Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Michael Rosefield]

The trouble with this whole area is that it's so incredibly easy to
not-quite understand each other without quite realising it. It's like that
Wilde quote: "England and America are two countries separated by a common
language."

I think I understand you, though

As regards the crystal, I think the best way to put it is that I'm thinking
in terms of 'possible contexts'; for every selected object, it could belong
in a number of supporting universes. My mind, for example, could be in a
physical body, a brain in a jar, or an abstract software emulation, etc...
and each of these possibilities has an infinite variety of instances. As far
as I'm concerned, I always exist in all the possible universes that can
generate my consiousness. And each universe can have its own set of
metaphysical contexts, etc.

I think I'm departing from my point rapidly, so I'll try another way. It's
like an inverted form of Kaufmann's 'adjacent possible', which is all the
possible ways a system may evolve next, and what features they may have.
Rather, this takes a feature of a system and asks what its immediate
possible surroudings/precursors are.

Oh, and the holy trinity thing was a term I just thought of -- but what I
mean to convey is that I think of reality as a bit like a fractal; you can
take a little bit of it and it will generate the complete form. In this way
the whole is equivalent to any bit plus the generational principle (growth
algorithm). Actually, I suppose the generational principle by itself should
be able to form the whole from scratch. Perhaps there are a number of
different principles you could have; they will 'grow out' in different ways,
but ultimately lead to the same whole.

Excuse me if I make absolutely no sense. I find language to be a real
problem when it comes to communicating this sort of thing



2008/8/21 John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

> Redface - ME!
> Michael, you picked my careless statement and I want to correct it:
> "...You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple parts..."
> should refer to THOSE parts we know of, observe, include, select, handle, -
> not ALL of the (unlimited, incl.  potential) parts (simple or not). From
> such ALL parts together (a topical oxymoron) you can(?) build anything,
> although it does not make sense.
>
> What I had in mind was a cut, a structural, functional, ideational  select
> model (system organization) FROM which you have no way to expand into the
> application of originally not included items.
> I agree with your 'whole caboodle' as a deterministic product (complexity),
> as far as its entailment is concerned. I don't understand "holy trinities" -
> yours included.
>
> "Growing out" your -it*- requires IMO the substrates it* grows by, - by
> addition - I dislike miraculous creations. A crystal grows by absorbing the
> ingredients already present. Cf (my) entail-determinism (- no goal or aim).
>
> John
>
>
> On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 8:32 AM, Michael Rosefield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > wrote:
>
>> "You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple parts"
>>
>> That would be the case if we were trying to reconstruct an arbitrary
>> universe, but you were talking about 'the totality'. My take is that the
>> whole caboodle is not arbitrary - it's totally specified by its requirement
>> to be complete. You could take a little bit of it* and 'grow' it out like a
>> crystal in some kind of fractal kaleidoscopic space; eventually its
>> exploration would completely fill it. This makes a kind of holy trinity of
>> equivalence of (Whole | Parts | Process) which I like.
>>
>>
>>
>> * That little bit could even be unitary or empty in nature, solving for me
>> the issue as to why something rather than nothing, and why anything in
>> particular.
>>
>> 2008/8/20 John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>>
>>> Brent wrote:
>>>
>>> "...But if one can reconstruct "the rest of the world" from these simpler
>>> domains, so much the better that they are simple"
>>>
>>> Paraphrased (facetiously): you have a painting of a landscape with
>>> mountains, river, people, animals, sky and plants. Call that 'the totality'
>>> and *select the animals as your model* (disregarding the rest) even you
>>> continue by Occam - reject the non-4-legged ones, to make it (even) simpler.
>>> ((All you have is some beasts in a frame))
>>> Now try to *"reconstruct"* the 'rest of the total' ONLY from those
>>> remnant 'model-elements' dreaming up (?) mountains, sunshine, river etc.
>>> *from nowhere*, not even from your nonexisting fantasy, or even(2!) as
>>> you say: from the *Occam-simple*, i.e. as you say: from those few
>>> 4-legged animals, - to make it even simpler.
>>> Good luck.
>>> You must be a 'creator', or a 'cheater', having at least seen the *total
>>> *to do so. You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple
>>> parts  -  you are restricted to the (reduced?) inventory you have - in a
>>> synthesis, (while in the analysis you can restrict yourself to a choice of

Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[John Mikes]

Redface - ME!
Michael, you picked my careless statement and I want to correct it:
"...You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple parts..."
should refer to THOSE parts we know of, observe, include, select, handle, -
not ALL of the (unlimited, incl.  potential) parts (simple or not). From
such ALL parts together (a topical oxymoron) you can(?) build anything,
although it does not make sense.

What I had in mind was a cut, a structural, functional, ideational  select
model (system organization) FROM which you have no way to expand into the
application of originally not included items.
I agree with your 'whole caboodle' as a deterministic product (complexity),
as far as its entailment is concerned. I don't understand "holy trinities" -
yours included.

"Growing out" your -it*- requires IMO the substrates it* grows by, - by
addition - I dislike miraculous creations. A crystal grows by absorbing the
ingredients already present. Cf (my) entail-determinism (- no goal or aim).

John

On Thu, Aug 21, 2008 at 8:32 AM, Michael Rosefield
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:

> "You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple parts"
>
> That would be the case if we were trying to reconstruct an arbitrary
> universe, but you were talking about 'the totality'. My take is that the
> whole caboodle is not arbitrary - it's totally specified by its requirement
> to be complete. You could take a little bit of it* and 'grow' it out like a
> crystal in some kind of fractal kaleidoscopic space; eventually its
> exploration would completely fill it. This makes a kind of holy trinity of
> equivalence of (Whole | Parts | Process) which I like.
>
>
>
> * That little bit could even be unitary or empty in nature, solving for me
> the issue as to why something rather than nothing, and why anything in
> particular.
>
> 2008/8/20 John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
>> Brent wrote:
>>
>> "...But if one can reconstruct "the rest of the world" from these simpler
>> domains, so much the better that they are simple"
>>
>> Paraphrased (facetiously): you have a painting of a landscape with
>> mountains, river, people, animals, sky and plants. Call that 'the totality'
>> and *select the animals as your model* (disregarding the rest) even you
>> continue by Occam - reject the non-4-legged ones, to make it (even) simpler.
>> ((All you have is some beasts in a frame))
>> Now try to *"reconstruct"* the 'rest of the total' ONLY from those
>> remnant 'model-elements' dreaming up (?) mountains, sunshine, river etc.
>> *from nowhere*, not even from your nonexisting fantasy, or even(2!) as
>> you say: from the *Occam-simple*, i.e. as you say: from those few
>> 4-legged animals, - to make it even simpler.
>> Good luck.
>> You must be a 'creator', or a 'cheater', having at least seen the *total
>> *to do so. You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple
>> parts  -  you are restricted to the (reduced?) inventory you have - in a
>> synthesis, (while in the analysis you can restrict yourself to a choice of
>> it. )
>>
>> John
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Aug 19, 2008 at 3:19 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> John Mikes wrote:
>>> > Isn't logical inconsistency = insanity? (Depends how we formulate the
>>> > state of being "sane".)
>>>
>>> As Bertrand Russell pointed out, if you are perfectly consistent you are
>>> either
>>> 100% right or 100% wrong.  Human fallibility being what it is, don't bet
>>> on
>>> being 100% right.  :-)
>>>
>>> In classical logic, an inconsistency allows you to prove every
>>> propositon.  In a
>>> para-consistent logic the rules of inference are changed (e.g. by
>>> restoring the
>>> excluded middle) so that an inconsistency doesn't allow you to prove
>>> everything.
>>>
>>> Graham Priest has written a couple of interesting books arguing that all
>>> logic
>>> beyond the narrow mathematical domain leads to inconsistencies and so we
>>> need to
>>> have ways to deal with them.
>>>
>>> > Simplicity in my vocabulary of the 'totality-view' means mainly to
>>> "cut"
>>> > our model of observation narrower and narrower to eliminate more and
>>> > more from the "rest of the world" (which only would complicate things)
>>> > from our chosen topic of the actual interest in our observational field
>>> > (our topical model).
>>> > Occam's razor is a classic in such simplification.
>>>
>>> And so is mathematical logic and arithmetic.  But if one can reconstruct
>>> "the
>>> rest of the world" from these simpler domains, so much the better that
>>> they are
>>> simple.
>>>
>>> Brent Meeker
>>>
>>> > John M
>>> >
>>> > On 8/18/08, *Bruno Marchal* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>> > > wrote:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > On 18 Aug 2008, at 03:45, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> >
>>> >  > Sorry.  I quite agree with you.  I regard logic and mathematics
>>> > as our
>>> >  > inventions - not restrictions on the world, but restrictions we
>>> >  > place on how we
>>> >  > think and talk about th

Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Michael Rosefield]

"You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple parts"

That would be the case if we were trying to reconstruct an arbitrary
universe, but you were talking about 'the totality'. My take is that the
whole caboodle is not arbitrary - it's totally specified by its requirement
to be complete. You could take a little bit of it* and 'grow' it out like a
crystal in some kind of fractal kaleidoscopic space; eventually its
exploration would completely fill it. This makes a kind of holy trinity of
equivalence of (Whole | Parts | Process) which I like.



* That little bit could even be unitary or empty in nature, solving for me
the issue as to why something rather than nothing, and why anything in
particular.

2008/8/20 John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

> Brent wrote:
> "...But if one can reconstruct "the rest of the world" from these simpler
> domains, so much the better that they are simple"
>
> Paraphrased (facetiously): you have a painting of a landscape with
> mountains, river, people, animals, sky and plants. Call that 'the totality'
> and *select the animals as your model* (disregarding the rest) even you
> continue by Occam - reject the non-4-legged ones, to make it (even) simpler.
> ((All you have is some beasts in a frame))
> Now try to *"reconstruct"* the 'rest of the total' ONLY from those remnant
> 'model-elements' dreaming up (?) mountains, sunshine, river etc. *from
> nowhere*, not even from your nonexisting fantasy, or even(2!) as you say:
> from the *Occam-simple*, i.e. as you say: from those few 4-legged animals,
> - to make it even simpler.
> Good luck.
> You must be a 'creator', or a 'cheater', having at least seen the *total *to
> do so. You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple parts  -
> you are restricted to the (reduced?) inventory you have - in a synthesis,
> (while in the analysis you can restrict yourself to a choice of it. )
>
> John
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 19, 2008 at 3:19 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:
>
>>
>> John Mikes wrote:
>> > Isn't logical inconsistency = insanity? (Depends how we formulate the
>> > state of being "sane".)
>>
>> As Bertrand Russell pointed out, if you are perfectly consistent you are
>> either
>> 100% right or 100% wrong.  Human fallibility being what it is, don't bet
>> on
>> being 100% right.  :-)
>>
>> In classical logic, an inconsistency allows you to prove every propositon.
>>  In a
>> para-consistent logic the rules of inference are changed (e.g. by
>> restoring the
>> excluded middle) so that an inconsistency doesn't allow you to prove
>> everything.
>>
>> Graham Priest has written a couple of interesting books arguing that all
>> logic
>> beyond the narrow mathematical domain leads to inconsistencies and so we
>> need to
>> have ways to deal with them.
>>
>> > Simplicity in my vocabulary of the 'totality-view' means mainly to "cut"
>> > our model of observation narrower and narrower to eliminate more and
>> > more from the "rest of the world" (which only would complicate things)
>> > from our chosen topic of the actual interest in our observational field
>> > (our topical model).
>> > Occam's razor is a classic in such simplification.
>>
>> And so is mathematical logic and arithmetic.  But if one can reconstruct
>> "the
>> rest of the world" from these simpler domains, so much the better that
>> they are
>> simple.
>>
>> Brent Meeker
>>
>> > John M
>> >
>> > On 8/18/08, *Bruno Marchal* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> > > wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On 18 Aug 2008, at 03:45, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> >
>> >  > Sorry.  I quite agree with you.  I regard logic and mathematics
>> > as our
>> >  > inventions - not restrictions on the world, but restrictions we
>> >  > place on how we
>> >  > think and talk about the world.  We can change them as in para-
>> >  > consistent logics.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > I think it depends of the domain of inquiry or application.
>> > Para-consistent logic can be interesting for the laws and in natural
>> > language mind processing, but hardly in elementary computer science
>> or
>> > number theory.
>> >
>> > Then recall that any universal machine, enough good in the art of
>> > remaining correct during introspection, discovers eventually at
>> least
>> > 8 non classical logics (the arithmetical hypostases) most of them
>> > being near "paraconsistency" (by Godel's consistency of
>> inconsistency)
>> > making the most sane machine always very near insanity.
>> > And so easily falling down.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Bruno
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > >
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> >
>

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[John Mikes]

Qhentin wrote:
"...It sounds like a bit like 'we can't know what is the ultimate real
(truth ?) at all',..."

 - - - RIGHT - - -

We have a *partial* info of the - what could be called - *reality,* even
that in our own interpretation (fitting our mental capabilities) what I call
(after Colin Hales' mini-solipsism) a "perceived reality"  - still NOT  the
(real?)  TRUTH. Not even a 'perceived one'. (Whose truth?)

Your defeatist pessimism in the 2nd par is true, but don't give up:
with that ignorance what we proudly call knowledge we came a long road from
the blue-green algae. Or from what some may call Big Bang.
*
I love your poetic PS-line, except for basing it on *time* - an attribute of
*our* -* who is that *-  (ignorant? ha ha) scientific worldview-figment in
this  universe.

John

On Wed, Aug 20, 2008 at 3:16 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>
> Hi,
>
> 2008/8/20 John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> > Brent wrote:
> > "...But if one can reconstruct "the rest of the world" from these simpler
> > domains, so much the better that they are simple"
> >
> > Paraphrased (facetiously): you have a painting of a landscape with
> > mountains, river, people, animals, sky and plants. Call that 'the
> totality'
> > and select the animals as your model (disregarding the rest) even you
> > continue by Occam - reject the non-4-legged ones, to make it (even)
> simpler.
> > ((All you have is some beasts in a frame))
> > Now try to "reconstruct" the 'rest of the total' ONLY from those remnant
> > 'model-elements' dreaming up (?) mountains, sunshine, river etc. from
> > nowhere, not even from your nonexisting fantasy, or even(2!) as you say:
> > from the Occam-simple, i.e. as you say: from those few 4-legged animals,
> -
> > to make it even simpler.
> > Good luck.
> > You must be a 'creator', or a 'cheater', having at least seen the total
> to
> > do so. You cannot build up unknown complexity from its simple parts  -
>  you
> > are restricted to the (reduced?) inventory you have - in a synthesis,
> (while
> > in the analysis you can restrict yourself to a choice of it. )
> >
> > John
> >
>
> It sounds like a bit like 'we can't know what is the ultimate real
> (truth ?) at all', and can only have a restricted/erroneous view on it
> because the real is not the views we have on it... our real models
> are, the real itself isn't. It's not the model and cannot be equate to
> it. But we can only apprehend reality through a model/representation
> we have in our mind.
>
> Then it is not even false to say  'we can't know in an absolute sense
> what is the ultimate real', but whatever the real real is, if this
> real real thing is not modelisable nor thinkable (in an absolute
> sense), then there is no sense of wondering or speaking of it, we
> can't know what can't be known by definition.
>
> Quentin
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>
> >
>

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi,

2008/8/20 John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Brent wrote:
> "...But if one can reconstruct "the rest of the world" from these simpler
> domains, so much the better that they are simple"
>
> Paraphrased (facetiously): you have a painting of a landscape with
> mountains, river, people, animals, sky and plants. Call that 'the totality'
> and select the animals as your model (disregarding the rest) even you
> continue by Occam - reject the non-4-legged ones, to make it (even) simpler.
> ((All you have is some beasts in a frame))
> Now try to "reconstruct" the 'rest of the total' ONLY from those remnant
> 'model-elements' dreaming up (?) mountains, sunshine, river etc. from
> nowhere, not even from your nonexisting fantasy, or even(2!) as you say:
> from the Occam-simple, i.e. as you say: from those few 4-legged animals, -
> to make it even simpler.
> Good luck.
> You must be a 'creator', or a 'cheater', having at least seen the total to
> do so. You cannot build up unknown complexity from its simple parts  -  you
> are restricted to the (reduced?) inventory you have - in a synthesis, (while
> in the analysis you can restrict yourself to a choice of it. )
>
> John
>

It sounds like a bit like 'we can't know what is the ultimate real
(truth ?) at all', and can only have a restricted/erroneous view on it
because the real is not the views we have on it... our real models
are, the real itself isn't. It's not the model and cannot be equate to
it. But we can only apprehend reality through a model/representation
we have in our mind.

Then it is not even false to say  'we can't know in an absolute sense
what is the ultimate real', but whatever the real real is, if this
real real thing is not modelisable nor thinkable (in an absolute
sense), then there is no sense of wondering or speaking of it, we
can't know what can't be known by definition.

Quentin
-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Brent Meeker]

John Mikes wrote:
> Brent wrote:
> "...But if one can reconstruct "the rest of the world" from these 
> simpler domains, so much the better that they are simple"
> 
> Paraphrased (facetiously): you have a painting of a landscape with 
> mountains, river, people, animals, sky and plants. Call that 'the 
> totality' and /select the animals as your model/ (disregarding the rest) 
> even you continue by Occam - reject the non-4-legged ones, to make it 
> (even) simpler. ((All you have is some beasts in a frame))
> Now try to *"reconstruct"* the 'rest of the total' ONLY from those 
> remnant 'model-elements' dreaming up (?) mountains, sunshine, river etc. 
> _from nowhere_, not even from your nonexisting fantasy, or even(2!) as 
> you say: from the /_Occam-simple_/, i.e. as you say: from those few 
> 4-legged animals, - to make it even simpler.
> Good luck.

So you've chosen the wrong "simpler domain".  If you had chosen red, green, 
blue, in small areas and increments of intensity (aka "pixels") you could have 
reproduced the painting.

> You must be a 'creator', or a 'cheater', having at least seen the *total 
> *to do so. 

That's the difference between "reconstruct" and "construct".

Brent

>You cannot /build up/ unknown complexity from its simple 
> parts  -  you are restricted to the (reduced?) inventory you have - in a 
> synthesis, (while in the analysis you can restrict yourself to a choice 
> of it. )
> 
> John
> 
> On Tue, Aug 19, 2008 at 3:19 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> John Mikes wrote:
>  > Isn't logical inconsistency = insanity? (Depends how we formulate the
>  > state of being "sane".)
> 
> As Bertrand Russell pointed out, if you are perfectly consistent you
> are either
> 100% right or 100% wrong.  Human fallibility being what it is, don't
> bet on
> being 100% right.  :-)
> 
> In classical logic, an inconsistency allows you to prove every
> propositon.  In a
> para-consistent logic the rules of inference are changed (e.g. by
> restoring the
> excluded middle) so that an inconsistency doesn't allow you to prove
> everything.
> 
> Graham Priest has written a couple of interesting books arguing that
> all logic
> beyond the narrow mathematical domain leads to inconsistencies and
> so we need to
> have ways to deal with them.
> 
>  > Simplicity in my vocabulary of the 'totality-view' means mainly
> to "cut"
>  > our model of observation narrower and narrower to eliminate more and
>  > more from the "rest of the world" (which only would complicate
> things)
>  > from our chosen topic of the actual interest in our observational
> field
>  > (our topical model).
>  > Occam's razor is a classic in such simplification.
> 
> And so is mathematical logic and arithmetic.  But if one can
> reconstruct "the
> rest of the world" from these simpler domains, so much the better
> that they are
> simple.
> 
> Brent Meeker
> 
>  > John M
>  >
>  > On 8/18/08, *Bruno Marchal* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 
>  > >> wrote:
>  >
>  >
>  >
>  > On 18 Aug 2008, at 03:45, Brent Meeker wrote:
>  >
>  >  > Sorry.  I quite agree with you.  I regard logic and
> mathematics
>  > as our
>  >  > inventions - not restrictions on the world, but
> restrictions we
>  >  > place on how we
>  >  > think and talk about the world.  We can change them as in
> para-
>  >  > consistent logics.
>  >
>  >
>  >
>  >
>  > I think it depends of the domain of inquiry or application.
>  > Para-consistent logic can be interesting for the laws and in
> natural
>  > language mind processing, but hardly in elementary computer
> science or
>  > number theory.
>  >
>  > Then recall that any universal machine, enough good in the art of
>  > remaining correct during introspection, discovers eventually
> at least
>  > 8 non classical logics (the arithmetical hypostases) most of them
>  > being near "paraconsistency" (by Godel's consistency of
> inconsistency)
>  > making the most sane machine always very near insanity.
>  > And so easily falling down.
>  >
>  >
>  >
>  > Bruno
>  >
>  >
>  >
>  > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
>  >
>  >
>  >
>  >
>  >
>  >
>  > >
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 


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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[John Mikes]

Brent wrote:
"...But if one can reconstruct "the rest of the world" from these simpler
domains, so much the better that they are simple"

Paraphrased (facetiously): you have a painting of a landscape with
mountains, river, people, animals, sky and plants. Call that 'the totality'
and *select the animals as your model* (disregarding the rest) even you
continue by Occam - reject the non-4-legged ones, to make it (even) simpler.
((All you have is some beasts in a frame))
Now try to *"reconstruct"* the 'rest of the total' ONLY from those remnant
'model-elements' dreaming up (?) mountains, sunshine, river etc. *from
nowhere*, not even from your nonexisting fantasy, or even(2!) as you say:
from the *Occam-simple*, i.e. as you say: from those few 4-legged animals, -
to make it even simpler.
Good luck.
You must be a 'creator', or a 'cheater', having at least seen the *total *to
do so. You cannot *build up* unknown complexity from its simple parts  -
you are restricted to the (reduced?) inventory you have - in a synthesis,
(while in the analysis you can restrict yourself to a choice of it. )

John

On Tue, Aug 19, 2008 at 3:19 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:

>
> John Mikes wrote:
> > Isn't logical inconsistency = insanity? (Depends how we formulate the
> > state of being "sane".)
>
> As Bertrand Russell pointed out, if you are perfectly consistent you are
> either
> 100% right or 100% wrong.  Human fallibility being what it is, don't bet on
> being 100% right.  :-)
>
> In classical logic, an inconsistency allows you to prove every propositon.
>  In a
> para-consistent logic the rules of inference are changed (e.g. by restoring
> the
> excluded middle) so that an inconsistency doesn't allow you to prove
> everything.
>
> Graham Priest has written a couple of interesting books arguing that all
> logic
> beyond the narrow mathematical domain leads to inconsistencies and so we
> need to
> have ways to deal with them.
>
> > Simplicity in my vocabulary of the 'totality-view' means mainly to "cut"
> > our model of observation narrower and narrower to eliminate more and
> > more from the "rest of the world" (which only would complicate things)
> > from our chosen topic of the actual interest in our observational field
> > (our topical model).
> > Occam's razor is a classic in such simplification.
>
> And so is mathematical logic and arithmetic.  But if one can reconstruct
> "the
> rest of the world" from these simpler domains, so much the better that they
> are
> simple.
>
> Brent Meeker
>
> > John M
> >
> > On 8/18/08, *Bruno Marchal* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On 18 Aug 2008, at 03:45, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >  > Sorry.  I quite agree with you.  I regard logic and mathematics
> > as our
> >  > inventions - not restrictions on the world, but restrictions we
> >  > place on how we
> >  > think and talk about the world.  We can change them as in para-
> >  > consistent logics.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > I think it depends of the domain of inquiry or application.
> > Para-consistent logic can be interesting for the laws and in natural
> > language mind processing, but hardly in elementary computer science
> or
> > number theory.
> >
> > Then recall that any universal machine, enough good in the art of
> > remaining correct during introspection, discovers eventually at least
> > 8 non classical logics (the arithmetical hypostases) most of them
> > being near "paraconsistency" (by Godel's consistency of
> inconsistency)
> > making the most sane machine always very near insanity.
> > And so easily falling down.
> >
> >
> >
> > Bruno
> >
> >
> >
> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > >
>
>
> >
>

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Brent Meeker]

John Mikes wrote:
> Isn't logical inconsistency = insanity? (Depends how we formulate the 
> state of being "sane".)

As Bertrand Russell pointed out, if you are perfectly consistent you are either 
100% right or 100% wrong.  Human fallibility being what it is, don't bet on 
being 100% right.  :-)

In classical logic, an inconsistency allows you to prove every propositon.  In 
a 
para-consistent logic the rules of inference are changed (e.g. by restoring the 
excluded middle) so that an inconsistency doesn't allow you to prove everything.

Graham Priest has written a couple of interesting books arguing that all logic 
beyond the narrow mathematical domain leads to inconsistencies and so we need 
to 
have ways to deal with them.

> Simplicity in my vocabulary of the 'totality-view' means mainly to "cut" 
> our model of observation narrower and narrower to eliminate more and 
> more from the "rest of the world" (which only would complicate things) 
> from our chosen topic of the actual interest in our observational field  
> (our topical model).
> Occam's razor is a classic in such simplification.

And so is mathematical logic and arithmetic.  But if one can reconstruct "the 
rest of the world" from these simpler domains, so much the better that they are 
simple.

Brent Meeker

> John M
> 
> On 8/18/08, *Bruno Marchal* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 18 Aug 2008, at 03:45, Brent Meeker wrote:
> 
>  > Sorry.  I quite agree with you.  I regard logic and mathematics
> as our
>  > inventions - not restrictions on the world, but restrictions we
>  > place on how we
>  > think and talk about the world.  We can change them as in para-
>  > consistent logics.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think it depends of the domain of inquiry or application.
> Para-consistent logic can be interesting for the laws and in natural
> language mind processing, but hardly in elementary computer science or
> number theory.
> 
> Then recall that any universal machine, enough good in the art of
> remaining correct during introspection, discovers eventually at least
> 8 non classical logics (the arithmetical hypostases) most of them
> being near "paraconsistency" (by Godel's consistency of inconsistency)
> making the most sane machine always very near insanity.
> And so easily falling down.
> 
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 


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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[John Mikes]

Isn't logical inconsistency = insanity? (Depends how we formulate the state
of being "sane".)
Simplicity in my vocabulary of the 'totality-view' means mainly to "cut" our
model of observation narrower and narrower to eliminate more and more from
the "rest of the world" (which only would complicate things) from our chosen
topic of the actual interest in our observational field  (our topical
model).
Occam's razor is a classic in such simplification.
John M

On 8/18/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 18 Aug 2008, at 03:45, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> > Sorry.  I quite agree with you.  I regard logic and mathematics as our
> > inventions - not restrictions on the world, but restrictions we
> > place on how we
> > think and talk about the world.  We can change them as in para-
> > consistent logics.
>
>
>
>
> I think it depends of the domain of inquiry or application.
> Para-consistent logic can be interesting for the laws and in natural
> language mind processing, but hardly in elementary computer science or
> number theory.
>
> Then recall that any universal machine, enough good in the art of
> remaining correct during introspection, discovers eventually at least
> 8 non classical logics (the arithmetical hypostases) most of them
> being near "paraconsistency" (by Godel's consistency of inconsistency)
> making the most sane machine always very near insanity.
> And so easily falling down.
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Aug 2008, at 03:45, Brent Meeker wrote:

> Sorry.  I quite agree with you.  I regard logic and mathematics as our
> inventions - not restrictions on the world, but restrictions we  
> place on how we
> think and talk about the world.  We can change them as in para- 
> consistent logics.




I think it depends of the domain of inquiry or application.
Para-consistent logic can be interesting for the laws and in natural  
language mind processing, but hardly in elementary computer science or  
number theory.

Then recall that any universal machine, enough good in the art of  
remaining correct during introspection, discovers eventually at least  
8 non classical logics (the arithmetical hypostases) most of them  
being near "paraconsistency" (by Godel's consistency of inconsistency)  
making the most sane machine always very near insanity.
And so easily falling down.



Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[John Mikes]

Brent,
thanx for the agreement, - however
"INVENTIONS"?
I feel more open than that, MAYBE (considering unlimited openness) there IS
something in the reality (which is not accessible to our feeble mentality)
that in some mental simplifying and planifying (? like digitalization) way
could lead to a DISCOVERY rather than invention.
Then we apply our Occam's crutches and 'simplify' the "overwhelming" into
'some logic' and 'Math'.
I go with D. Bohm that numbers are human inventions, but inventions have
some deterministic entailment from mostly unobserved (still unknown?) parts.

Then again to devise math (Math, cap., after Robert Rosen for the
theoretical rather than the applied) upon the 'other' simplification called
logic is no invention either.
Fuzzy logic IMO is closer to what we want to 'planify' than the strict
logical schools. We feel the inexpressable  and reduce its complexity (down
to Earth from above our head).
("Para-consistent"???)

Sorry for riding on words.

John


On Sun, Aug 17, 2008 at 9:45 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:

>
> John Mikes wrote:
> > Brent M,
> > please spare me  the arithmetic class.
> > I scribbled an example which may be wrong. So noted and I am ashamed.
> > I was referring to the concept of (our) /'axioms'/ - products of human
> > thinking to make our edifice of the cognitive inventory we carry *-
> > VALID*. I opened the possibility that a quite different view may exist
> > with maybe different 'axioms' - without going into theorizing about such.
> > And I won't.
> > I still hold that EVERYTHING is not restricted to our human ways - not
> > in logic, not in our so called possibilities, not in anything.
>
> Sorry.  I quite agree with you.  I regard logic and mathematics as our
> inventions - not restrictions on the world, but restrictions we place on
> how we
> think and talk about the world.  We can change them as in para-consistent
> logics.
>
> Brent
>
> > Best regards
> >  John Mikes
> >
> > On Sat, Aug 16, 2008 at 3:42 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >
> >
> > 1Z wrote:
> >  >
> >  >
> >  > On 15 Aug, 20:12, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > > wrote:
> >  >
> >  >> As for 1Z's axioms:
> >  >> In my vocabulary axioms are artifacts invented to make our
> theories
> >  >> workable. If 1 + 1 is NOT 2,
> >  >
> >  > How would that turn out the case?
> >  >
> >  >> you can say goodby to math.
> >
> > We define arithmetic so 1+1=2, but that's a particular model for
> > dealing with
> > distinguishable, discrete things.  It doesn't apply to everything,
> > e.g. (1
> > member of the U.S. 400m relay team) + (1 member of the U.S. 100m
> > sprint team) =
> > (1 member of the U.S. Olympic team).  And given quantum entanglement
> and
> > indistinquishability of particles it may only apply *approximately*
> > to things
> > like apples and oranges.  So if 1+1=/=2 it just means you tried to
> > apply a model
> > where it doesn't work.
> >
> > Brent Meeker
> >
> >  >> Furthermore I dislike the use of the word 'infinite' - in TEXTS
> > I  rather
> >  >> use: 'unlimited'.
> >  > >
> >  >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > >
>
>
> >
>

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Brent Meeker]

John Mikes wrote:
> Brent M,
> please spare me  the arithmetic class.
> I scribbled an example which may be wrong. So noted and I am ashamed.
> I was referring to the concept of (our) /'axioms'/ - products of human 
> thinking to make our edifice of the cognitive inventory we carry *- 
> VALID*. I opened the possibility that a quite different view may exist 
> with maybe different 'axioms' - without going into theorizing about such.
> And I won't.
> I still hold that EVERYTHING is not restricted to our human ways - not 
> in logic, not in our so called possibilities, not in anything.

Sorry.  I quite agree with you.  I regard logic and mathematics as our 
inventions - not restrictions on the world, but restrictions we place on how we 
think and talk about the world.  We can change them as in para-consistent 
logics.

Brent

> Best regards
>  John Mikes
> 
> On Sat, Aug 16, 2008 at 3:42 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> > wrote:
> 
> 
> 1Z wrote:
>  >
>  >
>  > On 15 Aug, 20:12, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > wrote:
>  >
>  >> As for 1Z's axioms:
>  >> In my vocabulary axioms are artifacts invented to make our theories
>  >> workable. If 1 + 1 is NOT 2,
>  >
>  > How would that turn out the case?
>  >
>  >> you can say goodby to math.
> 
> We define arithmetic so 1+1=2, but that's a particular model for
> dealing with
> distinguishable, discrete things.  It doesn't apply to everything,
> e.g. (1
> member of the U.S. 400m relay team) + (1 member of the U.S. 100m
> sprint team) =
> (1 member of the U.S. Olympic team).  And given quantum entanglement and
> indistinquishability of particles it may only apply *approximately*
> to things
> like apples and oranges.  So if 1+1=/=2 it just means you tried to
> apply a model
> where it doesn't work.
> 
> Brent Meeker
> 
>  >> Furthermore I dislike the use of the word 'infinite' - in TEXTS
> I  rather
>  >> use: 'unlimited'.
>  > >
>  >
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 


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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[John Mikes]

Brent M,
please spare me  the arithmetic class.
I scribbled an example which may be wrong. So noted and I am ashamed.
I was referring to the concept of (our) *'axioms'* - products of human
thinking to make our edifice of the cognitive inventory we carry *- VALID*.
I opened the possibility that a quite different view may exist with maybe
different 'axioms' - without going into theorizing about such.
And I won't.
I still hold that EVERYTHING is not restricted to our human ways - not in
logic, not in our so called possibilities, not in anything.
Best regards
 John Mikes

On Sat, Aug 16, 2008 at 3:42 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:

>
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 15 Aug, 20:12, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >> As for 1Z's axioms:
> >> In my vocabulary axioms are artifacts invented to make our theories
> >> workable. If 1 + 1 is NOT 2,
> >
> > How would that turn out the case?
> >
> >> you can say goodby to math.
>
> We define arithmetic so 1+1=2, but that's a particular model for dealing
> with
> distinguishable, discrete things.  It doesn't apply to everything, e.g. (1
> member of the U.S. 400m relay team) + (1 member of the U.S. 100m sprint
> team) =
> (1 member of the U.S. Olympic team).  And given quantum entanglement and
> indistinquishability of particles it may only apply *approximately* to
> things
> like apples and oranges.  So if 1+1=/=2 it just means you tried to apply a
> model
> where it doesn't work.
>
> Brent Meeker
>
> >> Furthermore I dislike the use of the word 'infinite' - in TEXTS I
>  rather
> >> use: 'unlimited'.
> > >
> >
>
>
> >
>

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Brent Meeker]

1Z wrote:
> 
> 
> On 15 Aug, 20:12, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
>> As for 1Z's axioms:
>> In my vocabulary axioms are artifacts invented to make our theories
>> workable. If 1 + 1 is NOT 2,
> 
> How would that turn out the case?
> 
>> you can say goodby to math.

We define arithmetic so 1+1=2, but that's a particular model for dealing with 
distinguishable, discrete things.  It doesn't apply to everything, e.g. (1 
member of the U.S. 400m relay team) + (1 member of the U.S. 100m sprint team) = 
(1 member of the U.S. Olympic team).  And given quantum entanglement and 
indistinquishability of particles it may only apply *approximately* to things 
like apples and oranges.  So if 1+1=/=2 it just means you tried to apply a 
model 
where it doesn't work.

Brent Meeker

>> Furthermore I dislike the use of the word 'infinite' - in TEXTS I  rather
>> use: 'unlimited'.
> > 
> 


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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[John Mikes]

Peter,
do you really expect from me upon one tiny sideline remark to redesign the
world? I just wanted to provide an idea why we have 'axioms' which we
(scinece) consider the sacrosanct cornerstones of the existence.
Ask the Zarathustrans in Cohen-Stewart: Collapse of Chaos.
John

On Sat, Aug 16, 2008 at 7:50 AM, 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>
>
>
> On 15 Aug, 20:12, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > As for 1Z's axioms:
> > In my vocabulary axioms are artifacts invented to make our theories
> > workable. If 1 + 1 is NOT 2,
>
> How would that turn out the case?
>
> > you can say goodby to math.
> > Furthermore I dislike the use of the word 'infinite' - in TEXTS I  rather
> > use: 'unlimited'.
> >
>

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[1Z]

On 15 Aug, 20:12, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> As for 1Z's axioms:
> In my vocabulary axioms are artifacts invented to make our theories
> workable. If 1 + 1 is NOT 2,

How would that turn out the case?

> you can say goodby to math.
> Furthermore I dislike the use of the word 'infinite' - in TEXTS I  rather
> use: 'unlimited'.
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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[John Mikes]

G.G. wrote:

1Z wrote:
> It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard
> cosmology accepts
> that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially
> unaccountable boundary conditions.

GüGr:
"Well, actually these strangely "contingent" conditions are what leads to
discussions of the "everything" sort - here, we want to explain these
contingents also (or say why they are not explainable)"

We can speak only about the already discovered (known?)  part of
'contingent'  conditions - cf your parenthetic alternate).
I believe in n existent 'relity' (whatever that may be) and in our tiny part
of it we got hold of so far (through epistemic enrichment). Even that in a
way of interpretation by our feeble mental capabilities.
Everything is contingent, - a consequence of happenings - do we know those
or not. (My determinism). If we don't know the originating factors we speak
about random, chaotic, emergent, or ID-creational miracles.
In unknown cases we feel free to use our fantasy. Nobody is compelled to
believe it.
Kreutzfidel
John M

As for 1Z's axioms:
In my vocabulary axioms are artifacts invented to make our theories
workable. If 1 + 1 is NOT 2, you can say goodby to math.
Furthermore I dislike the use of the word 'infinite' - in TEXTS I  rather
use: 'unlimited'.

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>   
>> But that assumes there can be a computation independent of any material
>> realization - a computation that never has an error.  Real computations
>> are realized by quantum mechanical devices.  Of course they may be so
>> large and hot that they are to a very good approximation classical (the
>> brain is according to Tegmark).  But I'm supposing that the complexity
>> of conscious computation (and remember we are talking about simulating
>> the environment, not just the brain) is so great that quantum effects
>> are inevitable.
>> 
>
> The model of the mind this implies is a digital computer with a random
> component. But even if this random component is truly random rather
> than pseudorandom, you could always emulate it with a branching
> algorithm that explores every possible case. It might be
> computationally very expensive, but given enough memory and enough
> time it could be done.
>   
That's one of those "in-principle" arguments that may not hold in 
reality.  The combinatorial explosion of possibilities would quickly 
exceed the capacity of any realizable computer.  Keep in mind that the 
computer must simulate a fair piece of the universe - not just the 
brain.  But I'm not clear on the implication here.  Is it enough that 
the two consciousness are identical for a moment?

Brent Meeker

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[1Z]

On 15 Aug, 14:05, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> If I
> know that there are two copies of my mind being implemented on two
> adjacent computers,

You don't know that. That is the whole problem.

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2008/8/15 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> The possibility that someone might be duplicated at some indeterminate
> point in the future leads to no indeminacy affecting me now.

The indeterminacy works the same way across time as across space. If I
know that there are two copies of my mind being implemented on two
adjacent computers, I can't know whether I am being implemented on one
or the other. If I know that my mind is being implemented on two
consecutive runs on the same computer, I can't know if whether I am
being implemented on the first run or the second. For if I could
distinguish between them, there would have to be some difference in
the mental content generated by the different runs, which would
inconsistent with the assumption that they are duplicates.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> But that assumes there can be a computation independent of any material
> realization - a computation that never has an error.  Real computations
> are realized by quantum mechanical devices.  Of course they may be so
> large and hot that they are to a very good approximation classical (the
> brain is according to Tegmark).  But I'm supposing that the complexity
> of conscious computation (and remember we are talking about simulating
> the environment, not just the brain) is so great that quantum effects
> are inevitable.

The model of the mind this implies is a digital computer with a random
component. But even if this random component is truly random rather
than pseudorandom, you could always emulate it with a branching
algorithm that explores every possible case. It might be
computationally very expensive, but given enough memory and enough
time it could be done.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[1Z]

On 15 Aug, 01:37, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> > But suppose we can create an AI, but we can't produce copies that don't
> > diverge immediately; perhaps a consequence of the quantum no-cloning
> > theorem.  I realize that's probably not the case since it would require
> > that computation of the complexity to produce consciousness must include
> > so essentially quantum aspect.But would that imply "1st person
> > indeterminacy" or not?
>
> > Brent Meeker
>
> If mind is a computation, we can copy it.

Indeterminacy requires that his has been done, not just that is is
possible.

>Computation is numbers to
> numbers in finite "time" and deterministic rules. I've put "time" in
> quotes because time can be a rule and not something inherent to
> computation.
>
> Computation can only diverges if the computation is not the same
> and/or input is not the same.

The natural interpretation of computionalism is that interactions
with an environment are not themselves part of mind/computation.

>Computation is a deterministic thing not
> something you could play with.

And minds are solipsistic things that carry their environment with
them?

> Regards,
> Quentin Anciaux
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[1Z]

> But suppose we can create an AI, but we can't produce copies that don't
> diverge immediately; perhaps a consequence of the quantum no-cloning
> theorem.  I realize that's probably not the case since it would require
> that computation of the complexity to produce consciousness must include
> so essentially quantum aspect.But would that imply "1st person
> indeterminacy" or not?

The possibility that someone might be duplicated at some indeterminate
point in the future leads to no indeminacy affecting me now.

> Brent Meeker
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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> If mind is a computation, we can copy it. Computation is numbers to
>> numbers in finite "time" and deterministic rules. I've put "time" in
>> quotes because time can be a rule and not something inherent to
>> computation.
>>
>> Computation can only diverges if the computation is not the same
>> and/or input is not the same. Computation is a deterministic thing not
>> something you could play with.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Quentin Anciaux
>>
>
> But that assumes there can be a computation independent of any material
> realization - a computation that never has an error.  Real computations
> are realized by quantum mechanical devices.  Of course they may be so
> large and hot that they are to a very good approximation classical (the
> brain is according to Tegmark).  But I'm supposing that the complexity
> of conscious computation (and remember we are talking about simulating
> the environment, not just the brain) is so great that quantum effects
> are inevitable.
>
> Brent Meeker

Sure that assumes mathematical realism, that assumes we don't invent
programs/algorithms/truth. We find them they are the primary ontology,
mathematics fits the world because the world/existence is a by product
of the "truth". It's sounds like crazy, but finite life in a finite
universe who will last a finite time put so much constraint on the
real that it should be rejected.

(It's late my mind is not so focus, so maybe I'm saying non-sense...
I'll will see tomorrow :-)
Quentin Anciaux
-- 
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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Brent Meeker]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>   
>> But suppose we can create an AI, but we can't produce copies that don't
>> diverge immediately; perhaps a consequence of the quantum no-cloning
>> theorem.  I realize that's probably not the case since it would require
>> that computation of the complexity to produce consciousness must include
>> so essentially quantum aspect.But would that imply "1st person
>> indeterminacy" or not?
>>
>> Brent Meeker
>> 
>
> If mind is a computation, we can copy it. Computation is numbers to
> numbers in finite "time" and deterministic rules. I've put "time" in
> quotes because time can be a rule and not something inherent to
> computation.
>
> Computation can only diverges if the computation is not the same
> and/or input is not the same. Computation is a deterministic thing not
> something you could play with.
>
> Regards,
> Quentin Anciaux
>   

But that assumes there can be a computation independent of any material 
realization - a computation that never has an error.  Real computations 
are realized by quantum mechanical devices.  Of course they may be so 
large and hot that they are to a very good approximation classical (the 
brain is according to Tegmark).  But I'm supposing that the complexity 
of conscious computation (and remember we are talking about simulating 
the environment, not just the brain) is so great that quantum effects 
are inevitable.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2008/8/15 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> But suppose we can create an AI, but we can't produce copies that don't
> diverge immediately; perhaps a consequence of the quantum no-cloning
> theorem.  I realize that's probably not the case since it would require
> that computation of the complexity to produce consciousness must include
> so essentially quantum aspect.But would that imply "1st person
> indeterminacy" or not?
>
> Brent Meeker

If mind is a computation, we can copy it. Computation is numbers to
numbers in finite "time" and deterministic rules. I've put "time" in
quotes because time can be a rule and not something inherent to
computation.

Computation can only diverges if the computation is not the same
and/or input is not the same. Computation is a deterministic thing not
something you could play with.

Regards,
Quentin Anciaux

-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Brent Meeker]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>   
>>
>> On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> 
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>>>   
 Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
 not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an
 ontologically
 parsimonious explanation that matches the evidence.
 
>>> Yes so ball at the centre... these axioms are equally valable...
>>> except that the finite number of universes hypothesis has to explain
>>> why that number (be it 1 or 42).
>>>   
>> It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard
>> cosmology accepts
>> that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially
>> unaccountable boundary conditions.
>>
>> 
>>> Could you explain more precisely what is parsimonious for you ?
>>>   
>> The non-existence of unobserved entities.
>> 
>
> Plenty of thing are "unobserved", have you ever seen an electron ?
>
>   
  One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
 not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms.
 
>>> Well so ?
>>>   
>> So the 0 axiom rule may be impossible to fulfill. Which would make
>> other methodological approaches preferable.
>>
>> 
> Besides I find very
> problematic the unicity.
>   
 Then you had better say what the problem is.
 
>>> Why one ?
>>>   
>> The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all-
>> there-is?
>> 
>
> Well you're playing with the word here. It's hand waving.
>
>   
>>> why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single
>>> universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in
>>> it, wow lucky.
>>>   
>> Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else
>> to be.
>> "Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking.
>>
>> 
>
> Well sure we must be in a universe, as we must be part of the
> everything because we are (well I'm sure for me...)
>
>
>   
 it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
 fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
 
>>> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of
>>> the WR problem.
>>>   
>> I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
>> off" WR's.
>> 
>
> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as
> easily. But we just make a step back and forth.
>
>   
 The computation needs some sort of substrate.
 
>>> *Any* substrate that can be use for doing a computation. Is a program
>>> running in a simulated processor can know that the substrate (imagine
>>> it has sensor to give information about it) is simulated if the
>>> simulated processor gives out exactly what it should ? no... so the
>>> substrate is nothing.
>>>   
>> "There is no substrate" doesn't follow from "the substrate is
>> unknown".
>> 
>
> The substrate is not part of the computation, it has never and never will.
>
>   
> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
> ontologically primary.
>   
 That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
 argue for it.
 
>>> I do not assume them.
>>>   
>> Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.
>>
>> 
>
> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and
> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't
> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
> if  consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.
> Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will
> never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital
> consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st
> person indeterminacy...
>
> Regards,
> Quentin Anciaux
>   
But suppose we can create an AI, but we can't produce copies that don't 
diverge immediately; perhaps a consequence of the quantum no-cloning 
theorem.  I realize that's probably not the case since it would require 
that computation of the complexity to produce consciousness must include 
so essentially quantum aspect.But would that imply "1st person 
indeterminacy" or not?

Brent Meeker

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[1Z]

On 14 Aug, 01:31, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:

> In principle we could create and artificial environment for two copies of the 
> AI
> and keep them identical.  But then it's a metaphysical question as to whether
> there are two separate consciousness.  If consciousness is computation then
> "same computation"="same consciousness".  The usual form of duplication that
> Bruno postulates contemplates two copies at separate places in this world - in
> which case they do diverge immediately.

The same thought has crossed my mind(s)
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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[1Z]

On 14 Aug, 13:15, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 2008/8/14 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> > In principle we could create and artificial environment for two copies of 
> > the AI
> > and keep them identical.  But then it's a metaphysical question as to 
> > whether
> > there are two separate consciousness.  If consciousness is computation then
> > "same computation"="same consciousness".  The usual form of duplication that
> > Bruno postulates contemplates two copies at separate places in this world - 
> > in
> > which case they do diverge immediately.
>
> This interesting question is considered in the following paper:
>
> http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/experience.pdf


Thanks for the link
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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[1Z]

On 14 Aug, 17:56, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> 1Z wrote:
> > It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard
> > cosmology accepts
> > that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially
> > unaccountable boundary conditions.
>
> Well, actually these strangely "contingent" conditions are what leads to
> discussions of the "everything" sort - here, we want to explain these
> contingents also (or say why they are not explainable).

Yes, you do. But if you can't explain things on a no-axiom basis --
and it is
difficult to see how you could, give that all deductive arguments
start from some premise or another--
then that approach is not advantageous.


> Also, in standard cosmology you have the problem of duplicate "yous" in
> remote parts of the infinite universe.

Standard cosmology is neutral about the (in)finity of the universe.
Also, the more extreme WR/HP
universes are forbidden because even in the MW versions of standard
cosmology, worlds are constrained by the laws of physics. That is: I
might just see a unicorn or a pixie, but I will never see a cold fire
or a hovering rock.

> Again, you have the indetermincy
> problem - here maybe even without turing emulable minds.

I don't see why. Even assuming the unknown and contingent issue of the
infinity of the universe,
either

a) I have the same consciousness in the same perceived environment, in
which case the indeterminacy is
is indetectible and trivial

or

b) I have the same (momentary) consciousness in different
environments, in which
case divergence will quickly follow.

> It depends if you believe in duplication or unity of conscious experience.
>
> Cheers,
> Günther
>
> --
> Günther Greindl
> Department of Philosophy of Science
> University of Vienna
> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> Blog:http://www.complexitystudies.org/
> esis:http://www.complexitystudies.org/proposal/
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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Günther Greindl]

Hi,

1Z wrote:
> It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard
> cosmology accepts
> that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially
> unaccountable boundary conditions.


Well, actually these strangely "contingent" conditions are what leads to 
discussions of the "everything" sort - here, we want to explain these 
contingents also (or say why they are not explainable).

Also, in standard cosmology you have the problem of duplicate "yous" in 
remote parts of the infinite universe. Again, you have the indetermincy 
problem - here maybe even without turing emulable minds.

It depends if you believe in duplication or unity of conscious experience.

Cheers,
Günther

-- 
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

Blog: http://www.complexitystudies.org/
Thesis: http://www.complexitystudies.org/proposal/


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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2008/8/14 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> In principle we could create and artificial environment for two copies of the 
> AI
> and keep them identical.  But then it's a metaphysical question as to whether
> there are two separate consciousness.  If consciousness is computation then
> "same computation"="same consciousness".  The usual form of duplication that
> Bruno postulates contemplates two copies at separate places in this world - in
> which case they do diverge immediately.

This interesting question is considered in the following paper:

http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/experience.pdf



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Brent Meeker]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2008/8/13 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> I've been following this back-and-forth with interest.  The above leads to an
>> interesting question which I will raise after a couple of background points.
>> First, I don't think a conscious AI can exist independent of some 
>> environment of
>> which it is conscious.  Of course this doesn't mean you can't create an AI
>> which, like us, is conscious of this particular world.
> 
> Agreed.
> 
>> Second, I think a
>> conscious AI must necessarily remember and learn.  A consequence of these 
>> two is
>> that if you copy an AI the two copies will immediately start to diverge due 
>> to
>> different experiences.
> 
> If we can build an AI we control it and we can give to it input in
> whatever way we like, even slowing it down, stopping it, dumping
> memory, restore a copy, record input from the world to the AI,
> (including clock time, etc) restore another copy and restart it 1 hour
> later than the first restore and feed the recorded input data. The two
> should do the same, it's a computation, it's deterministic. 

In principle we could create and artificial environment for two copies of the 
AI 
and keep them identical.  But then it's a metaphysical question as to whether 
there are two separate consciousness.  If consciousness is computation then 
"same computation"="same consciousness".  The usual form of duplication that 
Bruno postulates contemplates two copies at separate places in this world - in 
which case they do diverge immediately.

> If they
> diverge having the same input (and being the same program)  then there
> is magic somewhere.

Or quantum mechanical uncertainty.

Brent Meeker


> 
>> So the indeterminancy will immediately vanish.
> 
> They can be the same as long as you which.
> 
>> There
>> will be two different consciousnesses; which is perfectly ordinary except 
>> that
>> they will share a lot of memories.  So what does this have to do with MMW?
> 
> What is the status of "mind" ?
> 
>> Brent Meeker
>>
> 
> Regards,
> Quentin Anciaux


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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2008/8/13 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> I've been following this back-and-forth with interest.  The above leads to an
> interesting question which I will raise after a couple of background points.
> First, I don't think a conscious AI can exist independent of some environment 
> of
> which it is conscious.  Of course this doesn't mean you can't create an AI
> which, like us, is conscious of this particular world.

Agreed.

> Second, I think a
> conscious AI must necessarily remember and learn.  A consequence of these two 
> is
> that if you copy an AI the two copies will immediately start to diverge due to
> different experiences.

If we can build an AI we control it and we can give to it input in
whatever way we like, even slowing it down, stopping it, dumping
memory, restore a copy, record input from the world to the AI,
(including clock time, etc) restore another copy and restart it 1 hour
later than the first restore and feed the recorded input data. The two
should do the same, it's a computation, it's deterministic. If they
diverge having the same input (and being the same program)  then there
is magic somewhere.

> So the indeterminancy will immediately vanish.

They can be the same as long as you which.

> There
> will be two different consciousnesses; which is perfectly ordinary except that
> they will share a lot of memories.  So what does this have to do with MMW?

What is the status of "mind" ?

> Brent Meeker
>

Regards,
Quentin Anciaux
-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Brent Meeker]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

...
> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
> ontologically primary.
 That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
 argue for it.
>>> I do not assume them.
>> Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.
> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and
> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't
> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
> if  consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.
 And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with
 computationalism still true, and without any subjective
 indeterminacy).
>>> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical
>>> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness
>>> is a computational process then we'll build AI
>>
>> There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody,
>> and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another
>> appeal to coincidence.
> 
> i've never said that and that's not the point. This AI could be
> duplicated and run in multiple instance when does she die ? when you
> pull the last plug of the last computer running it ? by pulling out
> all devices capable of running it ? by destroying the whole everything

I've been following this back-and-forth with interest.  The above leads to an 
interesting question which I will raise after a couple of background points. 
First, I don't think a conscious AI can exist independent of some environment 
of 
which it is conscious.  Of course this doesn't mean you can't create an AI 
which, like us, is conscious of this particular world. Second, I think a 
conscious AI must necessarily remember and learn.  A consequence of these two 
is 
that if you copy an AI the two copies will immediately start to diverge due to 
different experiences.  So the indeterminancy will immediately vanish.  There 
will be two different consciousnesses; which is perfectly ordinary except that 
they will share a lot of memories.  So what does this have to do with MMW?

Brent Meeker


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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[1Z]

On 13 Aug, 21:47, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> When the universe will end is '17 is prime' still true ?
>
> Me winning the lotery is a WR event... I play lotery, I do not win
> therefore no one wins... It's basically your argument about WR.
>
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
> > On 13 Aug, 21:05, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> >> >> Sure, why one then ?
>
> >> > It would be the smallest number that fits the facts.
>
> >> Which facts ?
>
> > The observed ones.
>
> You're talking about the microscopic quantum world ?

All the facts.

> >> >> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does 
> >> >> >> >> > not
> >> >> >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>
> >> >> >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in 
> >> >> >> >> front of
> >> >> >> >> the WR problem.
>
> >> >> >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
> >> >> >> > off" WR's.
>
> >> >> >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR 
> >> >> >> as
> >> >> >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth.
>
> >> >> > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many
> >> >> > worlders--
> >> >> > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all.
>
> >> >> > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do
> >> >> > the same, tell me how.
>
> >> >> By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable
> >> >> of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of
> >> >> time...),
>
> >> >> and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are
> >> >> relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only
> >> >> one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking
> >> >> why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because
> >> >> you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :)
>
> >> > A lot of complicated hypotheses have been put forward on the
> >> > MMW side. What does that buy you? Ontological complexity combined
> >> > with
> >> > theoretical complexity.
>
> >> I see real complexity in asserting the single universe.
>
> > Don't just see it, explain it.
>
> I already did, one universe put more constraint because of its unicity
> than infinitely many...

One universe is the smallest number that fits a naive subset of the
facts, such as the fact of my existence.

> >> >> >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world 
> >> >> >> >> >> is
> >> >> >> >> >> ontologically primary.
>
> >> >> >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
> >> >> >> >> > argue for it.
>
> >> >> >> >> I do not assume them.
>
> >> >> >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple 
> >> >> >> > instantiations.
>
> >> >> >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
> >> >> >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
> >> >> >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious 
> >> >> >> (and
> >> >> >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
> >> >> >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they 
> >> >> >> won't
> >> >> >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
> >> >> >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
> >> >> >> if  consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
> >> >> >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
> >> >> >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.
>
> >> >> > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with
> >> >> > computationalism still true, and without any subjective
> >> >> > indeterminacy).
>
> >> >> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical
> >> >> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness
> >> >> is a computational process then we'll build AI
>
> >> > There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody,
> >> > and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another
> >> > appeal to coincidence.
>
> >> i've never said that and that's not the point. This AI could be
> >> duplicated and run in multiple instance when does she die ? when you
> >> pull the last plug of the last computer running it ? by pulling out
> >> all devices capable of running it ? by destroying the whole everything
> >> ?
>
> > If you make a chain of assumptions --how willing people are to build
> > AIs, how able they are, how long the universe will support such
> > activities--
> > then you can make the AI hypothesis look likely relative to those
> > assumptions.
> > But there is no necessity there. Anyone can evade the argument by
> > rejecting the
> > assumptions. It's basically just speculation.
>
> The necessity is this... either it's possible or not possible at all,
> if it's

Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Quentin Anciaux]

When the universe will end is '17 is prime' still true ?

Me winning the lotery is a WR event... I play lotery, I do not win
therefore no one wins... It's basically your argument about WR.

2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
> On 13 Aug, 21:05, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>>
>> >> Sure, why one then ?
>>
>> > It would be the smallest number that fits the facts.
>>
>> Which facts ?
>
> The observed ones.

You're talking about the microscopic quantum world ?

>> >> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does 
>> >> >> >> > not
>> >> >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>>
>> >> >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front 
>> >> >> >> of
>> >> >> >> the WR problem.
>>
>> >> >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
>> >> >> > off" WR's.
>>
>> >> >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as
>> >> >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth.
>>
>> >> > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many
>> >> > worlders--
>> >> > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all.
>>
>> >> > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do
>> >> > the same, tell me how.
>>
>> >> By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable
>> >> of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of
>> >> time...),
>>
>> >> and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are
>> >> relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only
>> >> one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking
>> >> why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because
>> >> you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :)
>>
>> > A lot of complicated hypotheses have been put forward on the
>> > MMW side. What does that buy you? Ontological complexity combined
>> > with
>> > theoretical complexity.
>>
>> I see real complexity in asserting the single universe.
>
> Don't just see it, explain it.

I already did, one universe put more constraint because of its unicity
than infinitely many...

>> >> >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
>> >> >> >> >> ontologically primary.
>>
>> >> >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
>> >> >> >> > argue for it.
>>
>> >> >> >> I do not assume them.
>>
>> >> >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.
>>
>> >> >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
>> >> >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
>> >> >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and
>> >> >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
>> >> >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't
>> >> >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
>> >> >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
>> >> >> if  consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
>> >> >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
>> >> >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.
>>
>> >> > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with
>> >> > computationalism still true, and without any subjective
>> >> > indeterminacy).
>>
>> >> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical
>> >> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness
>> >> is a computational process then we'll build AI
>>
>> > There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody,
>> > and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another
>> > appeal to coincidence.
>>
>> i've never said that and that's not the point. This AI could be
>> duplicated and run in multiple instance when does she die ? when you
>> pull the last plug of the last computer running it ? by pulling out
>> all devices capable of running it ? by destroying the whole everything
>> ?
>
> If you make a chain of assumptions --how willing people are to build
> AIs, how able they are, how long the universe will support such
> activities--
> then you can make the AI hypothesis look likely relative to those
> assumptions.
> But there is no necessity there. Anyone can evade the argument by
> rejecting the
> assumptions. It's basically just speculation.

The necessity is this... either it's possible or not possible at all,
if it's possible it will be done. Somewhere in some time in the
multi/universe.

>> >>you must suppose
>> >> either
>> >> 1) the end of the world before we do it
>> >> 2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible
>> >> because the mind is a computational process
>> >> 3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but
>> >> dependant on a non computational/non emulable process lik

Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[1Z]

On 13 Aug, 21:05, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> >> Sure, why one then ?
>
> > It would be the smallest number that fits the facts.
>
> Which facts ?

The observed ones.

> >> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
> >> >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>
> >> >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front 
> >> >> >> of
> >> >> >> the WR problem.
>
> >> >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
> >> >> > off" WR's.
>
> >> >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as
> >> >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth.
>
> >> > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many
> >> > worlders--
> >> > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all.
>
> >> > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do
> >> > the same, tell me how.
>
> >> By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable
> >> of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of
> >> time...),
>
> >> and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are
> >> relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only
> >> one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking
> >> why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because
> >> you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :)
>
> > A lot of complicated hypotheses have been put forward on the
> > MMW side. What does that buy you? Ontological complexity combined
> > with
> > theoretical complexity.
>
> I see real complexity in asserting the single universe.

Don't just see it, explain it.

> >> >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
> >> >> >> >> ontologically primary.
>
> >> >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
> >> >> >> > argue for it.
>
> >> >> >> I do not assume them.
>
> >> >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.
>
> >> >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
> >> >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
> >> >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and
> >> >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
> >> >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't
> >> >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
> >> >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
> >> >> if  consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
> >> >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
> >> >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.
>
> >> > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with
> >> > computationalism still true, and without any subjective
> >> > indeterminacy).
>
> >> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical
> >> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness
> >> is a computational process then we'll build AI
>
> > There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody,
> > and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another
> > appeal to coincidence.
>
> i've never said that and that's not the point. This AI could be
> duplicated and run in multiple instance when does she die ? when you
> pull the last plug of the last computer running it ? by pulling out
> all devices capable of running it ? by destroying the whole everything
> ?

If you make a chain of assumptions --how willing people are to build
AIs, how able they are, how long the universe will support such
activities--
then you can make the AI hypothesis look likely relative to those
assumptions.
But there is no necessity there. Anyone can evade the argument by
rejecting the
assumptions. It's basically just speculation.

> >>you must suppose
> >> either
> >> 1) the end of the world before we do it
> >> 2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible
> >> because the mind is a computational process
> >> 3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but
> >> dependant on a non computational/non emulable process like an oracle
> >> or your substance for example)..
>
> > Or 4) We build an AI and it isn;t me. Why shoudl it be? The odds
> > are billions to one.
>
> I've never said that and it's not the point if it is you, me, Georges
> Bush or Popeye... it's about consciousness.

Nothing follows for me if someone builds and AI of someone other than
me.
If I am never duplicated, I suffer from no indeterminacy, and no issue
of many
worlds arises.I can
quite justifiably regard myself as a single individual in a single
reality.

> >> >> Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will
> >> >> never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creat

Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> Sure, why one then ?
>
> It would be the smallest number that fits the facts.

Which facts ?

>> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
>> >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>>
>> >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of
>> >> >> the WR problem.
>>
>> >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
>> >> > off" WR's.
>>
>> >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as
>> >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth.
>>
>> > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many
>> > worlders--
>> > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all.
>>
>> > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do
>> > the same, tell me how.
>>
>> By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable
>> of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of
>> time...),
>
>
>> and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are
>> relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only
>> one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking
>> why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because
>> you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :)
>
> A lot of complicated hypotheses have been put forward on the
> MMW side. What does that buy you? Ontological complexity combined
> with
> theoretical complexity.

I see real complexity in asserting the single universe.

>> >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
>> >> >> >> ontologically primary.
>>
>> >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
>> >> >> > argue for it.
>>
>> >> >> I do not assume them.
>>
>> >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.
>>
>> >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
>> >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
>> >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and
>> >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
>> >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't
>> >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
>> >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
>> >> if  consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
>> >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
>> >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.
>>
>> > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with
>> > computationalism still true, and without any subjective
>> > indeterminacy).
>>
>> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical
>> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness
>> is a computational process then we'll build AI
>
>
> There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody,
> and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another
> appeal to coincidence.

i've never said that and that's not the point. This AI could be
duplicated and run in multiple instance when does she die ? when you
pull the last plug of the last computer running it ? by pulling out
all devices capable of running it ? by destroying the whole everything
?

>>you must suppose
>> either
>> 1) the end of the world before we do it
>> 2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible
>> because the mind is a computational process
>> 3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but
>> dependant on a non computational/non emulable process like an oracle
>> or your substance for example)..
>
> Or 4) We build an AI and it isn;t me. Why shoudl it be? The odds
> are billions to one.

I've never said that and it's not the point if it is you, me, Georges
Bush or Popeye... it's about consciousness.

>> >> Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will
>> >> never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital
>> >> consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st
>> >> person indeterminacy...
>>
>> > I don't have to do any of those things. I just have to point out that
>> > it isn't particularly likely. I could be living in a fantastically
>> > elaborate
>> > Truman-style replica of a *physical* environment..but why should I
>> > believe
>> > that?
>>
>> I do not believe in that, you talk of multiverse like if it was
>> something built for deceiving us... that's nonsense paranoia :)
>
> But you are basing your whole argument on the future construction of
> an AI. And
> you are trying or persuade me that that means *I* am affected by
> indeterminacy.
> So the AI must be an AI of me. How is that any less solipsistic than
> the Truman
> Show?

Where all affected, every consciousness if consciousness is
computation, but the point is n

Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[1Z]

On 13 Aug, 20:38, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> >> >> > Then you had better say what the problem is.
>
> >> >> Why one ?
>
> >> > The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all-
> >> > there-is?
>
> >> Well you're playing with the word here. It's hand waving.
>
> > I am not saying there is one universe. I am saying there is as many
> > as are needed to explain the evidence, and no more.
>
> You're not saying anything nor asserting something.

Says who?

> >> >>why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single
> >> >> universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in
> >> >> it, wow lucky.
>
> >> > Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else
> >> > to be.
> >> > "Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking.
>
> >> Well sure we must be in a universe, as we must be part of the
> >> everything because we are (well I'm sure for me...)
>
> > And if there is one universe, we must be in it. Nothing could
> > be less coincidental.
>
> Sure, why one then ?

It would be the smallest number that fits the facts.

> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
> >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>
> >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of
> >> >> the WR problem.
>
> >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
> >> > off" WR's.
>
> >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as
> >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth.
>
> > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many
> > worlders--
> > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all.
>
> > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do
> > the same, tell me how.
>
> By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable
> of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of
> time...),


> and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are
> relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only
> one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking
> why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because
> you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :)

A lot of complicated hypotheses have been put forward on the
MMW side. What does that buy you? Ontological complexity combined
with
theoretical complexity.

> >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
> >> >> >> ontologically primary.
>
> >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
> >> >> > argue for it.
>
> >> >> I do not assume them.
>
> >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.
>
> >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
> >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
> >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and
> >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
> >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't
> >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
> >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
> >> if  consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
> >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
> >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.
>
> > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with
> > computationalism still true, and without any subjective
> > indeterminacy).
>
> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical
> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness
> is a computational process then we'll build AI


There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody,
and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another
appeal to coincidence.

>you must suppose
> either
> 1) the end of the world before we do it
> 2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible
> because the mind is a computational process
> 3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but
> dependant on a non computational/non emulable process like an oracle
> or your substance for example)..

Or 4) We build an AI and it isn;t me. Why shoudl it be? The odds
are billions to one.

> >> Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will
> >> never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital
> >> consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st
> >> person indeterminacy...
>
> > I don't have to do any of those things. I just have to point out that
> > it isn't particularly likely. I could be living in a fantastically
> > elaborate
> > Truman-style replica of a *physical* environment..but why should I
> > believe
> > that?
>
> I do 

Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> >> > Then you had better say what the problem is.
>>
>> >> Why one ?
>>
>> > The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all-
>> > there-is?
>>
>> Well you're playing with the word here. It's hand waving.
>
> I am not saying there is one universe. I am saying there is as many
> as are needed to explain the evidence, and no more.

You're not saying anything nor asserting something.

>> >>why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single
>> >> universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in
>> >> it, wow lucky.
>>
>> > Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else
>> > to be.
>> > "Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking.
>>
>> Well sure we must be in a universe, as we must be part of the
>> everything because we are (well I'm sure for me...)
>
> And if there is one universe, we must be in it. Nothing could
> be less coincidental.

Sure, why one then ?

>> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
>> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>>
>> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of
>> >> the WR problem.
>>
>> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
>> > off" WR's.
>>
>> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as
>> easily. But we just make a step back and forth.
>
> That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many
> worlders--
> get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all.
>
> Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do
> the same, tell me how.
>

By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable
of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of
time...), and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are
relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only
one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking
why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because
you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :)

>> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
>> >> >> ontologically primary.
>>
>> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
>> >> > argue for it.
>>
>> >> I do not assume them.
>>
>> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.
>>
>> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
>> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
>> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and
>> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
>> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't
>> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
>> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
>> if  consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
>> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
>> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.
>
> And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with
> computationalism still true, and without any subjective
> indeterminacy).

If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical
argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness
is a computational process then we'll build AI... you must suppose
either
1) the end of the world before we do it
2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible
because the mind is a computational process
3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but
dependant on a non computational/non emulable process like an oracle
or your substance for example)..

>> Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will
>> never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital
>> consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st
>> person indeterminacy...
>
> I don't have to do any of those things. I just have to point out that
> it isn't particularly likely. I could be living in a fantastically
> elaborate
> Truman-style replica of a *physical* environment..but why should I
> believe
> that?

I do not believe in that, you talk of multiverse like if it was
something built for deceiving us... that's nonsense paranoia :)

> There are many sceptical hypotheses; they are all equally
> likely, ie "not certainly false". Rationally they should be treated
> equally,
> and, since they cannot be equally true, they must be treated as
> equally implausible..

Yes and many is more rationally simpler than unicity.

Regards,
Quentin Anciaux
-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[1Z]

On 13 Aug, 18:58, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> Hi,
>
> >> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
> >> > Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
> >> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an
> >> > ontologically
> >> > parsimonious explanation that matches the evidence.
>
> >> Yes so ball at the centre... these axioms are equally valable...
> >> except that the finite number of universes hypothesis has to explain
> >> why that number (be it 1 or 42).
>
> > It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard
> > cosmology accepts
> > that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially
> > unaccountable boundary conditions.
>
> >> Could you explain more precisely what is parsimonious for you ?
>
> > The non-existence of unobserved entities.
>
> Plenty of thing are "unobserved", have you ever seen an electron ?


We can posit unobserved things to do explain what is observed. But
that is not
analogous to MMW, since the extra universes in MMW should be observed,
but aren't.

> >> >  One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
> >> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms.
>
> >> Well so ?
>
> > So the 0 axiom rule may be impossible to fulfill. Which would make
> > other methodological approaches preferable.
>
> >> >>Besides I find very
> >> >> problematic the unicity.
>
> >> > Then you had better say what the problem is.
>
> >> Why one ?
>
> > The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all-
> > there-is?
>
> Well you're playing with the word here. It's hand waving.

I am not saying there is one universe. I am saying there is as many
as are needed to explain the evidence, and no more.

> >>why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single
> >> universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in
> >> it, wow lucky.
>
> > Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else
> > to be.
> > "Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking.
>
> Well sure we must be in a universe, as we must be part of the
> everything because we are (well I'm sure for me...)

And if there is one universe, we must be in it. Nothing could
be less coincidental.

> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>
> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of
> >> the WR problem.
>
> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
> > off" WR's.
>
> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as
> easily. But we just make a step back and forth.

That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many
worlders--
get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all.

Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do
the same, tell me how.


> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
> >> >> ontologically primary.
>
> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
> >> > argue for it.
>
> >> I do not assume them.
>
> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.
>
> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and
> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't
> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
> if  consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.

And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with
computationalism still true, and without any subjective
indeterminacy).

> Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will
> never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital
> consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st
> person indeterminacy...

I don't have to do any of those things. I just have to point out that
it isn't particularly likely. I could be living in a fantastically
elaborate
Truman-style replica of a *physical* environment..but why should I
believe
that?  There are many sceptical hypotheses; they are all equally
likely, ie "not certainly false". Rationally they should be treated
equally,
and, since they cannot be equally true, they must be treated as
equally implausible..

> Regards,
> Quentin Anciaux
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~--

Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
> On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>> > Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
>> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an
>> > ontologically
>> > parsimonious explanation that matches the evidence.
>>
>> Yes so ball at the centre... these axioms are equally valable...
>> except that the finite number of universes hypothesis has to explain
>> why that number (be it 1 or 42).
>
> It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard
> cosmology accepts
> that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially
> unaccountable boundary conditions.
>
>> Could you explain more precisely what is parsimonious for you ?
>
> The non-existence of unobserved entities.

Plenty of thing are "unobserved", have you ever seen an electron ?

>
>> >  One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
>> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms.
>>
>> Well so ?
>
> So the 0 axiom rule may be impossible to fulfill. Which would make
> other methodological approaches preferable.
>
>> >>Besides I find very
>> >> problematic the unicity.
>>
>> > Then you had better say what the problem is.
>>
>> Why one ?
>
> The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all-
> there-is?

Well you're playing with the word here. It's hand waving.

>>why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single
>> universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in
>> it, wow lucky.
>
> Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else
> to be.
> "Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking.
>

Well sure we must be in a universe, as we must be part of the
everything because we are (well I'm sure for me...)


>> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
>> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>>
>> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of
>> the WR problem.
>
> I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
> off" WR's.

Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as
easily. But we just make a step back and forth.

>> > The computation needs some sort of substrate.
>>
>> *Any* substrate that can be use for doing a computation. Is a program
>> running in a simulated processor can know that the substrate (imagine
>> it has sensor to give information about it) is simulated if the
>> simulated processor gives out exactly what it should ? no... so the
>> substrate is nothing.
>
> "There is no substrate" doesn't follow from "the substrate is
> unknown".

The substrate is not part of the computation, it has never and never will.

>> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
>> >> ontologically primary.
>>
>> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
>> > argue for it.
>>
>> I do not assume them.
>
> Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.
>

Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation
and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious
digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and
it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that
consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't
and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the
assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now
if  consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I
don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what
could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations.
Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will
never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital
consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st
person indeterminacy...

Regards,
Quentin Anciaux


-- 
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Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[1Z]

On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> > Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an
> > ontologically
> > parsimonious explanation that matches the evidence.
>
> Yes so ball at the centre... these axioms are equally valable...
> except that the finite number of universes hypothesis has to explain
> why that number (be it 1 or 42).

It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard
cosmology accepts
that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially
unaccountable boundary conditions.

> Could you explain more precisely what is parsimonious for you ?

The non-existence of unobserved entities.


> >  One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms.
>
> Well so ?

So the 0 axiom rule may be impossible to fulfill. Which would make
other methodological approaches preferable.

> >>Besides I find very
> >> problematic the unicity.
>
> > Then you had better say what the problem is.
>
> Why one ?

The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all-
there-is?

>why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single
> universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in
> it, wow lucky.

Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else
to be.
"Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking.


> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem.
>
> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of
> the WR problem.

I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch
off" WR's.

> > The computation needs some sort of substrate.
>
> *Any* substrate that can be use for doing a computation. Is a program
> running in a simulated processor can know that the substrate (imagine
> it has sensor to give information about it) is simulated if the
> simulated processor gives out exactly what it should ? no... so the
> substrate is nothing.

"There is no substrate" doesn't follow from "the substrate is
unknown".

> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
> >> ontologically primary.
>
> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
> > argue for it.
>
> I do not assume them.

Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations.


> > DuplicABLE is not enough. I might be dreamABLE by the butterfly as
> > well. If I am not duplicATED there is no indeterminacy. If there
> > is no serious evidence of duplication, there is no serious problem
> > of indeterminacy -- it is just speculation like the butterfly story.
>
> If mind is a computation it's a fact that conscious computation will
> be run.

Why ? Says who?

>If mind is not a computation on the other hand well yes mind
> wouldn't be duplicable so asking for potential duplicability in these
> conditions is meaningless.



> > All sorts of things are possible that I don't worry about. Why should
> > I?
>
> The question is about mind is or is not a computation and what it
> entails. You are saying mind is a computation but are rejecting
> multiple runs on the ground that there won't be any ever.

I am not claiming to be certain that there won't be. I am saying there
is no particular evidence three will be.

>.. Either you
> should dismiss the mind computation hypothesis or dismiss your
> susbtance real switch theory, they're not compatible.

They are in the absence of Multiple Instantiation and its
equivalents , such as Platonism.

> >>The only way
> >> to be sure not to be rerun is that the mind is not a computation... It
> >> can't be a computation and not imply 1st person indeterminacy.
>
> > You're doing it again...putting forward "you can't be sure of not-X"
> > as if it means "you can be sure of X".
>
> No I can be sure that if mind is a computation it is a computation in
> pure term and thus totally independent of the substrate.

Buys you nothing without actual multiple instantiations.


> > The universe we see is nowhere near as big as the Tegmark-Marechal
> > Platonia.
> > Therefore you cannot possibly lever Mathematical Many Worlds out
> > of Physical Many Worlds.
>
> nowhere as big... you've seen the entire universe or only what's in
> your light cone ?

The fact that physics picks out a small subset of mathematics as
applicable
tells me that the universe we see is nowhere near as big as the
Tegmark-Marechal
Platonia.


> >> Yes, but that's not the point, the point is assuming turing
> >> emulability of the mind/the mind is a computation hypothesis implies
> >> 1st person indeterminacy and hence many worlds/dreams.
> >
> > False. The TE alone does not imply indeterminacy. To obtain actual
> > indeterminacy,
> > you need to get actual -- not just theoretical--implementations from
> > somewhere. You need 

Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi,

2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
> On 12 Aug, 22:50, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> 2008/8/12 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Quentin Anciaux"
>> > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> >> 1) Why 1 is more than 0 and simpler than n ?
>>
>> >> 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem'... It follows by
>> >> looking at it in a first sight that it would means the one universe
>> >> hypothesis is simpler than MW. Yes, one universe involves many less
>> >> than MW (either there exists a finite number of other universes or
>> >> infinitely many)... Then by O'R we should take the one universe
>> >> hypothesis as simpler because requiring less universes (in this case
>> >> 1). But it's an ill way of understanding O'R... It should be
>> >> understood as saying something about the premises, the axioms...
>>
>> > Why ? Occam talked about entities. And does MMW really
>> > minimise the number of axioms? Doesn't it need the axiom
>> > that nothing non-mathematical exists?
>>
>> And doesn't the one universe has a 'real switch' axiom that only
>> something exists ?
>
> Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
> not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an
> ontologically
> parsimonious explanation that matches the evidence.

Yes so ball at the centre... these axioms are equally valable...
except that the finite number of universes hypothesis has to explain
why that number (be it 1 or 42).
Could you explain more precisely what is parsimonious for you ?

>> >> One
>> >> shouldn't add an axiom unnecessarily. And in this case none of one
>> >> univers, 42 universes or infinitely many hypothesis are simpler
>> >> relative to each other...
>>
>> > That doesn't follow on either interpretation of O's R. It is
>> > obviously false on the "entity" interpretation. On the "axiom"
>> > interpretation, if there are exactly 42 universes, and there is no
>> > strict necessity to the fact then, the "the number of universes is 42"
>> > is an axiom.
>>
>> Such as "the number of universes is one".
>
>  One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
> not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms.

Well so ?

>>Besides I find very
>> problematic the unicity.
>
> Then you had better say what the problem is.

Why one ? why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single
universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in
it, wow lucky.

>
>> >>and O'R could not help you choose or if it
>> >> could help for something would be to choose the 0 univers
>> >> hypothesis... well 0 < 1 << oo and this for all values of 0 even big
>> >> ones :)
>>
>> > O's R is of course about the simplest theory that fist the evidence.
>>
>> Well then infinitely many is simpler (does not have to bother to
>> explain why one and only one for ever and ever).
>
> it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
> fit the evidence because of the WR problem.

Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of
the WR problem.

>> >> 2) Why turing emulability of the mind entails first person
>> >> undeterminacy and/or MW ?
>>
>> >> Because if you're a computation then you're not dependant on the
>> >> substrate of the computation... but only to the computation itself.
>>
>> > I would be directly dependent on the computation but only indirectly
>> > on the substrate.
>>
>> You have no dependancy on the substrate (even indirectly), the
>> substrate can change and the you computation can't notice it (so the
>> direct substrate supporting the you computation may be an
>> emulated.substrate running on an emulated substrate running on your
>> level 0, still the you computation doesn't care.
>
> The computation needs some sort of substrate.

*Any* substrate that can be use for doing a computation. Is a program
running in a simulated processor can know that the substrate (imagine
it has sensor to give information about it) is simulated if the
simulated processor gives out exactly what it should ? no... so the
substrate is nothing.

>> >  A
>> >> computation is substrate independant.
>> >> Well you'd say it may be substrate independent but still it needs a
>> >> substrate to 'exist'. Ok let's accept that, but let's return on the
>> >> mind and on the hypothesis that the mind is a computation and the
>> >> brain the substrate on which it is run. As a computation is substrate
>> >> independant then what follows is if the mind is a computation it can
>> >> be run on other computational substrate for example on a... computer
>> >> for example. And 'the mind' wouldn't be able to tell if it is run on a
>> >> brain or on a computer. By our hypothesis the mind is a computation,
>> >> and a computation is
>>
>> > You have switched context here from what a computational process is
>> > ontologically dependent on, to what the abstract description of an
>> > algorithm is theoretically dependent n
>>
>> No you dev

Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[1Z]

On 12 Aug, 22:50, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> 2008/8/12 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
>
>
>
> > --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Quentin Anciaux"
> > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >> 1) Why 1 is more than 0 and simpler than n ?
>
> >> 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem'... It follows by
> >> looking at it in a first sight that it would means the one universe
> >> hypothesis is simpler than MW. Yes, one universe involves many less
> >> than MW (either there exists a finite number of other universes or
> >> infinitely many)... Then by O'R we should take the one universe
> >> hypothesis as simpler because requiring less universes (in this case
> >> 1). But it's an ill way of understanding O'R... It should be
> >> understood as saying something about the premises, the axioms...
>
> > Why ? Occam talked about entities. And does MMW really
> > minimise the number of axioms? Doesn't it need the axiom
> > that nothing non-mathematical exists?
>
> And doesn't the one universe has a 'real switch' axiom that only
> something exists ?

Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an
ontologically
parsimonious explanation that matches the evidence.

> >> One
> >> shouldn't add an axiom unnecessarily. And in this case none of one
> >> univers, 42 universes or infinitely many hypothesis are simpler
> >> relative to each other...
>
> > That doesn't follow on either interpretation of O's R. It is
> > obviously false on the "entity" interpretation. On the "axiom"
> > interpretation, if there are exactly 42 universes, and there is no
> > strict necessity to the fact then, the "the number of universes is 42"
> > is an axiom.
>
> Such as "the number of universes is one".

 One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does
not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms.

>Besides I find very
> problematic the unicity.

Then you had better say what the problem is.


> >>and O'R could not help you choose or if it
> >> could help for something would be to choose the 0 univers
> >> hypothesis... well 0 < 1 << oo and this for all values of 0 even big
> >> ones :)
>
> > O's R is of course about the simplest theory that fist the evidence.
>
> Well then infinitely many is simpler (does not have to bother to
> explain why one and only one for ever and ever).

it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not
fit the evidence because of the WR problem.

> >> 2) Why turing emulability of the mind entails first person
> >> undeterminacy and/or MW ?
>
> >> Because if you're a computation then you're not dependant on the
> >> substrate of the computation... but only to the computation itself.
>
> > I would be directly dependent on the computation but only indirectly
> > on the substrate.
>
> You have no dependancy on the substrate (even indirectly), the
> substrate can change and the you computation can't notice it (so the
> direct substrate supporting the you computation may be an
> emulated.substrate running on an emulated substrate running on your
> level 0, still the you computation doesn't care.

The computation needs some sort of substrate.

> >  A
> >> computation is substrate independant.
> >> Well you'd say it may be substrate independent but still it needs a
> >> substrate to 'exist'. Ok let's accept that, but let's return on the
> >> mind and on the hypothesis that the mind is a computation and the
> >> brain the substrate on which it is run. As a computation is substrate
> >> independant then what follows is if the mind is a computation it can
> >> be run on other computational substrate for example on a... computer
> >> for example. And 'the mind' wouldn't be able to tell if it is run on a
> >> brain or on a computer. By our hypothesis the mind is a computation,
> >> and a computation is
>
> > You have switched context here from what a computational process is
> > ontologically dependent on, to what the abstract description of an
> > algorithm is theoretically dependent n
>
> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
> ontologically primary.

That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to
argue for it.

> >>dependant only on it's state and transition rule,
> >> if the same input is given to the same algorithm it will yield the
> >> same result so seeing a brain is of no help because you would see a
> >> brain even run somewhere else if the same input is given.
> >> So why this entails first person undeterminacy and/or MW ?
> >  let's
> >> assume we could replicate the computation of your mind (I have assume
> >> by hypothesis that it is a computation, so replication can be done,
> >> even if currently we don't have a clue and even we don't know if the
> >> mind is a computation... but here I assume it just for the argument to
> >> see what it entails) then I could execute the 'you' computation on a
> >> computer then if I can, I can also run the 'you' computatio

Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi,

2008/8/12 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>
> --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Quentin Anciaux"
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> 1) Why 1 is more than 0 and simpler than n ?
>>
>> 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem'... It follows by
>> looking at it in a first sight that it would means the one universe
>> hypothesis is simpler than MW. Yes, one universe involves many less
>> than MW (either there exists a finite number of other universes or
>> infinitely many)... Then by O'R we should take the one universe
>> hypothesis as simpler because requiring less universes (in this case
>> 1). But it's an ill way of understanding O'R... It should be
>> understood as saying something about the premises, the axioms...
>
> Why ? Occam talked about entities. And does MMW really
> minimise the number of axioms? Doesn't it need the axiom
> that nothing non-mathematical exists?

And doesn't the one universe has a 'real switch' axiom that only
something exists ?

>> One
>> shouldn't add an axiom unnecessarily. And in this case none of one
>> univers, 42 universes or infinitely many hypothesis are simpler
>> relative to each other...
>
> That doesn't follow on either interpretation of O's R. It is
> obviously false on the "entity" interpretation. On the "axiom"
> interpretation, if there are exactly 42 universes, and there is no
> strict necessity to the fact then, the "the number of universes is 42"
> is an axiom.

Such as "the number of universes is one". Besides I find very
problematic the unicity.

>>and O'R could not help you choose or if it
>> could help for something would be to choose the 0 univers
>> hypothesis... well 0 < 1 << oo and this for all values of 0 even big
>> ones :)
>
> O's R is of course about the simplest theory that fist the evidence.

Well then infinitely many is simpler (does not have to bother to
explain why one and only one for ever and ever).

>> 2) Why turing emulability of the mind entails first person
>> undeterminacy and/or MW ?
>>
>> Because if you're a computation then you're not dependant on the
>> substrate of the computation... but only to the computation itself.
>
> I would be directly dependent on the computation but only indirectly
> on the substrate.

You have no dependancy on the substrate (even indirectly), the
substrate can change and the you computation can't notice it (so the
direct substrate supporting the you computation may be an
emulated.substrate running on an emulated substrate running on your
level 0, still the you computation doesn't care.

>  A
>> computation is substrate independant.
>> Well you'd say it may be substrate independent but still it needs a
>> substrate to 'exist'. Ok let's accept that, but let's return on the
>> mind and on the hypothesis that the mind is a computation and the
>> brain the substrate on which it is run. As a computation is substrate
>> independant then what follows is if the mind is a computation it can
>> be run on other computational substrate for example on a... computer
>> for example. And 'the mind' wouldn't be able to tell if it is run on a
>> brain or on a computer. By our hypothesis the mind is a computation,
>> and a computation is
>
>
> You have switched context here from what a computational process is
> ontologically dependent on, to what the abstract description of an
> algorithm is theoretically dependent n

No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is
ontologically primary.

>>dependant only on it's state and transition rule,
>> if the same input is given to the same algorithm it will yield the
>> same result so seeing a brain is of no help because you would see a
>> brain even run somewhere else if the same input is given.
>> So why this entails first person undeterminacy and/or MW ?
>  let's
>> assume we could replicate the computation of your mind (I have assume
>> by hypothesis that it is a computation, so replication can be done,
>> even if currently we don't have a clue and even we don't know if the
>> mind is a computation... but here I assume it just for the argument to
>> see what it entails) then I could execute the 'you' computation on a
>> computer then if I can, I can also run the 'you' computation not only
>> on one computer but on many computers. Ok so now I have at least two
>> computers running the same mind (computation)... I switch off one
>> computer, the mind die ? hell no, by our hypothesis mind is
>> computation and the computation is still running on the other
>> computer. So from the point of view of the mind unplugging one of the
>> two computers didn't change a thing. Now I'm a real serail killer I
>> switch of the last computer running the computation/mind... so now the
>> mind die now ?? Let's say I've done a program dump before stopping the
>> last computer and I decide 5 years later to rerun the computation from
>> this save point and on. Wasn't the mind dead ? If it is and mind ==
>> the computation, how can I have the ability to run the computation
>> without

Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Bruno Marchal]

  I appreciate. I am not sure this will convince people, like Peter  
Jones, who assume the existence of a primary material world, and  
insists that a material implementation has to exist at some level for  
a computation to exist. I agree this is a poorly convincing sort of  
magical hand waving, but from a logical point of view an argument of  
the style of the movie-graph or Olympia is still needed.

Bruno


On 10 Aug 2008, at 05:56, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

>
> 1) Why 1 is more than 0 and simpler than n ?
>
> 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem'... It follows by
> looking at it in a first sight that it would means the one universe
> hypothesis is simpler than MW. Yes, one universe involves many less
> than MW (either there exists a finite number of other universes or
> infinitely many)... Then by O'R we should take the one universe
> hypothesis as simpler because requiring less universes (in this case
> 1). But it's an ill way of understanding O'R... It should be
> understood as saying something about the premises, the axioms... One
> shouldn't add an axiom unnecessarily. And in this case none of one
> univers, 42 universes or infinitely many hypothesis are simpler
> relative to each other... and O'R could not help you choose or if it
> could help for something would be to choose the 0 univers
> hypothesis... well 0 < 1 << oo and this for all values of 0 even big
> ones :)
>
> 2) Why turing emulability of the mind entails first person
> undeterminacy and/or MW ?
>
> Because if you're a computation then you're not dependant on the
> substrate of the computation... but only to the computation itself. A
> computation is substrate independant.
> Well you'd say it may be substrate independent but still it needs a
> substrate to 'exist'. Ok let's accept that, but let's return on the
> mind and on the hypothesis that the mind is a computation and the
> brain the substrate on which it is run. As a computation is substrate
> independant then what follows is if the mind is a computation it can
> be run on other computational substrate for example on a... computer
> for example. And 'the mind' wouldn't be able to tell if it is run on a
> brain or on a computer. By our hypothesis the mind is a computation,
> and a computation is dependant only on it's state and transition rule,
> if the same input is given to the same algorithm it will yield the
> same result so seeing a brain is of no help because you would see a
> brain even run somewhere else if the same input is given.
> So why this entails first person undeterminacy and/or MW ? let's
> assume we could replicate the computation of your mind (I have assume
> by hypothesis that it is a computation, so replication can be done,
> even if currently we don't have a clue and even we don't know if the
> mind is a computation... but here I assume it just for the argument to
> see what it entails) then I could execute the 'you' computation on a
> computer then if I can, I can also run the 'you' computation not only
> on one computer but on many computers. Ok so now I have at least two
> computers running the same mind (computation)... I switch off one
> computer, the mind die ? hell no, by our hypothesis mind is
> computation and the computation is still running on the other
> computer. So from the point of view of the mind unplugging one of the
> two computers didn't change a thing. Now I'm a real serail killer I
> switch of the last computer running the computation/mind... so now the
> mind die now ?? Let's say I've done a program dump before stopping the
> last computer and I decide 5 years later to rerun the computation from
> this save point and on. Wasn't the mind dead ? If it is and mind ==
> the computation, how can I have the ability to run the computation
> without it being the mind ? It means also that if you're a computation
> you can't know at which 'level' you're run (if you're run on a VM
> running in a VM running in a VM or a non emulated substrate). So if
> mind is a computation to make correct prediction about the next state
> you must take all computation having the same state into account. Even
> using the 'real switch' theory a mind could be run on different 'real'
> (composed of substance) substrate... and the mind will *have* to take
> into account these runs on real substrate to make correct prediction.
> And unplugging one real substrate run will not kill the mind,
> unplugging them all also. The only way would be to not only unplug
> them all but to garantee that it wil *never and ever* be run *again*
> (even only one).
>
>
> If I'm run on another computational substrate than
> my brain, If someone pull the plug, I die ?
>
> Quentin Anciaux
> -- 
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)

[Quentin Anciaux]

1) Why 1 is more than 0 and simpler than n ?

'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem'... It follows by
looking at it in a first sight that it would means the one universe
hypothesis is simpler than MW. Yes, one universe involves many less
than MW (either there exists a finite number of other universes or
infinitely many)... Then by O'R we should take the one universe
hypothesis as simpler because requiring less universes (in this case
1). But it's an ill way of understanding O'R... It should be
understood as saying something about the premises, the axioms... One
shouldn't add an axiom unnecessarily. And in this case none of one
univers, 42 universes or infinitely many hypothesis are simpler
relative to each other... and O'R could not help you choose or if it
could help for something would be to choose the 0 univers
hypothesis... well 0 < 1 << oo and this for all values of 0 even big
ones :)

2) Why turing emulability of the mind entails first person
undeterminacy and/or MW ?

Because if you're a computation then you're not dependant on the
substrate of the computation... but only to the computation itself. A
computation is substrate independant.
Well you'd say it may be substrate independent but still it needs a
substrate to 'exist'. Ok let's accept that, but let's return on the
mind and on the hypothesis that the mind is a computation and the
brain the substrate on which it is run. As a computation is substrate
independant then what follows is if the mind is a computation it can
be run on other computational substrate for example on a... computer
for example. And 'the mind' wouldn't be able to tell if it is run on a
brain or on a computer. By our hypothesis the mind is a computation,
and a computation is dependant only on it's state and transition rule,
if the same input is given to the same algorithm it will yield the
same result so seeing a brain is of no help because you would see a
brain even run somewhere else if the same input is given.
So why this entails first person undeterminacy and/or MW ? let's
assume we could replicate the computation of your mind (I have assume
by hypothesis that it is a computation, so replication can be done,
even if currently we don't have a clue and even we don't know if the
mind is a computation... but here I assume it just for the argument to
see what it entails) then I could execute the 'you' computation on a
computer then if I can, I can also run the 'you' computation not only
on one computer but on many computers. Ok so now I have at least two
computers running the same mind (computation)... I switch off one
computer, the mind die ? hell no, by our hypothesis mind is
computation and the computation is still running on the other
computer. So from the point of view of the mind unplugging one of the
two computers didn't change a thing. Now I'm a real serail killer I
switch of the last computer running the computation/mind... so now the
mind die now ?? Let's say I've done a program dump before stopping the
last computer and I decide 5 years later to rerun the computation from
this save point and on. Wasn't the mind dead ? If it is and mind ==
the computation, how can I have the ability to run the computation
without it being the mind ? It means also that if you're a computation
you can't know at which 'level' you're run (if you're run on a VM
running in a VM running in a VM or a non emulated substrate). So if
mind is a computation to make correct prediction about the next state
you must take all computation having the same state into account. Even
using the 'real switch' theory a mind could be run on different 'real'
(composed of substance) substrate... and the mind will *have* to take
into account these runs on real substrate to make correct prediction.
And unplugging one real substrate run will not kill the mind,
unplugging them all also. The only way would be to not only unplug
them all but to garantee that it wil *never and ever* be run *again*
(even only one).


If I'm run on another computational substrate than
my brain, If someone pull the plug, I die ?

Quentin Anciaux
-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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