Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina, I am afraid you may be inside your 'semiotic blackhole" now. That is, you may be (mind you I am not saying you are) so attracted to your own system of beautiful ideas that you cannot get out of it to see the real, not always beautiful, world out there. All the beast. Sung On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 8:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Sung, please don't tell me what I meant. You aren't The Teacher here, but > just a debater among debaters - and one who hasn't read Peirce but chooses > to consider that his views on Peirce are always correct. > > I repeat - the 9 Relations are not dyads; that means that they aren't > dyadic relations because a dyad operates between two existential nodes - > and the Object-Representamen-Interpretant do not exist 'per se' each in > themselves. They exist within the interactions...Such semiosic interactions > may not be with a human agent; a cell can semiosically interact with > another cell and needs no human involvement. > > As Peirce noted, the semiosic triad is NOT made up of a collection of > dyadic relations. Your mechanical reductionism is not Peircean. > > Edwina. > > - Original Message - > *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > *To:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 8:02 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > Edwina, > > You say: " . . . the 9 Relations are not dyads . . ." >(122915-1) > > I say: " The 9 Relations are dyadic relations, not triadic ones." >(1229151-2) > > I think you also meant (122915-2). > > Sung > > On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Sung - as I have repeatedly said, and which you continue to ignore, the 9 >> Relations are not dyads. A dyad operates within two existentialities, and >> the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are not each existentialities in >> themselves. >> >> The icon doesn't need an *existential *object or interpretant but it >> still functions within a triadic semiosis. >> >> Edwina >> >> - Original Message - >> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> >> *To:* Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> >> *Cc:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 4:34 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations >> >> Hi Matt. >> >> I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it >> refers to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether >> here and now, or sometime in the future. In this sense, all of the 9 types >> of signs are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view >> that they are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e., >> R-R, R-O and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes. >> >> But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as >> a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce) >> neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a >> blackboard. It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic >> sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit >> that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as >> triadic as mentioned above. This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the >> sign": >> >> "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of >> discourse." (122915-1) >> >> Sung >> >> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken >>> of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that >>> mathematics is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) >>> circle signifies the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these >>> cases the signs are still only signs within their triad; it's just that the >>> object or interpretant doesn't need to be existent. >>> >>> Matt >>> >>> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: >>> >>> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: >>> >>> Jon A, List, >>> >>> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the >>> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994): >>> >>> "A si
[PEIRCE-L] Re: off-list
Hi GaryR and list, (I am sorry to make this off-list email public because it is related to my decision described below.) Since I have said just about all I wanted to say, as a chemist-turned-theoretical cell biologists, to the PEIRCE-L list during the past year or so, and since my posts are apparently not appreciated by most, if not all, of the senior members of The Peirce Group, according to Gary R, I have decided not to participate in future discussions on this list as of this time. If you have any questions or comments on the posts that I have written for this list in the past, I would be happy to communicate with you off-line any time. Good luck in your continued inquiry of signs. Sung On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 8:50 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > off-list final warning > > Sung, > > It has gotten to the point that, especially because we have Peirce novices > on list who could be led astray by your posts, frankly, insufficiently > informed by insufficient study, that I am seriously considering asking The > Peirce Group to approve my permanently removing you from the list. I have > no doubt that if I make this request that it will be approved by TPG. > > In addition, you still tend to post too frequently and at too great > length. So it is this combination of things, and your history of > problematic postings, which lead me to this decision. > > In the almost 6 years since Joe Ransdell passed and I took up moderating > the list, I have never even once considered taking such a step. But I am > beyond frustrated and, indeed, simply fed up with your idiosyncratic > postings which lead, as I see it, nowhere except to your own, in my > opinion--and others--bizarre theories (and I've heard complaints from > several others off-list, including all but one of the board members of The > Peirce Group and *all* members of the advisory board). > > I have discussed these problematic tendencies of yours which, in my > opinion, do *not* support good online inquiry. You seem to have no regard > for anyone else on the list but yourself, and that is, simply, > unacceptable. Consider this an absolutely final warning. > > Sincerely, > > Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator) > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina, You say: " . . . the 9 Relations are not dyads . . ." (122915-1) I say: " The 9 Relations are dyadic relations, not triadic ones." (1229151-2) I think you also meant (122915-2). Sung On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Sung - as I have repeatedly said, and which you continue to ignore, the 9 > Relations are not dyads. A dyad operates within two existentialities, and > the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are not each existentialities in > themselves. > > The icon doesn't need an *existential *object or interpretant but it > still functions within a triadic semiosis. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > *To:* Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> > *Cc:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 4:34 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > Hi Matt. > > I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it refers > to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether here and > now, or sometime in the future. In this sense, all of the 9 types of signs > are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view that they > are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e., R-R, R-O > and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes. > > But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as > a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce) > neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a > blackboard. It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic > sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit > that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as > triadic as mentioned above. This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the > sign": > > "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of > discourse." (122915-1) > > Sung > > On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken of >> the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics >> is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies >> the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are >> still only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or >> interpretant doesn't need to be existent. >> >> Matt >> >> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: >> >> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: >> >> Jon A, List, >> >> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the >> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994): >> >> "A sinsign may be index or icon. As index it is 'a sign which would, at >> once, (122915-1) >> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but >> would >> not lose that character if there were no interpretant." >> >> That's in CP 2.304 >> >> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which >> would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its >> object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a >> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the >> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not >> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a >> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the >> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether >> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign >> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no >> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does >> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification." >> >> >> >> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic >> sign*. >> >> Therefore, >> >> "Not all signs are triadic." >> (122915-2) >> >> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe. >> >> All the best. >> >> Sung >> >> >> >> - >> PEIRCE-L subsc
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina, You wrote: "Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the Relations are not dyads, (122915-1) are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?" You may repeat (122915-1) as many times as you wish, but, to me, the fact remains that "The 9 types of signs are *dyadic relations*, regardless of whether or not they become incorporated (122915-2) into a triadic sign, just as quarks are quarks regardless of whether or not they are incorporated into a baryon." Perhaps you will find the *quark-sign analogy *useful someday, even though it may not seem so now, despite the fact that I have been discussing this model on these lists since [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012. All the best. Sung On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 8:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the > Relations are not dyads, are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad? > > Also - your definition of 'nominal' seems to suggest that you think that > it refers to a view focused around 'names'. No- that's not the definition > of nominalism. > > Furthermore, the difference in analysis of the 9 types of Relations, isn't > simply due to their 'name' - where you call them 'elementary signs', and > Gary R. calls them 'parameters' and I call them 'Relations'. These > differences aren't simply terminological; they are conceptually > substantive. I strongly reject your mechanical reductionism. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > *To:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 6:47 PM > *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List, > > You wrote: > > "So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely > an index, (122015-1) > but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one > day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such." > > (*1*) I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis". > > It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square > triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be > explained below: > > f > g > Object (O) --> Representamen (R) --> Interpretant > (I) > | > ^ > | > | > |___| > h > > *Figure 1.* The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis. > f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign > interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence). > Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness, > Secondness or Thirdness. > > > The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e., > "interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in *Figure > 1) *in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is > determined by TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the > bullet. > > > (*2*) You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of > signs are not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not > triadic ? Rather you think the 9 types are the "parameters" needed to > produce the 10 classes of triadic signs ? You may be right, but the way > you are expressing your idea is not too convincing to me. To repeat my > humble opinion, both the 9 the types of signs and the 10 classes of signs > are all signs (simply because we are thinking about them right here and now > and we can only think in signs) but are not all of the same kind, since the > former are parts of the latter and not the other way around, in an > analogous way that quarks (there are 6 different kinds) are parts of > baryons (i.e., protons, and neutrons) and not the other way around. This > is why I think it is justified to differentiate the 9 types of signs and > the 10 classes of signs by giving them different names, for example, my > suggestion that the former be referred to as the "elementary signs" and the > latter "composite signs", which is in principle in the same spirit as your > naming the former as "parameters" and the latter as "triadic signs", the > difference being only NOMINAL. > > (*3*) Frankly I am really surprised that, after at least for 3 years of > discussions on the relation b
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Jon, You wrote: " . . . the nine "types" (A) are really just nine TERMS that name specific (122915-1) characteristics (B) . . ." (letters added) I agree. I wrote about it in [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2015. You can check it out. But what I am saying is in addition to what you are saying above. I am saying that "If A is the name of B, A is called the sign for B." (122915-2) Do you not agree ? Sung On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Sung, List: > > Again, the nine "types" are really just nine TERMS that name specific > characteristics within the ten CLASSES of signs. For example, an icon is > also a rheme, and either a qualisign, sinsign, or legisign; i.e., three of > the ten classes correspond to icons. But no sign is ONLY an icon; it also > ALWAYS has the R-R and R-I relations, as well. > > Icon, index, and symbol are all irreducibly triadic signs. In claiming > otherwise, you seem to be conflating reality with existence, contrary to > Peirce's own usage of those terms. The lead-pencil streak still has an > object--the geometrical line--even though it does not exist. The > bullet-hole still has an interpretant--immediate, as well as final--even > though it does not exist. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:34 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > >> Hi Matt. >> >> I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it >> refers to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether >> here and now, or sometime in the future. In this sense, all of the 9 types >> of signs are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view >> that they are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e., >> R-R, R-O and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes. >> >> But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as >> a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce) >> neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a >> blackboard. It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic >> sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit >> that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as >> triadic as mentioned above. This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the >> sign": >> >> "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of >> discourse." (122915-1) >> >> Sung >> >> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken >>> of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that >>> mathematics is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) >>> circle signifies the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these >>> cases the signs are still only signs within their triad; it's just that the >>> object or interpretant doesn't need to be existent. >>> >>> Matt >>> >>> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: >>> >>> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: >>> >>> Jon A, List, >>> >>> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the >>> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994): >>> >>> "A sinsign may be index or icon. As index it is 'a sign which would, at >>> once, (122915-1) >>> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but >>> would >>> not lose that character if there were no interpretant." >>> >>> That's in CP 2.304 >>> >>> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign >>> which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though >>> its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a >>> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the >>> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not >>> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a >>> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the >>> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether >>> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign >>> which would los
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Hi Matt. I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it refers to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether here and now, or sometime in the future. In this sense, all of the 9 types of signs are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view that they are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e., R-R, R-O and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes. But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce) neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a blackboard. It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as triadic as mentioned above. This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the sign": "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of discourse." (122915-1) Sung On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote: > Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken of > the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics > is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies > the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are > still only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or > interpretant doesn't need to be existent. > > Matt > > On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: > > On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > > Jon A, List, > > Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the > Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994): > > "A sinsign may be index or icon. As index it is 'a sign which would, at > once, (122915-1) > lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but > would > not lose that character if there were no interpretant." > > That's in CP 2.304 > > "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which > would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its > object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a > geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the > character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not > lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a > piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the > shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether > anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign > which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no > interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does > only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification." > > > > So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic > sign*. > > Therefore, > > "Not all signs are triadic." > (122915-2) > > as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe. > > All the best. > > Sung > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity
John, List, I just wrote to Jon A as below, reminding him that not all signs are triadic, according to Peirce: "Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994): "A sinsign may be index or icon. As index it is 'a sign which would, at once, (122915-1) lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant." So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic sign* . Therefore, "Not all signs are triadic." (122915-2)" All the best. Sung On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 1:42 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > The interpretant is a sign, so of course it is triadic. > > > > John Collier > > Professor Emeritus, UKZN > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > *From:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *On > Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji > *Sent:* Tuesday, 29 December 2015 2:34 PM > *To:* PEIRCE-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - > meta-languages and propositions of triadicity > > > > Jon A, List, > > > > Your excellent quote > > > > ". . . . the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic > relation to the Object,(122915-1) > > but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does." > > > > indicates that the Interpretant is triadic as well, just like the > Representamen is. But in the following quote I cited yesterday, Peirce > said: > > > > " . . . (A, or a sign; my addition) is also in a triadic relation to B > for a purely (122915-2) > passive correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine > *C to be in a dyadic relation, µ, to B*," (emphasis added) > > > > *30 - 1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably > July 1905 .* > > So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a > priman element generally) and we might define a sign as follows: > > "A "sign" is anything, A, which, > > (1) in addition to other characters of its own, > > (2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B, > > (3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate, > C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic > relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the > relation Þ." > > Retrieved from http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM > > > Statements (122915-1) and (122915-2) are clearly contradictory, just as > the following two statements are with respect to the ambiguous picture, P, > shown in Figure 1: > > > > "A is a lion and not a cat." >(122915-3) > > "A is a cat and not a lion." >(122915-4) > > > > [image: Inline image 1] > > > > Figure 1. An ambiguous picture. retrieved from the Internet. > > > > But in reality > > > > "A is both a lion and a cat." > (122915-5) > > > > It seems to me that there are two possible explanations for the seeming > contradiction revealed in Peirce's writings, (122915-1) and (122915-2): > > (i) Peirce contradicted himself. > (122915-6) > > > > (ii) Peirce (most likely unknowingly or unconsciously) prescinded > (122915-7) > the dyadic aspect of the triadic sign. > > > > Possibility (ii) is consistent with what I called yesterday the "Peirce > uncertainty principle" (PUP) or "Semiotic uncertainty principle" (PUP) in > analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. I now suggest that a > stronger version of PUP or SUP would be > > > > "*All signs are ambiguous to varying degrees*." > (122915-8) > > > > which may be referred to as the "Sign Uncertainty Principle" (SUP) > > > > where the letter S is ambiguous. > > > > All the best. > > > > Sung > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 10:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Edwina, List: > > > > Is it not the case, at least according to Peirce, that the > interpretant-object relation is necessarily the same as the > representamen-object relation? If so,
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Jon A, List, Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994): "A sinsign may be index or icon. As index it is 'a sign which would, at once, (122915-1) lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant." So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic sign* . Therefore, "Not all signs are triadic." (122915-2) as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe. All the best. Sung " On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 9:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Sung, List: > > Yes, I meant legisign not dicisign. Thanks for the correction. > > You asserted that it is "non-Peircean" to think that something non-triadic > CANNOT be a sign. If this is true, then Peirce's writings must identify > something non-triadic that CAN be a sign. I asked you to provide such a > citation. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 6:47 AM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > >> Hi Jon, >> >> You wrote: >> >> "Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; . . . " >> (122915-1) >> >> Did you mean to say "legisign: instead of "dicisign" ? It is my >> understanding that "dicisign" is the interpretan of a sinsign. >> >> "Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines >> something (122915-2) >> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign." >> >> Can you re-phrase (122915-2) ? >> >> All the best. >> >> Sung >> >> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Sung, List: >>> >>> The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each >>> one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign. Every sign is either a >>> qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an >>> index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an >>> argument. However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description, >>> with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument >>> (which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we >>> start taking additional trichotomies into account. >>> >>> Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines >>> something that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign." >>> >>> It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not >>> GUARANTEE that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of >>> Peirce," and I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this. However, >>> I suspect that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to >>> come away with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only >>> to a limited extent. Just my opinion, of course. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Edwina, >>>> >>>> You wrote: >>>> >>>> "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs." >>>> (122815-1) >>>> >>>> (*1*) Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to >>>> the 9 relations: >>>> >>>> 1) quali*sign,* >>>> 2) sin*sign*, >>>> 3) legi*sign*. >>>> 4) icon, >>>> 5) index, >>>> 6) symbol, >>>> 7) rheme, >>>> 8) dici*sign*, and >>>> 9) argument. >>>> >>>> If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made >>>> mistakes when he referred to 4 (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9 >>>> relations as "signs " ? >>>> >>>> (*2*) The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to >>>> be that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely >>>> tria
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Hi Jon, You wrote: "Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; . . . " (122915-1) Did you mean to say "legisign: instead of "dicisign" ? It is my understanding that "dicisign" is the interpretan of a sinsign. "Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something (122915-2) that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign." Can you re-phrase (122915-2) ? All the best. Sung On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote: > Sung, List: > > The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each > one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign. Every sign is either a > qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an > index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an > argument. However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description, > with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument > (which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we > start taking additional trichotomies into account. > > Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something > that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign." > > It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not > GUARANTEE that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of > Peirce," and I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this. However, > I suspect that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to > come away with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only > to a limited extent. Just my opinion, of course. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > >> Edwina, >> >> You wrote: >> >> "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs." >> (122815-1) >> >> (*1*) Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to >> the 9 relations: >> >> 1) quali*sign,* >> 2) sin*sign*, >> 3) legi*sign*. >> 4) icon, >> 5) index, >> 6) symbol, >> 7) rheme, >> 8) dici*sign*, and >> 9) argument. >> >> If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made mistakes >> when he referred to 4 (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9 relations as >> "signs " ? >> >> (*2*) The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to be >> that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely >> triadic. So if something is not triadic (e.g., the 9 dyadic relations >> above), that something cannot be a sign. I think such a mode of thinking >> is not only fallacious but also non-Peircean. >> >> (*3*) If my claim that your understanding of the 9 types of signs is >> fallacious turns out to be correct, this may provide , IMHO, an interesting >> lesson and warning for all Peircean scholars: >> >> "Reading Peirce extensively does not guarantee that the >> (122815-2) >> reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce." >> >> If (122815-2) proves to be true, upon further critical scrutiny, we may >> be able to identify possible reasons for why this statement may be true. >> One possibility that occurs to me, in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty >> Principle in physics, is something like the following: >> >> "It is impossible to simultaneously determine the object >> (122815-3) >> and the interpretant of a sign with arbitrary precision." >> >> Or, >> >> "The more accurately one can define the object of a sign, the >> (122815-4) >> less accurately can one define its interpretant, and *vice versa*." >> >> If (122815-3) and (122815-4) prove to be valid in the future, we may >> refer to them as the "Peircean uncertainty Principle" (PUP) or the >> "semiotic uncertainty principle" (SUP). >> >> Are there any Peircean experts on this list who knows whether or not >> Peirce discussed any topic in his extensive writings that may be related to >> what is here referred to as PUP or SUP? >> >> One indirect support for the PUP may be provided the by intense debates
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
lly affected by that Object. It cannot, therefore, be a
>> Qualisign, because qualities are whatever they are independently of
>> anything else. In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it
>> necessarily has some Quality in common with the Object, and it is in
>> respect to these that it refers to the Object. It does, therefore, involve
>> a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar kind; and it is not the mere
>> resemblance of its Object, even in these respects, which makes it a sign,
>> but it is the actual modification of it by the Object.
>>
>> 249. A *Symbol* is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by
>> virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to
>> cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus
>> itself a general type or law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts
>> through a Replica. Not only is it general itself, but the Object to which
>> it refers is of a general nature. Now that which is general has its being
>> in the instances which it will determine. There must, therefore, be
>> existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we must here
>> understand by “existent,” existent in the possibly imaginary universe to
>> which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will indirectly, through the
>> association or other law, be affected by those instances; and thus the
>> Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind.
>> It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight effect upon the
>> Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant character of the
>> Symbol.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Let’s compare what Peirce says about each sign type in this second
>> trichotomy with his definition of the three types in the first trichotomy.
>> Since the Qualisign and the Icon are each first in their respective
>> trichotomies, each exemplifies Firstness, but in a different way. The
>> Firstness of the Qualisign is its being a quality in itself. The Firstness
>> of the Icon, on the other hand, is the Firstness of its relation to its
>> Object, specifically the fact that it “refers to the Object that it
>> denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses,
>> just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not.”
>>
>>
>>
>> Now compare the Secondness of the Index in its trichotomy with the
>> Secondness of the Sinsign, which is its being an actual existent thing or
>> event. The Index “refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being
>> really affected by that Object.” Again, its Secondness is that of its
>> relation to its Object — which, as a genuine Secondness, *involves* a
>> Firstness (namely “a sort of Icon”). The *peculiarity* of that
>> Firstness, I would guess, is that its genuine Secondness to the Object *does
>> *have something to do with its character, which is not the case with the
>> Icon as defined above.
>>
>>
>>
>> Finally, we come to the Thirdness of the Symbol in its trichotomy. The
>> Thirdness of a Legisign is that it is in itself a “law” and a “general
>> type.” The Symbol, being also a Legisign, is general in its mode of being
>> but *also* in its relation to its Object. This entails that it acts
>> through a Replica, *and* that there must be existent instances of what
>> the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by “existent,”
>> existent in the possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers.
>> Hence, just as genuine Secondness involves Firstness, so also does the
>> Thirdness of a Symbol *involve* Secondness, in the form of “a sort of
>> Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind.”
>>
>>
>>
>> To close, I’d like to return to the “mirror” idea that Gary R. picked up
>> on awhile back, by suggesting that the *involvement* described above is
>> a sort of mirror image of *degeneracy*, in the way that the two concepts
>> are applied to these sign types here and in Kaina Stoicheia. I won’t
>> elaborate on that, though, but just wish everyone a happy Solstice!
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> } We are natural expressions of a deeper order. [Stuart Kauffman] {
>>
>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>>
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
e a
>> Qualisign, because qualities are whatever they are independently of
>> anything else. In so far as the Index is affected by the Object, it
>> necessarily has some Quality in common with the Object, and it is in
>> respect to these that it refers to the Object. It does, therefore, involve
>> a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a peculiar kind; and it is not the mere
>> resemblance of its Object, even in these respects, which makes it a sign,
>> but it is the actual modification of it by the Object.
>>
>> 249. A *Symbol* is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by
>> virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to
>> cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus
>> itself a general type or law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts
>> through a Replica. Not only is it general itself, but the Object to which
>> it refers is of a general nature. Now that which is general has its being
>> in the instances which it will determine. There must, therefore, be
>> existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we must here
>> understand by “existent,” existent in the possibly imaginary universe to
>> which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will indirectly, through the
>> association or other law, be affected by those instances; and thus the
>> Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind.
>> It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight effect upon the
>> Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant character of the
>> Symbol.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Let’s compare what Peirce says about each sign type in this second
>> trichotomy with his definition of the three types in the first trichotomy.
>> Since the Qualisign and the Icon are each first in their respective
>> trichotomies, each exemplifies Firstness, but in a different way. The
>> Firstness of the Qualisign is its being a quality in itself. The Firstness
>> of the Icon, on the other hand, is the Firstness of its relation to its
>> Object, specifically the fact that it “refers to the Object that it
>> denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses,
>> just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not.”
>>
>>
>>
>> Now compare the Secondness of the Index in its trichotomy with the
>> Secondness of the Sinsign, which is its being an actual existent thing or
>> event. The Index “refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being
>> really affected by that Object.” Again, its Secondness is that of its
>> relation to its Object — which, as a genuine Secondness, *involves* a
>> Firstness (namely “a sort of Icon”). The *peculiarity* of that
>> Firstness, I would guess, is that its genuine Secondness to the Object *does
>> *have something to do with its character, which is not the case with the
>> Icon as defined above.
>>
>>
>>
>> Finally, we come to the Thirdness of the Symbol in its trichotomy. The
>> Thirdness of a Legisign is that it is in itself a “law” and a “general
>> type.” The Symbol, being also a Legisign, is general in its mode of being
>> but *also* in its relation to its Object. This entails that it acts
>> through a Replica, *and* that there must be existent instances of what
>> the Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by “existent,”
>> existent in the possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers.
>> Hence, just as genuine Secondness involves Firstness, so also does the
>> Thirdness of a Symbol *involve* Secondness, in the form of “a sort of
>> Index, although an Index of a peculiar kind.”
>>
>>
>>
>> To close, I’d like to return to the “mirror” idea that Gary R. picked up
>> on awhile back, by suggesting that the *involvement* described above is
>> a sort of mirror image of *degeneracy*, in the way that the two concepts
>> are applied to these sign types here and in Kaina Stoicheia. I won’t
>> elaborate on that, though, but just wish everyone a happy Solstice!
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> } We are natural expressions of a deeper order. [Stuart Kauffman] {
>>
>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at
>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
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>> BODY of the message. More at
>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>
--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Hi Jon, That is an excellent point. Can we then say that "All actual signs derive from potential signs but not all potential signs need be actual signs." (122115-1) This statement may be related to the the fact that "There can be no Thirdness without Secondness and Firstness; (122115-2) there can be no Secondness without Firstness." If (122115-2) is true, then why stop at Firstness? Why can't we continue and say "There can be no Firstness without 'Zeroness'." (122115-3) The concept of Zeroness was invoked in 2013 as a logical consequence of the 9 types of signs defined by Peirce as detailed in [biosemiotics:4440] forwarded to you separately. All the best. Sung On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 1:50 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > Sung, > > Having a character that makes it a sign is not yet being a sign to someone > of something. The first is potential, the second is actualization. > > Regards, > Jon > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > > On Dec 21, 2015, at 12:33 AM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > > Edwina, > > You said > > "All signs are triads". > > I disagree. Not all signs are triads. Only symbols are. There can be > signs without interpretant (e.g., a piece of mould with a bullet hoe in it; > see below) or without object (e.g., a lead-pencil streak as representing a > geometric line), according to Peirce: > > > "An icon is a sign which would possess the character which renders it > significant, even though its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil > streak as representing a geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, > at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were > removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant. > Such, for instance, is a piece of mould with a bullet hole in it as a sign > of a shot; for without the shot there would have been no hole; but there is > a hole there, whether anyone has the sense to attribute it to a shot or > not. A symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a > sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which > signifies what it does only by virtue of it being understood to have that > signification." > > (Peirce, Philosophical Writings, 104, as cited in > http://goldberg.berkeley.edu/pubs/Index-and-the-Interface-Kris-Paulsen-Article-Spring-2013.pdf). > > > All the best. > > Sung > > > > On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 9:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Sung - if you want to consider the term 'Icon' as the 'name ' for the >> Relation between the Representamen and the Object--- AND as a 'sign' of >> that Relation...then, the term, ICON, must be operating within a triad. It >> is not in itself, as that word, as you insist, an 'elementary sign'. >> >> Again - that word ICON, to be considered a sign, must itself be >> functioning within a triad. The term ICON, as a sign, is made up of those >> three relations: R-R, R-O and R-I. There is no such thing as an 'elementary >> sign'. All signs are triads. So, when I hear or read the word ICON, [R-O], >> my Representamen in its memory [R-R], mediates that sight/hearing of ICON, >> to result in an Interpretant [R-I] of the relation between the R and the O. >> That's a full triad. Not an elementary sign. >> >> Again- your lion and cat are irrelevant felines. >> >> Edwina >> >> - Original Message - >> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 8:42 PM >> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic >> relations >> >> Hi Edwina, >> >> You wrote: >> >> "We are talking about the meaning of these terms. >> (122015-1) >> The term of 'icon' refers to the relation between the >> Representamen and the Object." >> >> I disagree. >> >> We are not talking about just the meaning of these terms but also their >> names. >> >> We agree that the *meaning *of 'icon' is *the relation between >> representamen and object in the mode of Firstness.* >> >> Where we do not agree is that I regard 'icon' as the *name* of (and >> hence a sign for) *the relation between representamen and object in the >> mode of Firstness.* >> >> Again you are seeing only the lion and not the cat. >> >> *Sung* >> >> >> >&g
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina, Helmut, John, Gary R, List, You wrote: "Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of representamen relations'. (122015-1) Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, . . . " These '9 types of representmane relations' are the *objects* of the 9 types of *signs* that Peirce named 'qualisign', 'singsign, 'legisign', 'dicisign', etc. For example, icon, index , and symbol are the *signs* referring to the* relation* between representamen and its object in the mode of being of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively. It seems to me that you are conflating *representmen *and *object. * The 3x3 table of the 9 types of signs is an *ambiguous* diagram, since it an be intepreted in more than one ways with equal validity, like the figure shown below. Clearly the figure can be interpreted as depicting a *lion*, a *cat*, or *both*, not unlike our 9 types and 10 classes of signs. I see both a lion (*relations, i.e., objects*) and a cat (name of the relations, i.e., *signs*) in the picture, but, metaphorically speaking, Edwina seems to see only a lion, and Helmut only a cat. [image: Inline image 1] Retrieved from http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/humanities/research/philosophyresearch/cspe/illusions/ on 12/20/2015. All the best. Sung On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of > representamen relations'. Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, despite > Sung's description of them as 'elementary signs'. A sign is, by definition, > a triad - and therefore, in my view, even the representamen-in-itself, > can't be a sign, because it is not in a triad. The triad is the sign. > > That is why I refer to the interactions between the Representamen and the > Object; the Representamen and the Interpretant - as Relations. And of > course, Peirce does this as well, I've provided the quotes previously. The > Representamen-in-itself is also a Relation, a depth relation, with its > history. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> > *To:* colli...@ukzn.ac.za > *Cc:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> ; PEIRCE-L > <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 5:40 PM > *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > John, Sung, list, > for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The > difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is > not, as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it > is a type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs, > and the 9 types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen > relations, 3 object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not > completely clear about, is, what the representamen, object, or > interpretant, has a relation with: Is it the representamen, or the whole > sign? I think it is the representamen, as Edwina often has said, because, > if they were relations between the whole triadic sign and either element of > its, this would be some circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already > is a relation between (or composition of?) these three relations...A > logical loop. So, my temporal understanding is to replace "9 types of > signs" with "9 types of representamen relations". Is that correct? > Best, > Helmut > > 20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr > "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > > Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to me that you are only > picking out different ways of classifying the same things, which is fine, > but they are not different things, as you seem to be saying. There is no > difference in the dynamical objects involved. If there is, you have not > shown this. You need tof show how the different classifications are > grounded in different expectations about possible experiences. You haven't > done that yet. From your response here it seems that you are confusing > different ways of talking about the same things with different objects. I > don't know of anyone who makes the mistake of confusing the objects of the > classifications. Perhaps you could give an example. Of course someone could > be misled by the difference in the immediate objects, which depends on how > we are thinking, if they are confused about what Peirce is talking about > with these classifications, I don't think that there are Peirce scholars > who make that mistake. So perhaps you could provide examples. There is a > good reason why Peirce didn't use different names. There is no need to. > This is quite d
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
t;> should thus involve an icon. Only, if it does not, it will convey no >> information. A cry of “Oh!” may be a direct reaction from a remarkable >> situation. But it will convey, perhaps, no further information. The letters >> in a geometrical figure are good illustrations of pure indices not >> involving any icon, that is they do not force anything to be an icon of >> their object. The cry “Oh!” does to a slight degree; since it has the same >> startling quality as the situation that compells it. The index acts >> compulsively on the interpretant and puts it into a direct and real >> relation with the object, which is necessarily an individual event (or, >> more loosely, a thing) that is hic et nunc, single and definite. >> A third kind of sign, which brings the reference to an interpretant into >> prominence, is one which is fit to be a sign, not at all because of any >> particular analogy with the quality it signifies, nor because it stands in >> any reactive relation with its object, but simply and solely because it >> will be interpreted to be a sign. I call such a sign a symbol. As an >> example of a symbol, Goethe's book on the Theory of Colors will serve. This >> is made up of letters, words, sentences, paragraphs etc.; and the cause of >> its referring to colors and attributing to colors the quality it does is >> that so it is understood by anybody who reads it. It not only determines an >> interpretant, but it shows very explicitly the special determinant, (the >> acceptance of the theory) which it is intended to determine. By virtue of >> thus specially showing its intended interpretant (out of thousands of >> possible interpretants of it) it is an argument. An index may be, in one >> sense, an argument; but not in the sense here meant, that of an >> argumentation. It determines such interpretant as it may, without >> manifesting a special intention of determining a particular interpretant. >> It is a perfection of a symbol, if it does this; but it is not essential to >> a symbol that it should do so. Erase the conclusion of an argumentation and >> it becomes a proposition (usually, a copulative proposition). Erase such a >> part of a proposition that if a proper name were inserted in the blank, or >> if several proper names were inserted in the several blanks, and it becomes >> a rhema, or term. Thus, the following are rhematic: >> Guiteau assassinated __ >> __ assassinated __ >> Logicians generally would consider it quite wrong for me to call these >> terms; but I shall venture to do so. >> >> From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf >> Of Sungchul Ji >> Sent: 18-Dec-15 16:22 >> >> Gary F, Jeff, List, >> >> Please excuse my ignorance. >> What is NDTR ? >> >> Thanks in advance. >> >> Sung >> >> >> - >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Hi Gary R, You wrote : "As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do not consider the 9 parameters (121915-1) as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs as possibly embodied signs, I am *always* referring to the 10 classes." I have two comments on (121915-1) and a suggestion: (1) If 'qualisign' is not a sign, why do you think Peirce used the word "sign" in "qualisign" ? (2) The problem, as I see it, may stem from what seems to me to be an unjustifiably firm belief on the part of many semioticians that there is only one kind of sign in Peirce's writings, i.e., the triadic ones (or the 10 classes of signs). But what if, in Peirce's mind, there were two kinds of signs, i.e., the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of signs, although he used the same word "sign" to refer to both of them, just as physicists use the same word "particles" for both *quarks* and *baryons.* They are both particles but physicists discovered that protons and neutrons are not fundamental particles but are composed of triplets of more fundamental particles called quarks. (3) I think the confusions in semiotics that Peirce himself seemed to have contributed to creating by not naming the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of signs DIFFERENTLY may be removed by adopting two different names (belatedly) for these two kinds of signs, e.g., the "*elementary signs*" for the 9 types and the "*composite signs*" for the 10 classes of signs as I recommended in [biosemiotics:46]. The former is monadic and incomplete as a sign, while the latter is triadic and hence complete as a sign. Again this situation seems similar to the relation between quarks and baryons: Quarks are incomplete particles in that they cannot be isolated outside baryons whereas baryons (which are composed of three quarks) are complete particles since they can be isolated and experimentally measured. All the best. Sung On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Sung, list, > > When I gave the example of the qualisign as a sign which " 'may not > possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign', and yet be a > part of that more complex sign," I was in fact referring to the rhematic > iconic qualisign following Peirce's (shorthand) usage, since "To > designate a qualisign as a rhematic iconic qualisign is redundant [. . .] > because a qualisign can only be rhematic and iconic." > http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/peirce.html > > As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do > not consider the 9 parameters as signs at all, so that when I am discussing > signs as possibly embodied signs, I am *always* referring to the 10 > classes. > > What I intended to convey in my last message was that the qualisign (that > is, the rhematic iconic qualisign) *must* be part of a more complete sign > (clear enough, I think, is Peirce's discussions of the 10 classes), that it > simply cannot exist independently of that fuller sign complex (e.g., a > 'feeling of red' doesn't float around in some unembodied Platonic universe). > > Now, I'm off to a holiday party, but I thought I'd best make this point > clear before there was any further confusion. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 5:30 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > >> Hi Jeff, Gary R, List, >> >> I agree that "qualisigin" is not a complete sign because it is one of the >> 9 sigh types and not one of the 10 sign classes. It seems to me that in >> order for "qualisign" to be a complete sign, it has to be a part of one of >> the 10 classes of signs, e.g., a "rhematic iconic qualisign" such as >> "feeling of red", i.e., the "redness" felt by someone or some agent. >> However, >> >> "Redness", as a qualisign, can be there even though no one is there to >> feel it.(121915-1) >> For example, red color was there before we invented artificial signs and >> applied one of them to it." >> >> Peirce said that legisign is "a sign which would lose the character which >> renders it a sign if there were no interpretant", and sinsign can be index >> or icon, but as index it is is "a sign which would, at once, lose the >> character which makes it a sign if its object is removed , but would not >> l
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
of the wind because the wind actively moves > it. It faces in the very direction from which the wind blows. In so far as > it does that, it involves an icon. The wind forces it to be an icon. A > photograph which is compelled by optical laws to be an *icon* of its > object which is before the camera is another example. It is in this way > that these indices convey information. They are *propositions*. That is > they separately indicate their objects; the weather-cock because it turns > with the wind and is known by its interpretant to do so; the photograph for > a like reason. If the weathercock sticks and fails to turn, or if the > camera lens is bad, the one or the other will be *false*. But if this is > known to be the case, they sink at once to mere icons, at best. It is not > essential to an index that it should thus involve an icon. Only, if it does > not, it will convey no information. A cry of “Oh!” may be a direct reaction > from a remarkable situation. But it will convey, perhaps, no further > information. The letters in a geometrical figure are good illustrations of > pure indices not involving any icon, that is they do not force anything to > be an icon of their object. The cry “Oh!” does to a slight degree; since it > has the same startling quality as the situation that compells it. The index > acts compulsively on the interpretant and puts it into a direct and real > relation with the object, which is necessarily an individual event (or, > more loosely, a thing) that is *hic et nunc*, single and definite. > > A third kind of sign, which brings the reference to an interpretant into > prominence, is one which is fit to be a sign, not at all because of any > particular analogy with the quality it signifies, nor because it stands in > any reactive relation with its object, but simply and solely because it > will be interpreted to be a sign. I call such a sign a *symbol*. As an > example of a symbol, Goethe's book on the Theory of Colors will serve. This > is made up of letters, words, sentences, paragraphs etc.; and the cause of > its referring to colors and attributing to colors the quality it does is > that so it is understood by anybody who reads it. It not only determines an > interpretant, but it shows very explicitly the special determinant, (the > acceptance of the theory) which it is intended to determine. By virtue of > thus specially showing its intended interpretant (out of thousands of > possible interpretants of it) it is an *argument*. An index may be, in > one sense, an argument; but not in the sense here meant, that of an > *argumentation*. It determines such interpretant as it may, without > manifesting a special intention of determining a particular interpretant. > It is a perfection of a symbol, if it does this; but it is not essential to > a symbol that it should do so. Erase the conclusion of an argumentation and > it becomes a proposition (usually, a copulative proposition). Erase such a > part of a proposition that if a proper name were inserted in the blank, or > if several proper names were inserted in the several blanks, and it becomes > a rhema, or term. Thus, the following are *rhematic*: > > Guiteau assassinated __ > __ assassinated __ > > Logicians generally would consider it quite wrong for me to call these > *terms*; but I shall venture to do so. > > > > *From:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *On > Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji > *Sent:* 18-Dec-15 16:22 > > Gary F, Jeff, List, > > > > Please excuse my ignorance. > > What is NDTR ? > > > > Thanks in advance. > > > > Sung > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
no being at all, it is > true. It must be embodied in something that exists. But the quality is as > it is positively and in itself. That is not true of a sign, which exists > only by bringing an interpretant to refer to an object. A quality, then, is > not a sign.” So is a Qualisign a sign or not a sign? > > > > In a way, this is like asking whether the quality of a feeling is the same > as the feeling of a quality; or whether the mode of apprehension of > something is the same as its mode of being. “For must not every sign, in > order to become a sign, get uttered?” And must not every sign, in order to > become a sign, get apprehended? To that last question I would say Yes, it > must; and therein lies my guess at why Peirce in 1908 does not mention a > trichotomy of signs according to their “mode of being”, but *instead* > begins with a trichotomy according to their “mode of apprehension.” > > > > This is of course no more than a guess, and I’m not sure whether it offers > answers to the questions you’ve raised in the remainder of your post. But > it’s just about all I have to say at the moment, so I’ll leave the rest to > you … > > > > JD: For example, in the Minute Logic, which was written in 1902 (one year > before NDTR), Peirce says the following about the relation between the > percept and the perceptual jugment: "The most ordinary fact of perception, > such as "it is light," involves precisive abstraction, or prescission. But > hypostatic abstraction, the abstraction which transforms "it is light" into > "there is light here," which is the sense which I shall commonly attach to > the word abstraction (since prescission will do for precisive abstraction) > is a very special mode of thought. It consists in taking a feature of a > percept or percepts (after it has already been prescinded from the other > elements of the percept), so as to take propositional form in a judgment > (indeed, it may operate upon any judgment whatsoever), and in conceiving > this fact to consist in the relation between the subject of that judgment > and another subject, which has a mode of being that merely consists in the > truth of propositions of which the corresponding concrete term is the > predicate. Thus, we transform the proposition, "honey is sweet," into > "honey possesses sweetness." CP 4.235 > > > > Is Peirce suggesting in this passage that a visual impression of light or > a taste impression of sweetness can function as a sign (e.g., a qualisign) > because the feeling is abstracted--both prescissively and > hypostatically--from the percept? Another possibility is that the > impressions of light and taste can function as qualisigns insofar as they > are precissively abstracted from the object, and then something like a > diagram (what he will later call a percipuum) comes in as the interpretant > of the qualisign. The remarks he makes about the conventional symbols > expressed as part of a perceptual judgment (e.g., "it is light" "honey is > sweet") are the data that we can analyze for the sake of sharpening our > account of how signs that are mere feelings (i.e., qualisigns) might > function in an uncontrolled inference to a perceptual judgment. > > > > --Jeff > > > > Jeffrey Downard > > Associate Professor > > Department of Philosophy > > Northern Arizona University > > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Matt, Franklin, List, ""Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most highly industrialized society. *There are no primitive languages*. Virtually no linguist today would disagree with this statement." If living cells use a language as I believe (so much so that I was motivated to coin the word, "cellese", to refer to it in 1999; NYAS *870* :411-417) and since we, including our primitive ancestors, are organized systems of cells, the language of Homo sapiens must be at least as complex and versatile as cellese. As our scientific knowledge increases in biology, we are finding out that cellese is much more complex and versatile than once thought. In fact the more we know about cellese (e.g., signal transduction) through scientific research, the more unknowns seem to be revealed. Sung On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 5:08 AM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote: > On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and the > things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time; the > development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific > terminology is not a development shared by every human language. > > Can you give your source for this? I remember reading the opposite from > two different linguists. Michael Shapiro is one. (I'd have to search for > the exact statements, but the keyword I'd use is 'passkey'.) Edward Vajda > writes > > " Human language is unlimited in its expressive capacity." > > "Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology > speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most highly > industrialized society. *There are no primitive languages*. Virtually > no linguist today would disagree with this statement." > > -- > Matt > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
gisign) in mind then you >> have a perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g., >> relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment. >> >> Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very >> basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x >> to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not y' is to >> generalize x by thinking it belongs to the general class of not y. For >> example, let's say 'x is not y' is 'the dark part* of my percept is >> different from the light part'; this is a way of typifying x, the dark >> side, as 'not y', 'not of the same type as the light part.' >> >> In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the tone of >> dark becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'. I can't imagine >> there can be a token that's not also a type of this most basic kind. If >> this is correct then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns. >> >> Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a good >> one. >> >> * Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone >> (qualisign), i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances of dark. >> Similarly, 'x is not y' etc., need not be verbalized propositions. It seems >> to me that this basic level of dicisign precedes the sinsign, in that 'x', >> 'the dark tone' only come as a result of the distinction (this basic level >> generalization). >> >> Matt >> >> >> On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:35 AM, Franklin Ransom < >> <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Gary F, >> >> Just to clarify, do the categories still apply to a percept when it is >> considered as a singular phenomenon? >> >> I noticed that you say the verbal expression of the perceptual judgment >> is a dicisign, but you do not say that the perceptual judgment is a >> dicisign. Is it your position that the perceptual judgment is not a >> dicisign? >> >> -- Franklin >> >> -- >> >> On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 10:36 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >> >>> Franklin, Jeff, >>> >>> >>> >>> Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To >>> perceive X *as smoke* is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression >>> of that judgment, “That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition), >>> uniting its subject (*that*) with a predicate (*__ is smoke*), which >>> like all predicates is a general term (rhematic symbol). If you infer the >>> presence of fire from the smoke (i.e. perceive the smoke *as a sign*), >>> then you have an argument (whether it is expressed verbally or not). >>> >>> >>> >>> I’m going to be offline for about a week now, so you may have to >>> continue the thread without me for awhile ... >>> >> >> - >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to <l...@list.iupui.edu>l...@list.iupui.edu with the line >> "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> - >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Franklin, List, (*1*) I like to number statements in my posts to keep track of them, and this is a common practice in physics and mathematics and some physicist writers even recommend this practice for non -technical writings. Also it makes it easier to refer to them when necessary. In fact I would recommend that the PEIRCE-L managers consider numbering each and every post consecutively as the [biosemiotics] list has been doing. The first post that I wrote for the [biosemiotics] list is [biosemiotics:46] dated December 26, 2012, I believe. (*2*) You wrote: "With respect to the comparison with language: It seems to me that it is not (121315-1) necessary at all for a judgment to be expressed in a sentence. A proposition can occur without being expressed verbally, and I think it wrong to refer to the grammar of the English language in order to justify a logical point. Perhaps some of the analytic philosophers would like to agree with such an idea, but I am no analytic philosopher and do not think the analysis of language is going to get us anywhere in philosophy." I agree. Humans must have been making judgement long before verbal language evolved in the human society, and all organism must be making judgement although they do not have any sentences as we do. But I do not see anything wrong with using human language as a model of reasoning in both humans and non-human species. For me, human language (or humanese for brevity) has been a useful model of reasoning in all organisms as well as the Universe itself. In fact I am now of the opinion that there may be two aspects to language -- (i) the language as a *type* (to be denoted with a bold capital, *L*),and (ii) the languages as *tokens* of *L* (to be denoted as L), leading to the following notations: * L*(L1, L2, L3, . . . , Ln) (121315-2) where Li is the i^th language that are used (or operates) in the Universe, including humanese, cellese, and cosmese (or cosmic language, i.e., mathematics, geometry, quantum mechanics, etc.). It is possible that *L* can be identified with Peircean semiotics. Do you know of any evidence to invalidate this possibility ? All the best. Sung On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Franklin Ransom < pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote: > Sung, list, > > Well Sung, you didn't quote yourself at length, and it's on topic, so I'll > respond. Your penchant for numbering every claim is a bit curious, and > since I don't think anyone else is making use of the numbered claims, I > wonder why you do it. Is this habit related to some professional practice > in which you participate? > > With respect to the comparison with language: It seems to me that it is > not necessary at all for a judgment to be expressed in a sentence. A > proposition can occur without being expressed verbally, and I think it > wrong to refer to the grammar of the English language in order to justify a > logical point. Perhaps some of the analytic philosophers would like to > agree with such an idea, but I am no analytic philosopher and do not think > the analysis of language is going to get us anywhere in philosophy. > > So, while what I have said fits with your understanding, what you have > said does not fit with my understanding. A perceptual judgment is not a > sentence which includes a subject and a predicate; a perceptual judgment is > a proposition (or dicisign) which attributes a predicate to a subject, or > an icon to an index, as the result of an uncontrollable inference. > > -- Franklin > > > On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 12:27 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > >> Franklin, List, >> >> You wrote the following statements with quotation marks: >> >> >> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment >> (121315-1) >> is not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate." >> >> "So, as I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke", >> introducing (1213`15-2) >> the general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a >> dicisign)." >> >> "Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a type. >>(121315-3) >> But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate, or >> type, to the subject, or percept." >> >> These fit with my understanding [1] that >> >> > (121315-4) >> In other words, to make a judgement, you need to use the >> vehicle of a sentence.> >> >> Also the following statements nicely fit (12135-4): >> >> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment." >>(121315-5) >> >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Gary R, lists, You wrote: "Following a suggestion made by Ben Udell many years ago when I was writing a paper which, in part, meant to distinguish between these sign types and classes, I sometimes refer to sign 'types' as 'parameters' as being closer to Peirce's meaning. This is also why I reject Sung's 'quark model' of semiotics, because the 9 classes are *not* analogous to (121115-1) elementary particles in being 'thing-like' and quasi-individual, but, again, are the *mere *parameters of the 10 possible signs which *might *be embodied, that is, the 10 classes." I agree that . No one on this list would conflate "signs" and "particles" in this manner, since that would be akin to conflating *semiotics* and *physics*. But what I did say was that these 9 types are "analogous to quarks in being subject to a hypothetical force or obeying the principle of gauge invariance". Both these concepts, "force" and "gauge invariance", can be applied *analogically *and *qualitatively *outside physics*, *for example, to Romeo and Juliet, although they are not protons and electrons. All the best. Sung On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 4:26 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > List, > > Although I don't see the point or relevance of Sung's (2) and (3), in my > opinion a great deal of semiotic confusion *has* been generated by > confusing and conflating (1) sign types with sign classes. No doubt Peirce > himself contributed to this confusion, although in *some *cases and *in > context* it seems quite logical (and Peirce offers legitimate reasons) to > refer to one of the classes by less than its full triadic name, for > example, 'Qualisign' to refer to the 1st of the 10 classes, the* rhematic > iconic qualisign. *But, again, even this sort of abbreviation has wreaked > a kind of semiotic havoc. (Btw, this is not the only way Peirce contributes > to this confusion.) > > Following a suggestion made by Ben Udell many years ago when I was writing > a paper which, in part, meant to distinguish between these sign types and > classes, I sometimes refer to sign 'types' as 'parameters' as being closer > to Peirce's meaning. > > This is also why I reject Sung's 'quark model' of semiotics, because the 9 > classes are *not* analogous to elementary particles in being 'thing-like' > and quasi-individual, but, again, are the *mere *parameters of the 10 > possible signs which *might *be embodied, that is, the 10 classes. > > There remain a number of scholars who still treat the table of 9 as if > they represented embodied sign classes. They simply do not. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 3:39 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > >> Clark, Jeff, Gary F, lists, >> >> You wrote: >> >> " . . . On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the >> sign types defined in NDTR, (120815-1) >> including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a possible >> ambiguity in the concepts of >> genuine and degenerate; . . . " >> >> (*1*) Shouldn't we distinguish between "sign types" and "sign >> classes"? Peirce defines >> >> (A) 9 sign types (analogous to quarks in particle physics) >> >> 1. qualisign, >> 2. sinsign, >> 3. legisign, >> 4. icon, >> 5. index, >> 6. symbol, >> 7. rheme, >> 8. dicisign, and >> 9. arguement) , and >> >> >> (B) 10 sign classes (analogous to baryons composed of 3 quarks) >> >> 1. rhematic iconic qualisign, >> 2. rhematic iconic sinsign, >> 3. rhematic iconic legisign, >> 4. rhematic indexical sinsign, >> 5. rhematic indexical legisign, >> 6. rhematic symbolic legisign, >> 7 decent indexical sinsign, >> 8. decent indexical legisign, >> 9. decent symbolic legisign >> 10. argument symbolic legisign. >> >> >> Not distinguishing between the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of >> signs may be akin to physicists not distinguishing between quarks (u, d, c, >> s, t and b quarks) and baryons (protons and neutrons). >> >> (*2*) According to the quark model of the Peircean sign discussed in >> earlier posts, the 9 types of signs (referred to as the "elementary signs") >> cannot exist without being parts of the 10 classes of signs (referred to as >> the "composite signs"), just as quarks cann
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
y Peirce contributes > to this confusion.) > > Following a suggestion made by Ben Udell many years ago when I was writing > a paper which, in part, meant to distinguish between these sign types and > classes, I sometimes refer to sign 'types' as 'parameters' as being closer > to Peirce's meaning. > > This is also why I reject Sung's 'quark model' of semiotics, because the 9 > classes are *not* analogous to elementary particles in being 'thing-like' > and quasi-individual, but, again, are the *mere *parameters of the 10 > possible signs which *might *be embodied, that is, the 10 classes. > > There remain a number of scholars who still treat the table of 9 as if > they represented embodied sign classes. They simply do not. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 3:39 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > >> Clark, Jeff, Gary F, lists, >> >> You wrote: >> >> " . . . On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the >> sign types defined in NDTR, (120815-1) >> including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a possible >> ambiguity in the concepts of >> genuine and degenerate; . . . " >> >> (*1*) Shouldn't we distinguish between "sign types" and "sign >> classes"? Peirce defines >> >> (A) 9 sign types (analogous to quarks in particle physics) >> >> 1. qualisign, >> 2. sinsign, >> 3. legisign, >> 4. icon, >> 5. index, >> 6. symbol, >> 7. rheme, >> 8. dicisign, and >> 9. arguement) , and >> >> >> (B) 10 sign classes (analogous to baryons composed of 3 quarks) >> >> 1. rhematic iconic qualisign, >> 2. rhematic iconic sinsign, >> 3. rhematic iconic legisign, >> 4. rhematic indexical sinsign, >> 5. rhematic indexical legisign, >> 6. rhematic symbolic legisign, >> 7 decent indexical sinsign, >> 8. decent indexical legisign, >> 9. decent symbolic legisign >> 10. argument symbolic legisign. >> >> >> Not distinguishing between the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of >> signs may be akin to physicists not distinguishing between quarks (u, d, c, >> s, t and b quarks) and baryons (protons and neutrons). >> >> (*2*) According to the quark model of the Peircean sign discussed in >> earlier posts, the 9 types of signs (referred to as the "elementary signs") >> cannot exist without being parts of the 10 classes of signs (referred to as >> the "composite signs"), just as quarks cannot exist outside of baryons. >> >> (*3*) What holds quarks together within a baryon (e.g., u, u and d >> quarks in a proton, or u, d and d quarks in a neutron) is the "strong >> force", so perhaps there exists a 'force' that holds three elementary signs >> together within a composite sign, and such a postulated 'force' in >> semiotics may be referred to as the "*semantic force*" or "*semiotic >> force*", in analogy to the "strong force". >> >> All the best. >> >> Sung >> >> >> >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> > On Dec 3, 2015, at 9:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: >>> > >>> > On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign >>> types defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This >>> flags a possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and >>> possibly this problem is related to the concepts of embodiment, just >>> introduced, and of involvement, which is introduced in the next paragraph >>> >>> I think this gets at exactly the ambiguity that is confusing me in many >>> of these discussions of late. It’s also why I ask people to define their >>> terms since I think we’re often using Peirce’s terminology or terminology >>> that seems obvious but which obscure these subtle ambiguities. While I may >>> be wrong, my sense is that it’s precisely upon these subtle issues that our >>> various disagreements are located. >>> >>> All too often I find myself suspicious that we disagree in these more >>> fundamental considerations but unsure due to the way the discussions >>> proceed. >>> >>> I’ve been unab
[PEIRCE-L] Double articulations in linguistics, biology, physics, and semiotics
Hi,
(*1*) When I proposed the notion of the isomorphism between cell language
(or cellese for short) and the human language (or humanese) in 1997 [1, 2,
3], one of the most striking features of both languages that caught my
attention was the phenomenon of double articulations, i.e., letters forming
words (2nd articulation) and words forming sentences (1st articulation).
In both languages, the second articulation (i.e., covalent bond in
cellese) is much more difficult to alter than the first articulation (i.e.,
non-covalent bonds).. Interestingly, this is also true in quantum
mechanics (see cosmese, or the *cosmic language*, in *Table 1*)
(*2*) The phenomena of double articulations in *humanese*, *cellese*, and
*cosmese* (i.e., t*he means of communication between the Universe and its
components, including Homo sapiens, and between its components*) are
defined in the upper portion of Table 1.
(*3*) The phenomenon of double articulation is semiotics (or logic) is not
as clear as in the other cases, primarily because Peircean semiotics, as I
understand it, is based on two kinds of signs -- 9 types and 10 classes --
without the third kind that is needed to complete the double
articulations. For convenience, I designated this third kind with the
symbol X in *Table 1. * It is possible that Peirce's writings mention
something similar to or identical with X but I am ignorant of it.
*Table 1*. The postulate that the principle of double articulation
underlies all organizations in the
Universe.
Organization
*Humanese*
*Cellese*
*Cosmese*
*First Articulation*
Words
|
|
V
Sentences
1D Structures
|
|
V
3 D Structures
Baryons
|
|
V
Molecules
*Second Articulation*
Letters
|
|
V
Words
Molecules
|
|
V
1 D Structures
Quarks
|
|
V
Baryons
*Force*
* ‘Semantic’***
*‘Cell force’**
*Strong and Electroweak forces*
*Field of Study*
*Linguistics*
*Biology*
*Physics/Chemistry*
*Semiotics:*
* 9 Sign Types ---> 10 Sign Classes > X *
* ('Elementary signs') ('Composite signs')('Complex
signs') *
*ITR(Irreducible Triadic Relation)*
*f
g*
* Cosmese ---> Cellese
> Humanese*
* |
^ |
|
|
| ||*
*h*
*f** = biogenesis*
*g** = semiogenesis (?)*
*h** = information flow*
*Defined as the new kind of force in nature that is postulated to be
responsible for organizing the physicochemical processes inside the cell so
as to maintain life despite the destructive power of thermal motions, just
as the strong force maintain the structure of the atomic nuclei despite the
electrostatic repulsions among protons [5].
**Used here for the first time and defined as the 'force' that holds
together the elements of a language (i.e., letters, words, sentences) so
that they can signify or be meaningful, just as the strong force holds
together nucleons (protons and neutrons) within atomic nuclei despite the
electrostatic repulsion among protons.
(*4*) It is interesting to note that *Semiotics* does not fit in nicely
with the three special sciences of *linguistics*,* biology *and* physics* that
occupy the three *columns* side by side in the upper portion of *Table 1*
but instead resides in one of the *rows* in the table, indicating that
semiotics is ORTHOGONAL to (or cannot be replaced by) special sciences.
(*5*) Finally, the question naturally arises as to the possible relation
among the four fields of inquiries -- *humanese*, *cellese*, *cosmese*, and
*semiotics*. One possibility is is depicted in the lower portion of *Table
1*, suggesting that the principle of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation),
the heart of Peircean semiotics, may provide the needed overarching
theoretical framework for integrating and organizing these distinct
disciplines.
All the best.
Sung
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
Referecnes:
[1] S. Ji (1997). Isomorphism between cell and human languages: molecular
biological, bioinformatics and linguistic implications. *BioSystems* *44*:
17-39. PDF at http://www.conformon.net under Publications > Refereed
Journal Articles.
[2] S. Ji (1999). The Linguistics of DNA: Words, Sentences, Grammar,
Phonetics, and
Semantics. *Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci*. *870: *411-41. PDF at
http://www.conformon.net under Publications > Refereed Journal Articles.
[3] Ji, S. (2001). Isomorphism between Cell and Huma
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
yellows that have been seen. If it *resembles* the sensational >> element of the percept, this resemblance consists only in the fact that a >> new judgment will predicate it of the percept, just as this judgment does. >> It also awakens in the mind an imagination involving a sensational element. >> But taking all these facts together, we find that there is no relation >> between the predicate of the perceptual judgment and the sensational >> element of the percept, except forceful connections. >> >> 635. As for the subject of the perceptual judgment, as subject it is a >> sign. But it belongs to a considerable class of mental signs of which >> introspection can give hardly any account. It ought not to be expected that >> it should do so, since the qualities of these signs as objects have no >> relevancy to their significative character; for these signs merely play the >> part of demonstrative and relative pronouns, like “that,” or like the A, B, >> C, of which a lawyer or a mathematician avails himself in making >> complicated statements. In fact, the perceptual judgment which I have >> translated into “that chair is yellow” would be more accurately represented >> thus: “ is yellow,” a pointing index-finger taking the place of the >> subject. On the whole, it is plain enough that the perceptual judgment is >> not a copy, icon, or diagram of the percept, however rough. It may be >> reckoned as a higher grade of the operation of perception. >> >> >> >> On that basis, I don’t think we can extract from this passage any good >> information about what a qualisign is or how it works. What it does make >> clear is that the perceptual judgment is not iconic. So at this point I’m >> going to jump down to your concluding paragraph. >> >> GF: There is no vagueness in a percept; it’s a singular. So I don’t see >> how the concept of qualisign can serve the purpose you suggest here. I >> think the qualisign is simply a necessary result of Peirce’s introduction >> of the trichotomy of signs based on the sign’s mode of being in itself. It >> has to be First in that trichotomy. >> >> >> >> - >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
of the operation of perception. >> >> >> >> On that basis, I don’t think we can extract from this passage any good >> information about what a qualisign is or how it works. What it does make >> clear is that the perceptual judgment is not iconic. So at this point I’m >> going to jump down to your concluding paragraph. >> >> GF: There is no vagueness in a percept; it’s a singular. So I don’t see >> how the concept of qualisign can serve the purpose you suggest here. I >> think the qualisign is simply a necessary result of Peirce’s introduction >> of the trichotomy of signs based on the sign’s mode of being in itself. It >> has to be First in that trichotomy. >> > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Peircean Information (PI): A diagramatic definition of information
Hi,
(*1*) Information is triadic in that it has three mutually exclusive
aspects --
(i) *amount* (how many bits of information can your USB store ?),
(ii) *meaning* (What is the meaning of this series of DNA nucleotides ?),
and
(iii) *value *(What does this series of DNA nucleotides do for the living
cell?).
(*2*) Most definitions of information (e.g., Hartley, Shannon, von Neumann,
'Planckian information' [1], etc.) in the literature are in the form
of *mathematical
equations* and attempt to capture the *amount* of information and not the
meaning or value. There are about 40 different such quantitative
definitions of information discussed in [2].
(*3*) The main purpose of this post is to propose the following,
diagrammatic, definition of "information" that is inspired by the
definition of the sign given by Peirce as shown in (120815-2) and *Figure
1:*
"Information is anything that is transferred from
*B* to *C* mediated by *A*."
(120815-1)
Please note that the placeholders, *A*, *B*, and* C*, are generalizations
of the A, B and C that appear in the definition of the sign given in
(120815-2) below; hence the suggested name *Peircean information *(PI).
The placeholders, *A*, *B* and *C* are analogous to the *free parameters*
appearing in mathematical equations. Thus, (120815-1) can be viewed as a
'qualitative parametric' definition of information in contrast to the
*parametric
definition of information* given by Burgin in [2] which may be considered
as a 'quantitative parametric' definition of information. If this view is
correct, it would mean that 'information' is a complementary union of
*quantity* and *quality*, in general agreement with the yin-yang doctrine
of the Daoist philosophy.
(Reproduced from yesterday's post)
*"30 - 1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably
July 1905 . *(120815-2)
So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a
priman
element generally) and we might define a sign as follows:
A "sign" is anything, A, which,
(1) in addition to other characters of its own,
(2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,
(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate,
C,
this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic
relation,
µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the relation
Þ."
This definition of the sign can be diagrammatically represented as
shown in *Figure
1, *which clearly shows that there are three *dyadic relations (or
arrows) *(two
of which are designated as Þ and µ and the third is not explicitly
mentioned by Peirce but represented by me as g in *Figure A*). MOST
IMPORTANTLY, the sign, A is related to object B in two ways -- (i)
*dyadically through
the relation **Þ*, and (ii) *triadically *through the relation µ *(*and the
relation g, in my opinion*)*.
* Þ g*
Object --> sign -> Interpretant
(*B*) (*A*) (*C*
)
|^
||
||
*µ*
*Figure 1.* A diagrammatic representation of the Irreducible Triadic
Relation (ITR) embodied in the Peircean sign.
Þ = sign production; g = sign interpretation; µ= *information
transfer.*
(*4*) It is interesting to note that *Figure 1* that defines the Peircean
SIGN simultaneously defines INFORMATION as well, the former emphasizing
the *node*, *A* , and the latter emphasizing the *edge*, *µ*.
(*5*) This leads me to suggest the following generalization:
"Just as a *network* cannot exist without *nodes* and *edges*, so it is
impossible to *communicate* without *signs* and *information *they carry."
(120815-3)
With all the best.
Sung
--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
References:
[1] Ji, S. (2015) Planckian information (IP): A new measure of order in
atoms, enzymes, cells, brains, human societies, and the cosmos. In: *Unified
Field Mechanics: Natural Science *
*beyond the Veil of Spacetime* (R. Amoroso, P. Rowlands, and L. Kauffman,
eds.), World Scientific, New Jersey, pp. 579-589.
[2] Burgin, M. (2010). Theory of Information: Fundamentality, Diversity
and Unification. World Scientific, New Jersey.
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Clark, Jeff, Gary F, lists, You wrote: " . . . On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types defined in NDTR, (120815-1) including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; . . . " (*1*) Shouldn't we distinguish between "sign types" and "sign classes"? Peirce defines (A) 9 sign types (analogous to quarks in particle physics) 1. qualisign, 2. sinsign, 3. legisign, 4. icon, 5. index, 6. symbol, 7. rheme, 8. dicisign, and 9. arguement) , and (B) 10 sign classes (analogous to baryons composed of 3 quarks) 1. rhematic iconic qualisign, 2. rhematic iconic sinsign, 3. rhematic iconic legisign, 4. rhematic indexical sinsign, 5. rhematic indexical legisign, 6. rhematic symbolic legisign, 7 decent indexical sinsign, 8. decent indexical legisign, 9. decent symbolic legisign 10. argument symbolic legisign. Not distinguishing between the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of signs may be akin to physicists not distinguishing between quarks (u, d, c, s, t and b quarks) and baryons (protons and neutrons). (*2*) According to the quark model of the Peircean sign discussed in earlier posts, the 9 types of signs (referred to as the "elementary signs") cannot exist without being parts of the 10 classes of signs (referred to as the "composite signs"), just as quarks cannot exist outside of baryons. (*3*) What holds quarks together within a baryon (e.g., u, u and d quarks in a proton, or u, d and d quarks in a neutron) is the "strong force", so perhaps there exists a 'force' that holds three elementary signs together within a composite sign, and such a postulated 'force' in semiotics may be referred to as the "*semantic force*" or "*semiotic force*", in analogy to the "strong force". All the best. Sung On Tue, Dec 8, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > > > On Dec 3, 2015, at 9:31 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > > > On the other hand, some semioticians say that all ten of the sign types > defined in NDTR, including the Qualisign, are genuine Signs. This flags a > possible ambiguity in the concepts of genuine and degenerate; and possibly > this problem is related to the concepts of embodiment, just introduced, and > of involvement, which is introduced in the next paragraph > > I think this gets at exactly the ambiguity that is confusing me in many of > these discussions of late. It’s also why I ask people to define their terms > since I think we’re often using Peirce’s terminology or terminology that > seems obvious but which obscure these subtle ambiguities. While I may be > wrong, my sense is that it’s precisely upon these subtle issues that our > various disagreements are located. > > All too often I find myself suspicious that we disagree in these more > fundamental considerations but unsure due to the way the discussions > proceed. > > I’ve been unable to read the list for about a week and am just catching > up. I see that the discussion of the above, or at least the terminology of > sign, continues. I just wanted to point out that in addition to these > subtle points it seems much of the debate is largely a semantic one over > the applicability of certain terms. It’s not clear to me yet that we have a > substantial difference in content. > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [biosemiotics:8992] Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Publicaitons > Book Chapters. [4] Burgin, M. (2010). Theory of Information: Fundamentality, Diversity,and Unification. World Scientific, New Jersey. Pp. 129-134. On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 9:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Sung, your comment doesn't make any sense. Because Peirce's three > categories don't correlate to the three worlds of Burgin and Popper [both > of whom are excellent scholars] , doesn't mean that Peircean theory doesn't > have anything to do with modern natural sciences or with information > science > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > *To:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Wednesday, December 02, 2015 8:35 PM > *Subject:* Re: [biosemiotics:8992] Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and > triadic relations > > Edwina, Clark, John, lists > > You wrote: > > "Burgin's three worlds seem remarkably similar to Popper's three worlds - > and neither, (120215-1) > in my view, have anything to do with the Peircean categories." > > If Statement (120215-1) is right, then Peirce (as represneted by E. > Taborsky) would have nothing to do with modern natural sciences (as > represented by Popper and Penrose) or with information science (as > represented by Burgin), which is hard to believe. > > All the best. > > Sung > > On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> I guess I must be 'nobody', since I don't see any way at all to >> 'distribute the Peircean categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness >> over the three worlds of Burgin". >> >> Burgin's three worlds seem remarkably similar to Popper's three worlds - >> and neither, in my view, have anything to do with the Peircean categories. >> It takes a huge stretch to make such a claim, and if one does so, the >> essential identity of the Peircean categories and their full semiosic >> interactive operation, is totally lost and one is reduced to such >> psychological nominals as 'subjective, objective and general' - and these >> are not valid outlines of the three categories. >> >> Edwina >> >> - Original Message - >> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> >> *To:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Wednesday, December 02, 2015 5:29 PM >> *Subject:* [biosemiotics:8992] Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and >> triadic relations >> >> Hi Clark, lists, >> >> You wrote: >> >> "I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where >> structures (120215-1) >> are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself >> without relations." >> >> (*1*) It seems that everybody, including you, John (and myself until >> recently), assumes that *there is only one way to distribute the >> Peircean categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness over the three >> worlds of Burgin, denoted as S (World of Structures), P (Physical >> world),and M (Mental world). * Let me designate such a view as the *1-to-1 >> view, *according to which only one of the 6 possibilities shown in *Table >> 1* is true and the rest are not. The alternative view would be that >> more than one of the 6 possibilities listed in Table 1 can be true, >> depending on context. I will refer to this view as the "*1-to-many*" >> view. >> >> >> *Table 1*. Non-deterministic relation between triadic model of the >> worlds and Peircean categories. >> >> Possibilities >> >> *Firstness* >> >> *Secondness* >> >> *Thirdness* >> >> Context or Field of Studies >> >> *1* >> >> S* >> >> P >> >> M >> >> ? >> >> *2* >> >> S >> >> M >> >> P >> >> ? >> >> *3* >> >> P >> >> S >> >> M >> >> ? >> >> *4* >> >> P >> >> M >> >> S >> >> ? >> >> *5* >> >> M >> >> S >> >> P >> >> ? >> >> *6* >> >> M >> >> P >> >> S >> >> ? >> >> *S = World of structures >> P = Physical world >> M = Mental world >> >> (*2*) It may be necessary to invoke at least two kinds of "structures" >> -- (i) "mental structures", i.e, those structures in the world whose >> existence depends
Re: [biosemiotics:8992] Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Typos: (1) Please replace "they thought that the same form of a mathematical equation, i.e., DPD, applies to both" with "they thought that it was impossible for the same form of a mathematical equation, i.e., DPD, to apply to both." (2) "Burgin [1]" with "Burgin [4]". Sorry for the confusion. S. Ji On Thu, Dec 3, 2015 at 7:48 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > Edwina, Gary R, John, lists, > > Edwina wrote: > > "Because Peirce's three categories don't correlate to the three worlds of > Burgin and Popper (120315-a) > [both of whom are excellent scholars] , doesn't mean that Peircean > theory doesn't have > anything to do with modern natural sciences or with information science." > > > I agree. But this does not conflict with what I said in the post you are > responding to. > In that post I said, in effect: > > "If your statement that "Burgin's and Popper's three worlds . . . do not have > anything to do with (120315-b) > the Peircean categories" is right, then *Peirce *(as *represented by E. > Taborsky*) would have nothing > to do with modern *natural sciences* (*as represented by Popper and * > *Penrose*) or with > *information science* (*as represented by Burgin*),. . . ." > > You misunderstood this statement, thus wrongly equating it with the > following: > > "If your statement that "Burgin's and Popper's three worlds . . . do not have > anything to do with (120315-c) > the Peircean categories" is right, then *Peirce *would have nothing to > do with modern *natural sciences* > or with *information science*, . . . ." > > Do you see the difference between (120315-b) and (120315-c) ? The former > is correct (which was what I said), > and the latter is not (which is not what I said but you wrongly attributed > it to me). > > Your conflation between (120315-b) and (12035-c) may have arisen from your > conflating "types" and "tokens". > I came to this conclusion based on the following analysis. > > (*2*) For convenience, I will use the notations given below: > > *PS(T)* = *Peircean semiotics *(as *represented by E. Taborsky*) > > (120315-d) > *NS(PP)* = modern *natural sciences* (*as represented by Popper and > Penrose*) (120315-e) > *IS(B*) = *information science* (*as represented by Burgin*) > > (120315-f) > > To me (120315-d), (120315-e), and (120315-f) are the *tokens* of *types* > *PS* (Peircean semiotics), *N*S (Natural sciences), and *IS* (Information > sciences), respectively, as summarized in *Table 1*. > > ___ > > *Table 1.* Tokes are not types. > The symbol "_" represents a "placeholder" which can be occupied by any > element of a set; T = Taborsky; P = Popper or Penrose; B = Burgin. > ___ > > Different Disciplines *Tokens > Types* > ___ > > *Peircean semiotics* *PS(T) > PS( _ )* > ___ > > *Natural sciences * *NS(PP) > NS( _ )* > ___ > > *Information science * *IS(B) > IS ( _ )* > ___ > > > Using the symbols defined in *Table 1*, we can re-write (120315-b) as > (120315-g) for a clearer comparison with (120315-c) re-written as > (120315-i): > > "If your statement that "Burgin's and Popper's three worlds . . . do not have > anything to do with (120315-b) > the Peircean categories" is right, then *Peirce *(as *represented by E. > Taborsky*) would have nothing > to do with modern *natural sciences* (*as represented by Popper and * > *Penrose*) or with > *information science* (*as represented by Burgin*), . . . ." > > "If your statement that IS(B) and NS(PP) . . . do not have anything to > do with PS(T)" is right,(120315-g) > then PS(T) would have nothing to do with modern NS (PP) or IS(B), . . . " > > which is equivalent to saying that > > "If IS(B) and NS(PP) are not PS(T), then PS(T) is not IS(B) or NS(PP)" > (120315-h) > > > This statement must be valid, since logic is reversible: "If A is not B, > then B is not A." > > > Now (120315-c) can be re-written as (120315-i): > > "If your statement that "Bu
Re: [biosemiotics:8992] Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina, Clark, John, lists You wrote: "Burgin's three worlds seem remarkably similar to Popper's three worlds - and neither, (120215-1) in my view, have anything to do with the Peircean categories." If Statement (120215-1) is right, then Peirce (as represneted by E. Taborsky) would have nothing to do with modern natural sciences (as represented by Popper and Penrose) or with information science (as represented by Burgin), which is hard to believe. All the best. Sung On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 8:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > I guess I must be 'nobody', since I don't see any way at all to > 'distribute the Peircean categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness > over the three worlds of Burgin". > > Burgin's three worlds seem remarkably similar to Popper's three worlds - > and neither, in my view, have anything to do with the Peircean categories. > It takes a huge stretch to make such a claim, and if one does so, the > essential identity of the Peircean categories and their full semiosic > interactive operation, is totally lost and one is reduced to such > psychological nominals as 'subjective, objective and general' - and these > are not valid outlines of the three categories. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > *To:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Wednesday, December 02, 2015 5:29 PM > *Subject:* [biosemiotics:8992] Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and > triadic relations > > Hi Clark, lists, > > You wrote: > > "I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where > structures (120215-1) > are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself > without relations." > > (*1*) It seems that everybody, including you, John (and myself until > recently), assumes that *there is only one way to distribute the Peircean > categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness over the three worlds of > Burgin, denoted as S (World of Structures), P (Physical world),and M > (Mental world). * Let me designate such a view as the *1-to-1 view, *according > to which only one of the 6 possibilities shown in *Table 1* is true and > the rest are not. The alternative view would be that more than one of the > 6 possibilities listed in Table 1 can be true, depending on context. I will > refer to this view as the "*1-to-many*" view. > > > *Table 1*. Non-deterministic relation between triadic model of the > worlds and Peircean categories. > > Possibilities > > *Firstness* > > *Secondness* > > *Thirdness* > > Context or Field of Studies > > *1* > > S* > > P > > M > > ? > > *2* > > S > > M > > P > > ? > > *3* > > P > > S > > M > > ? > > *4* > > P > > M > > S > > ? > > *5* > > M > > S > > P > > ? > > *6* > > M > > P > > S > > ? > > *S = World of structures > P = Physical world > M = Mental world > > (*2*) It may be necessary to invoke at least two kinds of "structures" > -- (i) "mental structures", i.e, those structures in the world whose > existence depends on the human mind (through discovery, creativity, and > production), and (ii) "real structures" that can exist independent of human > mind. The S in Possibility 1 and 2 above are of the first kind (i.e., real > structures) and the S in Possibilities 4 and 6 are of the second kind > (i.e., mental structures). > > (*3*) Even with my very limited reading of Peirce, I can recognize that > Table 1 is consistent with the basic tenet of the Peircean semiotics that > all signs (including S, P and M in Table 1) have in each the three basic > aspects of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, although each of the 6 > possibilites shown in Table 1 PRESCINDS different aspect of each sign. For > example, Possibility 1 rescinds the Firstness aspect of S, the Secondness > aspect of P, and the Thirdness aspect of M. In contrast, Possibility > 6 prescinds the Firstness aspect of M, the Secondness aspect of P and the > Thirdness aspect of S, etc. > > > If (*2*) and (*3*) are right, the *1-to-many view* described in (*1*) > would be validated. > > > All the best. > > Sung > > > > On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 11:18 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > >> >> On Dec 1, 2015, at 7:16 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: >> >> (*1*) I agree with you on the definition of these categories of Peirce. >> We seem to disagree
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
of objects are really there." (CP 4.551) I am not comfortable with (120115-4). I would agree with Peirce if he confines his "Mind" to those processes and structures in the Universe that embody ITR. With all the best. Sung On Mon, Nov 30, 2015 at 1:10 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > On Nov 30, 2015, at 10:50 AM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > > > * f* > *g* > *Real Rose* > *Rose * ---> *Mental > Rose* > (Firstness) (Secondness) > (Thirdness) > [World of Structures] [Physical World] [Mental World] > | >^ > | >| > || >*h* > > > Peirce’s ontology doesn’t quite follow that. Firstness is the world of raw > experience, ideas or possibility, secondness the world of reactions, brute > force & actuality and thirdness the world of signs, connections and power > (not necessarily mental unless one is careful what one means by that). So > depending upon what one means by structure you’d have that in the third > universe. > > Again though one has to be careful with terminology and Peirce’s shifts > around a bit over time. > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
ent sort of > arguing and terminology can be helpful to clarify the terminology around > Peirce. Often translating our arguments or assertions is a very helpful > endeavor for clarity. > > > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] The system-resonance approach in modeling genetic structures
Hi, The above article by Sergey V. Petoukhov is freely available for download until January 16, 2016 at http://authors.elsevier.com/a/1S6Jo14z5Hd4~4. Biosystems <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03032647> Volume 139 <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03032647/139/supp/C>, January 2016, Pages 1–11 [image: Cover image] <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03032647/139/supp/C> Review Article The system-resonance approach in modeling genetic structures In my opinion, this article unifies physics, chemistry, and bioinformatics (or 'genetic structures') through the mathematics of tensor algebra (or matrix mathematics). If you have any questions or comments, please let me know or contact the author directly at spetouk...@gmail.com. All the best. Sung -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] material relevant to Peircean linguistics
e would make no sense. That is, there must be flesh-and-blood bodies > that speak and listen, and it is their desires and needs that explain why > ever more adequate diagrammatization is an inevitable if unintended goal. > If the research program subtended by *semeiotic* > <http://languagelore.net/glossary/semeiotic/> neostructuralism can be > made to work, then it will indeed conflict with Chomskyan linguistics—and > prove superior to it. > > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] material relevant to Peircean linguistics
Hi Michael, Thanks. That helps. Sung On Sat, Nov 28, 2015 at 11:35 AM, Michael Shapiro <poo...@earthlink.net> wrote: > Dear Sung, > > "Neostructuralism" is the brand of structuralism based on Peirce's whole > philosophy, esp. his semeiotic. It is a name invented by me for the > purposes of setting off my way of doing linguistics from the current > mainstream brand. > > Best, > Michael > > -Original Message- > From: Sungchul Ji > Sent: Nov 28, 2015 11:02 AM > To: Michael Shapiro > Cc: CSP > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] material relevant to Peircean linguistics > > Hi Michael, > > Your Glossary is very helpful for me (and perhaps for others as well) to > understand your argument. > Let me ask you a naive question. What is(are) the key difference(s) > between "structuralism" and "neostructuralism" ? > > All the best. > > Sung > > On Sat, Nov 28, 2015 at 7:01 AM, Michael Shapiro <poo...@earthlink.net> > wrote: > >> List, >> >> Apologies for having just sent you a duplicate of my Nov. 22 post. Below >> is the one I intended to send. >> >> *Nominalism and Realism in Linguistics from a Neostructuralist >> Perspective* >> >> >> >> *GLOSSARY* >> >> >> >> *abduce, *v. < *abduction*, n.: (originally in the writings of C. S. >> Peirce) the only fallible mode of reasoning, viz. the formation or >> adoption of a plausible but unproven explanation for an observed >> phenomenon; a working hypothesis derived from limited evidence and >> informed conjecture >> >> *denominate*, v.: to give a name or appellation to; to call by a name, >> to name >> >> *diagrammatization*, n. < *diagrammatize*, v. < *diagram*, n.: (in >> Peirce's sign theory) an icon of relation >> >> *doctrinal*, adj. < *doctrine*, n.: that which is taught or laid down as >> true concerning a particular subject or department of knowledge, as >> religion, politics, science, etc.; a belief, theoretical opinion; a dogma, >> tenet. >> >> *explanandum*, n.: the thing to be explained (Latin) >> >> *explanans*, n.: the explaining element in an explanation; the >> explanatory premisses (Latin) >> >> *hermeneutic*, adj.: of, relating to, or concerning interpretation or >> theories of interpretation >> *icon*, n.: (in Peirce's sign theory) an image; a representation, >> specifically, a sign related to its object by similarity >> >> *mutatis mutandis*: with the necessary changes; with due alteration of >> details (Latin) >> >> *neostructuralism*, n.: a new linguistic theory based on Peirce's whole >> philosophy (esp. his sign theory) and supersedes traditional >> structuralism >> >> *nominalism*, n.: the doctrine that things denominated by the same term >> share nothing except that fact; the view that such terms are mere names >> without any corresponding reality >> >> *phenomenalism*, n.: a mode of thought which considers things from a >> phenomenal viewpoint, or as phenomena only; the metaphysical theory or >> belief that (actual or possible) phenomena are the only objects of >> knowledge, or the only realities >> *realism*, n.: the doctrine that matter as the object of perception has >> real existence (natural realism) and is neither reducible to universal >> mind or spirit nor dependent on a perceiving agent >> >> *semeiotic*, adj.: pertaining to and embodying the tenets of Peirce's >> sign theory >> >> *structuralism*, n.: any theory or mode of analysis in which language is >> considered as a system or structure comprising elements at various >> phonological, grammatical, and semantic levels, the interrelation of these >> elements rather than the elements themselves producing meaning >> >> *taxonomy*, n.: a classification of something; a particular system of >> classification >> >> *teleology*, n.: the doctrine or study of ends or final causes, esp. as >> related to the evidences of design or purpose in nature; also transf. such >> design as exhibited in natural objects or phenomena >> >> >> >> Philosophers have always thought of nominalism as a >> doctrine, not as a practice. They may therefore be excused for having >> trouble seeing the relation of nominalistic linguistics to the doctrine of >> nominalism, which is that the former is a way of doing linguistics to which >> doctrinal nominalists could not object, but that would seem deficient to >> those who are doctrinal realists. For if there are
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - "The union of units unites the unity."
; follows after CP 2.242.] > > > > Gary f. > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations
; Frances, Edwina, list, > > > > Just to straighten out the terminology here … > > For Peirce, a “representamen” is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a > “sign” is a kind of representamen. By this definition, there can be > representamens that are not signs; but empirically, Peirce has very little > to say about them. Two passages from the 1903 “Syllabus” should make this > clear: > > > > CP 2.242, EP2:290: A *Representamen* is the First Correlate of a triadic > relation, the Second Correlate being termed its *Object,* and the > possible Third Correlate being termed its *Interpretant,* by which > triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First > Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some > possible Interpretant. A *Sign* is a representamen of which some > interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens > that have been much studied. > > > > CP2:274, EP2:273: A *Sign* is a Representamen with a mental > Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. > Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act > fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which > turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with > the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of > the sun. But *thought* is the chief, if not the only, mode of > representation. > > > > Gary f. > > > > -- > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > -- > Matt > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
ontology. If you’re aware > of a place where he makes a clear distinction in his use of the term I’d be > very interested. I admittedly didn’t do a thorough search but my > preliminary search found nothing. Rather I think he sees this as phenomena > that applies at all levels of existence. Which is why he uses the same term. > > Also I’m not sure we can make the distinction between “psychic” and > “cognitive” in how he speaks. It seems to me it’s all just mind for him. > > As to whether they are 'reversible' - in the mechanical sense, I might > quibble with that. We can arrive at a belief, and then, change back to a > former belief, but I'm not sure if this return is as 'pure' as it > originally was. Let's say, I believe that unicorns do exist; then, I decide > that they do NOT exist; and then, I revert back to my first belief that > they do exist. I think this third belief is tainted, by its having been > 'vetted' so to speak, against the comparison with the belief in unicorns > NOT existing. So, the superficial belief might seem similar, but, not with > that comparison clinging to it. These changes have nothing mechanical and > reversible about them..They are, really, 'evolutionary'..even though the > final phase is similar, somewhat, to the first phase. > > > In a follow up email that may have come after you wrote this I suggested > one possible solution. To see habits as context sensitive. The reason we > change belief is due to new evidence and thus a change of system. Yet in > other ways I’m not sure that’s fully satisfactory. After all often I’m > musing over evidence and simply changing my mind in a short time as I think > through connections. If we make habits so context dependent then it almost > loses the significance Peirce is setting for them. > > Also (and I think this is important) I think Peirce might say that the > nature of the habit is wrapped up in his pragmatic maxim. That is a habit’s > meaning consists not of an index to a particular context but of its > counterfactual possibilities in all the ways we’d measure it. That is habit > to be a habit has to be general and deal with a range of contexts. > Presumably then the strength of habit would be tied to its properties > across those contexts. Much like hardness is tied to the range of things we > might scratch an object with. (To use Peirce’s own example) > > If we should understand the meaning of a particular habit in terms of the > more mature counterfactual view of the pragmatic maxim then I’m not sure > the move you make works. (Which is not to say Peirce necessarily thought > along those terms of course - I’m just not clear what he thought here) > > > > > > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
ays at play. When speaking of any particular > *analysis* we may exclude parts due to the focus of our analysis. Which > is fine. We just shouldn’t assume that the fact we can narrow our analysis > says anything about the world. > > CLARK wrote: I probably should draw the distinctions a bit more clearly. > Habits aren’t always absolute. Which implies it’s operational but sometimes > not. So if we discuss a habit of taking habits sometimes that will be true > and sometimes not. How strong the habit is consists of how often it is > operational. When not operational this “taking habits” doesn’t occur. That > means that the development of the habit in question (say going to be on > time) isn’t strengthened. It may be weakened. > > > EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by 'absolute habit' or 'sometimes > operational'. Or 'taking habits...will be true/sometimes not". *If > a habit is not operational..then, is it a habit?* > > And I have a problem with your notion of 'higher order habits' developing > another habit. I can certainly see that habits of organization, eg, in the > physico-chemical realm will constraint the habits of organization of the > biological world. > > > The term is mine but the notion was explicit in the quotes I gave from > Peirce. It makes sense that we have habits of habit formation. So I’m not > quite sure what your objection. > > As to habit being operational in a particular moment, of course it can and > be a habit. I brush my teeth nearly every night. It is a regular habit to > do before bed. If one night I neglect to brush my teeth because I come home > late it doesn’t follow that somehow I don’t have the habit. This is a > semantic point about the term habit. But it’s also rather key for many of > Peirce’s terms to which he applies the notion of degree. > > Peirce is clear that habit is a "*tendency *to repeat any action which > has been performed before” (EP 1.223) As a tendency it is not an absolute > law until it is always true. This focus on strength as how often it repeats > goes throughout Peirce’s thought I think. Certainly it’s key in his more > ontological and cosmological notions of the development of the categories. > > To give an example of this consider belief as habit. > > Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions. The Assassins, or > followers of the Old Man of the Mountain, used to rush into death at his > least command, because they believed that obedience to him would insure > everlasting felicity. Had they doubted this, they would not have acted as > they did. So it is with every belief, *according to its degree*. The > feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being > established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions. (EP > 1:114) > > > If one thinks that beliefs have degrees of strength then I think it > follows that this notion of strength is how often the tendency towards a > particular class of actions takes place. > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Clark, Edwina, lists, You wrote: "Now getting back to reversibility I suspect what we’re really talking about is acquiring(112515-1) habits or a second order habit. What Peirce called the habit of taking habits. In a certain sense habits aren’t reversible since if they are reversed by definition they are not longer called a habit. Perhaps that’s all Peirce means although my sense is he means something deeper." Is it possible that, by "habit", Peirce was trying to "philosophize" (or abstract the 'thirdness" out of) the phenomenon of biological evolution know to the late 19th century ? All the best. Sung On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 12:24 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > On Nov 24, 2015, at 10:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > No, a belief can be a 'Dicent Symbolic Legisign' where the > output/Interpretant is in a mode of Secondness; this would be a minor > premise - which is a belief. [2-3-3]. Or a rhematic indexical legisign > [1-2-3]..where the Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness. > > I didn't say that a belief was pure secondness [2-2-2]. > > > OK, I certainly don’t deny that. I’d say that’s still a type of thirdness > in each of those cases as they are all classes of signs. That’s what I > meant by "a particular belief is always still thirdness although it may > have an aspect of secondness to it.” > > In any particular discussion of something in the world firstness, > secondness and thirdness are all active. Even signs will have feeling and > action associated with them. > > My point is more that a habit as a habit is general in that it has an > essential feature of replicability. That is a habit must always include, if > only potentially, the ability to repeat. > > Now getting back to reversibility I suspect what we’re really talking > about is acquiring habits or a second order habit. What Peirce called the > habit of taking habits. In a certain sense habits aren’t reversible since > if they are reversed by definition they are not longer called a habit. > Perhaps that’s all Peirce means although my sense is he means something > deeper. > > It seems undeniable though that Peirce accepted habits (and belief) could > become stronger or weaker. He didn’t see them only as becoming stronger. > > After thinking about this quote in 8.318 I suspect he simply means the > habit of taking a particular habit makes it stronger until it’s permanent. > The habit of rejecting a particular habit does the opposite until the habit > is destroyed. One has to assume a middle ground as well although perhaps > it’s just accidence he doesn’t deal with that in the quote in question. > > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
ers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Hi Ed, I wonder if what Peirce calls "habits" can be divided into at least two groups -- (i) human habits, and (ii) natural habits. If so, the former is obviously reversible as someone recently pointed out in PEIRCE-L but the latter may not in general, although there may be exceptions, depending on how one defines "natural habits". All the best. Sung On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 2:13 PM, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de> wrote: > Sung, Jon – > > > > Peirce, as he has been quoted, is speaking of “every physical process”, > and of the allegedly all-explaining “laws of mechanics” which he believes > to be time-reversible without exception. He was not aware of the > time-irreversible second law of thermodynamics. He was also not aware of > the evident fact that Newton’s authentic second law of mechanics states a > geometric proportionality of “force” and “change in motion”. Force and > motion are heterogeneous entities here, and therefore they are not > equivalent, but geometrically proportional. The case is different in > classical mechanics, where we have F = ṗ, which asserted equivalence of > homogeneous entities is certainly time-reversible. Note that “classical > mechanics” based on F = ṗ is “analytical mechanics”; none of the principles > of that mechanics, which was conceived by Leonhard Euler and others in the > first half of the 18th century in Berlin, can be found in Newton’s > “Principia”. Classical mechanics is not Newton’s mechanics! It was and is > certainly a most momentuous mistake of theoretical physicists to make > Newton responsible for an absurd “law of motion” which due to its > mathematical reversibility has nothing to do with time-irreversible > reality. > > > > Ed. > ------ > > *Von:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *Im > Auftrag von *Sungchul Ji > *Gesendet:* Montag, 23. November 2015 18:22 > *An:* Jon Awbrey > *Betreff:* Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments > > > > Hi Jon, > > > > Even then, according to Ed Dellian (see my previous PEIRCE-L post), Peirce > would be wrong, since Newton's Second Law of motion is not time-reversible. > > > > Sung > > > > On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 8:30 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > > Sung, > > > > Peirce is using “mechanics” advisedly there to refer to classical > mechanics as distinguished from thermodynamics. > > > > Regards, > > Jon > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > > > On Nov 23, 2015, at 7:05 AM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > > Clark, Søren, lists, > > > > Peirce said: > > > > " . . . While every physical process can be reverse without violation of > the law of mechanics,(112315-1) > the law of habit forbids such reversal. ' (CP 8.318) > > > > I am glad you quoted this statement because I wanted to make a comment on > it when I first read it about a year ago somewhere in CP but could not find > it again. > > > > It seems to me that the first sentence of this this statement is false > even based on our common experience: Evaporated perfume cannot be put back > into a bottle. As we all now know the physical law forbidding the reversal > of evaporated perfume is called the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and there > developed a whole field of scientific studies during the 20th Century on > such processes called IRREVERSIBLE thermodynamics, for the contribution to > the establishment of which I. Prigogine (1917-2003) was awarded a Nobel > Prize in 1977. > > > > If this interpretation is correct, the validity of the second sentence in > (112315-1) seems weakened considerably, although not totally removed, since > it can stand on its own as an assertion with or without any supporting > scientific evidence. > > > > All the best. > > > > Sung > > > > > > On Sun, Nov 22, 2015 at 11:18 PM, CLARK GOBLE <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > > > On Nov 20, 2015, at 1:01 PM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote: > > > > I agree but Peirce is integrating it with an emptiness ontology inspired > by Buddhism. Hartshorne describes it as his Buddhisto-Christianism. Bishop > writes a paper on Peirce and Eastern Thought. See my > > Pure Zero paper attached. > > > > I just finished it. Very interesting. I hadn’t known that Peirce was > connected with Suzuki before. (Again as I said I know just enough Buddhism > to be dangerous but not enough to really be able to say much) > > > > One tangental comment that came to mind in one of your quotes. You have > Peirce commenting on his famous relationship of mind an
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Hi, Do you think it is possible that Peirce's conception of "habits" is largely based on the 19th century physics, chemistry and biology which needs to be updated based on the 21st century natural and human sciences ? If so, it would be a great challenge to discern what, if any, impact the "updated" concept of "habits" might have on the metaphysics of Peirce. All the best. Sung On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 2:18 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > On Nov 23, 2015, at 6:30 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net <jawb...@att.net>> > wrote: > > On Nov 23, 2015, at 7:05 AM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > > Clark, Søren, lists, > > Peirce said: > > " . . . While every physical process can be reverse without violation of > the law of mechanics,(112315-1) > the law of habit forbids such reversal. ' (CP 8.318) > > I am glad you quoted this statement because I wanted to make a comment on > it when I first read it about a year ago somewhere in CP but could not find > it again. > > It seems to me that the first sentence of this this statement is false > even based on our common experience: Evaporated perfume cannot be put back > into a bottle. As we all now know the physical law forbidding the reversal > of evaporated perfume is called the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and there > developed a whole field of scientific studies during the 20th Century on > such processes called IRREVERSIBLE thermodynamics, for the contribution to > the establishment of which I. Prigogine (1917-2003) was awarded a Nobel > Prize in 1977. > > > Peirce is using “mechanics” advisedly there to refer to classical > mechanics as distinguished from thermodynamics. > > > I took him to just be referring to basic mechanics rather than a more > holistic treatment of mechanics that includes thermodynamics or statistical > mechanics. I’m afraid I don’t know my 19th century physics history well > enough to recall when people started thinking of thermodynamics in terms of > statistical mechanics. I’m assuming it was Boltzman and thus around the > time of Peirce’s formative years. But I might be wrong. I think recognition > of reversibility problems despite the laws being reversible would have been > known to Peirce. But again we have to distinguish the law from it’s impact > on systems in practice. > > Anyone know the date for CP 8.318? (Or if it’s one of his better known > papers, the title?) > > It’s interesting that while everyone chimed in on the mechanics part of > the quote no one clarified to me the more troubling main part on habits > being reversible. I suspect, although I don’t know, that he may actually be > thinking thermodynamically here and the problem of reversibility there. Yet > it seems to me this runs up agains the problem of thermodynamics (in the > statistical mechanics version) being due to pure chance. Yet I’m not sure > Peirce’s adopting of the Epicurean swerve is pure chance in the same way. > That is mind traditionally was seen as something between determinism and > pure equally distributed chance. I’ll confess that I can’t recall of a > place Peirce addresses this though. > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments
creation can take place. In other words a primal > nothing creates a secondary nothing. This enables finitude to take place. > The reason to see connection to platonism is the parallel to the creation > of the elements from the forms and place or khora in the Timaeus. The khora > is receptical or empty space and the origin of the forms would be the One > of Plotinus. > > Getting back to Peirce and your paper you say that Eckhart and Bohme have > a pre-personal ground within God’s being called the godhead or abyss. This > seems similar. And of course Duns Scotus who also was a big influence on > Peirce has some writings on the ground of the Godhead that makes a similar > move. I’ve studied this more in connection to Heidegger but it seems like > there are some similar moves with Peirce. > > Within Peirce how do you see this notion of the Nothing as source and > Nothing as end as well as the distinction between God’s being and this > space within God’s being (or even its ground)? I confess it’s not > something I’ve studied in the least. > > > > > > > > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] The 'Petoukhov hypothesis': An experimetnal evidence
Hi, (*1*) In response to my PEIRCE-L post dated 11/22/2015, Petoukhov wrote to me this morning: "From the formal standpoint, our voice apparatus is a vibro-system with many degrees of freedom (112315-1) and with its resonant frequencies." This statement, when combined with his earlier theoretical results [1, 2], naturally leads to the following generarization: "*All living systems and their components are vibro-systems with many degrees of freedom*(112315-2) *with their resonant frequencies.*" With Petoukhov's permission and for reasons of convenience, I decided to refer to Statement (112315-2) as the '*Petoukhov hypothesis*'. (*2*) One experimental evidence supporting the Petoukhov hypothesis is that 3 of the 64 codons shown in Table 1 below (i.e., TAA, TAG, and TGA) encode the "actions" of stopping the transcriptional process rather than any amino acids (when viewed superficially). One plausible way to account for this fact would be that the 3 nucleotide triplets located along the the DNA double helix, i.e., the stop codons, may transfer their 'resonant frequencies' (i.e., their associated vibrational energies) to an RNA polymerase molecule thereby stopping its motions along the DNA tracks, preventing transcription. In fact the same molecular mechanism may be responsible for transcribing the amino acid-coding codons on DNA to its conjugate mRNA product. That is, these amino acid-coding codons may transfer their resonant frequencies to a mRNA polymerase molecule so that it can carry out the transcriptional process rather than stopping it, unlike the stopping action-coding codons. *Table 1*. *64 Codons connect nucleotide triplets to amino acid actions* (i.e., their resonant vibrational frequencies) mediated by transcriptional and translational processes. *CCC* *Pro* *CCA* *Pro* *CAC* *His* *CAA* *Gln* *ACC* *Thr* *ACA **Thr* *AAC **Asn* *AAA **Lys* *CCT* *Pro* *CCG* *Pro* *CAT* *His* *CAG* *Gln* *ACT **Thr* *ACG* *Thr* *AAT **Asn* *AAG **Lys* *CTC* *Leu* *CTA **Leu* *CGC **Arg* *CGA* *Arg* *ATC* *Ile* *ATA* *Met* *AGC **Ser* *AGA**Arg* *CTT **Leu* *CTG* *Leu* *CGT **Arg* *CGG* *Arg* *ATT* *Ile* *ATG **Met* *AGT* *Ser* *AGG**Arg* *TCC **Ser* *TCA* *Ser* *TAC **Tyr* *TAA **Stop* *GCC **Ala* *GCA **Ala* *GAC **Asp* *GAA* *Glu* *TCT* *Ser* *TCG **Ser* *TAT **Tyr* *TAG **Stop* *GCT **Ala* *GCG **Ala* *GAT **Asp* *GAG **Glu* *TTC **Phe* *TTA **Leu* *TGC **Cys* *TGA**Stop* *GTC **Val* *GTA **Val* *GGC **Gly* *GGA **Gly* *TTT* *Phe* *TTG **Leu* *TGT **Cys* *TGG **Trp* *GTT **Val* *GTG **Val* *GGT **Gly* *GGG **Gly* (*3*) Let us remember that the resonant frequencies, *ν, *of an oscillator is related to its energy, *E, *via the "Planck–Einstein relation <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planck%E2%80%93Einstein_relation>" ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planck_constant): [image: E = h \nu] (112315-3) Of curse, a codon on DNA carry not only the *resonant vibrational energy* determined by (112315-3) but also the '*genetic information*' encoded in the molecular shape of the codon that is essential for recognizing (and transferring resonant energy to) its binding partner on an RNA polymerase. In other words, we must be careful not to be blinded by the elegance of the Planck-Einstein relation, Eq. (112315-3), and forget the equally important 'genetic information' stored in a codon, since the *action* of a codon depends on both its vibrational ENERGY and genetic INFORMATION, in agreement with the Principle of Information-Energy complementarity or the Gnergy Principle of Organization [3]. The Petoukhov hypothesis, (112315-2), is consistent with the information-energy requirement for the action of a codon because the *resonant frequencies* of a codon embody both the *vibrational energy* and the *information about the molecular mass and shape* of the codon that determine its *resonant waves*. All the best. Sung -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net *References:* [1] Petoukhov, S. V. (2015). The system-resonance approach in modeling genetic structures. BioSystem (n press). The pre-print at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/aip/03032647 . [2] Petoukhov, S. D. (2015). Music and the Modeling Approach to Genetic Systems of Biological Resonances (Genetic System and Vibrational Mechanics). The 4th ISIS Summit, Vienna, 2015. Power Point slides at http://sciforum.net/conference/70/paper/2812. [3] Ji, S. (2012). Information-Energy Complementarity <http://www.conformon.net/?attachment_id=1110> as the Principle of Organization. In: Molecular Theor
Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Hi, According to Ed Dellian, even Newton's Second Law of motion is not time-reversible (contrary to what I thought), thus invalidating the first sentence of Peirce's statement, (112315-1), that I cited in my previous post. If these considerations are true, they may warn us against accepting Peirce's statements without critical examinations in light of the many advances that have been made in natural and human sciences since his death almost exactly a century ago. All the best. Sung -- Forwarded message -- From: Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de> Date: Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 10:56 AM Subject: AW: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments To: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>, CLARK GOBLE <cl...@lextek.com> Cc: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Sung, your Peirce quote shows that this great man as so many others has never read Newton’s Principia. Had he done so, he would have found Newton’s second law “Mutationem motus proportionalem esse vi motrici impressae”, and he would have immediately seen that this law is evidently n o t time-reversible! Therefore, Peirce, and whoever follows him here, is telling his readers nonsense. It is a fact that natural experience disproves the concept of reversibility. It is also a fact that the idea that “every physical process can be reverse without violation of the laws of mechanics” results only from ignorance and/or misinterpretation of Newton’s second law which was conceived not as an unrealistic absurdity but on the basis of natural experience and experiment! It is one thing to study the philosophy of Peirce, but it is a different thing to study the truth of nature. Ed. -- *Von:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *Im Auftrag von *Sungchul Ji *Gesendet:* Montag, 23. November 2015 13:05 *An:* CLARK GOBLE *Cc:* PEIRCE-L *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments Clark, Søren, lists, Peirce said: " . . . While every physical process can be reverse without violation of the law of mechanics,(112315-1) the law of habit forbids such reversal. ' (CP 8.318) I am glad you quoted this statement because I wanted to make a comment on it when I first read it about a year ago somewhere in CP but could not find it again. It seems to me that the first sentence of this this statement is false even based on our common experience: Evaporated perfume cannot be put back into a bottle. As we all now know the physical law forbidding the reversal of evaporated perfume is called the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and there developed a whole field of scientific studies during the 20th Century on such processes called IRREVERSIBLE thermodynamics, for the contribution to the establishment of which I. Prigogine (1917-2003) was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1977. If this interpretation is correct, the validity of the second sentence in (112315-1) seems weakened considerably, although not totally removed, since it can stand on its own as an assertion with or without any supporting scientific evidence. All the best. Sung On Sun, Nov 22, 2015 at 11:18 PM, CLARK GOBLE <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: On Nov 20, 2015, at 1:01 PM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote: I agree but Peirce is integrating it with an emptiness ontology inspired by Buddhism. Hartshorne describes it as his Buddhisto-Christianism. Bishop writes a paper on Peirce and Eastern Thought. See my Pure Zero paper attached. I just finished it. Very interesting. I hadn’t known that Peirce was connected with Suzuki before. (Again as I said I know just enough Buddhism to be dangerous but not enough to really be able to say much) One tangental comment that came to mind in one of your quotes. You have Peirce commenting on his famous relationship of mind and matter. I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I suppose matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit. While every physical process can be reverse without violation of the law of mechanics, the law of habit forbids such reversal. (CP 8.318) I assume here meaning we can’t lose a habit once developed. Does Peirce ever defend this position? I confess it seems a dubious position to hold although I understand why his ontology requires it. On much else I’ve taken Peirce, contra say the scientific realists, to reject any kind of convergence. That is there can be periods of rapid development and then because of fallibilism falling away or change. To use the metaphors James Burke famously did in the 70’s and 80’s about science, it is less convergence than pinball process. That’s always seemed more persuasive as a view of habit-forming too. Yet the reversibility is something that in at least a few places Peirce denies. Of course Peirce is inconsistent on this in certain ways. After all he conceives of belief
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments
**Cell Life and Death, *S. Ji (ed.), Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, pp. 90-119. On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 2:58 PM, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de> wrote: > Edwina, Sung – > > > > To write a text that includes references to Newton is not proof that the > author has read what he refers to. This is very often the case with > authors. Even Albert Einstein, in an interview with I. B. Cohen two weeks > before he died, admitted that he had never read Newton “because it’s all > in the textbooks”. Mhm. – “Newton’s focus was on the mechanical”? Well, > his focus was on “motion” (Principia, Books 1 and 2 entitled “On the motion > of bodies”). Motion is > > omnipresent, in “mechanical” and in other instances. – Yes, “To say that a > force exists is not a definition of the cause of that force”. But, if you > read Newton, you will see that a force is not an effect that requires a > cause, rather it is a cause itself that acts and produces certain effects > in the motion of bodies. Newton’s authentic second law that states the > geometrical proportionality of force and change in motion (and therefore > the time-irreversibility of a generated change in motion) is a true causal > “law of cause and effect”. > > > > Ed. > > > > > > > > *Von:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *Im > Auftrag von *Sungchul Ji > *Gesendet:* Montag, 23. November 2015 20:19 > *An:* Edwina Taborsky > *Cc:* PEIRCE-L > *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, > Arguments > > > > Edwina, and lists, > > > > You wrote: > > > > "That is, Peirce was quite aware of the difference between mechanical and > non-mechanical processes. (112315-1) > Newton's focus was on the mechanical, and as noted, . . . " > > > > But the point is, according to Ed Dellian, Newton's law(s) is(are) not > time-reversible. So, if Ed is right, perhaps Peirce 'mis-read' Newton > (understanding it to bar the time-irreversibilty), not realizing that it is > ? > > > > All the best. > > > > Sung > > > > > > > > On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 1:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > > Peirce has never read Newton??If you, Sung, had read Peirce, you would > know that this is incorrect. His texts include many references - sometimes > complementary and sometimes not complementary - for he calls it the > 'Corpuscular Philosophy' (CP 5.65) and writes: > > > > "The three laws of motion draw no dynamical distinction between > right-handed and left-handed screws, and a mechanical explanation is an > explanation founded on the three laws of motion". (5.65) and considers an > example which 'is absolutely incapable of mechanical explanation"...The > example, which you can read for yourself in the text cited, is about the > 'right-handed and left-handed screw structures of the molecules of those > bodies which are said to be optically active". > > > > That is, Peirce was quite aware of the difference between mechanical and > non-mechanical processes. Newton's focus was on the mechanical, and as > noted, such processes are not thermodynamic and do not include the 2nd law > of thermodynamics and are indifferent to causality. [To say that a 'force' > exists is not a definition of the cause of that force]. > > > > Certainly, if a box is moved from site A to site B, and then, back to site > A, there is no violation of any of Newton's three laws. But, when > the non-mechanical insertion of, as Peirce points out, 'habit' is > introduced, then, the capacity of the bird to fly, due to the evolution of > wings (habit), then, one cannot reverse this capacity and 'un-evolve' the > wings. > > > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > > *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > > *To:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > > *Sent:* Monday, November 23, 2015 12:15 PM > > *Subject:* Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, > Arguments > > > > Hi, > > > > According to Ed Dellian, even Newton's Second Law of motion is not > time-reversible (contrary to what I thought), thus invalidating the first > sentence of Peirce's statement, (112315-1), that I cited in my previous > post. > > > > If these considerations are true, they may warn us against accepting > Peirce's statements without critical examinations in light of the many > advances that have been made in natural and human sciences since his death > almost exactly a century ago. > > > > All the best. > > > > Sung > > > > -- Forward
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semeiotic Neostructuralism and Language
e is excluded from > linguistic explanation, while for the other it is the very stuff of > explanation. For the one, linguistic phenomena conform to a describable > structure of highly abstract laws, while for the other linguistic phenomena > exhibit an intelligible if less abstract, more complicated structure. For > the one, the system is a given, and any changes in it are accidental, while > for the other development is essential to language––development is more the > reality than is any one system of rules––and that development is also > intelligible and not merely given. > > That is the conflict. The reason the semeiotic > neostructuralist approach is, if it is successful, superior is that it can > be used to explain the very evolution of the brain-mechanism or linguistic > capacities and universals that Chomsky can at best describe. That is, given > creatures somewhat sociable, exchanging signs as their way of life, then > the survival value of their communicating more elaborate and precise > diagrams would explain the retention of those fortuitous variations, say, > in brain structure that promote exactly such powers of expressible > diagrammatization. That is, the principle of this evolution will be itself > linguistic, and continuous with the principles of postbiotic, strictly > linguistic evolution. > > The thought here is not unlike that which refuses to > postulate linguistic intentions separate from the capacity to exercise > those intentions. Just as there could be no desire to speak without an > ability to speak, so also there could be no evolution of linguistic > capacities––even, or especially, at the physiological level––except among > those who, already speaking to one another, will more likely survive as a > species if they speak more effectively. Thus, instead of a > neurophysiological explanation of language, we have a linguistic > explanation of the higher cortex––and probably not just the speech centers > either, since so many of our capacities for sensation and action would be > bootless without our capacities for speech. > > > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Ed, Thanks for your response. You wrote : "Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product of the human brain,(111815-1) and therefore it is not logical." I can't quite agree with (111815-1). Instead I would assert that "Logic may be a product of the Universe as is the human brain. Hence it is not surprising(111815-2) that that the logical reasoning of the human mind agrees with what happens in the Universe." All the best. Sung On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 8:56 AM, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de> wrote: > Sung, > > You say that the Universe is "by and large logical". This is not true. > "Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a > product of the human brain, and therefore it is not logical, and its > language is not the human mathematical logic of algebra. The rational > language of the Universe is Geometry (Plato, 400 BC, Galileo, 1623 AD). > Geometry as the art of measuring refers to everything "which is really > there" and therefore has its distinct measure. Mathematical logic, or the > art of calculating, refers to "what *could be* there" (cf. my 2012 essay > "The language of Nature is not Algebra", on my website > www.neutonus-reformatus.com, entry nr. 40, 201). Logic and algebra is an > "anthropocentric" art rooted in the human brain only; geometry is > "cosmocentric" and refers to the reality and truth of Nature (based on the > reality and measurability of space and time) > > Ed. > > -- > *Von:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *Im > Auftrag von *Sungchul Ji > *Gesendet:* Mittwoch, 18. November 2015 12:29 > *An:* PEIRCE-L > *Cc:* biosemiotics; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. Ulanowicz; Ed Dellian; > Auletta Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz > *Betreff:* Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments > > Hi, > > A correction: > > Please replace "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA" in (*4*) > with "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA, and A,T, G and U for RNA". > > Thanks. > > Sung > > > > -- Forwarded message -- > From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > Date: Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:04 PM > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments > To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Cc: biosemiotics <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>, Sergey Petoukhov < > spetouk...@gmail.com>, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de>, "Robert E. > Ulanowicz" <u...@cbl.umces.edu> > > > (The table below may be distorted beyond easy recognition.) > > Franklin, Gary R, lists, > > In connection with writing my manuscript on the cell language theory to be > published by Imperial College Press, I am toying with the ideas expressed > in Table 1 below. If anyone has any suggestions or comments, I would > appreciate hearing from you. > > There are several points that need explanations: > > (*1*) I coined three new words, 'cellese', 'humanese', 'cosmese', to > facilitate discussions. I am assuming that 'cosmese' is synonymous with > what we call logic, since the Universe is by and large 'logical'. > > (*2*) I imported the concept of "double articulations" from linguistics > to biology in 1997 [1-6]. (I feel funny to list so many of my own > references here despite Franklin's recent criticism. The only > justification I have for doing so is to assure the members of these lists > that most of the statements that I make on these posts are supported by my > published research results, as is also the case for many of the discussants > on these lists.) > > (*3*) When I applied the concept of "double articulation" to cell > biology, I was logically led to invoke the concept of "third articulation" > (see the second row, *Table 1*) in order to account for some of the > cellular metabolism and processes. I then decided to export this concept > back to humanese where "double articulation" originated, leading to the > distinction between *sentences* and *linguistic texts* including simple > syllogisms. This extension seems reasonable because we can then say that > > 1) *words denote *(first 6 of the 10 classes of the Pericean triadic > signs that I listed in my previous post) > > 2) *sentences decide or judge *(Classes 7, 8 & 9 of Peircean signs) > > 3)* texts argue *(the 10th class, i.e, argument symbolic legisign)*.* > > > > __ > > *Table 1*. The common structures of the languages at
Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Hi, A correction: Please replace "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA" in (*4*) with "nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA, and A,T, G and U for RNA". Thanks. Sung -- Forwarded message ------ From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> Date: Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:04 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Cc: biosemiotics <biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>, Sergey Petoukhov < spetouk...@gmail.com>, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de>, "Robert E. Ulanowicz" <u...@cbl.umces.edu> (The table below may be distorted beyond easy recognition.) Franklin, Gary R, lists, In connection with writing my manuscript on the cell language theory to be published by Imperial College Press, I am toying with the ideas expressed in Table 1 below. If anyone has any suggestions or comments, I would appreciate hearing from you. There are several points that need explanations: (*1*) I coined three new words, 'cellese', 'humanese', 'cosmese', to facilitate discussions. I am assuming that 'cosmese' is synonymous with what we call logic, since the Universe is by and large 'logical'. (*2*) I imported the concept of "double articulations" from linguistics to biology in 1997 [1-6]. (I feel funny to list so many of my own references here despite Franklin's recent criticism. The only justification I have for doing so is to assure the members of these lists that most of the statements that I make on these posts are supported by my published research results, as is also the case for many of the discussants on these lists.) (*3*) When I applied the concept of "double articulation" to cell biology, I was logically led to invoke the concept of "third articulation" (see the second row, *Table 1*) in order to account for some of the cellular metabolism and processes. I then decided to export this concept back to humanese where "double articulation" originated, leading to the distinction between *sentences* and *linguistic texts* including simple syllogisms. This extension seems reasonable because we can then say that 1) *words denote *(first 6 of the 10 classes of the Pericean triadic signs that I listed in my previous post) 2) *sentences decide or judge *(Classes 7, 8 & 9 of Peircean signs) 3)* texts argue *(the 10th class, i.e, argument symbolic legisign)*.* __ *Table 1*. The common structures of the languages at three levels -- 'cellese', 'humanese' and 'cosmese' [7].' __ *1st articulation 2nd articulation '3rd articulation'* __ 'humanese' wordsletters sentences | | | VV V sentenceswords syllogisms/texts ___ 'cellese' 1-D biopolymers monomers 3-D biopolymers | | | VV V 3-D biopolymers 1-D biopolymers chemical waves [8] 'cosmese' terms X propositions (or logic ?)| | | V V V propositions terms arguments _ (*4*) You will notice the appearance of x in the middle of the 4th row. I was led to postulate this entity based solely on the symmetry consideration with respect to the other two rows: x must be there, and I am at a loss what this may be. Does anyone on these lists know if Peirce discussed something related to this ? Can x be what Peirce called 9 groups of signs (i.e., qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, dicisign, and argument) ? If so, these 9 groups of signs may be akin to the monomers in biology (i.e., 4 nucleotides, A, T, G, and C for DNA and RNA, and 20 amino acids for proteins), and letters of the alphabets in human languages. This may justify Peirce's division of signs into 9 groups and 10 classes, which I referred to as "elementary signs" and "composite signs", respectively, in [biosemiotics:46], which elicited oppositions from Franklin in his recent
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
ue to the cases in which the term is not >> used alone, but with respect to other terms in propositions*. In the >> case of being used as predicate, it increases in informed breadth; in the >> case of subject, it increases in informed depth. Note that when the term >> appears as a subject, the predicate of the proposition is predicated of the >> term, and that when the term appears as a predicate, it has the subject of >> the proposition as its subject. >> >> >> >> Now if we consider the term as a proposition, this would simply amount to >> supposing its logical depth given as predicate and its logical breadth >> given as subject in a proposition. So we could say of man, "All men are >> such-and-such-and-such", and by this we would denote all real objects that >> are men and all the characters that man signifies. This is not a very >> practical thing to do, but it is theoretically possible. It also satisfies >> what Peirce says in the passage when he defines predicate and subject with >> respect to, not simply propositions, but signs in general. >> >> >> >> That's the interpretation I'm suggesting, namely that terms can be >> regarded as propositions. There are also some other points that are >> relevant to the claim that Peirce means signs, and not simply propositions. >> Although Peirce does admit that it is the proposition which is the main >> subject of the scholium as a whole, the term "proposition" appears a couple >> of times before the paragraph in question. Moreover, Peirce also goes on to >> explain rhemas and arguments as well after the passage in question, and >> then comes to focus on the idea of the symbol, which applies to all three. >> And, as I have suggested, Peirce is showing how terms and arguments may be >> regarded as propositions, So while his discussion of signs is focused >> around the idea of proposition, what he says of propositions has >> consequences for our understanding of signs in general, and so for terms >> and arguments. Although "[w]hat we call a 'fact' is something having the >> structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very >> universe itself," it is also true that "[t]he purpose of every sign is to >> express 'fact,' and by being joined to other signs, to approach as nearly >> as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect >> Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such...would be the very Universe" >> (ibid, p.304). So here we see that fact is focused on the idea of the >> proposition, but it has consequences for how we should understand what all >> signs are up to, what the purpose of every interpretant is, regardless of >> whether it is the interpretant of a proposition or of another type of sign. >> >> GF: I think you’re overlooking Peirce’s statement that signs fulfill that >> purpose *by being joined to other signs.* Also what he says in the >> Syllabus and elsewhere about how complex signs *involve* simpler signs, >> which offers a much less convoluted explanation of how all signs play their >> parts in approaching the ideal of the Absolute Truth. >> >> >> >> In the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (1903) Peirce >> defines a “sign” as “a representamen of which some interpretant is a >> cognition of a mind.” Then in 1909 he writes that: >> >> “The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the >> nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living >> intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as >> of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection >> of being” (CP 6.341, 1909). >> >> What kind of sign joins a predicate to a subject? Do we really want to >> say that all signs do that, or that “terms” do that? >> >> >> >> Then, at the end of the text when Peirce revisits the idea of judgment, >> we find him saying the following: "The man is a symbol. Different men, so >> far as they can have any ideas in common, are the same symbol. Judgment is >> the determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the >> judged proposition has." (ibid, p.324) Now I would suppose that the >> judgment is a certain kind of proposition, but the man-symbol is not likely >> to be regarded as being a proposition, nor an argument. It is a term, but >> we see in this respect that it is like a proposition, because just as the >> judgment is a determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant >> the judgment has, in turn &quo
Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a Self-Organizing Musical Instrument (USOMI)
-- Forwarded message -- From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> Date: Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 6:47 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a Self-Organizing Musical Instrument (USOMI) To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> John, Jerry, lists, (1) John asked, "Isn’t this just a straightforward consequence of Fourier analysis?" Indeed John is right. Any curve, including long tailed histograms, can be fit into a series of sine waves, as the Fourier theorem predicts ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourier_series). In fact we have found that not all long tailed histograms fit PDE (Planckian Distribution Equation), although more than 90% of them that we have examined so far do. As an example, see how a series of 8 sine waves (green curve) in Figure 1 can fit the long tailed histogram (blue curve) much better than PDE (red curve). [image: Inline image 5] Figure 1. The superiority of the Fourier series over PDE in fitting long tailed histograms. (I thank one of my students, Seungkee Kim, for producing this graph.) Several conclusions and definitions can be formulated from these observations: (i) All long tailed histograms fit Fourier series, i.e., a series of simple sine waves, confirming the Fourier theorem. (ii) Only a subset of the histograms fitting the Fourier series also fits PDE. (iii) Just as the Planckian information (I_P) is defined as the binary logarithm of the ratio of the area under the curve (AUC) of PDE over the AUC of Gaussian-like equation (GLE), i.e., I_P = log_2[AUC(PDE)/AUC(GLE)], so (111415-1) it would be logical to define as the Fourier information (I_F) the binary logarithm of the ratio of the AUC of the N-term Fourier series (FSN) fitting a histogram over the AUC of GLE, i.e., I_F = log_2[AUC(FSN)/AUC(GLE)] (111415-2) GLE is defined as the Gaussian equation wherein the pre-exponential factor, sigma x (2 x pi)^0.5, is replaced by a free parameter, A. (iv) M. Burgin, in his book, "Theory of Information: Fundamentality, Diversity and Unification" (World Scientific, New Jersey, 2010, pp. 131-133) lists no less than 35 ways of defining information. I_P and I_F are but two more such definitions. (v) Since all experimental records (some of which may be no more than half waves), including long tailed histograms, are expected to fit functions consisting of a series of N sine waves (where N could be 5-20 ?), it seems logical to conclude that all these records result from some mechanisms implicating wave phenomena, whether electromagnetic, mechanical, chemical, acoustic, or gravitational. (2) In response to Jerry's comments about what is new in my and Petoukhov's findings that the Universe may behave as a self-organizing system of oscillators, or as a musical instrument (since ancients have already thought about it), I just want to remind him that it took more than two millennia for the concept of the atom, first invoked by Democritus, to be proven scientifically. Similarly, with all due humility, I am tempted to suggest that the Pythagoras' and Plato's idea of musica universalis ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourier_series) may have taken more than two millennia to be proven empirically through the Fourier theorem, the universality of PDE, and the isomorphism between molecular genetics and waving phenomena discovered by Petoukhov through the application of matrix mathematics (http://sciforum.net/conference/70/paper/2812). All the best. Sung On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 5:49 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > Jerry, > > > > Isn’t this just a straightforward consequence of Fourier analysis? Are you > implying that Fourier analysis has no scientific value (it is tautological, > so no additional information content – so no additional empirical content), > or do you mean to imply some other value with your use of “scientific”? I > would prefer to keep the term from being value laden, but I know it is used > that way, though usually pejoratively. I really don’t understand your usage > here. > > > > John Collier > > Professor Emeritus, UKZN > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > *From:* Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] > *Sent:* November 14, 2015 7:04 AM > *To:* Sungchul Ji > *Cc:* PEIRCE-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a Self-Organizing Musical > Instrument (USOMI) > > > > Sung: > > > > Every 'vibrational motion' can be approximated by a sequence of intervals. > > > > How does your work relate to any form of scientific conclusion? > > > > In other words, what are the premisses? > > And what are the propositions? > > And, how are these premisses and propositions related to a scientific > conclusion? >
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8917] Re: Peirce's categories
HI,
Peirce said: "Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it
is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."
Why did Peirce say "a second and third into relation" instead of saying "a
first and second into relation" ?
Wouldn't it have been clearer if Peirce said
"Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing
two entities into relation to each other" ?
All the best.
Sung
On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 9:23 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
> I have to confess that I don't see the problem here, or the need for an
> elaborate explanation. Peirce's sentence seems to me perfectly clear in its
> context (CP 8.328):
>
>
>
> [[ The ideas of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are simple enough.
> Giving to being the broadest possible sense, to include ideas as well as
> things, and ideas that we fancy we have just as much as ideas we do have, I
> should define Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness thus:
>
> Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively
> and without reference to anything else.
>
> Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with
> respect to a second but regardless of any third.
>
> Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing
> a second and third into relation to each other.
>
> I call these three ideas the cenopythagorean categories. ]]
>
>
>
> Each of these "ideas" is the *mode of being* of a thing or idea ("that
> which is"). I think Edwina also confuses the issue by saying that Thirdness
> is a "mode of organization of matter". Peirce never says that about any of
> his "categories."
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that
> counts can be counted. [William Bruce Cameron] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
> Sent: 28-Oct-15 08:02
> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> Subject: [biosemiotics:8914] RE: Peirce's categories
>
>
>
> Hello Kobus,
>
>
>
> I happen to think that is a very good question, and one that is not
> adequately explained in the secondary literature. Having spent some time
> digging through Peirce's works for clearer answers, I think the answers can
> be found in the texts--but I sure wish Peirce had made things clearer
> himself. One thing we need, I think, is a clear explanation of how the key
> ideas that are being worked out in the phenomenological account of the
> formal categories are being developed and refined in a diagrammatical
> manner in the graphical systems of logic. That isn't much of a response,
> but I look forward to seeing what others have to say.
>
>
>
> If you are interested in seeing a bit more of an answer, I have a short
> paper that was presented at the Congress last summer and would be happy to
> share it with you. Bill McCurdy has also worked on this problem, and he has
> come to similar kinds of conclusions about how we should picture the
> connections that are being formed between un-bonded monadic, dyadic and
> triadic relations.
>
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
>
> Jeff Downard
>
> Associate Professor
>
> Department of Philosophy
>
> NAU
>
> (o) 523-8354
>
>
>
> From: Kobus Marais [jmar...@ufs.ac.za]
>
> Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 2:15 AM
>
> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
>
> Subject: [biosemiotics:8913] Peirce's categories
>
>
>
> Dear List
>
> I hope that you will have patience with what may be a very ignorant
> question. In CP8.328, Perice defines thirdness as follows:
>
> Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing
> a second and third into relation to each other.
>
>
>
> Now, I would have thought that thirdness brings a first and a second into
> relation to each other. Why would Peirce say that thirdness brings a second
> and a third into relation to each other? In which sense could thirdness
> bring a second into relation with itself? Or what am I missing here?
>
>
>
> Thanks.
>
> K
>
>
>
--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8922] Re: Peirce's categories
being formed between un-bonded monadic, dyadic and > triadic relations. > > > > --Jeff > > > > Jeff Downard > > Associate Professor > > Department of Philosophy > > NAU > > (o) 523-8354 > > > > From: Kobus Marais [jmar...@ufs.ac.za] > > Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 2:15 AM > > To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > > Subject: [biosemiotics:8913] Peirce's categories > > > > Dear List > > I hope that you will have patience with what may be a very ignorant > question. In CP8.328, Perice defines thirdness as follows: > > Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing > a second and third into relation to each other. > > > > Now, I would have thought that thirdness brings a first and a second into > relation to each other. Why would Peirce say that thirdness brings a second > and a third into relation to each other? In which sense could thirdness > bring a second into relation with itself? Or what am I missing here? > > > > Thanks. > > K > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
r "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Fwd: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
Hi, Correction: Please change " . . . dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication." in my previous post to ". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication." Thanks. Sung -- Forwarded message ------ From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object? To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary <g...@gnusystems.ca>, Peirce List < peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Helmut. lists, " . . .the concept of communication can be widened to the concept of interaction- . . . " I think 'interaction" is necessary but not sufficient for "communication". Persons A and B can interact without communicating. We have seen many examples of this in married couples and among members of these lists. This is because "interactions" are dyadic and "communications" are triadic. In other words, dyadic communications cannot lead to any communication. Only triadic interactions can, as shown in Figure 1. f g Person A --> Sign ---> Person B (Object) (Interpretant) | ^ | | |__| h *Figure 1. * Distinguishing between "interaction" and "communication". A can interact with B by sending sound signals (i.e., through steps f and g) but A may not be able to send any message to B, if B's mind is unable to receive A's message for one reason or another (e.g., lack of a common language, or A is too obsessed with his own ideas). A is said to communicate with B IF and ONLY IF Steps f, g, and h are engaged, i.e., IF and ONLY IF, the interaction is triadic, not dyadic. f = sign production; g = sign reception or interpretation; h = information flow, i.e., communication All the best. Sung On Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > Frances, List, > You distinguish very accurately between what belongs to or is a sign, and > what doesnt. In Garys Peirce-quote below the sign concept is also limited: > "I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the > communication or extension of a Form (or feature)." So for Peirce it is > communication or extension (what is extension in this case btw?), and for > you it is representation, that makes something (eg. an object) belong to > the sign-sphere. Now I guess, that the concept of communication can be > widened to the concept of interaction- maybe this is, what Peirce means by > "extension"? And then everything belongs to the sign sphere, because > everything interacts. A physicochemical result might be seen as an > interpretant, a kind of representation, so then we have pansemiotics, I > guess. But of course it is helpful to distinguish between realworld- or > mattergy-Signs and mental Signs. Or is a physicochemical representation in > a result a quasi-mental Sign? Meaning: Had the universe not a quasi-mind, > nothing could happen? > Best, > Helmut > > 25. Oktober 2015 um 19:06 Uhr > frances.ke...@sympatico.ca wrote: > > > To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth. > > Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need > only be nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield > phenomenal existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can > be synechastic objects that are not signs, and even semiosic objects that > are either not signs or that are signs. Phenomenal objects can seemingly > be mystically phantural, or materially physical, or mentally psychical. > Existent > synechastic objects initially are phenomenal representamen, but are not > yet signs nor semiotic tridents or terns in their formal structure, until > they become semiosic objects by way of representation; but some existent > semiosic objects also need not be signs, until enacted as signs by > signers. Existent semiosic objects are likely to become phenomenal > representamen that are signs by way of represented evolution, and whose > formal structure is hence a tridential tern; which is composed of a sole > represented vehicle in a medium, and a pair of referred objects in a > ground, and a tern of interpreted effects as a subject. > > The determinence and dependence in semiosis for the dyadic pair of objects > and the triadic tern of interpretants is not necessarily progressive or > hierarchical in a strict categoral manner. It se
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement
ciplinary endeavour, this needs to > be done. We are ill-served when we allow The Establishment to dominate with > a broken genocentric narrative. At the very least, these ideas merit > brainstorming. > > sj > > Pizzi, R., Fantasia, A., Gelain, F., Rosetti, D., & Vescovi, A. (2004). > Non-local correlations between separated neural networks (E. Donkor, A. > Pirick, & H. Brandt, Eds.). *Quantum Information and Computation > (Proceedings of SPIE)*, 5436(II), 107-117. Retrieved August 2, 2015, from > http://faculty.nps.edu/baer/CompMod-phys/PizziWebPage/pizzi.pdf > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)
> I'm not sure what you mean by the above. > > > In most ways psychoanalysis is treating the mind (especially dreams) as if > they were a literary work to be interpreted with the various ways > literature was interpreted. That’s why even though Jung, Freud and company > aren’t typically taken seriously in science they still are in literature > departments. > > The way a person interprets literature simply is quite different from say > what goes on in contemporary psychology or cognitive science. > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
Hi, The Existential Triad of Burgin was missing in my previous post which is given below: * World of structures * * /\* */\* * /\* * Physical world -- Mental world * *Figure 1. *The Existential Triad of the world. Reproduced from [1]. If ITR (Irreversible Triadic Relation) indeed applies to Figure 1 as suggested in Figure 3 in my previous post, the following logical inferences may be made: (1) The World cannot be reduced to any one or two of the triad, e.g., to the duality of the Physical world and the Mental world, as advocated by Descartes. (2) The World of Structures are as real as the Physical or the Mental world, meaning that, just as the Mental World is unthinkable without the Physical World, so is the Mental World unthinkable without the World of Structures. Nor the Physical World thinkable without the World of Structures. (3) In other words, the World may be ultimately *irreducibly triadic, *i.e, *Peircea*n ! (4) The World is also recursive with respect to ITR. That is, there are many ITR's embedded within each of the three worlds, reminiscent of the Russian babushka dolls. Each ITR can be visualized as a babushka doll, or simply as a 'bab', the term introduced by the Austrian theologian, H.-F. Angel, in 2006 in connection with his theory of the believing processes called "credition" [2]. (5) If (4) is right, it would follow that the World is the Largest Bab enclosing many smaller babs which divide into three groups belonging to the Physical world (I), the Mental world (II), and the World of structures (III)". *Bab = Bab (I)*Bab (II)*Bab (III) * (I) where the symbol * indicates the irreducibly triadic relation depicted in Figure 3. With all the best. Sung Reference: [1] Burgin, M. (2010). Theory of Information: Fundamentality, Diversity and Unification. World Scientific, New Jersey, p. 60. [2] *Angel, H.-F. (2015). A Process of Merging Interior and Exterior Reality: A Short View on the Structure of Credition, in: Teixeira, Maria-Teresa (Ed): **Mind in Nature, in: European Studies in Process Thought, 2016, Cambridge Scholars Publishing [in press].* On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 7:22 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > Stephen, Jeffrey, Edwina, lists, > > (1) In connection with the debate on nominalism vs. realism, it may be > of some interest to consider the Existential Triad of Burgin proposed in > [1] (see the figure below) that seems similar to the triadic models of the > world advocated by Popper and Penrose [2]. What is interesting to me is > that in all these models, a distinction is made between the Mental world > and the World of structures (which I used to think to be equivalent): > > > [image: Inline image 1] > (Reproduced from [1]) > > (2) As the possible 'residents' (or constituents) of the World of > structures (WS), I am inclined to suggest the concepts of (i) ITR > (Irreducible Triadic Relation) [3], (ii) the Golden ratio [3], (iii) > Fibonacci series [3], and PDE (Planckian distributions equation) [4] which > I have already discussed on these lists. > > (3) The main purpose of this post is to bring to your attention my recent > findings > > (a) that a Gaussian distribution (indicating randomness) can be > transformed into a right or a left long-tailed histogram (indicating > non-randomness or order) simply by replacing the x-coordinates of the > Gaussian distribution with Fibonacci numbers (or their derivatives such as > F^0.5 and log(log F), where F is a segment of the Fibonacci series),while > keeping its y coordinates invariant, and > (b) that such Gaussian-derived long tailed histograms can be simulated > with PDE using as its x-coordinates the same Fibonacci numbers used in > (a). I will refer to this combined procedure as the "*Fibonacci > number-based transformation of Gaussian to Planckian distribution*" > (FTGP), which can be schematically represented thus: > > > i) > replace x with F > * Gaussian Distribution* > -> *Planckian Distribution * > (Random processes) ii) keep y invariant >(Non-random, i.e., ordered processes) >[Thermal or Brownian motions] > [Selection processes driven by free energy] > > > *Figure 1.* A diagrammatic representation of FTGP. The transformation of > the Gaussian distribution to the Planckian distribution by carrying out two
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
Stephen, Jeffrey, Edwina, lists, (1) In connection with the debate on nominalism vs. realism, it may be of some interest to consider the Existential Triad of Burgin proposed in [1] (see the figure below) that seems similar to the triadic models of the world advocated by Popper and Penrose [2]. What is interesting to me is that in all these models, a distinction is made between the Mental world and the World of structures (which I used to think to be equivalent): [image: Inline image 1] (Reproduced from [1]) (2) As the possible 'residents' (or constituents) of the World of structures (WS), I am inclined to suggest the concepts of (i) ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) [3], (ii) the Golden ratio [3], (iii) Fibonacci series [3], and PDE (Planckian distributions equation) [4] which I have already discussed on these lists. (3) The main purpose of this post is to bring to your attention my recent findings (a) that a Gaussian distribution (indicating randomness) can be transformed into a right or a left long-tailed histogram (indicating non-randomness or order) simply by replacing the x-coordinates of the Gaussian distribution with Fibonacci numbers (or their derivatives such as F^0.5 and log(log F), where F is a segment of the Fibonacci series),while keeping its y coordinates invariant, and (b) that such Gaussian-derived long tailed histograms can be simulated with PDE using as its x-coordinates the same Fibonacci numbers used in (a). I will refer to this combined procedure as the "*Fibonacci number-based transformation of Gaussian to Planckian distribution*" (FTGP), which can be schematically represented thus: i) replace x with F * Gaussian Distribution* -> *Planckian Distribution * (Random processes) ii) keep y invariant (Non-random, i.e., ordered processes) [Thermal or Brownian motions] [Selection processes driven by free energy] *Figure 1.* A diagrammatic representation of FTGP. The transformation of the Gaussian distribution to the Planckian distribution by carrying out two operations, i) and ii), where F indicates a segment of the Fibonacci series, e.g., F = (5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, 133, 277, 410). (4) The findings in (3) indicate that the Gaussian distributions (or Brownian) motions are essential (or prerequisite) for Planckian processes that underlie LTHs, and PDE (or mathematics) is the sign that connects them: f g Gaussian Distribution ---> PDE ---> Observed LTH | ^ | | | | |_| h *Figure 2.* The Gaussian distribution as a pre-requisite for observed LTHs (long tailed histograms). f = FTGP; g = the numerical values of the PDE parameters conform to shape of Observed LTH; h = Gaussian distribution underlies Observed LTHs.The commutativity condition is thought to hold: f x g = h. (5) I suggest, for possible discussions on these lists, the following tentative conclusions: (a) All the 'Peirce's simple concepts' discussed above (i.e., the Golden ratio, Fibonacci numbers, ITR, and PDE) are "innate properties" of the Universe in which we reside and belong to the "World of Structures" of Plato, Popper, Penrose, and Burgin [1], and (b) Since humans are the products of the Universe, so are these concepts innate to the human mind, which would be consistent with the practopoiesis model of the human mind [6]. (c) The "Peirce's simple concepts are *Signs* that refer to the *Physical World* and determine the *Metal World *in such a manner as to make it compatible with the Physical World: f g *Physical World *--> *World of Structures* --> *Mental World* | ^ | | | | |_| h *Figure 3.*The irreducible triadic relation (ITR) among the three worlds of Popper, Penrose, and Burign [1]. f = natural sciences; g = human sciences; h = innate knowledge (?) With all the best. Sung ______
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Forgetfulness Of Purpose • 7
Jon, lists, (*1*) At http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/10/07/forgetfulness-of-purpose-%E2%80%A2-7/, you wrote: "Looking to the case at hand, [image: G_1 \subseteq D \times R \times O] is a triadic relation consisting of [image: 9] triples in the larger set [image: D \times R \times O] that consists of [image: 3 \times 3 \times 3 = 27] triples." It seems to me that the table at hand, although consisting of 9 triples, is one of the 27 possible 3 x 3 tables (each having 9 triples) and hence carries log_2 (27) = 4.75 bits of Shannon information (to be denoted as I_S), if all the 27 tables have an equal probability of occurrence: I_S = H1 - H2 = log_2(27) - log_2(1) = log_2 (27) = 4.75 bits (1) where H1 is the Shannon entropy of the table under discussion before selection and H2 is that after selection by an agent carrying (or implementing ) information, I_S. (*2*) If the choices available to R, i.e., alpha, beta, and gamma, have equal probability of being selected, then R will need log_2 (3) = 1.58 bits of Shannon information to select the winning choice: I_S = log_2(3) - log_2(1) = log_2(3) = 1.58 bits (2) (*3*) As you can see, Equations (1) and (2) clearly distinguish between Shannon entropy, H, and Shannon information I_S. That is, I_S is not H. This is the main content of what I recently called the First Law of Quantitative Semiotics (FLQS) which may be more conveniently called the First Law of Informatics (FLI). In words, FLI states that "Information is not entropy, since information can be negative, positive or zero but entropy cannot be negative." (3) Statement (3) must be valid because entropy, either thermodynamic or Shannon, cannot be negative according to the Third Law of thermodynamics in the former case and by definition in the latter case, (*4*) Applying FLI to the Ashby table under consideration, it may be stated that the Ashby table carries 4.75 bits of information, and R can exert 1.58 bits of control information when activated by the combination of the information carried by D and the energy dissipation driving the activities of D and R. All the best. Sung On Thu, Oct 8, 2015 at 9:54 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > Sung, List, > > On 2nd or 3rd thought I think you are correct in saying that > there is no correlation between D and R if we are looking at > just those two factors. What I think I was thinking is that > there is a correlation if we condition everything on getting > a particular outcome. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 10/7/2015 11:23 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > >> Forgetfulness Of Purpose • 7 >> >> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/10/07/forgetfulness-of-purpose-%e2%80%a2-7/ >> >> Sung, List, >> >> I went ahead and put a version of my last message on my blog -- >> it looks like Ashby's example is worth spending some care on >> and I'll be able to do a better job of formatting the tables >> and so on when I get down to discussing the various notions >> of irreducibility. I won't bother copying the revised text >> here as the content is pretty much the same, but just leave >> the link above. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: The First Law of Quantitative Semiotics: Information = Changes in Shannon Entropy, or I = dH
Hi, There should be the negative sign in front of "Sum" in Equations (091915-1), (091915-2), and (091915-3), which will not affect the content of this post: i.e., Equations (091915-4) through (091915-8) still hold. Sorry for the omission. Sung -- Forwarded message ------ From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> Date: Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 6:04 AM Subject: Fwd: The First Law of Quantitative Semiotics: Information = Changes in Shannon Entropy, or I = dH To: Sungchul Ji <sji.confor...@gmail.com> -- Forwarded message ------ From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> Date: Sat, Sep 19, 2015 at 5:07 PM Subject: The First Law of Quantitative Semiotics: Information = Changes in Shannon Entropy, or I = dH To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Hi, (*1*) I think semiotics can be divided into two branches --the *qualitative* and *quantitative *semiotics, i.e., the study of *qualitative signs (*e.g., words) and *quantitative signs *(e.g., numbers), respectively. *Quantitative semiotics* may be identified with (or referred to as) *informatics*. This post is then about the *First Law of Informatics (FLI)*. Examples of the former would include classical philosophy, linguistics, literature, arts, molecular biology, and those of the latter include *number-based *sciences and engineering such as physics, chemistry, quantitative biology, computer science and engineering, and mathematics. (*2*) Most of the discussions in the semiotics literature, including those seen on these lists, are almost exclusively concerned with what I would define as *qualitative semiotics, *since rarely do *numbers *and associated *mathematical equations *occur in them. (*3*) Two of the most important 'quantitative signs' (i.e., the signs that can be quantified) are *H* and *I*, the former standing for the well known *Shannon entropy* and the latter *Shannon information. * Because both of these signs are often defined by the same mathematical equation known as the *Shannon formula*, (091915-1), *H* and *I *are viewed as synonymous, which has caused great confusions in the field of informatics (the scientific study of information): Sum(from i = 1 to i = n) pi log pi (091915-1) where pi is the probability of the i^th event (or symbol in a message) occurring, n is the number of possible events (or symbols) under consideration, and log is the binary logarithm, i.e., y = log x means that x = 2^y, or that y is the exponent to the base 2 leading to x. (*4*) Strictly speaking, Eq. (091915-1) applies to H, and not to I: H = Sum(from i = 1 to i = n) pi log pi (091915-2) (*5*) In contrast, the Shannon information I involves the difference between two H values:: I = H (final) - H(initial) = Sum(from i=1 to i=n) dPi log dPi (091915-3) where H(final) and H(initial) are the Shannon entropy of the semiotic system under consideration in the final state (i.e, after receiving I) and in the initial state (i.e., before receiving I), respectively, and dpi is the change in the probability of the i^th event (or symbol) occurring that is induced by receiving I, or the I-induced changes in the probability of the i^th event (or symbol). (*6*) Since dH = H(final) - H(initial) in Eq. (091915-3) can be positive, zero, or negative, the information (or organization) of the system under consideration can be increased, unchanged or decreased when it receives information. In other words, Eq. (091915-3) states that information I is equal to the change in the Shannon entropy induced by the reception of I: I = dH (091915-4) where d indicates "change in". I suggest that Eq. (091915-4) be referred to as the *First Law of Quantitative Semiotics *(FLQS), because violating it inevitably leads to a paradox as explained in (*7*). (*7*) As indicated in (*3*), many investigators equate I and H: I = H (091915-5) Eq. (091915-5) is invalid because H *maximizes* and I *minimizes* when the system under consideration becomes completely disordered or randomized, thus violating the equality sign. Formally speaking, Eq. (091915-5) is invalid because it conflates H (absolute value, either positive or negative) and dH (a difference). (*8*) A similar error appears to have been committed by Schroedinger when he conflated - S and dS and claimed that, since thermodynamic entropy, S, represents disorder, its negative counterpart, i.e., -S, must represent order [1]: S = disorder (correct) (091915-6)
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [Fwd: Burgin’s Fundamental Triads as Peirceasn Signs.]
Hi Mark, I just ran into this old email where you asked: "For instance, when an individual speaks or e-mails to another individual, it is a fundamental triad but I don't know how to interpret this system as a Peircean sign." I do not remember answering this question. In any case, here is my current answer: The communication between two individuals, A and B, involves the Peircean triad (also called the Peircean sign): fg A > Message ---> B (Utterer) (Sign) (Hearer) | ^ | | |_| h Figure 1. Communication between two individuals involves the Peircean triad, also called the Peircean sign. Figure 1 is a commutative triangle, or a mathematical category, since f x g = h, i.e., f followed by g leads to the same result as h. f = encoding; g = decoding; h = information transfer. So we may conclude that your fundamental triad and the Peircean sign are two different names (or representamens) for the same object, i.e., *the basic unit of communication.* All the best. Sung On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 8:59 PM, Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu> wrote: > Dear Sung, > I was out of town and only now read your interesting e-mail. You found a > challenging connection between a Peircean sign and a fundamental triad. You > are a very creative person. What you suggest is a possible interpretation. > However, in general, a Peircean sign consists of three fundamental triads. > Besides, fundamental triad has more interpretations than a Peircean sign . > For instance, when an individual speaks or e-mails to another individual, > it is a fundamental triad but I don't know how to interpret this system as > a Peircean sign. > > Sincerely, >Mark > > On 7/5/2014 2:37 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > >> Dear Mark, >> >> I just sent off this email to semioticians. Please let me know if you >> have any comments or corrections. >> >> With all the best. >> >> Sung >> >> ---- Original Message >> Subject: Burgin’s Fundamental Triads as Peirceasn Signs. >> From:"Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> >> Date:Sat, July 5, 2014 5:33 pm >> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee >> -- >> >> (Undistorted figures are attached.) >> >> Stephen R on the Peirce list cited Peirce as saying: >> >> "The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to (070514-1) >> make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say, to >> outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to >> come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of >> every school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, >> in physical science, in history, in sociology, and in >> whatever other department there may be, shall appear >> as the filling up of its details. The first step toward >> this is to find simple concepts applicable to every >> subject." >> >> >> At least one of the potential "simple concepts" that Peirce is referring >> to above may turn out to be his concept of "irreducible triadicity" >> embedded in the following quote that Jon recently posted and further >> explained in Figure 1 and (070514-4): >> >> >> “Logic will here be defined as formal semiotic. (070514-2) >> A definition of a sign will be given which no more >> refers to human thought than does the definition of >> a line as the place which a particle occupies, part >> by part, during a lapse of time. Namely, a sign is >> something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant >> sign determined or created by it, into the same sort >> of correspondence with something, C, its object, as >> that in which itself stands to C. It is from this >> definition, together with a definition of “formal”, >> that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic. >> I also make a historical review of all the definitions >> and conceptions of logic, and show, not merely that my >> definition is no novelty, but that my non-psychological >> conception of logic has virtually been quite generally >> held, though not generally recognized.” (NEM 4, 20–21). >> >> >>ab >> C > A > B >> |
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Practopoiesis: now I understand it better
ested on these list a while ago), anapoiesis would be an essential component process performed by *practopoietons. Practopoietons *would in turn be 'isomorphic' with *creatons *as defined in the cell language theory [12]. (*10*) In conclusion, I would heartily agree with Danko that "Peirce's philosophy (at least a part of it) may even get some sort of a foundation in hard sciences, which would be amazing." With all the best. Sung Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net *References:* [1] Nikolic, Danko (2015). Practopoiesis: Or How life fosters a mind. *J. theoret. Biol.* *373*:40-61. [2] Ji, S. (2001). Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: Micro- and Macrosemiotics. *in:* *Semiotics 2000: “Sebeok’s Century”, *S. Simpkins, J. Deely (eds.), Legas, Ottawa, pp. 357-374. [3] Ji, S. (2013). Systome as the complementary union of system and environment. [biosemiotics:4003] dated December 2, 2013. [4] Burgin, M. (2010). Theory of Information: *Fundamentality, Diversity and Unification. * World Scientific, New Jersey. [5] Brown, R. and Porter, T. (2006). Category Theory: an abstract setting for analogy and comparison <http://pages.bangor.ac.uk/~mas010/Analogy-and-Comparison.pdf>. In: *What is Category Theory?* Advanced Studies in Mathematics and Logic, Polimetrica Publisher, Italy, 2006, pp. 257-274. PDF at http://pages.bangor.ac.uk/~mas010/Analogy-and-Comparison.pdf. [6] Spivak, D. I. (2013). Category Theory for Scientists. PDF at http://math.mit.edu/~dspivak/CT4S.pdf. [7] Ji, S. (2012). Ji, S. (2012). The Kinetics of Ligand-Protein Interactions: The“Pre-fit” Mechanism <http://www.conformon.net/?attachment_id=983>Based on the Generalized Franck-Condon Principle. In: Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. Pp. 209-214. PDF at http://www.conformon.net under Publications > Book Chapters.. [8] Ji, S. (2000). Free energy and Information Contents of C*onformons* in proteins and DNA. *BioSystems* *54: *107-130. [9] Ji, S. (2012). Micro-Macro Coupling in the Human Body, in *Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. * Springer, New York, pp. 554-571. PDF at http://www.conformon.net under Publicaitons > Book Chapters. (Please read the indicated text, and do not download it, unless you do not mind other related chapters of the book downloaded along with it.) [10] Hockett, C. F. (1960). The origin of speech. *Sci. Am*. *203* (3): 89-96. [11] Ji, S. (1997). Isomorphism between cell and human languages: molecular biological, bioinformatics and linguistic implications. *BioSystems* *44: *17-39. [12] Ji, S. (2016). *The Cell Language Theory: From Molecules to Mind. *Imperial College Press, London (to appear). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - *Appendix I *- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Reproduced from [PEIRCE-L] dated 4/14/2015. "In this category-theoretical sense, all self-organizing chemical reactions (exemplified by the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction which can be modeled by the Brusselator) can be said to exhibit "thought" and has "mind" if they are "irreducibly triadic", which seems to be the case (see below). (4) The Brusselator is probably the simplest theoretical model of chemical reactions that can self-organize. See the video at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brusselator. (Prigogine once told me that the key step in the Brusselator is the 'termolecular' step, 2X ---> 3 X.) It has the following 4 chemical steps involving reactants, (A + B), products, (D + E), and the transient intermediates, (X + Y) that interact obeying the following rules or mechanisms: A > X 2X + Y > 3X B + X > Y + D X > E __ A + B --> D + E Figure 1. The Brussleator -- a theoretical model of self-organizing chemical reactions, both organic and inorganic. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brusselator. I suggest that the Brusselator, Figture 1, can be mapped onto the ur-category, Figure 2, as shown in Figure 3. Mathematically speaking, Figure 1 and Figure 3 are isomorphic (i.e., embody similar regualarites or principles). fg A --> B --> C | ^ |
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Practopoiesis: now I understand it better
Hi Danko, Before I responded to your post, I decided to read your paper, "Practopoieis: Or bow life fosters a mind" (JTB, 2015) and I am about half done. So far I agree with most of your ideas described in the paper, since some of them are consistent with or related to similar ideas I have published, albeit in different idioms. One question. Why did you adopt the term "top" in your tri-transversal model of mind ? What does "top" mean and how is it different from "level" ? Al the best. Sung On Mon, Sep 28, 2015 at 4:57 AM, Danko Nikolic <danko.niko...@googlemail.com > wrote: > Dear all, > > When I presented the list with the theory of practopoiesis and suggested > that the three traverses can account for abductive reasoning, I also > received a number of questions regarding Peirce's work to which I had no > answers. The reason I had no answers was that I did not know much about > work of Peirce other than abductive reasoning. > > Now, I would like to share with you that I have made a bit of a step > forward. One of the questions (or suggestions) that I received was that > perhaps the three levels of organization that I proposed (three traverses) > correspond to the three Peirce's categories: Firstness, Secondness, and > Thirdness. > > Meanwhile, I have learned more about Peirce and I think that the answer > is: No. The three levels of organization do not correspond to these three > aspects of our consciousness. Actually, it seems that all three categories > should be assigned to the same level of organization, and this would be the > middle level, which I named anapoiesis. > >I always thought that this middle level is the most interesting part of > the theory, as it can produce a fascinatingly rich dynamics to explain > consciousness. Now, it seems to me that 1ness, 2ness, and 3ness correspond > very nicely to different aspects of its dynamics. So, it appears that this > aspect of Pierce's work will be extremely helpful in the future in > describing different aspects of adaptive processes in tri-traversal systems. > > Peirce's philosophy (at least a part of it) may even get some sort of a > foundation in hard sciences, which would be amazing. > > I hope that someone finds this useful. > > Best, > > Danko > > -- > > Prof. Dr. Danko Nikolic > > > Web: http://www.danko-nikolic.com > > Mail address 1: > Department of Neurophysiology > Max Planck Institute for Brain Research > Deutschordenstr. 46 > 60528 Frankfurt am Main > GERMANY > > Mail address 2: > Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies > Wolfgang Goethe University > Ruth-Moufang-Str. 1 > 60433 Frankfurt am Main > GERMANY > > > Office: (..49-69) 96769-736 > Lab: (..49-69) 96769-209 > Fax: (..49-69) 96769-327 > danko.niko...@gmail.com > > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Practopoiesis: now I understand it better
ufang-Str. 1 > > 60433 Frankfurt am Main > > GERMANY > > > > > Office: (..49-69) 96769-736 > > Lab: (..49-69) 96769-209 > > Fax: (..49-69) 96769-327 > > danko.niko...@gmail.com > > > > > > > - > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] The First Law of Quantitative Semiotics: Information = Changes in Shannon Entropy, or I = dH
Hi, (*1*) I think semiotics can be divided into two branches --the *qualitative* and *quantitative *semiotics, i.e., the study of *qualitative signs (*e.g., words) and *quantitative signs *(e.g., numbers), respectively. Examples of the former would include classical philosophy, linguistics, literature, arts, molecular biology, and those of the latter include *number-based *sciences and engineering such as physics, chemistry, quantitative biology, computer science and engineering, and mathematics. (*2*) Most of the discussions in the semiotics literature, including those seen on these lists, are almost exclusively concerned with what I would define as *qualitative semiotics, *since rarely do *numbers *and associated *mathematical equations *occur in them. (*3*) Two of the most important 'quantitative signs' (i.e., the signs that can be quantified) are *H* and *I*, the former standing for the well known *Shannon entropy* and the latter *Shannon information. * Because both of these signs are often defined by the same mathematical equation known as the *Shannon formula*, (091915-1), *H* and *I *are viewed as synonymous, which has caused great confusions in the field of informatics (the scientific study of information): Sum(from i = 1 to i = n) pi log pi (091915-1) where pi is the probability of the i^th event (or symbol in a message) occurring, n is the number of possible events (or symbols) under consideration, and log is the binary logarithm, i.e., y = log x means that x = 2^y, or that y is the exponent to the base 2 leading to x. (*4*) Strictly speaking, Eq. (091915-1) applies to H, and not to I: H = Sum(from i = 1 to i = n) pi log pi (091915-2) (*5*) In contrast, the Shannon information I involves the difference between two H values:: I = H (final) - H(initial) = Sum(from i=1 to i=n) dPi log dPi (091915-3) where H(final) and H(initial) are the Shannon entropy of the semiotic system under consideration in the final state (i.e, after receiving I) and in the initial state (i.e., before receiving I), respectively, and dpi is the change in the probability of the i^th event (or symbol) occurring that is induced by receiving I, or the I-induced changes in the probability of the i^th event (or symbol). (*6*) Since dH = H(final) - H(initial) in Eq. (091915-3) can be positive, zero, or negative, the information (or organization) of the system under consideration can be increased, unchanged or decreased when it receives information. In other words, Eq. (091915-3) states that information I is equal to the change in the Shannon entropy induced by the reception of I: I = dH (091915-4) where d indicates "change in". I suggest that Eq. (091915-4) be referred to as the *First Law of Quantitative Semiotics *(FLQS), because violating it inevitably leads to a paradox as explained in (*7*). (*7*) As indicated in (*3*), many investigators equate I and H: I = H (091915-5) Eq. (091915-5) is invalid because H *maximizes* and I *minimizes* when the system under consideration becomes completely disordered or randomized, thus violating the equality sign. Formally speaking, Eq. (091915-5) is invalid because it conflates H (absolute value, either positive or negative) and dH (a difference). (*8*) A similar error appears to have been committed by Schroedinger when he conflated - S and dS and claimed that, since thermodynamic entropy, S, represents disorder, its negative counterpart, i.e., -S, must represent order [1]: S = disorder (correct) (091915-6) - S = order (wrong) (091915-7) dS = S(final) - S(initial) = order if < 0 & disorder if > 0(correct) (091915-8) Eq. (091915-7) is wrong because there cannot be any "negative entropy" according to the Third Law of Thermodynamics [1]. (*9*) If FLQS given in Eq. (091915-4) is right, information I can be positive (information gained or uncertainty reduced), zero (no changes in information or uncertainty) or negative (information lost or uncertainty increased), whereas Shannon entropy H is always positive. Any questions or comments would be welcome. Sung - Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net References: [1] Ji, S. (2012). The Third Law of Thermodynamics and
Re: [peirce-l] [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8863] The problem with instinct - it's a category
ected one to the other by the Principle of Supplementarity as exemplified the the additive (i.e., supplementary) relation between *matter* and *energy* as established by Einstein's E = mc^2. The components of the F vector also exhibit unmistakable family resemblance, as exemplified perhaps by Shannon's famous equation, H = log_2 W, where H can be interpreted as *Information* and W as our *Knowledge* or *Mind* knowing or counting W. (*2*) The key postulate of Figure 1 is that the N and F vectors are complementary to each other. In other words the N and F vectors are the complementary aspects of a third entity which I identify with the *Ultimate Reality* or the *Firstness* of Peirce. (*3*) Combining (*1*) and (*2*) leads to the following diagram that connects the mind-body problem to Peircean (metaphysics) and [semiotics]: f g * Phaneron *->* Body * --> *Mind (Firstness)(Secondness) (Thirdness)[Object] [Representamen] [Interpretant]* | ^ | | |__| h *Figure 2.* The postulate that the phaneron-body-mind as an irreducible triadic relation (ITR). f = perception/consciousness (?); g = conceptualization (?); and h = correspondence or grounding (?) If you have any questions, suggestions or corrections, let me know. All the best. Sung ____ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Rutgers University Piscatawy, N.J. [1] Bohr, N. (1958). Quantum Physics and Philosophy - Causality and Complementarity, *in **Philosophy in the Mid-Century,* R. Klibansky (ed.), La Nouva Editrice, Florence. [2] Ji, S. (2012). Complementarity. <http://www.conformon.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Excerpts_Chapters_2_complementarity_08192012.pdf> In: *Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications.* Springer, New York. Section 2.3, pp. 24-50. PDF at http://www.conformon.net. [3] Ji, S. (2012). Towards a Category Theory of Everything <http://www.conformon.net/?attachment_id=993> (cTOE). In: Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. Pp. 633-642. PDF at http://www.conformon.net [4] Burgin, M. (2010). *Theory of Information: Fundamentality, Diversity and Unification.* World Scientific, Singapore. P. 117. [5] Rosen, R. (1991). *Life Itself*, Columbia University Press, New York. On Thu, Sep 17, 2015 at 3:09 AM, <kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote: > Stephen, I don't think adding "unity" helps. Unity is already implied in > the form of the 'mind-body'. - The problem lies deeper than in wordings. > The mind-body problem needs to be solved. Which is not easy. Right now I'm > quite busy writing down the solution I have arrived at, using both Peirce > and Foucault. (Which will yet take a month or two...). After I've finished > my work, I'll be happy to discuss it with you & other listers. > > Kirsti > > Stephen Jarosek kirjoitti 16.9.2015 16:56: > >> Kirsti, you make a sensible observation. Speaking for myself, it looks >> like I have become a bit sloppy in my wording... I used to write >> "mind-body unity" but have become lazy, shortening it to "mind-body", >> assuming that people will take the "unity" part for granted. But is >> there an alternative to writing "mind-body unity" every time? I like >> Ken Wilber's use of the word "holon", but not everybody knows what >> that means. I suppose the word "entity" is an alternative to "holon" >> and I've seen that used in the past. >> Cheers >> sj >> >> -Original Message- >> From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] >> Sent: Wednesday, 16 September 2015 3:23 PM >> To: Clark Goble >> Cc: PEIRCE-L >> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8863] The problem >> with instinct - it's a category >> >> Dear list, >> >> I sincerely do find talk about "mind-bodies" basically twisted. A >> modern division, a split, is thereby taken for granted, taken as the >> starting-point. - A being, be it a human being, or a bee, should >> remain as the starting point. >> >> Best, &g
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8879] Re: ORGANIZATION as the Natural Transformation
Stan, lists, Thanks for your thought-provoking comments about the possible role of environment in organization. (1) I am glad that we agree that the vertical hierarchy in Figure 1 is a *compositional* hierarchy. This hierarchy seems to have two more characteristics -- (i) The *scale* of measurement increasing from angstroms to light years from bottom to top (and hence it may be referred to as a *scale hierarchy* as well), and (ii) the degree of the *organized complexity* (and not necessarily the disorganized complexity of Weaver [8]) is increasing from the bottom to the top. (2) It is interesting to note that there does not seem to be any obvious* hierarchical relations* among the objects belonging to a given level. (3) To the best of my knowledge, there is no generally accepted mathematical equation yet that can quantify *organization *or *organized complexity *of Weaver. But *disorganized *or* random complexity* can be quantified using the algorithmic (or Kolmogorov) complexity measure (e.g., [9]), which is maximal for random complex systems. Although I have not yet proven the idea, it seems possible to quantify the degree of organization of a physical system using the *Planckian distribution equation (PDE)* discovered at Rutgers in 2008 and discussed rather in depth last November in the Peirce-L and [biosemiotics] lists [10] (which I would be happy to forward to anyone interested). If this conjecture turns out to be correct, it would be possible to state that the *Planckian information*, I_P, increases from the bottom to the top in Figure 1. With all the best. Sung _ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net On Sun, Sep 13, 2015 at 10:19 AM, Stanley N Salthe <ssal...@binghamton.edu> wrote: > Sung’s hierarchy: > > >9.* Universe *(our Universe, other universes; > *Cosmology*) > > ^ > > | > > | > > 8.*Galaxy* (Milky Way, other galaxies; ' > *Galaxology*') > > ^ > > | > > | > > 7. * Planet *(Earth, other planets; *Planetology*) > > ^ > > | > > | > > 6.*Biosphere* (unique ?; *Ecology*) > > ^ > > | > > | > > 5.*Societies* (ants, bees, humans, . . . ; > *Sociology*) > > ^ > > | > > | > > 4. * Brains* (bees, apes, humans, . . .; > *Psychology*) > > ^ > > | > > | > > 3. *Cells* (bacteria, yeast, white blood cells, > . . .;*Biology*) > > ^ > >| > >| > > 2. *Molecules* (water, sugar, DNA, hemoglobin, . . > .;*Chemistry*) > >^ > > | > > | > > 1. *Atoms* (hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, . . .; > *Physics*) > > > > *Figure 1.* Nine levels of material ORGANIZATION with associated EMERGENT > properties. > > > > is indeed a compositional hierarchy > > He shows it as if being built from the bottom-up, each level emergent from > the one below. But there are important constraints on what appears at any > level simultaneously imposed top-down. This means that the beginning had > to be somewhere, and that somewhere somehow afforded the lowest level. In > addition, that somewhere continues to exist at the top as the hierarchy > gets built, by intercalation between levels. Thus, take Molecules. They > emerge from attractions of various kinds working upon the atoms subject to > environmental constraints that allow this to happen. These will have been > imposing an environment later taken over by Cells. Then, consider Brains. > These multicellular forms emerge by way of cell adhesions in a contextual > environment, which later affords the intercalation of societies of > organisms.
[PEIRCE-L] ORGANIZATION as the Natural Transformation underlying the structural hierarchies of the Universe
Hi, I modified and expanded the *structural hierarchy* discussed in [biosemiotics:8854] to include 4 more levels -- biosphere, the earth, galaxy, and the Universe as shown *Figure 1* below. (1) The *structural hierarchy* consists of 9 levels, numbered 1 through 9, each, except perhaps Level 6, having more than one members or examples belonging to it as shown in the parenthesis. (2) Each level can be identified as a *type* and the members belonging to it as its *tokens*. Hence all the items in the network can be symbolically represented as T_i or as T_i,j, where i is the level and j is the number identifying the members belonging to the i^th level. (3) The symbol, "A ---> B", can be read as "A is a part of B" and hence Figure 1 can be called "*compositional hierarchy*" [1]. (4) Each level constitutes a "subsumption hierarchy" [1], since what is inside a parenthesis can be viewed as "*a kind of*" something", the "something" being the name of the level, e.g., Atom, Molecule, Cell, etc. That is, "Oxygen is a kind of Atom", "Hydrogen is a kind of Atom," "Nitrogen is a kind of Atom.", etc. Using the symbols defined in (2), we can more succinctly write, "T_i,j is *a kind of* T_i". (5) Each level is associated with a unique "discipline" (see the terms in bold letters), and this "discipline", I suggest, can be identified with what is called "*functors*"in category theory [2, 3], since it provides the connection among the "structure-preserving mappings" or "*morphisms*" that in turn connect the members belonging to a given discipline. (6) If the the category-theoretical assignments assumed in (5) are correct, there are 8 (if Level 6 is excluded) or 9 (if not) *functors* in the structural hierarchy shown in Figure 1. The *structure-preserving mapping* that connects one functor to another is known as a *natural transformation* [2, 4]. (7) I postulate that the natural transformation connecting the 8 or 9 functors in Figure 1 is *organization *(i.e., the arrangement of particles or symbols in space and time). (8) Finally, according to the *Gnergy Principle of Organization* (GPO) [5, 6, 7], all organizations in the Universe, including both biotic and abiotic systems, have two complementary aspects -- *informational* (or formal) and *energetic* (or material) aspects. In other words, if GPO is true, no organization of matter in the Universe would be possible without the *energy* dissipation driving the performance of the work of organizing and the *information* to guide the work, since any work without being guided by appropriate control information would inevitably lead to "*disorganized*" complexity [8]. 9.* Universe *(our Universe, other universes; *Cosmology*) ^ | | 8.*Galaxy* (Milky Way, other galaxies; '*Galaxology* ') ^ | | 7. * Planet *(Earth, other planets; *Planetology*) ^ | | 6.*Biosphere* (unique ?; *Ecology*) ^ | | 5. *Societies* (ants, bees, humans, . . . ; *Sociology*) ^ | | 4. * Brains* (bees, apes, humans, . . .; *Psychology*) ^ | | 3. *Cells* (bacteria, yeast, white blood cells, . . .; *Biology*) ^ | | 2.*Molecules* (water, sugar, DNA, hemoglobin, . . .; *Chemistry*) ^ | | 1. *Atoms* (hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, . . .; *Physics*) *Figure 1.* Nine levels of material ORGANIZATION with associated EMERGENT properties. Reproduced and modified from [biosemiotics:8854]. If you have any comments or questions, let me know. With all the best. Sung -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net *References:* [1] Salthe, S. N. (20xx). Hierarchical Structures. *Axiomathes* Where Science Meets Philosophy* 22*:355-383. [2] Spivak, D. I. (2013). Category Theory for Scientists. http://math.mit.edu/~dspivak/teaching/sp13/CT4S--static.pdf [3] Brown, R. and Porter, T. (20x
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8859] Re: Can crystals think ?
Helmut, Stan, lists, "A subsumes B" can be interpreted in more than one ways: "A contains B." "A depends on B." "A is supervenient on B." "B is prerequisite for A." "A emerges from B." The choice between these possible interpretations under a given context of discourse can be made only on the basis of the physicochemically realistic *MECHANISMS *that can implement the relations, and not just based on logic. I believe that "When it comes to evaluating the validity of any suggested (090715-1) physicochemical interactions, MECHANISMS trump logic." For the convenience of possible future discussions, Statement (090715-1) may be referred to as the *Principle of Mechanisms over Logic*" (*PoMoL* or more briefly *PML*). Most theoretical and philosophical discussions on *emergence* and *organizations *seem to ignore discussing the difficult problems of specifying the physical, chemical, macroscopic, and/or microscopic *mechanisms* responsible for emergence or organization, resulting in end-less and futile debates. For example, the issue of whether or not neurons synchronize their electrical activities through non-local effect (i..e, via entanglement) is an issue concerning the MECHANISM of neuronal interactions, and not concerning something outside of it, as some members on these lists seem to assume. To highlight the fundamental import of mechanisms in science, I am tempted to suggest the following generalization: "*Mechanisms* are to hard sciences (new philosophy ?) (090715-2) what *logic* is to soft sciences (traditional philosophy ?)." If I am not mistaken, Statement (090715-2) applies to Peirce's philosophy as well, since most of the *mechanisms* that are widely discussed in the contemporary physics (e.g., the second law, statistical mechanics, quantum mechanics, dark matter and structure of the spiral galaxies), chemistry (e.g., covalent vs. noncovalent bonds, transition-state theory of chemical kinetics, self-organizing chemical reactions or chemical waves), and biology (e.g., the role of DNA in storing and expressing genetic information, molecular biology, role of chemical waves in cell biology, neurotransmitters, neural synchrony and consciousness, fMRI and human thought, etc.) were unknown to him. If this is true, PML would suggest the following conclusion: "It is impossible to anticipate a complete agreement between (090715-3) Peircean semiotics and natural sciences because the former is based mainly on *logic* while the latter is based mainly on *mechanisms*." With all the best. Sung On Mon, Sep 7, 2015 at 6:46 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > > Sung, Stan, lists, > the interpretation as a subsumptive hierarchy in this case has a > metaphoric character, I think, because there is the demand, that within > subsumption the higher level "is-a-kind-of " the lower level: To say, that > cells are a kind of molecules, is a metaphor. And it is only understandable > (for an alien who has visited the earth, and whose body does not consist of > cells) from the time on when there have emerged multicellular organisms. > Best, > Helmut > > > "Sungchul Ji" <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > > Helmut, Stan, lists, > > (*1)* I agree. The structural hierarchy shown in Figure 1 is both > *compositional* and *subsumptive*. "Compositional" can mean either > reductive or reductionistic (top-down) or constructive or synthetic > (bottom-up), and "subsumptive" can mean emergent (bottom-up) or > supervenient (top-down). It may well be that these various names mean > little unless their associated *mechanisms *of *organization *are > specified*, *of which there are almost infinite number, just as there are > almost infinite number of organizations (both as types and as tokens) in > the Universe. > > > *Societies* (Languages, sciences, technologies, arts, > religions; SOCIOLOGY) ^ > | >* Brains* (Self-replication with variations, symbolic; > PSYCHOLOGY) > ^ > | > *Cells* (Life, or the highly condensed form of information > [3]; BIOLOGY) > ^ > | > *Molecules* (Catalysis of chemical reactions; CHEMISTRY) > ^ > | >*Atoms* (Crystals; PHYSICS) > > Figure 1. Five levels of material ORGANIZATION with associated EMERGENT > properties. > The bottom-up direction = *COMPOSITIONAL HIERARCHY* > The top-down direction = *SUBSUMPTION HIERARCHY *[1] (?) > Reproduced from [biosemiotics:8854]. > > > (*2*) I think the type-token distinction applies to each level of
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8857] Re: Can crystals think ?
tp://www.cnformon.net under Publciaitons > Proceedings On Sun, Sep 6, 2015 at 2:06 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > Stan, Sung, lists, > Stan, is it ok, to say: > -Subsumptive or specification hierarchy is about types, or intensions of > terms/concepts, > -Compositional or scale hierarchy is about tokens, or sets of same tokens, > or subsets of extensions of terms/concepts, > -Subsumptive hierarchy requires (or is the product of) a subsumer (such as > Linne), who looks at (or has inquired, or merely guesses) the history and > ancestry of the subsystems, > -Compositional hierarchy requires (or is the product of) an observer who > looks only at the momentary situation of the subsystems? > > Sung, in this case, your hierarchy "atoms, molecules, cells, brains, > societies" can be both kinds of hierarchies (and before I hadnt thought > that this was possible), but eg. the subsystem "molecules" in one case is > the type, and in the other case is the set of tokens, that are parts of the > respective cell that belongs to the set of "cells", that are parts of the > respective brain, and so on. > > Best, > Helmut > > "Stanley N Salthe" <ssal...@binghamton.edu> wrote: > > Sung -- Yes, in this case either interpretation is possible. But the > consequences of each choice are quite different, each representing a > different discourse. > > STAN > > On Sat, Sep 5, 2015 at 6:11 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: >> >> Stan, lists, >> >> Figure 1 seems to represent your 'scale hierarchy' (viewed from bottom >> up), since atoms are smaller than molecules which are smaller than cells >> which are smaller than brains which are smaller than societies [1]. >> >> Can we also say that Figure 1 represents a "specification" hierarchy [1] >> as well in the sense that >> >> "Physical laws constrain chemistry, chemical laws constrain biology, >> biological (090515-1) >> laws constrain psychology, and psychological laws constrain social >> behaviors." >> >> >> I think the term "supervenience" may apply here as well -- >> "supervenience" as defined in [2]: >> >> "A set of properties *A* supervenes upon another set *B* just in case no >> two things can differ with respect to *A*-properties without also >> differing with respect to their *B*-properties." >> >> "Donald Davidson played a key role in bringing the idea to center stage. >> He introduced the term ‘supervenience’ into contemporary philosophy of mind >> in the following passage: >> >> [M]ental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on >> physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that >> there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in >> some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect >> without altering in some physical respect (1970, 214)." >> >> >> Employing the concept of supervenience, Figure 1 may be described >> alternatively thus: >> >> "Sociology is supervenient on psychology which is supervenient >> (090515-2) >> on biology which is supervenient on chemistry which is supervenient >> on physics." >> >> >> >> *Societies* (Languages, sciences, >> technologies, arts, religions; >> SOCIOLOGY) >> >> ^ >> | >> * Brains* (Self-replication with >> variations, symbolic; >> PSYCHOLOGY) >> ^ >> | >> *Cells* (Life, or the highly >> condensed form of information [3]; >>BIOLOGY) >> ^ >> | >> *Molecules* (Catalysis of chemical >> reactions; >>CHEMISTRY) >> ^ >> | >> *Atoms* (Crystals; >>
[PEIRCE-L] Can crystals think ?
Hi Peirceans and biosemioticians, These following two quotes address the relations among three quite distinct types of material objects -- *crystals*, *bees*, and *humans*. "Thought is no necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals and(090215-1) throughout the purely physical world; and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc. of objects are really there." (CP 4.551) ". . . . This is not to say that bees and crystals think in anything like the way that human beings think, (090215-2) and they surely cannot know they are thinking, . . . " [1] To me, the first quote of Peirce highlights the CONTINUITY or invariance (i.e., thought, mind, semiosis, or ITR, irreducible triadic relation) found among these material systems. In contrast, Pickering [1], while cognizant of the continuity, nevertheless, is not blind to the DISCONTINUITY, or the emergent properties (resulting from the increasing organizational complexities from crystals, to bees and to humans), among the same set of objects. I agree with Pickering. Organizations are not all same. Some organizations (as in the human brain) can cause thinking that is detectable by an EEG machine, while some other organizations (e.g., in crystals) cannot cause any thinking since no EEG signals can be generated. To emphasize Statement (090215-1) at the neglect of Statement (090215-2) would be akin to asserting that light is particles (ignoring its wave properties) or waves (ignoring its particle properties), as was the common thinking among physicists before the principle of complementarity was established in the mid-1920s' [2]. Some Peircean scholars may wish to uphold (090215-1) and deny the validity of (090215-2), but, if what I referred to as "the principle of "*emergence-invariance complementarity*" in my last posting on these lists [3] is right, both (090215-1) and (090215-2) would be valid since they reflect the *complementary aspects of mind. *That is: "*Mind may be both continuous* (as Peirce asserts) *and* *discontinuous* (as suggested by the complementarity principle)." (090215-3) All the best. Sung Reference: [1] Pickering, J. (2007). Affordances are Signs. *tripleC* *5* (2):64-74. [2] Plotnitsky, A. (2003). Niel Bohr and Complementarity: An Introduction. Springer, New York. [3] Ji, S. (2015). Emergence vs. Invariance: Are they complementary aspects of complex systems ? Posted to PEIRCE-L on 9/1/2015. -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] EMERGENCE vs. INVARIANCE: Are they complementary aspects of complex systems ?
Hi, (*1*) Emergence is one of the best known characteristics of complex systems [1]. One simple example of emergence is the formation of water from the chemical reaction (involving electronic rearrangements of molecules) between oxygen and hydrogen: O_2 + 2 H_2 --> 2 H-O-H (essential for life) Oxygen and hydrogen are gases under normal conditions whereas water is a liquid. It is important to realize that different substances can EMERGE from the same set of components, depending on the MECHANISM of emergence or interactions. Thus the same set of reactants above can produce an entirely different product, i.e., hydrogen peroxide: O_2 + H_2 ---> H-O-O-H (poisonous) (*2*) The concept of emergence is not confined to hard sciences but also applies to soft sciences, e.g. linguistics: 2 T's + S + A + E --> State | | |-> Taste S + I + G + N -> Sign | | |> Sing Thus I am inclined to define "complexity" or "complex systems" as follows: "*Complex systems are those multi-component systems, either material or formal, *(090115-1) *whose properties are determined not only by those of individual components * *but also by the way (i.e., the mechanism by which) the components are organized,* *either spontaneously (resulting in self-organized systems) or artificially (resulting * *in **'other-organized'** systems [2]).* (*3*) Auyang is cited in [1, p. 12] as having defined complexity as follows: *"I use complex and complexity intuitively to describe self-organized systems that have *(090115-2) * many components and many characteristic aspects, exhibit many structures in various scales, undergo many processes in various rates, and have the capabilities to change abruptly and adapt to external environment".* There are many similarities between definitions of complexity, (090115-1) and (090115-2), but one significant difference may be that Auyang's definition applies only to *self-organized systems* (e.g., cells, brains, human societies) and excludes *other-organized* systems (e.g., Bernard cells, paintings, linguistic texts, computer programs, mathematical formulas). (*4*) Phase transitions in physics are examples of emergence [1], and both phase transitions and emergence may be viewed as examples of *discontinuity*, the opposite of *continuity* or synechism of Peirce. (*5*) There may be two kinds of discontinuities -- *intra-system discontinuity* (e.g., liquid-solid or liquid-gas phase transitions of water) and *inter-system discontinuity *(e.g., living vs. non-living systems, nautilus shells vs. the Milky Way spiral galaxy). Both kinds of discontinuities may be associated with emergences, leading to the conjecture that there are two kinds of emergences -- intra-system and inter-system emergences. (*6*) It seems to me that complexity scientists are more interested in studying the phenomenon of emergences of all kinds, e.g., life from non-life, entropy from molecular organizations, the universe from the Big Bang, etc. But I have provided to these lists many examples during the past year of the invariances (i.e., continuities), e.g., ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) and PDE (Planckian Distribution Equation), that are manifest across a wide range of structures in the Universe, from atoms to molecules, to cells, to brains, to linguistics, to economics, and to the cosmos. (*7*) Based on these observations, I came to postulate that, underlying many, if not all, DISCONTINUITIES, there exist associated CONTINUITIES, just as underlying every Yin there exists an associated Yang, according to the Yin-Yang doctrine of the Daoist philosophy and also consistent with the complementarity philosophy of Bohr [3] as generalized by S. Ji in the form of complementarism [4]. If these speculations are valid, Peirce's *synechism* (i.e. continuity; Yang) must have its complementary opposite having the property of EMERGENCE (i.e., discontinuity; Yin) (see the question mark in Table 1). _ Table 1. The *yin-yang duality of complex systems* named differently in different fields of studies. _ Fields*Yin Yang* _ 1. Mathematics *ContinuityDiscontinuity* _ 2. Physics *Invariance Emergence* _ 3. Semiotics *Synechism
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8831] Re: Anticipation and Semiotics: One Cannot
Tom, lists, I agree with your excellent interpretation of Mona Lisa. But, to me, that is not all there is to Mona Lisa. There may be much more to the painting. There may be something unique (or local) about Mona Lisa that has not been (and most likely will never be) reproduced by any other painters (e.g., her smile) and something common (or global) to all paintings (e.g., pigment molecules constituting the paints). When you compare Mona Lisa's smile and pigment molecules, there is no connection, an absolute disconnect, except the irrefutable fact that they are parts of the same object, i.e., the painting itself. This is an example of what I mean when I say that Mona Lisa is the complementary union of *irreconcilable opposite*s, i.e., Lisa's smile (or aesthetics) vs. pigment molecules (or physics/chemistry). To most viewers, the former is all important and the latter is irrelevant or non-existent. But to some chemists interested in preserving or restoring the panting, for example, the latter is of utmost importance. Thus I am tempted to conclude that A complex object, e.g., Mona Lisa, has a complex history and can (082815-1) be interpreted in complex ways, each having a unique pragmatic value depending on the purpose of the interpreter. A complex object can be interpreted in more than one ways (082815-2) that are equally valid and meaningful. I suggest that Statements (082815-1) and (082815-2) embody ITR (irreversible triadic relation) as shown below: f g Complex History --- Mona Lisa -- Interpretant (Complex *Object*)(Complex *Sign*) (Complex *interpretants*) | ^ | | || h Figure 1. The semiotics of Mona Lisa. f = the genesis of the painting; g = interpretations of the painting; h = information flow, correspondence, or grounding. (Please note that the term object is used in two different ways in Figure 1 vs. in Statements (082815-1) and (082815-2)). All the best. Sung On Thu, Aug 27, 2015 at 8:25 PM, Ozzie ozzie...@gmail.com wrote: Sung , List ~ Well, the artist could evidently explain the effect of the painting. Instead of describing an abstract-formal logical process involving the properties of paint, why not refer to Leonardo's own development of the object-painting, which comprise its interpretants? He planned the work, selected a model, made sketches, selected the paint (both for Mona and other paintings that used the same methods), and applied paint to canvas. The interpretants assigned by a philosopher without any pragmatic clues of the artist's does not seem like a way to explain the effect of Mona's smile. If instead we are modeling the logic of a typical viewer of Mona Lisa, the fact that his/her senses are deceived by the artist/painting suggests an outcome that somehow defies logic. That's what the (cited) research demonstrates. The art-lover philosopher might ask which objects+interpretants of the painting come into conflict within the viewer to produce that alogical impression. Perhaps the viewer experiences (emotionally) both mother and father, or friend and foe, when looking at Mona's face. The physics and chemistry of paint seems beside the point. The same paint, arranged differently, would not have created the same impression -- say, as Picasso might have painted Mona. Or different paint might have had the same effect, in Leonardo's hands. I believe that because historically the painting darkened, then was cleaned and re-varnished without Mona's smile gaining or losing appeal. IMO, the mind/hand of the artist and the eye/emotion of the beholder, working together, create Mona's unique smile. Those are the interpretants of the mystery. Regards, Tom wyrick On Aug 27, 2015, at 11:18 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Tom, lists, I accept the aesthetic interpretation of Mona Lisa you cited. But to some researchers, Mona Lisa embodies more than aesthetics but embodies also chemistry and physics, because Mona Lisa is a COMPLEX object. I think you may be referring to only one of the many aspects of a complex object. I believe that a complex object is characterized by the impossibility of its being completely explained on the basis of a given perspective. All the best. Sung On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 10:49 PM, Ozzie ozzie...@gmail.com wrote: Sung, List ~ According to some researchers, the specialness of Mona Lisa's smile comes down to Leonardo's painting technique, which tricks the eye of the observer. Mona's smile looks special because it defies logic. (See below for a short excerpt.) Regards, Tom Wyrick The portraits’ mouths seem to change their slant thanks to a technique called sfumato, which
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8831] Re: Anticipation and Semiotics: One Cannot
Tom, lists, I accept the aesthetic interpretation of Mona Lisa you cited. But to some researchers, Mona Lisa embodies more than aesthetics but embodies also chemistry and physics, because Mona Lisa is a COMPLEX object. I think you may be referring to only one of the many aspects of a complex object. I believe that a complex object is characterized by the impossibility of its being completely explained on the basis of a given perspective. All the best. Sung On Wed, Aug 26, 2015 at 10:49 PM, Ozzie ozzie...@gmail.com wrote: Sung, List ~ According to some researchers, the specialness of Mona Lisa's smile comes down to Leonardo's painting technique, which tricks the eye of the observer. Mona's smile looks special because it defies logic. (See below for a short excerpt.) Regards, Tom Wyrick The portraits’ mouths seem to change their slant thanks to a technique called sfumato, which blends colors and shades to produce soft, gradual transitions between shapes, without any clear outlines When a viewer focuses on the subject’s eyes, the sfumato technique creates the illusion of the lips slanting upward. But when you look at her lips themselves, they seem somewhat pursed. http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/d-brief/2015/08/14/mona-lisa-smile/#.Vd524MQ8KrV On Aug 24, 2015, at 6:30 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Hi Gary S, Gary R, lists, A thought just occurred to me that there may be a connection between the beauty of Mona Lisa (holism) and the various chemical pigments (reductionism) that constitute it -- namely, the organization of matter at two distinct scales, one at the macroscopic scale and the other at the microscopic. That is, what makes Mona Lisa beautiful is the way macroscopic pigment particles are ORGANIZED on its canvas, while what makes the pigment particles look colorful in Mona Lisa is the way microscopic particles known as atoms are ORGANIZED inside each pigment molecule. If this analysis is right, the concept of ORGANIZATION may be of fundamental significance at all physical scales and the consequence (or function or meaning) of organization may depend on the physical scales involved. In the case of Mona Lisa, the pigment ORGANIZATION on the canvas results in beautiful visual sensations while the atomic ORGANIZATIONs in pigment molecules result in desirable colors of individual pigments. Hence, I am tempted to conclude that Organization is the FUNCTOR connecting the beautiful aesthetics of Mona Lisa on the macrolevel and the colorful chemistry underlying it on the microlevel. All the best. Sung On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 6:53 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Hi Gary S, Gary R, lists, I agree that certain aspects (e.g., qualia) of Peircean semiosis cannot be reduced to mechanical terms, because life is more COMPLEX than physics or chemistry. But I believe that no semiosis is possible without physics and chemistry either, since, although the beauty of Mona Lisa is beyond the chemical reductionism, no Mona Lisa can exist without colored dye molecules having the right atomic organizations. So the challenging question may be: When does beauty begin and chemistry end in Mona Lisa? One possible answer that comes to mind would be: Mona Lisa is the complementary union of anesthetics and physics. All the best. Sung On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Gary Shank garysh...@comcast.net wrote: Is this in addition to your ongoing errors of trying to portray Peircean semiotics in reductionist and mechanical terms? All the best, Gary Sent from my iPad On Aug 24, 2015, at 6:00 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Gary, list, There is a minor error in Slide 23: R should be associated with quali, sin, and legi, and O should be associated with icon, index and symbol. All the best. Sung On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 3:21 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: List, Cary Campbell of the Semiotic Research Group posted this summary of a lecture, Anticipation and Semiotics: One Cannot Not Interact and gives a link to the accompanying ppt slideshow by Mihai Nadin (he inadvertently misspells his first name as 'Mihou') on that group's Facebook page. Many years ago I read a number of Nadin's papers and had a fascinating off-list discussion with him on his work, then focusing squarely on Peirce's semiotic theory and, as I recall, especially Peirce's understanding of virtuality. While Nadin has gone on to consider applications of semiotic theory to computer science, HCI, and other fields, it appears that his work continues to be 'grounded' in Peircean semiotics. Best, Gary Cary wrote: This is a super topical lecture from engineer/scientist/semiotician Mihou Nadin; quite inspiring. He talks about man’s current and developing relations with technology and how these relationships are slowly automating the human away; in which the emphasis has
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8831] Re: Anticipation and Semiotics: One Cannot
Hi Ed, Thanks for your interesting suggestion that the geometric principle of tetraktys may underlie all organizations, including the organization in Mona Lisa. Since I have been led to conclude in 1991 [1] that all organizations in the Universe are driven by *energy dissipation *under the *control of information *and hence obey the so-called the *Gnergy Principle of Organization (GPO)* symbolized by a tetrahedron whose 4 apexes being occupied by *Energy, Matter, Information* and *Life* [1, 2], there may be some theoretical connection between the geometric principle of *tetraktys *and the *gnergy tetrahedron*. For one thing, the tetraktys contains all the numbers that the gnergy tetrahedron does: 1 = Gnergy, 2 = Information and Energy, 3 = Complementarity as a triadic principle, and 4 = the tetrahedron as the simplex of the 3-dimensional space. I wonder if tetraktys is a MATHEMATICAL principle, whereas the gnergy tetrahedron is a PHYSICAL principle. All the best. Sung References: [1] Ji, S. (1991). Molecular Theories of Cell Life and Death. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick. Pp. 152-163, 230-237. [2] Ji, S. (2012). Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Sprigner, New York. Pp. 17, 28. On Tue, Aug 25, 2015 at 5:23 AM, Ed Dellian ed.dell...@t-online.de wrote: Sung, what makes Mona Lisa beautiful is indeed ORGANIZATION on the canvas (not only of matter, by the way: just think of light and colours). But organization *according to which principles*? The answer is: according to GEOMETRIC principles! Be sure that whenever you are struck by BEAUTY there is the medial section at work. It stimulates the EXPERIENCE OF HARMONY in the human soul. What is the medial section? It is a quaternary geometric proportion A : B = C : D, the tetraktys of the ancients, well-known to Renaissance artists as well as Renaissance scientists (Galileo, for instance, and Newton), being the basic true and rational organization principle of beauty, harmony, reality and truth. It is present in the double helix (so it is not restricted to the realm of lifelessness!). It is present in the theory of motion, where it works according to the quaternary proportion cause to effect equals element of space to element of time. A symbolic representation of this proportion is the formula E/p = c (Galileo, Newton, Maxwell, Poynting, Planck, Einstein, Heisenberg), which is only apparently a triadic formula, but actually a quaternate proportion, because c is element of space over element of time (just look at the dimensions of c). Note, by the way, that the basic mathematical rule of three is also a *geometric* *quaternary **proportion*, because the three are the known quantities; the fourth quantity is the unknown. A:B = C:X represents the rule of three with one quantity X unknown. The tetraktys is always present where rationality, reason, beauty, harmony, and truth is present. Best, Ed. Am 25.08.2015 um 01:30 schrieb Sungchul Ji: Hi Gary S, Gary R, lists, A thought just occurred to me that there may be a connection between the beauty of Mona Lisa (holism) and the various chemical pigments (reductionism) that constitute it -- namely, the organization of matter at two distinct scales, one at the macroscopic scale and the other at the microscopic. That is, what makes Mona Lisa beautiful is the way macroscopic pigment particles are ORGANIZED on its canvas, while what makes the pigment particles look colorful in Mona Lisa is the way microscopic particles known as atoms are ORGANIZED inside each pigment molecule. If this analysis is right, the concept of ORGANIZATION may be of fundamental significance at all physical scales and the consequence (or function or meaning) of organization may depend on the physical scales involved. In the case of Mona Lisa, the pigment ORGANIZATION on the canvas results in beautiful visual sensations while the atomic ORGANIZATIONs in pigment molecules result in desirable colors of individual pigments. Hence, I am tempted to conclude that Organization is the FUNCTOR connecting the beautiful aesthetics of Mona Lisa on the macrolevel and the colorful chemistry underlying it on the microlevel. All the best. Sung On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 6:53 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Hi Gary S, Gary R, lists, I agree that certain aspects (e.g., qualia) of Peircean semiosis cannot be reduced to mechanical terms, because life is more COMPLEX than physics or chemistry. But I believe that no semiosis is possible without physics and chemistry either, since, although the beauty of Mona Lisa is beyond the chemical reductionism, no Mona Lisa can exist without colored dye molecules having the right atomic organizations. So the challenging question may be: When does beauty begin and chemistry end in Mona Lisa? One possible answer that comes to mind would be: Mona Lisa
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semeiotic Visualization
Jon, How is your model of semiotic trichotomies related to Vinicius' solenoid model of semiosis (http://www.minutesemeiotic.org/?p=30) ? All the best. Sung On Tue, Aug 25, 2015 at 1:41 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com wrote: Gary, Edwina, List: Thanks for the kind words. I am still pondering whether this way of visualizing everything might offer any helpful insights about the nature of the various trichotomies and their logical order of determination, especially when it comes to the interpretants. Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] The ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) as a universal principle applicable to physics, biology, cybernetics/informatics, and semiotics.
*
1: Source Message -- Receiver
2: (Object) (Representamen)
(Interpretant)
3: {Input}{Constructor}
{Output}
4: EvolutionGenotypes Phenotypes
5: |Nucleic acids| |Proteins| |Chemical
Reactions|
6:|Mass| |Spacetime|
|Motion|
|
^
|
|
|__|
*h*
*Communication *(1) and *semiosis *(2) as instantiations of ITR,
Irreducible triadic relations:
(1)* f* = encoding; *g* = decoding; *h* = grounding/correspondence.
(2) *f* = sign production; *g* = sign interpretation; *h* = correspondence
(3) *f *= Initial state of substrates; *g* = Information-caused transformer
of substrate; *h* = Construction
(4) *f = *phylogenesis; *g* = ontogenesis; *h* = genetic inheritance
(5) *f* = transcription/translation; *g = *enzyme catalysis*; h = *genetic
information flow
(6) *f* =”Matter tells spacetime how to curve”; *g* = “Curved spacetime
tells matter how to move” [3]; *h* = gravitation or action at a distance.
References:
[1] Ji, S. (2014). Ur-category accommodates Peirce’s tychism and
evolutionary cosmology. [biosemiotics:6360] dated 8/5/2014.
[2] Ji, S. (2015). The Irreducible Triadic Relation (ITR) as a
Universal Principle.
http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16464[3]
Misner, C. W., Thorne, K. S. and Wheeler, J. A. (1973). Gravitation. W.
H. Freeman and Company, New York.
[4] Ji, S. (2015). The Cell Language Theory: Evolution as Semiosis.
Imperial College Press, London (top appear).
[5] Brier, S. (2011). Cybersemiotics: A New Foundation for
Transdisciplinary Theory of Information, Cognition, Meaning, Communcation
and Consciousness. Sign 5: 75-120.
[6] Deutsch, D. (2012). Constructor Theory.
arXiv.org/ftp/arxiv/1210/1210.7439.pdf downloaded on 1/1/2015.
[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotics.
[8] Spivak, D. I. (2013) Category Theory for the Sciences. The MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Open Access HTML Version at
http://category-theory.mitpress.mit.edu/
[9] Brown R, Porter T (2006). Category Theory: an abstract setting for
analogy and comparison. PDF at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.65.2083rep=rep1type=pdf
.\
[10] Ji, S. (2015). Amount and meaning of information as aspects of the
Peircean sign: the Peircean Theory f Information. Available at
http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16999,
[11] Marty, R. (). 76 Definitions of The Sign by C. S. Peirce.
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM.
All the best.
Sung
---
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701
www.conformon.net
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Anticipation and Semiotics: One Cannot Not Interact
Gary, list, There is a minor error in Slide 23: R should be associated with quali, sin, and legi, and O should be associated with icon, index and symbol. All the best. Sung On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 3:21 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: List, Cary Campbell of the Semiotic Research Group posted this summary of a lecture, Anticipation and Semiotics: One Cannot Not Interact and gives a link to the accompanying ppt slideshow by Mihai Nadin (he inadvertently misspells his first name as 'Mihou') on that group's Facebook page. Many years ago I read a number of Nadin's papers and had a fascinating off-list discussion with him on his work, then focusing squarely on Peirce's semiotic theory and, as I recall, especially Peirce's understanding of virtuality. While Nadin has gone on to consider applications of semiotic theory to computer science, HCI, and other fields, it appears that his work continues to be 'grounded' in Peircean semiotics. Best, Gary Cary wrote: This is a super topical lecture from engineer/scientist/semiotician Mihou Nadin; quite inspiring. He talks about man’s current and developing relations with technology and how these relationships are slowly automating the human away; in which the emphasis has shifted, since his pioneering work in interfaces and AI, from making machines more like humans to making humans more like machines. This leads him to assert that the dynamism and complexity of life (Godel defines complexity as the ability to interact) is not reducible to the machine. Or in other words, signs (in the Peircean understanding that always open up something new to an interpreter) are not reducible to signals, which carry preformed and static data. Naturally, this calls for him to explore Peircian interpretative semiotics. Here is also a pdf of his presentation to accompany the video: http://www.nadin.ws/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/tartu_presentation.pdf http://l.facebook.com/l/VAQGMDKVvAQGJ132n81efy1uUwZdfD1Jrw_TeQ0Vj6Gc8lA/www.uttv.ee/naita?id=22396 [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 718%20482-5690* - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8830] Re: Anticipation and Semiotics: One Cannot Not Interact
Hi Gary S, Gary R, lists, I agree that certain aspects (e.g., qualia) of Peircean semiosis cannot be reduced to mechanical terms, because life is more COMPLEX than physics or chemistry. But I believe that no semiosis is possible without physics and chemistry either, since, although the beauty of Mona Lisa is beyond the chemical reductionism, no Mona Lisa can exist without colored dye molecules having the right atomic organizations. So the challenging question may be: When does beauty begin and chemistry end in Mona Lisa? One possible answer that comes to mind would be: Mona Lisa is the complementary union of anesthetics and physics. All the best. Sung On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Gary Shank garysh...@comcast.net wrote: Is this in addition to your ongoing errors of trying to portray Peircean semiotics in reductionist and mechanical terms? All the best, Gary Sent from my iPad On Aug 24, 2015, at 6:00 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Gary, list, There is a minor error in Slide 23: R should be associated with quali, sin, and legi, and O should be associated with icon, index and symbol. All the best. Sung On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 3:21 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: List, Cary Campbell of the Semiotic Research Group posted this summary of a lecture, Anticipation and Semiotics: One Cannot Not Interact and gives a link to the accompanying ppt slideshow by Mihai Nadin (he inadvertently misspells his first name as 'Mihou') on that group's Facebook page. Many years ago I read a number of Nadin's papers and had a fascinating off-list discussion with him on his work, then focusing squarely on Peirce's semiotic theory and, as I recall, especially Peirce's understanding of virtuality. While Nadin has gone on to consider applications of semiotic theory to computer science, HCI, and other fields, it appears that his work continues to be 'grounded' in Peircean semiotics. Best, Gary Cary wrote: This is a super topical lecture from engineer/scientist/semiotician Mihou Nadin; quite inspiring. He talks about man’s current and developing relations with technology and how these relationships are slowly automating the human away; in which the emphasis has shifted, since his pioneering work in interfaces and AI, from making machines more like humans to making humans more like machines. This leads him to assert that the dynamism and complexity of life (Godel defines complexity as the ability to interact) is not reducible to the machine. Or in other words, signs (in the Peircean understanding that always open up something new to an interpreter) are not reducible to signals, which carry preformed and static data. Naturally, this calls for him to explore Peircian interpretative semiotics. Here is also a pdf of his presentation to accompany the video: http://www.nadin.ws/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/tartu_presentation.pdf http://l.facebook.com/l/VAQGMDKVvAQGJ132n81efy1uUwZdfD1Jrw_TeQ0Vj6Gc8lA/www.uttv.ee/naita?id=22396 [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 718%20482-5690* - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8831] Re: Anticipation and Semiotics: One Cannot
Hi Gary S, Gary R, lists, A thought just occurred to me that there may be a connection between the beauty of Mona Lisa (holism) and the various chemical pigments (reductionism) that constitute it -- namely, the organization of matter at two distinct scales, one at the macroscopic scale and the other at the microscopic. That is, what makes Mona Lisa beautiful is the way macroscopic pigment particles are ORGANIZED on its canvas, while what makes the pigment particles look colorful in Mona Lisa is the way microscopic particles known as atoms are ORGANIZED inside each pigment molecule. If this analysis is right, the concept of ORGANIZATION may be of fundamental significance at all physical scales and the consequence (or function or meaning) of organization may depend on the physical scales involved. In the case of Mona Lisa, the pigment ORGANIZATION on the canvas results in beautiful visual sensations while the atomic ORGANIZATIONs in pigment molecules result in desirable colors of individual pigments. Hence, I am tempted to conclude that Organization is the FUNCTOR connecting the beautiful aesthetics of Mona Lisa on the macrolevel and the colorful chemistry underlying it on the microlevel. All the best. Sung On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 6:53 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Hi Gary S, Gary R, lists, I agree that certain aspects (e.g., qualia) of Peircean semiosis cannot be reduced to mechanical terms, because life is more COMPLEX than physics or chemistry. But I believe that no semiosis is possible without physics and chemistry either, since, although the beauty of Mona Lisa is beyond the chemical reductionism, no Mona Lisa can exist without colored dye molecules having the right atomic organizations. So the challenging question may be: When does beauty begin and chemistry end in Mona Lisa? One possible answer that comes to mind would be: Mona Lisa is the complementary union of anesthetics and physics. All the best. Sung On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Gary Shank garysh...@comcast.net wrote: Is this in addition to your ongoing errors of trying to portray Peircean semiotics in reductionist and mechanical terms? All the best, Gary Sent from my iPad On Aug 24, 2015, at 6:00 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Gary, list, There is a minor error in Slide 23: R should be associated with quali, sin, and legi, and O should be associated with icon, index and symbol. All the best. Sung On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 3:21 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: List, Cary Campbell of the Semiotic Research Group posted this summary of a lecture, Anticipation and Semiotics: One Cannot Not Interact and gives a link to the accompanying ppt slideshow by Mihai Nadin (he inadvertently misspells his first name as 'Mihou') on that group's Facebook page. Many years ago I read a number of Nadin's papers and had a fascinating off-list discussion with him on his work, then focusing squarely on Peirce's semiotic theory and, as I recall, especially Peirce's understanding of virtuality. While Nadin has gone on to consider applications of semiotic theory to computer science, HCI, and other fields, it appears that his work continues to be 'grounded' in Peircean semiotics. Best, Gary Cary wrote: This is a super topical lecture from engineer/scientist/semiotician Mihou Nadin; quite inspiring. He talks about man’s current and developing relations with technology and how these relationships are slowly automating the human away; in which the emphasis has shifted, since his pioneering work in interfaces and AI, from making machines more like humans to making humans more like machines. This leads him to assert that the dynamism and complexity of life (Godel defines complexity as the ability to interact) is not reducible to the machine. Or in other words, signs (in the Peircean understanding that always open up something new to an interpreter) are not reducible to signals, which carry preformed and static data. Naturally, this calls for him to explore Peircian interpretative semiotics. Here is also a pdf of his presentation to accompany the video: http://www.nadin.ws/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/tartu_presentation.pdf http://l.facebook.com/l/VAQGMDKVvAQGJ132n81efy1uUwZdfD1Jrw_TeQ0Vj6Gc8lA/www.uttv.ee/naita?id=22396 [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 718%20482-5690* - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D
[PEIRCE-L] Amount and meaning of information as aspects of the Peircean sign: The Peircean Theory of Information
*impossible task* = the task that cannot be performed by any constructor without violating the laws of nature. (e) *constructor theory* = the theory of which transformations can or cannot be caused and why (f) *information* = It is an abstract constructor. (3) . . . it (i.e., CTI; my addition) does not regard information as an *a priori* mathematical or logical concept, but as something whose nature and properties are determined by the laws of physics alone. (4) . . . information is not abstract in the same sense as, say, the set of all prime numbers, for it only exists when it is physically instantiated. So the laws governing it . . unlike those governing prime numbers, are laws of physics. (5) . . .despite being physical, information has a counter-factual character: an object in a particular state cannot be said to carry information unless it could have been in a different state.(6) In the theory we present here, the status of information in physics is analogous to that of (say) energy . . . (7) (8) A quick comparison between CTI and PTI resulted in the family resemblances summarized in Table 1 below, indicating that CTI and PTI belong to the same family of categories called the ur-category [2, 3, 4]. __ Table 1. An approximate comparison among the terms appearing in the Constructor Theory of Information (CTI) and the 'Peircean Theory of Information (PTI) __ Items CTIPTI __ 1 constructor sign (or representamen) __ 2 construction semiosis __ 3 task communication (?) __ 4 information meaningless information meaningful information __ If you have any questions, comments, or criticisms, let me know. All the best. Sung References: [1] Volkenstein, M. V. (2009). Entropy and Information. Birkheuser, Basel. [2] Ji, S. (2014). Ur-category accommodates Peirce's tychism and evolutionary cosmology. [biosemiotics:6360]. [3] Spivak, D. I. (2013) Category Theory for the Sciences. The MIT Press, Cam-bridge, Massachusetts. Open Access HTML Version at http://category-theory.mitpress.mit.edu/ [4] Brown R, Porter T (2006). Category Theory: an abstract setting for analogy and comparison. PDF at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.65.2083rep=rep1type=pdf .\ [4a] Ji, S. (2012). Molecular theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. P. 93. [5] Deutsch, D. (2015). Constructor Theory. arXiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1210/1210.7439.pdf. Downloaded on 1/1/2015. [6] Deutsch, D. and Marletto, C. (2014). Constructor Theory of Information. arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1405/1405.5563.pdf -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Can there be an interpretant without an interpreter ?
Jon, lists, (1) I understand Peirce's intention: He wanted to generalize anthroposemiosis to include physiosemiosis (i.e., sign processes in abiotic systems or physicochemical realms), the combination of both of which I often refer to as cosmosemiosis [1]. In other words, I believe that Peircean semiosis (or ITR, Irreversible Triadic Relation, in my discussions) applies to the whole of the Universe, including life and non-life and throughout its evolutionary history starting from the Big Bang. (2) I think it is more logical to assume that Sign is irreducibly triadic and sign represents a prescinded version of Sign, i.e., sign highlights the two arrows attached to it directly while hiding the third arrow that by-pass it. All the best. Sung Reference: [1] Ji, S. (2012). Ji, S. (2012). Complementarity. http://www.conformon.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Excerpts_Chapters_2_complementarity_08192012.pdf In: *Molecular Theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications.* Springer, New York. Section 2.3, pp. 24-50, Table 2.13. PDF at http://www.conformon.net under Publications Book Chapters . On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 7:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com wrote: Sung, List: My understanding is that an interpretant is *any *effect that a sign *may *have (immediate), *does *have (dynamic), or *would *have (final). It is most commonly discussed in contexts where such effects are indeed on the mind of an interpreter, but Peirce was hoping to generalize his theory in such a way that this would not be its only application. As he wrote to Lady Welby: QUOTE Peirce, 12/23/1908, EP2:478 I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former. My insertion of upon a person is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception understood. END QUOTE By the way, regarding your comments today in the other thread, note that Peirce here clearly uses Sign (capitalized) to designate one relatum among three, not the triad itself. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 3:50 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: In a recent article (Semiosis stems from logical incompatibility in organic nature, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology XXX (2015) 1-6), Kalevi wrote: . . . . interpretant is enough; there can be interpretant without an interpreter. Is this true ? Can Kalevi or anyone else on these lists give me some example of this ? I always thought that Peirce defined an interpretant as the effect that a sign has on the mind of an interpreter. Perhaps this is a misunderstanding on my part ? -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8816] Re: Can there be an interpretant without an interpreter ?
, it will not be a sign. *60 - MS 670 :* A Sign, then, is anything whatsoever -whether an Actual or a May-be or a Would-be,- which affects *a mind*, its *Interpreter*, and draw that interpreter's attention to some Object whether Actual, May-be or Would-be) which has already come within the sphere of his experience; and beside this purely selective action of a sign, it has a power of exciting *the mind* (whether directly by the image or the sound or indirectly) to some kind of feeling, or to effort of some kind or to thought; [...] *62 - NEM IV - p. XXI - From MS.142.* A sign is a thing which is the representative, or deputy, of another thing for the purpose of affecting *a mind* [...] *64 - MS 381 -On the nature of Signs .* A sign is an object which stands for another to some *mind.* I propose to describe the characters of a sign. In the first place like any other thing it must have qualities which belong to it whether it be regarded as a sign or not thus a printed word is black, has a certain number of letters and those letters have certain shapes. Such characters of a sign I call its material quality. In the next place a sign must have some real connection with the thing it signifies so that when the object is present or is so as the sign signifies it to be the sign shall so signify it and otherwise not. [...] In the first place it is necessary for a sign to be a sign that it should be regarded as a sign for it is only a sign to that *mind* which so considers and if it is not a sign to any* mind* it is not a sign at all. It must be known to *the mind* first in its material qualities but also in its pure demonstrative application. That* mind *must conceive it to be connected with its object so that it is possible to reason from the sign to the thing. [...] *68 - MS 793[On Signs] .* For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that *any thing possessing consciousness*, that is, feeling or the peculiar common quality of all our feeling should be concerned. But it is necessary that there should be two, if not three, *quasi-minds, meaning things capable of varied determinations as to forms of the kind communicated.* As a medium the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the sign is passive, that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by on effect upon the sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the sign is active determining the interpretant without being itself thereby affected. *73 - MS 801 : Logic: Regarded as a Study of the general nature of Signs (Logic) .* By a sign I mean any thing which is in any way, direct or indirect, so influenced by any thing (which I term its object) and which in turn influence a *mind *that this* mind* is thereby influenced by the Object; and I term that which is called forth in the *mind* the Interpretant of the sign. This explanation will suffice for the present; but distinctions will have to be drawn are long. All the best. Sung On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 5:07 PM, Robert Boroch teoriekult...@gmail.com wrote: Hello, Sign points to itself – there is no referent – the sign that is the referent for himself – literary work could be a sign without referent, or so-called referent that is the work itself. Regards, Robert *From:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *On Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji *Sent:* Sunday, August 16, 2015 10:50 PM *To:* biosemiotics biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee *Subject:* [biosemiotics:8815] Can there be an interpretant without an interpreter ? Hi, In a recent article (Semiosis stems from logical incompatibility in organic nature, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology XXX (2015) 1-6), Kalevi wrote: . . . . interpretant is enough; there can be interpretant without an interpreter. Is this true ? Can Kalevi or anyone else on these lists give me some example of this ? I always thought that Peirce defined an interpretant as the effect that a sign has on the mind of an interpreter. Perhaps this is a misunderstanding on my part ? All the best. Sung -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Order of Interpretant Trichotomies for Sign Classes
to mull through his writings to see what he exactly meant]. 2) You yourself brought up the three-phase actions of the Interpretant, so, I'm confused now..for after all, the Interpretant, in all its phases, is in a Relation with the Representamen (which you term as 'sign']. 3) You write: you are aligning the immediate/dynamic/final interpretants with rheme/dicent/argument, rather than the relation of sign to the final interpretant only. Now, if I understand you in the above, you are focusing on the relation of the *Representamen* to the final interpretant'. I don't see that it is possible for the semiosic triad to exclude, in its semiosic process, the two less complex Interpretants; namely, the immediate and dynamic. All three are, in my view, in a Relation with the Representamen. So - what am I misunderstanding in your questions? 4) I don't see that the Peircean sign moves away from the basic triad; there's no 'ten-trichotomy'. There are microphases of the triad: dynamic object-immediate object - Representamen - and the Immediate, Dynamic and Final Interpretants ..which brings us to only six microparts. And you can then add in the modes which increases the complexity - where the Dynamic Object can be in any one of the three modes; and the Representamen can be in any one of the three modes. BUT - although this increases the *internal* complexity of the Sign, as you point out, I'm not sure how it moves away from the basic format of the triad. I would say that this internal complexity increases the ability of matter to adapt to environmental stimuli. So- I am obviously missing something in your argument! Edwina - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Can there be an interpretant without an interpreter ?
Hi, In a recent article (Semiosis stems from logical incompatibility in organic nature, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology XXX (2015) 1-6), Kalevi wrote: . . . . interpretant is enough; there can be interpretant without an interpreter. Is this true ? Can Kalevi or anyone else on these lists give me some example of this ? I always thought that Peirce defined an interpretant as the effect that a sign has on the mind of an interpreter. Perhaps this is a misunderstanding on my part ? All the best. Sung -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: ENERGY, INFORMATION, and the Principle of COMPLEMENTARITY
Clark, lists,
Clark wrote today: Someone just introduced me to Constructor Theory.
. . . Upon
reading it, the theory sounds very Peircean. I was curious if anyone here
has done any reading along those lines.
Sung: Yes. I have done a quick study of the Constructor Theory of
Information (CTI) early this year and came to the conclusion that CTI is an
instance of the Peircean semiosis (and hence an example of the mathematical
category; see Figure 1 below).
As some of you on these lists may recall, I introduced the concept of the
ur-category (see the biosemiotics post dated August 5, 2014 entitled
Ur-category
accommodates Peirce’s tychism and evolutionary cosmology), defined as the
category to which all other categories belong, representing it
diagrammatically as:
f g
A -- B -- C
| ^
| |
|___|
h
Figure A. The ur-category. A, B and C = objects; f , g, and h =
structure-preserving mappings that are related to one another through the
commutative condition, f x g = h, i.e., f followed by g leads tot he same
results as h.
The ur-category is related to ITR (irreversible triadic relation) first
articulated by Peirce (I believe) which may have led to the category theory
in mathematics. If my interpretation of CTI is right, what is called the
universal construction may turn out to be a mathematical category, as
depicted in Figure 1 below.
If you have any questions or comments, let me know.
All the best.
Sung
-- Forwarded message --
From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu
Date: Sun, Jan 4, 2015 at 9:52 PM
Subject: ENERGY, INFORMATION, and the Principle of COMPLEMENTARITY
To: biosemiotics biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: PEIRCE-L peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
(Undistorted diagrams are attached.)
The conclusion of this post given in Figure 1 at the end of the post may be
of some interest to the semiotics community, since it suggests that the
Universal computation described by Deutsch may be an instance of Peircean
semiosis. In other words, Deutsch's theory of information and Peircean
theory of sign or semiosis may be related, since both can be viewed as
mathematical categories represented as a commutative triangle.
The unabridged title of this email would read:
“Energy and Information may be the functors connected by the
(010515-1)
Principle of Complementarity acting as a natural transformation.”
The purpose of this post is to summarize the new theory of information
recently proposed by Deutsch [1] and Deutsch and Marletto [2] (to the
extent that I understand it, having just run into their papers only a few
days ago) and point out how their so-called “Constructor Theory of
Information (CTI)” may be consistent with (and hence supports) the validity
of Statement (010515-1).
(1)Although Deutsch never mentions the category theory in [1] and [2],
I think his ideas
(indicated in the parentheses in Table 1 below) fit nicely into the
three-level organization of the category theory discussed in [3]:
Table 1. The category theory of natural sciences [3].
Category Classes/Levels
*Nodes*
*Arrows*
*I*
OBJECTS
(electrons, protons, photons, molecules, cells, . . .)
MORPHISMS
(laws of physics, chemistry, biology, . . . )
*II*
CATEGORIES
(physics, chemistry, biology, . . . )
FUNCTORS
(energy*, information)
*II*
FUNCTORS
(energy, information)
NATURAL TRASNFORMATION
(Principle of Complementarity)
*includes matter
In [1, p.4], Deutsch and Marletto wrote:
“. . . In the theory (i.e., CTI; my addition) we present here, the status
(010515-2)
of information in physics is analogous to that of (say) energy . . . . “
I interpret (010515-2) as the indication that Deutsch and Marletto [1]
regard information and energy as being equally and independently
fundamental in physics, which idea I express in terms of their being
“complementary” to each other in the last row and column in Table 1, which
logically leads to the conclusion that the Principle of Complementarity [4]
is a natural transformation as defined in the category theory.
(2)The following two quotes explain what ”constructor theory” is:
(A) WHAT IS CONSTRUCTOR THEORY? (http://constructortheory.org/)
“The basic principle of constructor theory is that all fundamental laws of
nature are expressible entirely in terms of statements of which tasks (i.e.
classes of physical transformations) are possible and which are impossible,
and why. This is a new mode of explanation, intended to supersede the
prevailing conception of fundamental physics which seeks to explain the
world in terms of its state (describing everything that is there) and laws
of motion (describing how the everything changes with time). By
regarding counter-factuals ('X is possible' or 'X
[PEIRCE-L] Phaneron, Cybersemiotic Star, and Gnergy Tetrahedron may embody an ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation)
(*mathematical*) principle for organizing *philosophies* and *special sciences *in agreement with the architectonic theory of human knowledge advocated by Peirce. All the best. Sung Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.ne http://www.conformon.net/ References: [1] Brier, S. (2013). Cybersemiotics: Why Information Is Not Enough! University of Toronto Press, Toronto. [2] Ji, S. (2004). Semiotics of Life: A Unified Theory of Molecular Machines, Cells, the Mind, Peircean Signs, and the Universe Based on the Principle of Information-Energy Complementarity, in: Reports, Research Group on Mathematical Linguistics, XVII Tarragona Seminar on Formal Syntax and Semantics, Rovira i Virgili University, Tarragona, Spain, April 23-27, 2003. PDF Available at http://grammars.grlmc.com/GRLMC/reports/SOLManuscriptsubmitted_final.doc or http://www.confromon.net under Publications Proceedings and Abstracts. [3] Ji, S. (2012). Molecular theory of the Living Cell: Concepts, Molecular Mechanisms, and Biomedical Applications. Springer, New York. P. 289. [4] Ji, S. (2012). Ibid. Pp. 24-29. PDF at http://www.confromon.net under Publications Book Chapters. [5] Spivak, D. I. (2013). Category Theory for Scientists. http://math.mit.edu/~dspivak/teaching/sp13/CT4S--static.pdf [6] Brown, R. and Porter, T. (20xx). Category Theory: an abstract setting for analogy and comparison. http://pages.bangor.ac.uk/~mas010/Analogy-and-Comparison.pdf [7] Ji, S. (1991). The Biological Model of the Universe: The Shillongator. http://www.conformon.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Shillongator_110720111.pdf In: *Molecular Theories of Cell Life and Death *(S. Ji, ed.), The Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, pp. 152-163, 230-237. PDF at http://www.confromon.net under Publications Book Chapters. [8] Ji, S. (2012). Ibid. Experimental Evidence for Conformons. Pp. 240-243. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Zeroth Law Of Semiotics
or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Zeroth Law Of Semiotics
Hi Jon, Thanks for your reply. I wonder if we can distinguish nominalism and realism based on the ITR (irreducible triadic relation) diagram: f g Child as a- Child as --- Child as a neural firing biological object a word pattern in the brain (Object) (Representamen) (Interpretant) | ^ | | |__| h Figure 1. Defining 'nominalism' and 'realism' based on the ITR diagram. f = sign production; g = sign interpretation; h = correspondence/grounding/proof *Nominalism:* The actual child generates (f) the word 'child' in the mind of a nominalist (g) which need not be rooted in or supported by any real object. *Realism:* The actual child generates (f) the world 'child' which in turn induces (g) an image of a child in the brain of a realist that is consistent with or supported by a child in reality (h). If this analysis is valid, I am tempted to conclude that nominalism may be *dyadic* and realism *irreducibly triadic*. All the best. Sung On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 4:45 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16893 ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16894 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16895 MS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16898 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16898 TW:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16900 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16908 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16909 Sung, List, General terms are terms like man, woman, child, etc., each of which applies to many individuals, in other words, has a general denotation or a plural extension. Generally speaking, a general term is treated as bearing an accessory reference, indirect denotation, or other form of association to a general property like man-ness, woman-ness, child-ness, etc. and to a set of individuals like men, women, children, etc. But a strict nominalist would hold that we have no need of these properties or sets, that all we need are the individual terms that denote individuals individually together with the general terms that denote individuals in a general way. Regards, Jon On 8/4/2015 6:20 AM, Sungchul Ji wrote: Hi Jon, * In other words, we should not confuse a general term, one that applies to many individuals, with a term that denotes a general entity, property, or universal * Can you provide one or two concrete examples illustrating the point you are making ? Thanks. Sung On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: Tom, List, Let me back up, refresh my memory, and try to remember what I had in mind. Nominalism takes its name from the idea that generals are only names, and it goes by the maxims: Do not take a general name for the name of a general and Do not multiply entities beyond necessity. In other words, we should not confuse a general term, one that applies to many individuals, with a term that denotes a general entity, property, or universal, as those are dispensable in favor of individual entities. As far as the advice against confusing signs with objects and different types or uses of signs with each other, and even the advice to economize our budgets of entities to some degree, if not to the extreme of absolute austerity, pragmatism can go a long ways with that. The fork in the road comes with the degree to which general entities can be eliminated, wholly or not so wholly. I will have to break for dinner here ... Jon On 8/1/2015 11:52 AM, Thomas wrote: Jon, List ~ Here is how I interpreted Markku's comment: Because a semiotics process underlies the logical thinking of people, animals and plants, then the logic/thoughts that are the subject of a philosopher's investigation/analysis are not themselves nominalistic. They are (intended to be) pragmatic. The nominalism label in the poem must, perforce, apply to the thinking of a confused philosopher. His/her analytical approach is the Object of nominal (a Sign) in the poem. The poem is a critique of (some) philosophers. Instead of a simple verse, I sense that Peirce's preferred poetic form would be a limerick comprised of palindromes. Regards, Tom Wyrick On Jul 31, 2015, at 10:00 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: Marccu, List, I sometimes use “nominal thinking” as another name for nominalism even as I use “pragmatic thinking
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Time and ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation)
all you can learn about the types of time so long as you respect reality and Nature.* You assume that the measured time directly refers to the absolute time, which is reminiscent of the Saussrean theory of signs (where signifier directly refers to its signified without any mediation), but I am assuming that the measured time is a part of an irreducible triadic relation so that it is determined by the absolute time and determines its interpretant (or a mental model) in such a way that the interpretant is related to the absolute time. In other words, your concept of time is DYADIC, whereas mine is TRIADIC. All the best. Sung On Wed, Jul 29, 2015 at 2:26 AM, Ed Dellian ed.dell...@t-online.de wrote: Sung, (1) On what real grounds does it make sense to claim that there may be three types of times? (2) As you speak of the real and the physical: Is physical time not real for you? Why not? (3) If you just admit that somebody, for example Isaac Newton, may already have solved the enigma of time: Would it not make sense to explore this solution, instead of continuing to consider alternative hypotheses? Why not ask your students if they have ever read Newton, and what they would think of the reversibility or irreversibility of a second law that reads a change in motion is proportional to the motive force impressed? (4) The simple fact that you again and again quote Newton's second law of motion (while actually referring to Euler's law) as a time-reversible example demonstrates the importance of this example for your argument. Of course, if there should be an irreversible law of motion at the very basis of science, your considerations would prove at least superfluous. (5) Please will you finally see that it is *not **my** version of the second law* which I ask you to respect* but Newton's*. If you would read him, you would learn that there is no dualism of absolute and formal time but of absolute time and relative times: the absolute and infinite time serving as the invariant standard of measurement of the finite times of physical experience, which relative times then are evidently the real physical times which you're missing in Newton's law as you're insisting to misread it. What sense does it make to impute to Newton a concept of time-reversibility that (as everybody knows) proves totally absurd and nonsensical with respect to reality? Do you not think that this means to make dubious the reputation of a colleague, and should therefore be considered very carefully before doing so? (6) Perhaps your object of study is not reality but Peircean metaphysics. In this case, we would be speaking about different things. My object of study is reality, the reality of time, which is physical and real insofar as it is measurable, and which, in order to be measurable, requires absolute invariant standards for determining the measurable things relative to that standards, *as * *it* *happens in every real process of measurement* (not only of times). So there are in reality two (not three) types of time: (1) the absolute standard, and (2) the times measured relative to that standard. You have both types before youre eyes should you use a traditional analogue watch with a face and hands to show you the actual time. There is the scaled round of 24 hours on the face, representing the standard of measurement, or the absolute time; and there are the real physical times that you are measuring relative to that standard, as they are given through the position of the watch's hands relative to the said standard of measurement. That's it. And that's all you can learn about the types of time so long as you respect reality and Nature. Ed. Am 29.07.2015 um 00:19 schrieb Sungchul Ji: Hi Ed, What I am claiming is that there may be three types of times -- 'real', 'physical', and 'formal' that are mutually connected through ITR (irreducible triadic relation). As an example of 'formal time', also called 'reversible time', I cited the time appearing in Newton's second law of motion, F = md^2s/dt^2, which is invariant with respect to time reversal, i.e., F does not change when t is replaced by -t. You objected that I used the wrongly interpreted version of the Newton's second law, and, if I used your version of the law, my argument would not hold, since then F would not be time-reversal invariant. I accept that, but this would not affect my argument, since I am sure there are other physical laws, if not Newton's second law, that would exhibit the time-reversal invariance, thus supporting the concept of 'formal time' in contrast to 'physical time' which is always irreversible. Your version of Newton's second law may contain absolute and formal times, but not physical time, while Peircean triadic metaphysics (as I understand it) would predict absolute (or 'real' as I call
[PEIRCE-L] Apologies
Gary R, Ben, List members, A few weeks ago, Ben, as the co-manager of the list, had asked me to refrain from sending emails with attachments, to which I had agreed. But, in many of my recent emails, I failed to keep my promise, for which I feel sorry and would like to apologize. From now on, I will keep my post to PEIRCE-L free of any attachments, and, if necessary, they will be uploaded to my web site, http://www.conformon.net, following Ben's original suggestion. All the best. Sung -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Time and ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation)
Hi Ed, What I am claiming is that there may be three types of times -- 'real', 'physical', and 'formal' that are mutually connected through ITR (irreducible triadic relation). As an example of 'formal time', also called 'reversible time', I cited the time appearing in Newton's second law of motion, F = md^2s/dt^2, which is invariant with respect to time reversal, i.e., F does not change when t is replaced by -t. You objected that I used the wrongly interpreted version of the Newton's second law, and, if I used your version of the law, my argument would not hold, since then F would not be time-reversal invariant. I accept that, but this would not affect my argument, since I am sure there are other physical laws, if not Newton's second law, that would exhibit the time-reversal invariance, thus supporting the concept of 'formal time' in contrast to 'physical time' which is always irreversible. Your version of Newton's second law may contain absolute and formal times, but not physical time, while Peircean triadic metaphysics (as I understand it) would predict absolute (or 'real' as I call it), physical, and formal times. All the best. Sung On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 4:42 PM, Ed Dellian ed.dell...@t-online.de wrote: Dear Sung, my impression is that you're conflating Newton's irreversible geometric law of motion impressed force is proportional to change in motion with Leonhard Euler's reversible formula, the analytical arithmetic-algebraic force equals mass-acceleration law (for the first discovery of this law in Berlin on Sept. 3, 1750 see L. Euler, Découverte d'un nouveau principe de Mécanique, Mem. Acad. Roy. Sci. Berlin, vol. 6 , 1750 (1752), pp. 185-217). In order to avoid such a conflation, please note (1) that to be proportional is not the same as to be equal, (2) that a finite change in motion is not the same as a continuous acceleration. Wouldn't you admit, then, that an irreversible second law of Newton should make some difference for your line of resoning? As I said it before: It makes no sense to proceed with your studies on the presupposition of misinterpretations. And, a misinterpretation remains a misinterpretation, no matter for how many years or centuries how many scientists, including big shots and Nobel prize winners, have believed in it. Let me, by the way, declare here that I do not interprete Newton, nor do I propose my personal theory of motion, rather I do what many other scientists most regrettably have refused and still are refusing to do, namely, *read Newton's laws and take the author at his words* (maybe because they do not read Latin). Moreover, it is not my point here to say that Newton's authentic laws *are true* with respect to nature, rather I ask you to admit: Whether or not these laws are true *can only be decided on the basis of what Newton has actually written. *Finally, I think that Newton, as a colleague, simply deserves that you quote him correctly. Best wishes, Ed. Am 28.07.2015 um 21:49 schrieb Sungchul Ji: Hi, I am wondering if time is irreducibly triadic in the following three senses: (*1*) As a Peircean sign, i.e., time as a name or a representamen referring to a process and interpreted by a mind as such: fg Process --- Time as a name --- Time as theorized (object) (representamen) (interpretant) | ^ | | || h Figure 1. Time as an irreducible triadic sign. As always, the arrows can be read as determines or constrains in a broadest sense. f = encoding; g = decoding; h = grounding, correspondence or information flow (*2*) As a mechanism or a process: f g Past --- Present --- Future | ^ | | |__| h Figure 2. Time as an irreducible triadic process. f = natural law-governed; g = natural law- and human intention-governed; h = information flow (*3*) Figure 1 seems to reflect the formal aspect of time (or 'formal time'), while Figure 2 reflects the material/physical aspect of time (or 'physical time'). These two types of times together may constitute the 'real time', suggesting the following triadic diagram: f g Real Time --- Physical Time --- Formal Time | ^ | | || h Figure 3. The postulate that there are three irreducible aspects to time. f = natural process; g = mental process; h = information flow
[PEIRCE-L] Time and ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation)
Hi, I am wondering if time is irreducibly triadic in the following three senses: (*1*) As a Peircean sign, i.e., time as a name or a representamen referring to a process and interpreted by a mind as such: fg Process --- Time as a name --- Time as theorized (object) (representamen) (interpretant) | ^ | | || h Figure 1. Time as an irreducible triadic sign. As always, the arrows can be read as determines or constrains in a broadest sense. f = encoding; g = decoding; h = grounding, correspondence or information flow (*2*) As a mechanism or a process: f g Past --- Present --- Future | ^ | | |__| h Figure 2. Time as an irreducible triadic process. f = natural law-governed; g = natural law- and human intention-governed; h = information flow (*3*) Figure 1 seems to reflect the formal aspect of time (or 'formal time'), while Figure 2 reflects the material/physical aspect of time (or 'physical time'). These two types of times together may constitute the 'real time', suggesting the following triadic diagram: f g Real Time --- Physical Time --- Formal Time | ^ | | || h Figure 3. The postulate that there are three irreducible aspects to time. f = natural process; g = mental process; h = information flow, or correspondence It seems to me that 'physical time' is irreversible (as in irreversible thermodynamics) while 'formal time' can be reversed (as in Newtons' second law of motion). Thus it may be convenient to refer to the former as 'irreversible time' and the latter as 'reversible time'. My impression is that some physicists, including Einstein, may have conflated these two types of times. If you have any questions, comments, or corrections, please let me know. All the best. Sung -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
have been written after the publication of _Studies in Logic_ (1883) because Peirce mentions its publication. Another way maybe to narrow the date down: In MS 831, Peirce uses the words inference and reasoning to mean pretty much the same thing, and uses quasi-inference to mean instinctive or otherwise automatic inference. There comes a time when he uses reasoning to mean conscious, deliberate inference, thus widening the sense of inference to encompass instinctive inference (quasi-inference in MS 831). I'm not sure how consistent he was about that in later years, but assembling the dates of later quotes on reasoning and inference might help suggest a more specific time period during which he wrote MS 831. Best, Ben On 7/23/2015 10:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8786] Re: Instinct and emotion
reality back to the science of motion. It was also not necessary to think with Peirce of triadic relations and of abduction, things that appear at least superfluous as soon as one knows the principles of geometric proportion theory, which principles anticipate and imply everything that Peirce tried to formulate. Had he known the said principles, and had he known Newton's true irreversible second law, he would certainly not have developed what he did while presupposing mistaken principles of theoretical physics. It is necessary to correct the errors first, because in this mathematical science everything is connected to everything. I think that it makes no sense (I beg your pardon) to proceed with theoretical considerations which ignore fundamental errors about and misconceptions of the basic theory of motion. If you have any questions, please let me know. Best wishes, Ed. Am 22.07.2015 um 23:56 schrieb Sungchul Ji: Stan, Edwina, Tom, lists, (1) I am always impressed by the well-known fact that 99% of all the species that once populated the biosphere has undergone extinction. This scientific fact seems to support the yin-yang doctrine of the Daoist philosophy, speciation being the yang and extinction being the yin of the biological evolution. I am not a professional philosopher, but my impression is that the Western philosophy in general may have the tendency to emphasize the positive (or yang) aspect of reality, neglecting or ignoring the negative (or yin) aspect, and this may include Peirce's identification of matter (or reality) with mind (i.e., order, organization, habit, laws, etc.). I have long advocated a Daoist perspective on the relation between matter and mind: Matter is not only associated with order (or mind/organization) but also with disorder (or chaos/disorganization). To put it more strongly, Mind/order (yang) and mindlessness/disorder (yin) are the two (8786-1) sides of the same coin, i.e., matter (Dao). As I mentioned on these list on several occasions, Statement (8786-1) is consistent with Prigogine's theory of dissipative structures on which he delivered two lectures at Rutgers in the early 1980's, entitled: The Construtcive Role of Irreversibility. (8786-2) which means that no construction (or organization) is possible without the irreversible loss of the free energy of matter. (2) Peirce's view of the biological evolution ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agapism) seems to fit his principle of irreducible triadic relation (ITR) if we can define the structure-preserving mappings, f, g, and h, as indicated in the legend to Figure 1: f g Nature --- DNA --- Life | ^ | | |__| h Figure 1. The biological evolution as an irreducible tradic relation of Peirce. f = tychasm (e.g., thermal fluctuations, Brownian motions necessary for chemical reactions); g = anancasm (e.g., protein binding to DNA template triggering the synthesis of RNA, RNA acting as the template for protein synthesis upon binding to ribosomes); h = agapasm (e.g., tendency of organisms to reproduce, resulting from male-female attraction called 'love') As you can see, I have changed the name of the first node in this figure from Biological Evolution in my 7/20/2015 PEIRCE-L post to Nature, and the names of the mappings f, g, and h from, respectively, (encoding, decoding, and inheritance) to (tychasm, anancasm, and agapasm), because the semantics of the former ITR was the microscopic view of the biological evolution, while that of Figure 1 above is the macroscopic view of evolution. What connects these two views of biological evolution is ITR, which is acting as what mathematicians call a 'functor' (see Category Theory for Scientists at http://math.mit.edu/~dspivak/teaching/sp13/). This illustrates the power of using a diagram to represent an idea or a theory, because the (commutative) diagram provides us with a set of the degrees of freedom of populating the NODES and ARROWS with different terms or concepts, depending on the context of the topic under discussion, as long as the STRUCTURE of the diagram is preserved. (3) I happened to read this morning the following paragraph from CP 6.14 which indicates that Peirce's knowledge of thermodynamics was inadequate because he apparently was not aware of the Second Law of thermodynamics which allows for irreversible mechanical motions (and hence growth) unlike the Newton's Second Law of motions which prevents them: Mr. Herbert Spencer wishes to explain
Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct and emotion
Hi, Figure 1 below may be of some interest to you, because it suggests that the biological evolution (as the result of which we are all here, breathing, thinking, communicating) may be viewed as an example of the irreducibly triadic semiosis discovered by Peirce during the second half of the 19th century: BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION AS SEMIOSIS (072115-1) All the best. Sung -- Forwarded message -- From: Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu Date: Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 1:04 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct and emotion To: Stephen Jarosek sjaro...@iinet.net.au Cc: PEIRCE-L peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Stephen J, lists, Stephen: . . . this still does not explain the “technology” behind reading DNA and how said data gets transformed to thoughts and actions. Sung: Figure 1 explains a lot about how DNA is read by the living cell to generate thoughts and action in humans, because it (i) suggests that Peirce's irreducible triadic relation (ITR) may be involved (which is a new idea, to the best of my knowledge), and (ii) directs you where to go if you want to KNOW more abut any of the nodes or steps. For example, if you want to KNOW more about how DNA is read, i.e., Step g, just google gene expression and you will find enough papers and books to read for the rest of your life. f g Biological Evolution - DNA - Life (object) (representamen) (interpretant) | ^ | | |_| h Figure 1. DNA as the representamen of the biological evolution. f = encoding during the process of evolution (i.e., origin of life and phylogensis); g = decoding performed by the living cell (also called gene expression or ontogenesis); h = genetic information flow (also called inheritance). The commutativity condition is thought to be held, i.e., f x g = h. All the best. Sung On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 10:41 AM, Stephen Jarosek sjaro...@iinet.net.au wrote: Sung, this still does not explain the “technology” behind reading DNA and how said data gets transformed to thoughts and actions. If a simulation or model cannot be constructed, or at least imagined, to try to make it real, then the hypothesis is not workable. sj *From:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *On Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji *Sent:* Monday, 20 July 2015 4:35 PM *To:* PEIRCE-L *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct and emotion Stephen, Edwina, lists, That is, if people are going to go along with the info-tech narrative that describes genes and DNA in the context of information, then I’d like to see the computer that processes said information. Where is it? If people are going to run with a particular metaphor, like the computing/info-tech narrative, then they really should cover all aspects of it. To understand how DNA works, it may be necessary to know how DNA originated and how it is read by the living cell. I believe that DNA is a component of a complex network of molecular interactions that can be identified as an example of the Peircean triadic semiosis: f g Biological Evolution - DNA - Life (object) (representamen) (interpretant) | ^ | | |_| h Figure 1. DNA as the representamen of the biological evolution. f = encoding during the process of evolution (i.e., origin of life and phylogensis); g = decoding performed by the living cell (also called gene expression or ontogenesis); h = genetic information flow (also called inheritance). The commutativity condition is thought to be held, i.e., f x g = h. All the best. Sung - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct and emotion
Stephen J, lists, Stephen: . . . this still does not explain the “technology” behind reading DNA and how said data gets transformed to thoughts and actions. Sung: Figure 1 explains a lot about how DNA is read by the living cell to generate thoughts and action in humans, because it (i) suggests that Peirce's irreducible triadic relation (ITR) may be involved (which is a new idea, to the best of my knowledge), and (ii) directs you where to go if you want to KNOW more abut any of the nodes or steps. For example, if you want to KNOW more about how DNA is read, i.e., Step g, just google gene expression and you will find enough papers and books to read for the rest of your life. f g Biological Evolution - DNA - Life (object) (representamen) (interpretant) | ^ | | |_| h Figure 1. DNA as the representamen of the biological evolution. f = encoding during the process of evolution (i.e., origin of life and phylogensis); g = decoding performed by the living cell (also called gene expression or ontogenesis); h = genetic information flow (also called inheritance). The commutativity condition is thought to be held, i.e., f x g = h. All the best. Sung On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 10:41 AM, Stephen Jarosek sjaro...@iinet.net.au wrote: Sung, this still does not explain the “technology” behind reading DNA and how said data gets transformed to thoughts and actions. If a simulation or model cannot be constructed, or at least imagined, to try to make it real, then the hypothesis is not workable. sj *From:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *On Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji *Sent:* Monday, 20 July 2015 4:35 PM *To:* PEIRCE-L *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct and emotion Stephen, Edwina, lists, That is, if people are going to go along with the info-tech narrative that describes genes and DNA in the context of information, then I’d like to see the computer that processes said information. Where is it? If people are going to run with a particular metaphor, like the computing/info-tech narrative, then they really should cover all aspects of it. To understand how DNA works, it may be necessary to know how DNA originated and how it is read by the living cell. I believe that DNA is a component of a complex network of molecular interactions that can be identified as an example of the Peircean triadic semiosis: f g Biological Evolution - DNA - Life (object) (representamen) (interpretant) | ^ | | |_| h Figure 1. DNA as the representamen of the biological evolution. f = encoding during the process of evolution (i.e., origin of life and phylogensis); g = decoding performed by the living cell (also called gene expression or ontogenesis); h = genetic information flow (also called inheritance). The commutativity condition is thought to be held, i.e., f x g = h. All the best. Sung On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 10:06 AM, Stephen Jarosek sjaro...@iinet.net.au wrote: Edwina, on most of the points you raise, I can see where we are going to be going around in circles. So I’ll just respond to those couple of points where we might stand a better chance of coming to some kind of closure: EDWINA: “I was under the impression that research is quite knowledgeable about how DNA works“ SJ: How could you say that? They are constantly revising what they previously assumed. For example, the latest, I believe, is that “junk” DNA is supposed to be important in some new way that they had never anticipated. And then there is the problem that I raised in my previous post, regarding the missing computer. That is, if people are going to go along with the info-tech narrative that describes genes and DNA in the context of information, then I’d like to see the computer that processes said information. Where is it? If people are going to run with a particular metaphor, like the computing/info-tech narrative, then they really should cover all aspects of it. EDWINA: “Sorry - but this statement, to me, is circular. Who defines 'what matters' and what does 'what matters' functionally mean?” SJ: The “who” that defines what matters is the mind-body that must make choices from its Umwelt. [hmmm... i can see that this is not going to get us anywhere J] Mind-bodies define their own priorities, they need neither
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct and emotion
Stephen, lists, You may be interested in taking a look at the following article: Ji, S. (1999). Linguistics of DNA http://www.conformon.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Linguistics-of-DNA.pdf: Words, Sentences, Grammar, Phonetics, and Semantics. *Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci.* *879*:411-417. available at http://www.conformon.net under Publications Refereed Journal Articles. The main point of this article is that, just as we humans communicate using 'humanese', so cells communicate using their own language called cellese. Both these languages are based on the common principle of Peircean semiosis, the former at the macroscopic level and the latter at the microscopic, leading to the notions of macrosemiotics and microsemiotics as discussed in the following articles, also available from my web site above: Ji, S. (2001). Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: Micro- and Macrosemiotics http://www.conformon.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Micro_and_macro_semiotics_2001.pdf , http://www.conformon.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Micro-and-macrosemiotics_20011.pdf *in* *Semiotics 2000: “Sebeok’s Century”, *S. Simpkins, J. Deely, (eds.), Legas, Ottawa, pp. 357-374. Ji, S. (2002). Microsemiotics of DNA http://www.conformon.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Microsemiotics.docx. *Semiotica* *138 *(1/4): 15-42. Let me know if you have any questions or comments. All the best. Sung On Tue, Jul 21, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Stephen Jarosek sjaro...@iinet.net.au wrote: Actually Sung, as a point of clarification... I do see the gist of your point, though more with respect to genes/hormones rather than DNA. I think it might have been Jesper Hoffmeyer or Kalevi Kull who described a semiosphere at the cellular level inside the body, where genes were analogous to “language.” It’s at the level of the DNA molecule that my thinking diverges. *From:* Stephen Jarosek [mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au] *Sent:* Tuesday, 21 July 2015 11:13 PM *To:* 'Sungchul Ji' *Cc:* 'PEIRCE-L' *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct and emotion Sung, I understand where you are coming from... I recognize your kind of narrative in other articles that I’ve read on biosemiotics. However, the information technology metaphor does not sit well with me at all, in the first instance, because of the absence of specifics for the technology that might read or process the genetic data. What if DNA entanglement plays a central role? If it does, then this might change everything, because it implies something along the lines of Rupert Sheldrake’s theory of *morphic resonance* that draws on his metaphor portraying the DNA molecule as a kind of receiver. DNA is intricate and complex, like you would expect data to be, but that’s where the similarity ends. In the absence of said processing hardware, DNA entanglement would still rely on the molecule’s complex structure to resonate (entangle) with other equivalent molecules that are entangled with it by virtue of the manner of DNA replication. sj *From:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com sji.confor...@gmail.com] *On Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji *Sent:* Tuesday, 21 July 2015 7:05 PM *To:* Stephen Jarosek *Cc:* PEIRCE-L *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct and emotion Stephen J, lists, Stephen: . . . this still does not explain the “technology” behind reading DNA and how said data gets transformed to thoughts and actions. Sung: Figure 1 explains a lot about how DNA is read by the living cell to generate thoughts and action in humans, because it (i) suggests that Peirce's irreducible triadic relation (ITR) may be involved (which is a new idea, to the best of my knowledge), and (ii) directs you where to go if you want to KNOW more abut any of the nodes or steps. For example, if you want to KNOW more about how DNA is read, i.e., Step g, just google gene expression and you will find enough papers and books to read for the rest of your life. f g Biological Evolution - DNA - Life (object) (representamen) (interpretant) | ^ | | |_| h Figure 1. DNA as the representamen of the biological evolution. f = encoding during the process of evolution (i.e., origin of life and phylogensis); g = decoding performed by the living cell (also called gene expression or ontogenesis); h = genetic information flow (also called inheritance). The commutativity condition is thought to be held, i.e., f x g = h. All the best. Sung On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 10:41 AM, Stephen Jarosek sjaro...@iinet.net.au wrote: Sung, this still does not explain the “technology” behind reading DNA and how said data gets transformed to thoughts and actions
