Jon, list
OK the main difference comes from our respective understandings for
final and normal interpretant.
Subsidiarily there may be a question of method too: the order of logical
determinations is not , I think, the only rationale at stake for the
second way of dividing signs.
There is
Bernard, List:
Just a quick follow-up--I outlined below what my proposed sequence for the
last six trichotomies entails for the possible and necessitant classes, but
here is what it entails for the existent classes.
- An actuous (purpose of If is to produce action) can be a percussive
(Id
Bernard, List:
Thanks very much for these comments. I am grateful to all the contributors
to this thread, whose posts have been consistently respectful, substantive,
and on-topic--Jack, Gary F., Jeff, Gary R., Mike, Helmut, Phyllis,
Vinicius, Robert, Mary, and now Bernard. Our views diverge when
JAS, Vinicius, List
Le 10/11/2021 à 20:50, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit :
In my view, Peirce eventually gets the logical order of the correlates
right in his later taxonomies--the object determines the sign to
determine the interpretant, and the genuine object or interpretant
determines the
Vinicius, List:
Thanks for spelling all this out, there is much to ponder here. I have read
your "Minute Semeiotic" material in the past, but it likely warrants
revisiting now that my own ideas about speculative grammar are more
developed.
VR: Most scholars that have dealt with the interpretants
Jon, list
JAS: What would be the degenerate classes for the S-O
(iconic/indexical/symbolic) and S-O-I (abducent/inducent/deducent)
relations? Is it feasible instead to make the third move be for the S-I
(rheme/dicisign/argument or seme/pheme/delome) relation, as suggested by
Peirce's 1903
Vinicius, List:
VR: You can make only three moves on the podium. One for the S, one for the
relation S-0, and one for the relation S-O-I
What would be the degenerate classes for the S-O
(iconic/indexical/symbolic) and S-O-I (abducent/inducent/deducent)
relations? Is it feasible instead to make
Jon, list
> [image: image.png]
>
>
> JAS: There are genuine qualisigns (1), sinsigns (2), and legisigns (3);
> degenerate altersigns (1/2) and replicas (2/3); and doubly degenerate
> holisigns (1/2/3).
>
> Exact. I use a different notation: qualisigns (1), sinsigns (2) and
legisigns (3);
Vinicius, List:
Thanks for the additional explanations. I see now that holisigns and
altersigns fit into a phaneroscopic analysis in accordance with Robert
Marty's podium diagram (
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338449971_The_podium_of_the_categories-final
).
[image: image.png]
There
Robert, List:
Thanks for sharing some additional thoughts on this topic. The linked note
obviously presupposes Peirce's 1903 taxonomy that has only three
trichotomies and ten classes, rather than the later ones that have six
trichotomies (for all the correlates) and 28 classes, or ten
original
>>> effect of musement.
>>>
>>> Well, maybe things are now more complicated than when we started. Sorry
>>> for that.
>>>
>>> Vinicius
>>>
>>> On Sat, Nov 6, 2021 at 10:53 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
>>> jack.cody.2
men but firstness for the final interpretant.
>>> I wonder if you would be able to clarify on this notion a little.
>>> Perhaps delineating exactly what you consider a "degenerate legisign" to
>>> be, and then how it alters when the mode is "thirdness for representament"
>>> and &
(For some reason, the message below did not go through. I repost it. Sorry
if there is redundancy)
Jack, list
The concept of degeneration comes from projective geometry. It does not
carry any moral judgement. You can degenerate a tridimensional figure by
projecting it on a plane, and then
Gary F., List:
GF: Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses outside of semiotics
(unless we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic).
Indeed, the type/token distinction seems to be one of Peirce's most
commonly employed insights, although I doubt that very many
eirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens
Gary R, Jon AS, Phyllis, Jeff et al.,
Clearly the type/token distinction has many uses outside of semiotics (unless
we think that everything is a sign and nothing is non-semiotic). Gary’s subway
token furnishes one example.
My question was
Dear colleagues,
This is an interesting thread. I have been working on these questions for a
while now.
My ideas are inspired by Peirce but not exactly identical to Peirce's.
Tony Jappy once called me a Neo-Peircean, which I found OK. Better than
post or ante Peircean, anyway.
I will restrict my
Gary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 5-Nov-21 20:53
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens
Gary R., Phyllis, List:
GR: But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the subway
token is ...
I am
Gary R., Phyllis, List:
GR: But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the
subway token is ...
I am likely belaboring the point now, but a subway token is *not *a token
in the semeiotic sense, and its type is *not *a type in the semeiotic
sense. The English *term *"subway
gt;>>> as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of
>>>> those signs.
>>>>
>>>> GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken *word* that is a
>>>> token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are
>>
chy of *types* but not of
>>> *tokens*.
>>>
>>> I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to *external
>>> *signs.
>>> In his October 1995 *Monist* article, Peirce referred to “A sign (under
>>> which designation I place every kind
hought I am hosting at the moment is
>> certainly *embodied* here and now in a pattern of neural activity,
>> whether I *utter* it or not, just as a spoken or written text is
>> *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only
>> difference is that it is an *i
just as a spoken or written text is
> *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only
> difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does
> that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it a
> *type*.
>
> Gary f.
>
Gary F., List:
GF: It would follow that the three words in the different languages are
*subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred to
as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types *but not of *tokens*.
I agree, although I prefer to use "type" for what you are
Jeff, List:
This is another example of incorrectly applying Peirce's semeiotic
terminology of "type" and "token" to the *objects *of signs rather than to
signs *themselves*. Just as an individual man is *not *a token of the type
"man" as a word in English, the individual philosophers called by
ary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 4-Nov-21 18:24
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens
Gary F., List:
Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative
grammar is that only an individual e
Gary, Gary, Jon, list,
I think, being either an animal or a human does not make something either a sign or an object, but the context does.
Best, Helmut
05. November 2021 um 06:52 Uhr
"Gary Richmond"
wrote:
Jon A.S., Gary F, List,
JAS: Again, my
Hi All,
This is a frequent question, between token and type, in knowledge
representation systems. Of course, the answer to this question is
context. When talking about a thing or its attributes, token is your
choice. When talking about external relationships or group membership,
type is your
List,
To follow up on the message I just sent out:
When I first came to live in NYC, and for several decades after, when you
wanted to take the subway you would go to a booth and purchase
subway 'tokens'. Each subway token was a token (in Peircean terms) of
the *type*, 'that object which will
Jon A.S., Gary F, List,
JAS: Again, my understanding of the terminology *within the context of
speculative grammar* is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a
token (emphasis added, GR).
GR: I personally think that this is indisputable as there is more than
sufficient textual support
---
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu
> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 4, 2021 1:06 AM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key
> principle of normative semeiotic for interpreti
__
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Thursday, November 4, 2021 3:23 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens
Gary F., List:
Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of speculative
grammar is that only an i
Gary F., List:
Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of
speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign is a
token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that only
an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and
1:06 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key
principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)
Jack, List:
There is nothing "heretical" or even "heterodox" here from a Peircean
perspective. It just strikes me a
x29> here, in a passage leading up to a
discussion of the “categories.”
Gary f.
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 3-Nov-21 13:18
To: Peirce-L
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens (was A key principle of normative
semeiotic for interpreting texts)
G
Gary F., List:
I agree that where we diverge is in treating a type and one of its tokens
as two *different *signs vs. two "aspects" (I still need a better term
here) of the *same *sign. I acknowledge that your usage seems to be more
consistent with Peirce's various taxonomies for sign
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