 
> the definition. 
>

I'm not trying to sneak anything into the definition. The case that I make 
is that while it could be locally true that a given person could 
theoretically want something intentionally even if their brain were 
completely driven by unintentional influences, it doesn't make sense that 
there could be any such thing as 'intentional' if the entire universe were 
driven exclusively by unintentional influences. It is like saying that a 
dog could think that it is a cat if cats exist, but if you define the 
universe as having no cats, then there can be no such thing as 
cat-anything. No thoughts about cats, no cat-like feelings, no pictures of 
cats, etc. In an unintentional universe, intention is inconceivable in 
every way.



> >> > What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness 
> can 
> >> > have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to 
> >> > us. 
> >> > Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. 
> >> 
> >> If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test 
> >> then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. 
> > 
> > 
> > No, because empirical tests are third person and consciousness is not. 
>
> We are talking about third person observable determinism only. 


Who is?
 

> The 
> brain could be third person observable deterministic and still 
> conscious. 
>

The third person view always seems unintentional (deterministic-random). 
That goes along with it being a public body in space. You can't see 
intentions from third person.
 

>
> >> A 
> >> computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also 
> >> say without fear of contradiction that it is "not actually, cosmically 
> >> deterministic, only habitual." 
> > 
> > 
> > It could be in theory, but in fact, computers prove to be less than 
> sentient 
> > in every way. 
>
> Perhaps they are as a matter of fact, but not as a theoretical 
> requirement, that is the point. 
>

But the fact has to be understood before a theory can be worthwhile. I have 
a theory which explains the fact and it leads me to say that no assembled 
machine can ever have an experience which is more than the sum of its parts.
 

>
> >> I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any 

Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 10:01 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>
>
> On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 6:19:22 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg 
>> wrote:
>>
>> >> I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit.
>> >
>> >
>> > My terms are:
>> >
>> > Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition)
>> >  |
>> >  |
>> >  |
>> > unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional
>> > (random)
>> >  |
>> >  |
>> >  |
>> >Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct)
>> >
>> >
>> > + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference)
>> > The x axis = Impersonal
>>
>> I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition
>> of "intentional" in the common sense does not normally include
>> "neither determined nor random".
>
>
> Whose definition are you claiming doesn't include that? Why is that
> arbitrary and unsupported assertion not an 'argument' but my thorough
> diagram is less than a 'definition'?
>
>
>> You should start with the normal
>> definition
>
>
> Fuck that, and fuck normal.
>
>>
>> then show that it could be neither determined nor random.
>> It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts
>> their conclusion into the definition of the terms.
>
>
> It is not a problem. All definitions are terms reflecting conclusions. You
> don't have to agree with my terms, but there is no basis to assert that
> there is some objective normalcy which they fail to fulfill. My terms are a
> plausible definition of the actual phenomena we are discussing, and that is
> the only consideration that I intend to recognize.

All I am saying is that you should start with something that is not
already loaded with your conclusion, then reach your conclusion
through argument. If I "intend" to do something I do it because I want
to do it. On the face of it, I could want to do it and do it whether
my brain is determined or random. You can make the case that this is
impossible, but you have to actually make the case, not sneak it into
the definition.

>> > What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can
>> > have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to
>> > us.
>> > Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual.
>>
>> If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test
>> then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic.
>
>
> No, because empirical tests are third person and consciousness is not.

We are talking about third person observable determinism only. The
brain could be third person observable deterministic and still
conscious.

>> A
>> computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also
>> say without fear of contradiction that it is "not actually, cosmically
>> deterministic, only habitual."
>
>
> It could be in theory, but in fact, computers prove to be less than sentient
> in every way.

Perhaps they are as a matter of fact, but not as a theoretical
requirement, that is the point.

>> I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any
>> difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday by a
>> fantastically improbably whirlwind?
>
>
> Because the atoms are only tokens of a history. It's like if you dropped a
> bunch of infants into New York City. Even if they had adult bodies, without
> the history of their experience, they have no way to integrate their
> perceptions.
>
>>
>> I'd still feel basically the same,
>> though I might have some issues if I learned of my true origin.
>
>
> That's because you think that the universe is a place filled with objects,
> but I don't think that is possible. Objects are amputated experiences.

So you claim that if the hydrogen atoms in my body were replaced with
other hydrogen atoms I would stop being conscious?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 7:14:14 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
>
> On 3/19/2013 3:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 
> > On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > > 
> wrote: 
> > 
> >>> I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. 
> >> 
> >> My terms are: 
> >> 
> >>  Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition) 
> >>   | 
> >>   | 
> >>   | 
> >> unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional 
> >> (random) 
> >>   | 
> >>   | 
> >>   | 
> >> Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct) 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) 
> >> The x axis = Impersonal 
> > I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition 
> > of "intentional" in the common sense does not normally include 
> > "neither determined nor random". You should start with the normal 
> > definition then show that it could be neither determined nor random. 
> > It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts 
> > their conclusion into the definition of the terms. 
>
> As a diagram of different action it implies there are, in each quadrant, 
> actions that are 
> both "Intentional" and "unintentional". As I said there's no point in 
> arguing with someone 
> who contradicts himself. 
>

All actions that we take are both intentional and unintentional to 
different degrees. Obviously. We can have a instinct which is highly 
intentional but influenced by physiological conditions which are 
unintentional. We can have a personal preference which is intentional but 
rooted in an arbitrary whim. Human intention is a multilayered, multi-level 
quality, not a binary distinction.

Craig
 

>
> Brent 
>
> > 
> > So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is 
> > deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or 
> > do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third 
> > person perspective could not possibly be conscious? 
>  
>  Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent 
> sensory-motor 
>  participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we 
>  assume. 
>  What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as 
> droplets 
>  of 
>  water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not 
> at 
>  all 
>  as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale 
> emblem, 
>  not 
>  the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster 
> or 
>  much 
>  slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is 
> little 
>  hope 
>  of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with 
>  perceptual 
>  relativity rather than quant dimension. 
> >>> I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could 
> >>> be deterministic and still be conscious. 
> >> 
> >> What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness 
> can 
> >> have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to 
> us. 
> >> Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. 
> > If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test 
> > then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. A 
> > computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also 
> > say without fear of contradiction that it is "not actually, cosmically 
> > deterministic, only habitual." 
> > 
>  This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is 
>  microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole 
> is 
>  again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. 
> >>> I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is 
> >>> between a brain, a cloud and a computer. 
> >> 
> >> A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation 
> of 
> >> an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public 
> >> representation of microbiological experiences. 
> >> 
> >> A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of 
> some 
> >> scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who 
> knows. 
> >> 
> >> A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency 
> for 
> >> its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so 
> that 
> >> they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common 
> denominator 
> >> range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak 
> the 
> >> same language, jostling each other around rhythmically be

Re: Losing Control

[meekerdb]

On 3/19/2013 3:19 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:


I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit.


My terms are:

 Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition)
  |
  |
  |
unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional
(random)
  |
  |
  |
Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct)


+ = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference)
The x axis = Impersonal

I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition
of "intentional" in the common sense does not normally include
"neither determined nor random". You should start with the normal
definition then show that it could be neither determined nor random.
It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts
their conclusion into the definition of the terms.


As a diagram of different action it implies there are, in each quadrant, actions that are 
both "Intentional" and "unintentional". As I said there's no point in arguing with someone 
who contradicts himself.


Brent




So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is
deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or
do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third
person perspective could not possibly be conscious?


Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory-motor
participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we
assume.
What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as droplets
of
water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not at
all
as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale emblem,
not
the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster or
much
slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is little
hope
of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with
perceptual
relativity rather than quant dimension.

I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could
be deterministic and still be conscious.


What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can
have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to us.
Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual.

If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test
then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. A
computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also
say without fear of contradiction that it is "not actually, cosmically
deterministic, only habitual."


This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is
microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is
again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole.

I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is
between a brain, a cloud and a computer.


A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation of
an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public
representation of microbiological experiences.

A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of some
scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who knows.

A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency for
its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so that
they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common denominator
range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak the
same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because that's all
they can do.

The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated
civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The cloud is more
like farmland, passively cycling through organic phases.

I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any
difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday by a
fantastically improbably whirlwind? I'd still feel basically the same,
though I might have some issues if I learned of my true origin.




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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 6:19:22 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. 
> > 
> > 
> > My terms are: 
> > 
> > Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition) 
> >  | 
> >  | 
> >  | 
> > unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional 
> > (random) 
> >  | 
> >  | 
> >  | 
> >Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct) 
> > 
> > 
> > + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference) 
> > The x axis = Impersonal 
>
> I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition 
> of "intentional" in the common sense does not normally include 
> "neither determined nor random". 


Whose definition are you claiming doesn't include that? Why is that 
arbitrary and unsupported assertion not an 'argument' but my thorough 
diagram is less than a 'definition'?

 

> You should start with the normal 
> definition 


Fuck that, and fuck normal.
 

> then show that it could be neither determined nor random. 
> It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts 
> their conclusion into the definition of the terms. 
>

It is not a problem. All definitions are terms reflecting conclusions. You 
don't have to agree with my terms, but there is no basis to assert that 
there is some objective normalcy which they fail to fulfill. My terms are a 
plausible definition of the actual phenomena we are discussing, and that is 
the only consideration that I intend to recognize.
 

>
> >> >> So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is 
> >> >> deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or 
> >> >> do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third 
> >> >> person perspective could not possibly be conscious? 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent 
> sensory-motor 
> >> > participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we 
> >> > assume. 
> >> > What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as 
> droplets 
> >> > of 
> >> > water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not 
> at 
> >> > all 
> >> > as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale 
> emblem, 
> >> > not 
> >> > the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster 
> or 
> >> > much 
> >> > slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is 
> little 
> >> > hope 
> >> > of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with 
> >> > perceptual 
> >> > relativity rather than quant dimension. 
> >> 
> >> I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could 
> >> be deterministic and still be conscious. 
> > 
> > 
> > What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can 
> > have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to 
> us. 
> > Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. 
>
> If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test 
> then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic.


No, because empirical tests are third person and consciousness is not. 
 

> A 
> computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also 
> say without fear of contradiction that it is "not actually, cosmically 
> deterministic, only habitual." 
>

It could be in theory, but in fact, computers prove to be less than 
sentient in every way.
 

>
> >> > This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is 
> >> > microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole 
> is 
> >> > again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. 
> >> 
> >> I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is 
> >> between a brain, a cloud and a computer. 
> > 
> > 
> > A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation 
> of 
> > an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public 
> > representation of microbiological experiences. 
> > 
> > A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of 
> some 
> > scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who 
> knows. 
> > 
> > A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency 
> for 
> > its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so 
> that 
> > they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common 
> denominator 
> > range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak 
> the 
> > same language, jostling each othe

Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit.
>
>
> My terms are:
>
> Super-Personal Intentional (Intuition)
>  |
>  |
>  |
> unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional
> (random)
>  |
>  |
>  |
>Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct)
>
>
> + = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference)
> The x axis = Impersonal

I don't think these are definitions, they are arguments. A definition
of "intentional" in the common sense does not normally include
"neither determined nor random". You should start with the normal
definition then show that it could be neither determined nor random.
It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts
their conclusion into the definition of the terms.

>> >> So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is
>> >> deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or
>> >> do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third
>> >> person perspective could not possibly be conscious?
>> >
>> >
>> > Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory-motor
>> > participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we
>> > assume.
>> > What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as droplets
>> > of
>> > water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not at
>> > all
>> > as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale emblem,
>> > not
>> > the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster or
>> > much
>> > slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is little
>> > hope
>> > of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with
>> > perceptual
>> > relativity rather than quant dimension.
>>
>> I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could
>> be deterministic and still be conscious.
>
>
> What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can
> have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to us.
> Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual.

If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test
then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. A
computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also
say without fear of contradiction that it is "not actually, cosmically
deterministic, only habitual."

>> > This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is
>> > microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is
>> > again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole.
>>
>> I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is
>> between a brain, a cloud and a computer.
>
>
> A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation of
> an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public
> representation of microbiological experiences.
>
> A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of some
> scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who knows.
>
> A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency for
> its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so that
> they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common denominator
> range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak the
> same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because that's all
> they can do.
>
> The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated
> civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The cloud is more
> like farmland, passively cycling through organic phases.

I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any
difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday by a
fantastically improbably whirlwind? I'd still feel basically the same,
though I might have some issues if I learned of my true origin.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Tuesday, March 19, 2013 5:37:34 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 3:11 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> We need to agree on terminology if we're going to have a discussion at 
> >> all. Have aliens visited the Earth? We need to agree that an "alien" 
> >> is a being born on another planet. It doesn't mean we agree on the 
> >> facts, but we need to at least speak the same language! 
> > 
> > 
> > I'm not opposed to agreeing on terminology, but that means we both 
> agree, 
> > not that I agree to your terms. 
>
> I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit. 
>

My terms are:

Super-Personal Intentional 
(Intuition)   
 |
 |
 |
unintentional (determinism) +-- unintentional 
(random)
 |
 |
 |
   Sub-Personal Intentional (Instinct)


+ = Free will = Personal Intentional (Voluntary Preference)
The x axis = Impersonal

 

> >> So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is 
> >> deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or 
> >> do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third 
> >> person perspective could not possibly be conscious? 
> > 
> > 
> > Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory-motor 
> > participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we 
> assume. 
> > What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as droplets 
> of 
> > water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not at 
> all 
> > as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale emblem, 
> not 
> > the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster or 
> much 
> > slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is little 
> hope 
> > of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with 
> perceptual 
> > relativity rather than quant dimension. 
>
> I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could 
> be deterministic and still be conscious. 
>

What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can 
have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to us. 
Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual.
 

>
> > This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is 
> > microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is 
> > again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. 
>
> I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is 
> between a brain, a cloud and a computer. 
>

A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation of 
an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public 
representation of microbiological experiences.

A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of 
some scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who 
knows.

A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency for 
its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so 
that they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common 
denominator range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't 
speak the same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because 
that's all they can do.

The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated 
civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The cloud is more 
like farmland, passively cycling through organic phases.

Craig


> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 3:11 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> We need to agree on terminology if we're going to have a discussion at
>> all. Have aliens visited the Earth? We need to agree that an "alien"
>> is a being born on another planet. It doesn't mean we agree on the
>> facts, but we need to at least speak the same language!
>
>
> I'm not opposed to agreeing on terminology, but that means we both agree,
> not that I agree to your terms.

I'll agree on your terms, but you have to make it explicit.

>> So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is
>> deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or
>> do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third
>> person perspective could not possibly be conscious?
>
>
> Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory-motor
> participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we assume.
> What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as droplets of
> water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not at all
> as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale emblem, not
> the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster or much
> slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is little hope
> of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with perceptual
> relativity rather than quant dimension.

I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could
be deterministic and still be conscious.

> This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is
> microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is
> again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole.

I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is
between a brain, a cloud and a computer.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, March 18, 2013 9:05:13 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you are 
> >> an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why do you try 
> >> to make the discussion difficult by refusing to agree on terminology? 
> > 
> > 
> > Because the terminology is ideologically loaded and makes the truth 
> > impossible to address, obviously. It's like you are demanding that I 
> agree 
> > that electricity is either the work of God or the Devil. 
>
> We need to agree on terminology if we're going to have a discussion at 
> all. Have aliens visited the Earth? We need to agree that an "alien" 
> is a being born on another planet. It doesn't mean we agree on the 
> facts, but we need to at least speak the same language! 
>

I'm not opposed to agreeing on terminology, but that means we both agree, 
not that I agree to your terms.
 

>
> >> It seems, again, that you believe it is a priori impossible for 
> >> consciousness and determinism to co-exist. If we can't get beyond this 
> >> then there is not much point in further debate. 
> > 
> > 
> > Determinism is what consciousness looks like from the crippled third 
> person 
> > perspective. They coexist in the sense that the old woman and the young 
> > woman coexist in the famous ambiguous drawing. 
>
> So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is 
> deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or 
> do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third 
> person perspective could not possibly be conscious? 
>

Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent sensory-motor 
participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we 
assume. What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as 
droplets of water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, 
but not at all as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human 
scale emblem, not the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a 
much faster or much slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so 
there is little hope of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland 
only with perceptual relativity rather than quant dimension.

This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is 
microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole is 
again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole.

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Losing Control

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 19.03.2013 02:05 Stathis Papaioannou said the following:

On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Craig Weinberg
 wrote:


If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you
are an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why
do you try to make the discussion difficult by refusing to agree
on terminology?



Because the terminology is ideologically loaded and makes the
truth impossible to address, obviously. It's like you are demanding
that I agree that electricity is either the work of God or the
Devil.


We need to agree on terminology if we're going to have a discussion
at all. Have aliens visited the Earth? We need to agree that an
"alien" is a being born on another planet. It doesn't mean we agree
on the facts, but we need to at least speak the same language!


Recently I have listened to a nice talk about the search of 
extraterrestrial intelligence


http://embryogenesisexplained.com/2013/03/the-starivore-hypothesis.html

The author has mentioned two fallacies (slides 6 and 7)

Artificiality-of-the-gaps

and

Naturality-of-the-gaps

Yet, I was unable to understand his difference between artificial and 
natural. This is another example when there is a long discussion without 
an agreement on the terminology.


Evgenii

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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you are
>> an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why do you try
>> to make the discussion difficult by refusing to agree on terminology?
>
>
> Because the terminology is ideologically loaded and makes the truth
> impossible to address, obviously. It's like you are demanding that I agree
> that electricity is either the work of God or the Devil.

We need to agree on terminology if we're going to have a discussion at
all. Have aliens visited the Earth? We need to agree that an "alien"
is a being born on another planet. It doesn't mean we agree on the
facts, but we need to at least speak the same language!

>> It seems, again, that you believe it is a priori impossible for
>> consciousness and determinism to co-exist. If we can't get beyond this
>> then there is not much point in further debate.
>
>
> Determinism is what consciousness looks like from the crippled third person
> perspective. They coexist in the sense that the old woman and the young
> woman coexist in the famous ambiguous drawing.

So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is
deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or
do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third
person perspective could not possibly be conscious?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, March 18, 2013 7:34:59 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 3:18 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> But compatibilists and incompatibilists could agree on all the facts 
> >> of the matter and still disagree on free will, which makes it a matter 
> >> of definition. The argument is then over which definition is most 
> >> commonly used or which definition ought to be adopted. 
> > 
> > 
> > I'm looking to completely supersede the assumptions of compatibilism and 
> > incompatibilism. I am asserting a positive solution to the definition of 
> > free will as a physical-experiential primitive which is beneath all 
> forms of 
> > categorization and explanation. It can only be experienced first hand 
> and 
> > there can never be any definition beyond that experience. 
>
> If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you are 
> an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why do you try 
> to make the discussion difficult by refusing to agree on terminology? 
>

Because the terminology is ideologically loaded and makes the truth 
impossible to address, obviously. It's like you are demanding that I agree 
that electricity is either the work of God or the Devil.
 

>
> >> And there is the problem: you believe compatibilists are deluded or 
> >> frauds, but they don't, because they define free will differently. How 
> >> are you going to sell them your definition when they are happy with 
> >> theirs? 
> > 
> > 
> > I can only sell something to a person who has the freedom and the will 
> to 
> > buy. The power to evaluate what is being sold and to control your own 
> > communications supervenes on free will. If there were no free will, 
> everyone 
> > will have the definition which has been determined for them by 
> circumstance. 
>
> It seems, again, that you believe it is a priori impossible for 
> consciousness and determinism to co-exist. If we can't get beyond this 
> then there is not much point in further debate. 
>

Determinism is what consciousness looks like from the crippled third person 
perspective. They coexist in the sense that the old woman and the young 
woman coexist in the famous ambiguous drawing.

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, Mar 19, 2013 at 3:18 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> But compatibilists and incompatibilists could agree on all the facts
>> of the matter and still disagree on free will, which makes it a matter
>> of definition. The argument is then over which definition is most
>> commonly used or which definition ought to be adopted.
>
>
> I'm looking to completely supersede the assumptions of compatibilism and
> incompatibilism. I am asserting a positive solution to the definition of
> free will as a physical-experiential primitive which is beneath all forms of
> categorization and explanation. It can only be experienced first hand and
> there can never be any definition beyond that experience.

If you say that free will is compatible with determinism then you are
an compatibilist, otherwise you are an incompatibilist. Why do you try
to make the discussion difficult by refusing to agree on terminology?

>> And there is the problem: you believe compatibilists are deluded or
>> frauds, but they don't, because they define free will differently. How
>> are you going to sell them your definition when they are happy with
>> theirs?
>
>
> I can only sell something to a person who has the freedom and the will to
> buy. The power to evaluate what is being sold and to control your own
> communications supervenes on free will. If there were no free will, everyone
> will have the definition which has been determined for them by circumstance.

It seems, again, that you believe it is a priori impossible for
consciousness and determinism to co-exist. If we can't get beyond this
then there is not much point in further debate.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Monday, March 18, 2013 2:28:34 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 11:25 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> As I said, a common definition of "control" is the ability to 
> >> determine something's behaviour according to your wishes. That you 
> >> have wishes is independent of whether you have free will, whatever the 
> >> definition of free will. 
> > 
> > 
> > What turns a wish into action other than free will? We have many wishes, 
> > what determines which ones we promote to effort? 
>
> There are a number of factors, including which wish is in mind due to 
> current circumstances, the nature of competing wishes, how strong the 
> wish is, how difficult it would be to act on the wish, what the costs 
> and consequences of acting on the wish are, and so on. 
>
> >> >> However, if you define control as 
> >> >> incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is 
> impossible 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > I would not say that free will/self-control>control is incompatible 
> from 
> >> > unintentional processes (determinism or randomness), but just as the 
> >> > yellow 
> >> > traffic light implies the customs and meanings of both red and green 
> >> > lights, 
> >> > there is a clear distinction between intention and unintention. 
> >> > 
> >> >> 
> >> >> also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was 
> >> >> previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our 
> >> >> discussions. 
> >> > 
> >> > 
> >> > Why, getting too close to something that you can't deny and conflate? 
> >> 
> >> I know exactly what I mean by "free will" and "control" but if you 
> >> define them differently then I'll happily agree that these things are 
> >> impossible according to your definition. We are disagreeing about 
> >> language in this case, not about facts. We disagree about facts in 
> >> other cases, such as whether judges believe that the brain of the 
> >> accused works according to deterministic or random processes. 
> > 
> > 
> > I disagree that we are disagreeing about language. I have always 
> proposed 
> > that free will is orthogonal to deterministic or random processes, which 
> are 
> > both opposite kinds of unintentional phenomena. Free will is an 
> intentional 
> > process which explicitly opposes both external determination and 
> randomness. 
> > Intention is voluntary. As unintentional phenomena can be described as 
> the 
> > polarity of randomness and determination, intentional phenomena might 
> > similarly be described in the polarity of active creativity and reactive 
> > preference. 
>
> But compatibilists and incompatibilists could agree on all the facts 
> of the matter and still disagree on free will, which makes it a matter 
> of definition. The argument is then over which definition is most 
> commonly used or which definition ought to be adopted. 
>

I'm looking to completely supersede the assumptions of compatibilism and 
incompatibilism. I am asserting a positive solution to the definition of 
free will as a physical-experiential primitive which is beneath all forms 
of categorization and explanation. It can only be experienced first hand 
and there can never be any definition beyond that experience.


> > As far as judges go, any judge that believes that those they pass 
> judgment 
> > over are ruled by randomness or determinism would be a fraud, as all 
> such 
> > acts are by definition innocent. Likewise, to believe in their own 
> capacity 
> > for judgment they would be frauds to believe that their choices are 
> random 
> > or passively received by fate yet still present themselves as personally 
> > responsible for their own judgments. I don't doubt that some judges do 
> feel 
> > this way, but they are still frauds if they could really take their 
> beliefs 
> > seriously. 
>
> And there is the problem: you believe compatibilists are deluded or 
> frauds, but they don't, because they define free will differently. How 
> are you going to sell them your definition when they are happy with 
> theirs? 
>

I can only sell something to a person who has the freedom and the will to 
buy. The power to evaluate what is being sold and to control your own 
communications supervenes on free will. If there were no free will, 
everyone will have the definition which has been determined for them by 
circumstance.

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 11:25 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> As I said, a common definition of "control" is the ability to
>> determine something's behaviour according to your wishes. That you
>> have wishes is independent of whether you have free will, whatever the
>> definition of free will.
>
>
> What turns a wish into action other than free will? We have many wishes,
> what determines which ones we promote to effort?

There are a number of factors, including which wish is in mind due to
current circumstances, the nature of competing wishes, how strong the
wish is, how difficult it would be to act on the wish, what the costs
and consequences of acting on the wish are, and so on.

>> >> However, if you define control as
>> >> incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is impossible
>> >
>> >
>> > I would not say that free will/self-control>control is incompatible from
>> > unintentional processes (determinism or randomness), but just as the
>> > yellow
>> > traffic light implies the customs and meanings of both red and green
>> > lights,
>> > there is a clear distinction between intention and unintention.
>> >
>> >>
>> >> also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was
>> >> previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our
>> >> discussions.
>> >
>> >
>> > Why, getting too close to something that you can't deny and conflate?
>>
>> I know exactly what I mean by "free will" and "control" but if you
>> define them differently then I'll happily agree that these things are
>> impossible according to your definition. We are disagreeing about
>> language in this case, not about facts. We disagree about facts in
>> other cases, such as whether judges believe that the brain of the
>> accused works according to deterministic or random processes.
>
>
> I disagree that we are disagreeing about language. I have always proposed
> that free will is orthogonal to deterministic or random processes, which are
> both opposite kinds of unintentional phenomena. Free will is an intentional
> process which explicitly opposes both external determination and randomness.
> Intention is voluntary. As unintentional phenomena can be described as the
> polarity of randomness and determination, intentional phenomena might
> similarly be described in the polarity of active creativity and reactive
> preference.

But compatibilists and incompatibilists could agree on all the facts
of the matter and still disagree on free will, which makes it a matter
of definition. The argument is then over which definition is most
commonly used or which definition ought to be adopted.

> As far as judges go, any judge that believes that those they pass judgment
> over are ruled by randomness or determinism would be a fraud, as all such
> acts are by definition innocent. Likewise, to believe in their own capacity
> for judgment they would be frauds to believe that their choices are random
> or passively received by fate yet still present themselves as personally
> responsible for their own judgments. I don't doubt that some judges do feel
> this way, but they are still frauds if they could really take their beliefs
> seriously.

And there is the problem: you believe compatibilists are deluded or
frauds, but they don't, because they define free will differently. How
are you going to sell them your definition when they are happy with
theirs?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Sunday, March 17, 2013 3:16:15 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 1:55 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> You insist that "free will" is incompatible with determinism or 
> >> randomness. If I accept this definition, then free will is impossible. 
> >> "Control" can be defined in such a way that it is possible even if 
> >> free will is impossible. 
> > 
> > 
> > I don't think that control can be defined in such a way that it is 
> possible 
> > without free will. Not literally. We can project control onto an 
> inanimate 
> > system figuratively, via the pathetic fallacy, and say that rainfall 
> > controls crop yields or something like that, but there is no intention 
> on 
> > the part of rainfall to manipulate crop yields. While it may not always 
> be 
> > easy to discern what exactly makes a given process unintentional or 
> > intentional when it is a public observation, but privately the 
> difference 
> > between what we can possibly control and what we may not ever be able to 
> > control is abundantly clear. 
>
> As I said, a common definition of "control" is the ability to 
> determine something's behaviour according to your wishes. That you 
> have wishes is independent of whether you have free will, whatever the 
> definition of free will. 
>

What turns a wish into action other than free will? We have many wishes, 
what determines which ones we promote to effort?


Craig
 

>
> >> However, if you define control as 
> >> incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is impossible 
> > 
> > 
> > I would not say that free will/self-control>control is incompatible from 
> > unintentional processes (determinism or randomness), but just as the 
> yellow 
> > traffic light implies the customs and meanings of both red and green 
> lights, 
> > there is a clear distinction between intention and unintention. 
> > 
> >> 
> >> also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was 
> >> previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our 
> >> discussions. 
> > 
> > 
> > Why, getting too close to something that you can't deny and conflate? 
>
> I know exactly what I mean by "free will" and "control" but if you 
> define them differently then I'll happily agree that these things are 
> impossible according to your definition. We are disagreeing about 
> language in this case, not about facts. We disagree about facts in 
> other cases, such as whether judges believe that the brain of the 
> accused works according to deterministic or random processes. 
>

I disagree that we are disagreeing about language. I have always proposed 
that free will is orthogonal to deterministic or random processes, which 
are both opposite kinds of unintentional phenomena. Free will is an 
intentional process which explicitly opposes both external determination 
and randomness. Intention is voluntary. As unintentional phenomena can be 
described as the polarity of randomness and determination, intentional 
phenomena might similarly be described in the polarity of active creativity 
and reactive preference. 

As far as judges go, any judge that believes that those they pass judgment 
over are ruled by randomness or determinism would be a fraud, as all such 
acts are by definition innocent. Likewise, to believe in their own capacity 
for judgment they would be frauds to believe that their choices are random 
or passively received by fate yet still present themselves as personally 
responsible for their own judgments. I don't doubt that some judges do feel 
this way, but they are still frauds if they could really take their beliefs 
seriously.

Craig


>
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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 1:55 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> You insist that "free will" is incompatible with determinism or
>> randomness. If I accept this definition, then free will is impossible.
>> "Control" can be defined in such a way that it is possible even if
>> free will is impossible.
>
>
> I don't think that control can be defined in such a way that it is possible
> without free will. Not literally. We can project control onto an inanimate
> system figuratively, via the pathetic fallacy, and say that rainfall
> controls crop yields or something like that, but there is no intention on
> the part of rainfall to manipulate crop yields. While it may not always be
> easy to discern what exactly makes a given process unintentional or
> intentional when it is a public observation, but privately the difference
> between what we can possibly control and what we may not ever be able to
> control is abundantly clear.

As I said, a common definition of "control" is the ability to
determine something's behaviour according to your wishes. That you
have wishes is independent of whether you have free will, whatever the
definition of free will.

>> However, if you define control as
>> incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is impossible
>
>
> I would not say that free will/self-control>control is incompatible from
> unintentional processes (determinism or randomness), but just as the yellow
> traffic light implies the customs and meanings of both red and green lights,
> there is a clear distinction between intention and unintention.
>
>>
>> also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was
>> previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our
>> discussions.
>
>
> Why, getting too close to something that you can't deny and conflate?

I know exactly what I mean by "free will" and "control" but if you
define them differently then I'll happily agree that these things are
impossible according to your definition. We are disagreeing about
language in this case, not about facts. We disagree about facts in
other cases, such as whether judges believe that the brain of the
accused works according to deterministic or random processes.


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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, March 16, 2013 8:54:35 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 7:38 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> "Control" can be defined less controversially than "free will". I 
> >> control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my 
> >> wishes. 
> > 
> > 
> > What do you see as being the difference between free will and the 
> ability to 
> > determine the behavior of something according to your wishes? 
>
> You insist that "free will" is incompatible with determinism or 
> randomness. If I accept this definition, then free will is impossible. 
> "Control" can be defined in such a way that it is possible even if 
> free will is impossible. 


I don't think that control can be defined in such a way that it is possible 
without free will. Not literally. We can project control onto an inanimate 
system figuratively, via the pathetic fallacy, and say that rainfall 
controls crop yields or something like that, but there is no intention on 
the part of rainfall to manipulate crop yields. While it may not always be 
easy to discern what exactly makes a given process unintentional or 
intentional when it is a public observation, but privately the difference 
between what we can possibly control and what we may not ever be able to 
control is abundantly clear.
 

> However, if you define control as 
> incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is impossible 
>

I would not say that free will/self-control>control is incompatible from 
unintentional processes (determinism or randomness), but just as the yellow 
traffic light implies the customs and meanings of both red and green 
lights, there is a clear distinction between intention and unintention.
 

> also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was 
> previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our 
> discussions. 
>

Why, getting too close to something that you can't deny and conflate?

Craig
 

>
>
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> Stathis Papaioannou 
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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, Mar 17, 2013 at 7:38 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> "Control" can be defined less controversially than "free will". I
>> control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my
>> wishes.
>
>
> What do you see as being the difference between free will and the ability to
> determine the behavior of something according to your wishes?

You insist that "free will" is incompatible with determinism or
randomness. If I accept this definition, then free will is impossible.
"Control" can be defined in such a way that it is possible even if
free will is impossible. However, if you define control as
incompatible with determinism or randomness then control is impossible
also. We will have to use an alternative word to indicate what was
previously called control in order to avoid confusion in our
discussions.


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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Saturday, March 16, 2013 3:15:58 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 7:27 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> You persist in saying that if the components of the system are 
> >> mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the 
> >> way the phrase is normally used. 
> > 
> > 
> > What do you mean by 'control'? Can you define it? 
>
> "Control" can be defined less controversially than "free will". I 
> control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my 
> wishes. 
>

What do you see as being the difference between free will and the ability 
to determine the behavior of something according to your wishes?

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Losing Control

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Mar 2013, at 08:15, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 7:27 AM, Craig Weinberg  
 wrote:



You persist in saying that if the components of the system are
mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not  
the

way the phrase is normally used.



What do you mean by 'control'? Can you define it?


"Control" can be defined less controversially than "free will".


Nice!
We might define free-will by self-control, perhaps.

Bruno




I
control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my
wishes.


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 7:27 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> You persist in saying that if the components of the system are
>> mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the
>> way the phrase is normally used.
>
>
> What do you mean by 'control'? Can you define it?

"Control" can be defined less controversially than "free will". I
control something if I can determine its behaviour according to my
wishes.


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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, March 15, 2013 8:16:37 PM UTC-4, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
>
> Again the shorcomings of nominamism/positivism. The greeks would laugh at 
> these questions. It can be explained if we abandon the monomaniatic 
> reductionistic physicalism and think in terms of just what we are: rational 
> beings:
>
> I think that the notion of "lost control of something" in an intelligent 
> being -who think about future events in order to plan adequate actions in 
> advance- means that he can no longer preview what will happen next, so he 
> has no advanced plans, se has no control of the situation.
>

I think that's a big part of it. There is still a tangible reality that I 
think is beneath the planning of adequate actions which has to do with an 
expectation of maintaining effectiveness as a participant. To have 
attention deficit disorder or poor impulse control are like private and 
public versions of the same thing - an unwillingness or inability to engage 
one's will and ability. We say things like 'get a grip' or 'I can handle 
it' - the metaphor points to manual control, the hand as means for 
directing our influence over nature. Of course, this is all completely over 
the head of reductionist physics. Control, huh? influence over nature, wha?


Craig
 

>
> "Serious consequences" : The mind uses analogies and semantic to compress 
> information storage and communication. Serious means hard, severe, 
> important, not to be dismissed. Applied to consequences, it means that it 
> will be important to make plans to avoid them
>
>
> 2013/3/15 Craig Weinberg >
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, March 15, 2013 2:06:50 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>>>
>>> Apparently the legacy view negates free will. 
>>>
>>
>> I think it does in many people's minds - or it would if they took their 
>> own beliefs seriously.
>>
>> Craig
>>  
>>
>>>  
>>> On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:00 PM, Craig Weinberg  
>>> wrote: 
>>> > What does it mean to 'lose control' of something? 
>>> > 
>>> > Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler... 
>>> > 
>>> > What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking 
>>> about 
>>> > when we refer to this, and why is it something that can have 
>>> consequences 
>>> > considered to be 'serious'? 
>>> > 
>>> > It would seem that the legacy view is to simply deny that this phrase 
>>> refers 
>>> > to anything in particular. All processes are simply probabilistic 
>>> exchanges 
>>> > and clockwork mechanisms which are not 'controlled' by anything in 
>>> > particular to begin with. 
>>> > 
>>> > Craig 
>>> > 
>>> > -- 
>>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
>>> Groups 
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>>>
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>>> > https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out.
>>> >  
>>>
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>>
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>>  
>>
>
>
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Re: Losing Control

[Alberto G. Corona]

Again the shorcomings of nominamism/positivism. The greeks would laugh at
these questions. It can be explained if we abandon the monomaniatic
reductionistic physicalism and think in terms of just what we are: rational
beings:

I think that the notion of "lost control of something" in an intelligent
being -who think about future events in order to plan adequate actions in
advance- means that he can no longer preview what will happen next, so he
has no advanced plans, se has no control of the situation.

"Serious consequences" : The mind uses analogies and semantic to compress
information storage and communication. Serious means hard, severe,
important, not to be dismissed. Applied to consequences, it means that it
will be important to make plans to avoid them


2013/3/15 Craig Weinberg 

>
>
> On Friday, March 15, 2013 2:06:50 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>>
>> Apparently the legacy view negates free will.
>>
>
> I think it does in many people's minds - or it would if they took their
> own beliefs seriously.
>
> Craig
>
>
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:00 PM, Craig Weinberg 
>> wrote:
>> > What does it mean to 'lose control' of something?
>> >
>> > Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler...
>> >
>> > What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking
>> about
>> > when we refer to this, and why is it something that can have
>> consequences
>> > considered to be 'serious'?
>> >
>> > It would seem that the legacy view is to simply deny that this phrase
>> refers
>> > to anything in particular. All processes are simply probabilistic
>> exchanges
>> > and clockwork mechanisms which are not 'controlled' by anything in
>> > particular to begin with.
>> >
>> > Craig
>> >
>> > --
>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>> Groups
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>> an
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>> group/everything-list?hl=en.
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>> > https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out.
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>> >
>>
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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, March 15, 2013 2:06:50 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>
> Apparently the legacy view negates free will. 
>

I think it does in many people's minds - or it would if they took their own 
beliefs seriously.

Craig
 

>
> On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:00 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
> > What does it mean to 'lose control' of something? 
> > 
> > Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler... 
> > 
> > What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking 
> about 
> > when we refer to this, and why is it something that can have 
> consequences 
> > considered to be 'serious'? 
> > 
> > It would seem that the legacy view is to simply deny that this phrase 
> refers 
> > to anything in particular. All processes are simply probabilistic 
> exchanges 
> > and clockwork mechanisms which are not 'controlled' by anything in 
> > particular to begin with. 
> > 
> > Craig 
> > 
> > -- 
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>
> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. 
> > 
> > 
>

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Re: Losing Control

[Craig Weinberg]

On Friday, March 15, 2013 4:11:28 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 5:00 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
> > What does it mean to 'lose control' of something? 
> > 
> > Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler... 
> > 
> > What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking 
> about 
> > when we refer to this, and why is it something that can have 
> consequences 
> > considered to be 'serious'? 
> > 
> > It would seem that the legacy view is to simply deny that this phrase 
> refers 
> > to anything in particular. All processes are simply probabilistic 
> exchanges 
> > and clockwork mechanisms which are not 'controlled' by anything in 
> > particular to begin with. 
>
> You persist in saying that if the components of the system are 
> mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the 
> way the phrase is normally used. 
>

What do you mean by 'control'? Can you define it?

Craig 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Losing Control

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, Mar 16, 2013 at 5:00 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> What does it mean to 'lose control' of something?
>
> Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler...
>
> What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking about
> when we refer to this, and why is it something that can have consequences
> considered to be 'serious'?
>
> It would seem that the legacy view is to simply deny that this phrase refers
> to anything in particular. All processes are simply probabilistic exchanges
> and clockwork mechanisms which are not 'controlled' by anything in
> particular to begin with.

You persist in saying that if the components of the system are
mechanistic then the system cannot control something. That is not the
way the phrase is normally used.


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Re: Losing Control

[Richard Ruquist]

Apparently the legacy view negates free will.

On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:00 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
> What does it mean to 'lose control' of something?
>
> Your car, your bladder, your gambling, your pet Rottweiler...
>
> What are the broad physical principles involved? What are we talking about
> when we refer to this, and why is it something that can have consequences
> considered to be 'serious'?
>
> It would seem that the legacy view is to simply deny that this phrase refers
> to anything in particular. All processes are simply probabilistic exchanges
> and clockwork mechanisms which are not 'controlled' by anything in
> particular to begin with.
>
> Craig
>
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>

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