date:20140111



On 10 Jan 2014, at 23:25, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/10/2014 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But what about Glak, a being in an alternative physics?


If Glak mind obeys to the laws of Boole, and if Glak as a finite  
body, and if he is self-referentially correct, then we share with  
Glak the same sigma_1 true sentences, and he figures it out (by Bp  
 Dt) in the same way, so we have the same physics. If Glak shows  
us an electron heaver than ours, we can conclude that the mass of  
an electron is not a necessity, but a contingency, a geographical  
fact, and there might be a law given the mass electron relatively  
to that type of accessible physics (given that we succeed in  
talking with Glak).



But there's the rub.  Could Glak's universe not have electrons?   
Could it not have electrical charge?


Open problem. Both for comp and QM+GR (or the needed unknon  
correction of GR, 'course).




A theory that cannot tell us what is contingent


But the theory does that. The physical, like the quantum principle,  
which can be derived from the material hypostases are laws, and the  
rest is contingent and belongs to geography/history.





and only that arithmetical (or logical truths) are necessary


That's G, not the S4GRz, or X and Z logics.



doesn't really tell us anything.  It just says Tautologies are true.


So we get much more than that: 8 non trivial intensional mathematics  
(the quantified hypostases), with three of them given the physical laws.


Bruno






Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Bruno,

  I don't see how it follows that Pratt's theory does not allow for a FPI.
I have repeatedly said that a 3p is a construct from 1p and does not have
content outside of some 1p. He does not assume that the universe is
classical, as you do. You are the one making a mistake, I am afraid.


On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Jan 2014, at 23:23, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Brent,

   Vaughn Pratt's dualist theory is consistent with QM and does show a
 mechanism that prohibits White Rabbits. It is intelligible to anyone that
 puts forth the effort to comprehend it.


 There is no FPI in Pratt, no 1p/3p distinction. He does not take comp and
 its consequences into account.
 (We have already discussed this).

 Bruno






 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 QM predict a infinite small
 probability for white rabbits, while yours infer a decent amount of
 them until some cut criteria emerges. And that is not my work, but
 yours.


 QM predict all this by using comp, or an unintelligible dualist theory of
 observation.


  I don't understand that.  QM predicts a low probability for white
 rabbits - but not by using comp, in fact it assumes a continuum.

 And comp doesn't entail QM.

 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 10 Jan 2014, at 23:26, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent!

Indeed! A theory that explains everything must be more than a list
of tautologies!

Good. And that's the case with comp. We get 8 logics and mathematics.

Bruno

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:25 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 1/10/2014 10:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But what about Glak, a being in an alternative physics?

If Glak mind obeys to the laws of Boole, and if Glak as a finite
body, and if he is self-referentially correct, then we share with
Glak the same sigma_1 true sentences, and he figures it out (by Bp
Dt) in the same way, so we have the same physics. If Glak shows
us an electron heaver than ours, we can conclude that the mass of
an electron is not a necessity, but a contingency, a geographical
fact, and there might be a law given the mass electron relatively
to that type of accessible physics (given that we succeed in
talking with Glak).

But there's the rub. Could Glak's universe not have electrons?
Could it not have electrical charge? A theory that cannot tell us
what is contingent and only that arithmetical (or logical truths)
are necessary doesn't really tell us anything. It just says
Tautologies are true.

Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 11 Jan 2014, at 00:21, LizR wrote:


On 11 January 2014 07:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

On 10 Jan 2014, at 17:57, Terren Suydam wrote:



Bruno,

It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined -  
but only for a particular point of view.


Yes, but it is a very general one. It is the particular view of any  
(universal) machine. It has to be the same for any person capable of  
being incarnated/implemented through a finitely describable body  
relatively to some universal numbers.


All what you will add, by consciousness differentiation is local,  
historical, and geographical.


What does local mean in this context?


it means First person.

Bruno





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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 11 Jan 2014, at 00:24, LizR wrote:


On 11 January 2014 10:57, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/10/2014 1:34 AM, LizR wrote:

On 10 January 2014 22:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

I don't think that there can be a single or multiple processor  
computing the state of the universe. In fact there is no such  
universe. The universe is an appearance emerging, from below the  
substitution level, on all computations going through our current  
state. A single computation can hardly do that a priori, although  
this is not excluded, but this would lead to a newtonian-like type  
ofreality. Everett confirms that such a  
computation cannot be unique, which is the default stance in the  
comp theory, although we cannot avoid at this stage some possible  
conspiracy by numbers leading to a unique computable reality.


Surely a single computer could run the UD, at least until it wore  
out?


As I understand it the multiverse, the world, is the complete output  
of the UD.  In effect the UD must finish in order to have computed  
the world, which of course is an uncomputable output.


Eek! Of coruse it must, to have an infinity of computations...!  
Still, I suppose the UD has always finished, within Platonia.


The complete infinite execution is in platonia, but it is infinite,  
and there is no output. It is finished in perhaps some metaphorical  
way, but that is misleading. The UD has no input, and no output, like  
a universe.




But a computer, running for a large amount of time, running the UD,  
might still generate some experiences --- eventually --- surely?


I don't think it is wise to say that the UD generates experiences. It  
relativizes the consciousness in particular histories. By the 1p delay  
invariance we are infinitely distributed in the UD*, and that might  
play a role in consciousness, which, by being pure 1p, is associated  
to both the state and the infinitely many extensions in the UD.


Bruno







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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 11 Jan 2014, at 00:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and  
simple example is arithmetic. Only a very tiny part of it is  
computable (this is provable if you accept the Church Turing thesis).


But it's questionable whether it exists.


In which sense?

Note that in the arithmetical expression: ExAyEzAt P(x, y, z, t),  
the E has the same meaning than in the constructive sigma_1 ExP(x).
Existence in math is never necessarily computable in the usual  
classical math, unless we work in non classical intuitionist logic  
(but this recovered by the existence in the quantified S4Grz).


Keep in mind that exists has 8 different meaning in the eight  
different hypostases, and you should say precisely if you talk of  
psychological existence, physical existence, arithmetical existence ...


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter



On 11 Jan 2014, at 01:06, LizR wrote:


On 11 January 2014 12:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and  
simple example is arithmetic. Only a very tiny part of it is  
computable (this is provable if you accept the Church Turing thesis).

But it's questionable whether it exists.

Does it kick back? Could two beings in different universes, with  
different laws of physics (if such exist) discover it independently?


If so, it exists by any reasonable definition (including Stephen's)


Indeed.

Bruno





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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 Jan 2014, at 02:04, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Terren,

Yes, it is about the continuations and measures thereof. I am not
having much luck discovering how the measures are defined.

Yes, that *is* the problem. And that is the result: that very problem
and a translation of that problem in arithmetical terms. The
beginning of the solution is given by 3 mathematics among 8
constituting the theology of the machine(s). Theology includes
physics: both the communicable (quanta) and the non communicable
(qualia).

The measure problem (UDA) is what makes comp non trivial, non
tautological and interesting. AUDA illustrates in detail where the
measure comes from, if it exists. The rest is (pure) math.

That was the main goal: to show that comp does not solve the mind-body
problem per se, but allows a purely mathematical reformulation, which
gives the (Plotinian) shape of the possible solutions.

Bruno

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 8:02 PM, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com
wrote:
Not sure I see the relevance, except to corroborate the idea
(notwithstanding Bruno's comments) that mine and Glak's worlds would
be separated as a result of the measure of stable continuations of
those worlds... or were you making a different point?

Terren

On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined -
but only for a particular point of view. So I, Terren, experience
one and only one physics, because my consciousness is the selection
criteria among the infinity of computations going through my state.
But what about Glak, abeing in an alternative physics?
Glak's consciousness selects a unique/invariant physics for Glak,
but that emergent physical universe Glak experiences is
characterized by laws that are different from what I experience.

But then if you ask, Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and vice-
versa? you see that the answer must be that it would be an
improbable continuation of my brain states to suddenly instantiate a
different physics and experience being Glak. This is like the
white rabbit problem, except in the form of why don't I turn into
a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps saying must have a solution (if
comp is true).

Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 Jan 2014, at 02:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to
me, that's it - how an infinity of emulations condense into a
single conscious experience.

I would be please to understand the problem. If you are OK with step
3, you know that the condensation is given by the probability
measure on all computations going through your local current state, by
the FPI.

Your consciousness condenses into here and now for the same measure
the guy in Washington feel to be in only once city after the WM-
duplication.

I am not sure to really see what you don't see.

QM suggests a measure exists, but with comp, if the measure exists, we
must derived it from arithmetic. If we can show that such a measure
does not exist, then we know that comp is false.

Bruno

Terren

On Jan 10, 2014 8:04 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
wrote:

Dear Terren,

Yes, it is about the continuations and measures thereof. I am not
having much luck discovering how the measures are defined.

Terren

On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:

It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined -
but only for a particular point of view. So I, Terren, experience
one and only one physics, because my consciousness is the selection
criteria among the infinity of computations going through my state.
But what about Glak, a being in an alternative physics? Glak's
consciousness selects a unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that
emergent physical universe Glak experiences is characterized by
laws that are different from what I experience.

Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 11 Jan 2014, at 03:57, Terren Suydam wrote:

If they're all truly identical then yes, it's much easier to see how  
it could be experienced as a single consciousness.


But what precisely does it mean for an infinity of computations to  
go through my state?


It means that from your first person perspective, you would not see  
the difference between those computations. Now this is not  
constructive. If you look at the UD* from outside, you cannot in  
general recognize those computations. But by definition, they go  
through the right subst level, so you can lived them, and they add to  
the measure.






How precisely is my state specified?  Imagine you have two  
computations that essentially simulate my brain and they are  
identical in every way except that there is a difference in  
orientation of a single water molecule.




Normally, this will count as two different computations. But actually,  
it is simple to distinguish the computations by the i in the  
computations of the phi_i(x) in the UD*.




Would one of those emulations be excluded from the infinity of  
computations going through my state?



No.


If so, it seems to be an overly stringent requirement for specifying  
my state, but that could just be a question of what substitution  
level you bet on.


of course, if the position of the water molecule implemented a special  
private memory, then the computations can differentiate, and you need  
to refine the subst level. If not, you will have two equiavlent  
computations, but running in different part of the UD*, and this can  
play a role in the measure.




If the two nearly identical simulations do both contribute, then we  
can ask the same question of bigger and bigger differences between  
two hypothetical simulations until we can say unambiguously that  
they cannot both be part of the snapshot of my current conscious  
state. The question is then, where exactly did we cross the line,  
and how do you define it?


We cannot know our level, and worst: we cannot algorithmically  
recognize what a program do. So there is just no 3p criterion. That is  
why you need to *bet* on a level. But this makes only the problem more  
complex, and physics get the non computable feature on which I insist  
so often.





You can also go through the same exercise, but modifying instead the  
environment, where the environment could include other people and  
their states of mind. This one seems easier, as you could group  
together all computations whose differences don't impact the  
environment that I am consciously aware of.


The point being that if we do allow that non-identical emulations  
can contribute,



We do allow them, an infinity of them. They all contribute.




that's where the magic happens... the fact that my experience is a  
measure of the most stable continuations, in the sense that white  
rabbits don't appear. Are there other worlds (akin to Glak's) where  
I am typing this email only to be interrupted by a ufo tractoring my  
house off the ground?


Yes, but if comp is true, that events has a very low probability to  
happen, but it is not null. The same already happens with QM.


Bruno





Terren

On Jan 10, 2014 9:02 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 11 January 2014 14:34, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com  
wrote:
Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to  
me, that's it - how an infinity of emulations condense into a  
single conscious experience.


If they're identical, I guess you wouldn't be able to tell the  
experiences apart. They would be fungible, like the infinite  
identical copies that exist in the MWI prior to branching /  
differentiation. So they would just be one experience, even if it  
was generated an infinite number of times. I guess this is the  
capsule theory of identity, like Fred Hoyle and his pigeon holes  
and flashlight view of consciousness in October the first is too  
late. From the viewpoint of the experiencer, it wouldn't matter if  
millions of pigeon holes were identical, with identical notes in  
them, and others only appeared once.


I think.

(I'm assuming it's the infinity part that's the problem...)


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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 11 Jan 2014, at 04:12, LizR wrote:

On 11 January 2014 15:57, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com  
wrote:
If they're all truly identical then yes, it's much easier to see how  
it could be experienced as a single consciousness.


But what precisely does it mean for an infinity of computations to  
go through my state? How precisely is my state specified?  Imagine  
you have two computations that essentially simulate my brain and  
they are identical in every way except that there is a difference in  
orientation of a single water molecule. Would one of those  
emulations be excluded from the infinity of computations going  
through my state? If so, it


I don't think they emulate your brain, only your mental state.


They emulate the brains. emulation is 3p arithmetical (type Bp, G) The  
mental is 1p (type Bp  p, S4Grz). the p is true (not emulated).




So I don't think a water molecule would normally matter, since it  
isn't perceived.


It plays a role for the measure.



seems to be an overly stringent requirement for specifying my state,  
but that could just be a question of what substitution level you bet  
on. If the two nearly identical simulations do both contribute, then  
we can ask the same question of bigger and bigger differences  
between two hypothetical simulations until we can say unambiguously  
that they cannot both be part of the snapshot of my current  
conscious state. The question is then, where exactly did we cross  
the line, and how do you define it?


Yes, that sounds reasonable. Although I beleive the subst level  
isn't knowable, even in principle, according to Bruno.


Right. Terren asks for something impossible. Even if you know the  
level, by chance, you cannot recognize all programs emulating you. We  
cannot even recognize a program computing the factorial function, in  
general. The link program == semantics is NOT computable (cf Rice  
theorem, or just the seond recursion theorem: I can explain more).





You can also go through the same exercise, but modifying instead the  
environment, where the environment could include other people and  
their states of mind. This one seems easier, as you could group  
together all computations whose differences don't impact the  
environment that I am consciously aware of.


The point being that if we do allow that non-identical emulations  
can contribute, that's where the magic happens... the fact that my  
experience is a measure of the most stable continuations, in the  
sense that white rabbits don't appear. Are there other worlds (akin  
to Glak's) where I am typing this email only to be interrupted by a  
ufo tractoring my house off the ground?


I think we have to assume so, along with ones where you  
spontaneously combust, turn into a white rabbit, etc. But those have  
very small measure (and I expect one day Bruno will explain why...  
but I think this is an open problem!)


Yes, but the non triviality of the hypostases suggests we are not a so  
long way from having a measure. the three material hypostases are  
close to being under the apossible application of a theorem à-la  
Gleason, justifying a unique measure, like a trace of some computation  
density operator.
We might need some Ramanujan, of course. And close could mean some  
centuries, especially if people continue to ignore the question  
(which we do since 1500 years).


Bruno






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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 Jan 2014, at 06:05, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent,

I will try a crude summary and hope to not be misunderstood... It
starts with the Stone duality, a well known isomorphism between
Boolean algebras and totally disconnected compact Hausdorff spaces.
The former are identified with minds (logical, computational,
numerical, etc) and the latter with physical objects (what is more
physical that a space that looks exactly like Democritus' atoms
in a void?.
This solves the mind-body linkage problem of Descartes' dualism.
The paper then discusses how interactions between pairs of minds
(generalizations of Boolean algebras identified as states) is
mediated via pairs of bodies (generalizations of Stone spaces to
include mass, spin, charge, potentials,... physics identified as
events). A crude diagram of this relation for the evolution of a
single entity is:

... - Body - Body' - ...
| |
... - Mind - Mind' - ...

where the | symbol is the Stone isomorphism, - is the physical
evolution of one event to the next and - is the logical arrow of
implication.

Mathematics as considered my most people usually ignores evolution
of logical structures, such as Boolean algebras, and so the
difference between mind and mind' is not considered. Now that
computers are commonplace, the idea that logical structures evolve
makes a lot more sense! A computation is the transformation of
information and since logical structures capture the relations of
the information, it is natural to consider this theory.

In this theory, minds and bodies (including brains!) are not
separable substances but are isomorphs that have dynamics whose
arrows point in opposite directions. Physical process moves
forward from event to event' in sequences of time according to
thermodynamics, etc. and logic looks backward to ensure that any
new state is consistent with previous states. This implies an
elegant solution to the measurement problem of QM! Differences
between states and parameters of time can be subdivided as finely as
one wishes; even to the smoothness of continua.
It is what the logical 'side of the coin does to select physical
events that won me over to Pratt's theory: a physical transition
from event x at time t to event x' at time t' is allowed if and only
if the state x'* at t' does not imply information that would
contradict prior states at t^-1, t^-2, etc. Basically, events will
occur iff they do not imply a contradiction of previously allowed
events. This automatically solves the White Rabbit problem by
disallowing events that imply logical contradictions.
It also gives a slightly different take on computational
universality: individual logical structures are associated with
equivalence classes of physical functions and physical systems are
associated with equivalence classes of logical structures. The
equivalences are, respectively: equivalent function and semantical
equivalence. Thus computations and the physical processes are not
ontologically isolated from each other, but universality obtains
because there is no a priori bijective map between the set of
particular physical systems and the set of particular Turing
universal computations.

It seems that Pratt abandoned the theory because of a lack of
interest in the community but still hosts the papers on his website.
Maybe in hope that some one might come along, like me, that can make
sense of it and develop it further. It does not consider SR at all,
which bothers me a little bit, but that can be fixed using ideas
such as those of Kevin Knuth, IMHO.

It is a nice idea, but it does not take into account the FPI (he is
unaware of it), and so does not address the comp mind-body problem.

Its main prediction is that neither ghosts (logics that cannot be
associated with any physical structure) nor zombies (bodies that
cannot be represented by an internal self-referencing logical
structure) exist. This argues against both material and mental
monism. (Thus my conflict with Bruno's AR!)

AR provides the neutral monism!
Comp is neutral monism. Neither mind, nor matter are taken as
primitive. Both emerge from the additive-multiplicative structure of
arithmetic (AR), and that structure provides the neutral stuff.

Bruno

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 9:02 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 1/10/2014 2:23 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent,

Vaughn Pratt's dualist theory is consistent with QM and does show
a mechanism that prohibits White Rabbits. It is intelligible to
anyone that puts forth the effort to comprehend it.

Can you summarize it?

Brent

Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 11 Jan 2014, at 08:29, Stephen Paul King wrote:


Dear Brent,

  Hmm?  Steven turns into a White Rabbit is not a logical  
contradiction, it's a nomological one.  If there's a transition from  
(t1,x1) to (t2,x2) it seems the only logical contradiction would be  
x2=Not x1 at t1.  Logical is a very weak condition; as far as I  
know it just means being consistent=(not every sentence is a  
theorem).


But consistent, like provable, is theory dependent.





nom·o·log·i·cal
ˌnäməˈläjikəl/
adjective
1.
relating to or denoting certain principles, such as laws of nature,  
that are neither logically necessary nor theoretically explicable,  
but are simply taken as true.


Then arithmetical truth nomological. But once assuming it, physical  
truth becomes necessary and logical.





  Right! It was a very crude and informal explanation. Things  
become, hopefully, more clear when one considers the scenario where  
there are many minds that are communicating/interacting while  
evolving. Interaction requires some level of  similarity between the  
participants.


Sure, but you are assuming much more than comp allows. That is a form  
of treachery which prevent the use of the G/G* distinction, and it  
inheritance on the other hypostases, to be used to distinguish qualia  
and quanta. In fact you are doing physics again, if you *assume*  
interacting observers. You are ignoring comp, or the UDA, in such  
approaches.






  For example, I I where to experience a White Rabbit, what effects  
would it have to have on others that I interact with so that it  
would not effect their 1p content. I would say that it was a  
hallucination, maybe... We forget that what we experience of the  
world is not that world itself, it is our mind/brains version of  
such. We have to take the capacity of hallucinations into account in  
our thoughts of that is a mind...

   Can we not take as true what we experience?


Not when assuming comp. You need Church thesis, which need 17 is  
prime even when we don't experience the fact.




How can we know that it is not some controlled simulation? We need  
to answer Descartes question: How do I know that I am not just a  
brain in a vat (or a computation running in some UD)?


Comp answers this by saying that we (in the 3p sense, at the right and  
other levels) are emulated in the UD or arithmetic, even in some brain  
in a vat, itself emulated in the UD, even in some UD emulated by some  
brain in a vat. We are in absolutely all of them. Physical reality is  
a self-referential emerging pattern coming from all of those emulation  
infinitely distributed in UD*.


Bruno








On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 12:45 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net  
wrote:

On 1/10/2014 9:05 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent,

  I will try a crude summary and hope to not be misunderstood... It  
starts with the Stone duality, a well  known isomorphism  
between Boolean algebras and totally disconnected compact Hausdorff  
spaces. The former are identified with minds (logical,  
computational, numerical, etc) and the latter with physical objects  
(what is more physical that a space that looks exactly like  
Democritus' atoms in a void?.
   This solves the mind-body linkage problem of Descartes' dualism.  
The paper then discusses how interactions between pairs of minds  
(generalizations of Boolean algebras identified as states) is  
mediated via pairs of bodies (generalizations of Stone spaces to  
include mass, spin, charge, potentials,... physics identified as  
events). A crude diagram of this relation for the evolution of a  
single entity is:


... - Body - Body' - ...
   | |
... - Mind - Mind' - ...

where the | symbol is the Stone isomorphism, - is the physical  
evolution of one event to the next and - is the logical arrow of  
implication.


  Mathematics as considered my most people usually ignores  
evolution of logical structures, such as Boolean algebras, and so  
the difference between mind and mind' is not considered. Now that  
computers are commonplace, the idea that logical structures evolve  
makes a lot more sense! A computation is the transformation of  
information and since logical structures capture the relations of  
the information, it is natural to consider this theory.


  In this theory, minds and bodies (including brains!) are not  
separable substances but are isomorphs that have dynamics whose  
arrows point in opposite directions. Physical process moves  
forward from event to event' in sequences of time according to  
thermodynamics, etc. and logic looks backward to ensure that any  
new state is consistent with previous states. This implies an  
elegant solution to the measurement problem of QM! Differences  
between states and parameters of time can be subdivided as finely  
as one wishes; even to the smoothness of continua.
  It is what the logical 'side of the coin does to select physical  
events that won me over to Pratt's

Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 Jan 2014, at 08:56, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Der Bruno,

The UD has no output. I guess you think to the trace of the UD, UD*,
which from the first person perspective is entirely given, by the
1p delay invariance.

The UD never stops. If a process lasts forever, it is eternal,
then it does not ever complete and thus its results never obtain in
any way that can be considered as accessible.

?
Then real numbers don't exist.

To belong to your first person indeterminacy domain, the UD needs only
to access the state, which, by non stopping, has to occur once. of
course we might need to look at the 10^(10^1000) nth step of the UD.
But the 1p is not aware of the reconstitution (in UD*) delay, so
that does not matter. Either your state is accessed, or not, and if it
is accessed it take a finite time (number of the UD-steps), and
belongs to the indeterminacy domain. So the global FPI does have the
whole infinite trace of the UD as domain, or if you prefer it is the
infinite union of all its finite parts. Just keep in mind the step 2
and 4.

Bruno

On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 2:51 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

On 10 Jan 2014, at 22:57, meekerdb wrote:

On 1/10/2014 1:34 AM, LizR wrote:

On 10 January 2014 22:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

I don't think that there can be a single or multiple processor
computing the state of the universe. In fact there is no such
universe. The universe is an appearance emerging, from below the
substitution level, on all computations going through our current
state. A single computation can hardly do that a priori, although
this is not excluded, but this would lead to a newtonian-like type
of reality. Everett confirms that such a computation cannot be
unique, which is the default stance in the comp theory, although
we cannot avoid at this stage some possible conspiracy by numbers
leading to a unique computable reality.

Surely a single computer could run the UD, at least until it wore
out?

As I understand it the multiverse, the world, is the complete
output of the UD.

The UD has no output. I guess you think to the trace of the UD, UD*,
which from the first person perspective is entirely given, by the
1p delay invariance.

In effect the UD must finish in order to have computed the world,

UD* is entirely given in the tiny sigma_1 block arithmetical reality.

which of course is an uncomputable output.

It is not an output. The trace is computable. Only the FPI on that
set of computations is not computable.

Bruno

Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 Jan 2014, at 09:04, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

I don't see how it follows that Pratt's theory does not allow for
a FPI. I have repeatedly said that a 3p is a construct from 1p

But then you make the 1p primitive, which contradicts many of your
saying.

You know the problem I have with you. It is like with some others. you
don't give a theory, I don't know what you assume. Once you said
existence, but this convey no meaning to me.

and does not have content outside of some 1p.

Then you need a conscious God (open problem in comp) or to make 1p
primitive (forbid in comp).

He does not assume that the universe is classical, as you do.

Not only I do not assume the physical universe to be classical, but I
prove that if comp is true, then the physical cannot be classical, but
is quantum like.

You are perhaps alluding to the arithmetical universe? yes, I do
assume that Goldbach conjecture, like 17 is prime are either true or
false.

You are the one making a mistake, I am afraid.

Which one?

Bruno

On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 2:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:

On 10 Jan 2014, at 23:23, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent,

Vaughn Pratt's dualist theory is consistent with QM and does show
a mechanism that prohibits White Rabbits. It is intelligible to
anyone that puts forth the effort to comprehend it.

There is no FPI in Pratt, no 1p/3p distinction. He does not take
comp and its consequences into account.

(We have already discussed this).

Bruno

On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:19 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:

On 1/10/2014 9:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

QM predict a infinite small
probability for white rabbits, while yours infer a decent amount of
them until some cut criteria emerges. And that is not my work, but
yours.

QM predict all this by using comp, or an unintelligible dualist
theory of observation.

I don't understand that. QM predicts a low probability for white
rabbits - but not by using comp, in fact it assumes a continuum.

And comp doesn't entail QM.

Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 11 Jan 2014, at 09:28, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Your consciousness condenses into here and now for the same  
measure the guy in Washington feel to be in only once city after the  
WM-duplication.


Read:  Your consciousness condenses into here and now for the same  
REASON the guy in Washington feelS to be in only ONE city after the WM- 
duplication.


Sorry, I wrote to quickly.

Hope you recover the meaning from my typo errors. Here I made three  
typo error in one sentence,with abig one, using the word measure  
instead of reason!


Don't hesitate to ask me to rewrite some paragraph in case it seems  
too much not understandable. It looks like there are few correlations  
between my brain and my hands ...


Bruno

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 January 2014 17:41, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 7:36 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 11 January 2014 16:08, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

   On 1/10/2014 6:01 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 11 January 2014 14:34, Terren Suydam terren.suy...@gmail.com wrote:

 Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to me,
 that's it - how an infinity of emulations condense into a single
 conscious experience.

 If they're identical, I guess you wouldn't be able to tell the
 experiences apart. They would be fungible, like the infinite identical
 copies that exist in the MWI prior to branching / differentiation. So they
 would just be one experience, even if it was generated an infinite number
 of times. I guess this is the capsule theory of identity, like Fred Hoyle
 and his pigeon holes and flashlight view of consciousness in October the
 first is too late. From the viewpoint of the experiencer, it wouldn't
 matter if millions of pigeon holes were identical, with identical notes in
 them, and others only appeared once.


  But might their number provide a kind of probability measure for the
 continuation of your consciousness?


  I don't know. I assume that it continues in all possible continuations,


 Sure, but it is quite likely that you experience some things and almost
 impossible that you experience others.  One of the problems with Everett's
 quantum mechanics is explaining this.  I think Deutsch has argued that the
 probability has to be proportional to the number of continuations: So when
 you observed a quantum event that was only half as likely as its complement
 there must be three continuations.  But then what is the probability is
 1/pi?  If you just assume there IS a probability measure then you can show
 it must be the Hilbert space norm; but that corresponds to assigning a real
 numbered weight to each world.


Well, exactly. Not a but (again) but another and - see the rest of my
post quoted below, in which I am equally perplexed by the same topic.

I think the MWI has to assume that the multiverse is a continuum, and that
it is infinitely differentiable (to semi-answer your earlier question about
whether the continuum exists, I suppose). That allows for arbitrary
division, and gives a measure to all quantum outcomes, even ones that have
a probability of 1/pi (if there are any that do).


 Brent

 if that isn't a tautology, but there's definitely a measure problem here -
 why are white rabbits far, far less common? So what do you think? Does
 the measure mean that I'm more likely to remain me rather than
 spontaneously morphing into the ruler of the World? (dammit!) I think my
 mind is starting to boggle just thinking about this...

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 January 2014 20:56, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Der Bruno,

 The UD has no output. I guess you think to the trace of the UD, UD*, which
 from the first person perspective is entirely given, by the 1p delay
 invariance.

The UD never stops. If a process lasts forever, it is eternal, then it
 does not ever complete and thus its results never obtain in any way that
 can be considered as accessible.

 This is true if you run the UD on a computer, but not if it exists in
Platonia. If the UD exists in an arithmetical wonderland, then it never
stops, nor does it ever start, nor does it do anything - it's simply there,
in a timeless realm. Assuming this is so, then time - or the appearance of
time - has to be recovered from the fact of its existence.

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Re: Tegmark's New Book



On 11 Jan 2014, at 11:01, LizR wrote:

On 11 January 2014 20:56, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com 
 wrote:

Der Bruno,

The UD has no output. I guess you think to the trace of the UD, UD*,  
which from the first person perspective is entirely given, by the  
1p delay invariance.


   The UD never stops. If a process lasts forever, it is eternal,  
then it does not ever complete and thus its results never obtain in  
any way that can be considered as accessible.


This is true if you run the UD on a computer, but not if it exists  
in Platonia. If the UD exists in an arithmetical wonderland,


Well, it exists in arithmetic. That arithmetic is a wonderland is a  
late discovery :)





then it never stops,


PA can prove that the UD never stops. (RA cannot).




nor does it ever start,


OK. if ever alludes to the physical universe. But note that PA (and  
RA) can prove that the UD has first step, and a second step, and a  
third step, and do one.


Ex( x = the nth step of the UD work) *is* a theorem in PA, for each n.  
In that arithmetical sense, we can say that the UD starts.






nor does it do anything - it's simply there, in a timeless realm.


UD* does not do anything, but we can say that relatively to the  
addition and multiplication laws, the UD does something, indeed, it  
does UD*. But not as an output, it does it as its normal arithmetical  
activity.
The same can be said of you Liz? Your many (3p) activities are  
already in UD*.




Assuming this is so, then time - or the appearance of time - has to  
be recovered from the fact of its existence.


Yes, indeed.

Bruno






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Re: A Theory of Consciousness

2014-01-11 Thread Telmo Menezes

Hi Edgar,

 My theory of consciousness is made considerably clearer in detail in my book
 on Reality if you want to get the full story :-)

 The answers to some of your questions:

 Sure dreams are real, like everything is, but their reality is that they are
 dreams. Actually mind is continually actively simulating reality whether
 asleep or awake, It continually goes off on its own predicting what it
 thinks will happen before it even happens. When we are awake this process is
 continually corrected by incoming sensory information and brought back on
 track. During dreams sensory input to the process is minimal and that
 self-correction process is minimal and the mind is freer to follow
 directions of its own based on internal priorities.

Ok, this is how I believe the brain works too. At a high-level: the
hard stuff is in the implementation details :)

 All this is explained in
 detail in Part IV: Mind and Reality of my book.

 Ontological energy is NOT any form of physical energy. It's a somewhat
 deficient term to signify the fact that reality is actually real and actual
 and actually here, present and happening right now. It is the 'stuff' or
 'substance' (entirely logical rather than physical) of actual existence and
 being, and because it is such that makes the forms and computations that
 appear within it real and actual.

What do you think of the Universal Dovetailer? Could it be what you
mean by Ontological Energy?

 OE is obviously difficult to properly describe. To paraphrase Lao Tse, The
 ontological energy that can be named is not ontological energy. In fact the
 ancient concept of Tao was an ancient approach to pretty much the same
 concept. If you know how to describe this without overloading of terms
 then take a shot at it...

No, I tend to agree with Lao Tse...

 You ask how do I know the physical world (doesn't) arise from
 consciousness? I don't claim that. I agree the 'physical' world DOES arise
 from conscousness. That's what I've said all along, if you've been
 following.
 The actual external reality is NOT physical, it's computational.

So you believe in comp?

 It consists entirely of the computational interaction of information forms
 in OE.

This sounds like comp and UD.

 All so called physical worlds are how organismic minds simulate their
 interactions with this information world. Organismic, including human, minds
 simulate information reality as a physical reality because that makes it
 easier to compute and interact with and thus function within. All the many
 ways this happens is described in detail in my book...

Ok, again this seems compatible with the concepts of 1p/3p, which are
frequently mentioned in this mailing list. (not everyone likes them,
for sure... I do)

Cheers
Telmo

 The only 'physical worlds' are products of organismic minds and occur only
 within those minds as simulations of the external information reality.
 Actual fundamental external reality is computationally evolving information
 in OE only.

 Edgar



 On Thursday, January 9, 2014 1:06:49 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:

 Hi Edgar,

 Ok, I'll bite :)

 On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 3:09 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
  All,
 
  I'll present a brief overview of my theory of consciousness from my book
  on
  Reality here. If anyone is interested I can elaborate.
 
  To understand consciousness we first must clearly distinguish between
  consciousness ITSELF and

  the contents of consciousness that become conscious

 This seems circular.

  by appearing within consciousness itself.
 
  The nature of consciousness itself, why things seem conscious,

 I would argue that why things seem conscious can be explained with
 neuroscience + computer science. The real mystery is why I am
 conscious.

  is the
  subject of Chalmer's 'Hard Problem', whereas the various structures of
  the
  contents of consciousness are the so called 'Easy Problems', the
  subjects of
  the study of mind.

 Several theories of mind address consciousness, notably comp (as Liz
 pointed out)

  Chalmer's formulation of the Hard Problem is 'How does consciousness
  arise
  from a physical brain?' Let's generalized this a little to 'How does
  consciousness arise from a physical world?'

 Here you're already making a strong assumption. How do you know it's
 not the other way round: the physical world arising from
 consciousness?

  The key to the solution is understanding that the world is not
  'physical' in
  the sense assumed. It is not a passive clockwork Newtonian world that
  just
  sits there waiting to be brought into consciousness by an observer. In
  fact
  the notion of observation is intrinsic to reality itself in a manner
  that
  reality actively manifests most of the defining attributes of reality on
  its
  own and all the conscious observer adds is participation in that process
  from a particular locus with a particular computational nformation
  structure.
 
  I'll explain how this works though the theory is

Re: Tegmark's New Book

2014-01-11 Thread Terren Suydam

Hi Bruno,

The WM experiment is easy to grasp. For me the difficulty lies, as Liz
guessed, with the infinity of possibilities. For continuation Cn does p(n)
stabilize as the number of computations approaches infinity? Are there an
infinity of possible continuations? Are they enumerable? I mean there is a
way of using intuition here but infinities have a way of making intuition
obsolete.

Terren
On Jan 11, 2014 3:28 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 11 Jan 2014, at 02:34, Terren Suydam wrote:

 Yeah, if there's one thing about the UDA that seems like magic to me,
 that's it - how an infinity of emulations condense into a single
 conscious experience.

 I would be please to understand the problem. If you are OK with step 3,
 you know that the condensation is given by the probability measure on all
 computations going through your local current state, by the FPI.

 Your consciousness condenses into here and now for the same measure the
 guy in Washington feel to be in only once city after the WM-duplication.

 I am not sure to really see what you don't see.

 QM suggests a measure exists, but with comp, if the measure exists, we
 must derived it from arithmetic. If we can show that such a measure does
 not exist, then we know that comp is false.

 Bruno





 Terren
 On Jan 10, 2014 8:04 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
 wrote:

 Dear Terren,

   Yes, it is about the continuations and measures thereof. I am not
 having much luck discovering how the measures are defined.


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 8:02 PM, Terren Suydam 
 terren.suy...@gmail.comwrote:

 Not sure I see the relevance, except to corroborate the idea
 (notwithstanding Bruno's comments) that mine and Glak's worlds would be
 separated as a result of the measure of stable continuations of those
 worlds... or were you making a different point?

 Terren
 On Jan 10, 2014 5:13 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 8:57 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:


  It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined -
 but only for a particular point of view.  So I, Terren, experience one and
 only one physics, because my consciousness is the selection criteria among
 the infinity of computations going through my state. But what about Glak, a
 being in an alternative physics?  Glak's consciousness selects a
 unique/invariant physics for Glak, but that emergent physical universe Glak
 experiences is characterized by laws that are different from what I
 experience.


 But then if you ask, Why do not I, Terren, become Glak and
 vice-versa? you see that the answer must be that it would be an improbable
 continuation of my brain states to suddenly instantiate a different physics
 and experience being Glak.  This is like the white rabbit problem, except
 in the form of why don't I turn into a white rabbit, that Bruno keeps
 saying must have a solution (if comp is true).

 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

2014-01-11 Thread Terren Suydam

Hi Bruno,

Unfortunately I don't have enough familiarity with the math to follow you
here. It is something I'd like to become fluent in one of these days but
unfortunately I barely have enough time these days to read this list.

However one thing still nags me. I don't find it hard to imagine that given
enough computational power, we could simulate a universe with alternative
physics, that leads within the simulation to intelligent, conscious life
forms, eventually. So Glak appears in our simulation. And if we can
simulate it, well, it's already in the UD*, as well as the infinite
computations going through Glak's state.

The only way I can resolve this with your reply is that I fear you have to
say conscious beings cannot exist in alternative physics simulations, but
I'd love to be wrong here.

Terren
 On Jan 10, 2014 1:27 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Jan 2014, at 17:57, Terren Suydam wrote:


 Bruno,

 It seems that the UDA implies that physics is uniquely determined - but
 only for a particular point of view.


 Yes, but it is a very general one. It is the particular view of any
 (universal) machine. It has to be the same for any person capable of being
 incarnated/implemented through a finitely describable body relatively to
 some universal numbers.

 All what you will add, by consciousness differentiation is local,
 historical, and geographical.



 So I, Terren, experience one and only one physics, because my
 consciousness is the selection criteria among the infinity of computations
 going through my state.


 Consciousness select you in the consistent extension, OK. But the
 extensions themselves are provided by the infinitely many competing
 universal numbers/computations below you substitution level, and the
 constraints of the observation seen from the self (captured by the
 intensional variant of G and G*, in the math).




 But what about Glak, a being in an alternative physics?


 If Glak mind obeys to the laws of Boole, and if Glak as a finite body, and
 if he is self-referentially correct, then we share with Glak the same
 sigma_1 true sentences, and he figures it out (by Bp  Dt) in the same way,
 so we have the same physics. If Glak shows us an electron heaver than ours,
 we can conclude that the mass of an electron is not a necessity, but a
 contingency, a geographical fact, and there might be a law given the mass
 electron relatively to that type of accessible physics (given that we
 succeed in talking with Glak).






 Glak's consciousness selects a unique/invariant physics for Glak,


 OK, but it does it with some stability, and then Everett suggest that we
 are multiplied collectively, and so do share most of our histories locally.

 Better to bet that we do have a collective comp first person plural
 reality.



 but that emergent physical universe Glak experiences is characterized by
 laws that are different from what I experience.


 It is a different place, but comp suggest it will have the same law,
 probably the same constant. But we get three physics, and they can be quite
 alternated type of reality. It is like the electron might be heavier in
 Heaven apparently :)
 I suspect the three physics to be related to possible altered state of
 consciousness here. The soul ( p) resides in three hypostases (S4Grz1,
 X1, X1*).

 Without incompleteness, such comp physics would have collapsed into
 classical logic, and physics would have been without law, the multiverse
 would be smooth and and still more multiple, in the high continua,
 inconsistent. That does not exist, thanks to inompleteness. The laws of
 prediction of events are the same for all creature, but perhaps with some
 variants.

 Bruno


 Terren


 On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:28 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 10 Jan 2014, at 09:58, LizR wrote:

 On 10 January 2014 21:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 09 Jan 2014, at 22:45, LizR wrote:

 On 10 January 2014 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:


 I think the question is whether comp determines that the world is
 (locally) Lorentz invariant.  If it is, then c is just a unit conversion
 factor between the + and - signature terms.  It's value is arbitrary, like
 how many feet in a mile, which is why it is now an exact number in SI
 units.

 Oh yes, I seem to remember that physicists like to set c (and h?) to 1.

 So does comp predict that any TOE will have a unique solution - namely
 the one we experience? So is this an alternative to the WAP - we experience
 a universe compatible with our existence because such a universe has to
 drop out of the interations of conscious beings in Platonia?


 It is not the same. WAP use a form of ASSA, where comp uses only RSSA.
 (Absolute versus Relative self sampling assumptions).

 Ah, I don't quite understand that but I feel like a dim light migvht
 have appeared.


 We might revise step seven, as this should be understood from it. Any
 TOE (that is any first order logical

Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear LizR,


On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 5:01 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 11 January 2014 20:56, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Der Bruno,

 The UD has no output. I guess you think to the trace of the UD, UD*,
 which from the first person perspective is entirely given, by the 1p
 delay invariance.

The UD never stops. If a process lasts forever, it is eternal, then
 it does not ever complete and thus its results never obtain in any way that
 can be considered as accessible.

 This is true if you run the UD on a computer, but not if it exists in
 Platonia. If the UD exists in an arithmetical wonderland, then it never
 stops, nor does it ever start, nor does it do anything - it's simply there,
 in a timeless realm. Assuming this is so, then time - or the appearance of
 time - has to be recovered from the fact of its existence.



I understand that argument. But then we have to account for the infinite
pluralities of times that are eternally co-present in that Platonia when
there is no way to break the stalemate of neutrality. Becoming is a better
candidate for the ontological ground since it includes potential at the
root, potential would be then the fire that breaks the symmetry that
would otherwise keep Platonia frozen stiff.




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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Bruno,

  You wrote:
AR provides the neutral monism!
Comp is neutral monism. Neither mind, nor matter are taken as primitive.
Both emerge from the additive-multiplicative structure of arithmetic (AR),
and that structure provides the neutral stuff.

Ontological neutrality is that there are no particular properties or
orders. AR has a particular set of properties and an order, thus it cannot
be considered as neutral. It must includes all possibilities and orderings
equally. Numbers have particular properties and orders so how is it that
you can think of them as being a neutral monism?

No Bruno, you are advocating a form of Idealism, almost like Berkeley, but
unlike Berkeley you do not fall prey to Mr. Johnson's criticism by
appealing to the kickability of prime numbers, the truth of theorems
(within theories), etc. Nice move, but it is still flawed.




On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 3:53 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 11 Jan 2014, at 06:05, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Dear Brent,

   I will try a crude summary and hope to not be misunderstood... It starts
 with the Stone duality, a well known isomorphism between Boolean algebras
 and totally disconnected compact Hausdorff spaces. The former are
 identified with minds (logical, computational, numerical, etc) and the
 latter with physical objects (what is more physical that a space that
 looks exactly like Democritus' atoms in a 
 voidhttp://www.scottaaronson.com/democritus/lec1.html
 ?.
This solves the mind-body linkage problem of Descartes' dualism. The
 paper http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf then discusses how
 interactions between pairs of minds (generalizations of Boolean algebras
 identified as states) is mediated via pairs of bodies (generalizations of
 Stone spaces to include mass, spin, charge, potentials,... physics
 identified as events). A crude diagram of this relation for the evolution
 of a single entity is:

 ... - Body - Body' - ...
| |
 ... - Mind - Mind' - ...

 where the | symbol is the Stone isomorphism, - is the physical
 evolution of one event to the next and - is the logical arrow of
 implication.

   Mathematics as considered my most people usually ignores evolution of
 logical structures, such as Boolean algebras, and so the difference between
 mind and mind' is not considered. Now that computers are commonplace, the
 idea that logical structures evolve makes a lot more sense! A computation
 is the transformation of information and since logical structures capture
 the relations of the information, it is natural to consider this theory.

   In this theory, minds and bodies (including brains!) are not separable
 substances but are isomorphs that have dynamics whose arrows point in
 opposite directions. Physical process moves forward from event to event' in
 sequences of time according to thermodynamics, etc. and logic looks
 backward to ensure that any new state is consistent with previous states.
 This implies an elegant solution to the measurement problem of QM!
 Differences between states and parameters of time can be subdivided as
 finely as one wishes; even to the smoothness of continua.
   It is what the logical 'side of the coin does to select physical events
 that won me over to Pratt's theory: a physical transition from event x at
 time t to event x' at time t' is allowed if and only if the state x'* at t'
 does not imply information that would contradict prior states at t^-1,
 t^-2, etc. Basically, events will occur iff they do not imply a
 contradiction of previously allowed events. This automatically solves the
 White Rabbit problem by disallowing events that imply logical
 contradictions.
It also gives a slightly different take on computational universality:
 individual logical structures are associated with equivalence classes of
 physical functions and physical systems are associated with equivalence
 classes of logical structures. The equivalences are, respectively:
 equivalent function and semantical equivalence. Thus computations and the
 physical processes are not ontologically isolated from each other, but
 universality obtains because there is no a priori bijective map between the
 set of particular physical systems and the set of particular Turing
 universal computations.


 ?



   It seems that Pratt abandoned the theory because of a lack of interest
 in the community but still hosts the papers on his website. Maybe in hope
 that some one might come along, like me, that can make sense of it and
 develop it further. It does not consider SR at all, which bothers me a
 little bit, but that can be fixed using ideas such as those of Kevin Knuth,
 IMHO.


 It is a nice idea, but it does not take into account the FPI (he is
 unaware of it), and so does not address the comp mind-body problem.



 Its main prediction is that neither ghosts (logics that cannot be
 associated with any physical structure) nor zombies (bodies that cannot be
 represented by an

A different take on the ontological status of Math

Dear Friends,

  I highly recommend Louis H. Kauffman's new blog. His latest post speaks
to the Becoming interpretation of mathematics that I advocate:

http://kauffman2013.wordpress.com/2014/01/11/is-mathematics-real/

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Stephen Paul King

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Re: A different take on the ontological status of Math

2014-01-11 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 3:47 PM, Stephen Paul King 
stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Friends,

   I highly recommend Louis H. Kauffman's new blog. His latest post speaks
 to the Becoming interpretation of mathematics that I advocate:

 http://kauffman2013.wordpress.com/2014/01/11/is-mathematics-real/


Last I understood, you advocate some kind of process, here becoming
interpretation. I don't see how that fits with some set theoretical
foundation. Could you elaborate? I don't think sets are necessary for some
comp foundation and arithmetic suffices already in throwing us down a
rabbit hole. PGC



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Re: Tegmark's New Book

2014-01-11 Thread Jason Resch

On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 11 Jan 2014, at 08:56, Stephen Paul King wrote:

 Der Bruno,

 The UD has no output. I guess you think to the trace of the UD, UD*, which
 from the first person perspective is entirely given, by the 1p delay
 invariance.

The UD never stops. If a process lasts forever, it is eternal, then it
 does not ever complete and thus its results never obtain in any way that
 can be considered as accessible.


 ?
 Then real numbers don't exist.

 To belong to your first person indeterminacy domain, the UD needs only to
 access the state, which, by non stopping, has to occur once. of course we
 might need to look at the 10^(10^1000) nth step of the UD. But the 1p is
 not aware of the reconstitution (in UD*) delay, so that does not matter.
 Either your state is accessed, or not, and if it is accessed it take a
 finite time (number of the UD-steps), and belongs to the indeterminacy
 domain. So the global FPI does have the whole infinite trace of the UD as
 domain, or if you prefer it is the infinite union of all its finite parts.
  Just keep in mind the step 2 and 4.


Bruno,

I was thinking: Shouldn't halting programs still contribute an infinite
amount of weight in the UD, since they are still reached an infinite number
of times (at least once each time the UD reaches itself).  Perhaps there is
some noticeable cut off or difference in weight between those programs that
take longer to reach than the UD itself and those that occur multiple times
before the UD reaches itself.

Jason

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 11 January 2014 23:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 11 Jan 2014, at 11:01, LizR wrote:

 nor does it do anything - it's simply there, in a timeless realm.

 UD* does not do anything, but we can say that relatively to the addition
 and multiplication laws, the UD does something, indeed, it does UD*. But
 not as an output, it does it as its normal arithmetical activity.
 The same can be said of you Liz? Your many (3p) activities are already
 in UD*.


Yes, true. I had some difficulty getting up this morning, knowing my
activities are already there :)

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Re: A different take on the ontological status of Math

2014-01-11 Thread Alberto G. Corona

By the way

2014/1/11, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com:
 On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 3:47 PM, Stephen Paul King 
 stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

 Dear Friends,

   I highly recommend Louis H. Kauffman's new blog. His latest post speaks
 to the Becoming interpretation of mathematics that I advocate:

 http://kauffman2013.wordpress.com/2014/01/11/is-mathematics-real/


 Last I understood, you advocate some kind of process, here becoming
 interpretation. I don't see how that fits with some set theoretical
 foundation. Could you elaborate? I don't think sets are necessary for some
 comp foundation and arithmetic suffices already in throwing us down a
 rabbit hole. PGC



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 Kindest Regards,

 Stephen Paul King


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Homotopy Type Theory

2014-01-11 Thread Alberto G. Corona

By the way, what about if you find a mathematical theory that show that:

computer programs and matematical proofs  are no longer something out
of math, but mathematical structures and both are essentially the same
thing: both are paths from premises to conclussion in a  space with
topological properties

And the theory stablish topological relations between these paths so
that proofs and computer algorithms are classified according with
these relations.

That is homotopy type theory.

http://homotopytypetheory.org/

I´m starting to learn something about it, It is based on type theory,
category theory and topology. The book introduction is nice (HOTT link
at the bottom of the page). It seems to be a foundation of computer
science and math that unify both at a higher level, since proofs and
programs become legitimate mathematical structures

The book:

http://homotopytypetheory.org/2013/06/20/the-hott-book/

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Re: A different take on the ontological status of Math

The mathematical entity GG wraps right around itself.  Just so does our
language and apparent existence wrap around itself and give us the
possibility that we are ‘nothing more’ than our own description of our own
description, a kind of illusion that generates its own illusion.

Lovely! The sort of beauty we can only hope underlies the sometimes all too
apparent ugliness of reality.



On 12 January 2014 03:47, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Dear Friends,

   I highly recommend Louis H. Kauffman's new blog. His latest post speaks
 to the Becoming interpretation of mathematics that I advocate:

 http://kauffman2013.wordpress.com/2014/01/11/is-mathematics-real/

 --

 Kindest Regards,

 Stephen Paul King


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Re: Homotopy Type Theory

That sounds like (some of) what Bruno talks about. The computer programme
known as the UD (and its trace) are in maths. (And didn't Godel make
proofs paths of maths?)


On 12 January 2014 10:41, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote:

 By the way, what about if you find a mathematical theory that show that:

 computer programs and matematical proofs  are no longer something out
 of math, but mathematical structures and both are essentially the same
 thing: both are paths from premises to conclussion in a  space with
 topological properties

 And the theory stablish topological relations between these paths so
 that proofs and computer algorithms are classified according with
 these relations.

 That is homotopy type theory.

 http://homotopytypetheory.org/

 I´m starting to learn something about it, It is based on type theory,
 category theory and topology. The book introduction is nice (HOTT link
 at the bottom of the page). It seems to be a foundation of computer
 science and math that unify both at a higher level, since proofs and
 programs become legitimate mathematical structures

 The book:

 http://homotopytypetheory.org/2013/06/20/the-hott-book/

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Re: A different take on the ontological status of Math

2014-01-11 Thread Platonist Guitar Cowboy

Note however that Kauffman does not go into axioms involved for set theory,
whichever version he is referencing I can't make out, and steps to the side
of that. The article would loose a bit of its metaphorical slickness if he
had, I'd guess... PGC


On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 10:45 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 The mathematical entity GG wraps right around itself.  Just so does our
 language and apparent existence wrap around itself and give us the
 possibility that we are ‘nothing more’ than our own description of our own
 description, a kind of illusion that generates its own illusion.

 Lovely! The sort of beauty we can only hope underlies the sometimes all
 too apparent ugliness of reality.



 On 12 January 2014 03:47, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Dear Friends,

   I highly recommend Louis H. Kauffman's new blog. His latest post speaks
 to the Becoming interpretation of mathematics that I advocate:

 http://kauffman2013.wordpress.com/2014/01/11/is-mathematics-real/

 --

 Kindest Regards,

 Stephen Paul King


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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 1/10/2014 11:29 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Brent,

Hmm? Steven turns into a White Rabbit is not a /*logical*/ contradiction, it's a
/*nomological*/ one. If there's a transition from (t1,x1) to (t2,x2) it seems the only
/*logical*/ contradiction would be x2=Not x1 at t1. Logical is a very weak
condition; as far as I know it just means being consistent=(not every sentence is a
theorem).

nom·o·log·i·cal
ˌnäməˈläjikəl/
/adjective/

1.
*1*.
relating to or denoting certain principles, such as laws of nature, that
are neither
logically necessary nor theoretically explicable, but are simply taken as
true.

Right! It was a very crude and informal explanation.

But it's not an explanation at all if it assumes regularities such as laws of nature
because those are what we're trying to explain.

Things become, hopefully, more clear when one considers the scenario where there are
many minds that are communicating/interacting while evolving. Interaction requires some
level of similarity between the participants.
For example, I I where to experience a White Rabbit, what effects would it have to
have on others that I interact with so that it would not effect their 1p content. I
would say that it was a hallucination, maybe... We forget that what we experience of the
world is not that world itself, it is our mind/brains version of such. We have to take
the capacity of hallucinations into account in our thoughts of that is a mind...
Can we not take as true what we experience? How can we know that it is not
some controlled simulation? We need to answer Descartes question: How do I know that I
am not just a brain in a vat (or a computation running in some UD)?

Sure, we can take our experiences as true in the sense that we know we have the
experience. Then we reason from there and hypothesize models of the world to make sense
of our experiences. But I think it makes no sense to speculate that I am brain in a vat -
what difference would it make? My model for understanding my experiences could only
include that by assuming much more about the vat, the stimulus to my brain, who made the
vat,it's just a lot of extra complication with no predictive power.

Brent

Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/10/2014 11:43 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But what is the measure of relative persistence?


It is the measure almost defined by the material hypostases (in S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*). It 
defines the comp physical laws.


How do those different logics define a measure over possible physics?

Brent

If they don't exist, comp has to be false, or we are in a simulation, or the S4 theory 
of knowledge should be amended.


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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Brent,

  If there exit an infinite number of observers and similarities in the 1p
content of those observers is a priori possible, it follows that there will
be regularities as those are the similarities that observers share.
  The brain in a vat thought experiment is an attempt to ask competent
questions as to what is reality. It also allows us to consider possible
relations between the complexity of the 1p content and resources required
to generate (computationally) said content.


On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 5:09 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/10/2014 11:29 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  Dear Brent,

Hmm?  Steven turns into a White Rabbit is not a *logical* contradiction,
 it's a *nomological* one.  If there's a transition from (t1,x1) to
 (t2,x2) it seems the only *logical* contradiction would be x2=Not x1 at
 t1.  Logical is a very weak condition; as far as I know it just means
 being consistent=(not every sentence is a theorem).

  nom·o·log·i·cal
  ˌnäməˈläjikəl/
  *adjective*

1.  *1*.
 relating to or denoting certain principles, such as laws of nature,
that are neither logically necessary nor theoretically explicable, but are
simply taken as true.


Right! It was a very crude and informal explanation.


 But it's not an explanation at all if it assumes regularities such as
 laws of nature because those are what we're trying to explain.


  Things become, hopefully, more clear when one considers the scenario
 where there are many minds that are communicating/interacting while
 evolving. Interaction requires some level of  similarity between the
 participants.
   For example, I I where to experience a White Rabbit, what effects would
 it have to have on others that I interact with so that it would not effect
 their 1p content. I would say that it was a hallucination, maybe... We
 forget that what we experience of the world is not that world itself, it is
 our mind/brains version of such. We have to take the capacity
 of hallucinations into account in our thoughts of that is a mind...
Can we not take as true what we experience? How can we know that it
 is not some controlled simulation? We need to answer Descartes question:
 How do I know that I am not just a brain in a vat (or a computation running
 in some UD)?


 Sure, we can take our experiences as true in the sense that we know we
 have the experience.  Then we reason from there and hypothesize models of
 the world to make sense of our experiences.  But I think it makes no sense
 to speculate that I am brain in a vat - what difference would it make?  My
 model for understanding my experiences could only include that by assuming
 much more about the vat, the stimulus to my brain, who made the
 vat,it's just a lot of extra complication with no predictive power.

 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 1/11/2014 6:43 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

You wrote:
AR provides the neutral monism!
Comp is neutral monism. Neither mind, nor matter are taken as primitive. Both emerge
from the additive-multiplicative structure of arithmetic (AR), and that structure
provides the neutral stuff.

Ontological neutrality is that there are no particular properties or orders.

So there are things with no properties?? Or there are things with vague and ambiguous
properties? I've never heard of this ontological neutrality. Can you cite some references?

AR has a particular set of properties and an order, thus it cannot be considered as
neutral. It must includes all possibilities and orderings equally. Numbers have
particular properties and orders so how is it that you can think of them as being a
neutral monism?

Because everything is arithmetic IS neutral monism:

Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate reality is all of one
kind. To this extent neutral monism is in agreement with idealism and materialism. What
distinguishes neutral monism from its better known monistic rivals is the claim that the
intrinsic nature of ultimate reality is neither mental nor physical. This negative claim
also captures the idea of neutrality: being intrinsically neither mental nor physical in
nature ultimate reality is said to be neutral between the two.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/

Brent

Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear Brent,


On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 6:08 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  On 1/11/2014 6:43 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  Dear Bruno,

You wrote:
 AR provides the neutral monism!
  Comp is neutral monism. Neither mind, nor matter are taken as primitive.
 Both emerge from the additive-multiplicative structure of arithmetic (AR),
 and that structure provides the neutral stuff.

   Ontological neutrality is that there are no particular properties or
 orders.


 So there are things with no properties??  Or there are things with vague
 and ambiguous properties?  I've never heard of this ontological
 neutrality.  Can you cite some references?



I am not considering things here, I am considering the ontological ground
from which things are defined. Prof. Standish's Nothing, as discussed in
his book* A theory of Nothing*, is a good example.



   AR has a particular set of properties and an order, thus it cannot be
 considered as neutral. It must includes all possibilities and orderings
 equally. Numbers have particular properties and orders so how is it that
 you can think of them as being a neutral monism?


 Because everything is arithmetic IS neutral monism:

 Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate reality
 is all of one kind. To this extent neutral monism is in agreement with
 idealism and materialism. What distinguishes neutral monism from its better
 known monistic rivals is the claim that the intrinsic nature of ultimate
 reality is neither mental nor physical. This negative claim also captures
 the idea of neutrality: being intrinsically neither mental nor physical in
 nature ultimate reality is said to be neutral between the two.

 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/


I like that reference, but do not agree with some of the definitions of
words that it uses. For example, reality as it is used implies that
there are degrees or level of reality, such that the notion of an ultimate
reality is possible. This way of thinking assumes a separation between
observers and what is observed such that the two somehow are completely
independent of each other as classes or categories. This makes no sense.
What is an observer that has nothing as its observations? Seriously!

  We should use the concept of ontological ground. Grundlagen. Foundation.
Many philosophers have discussed the idea. Standish's Nothing is good. I
would stay with it.

Now, note the sentences:
What distinguishes neutral monism from its better known monistic rivals is
the claim that the intrinsic nature of ultimate reality is *neither mental
nor physical*. This negative claim also captures the idea of neutrality:
being intrinsically neither mental nor physical in nature ultimate reality
is said to be neutral between the two.


...neither mental nor physical... My claim is that arithmetic is mental
and thus is not neutral. It has specific properties that a mind can
distinguish. Given the inseparability of an observer from its observations
or, better, what which it can distinguish it follows that all that a mind
can distinguish falls under the umbrella class of Mental observations, thus
we cannot claim that what which is capable of being distinguished mentally
is a neutral class.

AR is a form of Mental monism. It is not Neutral monism.





 Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 12 January 2014 12:08, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  Because everything is arithmetic IS neutral monism:

 Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate reality
 is all of one kind. To this extent neutral monism is in agreement with
 idealism and materialism. What distinguishes neutral monism from its better
 known monistic rivals is the claim that the intrinsic nature of ultimate
 reality is neither mental nor physical. This negative claim also captures
 the idea of neutrality: being intrinsically neither mental nor physical in
 nature ultimate reality is said to be neutral between the two.

 So comp *is *neutral monism. I never realised that.

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Re: Homotopy Type Theory

2014-01-11 Thread Alberto G. Corona

But the proofs where not studied before as mathematical structures.
Godel and any mathematician did profs, but proofs where
meta-mathematical, in the sense that they were not mathematical
objects,  although they could be formalized in a language. The same
happened with the notion of equality and equivalence etc That are
defined in a fuzzy or ad-hoc way. HOTT study how equal are two things
depending on the path from the one to the other, that is , what
topology has the proof of equality between the two.

2014/1/11, LizR lizj...@gmail.com:
 That sounds like (some of) what Bruno talks about. The computer programme
 known as the UD (and its trace) are in maths. (And didn't Godel make
 proofs paths of maths?)


 On 12 January 2014 10:41, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote:

 By the way, what about if you find a mathematical theory that show that:

 computer programs and matematical proofs  are no longer something out
 of math, but mathematical structures and both are essentially the same
 thing: both are paths from premises to conclussion in a  space with
 topological properties

 And the theory stablish topological relations between these paths so
 that proofs and computer algorithms are classified according with
 these relations.

 That is homotopy type theory.

 http://homotopytypetheory.org/

 I´m starting to learn something about it, It is based on type theory,
 category theory and topology. The book introduction is nice (HOTT link
 at the bottom of the page). It seems to be a foundation of computer
 science and math that unify both at a higher level, since proofs and
 programs become legitimate mathematical structures

 The book:

 http://homotopytypetheory.org/2013/06/20/the-hott-book/

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear LizR,

  That is the claim and I show that it is false. A class that has a
particular set of properties and not the rest of the properties required to
balance it all out to Nothing is not neutral. It is biased!


On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 8:32 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 12 January 2014 12:08, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  Because everything is arithmetic IS neutral monism:

 Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate reality
 is all of one kind. To this extent neutral monism is in agreement with
 idealism and materialism. What distinguishes neutral monism from its better
 known monistic rivals is the claim that the intrinsic nature of ultimate
 reality is neither mental nor physical. This negative claim also captures
 the idea of neutrality: being intrinsically neither mental nor physical in
 nature ultimate reality is said to be neutral between the two.

 So comp *is *neutral monism. I never realised that.

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RE: Tegmark and consciousness

2014-01-11 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales

RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014
Consciousness as a State of Matter
Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014

Hi Folk,
Grrr!
I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science's grapplings with 
consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so pervasive and 
so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it's a long way from physics to 
neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we can see it for what it 
is. Can't they (Tegmark and ilk)  see that the so-called science of 
consciousness is

* the the science of the scientific observer

* trying to explain observing with observations

* trying to explain experience with experiences

* trying to explain how scientists do science.

* a science of scientific behaviour.

* Descriptive and never explanatory.

* Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm 'laws of nature' 
contacts the actual underlying reality...

* Assuming there's only 1 scientific behaviour and never ever ever 
questioning that.

* Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of anything.

* Assuming that objectivity, in objectifying something out of 
subjectivity, doesn't evidence the subjectivity at the heart of it.

* Confusing scientific evidence as being an identity with objectified 
phenomena.

2500 years of blinkered paradigmatic tacit presuppositionnow gives us 
exactly what happened for phlogiston during the 1600s. A new 'state of matter'? 
 Bah! Phlogiston!!! Of course not! All we have to do is admit we are actually 
inside the universe, made of whatever it is made of, getting a view from the 
point of view of being a bit of it.. g. The big mistake is that 
thinking that physics has ever, in the history of science, ever ever ever dealt 
with what the universe is actually made of, as opposed to merely describing 
what a presupposed observer 'sees it looking like'. The next biggest mistake is 
assuming that we can't deal with what the universe is actually made of, when 
that very stuff is delivering an ability to scientifically observe in the first 
place.

These sorts of expositions have failed before the authors have even lifted a 
finger over the keyboard. Those involved don't even know what the problem is. 
The problem is not one _for_ science. The problem is _science itself_  ... _us_.

Sorry. I just get very very frustrated at times. I have written a book on this 
and hopefully it'll be out within 6 months. That'll sort them out.

Happy new year!

Cheers,

Colin   (@Dr_Cuspy, if you tweet).
phew rant over, feel better now

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Re: Tegmark and consciousness

2014-01-11 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Saturday, January 11, 2014 11:12:46 PM UTC-5, ColinHales wrote:

  RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014 

 Consciousness as a State of Matter

 Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014

  

 Hi Folk,

 Grrr!

 I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s grapplings 
 with consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so 
 pervasive and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. 


Exactly. It would be interesting to see a study that focuses on why some 
people can't seem to understand the blindspot. That will tell us more about 
consciousness than any mathematical or physical principle.

 

 I know it’s a long way from physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But 
 surely in 2014 we can see it for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk) 
  see that the so-called “science of consciousness” is

 · the “the science of the scientific observer”

 · trying to explain observing with observations

 · trying to explain experience with experiences

 · trying to explain how scientists do science.

 · a science of scientific behaviour.

 · Descriptive and never explanatory.

 · Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws of 
 nature’ contacts the actual underlying reality...

 · Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never ever 
 ever questioning that.

 · Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of anything.

 · Assuming that objectivity, in objectifying something out of 
 subjectivity, doesn’t evidence the subjectivity at the heart of it.

 · Confusing scientific evidence as being an identity with 
 objectified phenomena.

  

 2500 years of blinkered paradigmatic tacit presuppositionnow gives us 
 exactly what happened for phlogiston during the 1600s. A new ‘state of 
 matter’?  Bah! Phlogiston!!! Of course not! All we have to do is admit we 
 are actually inside the universe, made of whatever it is made of, getting a 
 view from the point of view of being a bit of it.. g. The big 
 mistake is that thinking that physics has ever, in the history of science, 
 ever ever ever dealt with what the universe is actually made of, as opposed 
 to merely describing what a presupposed observer ‘sees it looking like’. 
 The next biggest mistake is assuming that we can’t deal with what the 
 universe is actually made of, when that very stuff is delivering an ability 
 to scientifically observe in the first place.

  

 These sorts of expositions have failed before the authors have even lifted 
 a finger over the keyboard. Those involved don’t even know what the problem 
 is. The problem is not one _*for*_ science. The problem is _*science 
 itself*_  ... _*us*_. 

  

 Sorry. I just get very very frustrated at times. I have written a book on 
 this and hopefully it’ll be out within 6 months. That’ll sort them out.

  

 Happy new year!

  

 Cheers,

  

 Colin   (@Dr_Cuspy, if you tweet).

 phew rant over, feel better now

  
  

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

On 12 January 2014 14:52, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Dear LizR,

   That is the claim and I show that it is false. A class that has a
 particular set of properties and not the rest of the properties required to
 balance it all out to Nothing is not neutral. It is biased!


So, can't arithmetic be balanced out to nothing? What can?



 On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 8:32 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 12 January 2014 12:08, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  Because everything is arithmetic IS neutral monism:

 Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate
 reality is all of one kind. To this extent neutral monism is in agreement
 with idealism and materialism. What distinguishes neutral monism from its
 better known monistic rivals is the claim that the intrinsic nature of
 ultimate reality is neither mental nor physical. This negative claim also
 captures the idea of neutrality: being intrinsically neither mental nor
 physical in nature ultimate reality is said to be neutral between the two.

 So comp *is *neutral monism. I never realised that.

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Re: Tegmark and consciousness

2014-01-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On 12 January 2014 15:12, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote:
 RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014

 Consciousness as a State of Matter

 Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014



 Hi Folk,

 Grrr!

 I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s grapplings with
 consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so pervasive
 and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it’s a long way from
 physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we can see it
 for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk)  see that the so-called
 “science of consciousness” is

 · the “the science of the scientific observer”

 · trying to explain observing with observations

 · trying to explain experience with experiences

 · trying to explain how scientists do science.

 · a science of scientific behaviour.

 · Descriptive and never explanatory.

 · Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws of nature’
 contacts the actual underlying reality...

 · Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never ever ever
 questioning that.

 · Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of anything.

 · Assuming that objectivity, in objectifying something out of
 subjectivity, doesn’t evidence the subjectivity at the heart of it.

 · Confusing scientific evidence as being an identity with
 objectified phenomena.



 2500 years of blinkered paradigmatic tacit presuppositionnow gives us
 exactly what happened for phlogiston during the 1600s. A new ‘state of
 matter’?  Bah! Phlogiston!!! Of course not! All we have to do is admit we
 are actually inside the universe, made of whatever it is made of, getting a
 view from the point of view of being a bit of it.. g. The big
 mistake is that thinking that physics has ever, in the history of science,
 ever ever ever dealt with what the universe is actually made of, as opposed
 to merely describing what a presupposed observer ‘sees it looking like’. The
 next biggest mistake is assuming that we can’t deal with what the universe
 is actually made of, when that very stuff is delivering an ability to
 scientifically observe in the first place.



 These sorts of expositions have failed before the authors have even lifted a
 finger over the keyboard. Those involved don’t even know what the problem
 is. The problem is not one _for_ science. The problem is _science itself_
 ... _us_.



 Sorry. I just get very very frustrated at times. I have written a book on
 this and hopefully it’ll be out within 6 months. That’ll sort them out.



 Happy new year!

I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am
conscious, so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in
a special way might not also be conscious. What is it about that idea
that you see as not only wrong, but ridiculous?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Tegmark's New Book

Dear LizR,


On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 12:00 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 12 January 2014 14:52, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote:

 Dear LizR,

   That is the claim and I show that it is false. A class that has a
 particular set of properties and not the rest of the properties required to
 balance it all out to Nothing is not neutral. It is biased!


 So, can't arithmetic be balanced out to nothing? What can?


Of course arithmetic be balanced out to nothing! By the class of physical
objects and their actions! They are what it isn't. Is this not making
sense? I don't see how it is complicated...





 On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 8:32 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

 On 12 January 2014 12:08, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

  Because everything is arithmetic IS neutral monism:

 Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate
 reality is all of one kind. To this extent neutral monism is in agreement
 with idealism and materialism. What distinguishes neutral monism from its
 better known monistic rivals is the claim that the intrinsic nature of
 ultimate reality is neither mental nor physical. This negative claim also
 captures the idea of neutrality: being intrinsically neither mental nor
 physical in nature ultimate reality is said to be neutral between the two.

 So comp *is *neutral monism. I never realised that.

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 Stephen Paul King

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 stephe...@provensecure.com

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stephe...@provensecure.com

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Re: Tegmark and consciousness

 Phlogiston!!!  Nice to hear from you, Colin! :-)


On Sat, Jan 11, 2014 at 11:12 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales 
cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote:

  RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014

 Consciousness as a State of Matter

 Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014



 Hi Folk,

 Grrr!

 I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science’s grapplings
 with consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so
 pervasive and so incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it’s a long
 way from physics to neuroscience (discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we
 can see it for what it is. Can’t they (Tegmark and ilk)  see that the
 so-called “science of consciousness” is

 · the “the science of the scientific observer”

 · trying to explain observing with observations

 · trying to explain experience with experiences

 · trying to explain how scientists do science.

 · a science of scientific behaviour.

 · Descriptive and never explanatory.

 · Assuming that the use of consciousness to confirm ‘laws of
 nature’ contacts the actual underlying reality...

 · Assuming there’s only 1 scientific behaviour and never ever
 ever questioning that.

 · Assuming scientists are not scientific evidence of anything.

 · Assuming that objectivity, in objectifying something out of
 subjectivity, doesn’t evidence the subjectivity at the heart of it.

 · Confusing scientific evidence as being an identity with
 objectified phenomena.



 2500 years of blinkered paradigmatic tacit presuppositionnow gives us
 exactly what happened for phlogiston during the 1600s. A new ‘state of
 matter’?  Bah! Phlogiston!!! Of course not! All we have to do is admit we
 are actually inside the universe, made of whatever it is made of, getting a
 view from the point of view of being a bit of it.. g. The big
 mistake is that thinking that physics has ever, in the history of science,
 ever ever ever dealt with what the universe is actually made of, as opposed
 to merely describing what a presupposed observer ‘sees it looking like’.
 The next biggest mistake is assuming that we can’t deal with what the
 universe is actually made of, when that very stuff is delivering an ability
 to scientifically observe in the first place.



 These sorts of expositions have failed before the authors have even lifted
 a finger over the keyboard. Those involved don’t even know what the problem
 is. The problem is not one _*for*_ science. The problem is _*science
 itself*_  ... _*us*_.



 Sorry. I just get very very frustrated at times. I have written a book on
 this and hopefully it’ll be out within 6 months. That’ll sort them out.



 Happy new year!



 Cheers,



 Colin   (@Dr_Cuspy, if you tweet).

 phew rant over, feel better now



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Stephen Paul King

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Mobile: (864) 567-3099

stephe...@provensecure.com

 http://www.provensecure.us/


“This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of
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Re: Tegmark and consciousness


On 1/11/2014 8:12 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:


RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014

Consciousness as a State of Matter

Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014

Hi Folk,

Grrr!

I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science's grapplings with 
consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so pervasive and so 
incredibly unseen it beggars belief. I know it's a long way from physics to neuroscience 
(discipline-wise). But surely in 2014 we can see it for what it is. Can't they (Tegmark 
and ilk)  see that the so-called science of consciousness is


暗he the science of the scientific observer

暗rying to explain observing with observations

暗rying to explain experience with experiences

暗rying to explain how scientists do science.

戢 science of scientific behaviour.

嵯escriptive and never explanatory.



The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to interpret, they mainly make 
models. By a model is meant a mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain 
verbal interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The justification of such a 
mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it is expected to work.

-John von Neumann

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Re: Tegmark's New Book


On 1/11/2014 9:33 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Dear LizR,


On Sun, Jan 12, 2014 at 12:00 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com 
mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote:

On 12 January 2014 14:52, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com
mailto:stephe...@provensecure.com wrote:

Dear LizR,

  That is the claim and I show that it is false. A class that has a 
particular
set of properties and not the rest of the properties required to 
balance it all
out to Nothing is not neutral. It is biased!


So, can't arithmetic be balanced out to nothing? What can?


Of course arithmetic be balanced out to nothing! By the class of physical objects and 
their actions! They are what it isn't. Is this not making sense? I don't see how it is 
complicated...


Doesn't make sense to me.  What does balanced out to nothing mean?...like the net 
mass-energy of the universe is zero, the negative gravitational potential just balancing 
the matter (which seems to be true)?  Or the total information may be zero if we could 
count the negative contributions beyond the Hubble sphere?


Brent

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Re: Tegmark's New Book