On 10 Jan 2014, at 03:38, LizR wrote:
On 10 January 2014 15:34, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:
Liz,
No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show
it doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even
assume a computational universe in the first
On 10 Jan 2014, at 03:52, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Liz,
Your comp is obviously not my comp. Don't tell me what my comp does
or doesn't do...
But then, please, define your comp. my comp is only a very weak form
of computationalism; which implies all the know standard form of comp.
I am still
On 10 Jan 2014, at 04:16, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Liz,
So? I'm not really interested in Bruno's comp as I don't think it
actually applies to reality. I'll stick with my computational
reality for the time being at least...
But, please, define it. Nobody has the slightest idea of what you
On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and simple example is
arithmetic. Only a very tiny part of it is computable (this is provable if you accept
the Church Turing thesis).
But it's questionable whether it exists.
Brent
--
On 11 January 2014 12:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and simple
example is arithmetic. Only a very tiny part of it is computable (this is
provable if you accept the Church
On 1/10/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 January 2014 12:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and simple
example is
arithmetic. Only a very tiny
On 11 January 2014 16:02, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/10/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 January 2014 12:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and simple
example is
On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 6:06 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 11 January 2014 12:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Second, a reality can exist without being computed. the best and simple
example is arithmetic. Only a very tiny part of
On 1/10/2014 7:33 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 January 2014 16:02, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 1/10/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 January 2014 12:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM,
On 11 January 2014 17:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/10/2014 7:33 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 January 2014 16:02, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/10/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
On 11 January 2014 12:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/10/2014 1:42 AM,
On 08 Jan 2014, at 18:57, Telmo Menezes wrote:
In case you haven't seen it...
http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1219
Seems like an attempt to recover materialism, which strikes me as
somewhat unexpected from Tegmark. Am I missing something?
Will take a look. It is weird indeed. Especially coming
On his web site Max Tegmark says something like for every 10 serious
papers I publish, I allow myself one crazy one - this may be the latest
crazy one, meaning that it's highly speculative and shouldn't be expected
to synch with his other papers (crazy or otherwise).
(Or then again, this may be
Terren,
I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new and
independent theory.
The way it works starting from the beginning:
At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally
interacting information forms made real by occurring in the reality of
being.
OK, that's actually pretty close to my own thinking on consciousness. FWIW
I don't see all that big of a difference between what you've articulated
regarding Xperience and what has been articulated by panpsychist
philosophy. I agree with your point about the limitations of labels, but if
they can
Terren,
First, it will only detract, not help, to try to shoehorn my theories into
standard categories. It's an entirely new theory.
Yes, everything, including computers, Xperiences according to its actual
form structure. A computer with sufficient self-monitoring and other human
simulating
On 09 Jan 2014, at 18:29, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Terren,
I don't find the panpsychism label useful. Mine is an entirely new
and independent theory.
The way it works starting from the beginning:
At the fundamental level reality consists only of computationally
interacting information
Hi Edgar,
OK, so I think you are would say yes to the doctor who would save you
from a life-threatening brain disorder by giving you a prosthetic brain
that replicates your biological brain at some level.
If so, Bruno's UDA proves that the physical world as we experience it is
not computable.
Terren,
Receiving a prosthetic brain is a (probably insurmountable) technical
problem. There could certainly be one functionally equivalent to mine but
it wouldn't be mine because it wouldn't have the exact same history. If it
did it would be mine in the first place rather than some prosthetic
Edgar,
The yes doctor scenario is just a means of discovering whether you'd have
faith that a digital copy of yourself, in principle, would still be you
enough to perhaps avoid certain death. If you say yes, in principle I could
be substituted, then you are betting that comp is true.
My question
Terren,
I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's an
impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You can't
come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically
possible and make a correct deduction about reality on that basis.
We
Edgar,
It may not be necessary to produce an exact replica of the brain. I mean
that is more or less implied by choosing a level of substitution... if
you're substituting at a relatively coarse-grained level such as neurons,
then you are betting that most of the intracellular details of a neuron
On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:
Terren,
I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's an
impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You can't
come up with a hypothetical scenario which isn't actually physically
On 1/9/2014 1:15 PM, LizR wrote:
On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net mailto:edgaro...@att.net
wrote:
Terren,
I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's an
impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the reasons I pointed out. You can't
On 10 January 2014 11:01, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 1/9/2014 1:15 PM, LizR wrote:
On 10 January 2014 09:20, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:
Terren,
I understand very well that's what the 'yes dr.' scenario is but it's
an impossibility to be exactly 'me' for the
Brent,
This is precisely why it is impossible to exactly clone a mind. Because you
are always trying to hit a moving target. That was included in what I meant
by saying the histories would not be the same.
Saying somebody is the 'same' person from day to day is just loose common
speech using
Liz and Terren,
I'm thinking more about this and think I've now changed my mind on it.
After all I (my mental state etc.) do continually change from moment to
moment yet I have no doubt I'm still me. I'm not the 'same' person, but I'm
still me by all reasonable definitions.
Therefore assuming
On 10 January 2014 13:51, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:
Liz and Terren,
I'm thinking more about this and think I've now changed my mind on it.
After all I (my mental state etc.) do continually change from moment to
moment yet I have no doubt I'm still me. I'm not the 'same' person,
Liz,
No, I don't agree with that at all. As I've said on a number of occasions,
reality is obviously computed because it exists. What more convincing proof
could there be? If Bruno's comp claims reality is non-computable it's pure
nonsense that is conclusively falsified by the very existence
On 10 January 2014 14:22, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:
Liz,
No, I don't agree with that at all. As I've said on a number of occasions,
reality is obviously computed because it exists. What more convincing proof
could there be?
One that explains why that has to be so would be a
Liz,
No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show it
doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even assume a
computational universe in the first place you have to assume (you are
assuming) that it computes reality. The fact that reality exists is
On 10 January 2014 15:34, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:
Liz,
No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show it
doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even assume a
computational universe in the first place you have to assume (you are
Liz,
Your comp is obviously not my comp. Don't tell me what my comp does or
doesn't do...
Edgar
On Thursday, January 9, 2014 9:38:47 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
On 10 January 2014 15:34, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:wrote:
Liz,
No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One
When I talk about comp, like everyone else on this list apart from you, I
mean Bruno's theory. That's what I'm talking about here. May I respectfully
suggest you call yours something else, to avoid confusion?
On 10 January 2014 15:52, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote:
Liz,
Your comp is
Well, that's OK then.
Now we've cleared that up, I can repeat my original point:
On 10 January 2014 15:34, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote:
Liz,
No, that's not the only way to falsify it. One merely needs to show it
doesn't properly describe reality as I've just done. If you even assume
Liz,
So? I'm not really interested in Bruno's comp as I don't think it actually
applies to reality. I'll stick with my computational reality for the time
being at least...
Edgar
On Thursday, January 9, 2014 10:05:03 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
Well, that's OK then.
Now we've cleared that up, I
Edgar,
That begs the question. You start by assuming reality is computed, and then
conclude that because reality exists, reality must be computed.
Again I will point out that except for one key difference, your ideas and
Bruno's are actually pretty similar. The difference of course being that
Telmo,
Thanks for the link but see my new topic A theory of consciousness of a
few days ago which no one has even commented on and which is much more
reasonable and explanatory.
Edgar
On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 12:57:37 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
In case you haven't seen it...
On the contrary, I replied with a question that went unanswered.
It was a question about whether a human baby, fed a stream of virtual sense
data as in the movie The Matrix, could be considered conscious in your
theory, as you seemed to suggest that consciousness was a property of
reality, as a
Eh, just looks like more information-theoretic functionalism. Explanatory
Gap? Hard Problem? States of matter make sense...solid, liquid, gas, plasma
- hungry doesn't fit in.
On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 12:57:37 PM UTC-5, telmo_menezes wrote:
In case you haven't seen it...
John,
All organisms, including babies, are conscious. Of course baby's minds do
not compute the details of reality that well initially. But the results of
those poor computations are nevertheless conscious...
The necessary distinction (elucidated by Chalmers and others as well as me)
is
John,
PS: BTW your statement *I know for sure that we don't know anything for
sure. is of course an illogical and meaningless self-contradiction. It has
no relevance to reality*
*Edgar*
On Wednesday, January 8, 2014 4:45:20 PM UTC-5, JohnM wrote:
Edgar wrote:
*Terren,*
*All human
It seems to me Max Tegmark is assuming that consciousness is a state of
matter, and looking at what properties that matter must have. Hence he
doesn't have an explanatory theory, just an assumption. It is a materialist
assumtpion, I guess similar to Hugh Everett III's viewpoint when he
considers
Edgar,
Thanks for clarifying. Your theory sounds like a spinoff of panpsychism...
would you say a rock is capable of experiencing? If not, what is the
theoretical difference between a rock and a baby that demarcates what is
capable of experiencing, and what isn't?
Terren
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