Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-20 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 15-sept.-06, à 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Yes, that's just what I would say. The only purpose served by the rock is to provide the real world dynamism part of the computation, even if it does this simply by mapping lines of code to the otherwise idle passage of time. The

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): OK, but then you have the situation whereby a very complex, and to our mind disorganised, conscious computer might be designed and built by aliens, then discovered by us after the aliens have become extinct and their design blueprints, programming manuals

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-16 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 16-sept.-06, à 10:10, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : 5) Re a fatal test for the Turing machine? Give it exquisite novelty by asking it to do science on an unknown area of the natural world. Proper science. It will fail because it does not know there is an outside world. And you

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-16 Thread 1Z
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: Q. What is it like to be a human? It is like being a mind. There is information delivered into the mind by the action of brain material which bestows on the human intrinsic knowledge about the natural world outside the humanin the form of phenomenal

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-16 Thread 1Z
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: Q. What is it like to be a human? It is like being a mind. There is information delivered into the mind by the action of brain material which bestows on the human intrinsic knowledge about the natural world outside the

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-16 Thread Brent Meeker
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: ... COLIN: Hi a bunch of points... 1) Re paper.. it is undergoing review and growing.. The point of the paper is to squash the solipsism argument ...in particular the specific flavour of it that deals with 'other minds' and as it has (albeit tacitly)

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Colin Hales writes: Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the zombie. Add a capacity to detect regularity in the

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2006 04:43:54 -0700 Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer No, I haven't! I have tried

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me on the list, and I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every physical system implements every

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me on the list, and I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every physical system

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: What if the computer is built according to some ridiculously complex plan, plugged in, then all the engineers, manuals, etc. disappear. If it was conscious to begin with, does it suddenly cease being conscious because no-one is able to understand it? If it was

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: We would understand it in a third person sense but not in a first person sense, except by analogy with our own first person experience. Consciousness is the difference between what can be known by observing an entity and what can be known by being the entity, or

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-15 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2006 04:43:54 -0700 Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-15 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me on the list, and I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-15 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-15 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Colin Hales writes: Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the zombie. Add a capacity to

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: That is what I mean when I say that any computation can map onto any physical system. The physical structure and activity of computer A implementing program a may be completely different to that of computer B implementing program b, but

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in rather simple cases, like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and it can also be implemented so we can interact with it, as when there is a collection of 5

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent meeker writes: We would understand it in a third person sense but not in a first person sense, except by analogy with our own first person experience. Consciousness is the difference between what can be known by observing an entity and what can be known by being the entity,

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-14 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: I don't recall anything about all computations implementing consciousness? Brent Meeker OK, this is the basis of our disagreement. I understood computationalism as the idea that it is the actual computation that gives rise to

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in rather simple cases, like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and it can also be implemented so we can interact with it, as when there is

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: We would understand it in a third person sense but not in a first person sense, except by analogy with our own first person experience. Consciousness is the difference between what can be known by observing an entity and what can be known

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
be rich. Stathis Papaioannou From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2006 09:15:12 -0700 Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I could make

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-13 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: If consciousness supervenes on inherent non-interprtation-dependent features, it can supervene on features which are binary, either present or absent. For instance, whether a programme examines or modifies its own code is surely

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-13 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of computationalism have used

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-13 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-13 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Thanks for the quotes from Dennett's Freedom Evolves. The physiological experiments are interesting, but the fact is, even if they can be shown to be flawed in some way, it would still be entirely consistent with our behaviour and our subjective experience of

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-13 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me on the list, and I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every physical system implements every conscious computation, no

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-13 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me on the list, and I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every physical system implements every conscious

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-13 Thread Brent Meeker
1Z wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Thanks for the quotes from Dennett's Freedom Evolves. The physiological experiments are interesting, but the fact is, even if they can be shown to be flawed in some way, it would still be entirely consistent with our behaviour and our subjective

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-13 Thread Brent Meeker
1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me on the list, and I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every physical system implements every conscious

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-13 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: Didn't what?...decide we had acted freely?...noticed? if we noticed our decisions at the same time as we made them. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent meeker writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that it is the case if computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used the self-evident

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2006 13:10:52 -0700 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I think we need to say what it means

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent meeker writes: I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of computationalism have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any conscious computation as

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Colin Hales writes: Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the zombie. Add a capacity to detect regularity in the

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent meeker writes (quoting SP): Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically possible to explain what consciousness *is* unless you have it. Not being *logically* possible means entailing a contradiction - I doubt that. But anyway you do have it and you

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences of assuming it must. It

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your abacus has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of the tenets of computationalism. Some time later, you are walking

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me on the list, and I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every physical system implements every conscious computation, no physical system implements any

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: We should ask ourselves how do we know the thermometer isn't conscious of the temperature? It seems that the answer has been that it's state or activity *could* be intepreted in

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of computationalism have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of computationalism have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly withdraw it's hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the robot with feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of computationalism have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Colin Hales writes: Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the zombie. Add a capacity to detect

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes (quoting SP): Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically possible to explain what consciousness *is* unless you have it. Not being *logically* possible means entailing a contradiction - I doubt that. But anyway

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Brent Meeker
1Z wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: We should ask ourselves how do we know the thermometer isn't conscious of the temperature? It seems that the answer has been that it's state or activity *could* be intepreted in

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that it is the case if computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Brent Meeker
1Z wrote: ... Dennett's idea of stored conscious volition is quite in line with our theory. Indeed, we would like to extend it in a way that Dennett does not. We would like to extend it to stored indeterminism. Any decision we make in exigent situations wher we do nto have the luxury of

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences of assuming it must. It seems to

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your abacus has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of the tenets of computationalism.

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me on the list, and I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every physical system implements every conscious computation, no physical system implements any

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences of assuming it must. It

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your abacus has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of the tenets of

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me on the list, and I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every physical system implements every conscious computation, no physical system

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Colin Hales
Brent Meeker: Colin Hales wrote: Stathis Papaioannou snip Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically possible to explain what consciousness *is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a blind man: he might be the world's greatest

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: If consciousness supervenes on inherent non-interprtation-dependent features, it can supervene on features which are binary, either present or absent. For instance, whether a programme examines or modifies its own code is surely such a feature. Even if

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Colin Hales wrote: ... As far as the internal life of the CPU is concerned... whatever it is like to be an electrically noisy hot rock, regardless of the programalthough the character of the noise may alter with different programs! That's like say whatever it is like to be you, it is

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of computationalism have used the absurdity of the conclusion that

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-12 Thread Colin Hales
Brent Meeker: Colin Hales wrote: ... As far as the internal life of the CPU is concerned... whatever it is like to be an electrically noisy hot rock, regardless of the programalthough the character of the noise may alter with different programs! That's like say whatever it is

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that it is the case if computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used the self-evident absurdity of the idea as an argument demonstrating that

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: I think we need to say what it means for a computation to be self-interpreting. Many control programs are written with self-monitoring functions and logging functions. Why would we not attribute consciousness to them? Well, why not? Some people don't even think

RE : computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Bruno Marchal
Brent Meeker wrote (through many posts): I won't insist, because you might be right, but I don't think that is proven. It may be that interaction with the environment is essential to continued consciousness. Assuming comp, I think that this is a red herring. To make this clear I

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that it is the case if computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used the self-evident absurdity of the idea as an

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I think we need to say what it means for a computation to be self-interpreting. Many control programs are written with self-monitoring functions and logging functions. Why would we not attribute consciousness to them? Well, why not?

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious-computation; since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're thinking, since there a practical infinity of maps (even a countable infinity if you allow one-many) there is

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of computationalism have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any conscious computation as

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Colin Hales
-Original Message- Stathis Papaioannou Brent Meeker writes: Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious- computation; since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're thinking, since there a practical infinity of maps (even a

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious-computation; since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're thinking, since there a practical infinity of maps (even a countable infinity if you

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of computationalism have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any conscious

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent meeker writes: I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly withdraw it's hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the robot with feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it would be conscious.

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Colin Hales
Stathis Papaioannou snip Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically possible to explain what consciousness *is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a blind man: he might be the world's greatest scientific expert on it but still have

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly withdraw it's hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the robot with feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Colin Hales wrote: Stathis Papaioannou snip Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically possible to explain what consciousness *is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a blind man: he might be the world's greatest scientific expert on it

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly withdraw it's hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the robot with feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it would be conscious. But

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences of assuming it must. It seems to me that some sort of

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your abacus has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of the tenets of computationalism. Some time later, you are walking in the Amazon rain forest

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-10 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: With physical supervenience, it is possible for the same person to supervene on multiple physical objects. What is disallowed is multiple persons to supervene on the same physical object. That

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-10 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly withdraw it's hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the robot with feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-10 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences of assuming it must. It seems to me

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: A non-conscious computation cannot be *useful* without the manual/interpretation, and in this sense could be called just a potential computation, but a conscious computation is still *conscious* even if no-one else is able to figure this out or interact with

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: A non-conscious computation cannot be *useful* without the manual/interpretation, and in this sense could be called just a potential computation, but a conscious computation is still *conscious* even if no-one else is able to figure this out

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread 1Z
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le jeudi 7 septembre 2006 14:14, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 06-sept.-06, à 21:59, 1Z a écrit : Of course it is not natural, or we would not have two separate words for possible and actual. Well, Platonist theories are counter-intuitive.

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: That's not very interesting for non-conscious computations, because they are only useful or meaningful if they can be observed or interact with their environment. However, a conscious computation is interesting all on its own. It might have a fuller life if it

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 07-sept.-06, à 01:56, Russell Standish a écrit : This simplest way of addressing this is to use your dovetailer instead of quantum multiverses, which tends to confuse people, and get associated with quantum mysticism. The dovetailer is obviously computable, but not the internal trace of

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 07-sept.-06, à 03:19, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Why do you disagree that one of the bitstrings is conscious? It seems to me that the subcollection of bitstrings that corresponds to the actions of a program emulating a person under all possible inputs is a collection of multiple

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 07-sept.-06, à 06:21, Brent Meeker a écrit : This seems to me very close to saying that every conscious computation is implemented necessarily in Platonia, as the physical reality seems hardly relevant. It seems to me to be very close to a reductio ad absurdum. Reductio ad

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 07-sept.-06, à 14:14, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 06-sept.-06, à 21:59, 1Z a écrit : Of course it is not natural, or we would not have two separate words for possible and actual. Well, Platonist theories are counter-intuitive. Aristotle is the one responsible to make us

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 07-sept.-06, à 16:42, 1Z a écrit : Rationalists, and hence everythingists, are no better off because they still have to appeal to some contingent brute fact, that *onl* mathemematical (or computational) entities exist, even if *all* such entities do. (Platonia is broad but flat). Since

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: A non-conscious computation cannot be *useful* without the manual/interpretation, and in this sense could be called just a potential computation, but a conscious computation is still *conscious* even if no-one else is able to figure this out

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread Brent Meeker
1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: That's not very interesting for non-conscious computations, because they are only useful or meaningful if they can be observed or interact with their environment. However, a conscious computation is interesting all on its own. It might have a fuller life if

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 07-sept.-06, à 06:21, Brent Meeker a écrit : This seems to me very close to saying that every conscious computation is implemented necessarily in Platonia, as the physical reality seems hardly relevant. It seems to me to be very close to a reductio ad absurdum.

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 07-sept.-06, à 16:42, 1Z a écrit : Rationalists, and hence everythingists, are no better off because they still have to appeal to some contingent brute fact, that *onl* mathemematical (or computational) entities exist, even if *all* such entities do. (Platonia

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-08 Thread 1Z
Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: That's not very interesting for non-conscious computations, because they are only useful or meaningful if they can be observed or interact with their environment. However, a conscious computation is interesting all on its own. It

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-07 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 05-sept.-06, à 20:49, 1Z a écrit : That is the answer Stathis wants, but it doesn't work. Whether a computation is self-interpreting or not is itself a matter of interpretation, given his premises. He seems to need some sort of interpretation-independently self-interpreting system to

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-07 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: Let's not try to define consciousness at all, but agree that we know what it is from personal experience. Computationalism is the theory that consciousness arises as a result of computer activity: that our brains are just complex computers,

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-06 Thread Hal Finney
Russel Standish writes: Or my point that in a Multiverse, counterfactuals are instantiated anyway. Physical supervenience and computationalism are not incompatible in a multiverse, where physical means the observed properties of things like electrons and so on. I'd think that in the context

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-09-06 Thread Russell Standish
On Wed, Sep 06, 2006 at 12:25:10AM -0700, Hal Finney wrote: I'd think that in the context of a multiverse, physical supervenience would say that whether consciousness is instantiated would depend only on physical conditions here, at this point in the multiverse, and would not depend on

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