Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 18-juil.-06, à 18:42, 1Z a écrit :

> >> and  I would say experimentally vague since the birth of experimental
> >> quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman, Deutsch, Bennett
> >> ...).
> >
> > Huh Electrons and photons are still matter...what *do* you mean ?
>
>
> "matter" is a word use like a lot of misuse of God in theocracies. What
> do you mean when you say "photon" is matter? That we can make repeated
> measurement on them and find stable number pattern.


Also that we can measure it at all, that is available for causal
interaction.
That it exists and other things don't.


> > (BTW, Deutsch uses the Johnsonian "if it kicks back" appraoch
> > to reality).
>
>
> Yes. And Deutsch applied it to defend AR in his FOR (Fabric Of Reality)
> book.

On the basis that you can detect unexpected truths
in maths. Which you can. But that is not *causal* interaction,
so it is not existence in my book.


> >> The big problem with the notion of *primary* matter =  how to relate
> >> "1-experiences" with "3-experiments".
> >
> > The mind-body prolbem boild down to qualia, and
> > the problem of qualia and physics boils down to
> > the problem of qualia and mathematical description
>
>
> Feeling to listen to myself here :)

That's the *problem* of maths, not the *solution* !


> > Any inability to have mental proeprties would
> > itslef be a property and
> > therefore be inconsistent with the bareness of a bare substrate.
>
>
> You mean an electron or a string would have bare mental properties.
> I admire you being  coherent with non-comp.

I mean a bare substrate. Electons are a particular form of matter which
is thought of in physical, and hence ,mathematical terms.

> > The
> > "subjectity" of
> > consciouss states, often treated as "inherent" boils down to a problem
> > of communicating
> > one's qualia -- how one feesl, how things seem.
>
>
> I would say it is more the uncommunicability of qualia which could be
> problematic.


Huh ? Meaning if we can't communicate them, that is a problem ?
Or meaning that if we can't understand why we can't communicate them,
that is a problem.

> > Thus it is not truly
> > inherent but
> > depends on the means of communication being used. Feelings and seemings
> > can be more readily
> > communicated in artistic, poetice language, and least readily in
> > scientifi technical
> > language.
>
>
> OK, but that is not scientific (3-person) communication. An artist need
> to bet on sufficiently similar experiences for those he wish to
> "communicate" with.

Mathematics is the epitome and pinnacle of 3rd-person communication
*because* it deals with abstract structures. Because it deals with
abstract structures,
it is not good at handling concrete reality -- substance, time,
enality.

> > Since the harder, more technical a science is, the more
> > mathematical it is,
> > the communication problem is at its most acute in a purely mathematical
> > langauge.
> > Thus the problem with physicalism is not its posit of matter (as a bare
> > substrate)
> > but its other posit, that all properties are phycial. Since physics is
> > mathematical,
> > that amounts to the claim that all properties are mathematical (or at
> > least mathematically
> > describable). In making the transition from a physicalist world-view to
> > a mathematical
> > one, the concept of a material substrate is abandoned (although it was
> > never a problem
> > for consciousness) and the posit of mathematical properties becomes,
> > which is a problem
> > for consciousness becomes extreme.
>
>
> I agree.


Really ?

> >> The naïve idea of attaching consciousness to physical activity leads
> >> to
> >> fatal difficulties.
> >
> > Do you mean the Maudlin/Olympia/Movie argument ? But that is
> > very much phsyical activity as opposed to physical passivity.
> > If you are the kind of physicalist who thinks
> > counterfactuals and potentials are part of the total
> > physical situation, the Maudlin argument has little
> > impact.
>
> This is cute. It is already a way to derive QM from comp, especially if
> you know Hardegree's work showing that Quantum Logic is a particular
> logic of counterfactuals. Again, with comp, it is cuter: the stuffy
> appearances are explained by that very counterfactuality: the "stuff"
> can be defined by what makes "many comp dreams" partially sharable.
> Solidity has to be explained by *many* things (world, computations,
> etc.).


I don't think of substance in terms of solidity. Is that the
problem ? Is that why you keep saying that matter has disappeared from
physics -- because "solidity" has ?

> May I ask you what is your opinion on Everett?

Philosophically, it is still a substance theory. The SWE is a
contingent
fact which does not emerge out of Platonia, and as such it resolves the
HP (as much as
it needs to be resolved in the face of the evidence of QM).

I think MW has technical probelms as physics.

> > Of course. I start from the assumption
> > that I 

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 18-juil.-06, à 18:42, 1Z a écrit :

>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Le 12-juil.-06, à 18:06, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>> I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical
>>> justification.
>>
>> So this is your main hypothesis: what is material exist.
>> Now my problem is that a term like "material" is very vague in 
>> physics,
>
> Huh ? Physics studies matter, energy, time and space. Those
> are its topics. Physics may not have a single neat definition of
> matter, but
> that does not mean physicsts are a lot to know what it is.
> Arguably, the whole of economics is a definition of "money",
> Likewise for physics and matter.


All right. That is what I was saying. You do postulate stuffy matters. 
I don't. It is all normal you have to criticize comp. But your critics 
of the AR part of it does not convince me.




>
>
>> and  I would say experimentally vague since the birth of experimental
>> quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman, Deutsch, Bennett 
>> ...).
>
> Huh Electrons and photons are still matter...what *do* you mean ?


"matter" is a word use like a lot of misuse of God in theocracies. What 
do you mean when you say "photon" is matter? That we can make repeated 
measurement on them and find stable number pattern.




>
> (BTW, Deutsch uses the Johnsonian "if it kicks back" appraoch
> to reality).


Yes. And Deutsch applied it to defend AR in his FOR (Fabric Of Reality) 
book.



>
>
>> The big problem with the notion of *primary* matter =  how to relate
>> "1-experiences" with "3-experiments".
>
> The mind-body prolbem boild down to qualia, and
> the problem of qualia and physics boils down to
> the problem of qualia and mathematical description


Feeling to listen to myself here :)


>
>
> Consciousness is a problem for all forms of materialism and physicalism
> to some
> extent, but it is possible to discern where the problem is particularly
> acute.
> There is no great problem with the idea that matter considered as a
> bare substrate can
> have mental properities.


Ah? (Well I guess I can deduce it from your non-comp theory)



> Any inability to have mental proeprties would
> itslef be a property and
> therefore be inconsistent with the bareness of a bare substrate.


You mean an electron or a string would have bare mental properties.
I admire you being  coherent with non-comp.



> The
> "subjectity" of
> consciouss states, often treated as "inherent" boils down to a problem
> of communicating
> one's qualia -- how one feesl, how things seem.


I would say it is more the uncommunicability of qualia which could be 
problematic.



> Thus it is not truly
> inherent but
> depends on the means of communication being used. Feelings and seemings
> can be more readily
> communicated in artistic, poetice language, and least readily in
> scientifi technical
> language.


OK, but that is not scientific (3-person) communication. An artist need 
to bet on sufficiently similar experiences for those he wish to 
"communicate" with.





> Since the harder, more technical a science is, the more
> mathematical it is,
> the communication problem is at its most acute in a purely mathematical
> langauge.
> Thus the problem with physicalism is not its posit of matter (as a bare
> substrate)
> but its other posit, that all properties are phycial. Since physics is
> mathematical,
> that amounts to the claim that all properties are mathematical (or at
> least mathematically
> describable). In making the transition from a physicalist world-view to
> a mathematical
> one, the concept of a material substrate is abandoned (although it was
> never a problem
> for consciousness) and the posit of mathematical properties becomes,
> which is a problem
> for consciousness becomes extreme.


I agree.




>
>> The naïve idea of attaching consciousness to physical activity leads 
>> to
>> fatal difficulties.
>
> Do you mean the Maudlin/Olympia/Movie argument ? But that is
> very much phsyical activity as opposed to physical passivity.
> If you are the kind of physicalist who thinks
> counterfactuals and potentials are part of the total
> physical situation, the Maudlin argument has little
> impact.

This is cute. It is already a way to derive QM from comp, especially if 
you know Hardegree's work showing that Quantum Logic is a particular 
logic of counterfactuals. Again, with comp, it is cuter: the stuffy 
appearances are explained by that very counterfactuality: the "stuff" 
can be defined by what makes "many comp dreams" partially sharable. 
Solidity has to be explained by *many* things (world, computations, 
etc.).

May I ask you what is your opinion on Everett?



> Of course. I start from the assumption
> that I exist, since I do.


If by "I" you mean your first person, it is a good implicit assumption 
to motivate the moring cup of coffe or tea. But such an assumption is 
not "scientific", where we are asked to have refutable third person 
assumption.



>
> I don't start from the assum

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Bruno Marchal wrote:


> >> No. But what actually *seems* to exist, could emerge from mathematical
> >> truth.
> >
> > No, same problem. There's no more any phenomenality to be
> > found in maths than any substantiallity.
>
>
>
>
> But there is no more any phenomenality to be found in physics,

Then we need something ontologically richer than physics
to explain experience, not something onotologically
stripped-down (physics without substance).


> nor
> really substantiality, unless you define it by electron or strings.

Substance is mass-energy, and it still exists
as such in current physics.

>  But
> nobody has proved that electron or string, or energy, ... are stuffy.

Huh ? They have non-zero mass-energy. That's all
physicists need. Was that a solipsist's "proved" ?

> In books and laboratories I see only relation between numbers, and
> eventually they are related to personal qualia, like the feeling to see
> a needle on some apparatus.

Looks like it was

IOW, having assumed solipsism, you can find no way out of it.

Well, you can: you can assume the Platonic existence of numbers,
even though numbers as such don't feature in your experience.

But if you are entitled to do that to find a way out
of solipsism, the materialist is entitled to assume matter.

(Or even posit substance as necessary to explain the phenomenal flow
of time, as Kant did).

> You seem to believe it is easier to make consciousness emerged or just
> related with stuffy things.

Some kinds of non-mathematical stuff are needed to resolve
the HP problem, to explain time, to explain phenomenality
and so on. The point is to posit enough to explain the universe
as we experience it and then stop.

>  How and why? Many philosophers of mind
> agree that a pain or any qualia are not something localized.

I'm not one of them.

>  A pain is
> already immaterial,

There is no basis for saying that whatosever.
Only living organisms feel pains, and organisms
are material.

> and that is why so many accept the comp hyp
> (perhaps without seeing the consequences of it): it is easier to
> explain (or to tackle an explanation) of consciousness (immaterial)
> from something immaterial (like numbers or relations between numbers)
> than on something material.

So can you give the mathematical formula for the colour
purple, or the taste of honey ? Of course not!

The mind-body problem boils down to reconciling phenomenality with
mathematical* descriptions, not with matter pre se!

Consciousness is a problem for all forms of materialism and physicalism
to some extent, but it is possible to discern where the problem is
particularly acute. There is no great problem with the idea that matter
considered as a bare substrate can have mental properities. Any
inability to have mental proeprties would itslef be a property and
therefore be inconsistent with the bareness of a bare substrate. The
"subjectity" of consciouss states, often treated as "inherent" boils
down to a problem of communicating one's qualia -- how one feesl, how
things seem. Thus it is not truly inherent but depends on the means of
communication being used. Feelings and seemings can be more readily
communicated in artistic, poetice language, and least readily in
scientifi technical language. Since the harder, more technical a
science is, the more mathematical it is, the communication problem is
at its most acute in a purely mathematical langauge. Thus the problem
with physicalism is not its posit of matter (as a bare substrate) but
its other posit, that all properties are phycial. Since physics is
mathematical, that amounts to the claim that all properties are
mathematical (or at least mathematically describable). In making the
transition from a physicalist world-view to a mathematical one, the
concept of a material substrate is abandoned (although it was never a
problem for consciousness) and the posit of mathematical properties
becomes, which is a problem for consciousness becomes extreme.


>  Especially when we don't know what
> "material" really means.

It means the substrate of properties, contingent existence, endurance
through time, and hence real change, unactualised potential and causal
interaction.

> I hope you agree that the mind/body problem is
> not yet solved. My point is just a reformulation of it in the comp
> frame. Then I got partial solutions.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 18-juil.-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit :

>
> It is far from obvious that a simulation even
> contains 1stP POV's.


I agree with you. That is why I postulate comp to begin with.





>  In any case
> that doesn't effect the logic: simulations
> *might* be detectable, so they are not necessarily
> indetectable.


I totally agree with you. Indeed, I take the qm-MWI (Everett, Deutsch, 
...) as evidence we are detecting the "simulated" or "emulated" aspect 
of our reality.
Comp predict that any machine looking below its "level of substitution" 
will detect, albeit indirectly, the presence of *many* interfering 
realities. Only with comp, those realities are not material, but number 
theoretical.




>
>
>> No. But what actually *seems* to exist, could emerge from mathematical
>> truth.
>
> No, same problem. There's no more any phenomenality to be
> found in maths than any substantiallity.




But there is no more any phenomenality to be found in physics, nor 
really substantiality, unless you define it by electron or strings. But 
nobody has proved that electron or string, or energy, ... are stuffy. 
In books and laboratories I see only relation between numbers, and 
eventually they are related to personal qualia, like the feeling to see 
a needle on some apparatus.

You seem to believe it is easier to make consciousness emerged or just 
related with stuffy things. How and why? Many philosophers of mind 
agree that a pain or any qualia are not something localized. A pain is 
already immaterial, and that is why so many accept the comp hyp 
(perhaps without seeing the consequences of it): it is easier to 
explain (or to tackle an explanation) of consciousness (immaterial) 
from something immaterial (like numbers or relations between numbers) 
than on something material. Especially when we don't know what 
"material" really means. I hope you agree that the mind/body problem is 
not yet solved. My point is just a reformulation of it in the comp 
frame. Then I got partial solutions.

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[John M]

Bruno and 1Z:

both of you write extraordinary wise remarks in
approx. 3-4 times as many words than I can attentively
folloow. 
However - with mostly agreeing with the positions of
BOTH OF YOU - I may remark (hopefully in less words??)
*
I consider the epistemic development of our experience
about the world, from precaveman on, so I consider the
figments of earlier explanations reflected in ongoing
(scientific and common sense) thinking. Matter(ly?) is
a primitive view physicists picked up centuries (25+?)
ago and still ride it. I don't know better myself. 
Experimental (truth) is gathered by whatever
constructs the appropriate epistemic level allowed for
instrument design and for (sweatty) explanations on
"readings". 
Math contributed always to the misunderstganding by
equating the primitively cut model-views into soothing
matchings: to satisfy the 'savants'. As long as we do
abide by the past misunderstandings (and I mean
EVERYTHING gotten from past wisdom) and do not regard
them just as hints for a better thinking, we go in
circles. Example the multiverse as a replications of
this one we observe (as we can). I had no echo on 'my'
multiverse: universes in "all possible" qualia and
"all possible systems (some of them - maybe - CAPABLE
OF CONTACTING US. That reaches into sci-fi, into the
'zookeeper' theory, even a rational foundation for
many religious miracles and their systemic
explanations. E.g. teleportation marvels and Q-suicide
etc.)

1Z mentions 'mentality of matter' - of course, if we
consider the m-word as ideational functioning, any
following of 'rules' in the coexistence(?) simplified
in our physics (and logical) reductionism as 'laws'. 
Matter is more difficult, we 'grew' into percepts over
milennia to assign response to impact as 'hard',
'pain', 'warm', whatever. 

The "all possible" is a hard phrase, WE are not to
tell what is (=we find) possible or not. Matter,
particles are  not possible, they are explanations for
our age- long ignorance and so leveled explanations,
which went as inherited memes into our basic 'mental'
construction
and gives foundation to the ways we think.

I cannot elaborate on these features, cannot defend
them in an argument, cannot even 'think' in them: I am
(I hope) a human being with all the imperfections.

And I may be wrong, just as any other thinking person.

John Mikes  

--- 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: 
> 
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> > Le 12-juil.-06, � 18:06, 1Z a �crit :
> >
> > >
> > > I mean that is what material exists regardless
> of any mathematical
> > > justification.
> >
> > So this is your main hypothesis: what is material
> exist.
> > Now my problem is that a term like "material" is
> very vague in physics,
> 
> Huh ? Physics studies matter, energy, time and
> space. Those
> are its topics. Physics may not have a single neat
> definition of
> matter, but
> that does not mean physicsts are a lot to know what
> it is.
> Arguably, the whole of economics is a definition of
> "money",
> Likewise for physics and matter.
> 
> 
> > and  I would say experimentally vague since the
> birth of experimental
> > quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman,
> Deutsch, Bennett ...).
> 
> Huh Electrons and photons are still
> matter...what *do* you mean ?
> 
> (BTW, Deutsch uses the Johnsonian "if it kicks back"
> appraoch
> to reality).
> 
> 
> > The big problem with the notion of *primary*
> matter =  how to relate
> > "1-experiences" with "3-experiments".
> 
> The mind-body prolbem boild down to qualia, and
> the problem of qualia and physics boils down to
> the problem of qualia and mathematical description
> 
> 
> Consciousness is a problem for all forms of
> materialism and physicalism
> to some
> extent, but it is possible to discern where the
> problem is particularly
> acute.
> There is no great problem with the idea that matter
> considered as a
> bare substrate can
> have mental properities. Any inability to have
> mental proeprties would
> itslef be a property and
> therefore be inconsistent with the bareness of a
> bare substrate. The
> "subjectity" of
> consciouss states, often treated as "inherent" boils
> down to a problem
> of communicating
> one's qualia -- how one feesl, how things seem. Thus
> it is not truly
> inherent but
> depends on the means of communication being used.
> Feelings and seemings
> can be more readily
> communicated in artistic, poetice language, and
> least readily in
> scientifi technical
> language. Since the harder, more technical a science
> is, the more
> mathematical it is,
> the communication problem is at its most acute in a
> purely mathematical
> langauge.
> Thus the problem with physicalism is not its posit
> of matter (as a bare
> substrate)
> but its other posit, that all properties are
> phycial. Since physics is
> mathematical,
> that amounts to the claim that all properties are
> mathematical (or at
> least mathematically
> describable). In making the transition from a
> physicalist world-view to
> a 

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Bruno Marchal wrote:

> Le 12-juil.-06, à 18:06, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> > I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical
> > justification.
>
> So this is your main hypothesis: what is material exist.
> Now my problem is that a term like "material" is very vague in physics,

Huh ? Physics studies matter, energy, time and space. Those
are its topics. Physics may not have a single neat definition of
matter, but
that does not mean physicsts are a lot to know what it is.
Arguably, the whole of economics is a definition of "money",
Likewise for physics and matter.


> and  I would say experimentally vague since the birth of experimental
> quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman, Deutsch, Bennett ...).

Huh Electrons and photons are still matter...what *do* you mean ?

(BTW, Deutsch uses the Johnsonian "if it kicks back" appraoch
to reality).


> The big problem with the notion of *primary* matter =  how to relate
> "1-experiences" with "3-experiments".

The mind-body prolbem boild down to qualia, and
the problem of qualia and physics boils down to
the problem of qualia and mathematical description


Consciousness is a problem for all forms of materialism and physicalism
to some
extent, but it is possible to discern where the problem is particularly
acute.
There is no great problem with the idea that matter considered as a
bare substrate can
have mental properities. Any inability to have mental proeprties would
itslef be a property and
therefore be inconsistent with the bareness of a bare substrate. The
"subjectity" of
consciouss states, often treated as "inherent" boils down to a problem
of communicating
one's qualia -- how one feesl, how things seem. Thus it is not truly
inherent but
depends on the means of communication being used. Feelings and seemings
can be more readily
communicated in artistic, poetice language, and least readily in
scientifi technical
language. Since the harder, more technical a science is, the more
mathematical it is,
the communication problem is at its most acute in a purely mathematical
langauge.
Thus the problem with physicalism is not its posit of matter (as a bare
substrate)
but its other posit, that all properties are phycial. Since physics is
mathematical,
that amounts to the claim that all properties are mathematical (or at
least mathematically
describable). In making the transition from a physicalist world-view to
a mathematical
one, the concept of a material substrate is abandoned (although it was
never a problem
for consciousness) and the posit of mathematical properties becomes,
which is a problem
for consciousness becomes extreme.

> The naïve idea of attaching consciousness to physical activity leads to
> fatal difficulties.

Do you mean the Maudlin/Olympia/Movie argument ? But that is
very much phsyical activity as opposed to physical passivity.
If you are the kind of physicalist who thinks
counterfactuals and potentials are part of the total
physical situation, the Maudlin argument has little
impact.


> >> Well, why not, if that is your definition. I understand better why you
> >> say you could introduce "matter" in Platonia. Plato would have
> >> disagree
> >> in the sense that "matter" is the shadow of the ideal intelligible
> >> reality.
> >
> > What is material exists. Whether Platonia exists
> > is another matter. It is for Platonism to justify itslef
> > in terms of the concrete reality we find oursleves in,
> > not for concrete reality to be justify itself in terms
> > of Platonia.
>
> It depends of the assumptions you start from.

Of course. I start from the assumption
that I exist, since I do.

I don't start from the assumtion that numbers
exist supernaturally , floating around in Plato's
heaven.

> > The "intelligible" is a quasi-empiricist mathematical epistemology.
> > Mathematicians are supposed by Platonists to be able to "perceive"
> > mathematical
> > truth with some extra organ.
>
>
> That is naïve platonism. Already condemned by Plato himself and most of
> his followers. Read Plotinus for more on this (especially Ennead V).


The question then is whether numbers have any role at all,
if they have no epistemological role.

> >> I don't understand what you mean by "numbers don't exist at all".
> >
> > Well, I've never seen one.
>
>
> Again that would be a critics of naïve Platonism. As I have said:
> "number n exists in Platonia" means just that the proposition "number n
> exists" is true. For example I believe that the equation
> x^2 - 61y^2 = 1 admits integers solutions independently of any things
> related to me.

If that is all it means, it cannot possibly support an argument
whose conclusion is that something really exists.

The conclusion of a deductive argument has to be implicit in its
premisses.

> >> Numbers exists in Platonia in the sense that the classical proposition
> >> "4356667654090987890111 is prime or 4356667654090987890111 is not
> >> prime" is true there.
> >
> > It's true here. why bring Platonia into

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 18-juil.-06, à 16:37, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> > A computer simulation is obviously computable.
>
>
> Not necessarily from the first person povs.

It is far from obvious that a simulation even
contains 1stP POV's. In any case
that doesn't effect the logic: simulations
*might* be detectable, so they are not necessarily
indetectable.


> No. But what actually *seems* to exist, could emerge from mathematical
> truth.

No, same problem. There's no more any phenomenality to be
found in maths than any substantiallity.


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 18-juil.-06, à 16:37, 1Z a écrit :


> A computer simulation is obviously computable.


Not necessarily from the first person povs.




> The word "emerge" is often used to hide magic.


I agree with you. Often, but not necessarily always.




> What actually exists cannot emerge from mere truths.


No. But what actually *seems* to exist, could emerge from mathematical 
truth.

Sometimes I feel we agree on everything except the theory we play with.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 18-juil.-06, à 12:30, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >> Quentin Anciaux: Because if you were in a "simulation" and you have
> >> managed to get out of it,
> >> how can you know you have reach the bottom level of reality (ie: the
> >> material
> >> world then) ? How can you know the new real world you are now in is
> >> the real
> >> world and not another simulation ?
> >
> > 1Z: e.g it has some non-computable physics.
>
>
> But comp and platonism already predict some non computable physics. You
> said it yourself by pointing correctly that platonism leads to the
> apparent possibility of HP universe (Harry Potter Universe, or flying
> pigs, or random noise, ...).

Platonism obviously implies non-computability,
since non-computable functions mathematically exist.

However, the claim was that we are in a computer simulation.

A computer simulation is obviously computable.

>The mystery with "naive comp" is that it
> remains something apparently computable in our neighborhood.
> And that  "mystery" cannot be used as a straightforward refutation of
> comp, once we look at the non trivialities of computer science and of
> consistent self-referential discourses.
>
> If we bet on comp, then we can already bet we already live in a
> simulation, the natural one which emerges from the "creative nature" of
> the relations between numbers.

The word "emerge" is often used to hide magic.

What actually exists cannot emerge from mere truths.


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 18-juil.-06, à 12:30, 1Z a écrit :

>> Quentin Anciaux: Because if you were in a "simulation" and you have 
>> managed to get out of it,
>> how can you know you have reach the bottom level of reality (ie: the 
>> material
>> world then) ? How can you know the new real world you are now in is 
>> the real
>> world and not another simulation ?
>
> 1Z: e.g it has some non-computable physics.


But comp and platonism already predict some non computable physics. You 
said it yourself by pointing correctly that platonism leads to the 
apparent possibility of HP universe (Harry Potter Universe, or flying 
pigs, or random noise, ...). The mystery with "naive comp" is that it 
remains something apparently computable in our neighborhood.
And that  "mystery" cannot be used as a straightforward refutation of 
comp, once we look at the non trivialities of computer science and of 
consistent self-referential discourses.

If we bet on comp, then we can already bet we already live in a 
simulation, the natural one which emerges from the "creative nature" of 
the relations between numbers.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:

> Le Mercredi 12 Juillet 2006 23:54, 1Z a écrit :
> > Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism.
> > Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism
> > (whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational
> > thesis, that "cognition is computation").
>
> If computationalism is true then platonism must also be true.
>
> Because if you were in a "simulation" and you have managed to get out of it,
> how can you know you have reach the bottom level of reality (ie: the material
> world then) ? How can you know the new real world you are now in is the real
> world and not another simulation ?

e.g it has some non-computable physics.

>  It is the turtle on the turtle on the
> turtle... Even if you take "standard computational thesis", then by the
> reasoning upper you must reject a bottom level real... ie: a material world,
> a stuffy world... every reality is stuffy and real (from the inside).

"(seemingly) real (from the inside" just doesn't add up
to "really real". Your argument only works if you adopt
solipsistic premises to start with -- if you just want to have your
sensations explained. All you are saying is that if you don't
care about what is ultimately true, you do need to bother
with what is ultimately real. Equally, if you are interested in
ultimate
truth, you will need ultimate reality. It has no impact on a realist at
all.

(BTW, the same arguments that say you don't need matter mean
you don't need Other Minds, so solipsism is very much the word!)


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

1Z wrote:

Erratum:


> http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/diagrams/time_growing.jpg
> 
> http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/met_time2.html


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Jesse Mazer wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> >
> >Jesse Mazer wrote:


> >IOW, if MMW heories worked, MMW theories would work.
>
> No, that is not a fair paraphrase of what I said. I meant exactly what I
> said I meant--if a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the
> relative probability of different possibilities, that does not justify the
> claim that the hypothesis predicts each possibility is equally likely. Do
> you agree with this principle or not?

If a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the
relative probability of different possibilities, the claim
that they are not all the same is unsupported.




> >That isnot really analogous becasue the CC can only have one
> >value at a time.
>
> That difference is irrelevant to my point about probabilities. Again, it is
> *always* unjustified to say that because a theory doesn't predict the
> relative probabilities of different outcomes, that means it predicts they
> are equally likely; it doesn't matter whether or not we are talking about
> the probability in the context of a large ensemble of events (say, the
> probability a certain type of atom will decay in a 1-minute time period,
> where we are repeating the test with a large number of atoms) or in the
> context of a single event.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary , you have to
assume that probabilites are even.




> > > In this case I would say the reference would be to a certain concept
> >which
> > > humans have collectively defined;
> >
> >No, that's the sense. Sense is in-hte-head , reference
> >is out-of-the-head.
>
> OK, I see. So what if we are talking about a concept in itself, as in "most
> people's concept of a unicorn is that of a horse-like creature with a single
> horn"; would the "concept" itself be a reference?

Only the reference of "a concept" is a concept.

Fictional terms don't have referents. That's why they are unreal.

The point is that you don't need reference for meaning.



> >If we can reason about (for instance)
> >historical what-is without concrete ferefernces is parallel
> >dimensions, we can reason about maths without taking
> >a trip to Plato's heaven.


> But I have already made clear that I *don't* think that we need to refer to
> platonic forms which somehow causally interact with people's brains in our
> explanation of how people reason about math, just like David K Lewis doesn't
> think we need a causal interaction between different possible worlds to
> explain how people reason about possibilities.

So how do we need to refer to them ? Why do we need to refer to them ?
If they are causally inactive, an evil daemon could snap his
fingers and make them vanish. How do we know that hasn't happened
already ?

We can interact with real-world objects, and we must interact it them
in order to confirm the truth of non-mathematical, not-fictional
sentences.

If we had reason to think mathematical sentences were uniform with
empirical sentences, we would be forced to require the existence of
mathematical objects in spite of their lack of a role to play.

But it is the very fact that we do not need experiment or observation
to confirm mathematical sentences that shows they are differnt
from empirical sentences, and different in a way that absolves them
from requiring reference.


> > > The question was to try to help me grasp what you meant by "sense
> >without
> > > reference" and "mind-independent". If it's impossible to come up with
> >any
> > > examples outside of math, that should make you suspicious whether
> > > mathematics really has the strange and marvellous property of there
> >being
> > > objective mind-independent truths about mathematical terms even though
> >they
> > > lack any reference.
> >
> >No it shoudn't. Maths is obviously unique in a number of respects.
> >That is why there is such a subject as philosophy-of-mathematics.


> That's pretty vague--unique in what respects? Does uniqueness in these other
> respects somehow justify the belief that it is unique in the respect of
> involving both sense-without-reference and mind-independence?

Yes. Maths is apriori. It doesn't require experiment or
observation. Aprioriness is explained by analycity.
An analytical sentences contains in its meaning everything
necessary to determine its truth-value. Analycity is explained
by sense. Analycity requires a kind of meaning that is
in-the-head, in addition to reference.

Analycity and aprioriness explain objectivity and necessity. if
mathematical sentence doesn't require anything outside
itself to arrive at its truth value, then its truth-value
is not going to vary between times, places and persons.

> > >  If you really believe this, you should at least be able
> > > to give an argument about *why* math is different from every other
> >domain in
> > > this respect.
> >
> >
> >It is on a deeper level of abstraction.
>
> That doesn't remotely resemble an argument--can you define precisely what
> "deeper level of abstraction" means, and why "

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Jesse Mazer wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> >
> >Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > 1Z wrote:
> > >
> >

> > > If a theory can't predict the relative probabilities of X vs. Y, that is
> >not
> > > in any way equivalent to the statement that it predicts X and Y are
> >equally
> > > likely. One is an absence of any prediction, the other is a specific and
> > > definite prediction.
> >
> >IOW, if MMW heories worked, MMW theories would work.
>
> No, that is not a fair paraphrase of what I said. I meant exactly what I
> said I meant--if a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the
> relative probability of different possibilities, that does not justify the
> claim that the hypothesis predicts each possibility is equally likely. Do
> you agree with this principle or not?

If a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the
relative probability of different possibilities, the claim
that they are not all the same is unsupported.




> >That isnot really analogous becasue the CC can only have one
> >value at a time.
>
> That difference is irrelevant to my point about probabilities. Again, it is
> *always* unjustified to say that because a theory doesn't predict the
> relative probabilities of different outcomes, that means it predicts they
> are equally likely; it doesn't matter whether or not we are talking about
> the probability in the context of a large ensemble of events (say, the
> probability a certain type of atom will decay in a 1-minute time period,
> where we are repeating the test with a large number of atoms) or in the
> context of a single event.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary , you have to
assume that probabilites are even.


> Anyway, it is quite possible that even if string theory could make
> predictions about the value of the cosmological constant, it would only be a
> probabilistic prediction rather than predicting a single unique value, which
> means that if you are prepared to entertain either the MWI of quantum
> mechanics or "chaotic inflation" where new universes bubble from prior ones
> via inflation, then there might in fact be different "universes" with
> different values of the cosmological constant.





> > > >We can make "sense" of "unicorns have horns", despite
> > > >the lack of reference.
> > >
> > > In this case I would say the reference would be to a certain concept
> >which
> > > humans have collectively defined;
> >
> >No, that's the sense. Sense is in-hte-head , reference
> >is out-of-the-head.
>
> OK, I see. So what if we are talking about a concept in itself, as in "most
> people's concept of a unicorn is that of a horse-like creature with a single
> horn"; would the "concept" itself be a reference?

Only the reference of "a concept" is a concept.

Fictional terms don't have referents. That's why they are unreal.

The point is that you don't need reference for meaning.



> > > I agree, and even a "modal realist" philosopher like David Lewis (see
> > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Lewis_(philosopher) ), who thinks
> >that
> > > propositions about possibilities can only be objectively true or false
> >if we
> > > assume all possible worlds actually exist, would not say that there is
> >any
> > > kind of causal interaction between worlds needed to explain our ability
> >to
> > > reason about them.
> >

> >If we can reason about (for instance)
> >historical what-is without concrete ferefernces is parallel
> >dimensions, we can reason about maths without taking
> >a trip to Plato's heaven.


> But I have already made clear that I *don't* think that we need to refer to
> platonic forms which somehow causally interact with people's brains in our
> explanation of how people reason about math, just like David K Lewis doesn't
> think we need a causal interaction between different possible worlds to
> explain how people reason about possibilities.

So how do we need to refer to them ? Why do we need to refer to them ?
If they are causally inactive, an evil daemon could snap his
fingers and make them vanish. How do we know that hasn't happened
already ?

We can interact with real-world objects, and we must interact it them
in order to confirm the truth of non-mathematical, not-fictional
sentences.

If we had reason to think mathematical sentences were uniform with
empirical sentences, we would be forced to require the existence of
mathematical objects in spite of their lack of a role to play.

But it is the very fact that we do not need experiment or observation
to confirm mathematical sentences that shows they are differnt
from empirical sentences, and different in a way that absolves them
from requiring reference.


> > > The question was to try to help me grasp what you meant by "sense
> >without
> > > reference" and "mind-independent". If it's impossible to come up with
> >any
> > > examples outside of math, that should make you suspicious whether
> > > mathematics really has the strange and marvellous property of there
> >being
> > > objective mind-independent

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 12-juil.-06, à 18:06, 1Z a écrit :

>
> I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical
> justification.

So this is your main hypothesis: what is material exist.
Now my problem is that a term like "material" is very vague in physics, 
and  I would say experimentally vague since the birth of experimental 
quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman, Deutsch, Bennett ...).
The big problem with the notion of *primary* matter =  how to relate 
"1-experiences" with "3-experiments".
The naïve idea of attaching consciousness to physical activity leads to 
fatal difficulties.



>
>> Well, why not, if that is your definition. I understand better why you
>> say you could introduce "matter" in Platonia. Plato would have 
>> disagree
>> in the sense that "matter" is the shadow of the ideal intelligible
>> reality.
>
> What is material exists. Whether Platonia exists
> is another matter. It is for Platonism to justify itslef
> in terms of the concrete reality we find oursleves in,
> not for concrete reality to be justify itself in terms
> of Platonia.

It depends of the assumptions you start from.



> The "intelligible" is a quasi-empiricist mathematical epistemology.
> Mathematicians are supposed by Platonists to be able to "perceive"
> mathematical
> truth with some extra organ.


That is naïve platonism. Already condemned by Plato himself and most of 
his followers. Read Plotinus for more on this (especially Ennead V).



>
>> I don't understand what you mean by "numbers don't exist at all".
>
> Well, I've never seen one.


Again that would be a critics of naïve Platonism. As I have said: 
"number n exists in Platonia" means just that the proposition "number n 
exists" is true. For example I believe that the equation
x^2 - 61y^2 = 1 admits integers solutions independently of any things 
related to me.




>
>> Numbers exists in Platonia in the sense that the classical proposition
>> "4356667654090987890111 is prime or 4356667654090987890111 is not
>> prime" is true there.
>
> It's true here. why bring Platonia into it ?


I don't understand what you mean by "4356667654090987890111 is prime or 
not" is true here.
Is it false or meaningless on the moon?
is it false or meaningless beyond the solar system?
is it false or meaningless beyond the Milky Way?




>
>>> they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical 
>>> world,
>>> as Bruno requires.
>>
>> Why?
>
> What doesn't exist at all cannot underpin the existence of anything --
> even of an illusion.


I do agree with you. But, once we assume comp, we can attach 
consciousness to sheaf of computational histories (abstract 
computations which can be defined precisely from the Fi and the Wi: 
more in the diagonalization posts).
Those computations are entirely defined by infinite sets of true 
relations among numbers. You could perhaps wait I define the "Kleene 
predicate" in the diagonalization posts. or read the beautiful work of 
Matiazevitch on the diophantine equations. A set of numbers is RE, i.e. 
is a Wi set, if and only if it is given by the zero of a diophantine 
polynomial.
In *all* situation, when I say a number exists, or when I say a 
sequence of numbers exists, I only mean that the proposition expressing 
that existence is true independently of me or you.





>
>> With Church thesis all computations, as defined in computer
>> science (not in physics), exists in Platonia, exactly in the same 
>> sense
>> that for the prime numbers above.
>
> That is a most unhelpful remark. All you said above is
> that true mathematical sentences have truth-values
> independent of you. You have now started treating
> that as a claim about existence. It is as if
> your are using "is true" and "exists" as synonyms.


You did not read carefully what I have said. I am just using "exists" 
as a quantifier (in first or second order logic). Exists n P(n) = truth 
of "exists n P(n)".
I believe that there is an infinity of twin primes ... or not, 
independently of the fact that mathematicians on this planet or 
elsewhere will solve, or not, that (currently open) problem.




>
>> And I do provide evidence that "rational unitary transform" could be
>> the mathematical computations winning the measure-battle in Platonia.
>
>
> Huh How can you have a battle without time ?


By using varieties of theoretical computer science notion of 
convergence. If you want, I am using the integers themselves for 
measuring complexity of computations. The UDA shows that if you are in 
the  comp state S, then your "consistent extensions" are defined by a 
measure on all computations going through that state S. It is a static 
well defined mathematical set. A type of computation wins the 
measure-battle if it has a reasonable measure.




>
>> This would explain not only the existence of computations with
>> self-aware observers, but also they relative stability.@
>> But MUCH more can be said, from Solovay theorem (justifying the modal
>> logics G and

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Jesse Mazer]

1Z wrote:

>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> >
>
> > > > But it is a straw man to say "everything-theories makes the 
>prediction
> > >that
> > > > Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones",
> > >because in
> > > > fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just 
>said
> > > > something like, "everything theories do not yet have any rigourous 
>proof
> > > > that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones" 
>I
> > > > wouldn't object.
> > >
> > >If they do not yet have any rigourous proof
> > >that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones
> > >then they do IN FACT make the prediction that
> > >Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones
> >
> > If a theory can't predict the relative probabilities of X vs. Y, that is 
>not
> > in any way equivalent to the statement that it predicts X and Y are 
>equally
> > likely. One is an absence of any prediction, the other is a specific and
> > definite prediction.
>
>IOW, if MMW heories worked, MMW theories would work.

No, that is not a fair paraphrase of what I said. I meant exactly what I 
said I meant--if a hypothesis is not well-defined enough to tell you the 
relative probability of different possibilities, that does not justify the 
claim that the hypothesis predicts each possibility is equally likely. Do 
you agree with this principle or not?

>
> > >
> > >Classical physicists din't WANT to make the
> > >implications that atoms are unstable and will
> > >implode; nonetheless, classical phsyics makes that
> > >assumption.
> >
> > Yes, that is a definite prediction of classical mechanics, and therefore 
>has
> > nothing to do with examples of theories that cannot make definite
> > predictions about certain questions in the first place. A more analogous
> > case would be the fact that string theory cannot at present predict the
> > value of the cosmological constant; would you therefore conclude that
> > "string theory predicts all values of the cosmological constant are 
>equally
> > likely"?
>
>That isnot really analogous becasue the CC can only have one
>value at a time.

That difference is irrelevant to my point about probabilities. Again, it is 
*always* unjustified to say that because a theory doesn't predict the 
relative probabilities of different outcomes, that means it predicts they 
are equally likely; it doesn't matter whether or not we are talking about 
the probability in the context of a large ensemble of events (say, the 
probability a certain type of atom will decay in a 1-minute time period, 
where we are repeating the test with a large number of atoms) or in the 
context of a single event.

Anyway, it is quite possible that even if string theory could make 
predictions about the value of the cosmological constant, it would only be a 
probabilistic prediction rather than predicting a single unique value, which 
means that if you are prepared to entertain either the MWI of quantum 
mechanics or "chaotic inflation" where new universes bubble from prior ones 
via inflation, then there might in fact be different "universes" with 
different values of the cosmological constant.


>
>
>
> > > > > > >"Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems 
>of
> > >our
> > > > > > >mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem 
>of
> > > > > > >arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal
> > > > > > >numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and 
>that
> > > > > > >the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are 
>ABOUT
> > > > > > >ABSTRACT OBJECTS "
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >(emphasis added)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > What do the words "abstract object" mean to you? To me, if
> > >propositions
> > > > > > about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or 
>beliefs,
> > >that's
> > > > > > equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract
> > > > >objects--how
> > > > > > could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything?
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >By having sense but no reference, for instance.
> > > > >
> > > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference
> > > >
> > > > The sense/reference distinction is about the possibility of our 
>having
> > > > multiple mentally distinct terms which map to the same real-world
> > > > object...but what would "sense but no reference" mean?
> > >
> > >We can make "sense" of "unicorns have horns", despite
> > >the lack of reference.
> >
> > In this case I would say the reference would be to a certain concept 
>which
> > humans have collectively defined;
>
>No, that's the sense. Sense is in-hte-head , reference
>is out-of-the-head.

OK, I see. So what if we are talking about a concept in itself, as in "most 
people's concept of a unicorn is that of a horse-like creature with a single 
horn"; would the "concept" itself be a reference?

>
> > > > I don't see how there can be an
> > > > objective, mind-indepe

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Bruno Marchal wrote:

> Deutsch uses this to explain "objectivity", and argues, with such a
> criteria due to Johnson, that math is objective. Perhaps some
> materialist use this to define matter but then there need to define
> "kicking back", and thus interaction, etc.

Johnson' demonstration was supposed to be ostensive, not semantic.


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le Mercredi 12 Juillet 2006 23:54, 1Z a écrit :
> Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism.
> Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism
> (whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational
> thesis, that "cognition is computation").

If computationalism is true then platonism must also be true.

Because if you were in a "simulation" and you have managed to get out of it, 
how can you know you have reach the bottom level of reality (ie: the material 
world then) ? How can you know the new real world you are now in is the real 
world and not another simulation ? It is the turtle on the turtle on the 
turtle... Even if you take "standard computational thesis", then by the 
reasoning upper you must reject a bottom level real... ie: a material world, 
a stuffy world... every reality is stuffy and real (from the inside).

Regards,
Quentin


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Bruno Marchal wrote:

> > You could at least state them.
>
> I do it in all paper on this subject, and I have done it at nauseam in
> this list. It is computationalism: the doctrine according to which
> there is a level of substitution such that I survive a digital graft
> made correctly at that level. (+ CT + AR for giving univocal sense to
> word like "number" and (discrete) computation").  Just go there:
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/
> SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>
> (I recall having already given to you this reference).


3) Arithmetical Realism (AR). This is the assumption that arithmetical
proposition, like
''1+1=2,'' or Goldbach conjecture, or the inexistence of a
bigger prime, or the statement
that some digital machine will stop, or any Boolean formula bearing on
numbers, are
true independently of me, you, humanity, the physical universe (if that
exists), etc. It is
a version of Platonism limited at least to arithmetical truth."


Platonism isn't about truth, it is about existence.


http://www.maa.org/reviews/whatis.html

There were three major points of view in the debate about the nature of
mathematics. The formalists argued (roughly: the short
summaries that follow are really caricatures) that mathematics was
really simply the formal manipulation of symbols based on
arbitrarily-chosen axioms. The Platonists saw mathematics as almost an
experimental science, studying objects that really exist
(in some sense), though they clearly don't exist in a physical or
material sense. The intuitionists had the most radical point of
view; essentially, they saw all mathematics as a human creation and
therefore as essentially finite.



http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#1

Platonism is the view that there exist abstract objects, and again, an
object is abstract just in case it is non-spatiotemporal, i.e.,
does not exist in space or time. [ ... ] Three examples of things that
are often taken to be abstract are (a) mathematical objects
(most notably, numbers), (b) properties, and (c) propositions.

Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our
mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime'
(a theorem of arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite
cardinal numbers' (a theorem of set theory) -
are literally true and that the only plausible view of such sentences
is that they are about abstract objects
(i.e., that their singular terms denote abstract objects and their
existential quantifiers range over abstract objects).



The philosophy of Plato, or an approach to philosophy resembling his.
For example, someone who asserts that numbers exist
independently of the things they number could be called a Platonist.



http://www.fortunecity.com/emachines/e11/86/enm3.html#

The view that mathematical concepts could exist in such a
timeless,ethereal sense was put forward in ancient times
(c.360 BC) by the great Greek philosopher  Plato.Consequently,this view
is frequently referred to as mathematical Platonism


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
>
> 1Z wrote:
> > I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until
> > demostrated
> > otherwise.
>
> This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that
> Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary
> reality does not exists ! It even doesn't mean anything in this
> context.

And the point of my various comments is that what he
has actualy shown is that IF computationalism is true
AND ontologicial Platonism is true AND if the HP prolbem
can be solved AND the appearance-of-time problem can be
solved AND if there is nothing more to consciousness
than cognition AND occam's razor still applies in
Paltonia THEN materialism is an unnecessary hypothesis.


> So the point is not that you accept or not computationalism and
> stuffy/not stuffy stuff... It is just that if you accept
> computationalism you cannot accept a primary reality... If you do not
> (as it seems) then it's normal, but you cannot claim computationalism
> at the same time, Bruno proved that it is not compatible.

Bruno-computationalism is standard computationalism+platonism.
Since I reject platomnism, I reject Bruno-computationalism
(whilst having rather less problem with the standard computational
thesis, that "cognition is computation").


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi,

1Z wrote:
> I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until
> demostrated
> otherwise.

This was not the point... the point was to make you understand that
Bruno has proved that *IF* computationalism is true *THEN* primary
reality does not exists ! It even doesn't mean anything in this
context.

So the point is not that you accept or not computationalism and
stuffy/not stuffy stuff... It is just that if you accept
computationalism you cannot accept a primary reality... If you do not
(as it seems) then it's normal, but you cannot claim computationalism
at the same time, Bruno proved that it is not compatible.

Regards,
Quentin


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 11-juil.-06, ˆ 21:06, 1Z a Žcrit :
>
> > And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
> > it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
>
> See my work and this list for some path toward it.
>
>
> > To have material existence is to have non-zero measure,
> > and vice-versa.
>
>
> So, in the space {0,1}* (that is: the space of functions from N to
> {0,1}, or the space of infinite sequence of "0" and "1") together with
> some reasonable topology)  the set of random sequences, just because it
> has non-zero measure, has a material existence ?!?!?!.


I mean that is what material exists regardless of any mathematical
justification.

> Well, why not, if that is your definition. I understand better why you
> say you could introduce "matter" in Platonia. Plato would have disagree
> in the sense that "matter" is the shadow of the ideal intelligible
> reality.

What is material exists. Whether Platonia exists
is another matter. It is for Platonism to justify itslef
in terms of the concrete reality we find oursleves in,
not for concrete reality to be justify itself in terms
of Platonia.

>  Note the "intelligible", which will be developped by Plotinus
> (notably), taking then "ontology" in "my" sense (or Jesse one, or as I
> and Jesse are suspecting: the common current one).

The "intelligible" is a quasi-empiricist mathematical epistemology.
Mathematicians are supposed by Platonists to be able to "perceive"
mathematical
truth with some extra organ.

> > Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our
> > mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of
> > arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal
> > numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that
> > the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT
> > ABSTRACT OBJECTS
>
> I agree, (although in some context it helps to consider mathematical
> objects like numbers and strings, turing machine's computation as
> concrete, to better appreciate the non concreteness of "variables and
> functions", but this should not be relevant here).

What are you agreeing with? That Platoism is an ontological
claim ?

> > Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even
> > platonically --
>
> I am just saying that the truth value of the sentence "there is a prime
> number" does not depend on me ...

Then your AR is non-ontological, and does
not justify the claim that we are in Platonia,
since it doesn't justify the claim that Platonia exists.

> I don't understand what you mean by "numbers don't exist at all".

Well, I've never seen one.

> Numbers exists in Platonia in the sense that the classical proposition
> "4356667654090987890111 is prime or 4356667654090987890111 is not
> prime" is true there.

It's true here. why bring Platonia into it ?

> > they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical world,
> > as Bruno requires.
>
> Why?

What doesn't exist at all cannot underpin the existence of anything --
even of an illusion.

> With Church thesis all computations, as defined in computer
> science (not in physics), exists in Platonia, exactly in the same sense
> that for the prime numbers above.

That is a most unhelpful remark. All you said above is
that true mathematical sentences have truth-values
independent of you. You have now started treating
that as a claim about existence. It is as if
your are using "is true" and "exists" as synonyms.

> And I do provide evidence that "rational unitary transform" could be
> the mathematical computations winning the measure-battle in Platonia.


Huh How can you have a battle without time ?

> This would explain not only the existence of computations with
> self-aware observers, but also they relative stability.@
> But MUCH more can be said, from Solovay theorem (justifying the modal
> logics G and G* for the provable and non provable by a machine/entity
> self-referential truth) I get not only an arithmetical quantization
> justifying the quanta, I get a larger theory divided into sharable and
> non sharable measurement results. This means I get one mathematical
> structure explaining not only the appearance of a physical world (the
> quanta),

You have to explain how a mathematical structure can appear
at all, before you can explain how it can appear quantal (or whatever).

> but explaining why such quanta are accompanied by non
> communicable personal truth (like the qualia experienced by the
> physicist at the moment where he look at the needle of his/her
> measuring apparatus). In *that* precise sense, the comp-physics is in
> advance on the "materialist hypo based physics".

Materialism does not imply everything should be communicable.

> Now when you say in another post:
>
> > I cant address your anti-materialism arguments directly since
> > you idn't state them, only alluding to them.
>
> I think you have a memory problem. See my URL for my papers. Se

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 12-juil.-06, à 03:53, Jesse Mazer a écrit :

> Well, I don't think the world obeys mathematical laws because it is 
> causally
> interacting with platonic forms, any more than I think the world obeys 
> the
> law of noncontradiction because it is causally interacting with 
> platonic
> laws of logic. I would say ontology is about the most exhaustive 
> possible
> list of objective truths, and any entity referred to in this 
> exhaustive list
> of objectively true statements "exists" by definition.


Very well said Jesse. It is a very fundamental point.

Even Godel did not entirely understand this for a time, and has been, 
at some moment of its intellectual life, tempted by the idea that 
mathematician could have a sort sixth sense letting them to apprehend 
"physically" platonist truth. But this can be related to its non-comp 
earlier temptation. Eventually Godel will see the point: 
physicalisation of platonia makes the relation between math and physics 
still more impalatable.
In plato it is more simple: the "heaven" is the *intelligible in 
principle* realm of forms, and with Plotinus, this is extended up to 
the border of the non-intelligible called evil, transcendental 
obscurity or ... matter.
This (advanced) remark could help for the arithmetical interpretation 
of the Plotinian hypostases.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 12-juil.-06, à 02:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :

BM (Bruno):
>> For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And
>> none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for
>> granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by
>> knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists.

BM (Brent):
> But that is consistent.  You assume arithmetic is real and so you seek 
> an arithmetical definition of
> matter.



or better an arithmetical justification why machines believes (in some 
local correct and stable way) in the appearance of empirical 
stability/matter.
I doubt that word like "matter"  or "consciousness" or "god" can be 
"third person" defined at all.




> A scientists assume the matter gives an operational definition, e.g. 
> as Vic Stenger does:
> matter is what kicks back when you kick it.


Deutsch uses this to explain "objectivity", and argues, with such a 
criteria due to Johnson, that math is objective. Perhaps some 
materialist use this to define matter but then there need to define 
"kicking back", and thus interaction, etc.




> You cannot criticize people who don't believe in
> Platonia for giving non-platonic definitions.


They believe in Platonia in the sense we use the words in the list 
since years. Once again, all what I say is that the belief that you can 
survive with  a digital brain (material or not) entails the total lack 
of explanative power of any notion of primary matter.
 From a pure logical point of view, a materialist who believes in comp 
can still believe in "primitive matter", but he cannot use it in any 
account of a "material sensation". Primary matter is devoid of any 
explanation power. It is perhaps the last form of ether or phlogiston 
...
It would be false modesty on my part to harbor doubt about my 
derivation. Also, it has been verified by many many people now, and 
although systematic error are possible, I am on the path to make a 
paper corresponding to my thesis along with the new development both 
mathematical, and then "plotinian".
The result is highly not obvious after 1500 of Aristotelianism,  but  
it has been intuited by many during one millennium of greek rational 
theology. See also Descartes who, imo, already annonced the coming back 
of the platonician and the "rational mystics"  (called theoretician by 
the greeks).

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 11-juil.-06, ˆ 21:06, 1Z a Žcrit :

> And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
> it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.

See my work and this list for some path toward it.


> To have material existence is to have non-zero measure,
> and vice-versa.


So, in the space {0,1}* (that is: the space of functions from N to  
{0,1}, or the space of infinite sequence of "0" and "1") together with  
some reasonable topology)  the set of random sequences, just because it  
has non-zero measure, has a material existence ?!?!?!.

Well, why not, if that is your definition. I understand better why you  
say you could introduce "matter" in Platonia. Plato would have disagree  
in the sense that "matter" is the shadow of the ideal intelligible  
reality. Note the "intelligible", which will be developped by Plotinus  
(notably), taking then "ontology" in "my" sense (or Jesse one, or as I  
and Jesse are suspecting: the common current one).


> Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our
> mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of
> arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal
> numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that
> the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT
> ABSTRACT OBJECTS

I agree, (although in some context it helps to consider mathematical  
objects like numbers and strings, turing machine's computation as  
concrete, to better appreciate the non concreteness of "variables and  
functions", but this should not be relevant here).


> Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even
> platonically --

I am just saying that the truth value of the sentence "there is a prime  
number" does not depend on me ...
I don't understand what you mean by "numbers don't exist at all".  
Numbers exists in Platonia in the sense that the classical proposition  
"4356667654090987890111 is prime or 4356667654090987890111 is not  
prime" is true there.

> they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical world,
> as Bruno requires.

Why? With Church thesis all computations, as defined in computer  
science (not in physics), exists in Platonia, exactly in the same sense  
that for the prime numbers above.
And I do provide evidence that "rational unitary transform" could be  
the mathematical computations winning the measure-battle in Platonia.  
This would explain not only the existence of computations with  
self-aware observers, but also they relative stability.@
But MUCH more can be said, from Solovay theorem (justifying the modal  
logics G and G* for the provable and non provable by a machine/entity  
self-referential truth) I get not only an arithmetical quantization  
justifying the quanta, I get a larger theory divided into sharable and  
non sharable measurement results. This means I get one mathematical  
structure explaining not only the appearance of a physical world (the  
quanta), but explaining why such quanta are accompanied by non  
communicable personal truth (like the qualia experienced by the  
physicist at the moment where he look at the needle of his/her  
measuring apparatus). In *that* precise sense, the comp-physics is in  
advance on the "materialist hypo based physics".

Now when you say in another post:

> I cant address your anti-materialism arguments directly since
> you idn't state them, only alluding to them.

I think you have a memory problem. See my URL for my papers. Search in  
Science-direct Elsevier for my last one.

> Insamuch as you claim that COMP is your only
> assumption, CT and AR are *not* assumed explicitly.

I defined in this list comp by "yes doctor"+ CT + AR. In my Brussel's  
thesis  "conscience et mŽcanisme" I call it digital mechanism. CT is  
explicitly assumed for giving a univocal sense to the words  
computations or digital machine, and AR is made explicit for clarity.  
That comp entails immateriality (in the sense that the observable must  
be justified by computer science exclusively) is just a result (not  
obvious at all).

> Brains are material. Computers are material.

Ah. If you say so. Perhaps you are right,  but then they are actual  
material realities, not emulable at all by any turing machine. It is up  
to you to find the mistake in the UDA, if you still believe that comp  
does not entail the reversal between physics and number theory (large  
sense like in the book of Manin on Number Theory).

> Comp is about the behaviour of the brain as a material system.

This is the naturalist preconception of comp. If you want it is comp  
before I get the proof that comp entails immateriality. But perhaps you  
agree now, giving that you gave us an immaerial definition of matter:  
measure ­ 0. (But elsewhere you gave another: casually capable of  
interacting with you: so I am not sure).


>> Why should I prove my assumptions?
>
> You could at least state them.

I do it in all paper on thi

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Jesse Mazer wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>

> > > But it is a straw man to say "everything-theories makes the prediction
> >that
> > > Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones",
> >because in
> > > fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just said
> > > something like, "everything theories do not yet have any rigourous proof
> > > that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones" I
> > > wouldn't object.
> >
> >If they do not yet have any rigourous proof
> >that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones
> >then they do IN FACT make the prediction that
> >Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones
>
> If a theory can't predict the relative probabilities of X vs. Y, that is not
> in any way equivalent to the statement that it predicts X and Y are equally
> likely. One is an absence of any prediction, the other is a specific and
> definite prediction.

IOW, if MMW heories worked, MMW theories would work.

> >
> >Classical physicists din't WANT to make the
> >implications that atoms are unstable and will
> >implode; nonetheless, classical phsyics makes that
> >assumption.
>
> Yes, that is a definite prediction of classical mechanics, and therefore has
> nothing to do with examples of theories that cannot make definite
> predictions about certain questions in the first place. A more analogous
> case would be the fact that string theory cannot at present predict the
> value of the cosmological constant; would you therefore conclude that
> "string theory predicts all values of the cosmological constant are equally
> likely"?

That isnot really analogous becasue the CC can only have one
value at a time.



> > > > > >"Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of
> >our
> > > > > >mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of
> > > > > >arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal
> > > > > >numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that
> > > > > >the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT
> > > > > >ABSTRACT OBJECTS "
> > > > > >
> > > > > >(emphasis added)
> > > > >
> > > > > What do the words "abstract object" mean to you? To me, if
> >propositions
> > > > > about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs,
> >that's
> > > > > equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract
> > > >objects--how
> > > > > could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything?
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >By having sense but no reference, for instance.
> > > >
> > > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference
> > >
> > > The sense/reference distinction is about the possibility of our having
> > > multiple mentally distinct terms which map to the same real-world
> > > object...but what would "sense but no reference" mean?
> >
> >We can make "sense" of "unicorns have horns", despite
> >the lack of reference.
>
> In this case I would say the reference would be to a certain concept which
> humans have collectively defined;

No, that's the sense. Sense is in-hte-head , reference
is out-of-the-head.

> there is no way you could have a
> mind-independent truth about whether unicorns have horns that's separate
> from what people collectively believe about unicorns.

The unicorn example is an example of sense without
reference. It is not an example of mind-indepnednet truth.


> >Senses are logically
> >interelated in a way that allows us to confirm
> >the truth-values of *some* sentences
> >without seaking theri references. Those
> >kind of sentences are called apriopri, and it
> >is almost universally held that mathematical sentences
> >are apriori.
>
> Holding that they are a priori is not the same as holding that they lack
> references; platonists would presumably agree they're a priori.

Analycity explains apriority, and sense explains analycity.

> > > I don't see how there can be an
> > > objective, mind-independent truth about a term that doesn't refer to any
> > > coherent object or possibility.
> >
> >I am not asking you to. There are coherent possibilities that
> >are not instantiated (or perphaps
> >I should say, pace many-worlders, not obviously instantiated).
> >
> >Nonetheless, we can address many issues about these possibilites
> >without peaking into the universe next door. Many-world
> >metaphysics is not needed to explain how abstrract reasoning
> >is possible.
>
> I agree, and even a "modal realist" philosopher like David Lewis (see
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Lewis_(philosopher) ), who thinks that
> propositions about possibilities can only be objectively true or false if we
> assume all possible worlds actually exist, would not say that there is any
> kind of causal interaction between worlds needed to explain our ability to
> reason about them.

If we can reason about (for instance)
historical what-is without concrete ferefernces is parallel
dimensions, we can reason about math

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Jesse Mazer]

>I would say ontology is about the most exhaustive possible
>list of objective truths, and any entity referred to in this exhaustive 
>list
>of objectively true statements "exists" by definition. With something like 
>a
>unicorn, once you have all true statements about peoples' *concepts* of
>unicorns, you won't have any additional statements about what unicorns are
>"really" like; but with mathematics I think there can be statements that
>would be true even if no human had thought about them, or if they had
>thought about them but concluded they were false due to some mental error.

By the way, I just came across this website which supports my notion that 
philosophers tend to define "ontology" in terms of the entities you'd need 
to refer to in an exhaustive list of objectively true statements:

http://artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/ontology.html

"The most familiar theory of ontological commitment is that offered by Quine 
in his "On what there is" (1948). It may fairly be called the received view 
of ontological commitment. In effect, it is a combination of a criterion of 
ontological commitment and an account of that to which the criterion 
applies.

The criterion itself is quite simple. A sentence S is committed to the 
existence of an entity just in case either (i) there is a name for that 
entity in the sentence or (ii) the sentence contains, or implies, an 
existential generalization where that entity is needed to be the value of 
the bound variable. In other words, one is committed to an entity if one 
refers to it directly or implies that there is some individual which is that 
entity.

Quine’s account of that to which the criterion applies provides the theory 
some bite. On his account, a sentence is not, in fact, committed to an 
entity if there is some acceptable paraphrase of it which avoids commitment 
to it as per the criterion.

The appeal to paraphrase allows us to avoid the problem of Plato’s Beard, or 
the problem of nonexistent entities to which we nonetheless apparently 
refer. The names are to be eliminated in such a way that the remaining set 
of true claims contains none committed to any such entity after the manner 
of the theory. For example, the name ‘Pegasus’ is eliminated in favor of a 
verb ‘Pegasize,’ which is understood as the thing one does when one is 
Pegasus. We can then say that nothing Pegasizes."

[end quote]


Would there by any way to "paraphrase" statements about mathematical truths 
purely in terms of statements about physical entities? I don't see how, 
because again, there is always the possibility that all attempts to compute 
some mathematical truth (say, whether a given axiomatic system can produce a 
given proposition) using physical computers or brains could go wrong, but 
that wouldn't change the mind-independent mathematical truth itself.

Jesse



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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Jesse Mazer]

1Z wrote:

>
>
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > IZ wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > > IZ wrote:
> > > >
> > >
> > > > >And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
> > > > >it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
> > > > >
> > > > >However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure,
> > > > >no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence
> > > > >is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure,
> > > > >and vice-versa.
> > > >
> > > > Yes, but the point is that almost all of us on this list want to 
>*find*
> > >a
> > > > "satisfactory theory of measure" to apply to "everything", so it's a
> > > > strawman to say that it's a prediction of "everything" hypotheses 
>that
> > >Harry
> > > > Potter universes should be just as probable as any other.
> > >
> > >
> > >Wanting to find a measure theory doesn't mean you have
> > >found one, and if you havent found one, it isn't a straw man
> > >to say so.
> > >
> >
> > But it is a straw man to say "everything-theories makes the prediction 
>that
> > Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones", 
>because in
> > fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just said
> > something like, "everything theories do not yet have any rigourous proof
> > that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones" I
> > wouldn't object.
>
>If they do not yet have any rigourous proof
>that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones
>then they do IN FACT make the prediction that
>Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones

If a theory can't predict the relative probabilities of X vs. Y, that is not 
in any way equivalent to the statement that it predicts X and Y are equally 
likely. One is an absence of any prediction, the other is a specific and 
definite prediction.

>
>Classical physicists din't WANT to make the
>implications that atoms are unstable and will
>implode; nonetheless, classical phsyics makes that
>assumption.

Yes, that is a definite prediction of classical mechanics, and therefore has 
nothing to do with examples of theories that cannot make definite 
predictions about certain questions in the first place. A more analogous 
case would be the fact that string theory cannot at present predict the 
value of the cosmological constant; would you therefore conclude that 
"string theory predicts all values of the cosmological constant are equally 
likely"?

>
>
> > > > > > >UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your
> > > > > > >argument for that -- AR as you call it --
> > > > > > >just repeats the same error: the epistemological
> > > > > > >claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is 
>mind-independent"
> > > > > > >is confused with the ontological claim "the number of 17 exists
> > > > > > >separately
> > > > > > >from us in Plato's heaven".
> > > > >
> > > > > > But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical
> > >platonism,
> > > > > > that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent--
> > > > >
> > > > >nope.
> > > > >
> > > > >"Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of 
>our
> > > > >mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of
> > > > >arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal
> > > > >numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that
> > > > >the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT
> > > > >ABSTRACT OBJECTS "
> > > > >
> > > > >(emphasis added)
> > > >
> > > > What do the words "abstract object" mean to you? To me, if 
>propositions
> > > > about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, 
>that's
> > > > equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract
> > >objects--how
> > > > could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything?
> > >
> > >
> > >By having sense but no reference, for instance.
> > >
> > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference
> >
> > The sense/reference distinction is about the possibility of our having
> > multiple mentally distinct terms which map to the same real-world
> > object...but what would "sense but no reference" mean?
>
>We can make "sense" of "unicorns have horns", despite
>the lack of reference.

In this case I would say the reference would be to a certain concept which 
humans have collectively defined; there is no way you could have a 
mind-independent truth about whether unicorns have horns that's separate 
from what people collectively believe about unicorns.


>Senses are logically
>interelated in a way that allows us to confirm
>the truth-values of *some* sentences
>without seaking theri references. Those
>kind of sentences are called apriopri, and it
>is almost universally held that mathematical sentences
>are apriori.

Holding that they are a priori is not the same as holding that they lack 
references; platonists would presumably agree they'r

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Brent Meeker wrote:

> > For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And
> > none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for
> > granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by
> > knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists.
>
> But that is consistent.  You assume arithmetic is real and so you seek an 
> arithmetical definition of
> matter.  A scientists assume the matter gives an operational definition, e.g. 
> as Vic Stenger does:
> matter is what kicks back when you kick it.  You cannot criticize people who 
> don't believe in
> Platonia for giving non-platonic definitions.

hear,hear!


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Jesse Mazer wrote:
> IZ wrote:
>
> >
> >
> >
> >Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > IZ wrote:
> > >
> >
> > > >And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
> > > >it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
> > > >
> > > >However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure,
> > > >no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence
> > > >is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure,
> > > >and vice-versa.
> > >
> > > Yes, but the point is that almost all of us on this list want to *find*
> >a
> > > "satisfactory theory of measure" to apply to "everything", so it's a
> > > strawman to say that it's a prediction of "everything" hypotheses that
> >Harry
> > > Potter universes should be just as probable as any other.
> >
> >
> >Wanting to find a measure theory doesn't mean you have
> >found one, and if you havent found one, it isn't a straw man
> >to say so.
> >
>
> But it is a straw man to say "everything-theories makes the prediction that
> Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones", because in
> fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just said
> something like, "everything theories do not yet have any rigourous proof
> that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones" I
> wouldn't object.

If they do not yet have any rigourous proof
that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones
then they do IN FACT make the prediction that
Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones
even if they Everything theorists don't WNAT them
to make that prediciton. The implications of a premiss
are what they are, not what we want them to be.

Classical physicists din't WANT to make the
implications that atoms are unstable and will
implode; nonetheless, classical phsyics makes that
assumption.


> > > > > >UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your
> > > > > >argument for that -- AR as you call it --
> > > > > >just repeats the same error: the epistemological
> > > > > >claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent"
> > > > > >is confused with the ontological claim "the number of 17 exists
> > > > > >separately
> > > > > >from us in Plato's heaven".
> > > >
> > > > > But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical
> >platonism,
> > > > > that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent--
> > > >
> > > >nope.
> > > >
> > > >"Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our
> > > >mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of
> > > >arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal
> > > >numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that
> > > >the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT
> > > >ABSTRACT OBJECTS "
> > > >
> > > >(emphasis added)
> > >
> > > What do the words "abstract object" mean to you? To me, if propositions
> > > about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's
> > > equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract
> >objects--how
> > > could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything?
> >
> >
> >By having sense but no reference, for instance.
> >
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference
>
> The sense/reference distinction is about the possibility of our having
> multiple mentally distinct terms which map to the same real-world
> object...but what would "sense but no reference" mean?

We can make "sense" of "unicorns have horns", despite
the lack of reference. Senses are logically
interelated in a way that allows us to confirm
the truth-values of *some* sentences
without seaking theri references. Those
kind of sentences are called apriopri, and it
is almost universally held that mathematical sentences
are apriori.

> A term that is
> completely meaningless, like a round square?

A refernceless term only needs to be contingently
non-existent, like "present King of France". Logical
impossiblity is over-egging it.

> I don't see how there can be an
> objective, mind-independent truth about a term that doesn't refer to any
> coherent object or possibility.

I am not asking you to. There are coherent possibilities that
are not instantiated (or perphaps
I should say, pace many-worlders, not obviously instantiated).

Nonetheless, we can address many issues about these possibilites
without peaking into the universe next door. Many-world
metaphysics is not needed to explain how abstrract reasoning
is possible.

>  Can you think of any statements outside of
> math or logic that you would say have "sense but no reference" but also have
> a mind-independent truth value?

What difference does it make ? The topic is maths.


> >The case for mathematical Platonism needs to be made in the first
> >place; if numbers do not exist at all, the universe, as an existing
> >thing, cannot be a mathematical structure.
>
> Again, what does "exist" mean for you?

Capable o

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
> 
> 
>>>How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
>>
>>By explaining a lot from on e premiss.
> 
> 
> 
> I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it 
> explains nothing, like when "God" is used as an (empty) explanation.
> Today, physician relates numbers with numbers (like in F = ma, or E = 
> mc^2), but we still don't know if particles exist, in which sense, if 
> they are as big as the universe like expanding waves, etc.
> (You talk sometimes if physics was not confronted to conceptual 
> difficulties, which can be enlightened by MWI ideas, but, wait, there 
> is still many remaining questions OK?
> 
> 
> 
>>>First nobody knows what such a "substance" can be defined without
>>>infinite regress.
>>
>>"No one" ? But there are far more materialist
>>philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays.
> 
> 
> 
> For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And 
> none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for 
> granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by 
> knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists.

But that is consistent.  You assume arithmetic is real and so you seek an 
arithmetical definition of
matter.  A scientists assume the matter gives an operational definition, e.g. 
as Vic Stenger does: 
matter is what kicks back when you kick it.  You cannot criticize people who 
don't believe in 
Platonia for giving non-platonic definitions.

Brent Meeker



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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Jesse Mazer]

IZ wrote:

>
>
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > IZ wrote:
> >
>
> > >And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
> > >it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
> > >
> > >However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure,
> > >no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence
> > >is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure,
> > >and vice-versa.
> >
> > Yes, but the point is that almost all of us on this list want to *find* 
>a
> > "satisfactory theory of measure" to apply to "everything", so it's a
> > strawman to say that it's a prediction of "everything" hypotheses that 
>Harry
> > Potter universes should be just as probable as any other.
>
>
>Wanting to find a measure theory doesn't mean you have
>found one, and if you havent found one, it isn't a straw man
>to say so.
>

But it is a straw man to say "everything-theories makes the prediction that 
Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones", because in 
fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just said 
something like, "everything theories do not yet have any rigourous proof 
that Harry Potter universes should be less likely than lawlike ones" I 
wouldn't object.


> >  Some rough
> > proposals for such a theory of measure have been made in this list in 
>the
> > past, like the "universal prior" (see
> > http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/node2.html or
> > http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/node4.html ), or my own 
>speculation
> > that a theory of consciousness assigning relative and absolute 
>probability
> > to observer-moments might have only a single self-consistent solution 
>(see
> > http://tinyurl.com/ekz7u or http://tinyurl.com/jnaqb for more on this 
>idea).
> >
> > >
> > > > >You are not going to get anywhere with the
> > > > >UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your
> > > > >argument for that -- AR as you call it --
> > > > >just repeats the same error: the epistemological
> > > > >claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent"
> > > > >is confused with the ontological claim "the number of 17 exists
> > > > >separately
> > > > >from us in Plato's heaven".
> > >
> > > > But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical 
>platonism,
> > > > that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent--
> > >
> > >nope.
> > >
> > >"Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our
> > >mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of
> > >arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal
> > >numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that
> > >the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT
> > >ABSTRACT OBJECTS "
> > >
> > >(emphasis added)
> >
> > What do the words "abstract object" mean to you? To me, if propositions
> > about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's
> > equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract 
>objects--how
> > could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything?
>
>
>By having sense but no reference, for instance.
>
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference

The sense/reference distinction is about the possibility of our having 
multiple mentally distinct terms which map to the same real-world 
object...but what would "sense but no reference" mean? A term that is 
completely meaningless, like a round square? I don't see how there can be an 
objective, mind-independent truth about a term that doesn't refer to any 
coherent object or possibility. Can you think of any statements outside of 
math or logic that you would say have "sense but no reference" but also have 
a mind-independent truth value?

>The case for mathematical Platonism needs to be made in the first
>place; if numbers do not exist at all, the universe, as an existing
>thing, cannot be a mathematical structure.

Again, what does "exist" mean for you?

>However, the basic case for the
>objectivity of mathematics is the tendency of mathematicians to agree
>about the answers to mathematical problems; this can be explained by
>noting that mathematical logic is based on axioms and rules of
>inference, and different mathematicians following the same rules will
>tend to get the same answers , like different computers running the
>same problem.

"Tend to", although occasionally they can make mistakes. For the answer to 
be really objective, you need to refer to some sort of ideal mathematician 
or computer following certain rules, but that is just another form of 
Platonism.


>
> > >
> > >http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.1
> > >
> > > > this is itself
> > > > an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one.
> > >
> > >Quite. Did you mean that the other way around ?
> >
> > No, I was responding to your comment:
> >
> > >You are not going to get anywhere with the
> > >UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your
> > >

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Le Mardi 11 Juillet 2006 21:52, 1Z a écrit :
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
> > > Now if you assume "primary matter", no doubt you need to reject comp,
> > > giving that what I show is that you cannot have both.
> >
> > Brains are material. Computers are material.
>
> I think you misunderstand something here (or I do). I think when bruno talk
> about matter (and always emphasis it with primary), it really means "primary
> reality"... That said, it means (taking as an example the movie the matrix),
> that when neo wake up after taking the red pill and is welcome by Morpheus
> saying "Welcome to the real world" is not true... There can't be a "real
> world" in this sense, a primary world where the other reality is emulated in
> a stuffy computer, a world which is at the beginning of the emulated chain...
> The computer who runs the matrix in the Morpheus real world (so outside the
> so called matrix) is as stuffy as the computer running the matrix inside the
> matrix.
>
> Regads,
> Quentin

I will take the stuff that seems solid to me as primary reality until
demostrated
otherwise.


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Jesse Mazer wrote:
> IZ wrote:
>

> >And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
> >it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
> >
> >However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure,
> >no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence
> >is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure,
> >and vice-versa.
>
> Yes, but the point is that almost all of us on this list want to *find* a
> "satisfactory theory of measure" to apply to "everything", so it's a
> strawman to say that it's a prediction of "everything" hypotheses that Harry
> Potter universes should be just as probable as any other.


Wanting to find a measure theory doesn't mean you have
found one, and if you havent found one, it isn't a straw man
to say so.

>  Some rough
> proposals for such a theory of measure have been made in this list in the
> past, like the "universal prior" (see
> http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/node2.html or
> http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/node4.html ), or my own speculation
> that a theory of consciousness assigning relative and absolute probability
> to observer-moments might have only a single self-consistent solution (see
> http://tinyurl.com/ekz7u or http://tinyurl.com/jnaqb for more on this idea).
>
> >
> > > >You are not going to get anywhere with the
> > > >UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your
> > > >argument for that -- AR as you call it --
> > > >just repeats the same error: the epistemological
> > > >claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent"
> > > >is confused with the ontological claim "the number of 17 exists
> > > >separately
> > > >from us in Plato's heaven".
> >
> > > But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism,
> > > that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent--
> >
> >nope.
> >
> >"Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our
> >mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of
> >arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal
> >numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that
> >the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT
> >ABSTRACT OBJECTS "
> >
> >(emphasis added)
>
> What do the words "abstract object" mean to you? To me, if propositions
> about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's
> equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract objects--how
> could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything?


By having sense but no reference, for instance.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference


The case for mathematical Platonism needs to be made in the first
place; if numbers do not exist at all, the universe, as an existing
thing, cannot be a mathematical structure. (solipsists read: if numbers
are not real, I cannot be mathematical structure). The case for
mathematical Platonism is usually argued on the basis of the objective
nature of mathematical truth. Superficially, it seems persuasive that
objectivity requires objects. However, the basic case for the
objectivity of mathematics is the tendency of mathematicians to agree
about the answers to mathematical problems; this can be explained by
noting that mathematical logic is based on axioms and rules of
inference, and different mathematicians following the same rules will
tend to get the same answers , like different computers running the
same problem.


Your remark is quite telling though. Almost everybody on the list
is making that kind of asumotion with varying degrees of
unconsiousness.


> >
> >http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.1
> >
> > > this is itself
> > > an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one.
> >
> >Quite. Did you mean that the other way around ?
>
> No, I was responding to your comment:
>
> >You are not going to get anywhere with the
> >UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your
> >argument for that -- AR as you call it --
> >just repeats the same error: the epistemological
> >claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent"
> >is confused with the ontological claim "the number of 17 exists
> >separately
> >from us in Plato's heaven".
>
> Here you seem to be saying that "the truth value of '17 is prime' is
> mind-independent" is a purely "epistemological" claim.

It certainly *could* be, at least. Platonism is *not* the only
philosophy of mathematics!

>  What I'm saying is
> that it's necessarily ontological, as are any claims about the objective
> (mind-independent) truth-value of a given proposition.

So you are claiming that mathematical Platonism is not merely
true but *necessarily* true ? That is quite a claim!

>
> >
> > > Few would literally
> > > imagine some alternate dimension called "Plato's heaven" where platonic
> > > forms hang out, and which is somehow able to causally interact with our
> > > brains to produce our ideas about math

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi,

Le Mardi 11 Juillet 2006 21:52, 1Z a écrit :
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
> > Now if you assume "primary matter", no doubt you need to reject comp,
> > giving that what I show is that you cannot have both.
>
> Brains are material. Computers are material.

I think you misunderstand something here (or I do). I think when bruno talk 
about matter (and always emphasis it with primary), it really means "primary 
reality"... That said, it means (taking as an example the movie the matrix), 
that when neo wake up after taking the red pill and is welcome by Morpheus 
saying "Welcome to the real world" is not true... There can't be a "real 
world" in this sense, a primary world where the other reality is emulated in 
a stuffy computer, a world which is at the beginning of the emulated chain... 
The computer who runs the matrix in the Morpheus real world (so outside the 
so called matrix) is as stuffy as the computer running the matrix inside the 
matrix.

Regads,
Quentin

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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Jesse Mazer]

IZ wrote:

>
>
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> > >
> > >The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
> > >as predicted by Platonic theories.
> > >
> > >It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
> > >it is falsified.
> >
> > But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe 
>to
> > the view that every possible world or observer-moment exists (which is 
>the
> > idea that the 'everything' in 'everything-list' is supposed to stand 
>for)
> > would argue for some sort of probability measure on worlds/OMs which 
>would
> > assign much higher probability to worlds with regular laws than to Harry
> > Potter universes.
>
>They *need* that idea, certainly. The success of mathematical MW
>theories
>depends very much on being able to find a natural, intrinsic
>justification for measure.
>
>Physical MW theories are very much on the same side of the fence
>as classical single-universe theories. In both cases, "measure" is
>extraneous
>to what is being measure. In physical MWI, measure is given by
>Schrodinger's
>equation, which is not justified platonically; it is justified
>empirically. In single-world
>theories , measure is 1 or 0 -- the Law of the Excluded Middle holds.
>
> > Quantum theory predicts a nonzero probability of Harry
> > Potter type events too (a bunch of random atoms could tunnel into the 
>shape
> > of a living hippogriff, for example), but our failure to observe such 
>events
> > in practice is not a falsification of the theory, since the theory 
>predicts
> > they'd be ridiculously improbable and we should not expect to observe 
>such
> > events on human timescales.
>
>And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
>it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
>
>However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure,
>no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence
>is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure,
>and vice-versa.

Yes, but the point is that almost all of us on this list want to *find* a 
"satisfactory theory of measure" to apply to "everything", so it's a 
strawman to say that it's a prediction of "everything" hypotheses that Harry 
Potter universes should be just as probable as any other. Some rough 
proposals for such a theory of measure have been made in this list in the 
past, like the "universal prior" (see 
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/node2.html or 
http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/everything/node4.html ), or my own speculation 
that a theory of consciousness assigning relative and absolute probability 
to observer-moments might have only a single self-consistent solution (see 
http://tinyurl.com/ekz7u or http://tinyurl.com/jnaqb for more on this idea).

>
> > >You are not going to get anywhere with the
> > >UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your
> > >argument for that -- AR as you call it --
> > >just repeats the same error: the epistemological
> > >claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent"
> > >is confused with the ontological claim "the number of 17 exists
> > >separately
> > >from us in Plato's heaven".
>
> > But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism,
> > that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent--
>
>nope.
>
>"Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our
>mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of
>arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal
>numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that
>the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT
>ABSTRACT OBJECTS "
>
>(emphasis added)

What do the words "abstract object" mean to you? To me, if propositions 
about numbers have a truth independent of human minds or beliefs, that's 
equivalent to saying they are true statements about abstract objects--how 
could a statement be objectively true yet not be about anything?

>
>http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.1
>
> > this is itself
> > an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one.
>
>Quite. Did you mean that the other way around ?

No, I was responding to your comment:

>You are not going to get anywhere with the
>UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your
>argument for that -- AR as you call it --
>just repeats the same error: the epistemological
>claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent"
>is confused with the ontological claim "the number of 17 exists
>separately
>from us in Plato's heaven".

Here you seem to be saying that "the truth value of '17 is prime' is 
mind-independent" is a purely "epistemological" claim. What I'm saying is 
that it's necessarily ontological, as are any claims about the objective 
(mind-independent) truth-value of a given proposition.


>
> > Few would literally
> > imagine some alternate dimension called "Plato's heaven" where platonic
> > forms hang out, and which is somehow able to cau

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >>
> >> How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
> >
> > By explaining a lot from on e premiss.
>
>
> I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it
> explains nothing, like when "God" is used as an (empty) explanation.

It "explains nothing" in the sense that it buys out of the
rationalist dream of explaining the universe on purely logical
principles. OTOH, it buys into the other style of explanation,
positing the existence of contingent entitites on the basis
of empirical evidence. Of course that style of evidence
fits the evidence much better, in that we don't experience every
logically possible universe simultaneously.

> Today, physician relates numbers with numbers (like in F = ma, or E =
> mc^2),

But only *certain* numbers. If we are in Platonia,
we should be seeing F=m^a , F=ma^3 and all the
other infinite possibilites.

>  but we still don't know if particles exist, in which sense, if
> they are as big as the universe like expanding waves, etc.

So ? Those question are all posed within the
framework that empricism-substance-contingency.

Being unable to answer those questions doesn't
enttile us to say that nothing exists or
everything exists.

> (You talk sometimes if physics was not confronted to conceptual
> difficulties, which can be enlightened by MWI ideas, but, wait, there
> is still many remaining questions OK?

Physical MWI are still on the empiricism-substance-contingency.
side of the fence, not the raitonalism-idealism-ncessity side.


> >> First nobody knows what such a "substance" can be defined without
> >> infinite regress.
> >
> > "No one" ? But there are far more materialist
> > philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays.
>
>
> For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And
> none of your materialist even try to define matter.

"Materiality is the pre-condition fo anything being
able to interact with me casually"

There.

> They take it for
> granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by
> knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists.

Why not ? It's *a* table not all possible tables.

> (btw, invoking the number of people believing something is not an
> argument).

I cant address your anti-materialism arguments directly since
you idn't state them, only alluding to them.

> All what I say, is that the notion of "primitive matter" is unclear.
> The only definition which we can find in Aristotle is contradict by QM
> and comp, independently.

I've just given you a definitiion.


> >> Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance
> >> such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the
> >> property of its subparts (Aristotle the first).
> >
> > Noy always. Things have moved on since Aristotle's day.
>
>
> Not about matter.


Of course, about matter. Matter is now "mostly empty space",
it is now "interchangeable with energy".

>  Except recently through the slow admittance of
> quantum (computation) which makes even engineers accepting (like
> Mellac) that the quantum formalism forces us to choose between:
> 1) a NON observed reality does not exist (like Bohr often said)
> 2) Parallel realities exist

there are many othe options, inlcuding

3) a non-observed reality exists, and prallel realities are curtailed
by
an objective, observer-independent  process of reduction (Penrose)


> >> But then, the
> >> ontological existence of such "substance" does not fit neither the
> >> experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those
> >> facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL).
> >
> > The modern-version of substance is mass-energy, which
> > can be measured and does feature in theories.
>
>
> But the measurment gives numbers. *You* posit some (which btw?)
> interpretation.

Certain numbers, not every possible number.


> > if you are going to assume that
> > a) all computations already exist immaterially
>
> OK, but in the same sense that PI or sqrt(2) exists.

Which as far as I am concerned, is not at all.

> > b) matter must be distinguished by some comptutational
> > or mathematical property
>
>
> Where do I make that assumption.

I don't know. You didn't actually give an argument. so I am
just guessing.

> You forget the main assumption I do: my (generlaized) brain is turing
> emulable. (or more simply: "yes doctor").

As a material systesm, it can be emulated by antoher, suitable ,
material system...


> Church thesis and AR are assumed explicitly for making things clearer,
> and avoiding spurious debate in the course of the proof.

Insamuch as you claim that COMP is your only
assumption, CT and AR are *not* assumed explicitly.


> Now if you assume "primary matter", no doubt you need to reject comp,
> giving that what I show is that you cannot have both.

Brains are material. Computers are material.

> > The problem of the MBP is linking 1st person experie

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Jesse Mazer wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> >The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
> >as predicted by Platonic theories.
> >
> >It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
> >it is falsified.
>
> But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to
> the view that every possible world or observer-moment exists (which is the
> idea that the 'everything' in 'everything-list' is supposed to stand for)
> would argue for some sort of probability measure on worlds/OMs which would
> assign much higher probability to worlds with regular laws than to Harry
> Potter universes.

They *need* that idea, certainly. The success of mathematical MW
theories
depends very much on being able to find a natural, intrinsic
justification for measure.

Physical MW theories are very much on the same side of the fence
as classical single-universe theories. In both cases, "measure" is
extraneous
to what is being measure. In physical MWI, measure is given by
Schrodinger's
equation, which is not justified platonically; it is justified
empirically. In single-world
theories , measure is 1 or 0 -- the Law of the Excluded Middle holds.

> Quantum theory predicts a nonzero probability of Harry
> Potter type events too (a bunch of random atoms could tunnel into the shape
> of a living hippogriff, for example), but our failure to observe such events
> in practice is not a falsification of the theory, since the theory predicts
> they'd be ridiculously improbable and we should not expect to observe such
> events on human timescales.

And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.

However, in the absence of a satifactory theory of measure,
no-once can say that the posit of matter, of material existence
is useless. To have material existence is to have non-zero measure,
and vice-versa.

> >You are not going to get anywhere with the
> >UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your
> >argument for that -- AR as you call it --
> >just repeats the same error: the epistemological
> >claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent"
> >is confused with the ontological claim "the number of 17 exists
> >separately
> >from us in Plato's heaven".

> But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism,
> that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent--

nope.

"Platonists about mathematical objects claim that the theorems of our
mathematical theories - sentences like '3 is prime' (a theorem of
arithmetic) and 'There are infinitely many transfinite cardinal
numbers' (a theorem of set theory) - are literally true and that
the only plausible view of such sentences is that they are ABOUT
ABSTRACT OBJECTS "

(emphasis added)

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#4.1

> this is itself
> an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one.

Quite. Did you mean that the other way around ?

> Few would literally
> imagine some alternate dimension called "Plato's heaven" where platonic
> forms hang out, and which is somehow able to causally interact with our
> brains to produce our ideas about math.

Some do. In any case, if numbers don't exist at all -- even
platonically --
they they cannot even produce the mere appearance of a physical world,
as Bruno requires.


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Tom Caylor]

This discussion is very interesting to me.  Not addressing anyone in
particular, I only have time to make a quick comment, and hope that I
can get time for later:

In my reading about Plato, it seems that Plato didn't have the answers
either.  It might be helpful to remember that Plato not only had the
Forms, but also Matter.  I think he probably was also struggling with
the white rabbit and Harry Potter universe problem too (yes, way back
then!).  Matter was chaotic (anti-Form) and the problem was how to
stuff it all into Forms.  Mind/body problem.

Tom


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :

>>
>> How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
>
> By explaining a lot from on e premiss.


I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it 
explains nothing, like when "God" is used as an (empty) explanation.
Today, physician relates numbers with numbers (like in F = ma, or E = 
mc^2), but we still don't know if particles exist, in which sense, if 
they are as big as the universe like expanding waves, etc.
(You talk sometimes if physics was not confronted to conceptual 
difficulties, which can be enlightened by MWI ideas, but, wait, there 
is still many remaining questions OK?


>
>> First nobody knows what such a "substance" can be defined without
>> infinite regress.
>
> "No one" ? But there are far more materialist
> philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays.


For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And 
none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for 
granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by 
knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists.
(btw, invoking the number of people believing something is not an 
argument).
All what I say, is that the notion of "primitive matter" is unclear. 
The only definition which we can find in Aristotle is contradict by QM 
and comp, independently.


>
>> Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance
>> such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the
>> property of its subparts (Aristotle the first).
>
> Noy always. Things have moved on since Aristotle's day.


Not about matter. Except recently through the slow admittance of 
quantum (computation) which makes even engineers accepting (like 
Mellac) that the quantum formalism forces us to choose between:
1) a NON observed reality does not exist (like Bohr often said)
2) Parallel realities exist

>
>> But then, the
>> ontological existence of such "substance" does not fit neither the
>> experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those
>> facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL).
>
> The modern-version of substance is mass-energy, which
> can be measured and does feature in theories.


But the measurment gives numbers. *You* posit some (which btw?) 
interpretation.


>> If you want use the ontological existence of "matter" to solve the
>> Harry Potter enigma, I can prove to you in all details that the only
>> way to do that would consist in positing actual non computable
>> infinities in matter. Just ask, or read the already available info on
>> the list or in my url.
>
>
> if you are going to assume that
> a) all computations already exist immaterially

OK, but in the same sense that PI or sqrt(2) exists.


> b) matter must be distinguished by some comptutational
> or mathematical property


Where do I make that assumption.
You forget the main assumption I do: my (generlaized) brain is turing 
emulable. (or more simply: "yes doctor").
Church thesis and AR are assumed explicitly for making things clearer, 
and avoiding spurious debate in the course of the proof.

Now if you assume "primary matter", no doubt you need to reject comp, 
giving that what I show is that you cannot have both.




>
>> And then, having that heavy matter to play with, you will still have 
>> to
>> explain how do you link the first person experience to it (the
>> mind/body problem).
>
> The problem of the MBP is linking 1st person experience
> to mathematical descriptions.  Adding matter to Platonia certainly
> doesn't make things worse.


It does (with comp). cf UDA. (or just the movie graph, or Maudlin's 
Olympia).




>> That the "observed world" is smaller than platonia is trivial: our
>> observation are finite, and platonia is infinite.
>> Now, you, following (I agree) common sense infer the existence of an
>> ontological world, but I don't see any clues from which you can infer
>> it is smaller than platonia.
>
> The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
> as predicted by Platonic theories.


Platonic resetting of Everret's QM *does* explained why the Quantum HP 
universes are *very* difficulmt to observe. Hall Finney-like Universal 
distribution could explain the same thing for some of the thrid person 
white rabbits.
I show a path leading to a possible explanation of why the first person 
rabbits are non observable.
This has led to 5 mathematical conjectures. The first one has been 
solved since ... our last conversation ...



> You are not going to get anywhere with the
> UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism,

Why should I prove my assumptions?
Also, proving "mathematical platonism" or proving "physical 
materialism" is impossible (what would that means). You could ask me to 
prove Church thesis at this point. It is non sense, unless you give me 
some precise other assumption to build on.



> and your
> argument for that -- AR as you call it --
> just repeats the same error: the epistemolo

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Jesse Mazer]

1Z wrote:
>
>The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
>as predicted by Platonic theories.
>
>It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
>it is falsified.

But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to 
the view that every possible world or observer-moment exists (which is the 
idea that the 'everything' in 'everything-list' is supposed to stand for) 
would argue for some sort of probability measure on worlds/OMs which would 
assign much higher probability to worlds with regular laws than to Harry 
Potter universes. Quantum theory predicts a nonzero probability of Harry 
Potter type events too (a bunch of random atoms could tunnel into the shape 
of a living hippogriff, for example), but our failure to observe such events 
in practice is not a falsification of the theory, since the theory predicts 
they'd be ridiculously improbable and we should not expect to observe such 
events on human timescales.

>You are not going to get anywhere with the
>UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your
>argument for that -- AR as you call it --
>just repeats the same error: the epistemological
>claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent"
>is confused with the ontological claim "the number of 17 exists
>separately
>from us in Plato's heaven".

But that is really all that philosophers mean by mathematical platonism, 
that mathematical truths are timeless and mind-independent--this is itself 
an ontological claim, not a purely epistemological one. Few would literally 
imagine some alternate dimension called "Plato's heaven" where platonic 
forms hang out, and which is somehow able to causally interact with our 
brains to produce our ideas about math.

Jesse



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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> > It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain
> > a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change
> > to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes.
>
>
> How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?

By explaining a lot from on e premiss.


> First nobody knows what such a "substance" can be defined without
> infinite regress.

"No one" ? But there are far more materialist
philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays.

> Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance
> such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the
> property of its subparts (Aristotle the first).

Noy always. Things have moved on since Aristotle's day.

> But then, the
> ontological existence of such "substance" does not fit neither the
> experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those
> facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL).

The modern-version of substance is mass-energy, which
can be measured and does feature in theories.

> If you want use the ontological existence of "matter" to solve the
> Harry Potter enigma, I can prove to you in all details that the only
> way to do that would consist in positing actual non computable
> infinities in matter. Just ask, or read the already available info on
> the list or in my url.


if you are going to assume that
a) all computations already exist immaterially
b) matter must be distinguished by some comptutational
or mathematical property

you might be lead to that conculusion. But I don't assume
either.

> And then, having that heavy matter to play with, you will still have to
> explain how do you link the first person experience to it (the
> mind/body problem).

The problem of the MBP is linking 1st person experience
to mathematical descriptions.  Adding matter to Platonia certainly
doesn't make things worse.

> > The question is not whether there is a world beyond even
> > logical possibility, but why the observed world is so much
> > smaller than the Platonias. Matter answers that easily.
>
> That the "observed world" is smaller than platonia is trivial: our
> observation are finite, and platonia is infinite.
> Now, you, following (I agree) common sense infer the existence of an
> ontological world, but I don't see any clues from which you can infer
> it is smaller than platonia.

The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
as predicted by Platonic theories.

It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
it is falsified.

> Actually many infinities appears at the
> bottom, and it is hard how to interpret them.





> > The list needs to be a lot more particualr about the
> > difference between ontology and epistemology, between
> > "to be" and "to know". Then they would not slide
> > from "X cannot be known without an observer" to "X cannot exist without
> > an observer".
>
> You make a good point, but I am not sure it is a genuine answer for
> John or me.
> I will not insist because it is an easy consequence of the UDA (and I
> recall you saying you don't want to study it because, if I remember
> well,  you are so sure the result is false that you don't need to read
> it, but then you miss the opportunity to either find a real error of
> reasoning in my deduction or to discover that the greek theologian were
> right, and naturalism (nature deification) is wrong).

You are not going to get anywhere with the
UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism, and your
argument for that -- AR as you call it --
just repeats the same error: the epistemological
claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent"
is confused with the ontological claim "the number of 17 exists
separately
from us in Plato's heaven".


> 1Z to Lennart Nilsson
> > I am trying to get away from the idea that logic needs to
> > be propped up by some external authority. The validity
> > of logic comes about from the lack of any basis
> > to criticise it that doesn't presuppose it. That's
> > epistemology, not metaphysics.
>
> I agree for the part of logic use in elementary mathematical theories.
> Still there has been (and still exist) some critics on some formula.
> The most known case is the case of the third excluded principle (A v
> ~A). In my context such a critics is a confusion between first person
> and third person. Could say more when I get to the Arithmetical
> Hypostases ...

The criticism uses logic.


> 1Z to Brent
> > The claim I made was "Whatever else you
> > do, you'll be using logic. There is no
> > standpoint outside of logic. No, not
> > even evolutionary theory".
>
> I agree with you, as an arithmetical platonist.

My point was purely epistemological.

> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 10-juil.-06, à 16:03, 1Z a écrit :


> It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain
> a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change
> to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes.


How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
First nobody knows what such a "substance" can be defined without 
infinite regress.
Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance 
such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the 
property of its subparts (Aristotle the first). But then, the 
ontological existence of such "substance" does not fit neither the 
experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those 
facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL).

If you want use the ontological existence of "matter" to solve the 
Harry Potter enigma, I can prove to you in all details that the only 
way to do that would consist in positing actual non computable 
infinities in matter. Just ask, or read the already available info on 
the list or in my url.

And then, having that heavy matter to play with, you will still have to 
explain how do you link the first person experience to it (the 
mind/body problem).


> The question is not whether there is a world beyond even
> logical possibility, but why the observed world is so much
> smaller than the Platonias. Matter answers that easily.

That the "observed world" is smaller than platonia is trivial: our 
observation are finite, and platonia is infinite.
Now, you, following (I agree) common sense infer the existence of an 
ontological world, but I don't see any clues from which you can infer 
it is smaller than platonia. Actually many infinities appears at the 
bottom, and it is hard how to interpret them.


1Z (to George Levy):
> Science may have moved close to making the observer
> central epistemically , but it has not room for the idea
> that observers are ontologically fundamental.
>
> Observers are people, homo sapiens, the product of millions
> of years of evolution. Scientifically speaking.


Human observers are people. With comp, *any* locally or partially 
irreversible machine is up for the job. Still, comp makes that large 
class of number/digital-machines basic for just (re)defining a coherent 
notion of physical reality, which remained to be tested with the facts 
(current test are going in the quantum direction).


1Z (to John M)
> The no-metaphysical-role for observers rule is one that
> maintains the consilience of science.
>
> http://www.csicop.org/si/9701/quantum-quackery.html


I agree that there is a lot of quantum-quackery, as there is 
godel-quackery. This makes progress in our fundament fields 
psychologically difficult to assess.
Unfortunately, many if not most scientist reaction to those quackeries 
are lacking rigor, and contend themselves to present some facts as 
"scientific" when they are not.
Let me give you an example. After Godel published its 1931 
incompleteness paper, the belgium logician Barzin publishes a detailed 
"refutation" of Godel's proof (like many). If I remember well it is 
Kleene, or Kreisel: I should verify, but the point is that big guy in 
logic will criticize, technically, Barzin's attempt to refute Godel. 
All scientist will believe that matter settled until 20 years later, 
Kleene himself (or Kreisel himself) find an error in his own critics. 
It was just false and Barzin's point appeared to be much subtle and 
harder to refute. For sure, Barzin *was* wrong, but many scientist took 
Kleene (or Kreisel) first reply like an authoritative truth ...




>> JM: The observer seems so fundamental in the views of this
>> list (and in wider circles of contemporaryh thinking)
>> that a more general identification may be in order.
>
> No, no,nooo!!!
>
> It is far too general already.

I don't think so. Read about the lobian machine ...

>
> The list needs to be a lot more particualr about the
> difference between ontology and epistemology, between
> "to be" and "to know". Then they would not slide
> from "X cannot be known without an observer" to "X cannot exist without
> an observer".

You make a good point, but I am not sure it is a genuine answer for 
John or me.
I will not insist because it is an easy consequence of the UDA (and I 
recall you saying you don't want to study it because, if I remember 
well,  you are so sure the result is false that you don't need to read 
it, but then you miss the opportunity to either find a real error of 
reasoning in my deduction or to discover that the greek theologian were 
right, and naturalism (nature deification) is wrong).

1Z to Lennart Nilsson
> I am trying to get away from the idea that logic needs to
> be propped up by some external authority. The validity
> of logic comes about from the lack of any basis
> to criticise it that doesn't presuppose it. That's
> epistemology, not metaphysics.

I agree for the part of logic use in elementary mathematical theories. 
Still ther

Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[1Z]

Bruno Marchal wrote:

> Le 09-juil.-06, à 17:15, Lennart Nilsson a écrit :
>
> > I really think that we should infer both the substantial world and the
> > numerical world from the middleground so to speak, from our
> > observations.
>
>
> But why should we infer a substantial world? Substantial or primary or
> primitive matter is an incredible metaphysical extrapolation.

It is a modest metaphysical posit which can be used to explain
a variety of observed phenomena, ranging from Time and Change
to the observed absence of Harry Potter universes.

>  I still
> want to (re)study why Aristotle made that step, except as a tool for
> burying the mind-body problem.

As opposed to the mind-mathematics problem.

> Sade is very clear on the role of matter and why linking consciousness
> to it: to make people believed their act have few personal
> consequences. La Mettrie also begin the celbnrate "materialist"
> dissolution of the first person, including its responsibility feelings.
> The modern materialist have to be a first person eliminativist.
> I doubt less about consciousness and the number 317 than about *stuffy*
> strings or waves, which are not even assumed in physical theories,
> except in the background for separating conceptual issues from
> practice.

Stuffiness explains why the only one logical possibility is real.


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Re: SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 09-juil.-06, à 17:15, Lennart Nilsson a écrit :

> I really think that we should infer both the substantial world and the
> numerical world from the middleground so to speak, from our 
> observations.


But why should we infer a substantial world? Substantial or primary or 
primitive matter is an incredible metaphysical extrapolation. I still 
want to (re)study why Aristotle made that step, except as a tool for 
burying the mind-body problem.
Sade is very clear on the role of matter and why linking consciousness 
to it: to make people believed their act have few personal 
consequences. La Mettrie also begin the celbnrate "materialist"  
dissolution of the first person, including its responsibility feelings. 
The modern materialist have to be a first person eliminativist.
I doubt less about consciousness and the number 317 than about *stuffy* 
strings or waves, which are not even assumed in physical theories, 
except in the background for separating conceptual issues from 
practice.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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SV: Only Existence is necessary?

[Lennart Nilsson]

I really think that we should infer both the substantial world and the
numerical world from the middleground so to speak, from our observations.

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Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Bruno Marchal
Skickat: den 9 juli 2006 14:36
Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Ämne: Re: Only Existence is necessary?



Le 09-juil.-06, à 14:26, 1Z a écrit :



> So how do insubstantial numbers generate a substantial world ?




I guess there is no substantial world and I explain in all details here 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ (and on this list) why insubstantial 
numbers generate inescapably, by the mixing of their additive and 
multiplicative structures,  local coherent webs of beliefs in 
substantial worlds, and how the laws of physics must emerge (with comp) 
from those purely mathematical webs ... making "comp" testable in the 
usual Popperian sense. In that sense "comp" already succeeds some first 
tests.


Bruno






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