On Mar 9, 7:24 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Mar 2011, at 15:54, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Reduction is not
On 08/03/11 12:29, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 11:32 am, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 06/03/11 15:06, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:46 pm, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.comwrote:
The measurement problem is the question of why, or even if, collapse
occurs. Certainly no coherent
On 08/03/11 14:15, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 11:10 am, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 06/03/11 19:24, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 14:16, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp makes precise that saying to be a machine is equivalent with
On 08/03/11 14:39, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 11:47 am, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 06/03/11 15:22, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 8:12 pm, Andrew Soltauandrewsol...@gmail.comwrote:
On 04/03/11 19:10, Brent Meeker wrote:Collapse appears to instruments as
well as people
We don't
Peter, your comments appear to illustrate a basic confusion between
ontological and epistemological claims that makes me think that you
haven't taken on board the fundamental distinction entailed in Bruno's
original statement:
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
On 08/03/11 16:14, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/8/2011 3:14 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
What I am driving at here is the same question as in the email Comp.
Granted that all possible states exist, what changes the point of the
present moment from one to another. My referring to 'the thinker' was
On Mar 9, 12:50 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
Peter, your comments appear to illustrate a basic confusion between
ontological and epistemological claims that makes me think that you
haven't taken on board the fundamental distinction entailed in Bruno's
original statement:
On 08/03/11 18:41, Bruno Marchal wrote:
1) SWE
what is SWE?
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On Mar 9, 1:46 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 13:30, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Peter, this is too confusing, you seem to be debating a straw man.
Let's try to keep it simple: am I to assume that you don't agree that
ontological reduction entails
On 9 March 2011 14:17, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Phlogiston was eliminated, heat was reduced. There's a difference
So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically* (i.e.
not merely epistemologically) distinguishable from molecular motion?
On Mar 9, 1:46 pm, David Nyman
On Mar 9, 2:23 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 14:17, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Phlogiston was eliminated, heat was reduced. There's a difference
So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically* (i.e.
not merely epistemologically)
On Tue, Mar 8, 2011 at 10:14 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:
On 3/8/2011 3:14 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
What I am driving at here is the same question as in the email Comp.
Granted that all possible states exist, what changes the point of the
present moment from one to another.
On 9 March 2011 14:39, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically* (i.e.
not merely epistemologically) distinguishable from molecular motion?
No. I would say it is ontologically the same as molecular
motion, and molecular motion exists, so
On 09 Mar 2011, at 14:31, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 08/03/11 18:41, Bruno Marchal wrote:
1) SWE
what is SWE?
Sorry. It is Schroedinger Wave Equation.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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On 3/9/2011 3:28 AM, 1Z wrote:
I can
say yes to the doctor if my consciousness and qualia is related to a
noumenal hinterland of the matter in my physical brain. That noumenal
matter hinterland contradicts the idea that there is a level of
description of myself where matter and physical
On 3/9/2011 4:00 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Coupled with the
inability to find any physiology corresponding to phenomenal
consciousness,
That's an odd thing to say. It is rather well known
that phenomenal consciousness can be switched off
by drugs.
True, but when not switched off, when operating
On 09 Mar 2011, at 12:28, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 7:24 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Mar 2011, at 15:54, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David Nyman wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal
On Mar 9, 1:24 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 08/03/11 16:14, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/8/2011 3:14 AM, Andrew Soltau
wrote:
What I am driving at here is the same question as in the email Comp.
Granted that all possible states exist, what changes the point of the
On Mar 9, 3:06 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Mar 8, 2011 at 10:14 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:
On 3/8/2011 3:14 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
What I am driving at here is the same question as in the email Comp.
Granted that all possible states exist,
On 3/9/2011 4:30 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
Omnes for example, is that the collapse is purely
epistemological. All that changes is our knowledge or model of the
state and QM merely
predicts probabilities for this change.
That's what I thought I was saying!
No. Everett and Omnes are quite
On Mar 9, 4:30 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 09 Mar 2011, at 12:28, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 7:24 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 Mar 2011, at 15:54, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 8, 1:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 21:48, David
On 3/9/2011 5:24 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
On 08/03/11 16:14, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/8/2011 3:14 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
What I am driving at here is the same question as in the email Comp.
Granted that all possible states exist, what changes the point of
the present moment from one to
On Mar 9, 4:47 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/9/2011 4:50 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Peter, your comments appear to illustrate a basic confusion between
ontological and epistemological claims that makes me think that you
haven't taken on board the fundamental
On 3/9/2011 5:30 AM, 1Z wrote:
Zombies are not a typical example of the problems of reduction,
they are an instance of the reduction being bought too cheaply:
the reductive materialist presents the off-the-peg conclusion that
consciousness
just is neural firing, without filling in the
On Mar 9, 3:25 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 14:39, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
So on this basis you would claim that heat is *ontologically* (i.e.
not merely epistemologically) distinguishable from molecular motion?
No. I would say it is ontologically
On 9 March 2011 16:21, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
To me that is an open question. Are philosophical zombies possible? It
seems unlikely, but when I consider specific ideas about consciousness, such
as Julian Jaynes, then it seems more plausible that conscious-like behavior
On 09 Mar 2011, at 16:06, Jason Resch wrote:
On Tue, Mar 8, 2011 at 10:14 AM, Brent Meeker
meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/8/2011 3:14 AM, Andrew Soltau wrote:
What I am driving at here is the same question as in the email Comp.
Granted that all possible states exist, what changes
On 09 Mar 2011, at 17:49, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 4:30 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
OK. I guess you associate pain to the primitive matter. But that is
even more incoherent with respect to the comp hypothesis.
There is nothing mystical about the falsehood of comp. It
is
On 9 March 2011 17:22, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
The point of eliminativism is that the eliminated thing doesn't exist
at all.
Just so. At a reduced ontological level, heat doesn't exist at all -
it's just molecular motion, no more, no less, and any explanation
invoking heat could in
On Mar 9, 5:56 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
In that sense all right. Comp is the theory which accept as axiom that
my brain/body is Turing emulable at some level.
But in that sense, comp is a theory of everything. Indeed, it even
makes elementary arithmetic a theory of
On Mar 9, 6:00 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 17:22, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
The point of eliminativism is that the eliminated thing doesn't exist
at all.
Just so. At a reduced ontological level, heat doesn't exist at all -
It does, because it is
When you compare heat and molecular motion, first it would be good to
define what molecular motion is.
At the beginning, the molecules and atoms were considered as hard
spheres. At this state, there was the problem as follows. We bring a
glass of hot water in the room and leave it there.
On 3/9/2011 8:49 AM, 1Z wrote:
If you have a theory of qualia using primitive matter, and coherent
with comp, then you should be able to use it to extract a flaw in the
UD Argument.
Here's one: minds can be computed, but they only have
real conscious if they run on the metal (at the
On 3/9/2011 9:24 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 9 March 2011 16:21, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
To me that is an open question. Are philosophical zombies possible? It
seems unlikely, but when I consider specific ideas about consciousness, such
as Julian Jaynes, then it
On Mar 9, 5:15 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/9/2011 5:30 AM, 1Z wrote:
Zombies are not a typical example of the problems of reduction,
they are an instance of the reduction being bought too cheaply:
the reductive materialist presents the off-the-peg conclusion that
On 3/9/2011 9:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can see why in a movie they do not, as there is no mathematical
relation between the frames.
OK. Nice.
But they do have a relation via the thing that was filmed.
Brent
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On 3/9/2011 11:46 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 5:15 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/9/2011 5:30 AM, 1Z wrote:
Zombies are not a typical example of the problems of reduction,
they are an instance of the reduction being bought too cheaply:
the reductive materialist
On 9 March 2011 19:09, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Fine, Peter, have it your way. We can't seem to progress beyond
vocabulary difficulties to the substance. No doubt I have been less
than persuasive, and thus have failed to convince you that there is
indeed any substance. But since I have
On 9 March 2011 19:43, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Yes, I realize there are kinds of consciousness. I thought the interesting
idea in Jaynes was that perceptual consciousness, which I'm sure my dog has,
was co-opted by evolution to become self-consciousness. Specifically that
On 9 March 2011 19:22, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote:
So I personally not that sure that molecular motion has more meaning
*ontologically* than heat.
Actually, I agree with you. Of course whatever we can speak or
theorise about is, strictly, entirely epistemological and consequently
On Mar 9, 10:33 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 19:09, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Fine, Peter, have it your way. We can't seem to progress beyond
vocabulary difficulties to the substance.
Unfortunately non-vocabulary differences have to be expressed in
On Mar 9, 7:28 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/9/2011 8:49 AM, 1Z wrote:
If you have a theory of qualia using primitive matter, and coherent
with comp, then you should be able to use it to extract a flaw in the
UD Argument.
Here's one: minds can be computed,
On Mar 9, 7:22 pm, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote:
When you compare heat and molecular motion, first it would be good to
define what molecular motion is.
At the beginning, the molecules and atoms were considered as hard
spheres. At this state, there was the problem as follows. We
On 09 Mar 2011, at 19:10, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 5:56 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
In that sense all right. Comp is the theory which accept as axiom
that
my brain/body is Turing emulable at some level.
But in that sense, comp is a theory of everything. Indeed, it even
makes
On 09 Mar 2011, at 20:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/9/2011 9:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can see why in a movie they do not, as there is no mathematical
relation between the frames.
OK. Nice.
But they do have a relation via the thing that was filmed.
The point consists in showing
On 3/9/2011 4:15 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 7:28 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/9/2011 8:49 AM, 1Z wrote:
If you have a theory of qualia using primitive matter, and coherent
with comp, then you should be able to use it to extract a flaw in the
UD
On 09 Mar 2011, at 20:09, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 9, 6:00 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 9 March 2011 17:22, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
The point of eliminativism is that the eliminated thing doesn't
exist
at all.
Just so. At a reduced ontological level, heat doesn't
On Mar 9, 11:33 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Mar 9, 1:24 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
On 08/03/11 16:14, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/8/2011 3:14 AM, Andrew Soltau
wrote:
What I am driving at here is the same question as in the email Comp.
Granted that all
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