date:20121102


Information theory, computationalism and the science of Platonia  

I am not a mathematician, so what I say here may be nonsense,
but can't we say something more scientific about Platonia and monads
than we have ? For example:

a) I think that the "physics" or science of Platonia must be information theory.

b) I conceive of the One as a singularity which is analogous to
the Big Bang singularity except that it is inverse to it.
The Big Bang singularity is one in which matter pours out of
intelligence. 

c) The Platonic singularity might be one in which
meaningful information, instead of matter, pours out of intelligence.

d) If we consider this Big Bang process as platonic, 
then  creation begins as perfect forms and these become 
less perfect as they drop down in some sort of physical ontology.

e) The infomation of each monad is contained in its perceptions,
which I envision as data sets, each data set is a reflection of
all of the other monadic data sets but from the point of view of
that monad. This suggests that perhaps the information
has a holographic format. Or the Bohmian implicit/explict
dichotomy. 

f) The total amount of information in the universe has to
be the sum of those in e). This is suggestive again of 
Bohm or holography. 


etc. etc. etc. 








Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/2/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

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Re: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be aproblem ?

Hi Bruno Marchal  

Thanks. Then the numbers are noit separate but
included in the truth.  My feeling is that the truth
then may be the truth(s) of information theory.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/2/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-01, 11:36:18 
Subject: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be 
aproblem ? 


On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote: 

> On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
>> 1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One). 
>> 
>> 2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic 
>> homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind, 
>> then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that 
>> other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access 
>> (the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse 
>> theories ? 
>> 
>> 
>> Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012 
> Dear Roger, 
> 
> I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers  
> float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an  
> infinite regress. 

Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress  
disappear. 

They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some  
provably, some non provably). No problem. 





> That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to be  
> Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if not  
> it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be distinguishable  
> from to have individual values. The totality of numbers is an  
> infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot  
> be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish  
> this? It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is  
> conscious of the numbers and that makes the numbers something  
> "different" from the One for 1) to work and this is no different  
> from what a finite mind does. My point here is that a mind cannot be  
> infinite because it would be incapable of distinguishing it's self  
> from any of its proper parts - making it the ultimate solipsist. Do  
> there exist maps between the totality of an infinite set to an  
> improper part? If yes, what are their necessary properties? 

The One is solipsist, as the one is unique and alone. But I don't see  
why it should be conscious. It might be, but I see no evidence for this. 

Bruno 



> 
> The idea of 2) seems to be demolished by Dennett's argument  
> against the homunculus or else the One is strictly a solipsist as I  
> argued above. I suspect that the mapping between wholes and improper  
> parts is the same as Bruno's measure problem. 
> 
> --  
> Onward! 
> 
> Stephen 
> 
> 
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> 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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Re: Re: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"

Hi Bruno,  

Could it not be that there is nothing especially sacred
about the natural numbers, that these are, as Hobbes
put it regarding words, "but counterfeit tokens" ?
And the real controlling force which uses them is
information theory ?   That is to say, intelligence.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/2/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

- Receiving the following content -  
From: Evgenii Rudnyi  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-01, 06:09:50 
Subject: Re: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model" 

On 30.10.2012 16:25 Bruno Marchal said the following: 
> 
> On 30 Oct 2012, at 12:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: 
> 

... 

>> 
>> You talk for example about integers as a framework for everything. 
>> Fine. Yet, I would like to understand how mankind through it 
>> development has invented integers. How comp would help to answer 
>> this? 
> 
> Comp might not been able to answer that, in any better way than, say, 
> evolution theory. Numbers are important in nature, as everything is 
> born from them, and to survive with bigger chance, the universal 
> numbers, us in particular, have to be able to recognize them, and 
> manipulate them accordingly. Comp is not a theory aimed at explaining 
> everything directly. It is just, at the start, an hypothesis in 
> philosophy of mind, and then it appears that it reduces the mind-body 
> problem to an explanation of quanta and qualia from 
> arithmetic/computer science. 
> 
> Its main value in the human science, is, imo, that he forces us to be 
> more modest, and more aware that we know about nothing, if only 
> because we have wrongly separate the human science (including 
> theology, afterlife, metaphysics) and the exact sciences. Comp 
> provides a way to reunite them. Comp can be seen as an abstract 
> corpus callosum making a bridge between the formal and the informal, 
> before bridging mind and matter. 

Below there is a couple of quotes about German idealism. Please replace  
Absolute Spirit by Natural Numbers there. Then it may give one possible  
answer to my question. 

?bsolute Spirit is the fundamental reality. But in order to create the  
world, the Absolute manifests itself, or goes out of itself in a sense,  
the Absolute forgets itself and empties itself into creation (although  
never really ceasing to be itself). Thus the world is created as a  
?alling away? from Spirit, as a ?elf-alienation? of Spirit, although  
the Fall is never anything but a play of Spirit itself.? 

?aving ?allen? into the manifest and material world, Spirit begins the  
process of returning to itself, and this process of the return of Spirit  
to Spirit is simply development or evolution itself. The original  
?escent? (or involution) is a forgetting, a fall, a self-alienation of  
Spirit; and the reverse movement of ?scent? (or evolution) is thus the  
self-remembering and self-actualization of Spirit. And yet, the  
Idealists emphasized, all of Spirit is fully present at each and every  
stage of evolution as the process of evolution itself. ? 

Evgenii 
--  
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/10/evolution-and-german-idealism.html 

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Isn't intelligence more basic than numbers ?

Hi Evgenii Rudnyi  

Cool. But I am in the minority who believe that intelligence
is more basic than the natural numbers. Because it does things
with numbers. It governs them. 

The ancient philosophers had no concept of information theory, 
so it is not surprising then that  they held numbers to be 
the ultimate.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/2/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Evgenii Rudnyi  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-01, 07:13:12 
Subject: What is reality 


A nice video 

http://www.newscientist.com/video/1872152752001-what-is-reality.html 

You have to ignore a short sponsor message at the beginning. 

Evgenii 

P.S. I have found it by 

http://magpie73.livejournal.com/ 

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IMHO the properties of life

Hi Hal Ruhl 

Those are objective features of life, but IMHO 

a) life is subjective not objective.

b) life is intelligence itself. 

c) intelligence governs an objective body.

d) intelligence is the ability to make choices on one's own, 
without outside help or rules. 

e) The above is another way of saying that life has free will. 

f) Free will need not be entirely free.

g) Live is not driven entirely by effective causes (from below or from phjysics)
 by what is called entelechy, the drive to realize itself.

h) Life is partly driven by final causes (goal-seeking)

i) Self-animation results from this entelechy.

j) All of the above are properties of monads. 

k) Monads are the descriptors or identities of corporeal bodies. 

l) Consequently all of nature is alive (is intelligent) to varying
degrees.

m) There are many more properties of monads given
in Leibniz's "Monadology". 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/2/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content - 
From: Hal Ruhl 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-10-31, 21:48:37 
Subject: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum 


Hi Everyone: 

I would like to restart my participation on the list by having a discussion 
regarding the aspects of what we call ?ife? in our universe starting in a 
simple manner as follows: [terms not defined herein have the usual ?aws of 
Physics? definition] 

1) Definition (1): Energy (E) is the ability to subject a mass to a force. 

2) There are several types of energy currently known: 

 a) Mass itself via the conversion: [M <=> E/(c*c)] 
 b) Gravitational 
 c) Electromagnetic 
 d) Nuclear [Strong and Weak forces] 
 e) Dark Energy 

3) Definition (2) Work (W) Work is the flow of energy amongst the various types 
by means of a change in the spatial configuration, dynamics and/or amount of 
mass in a system brought about by an actual application of a force to a mass. 

4) The exact original distribution of energy amongst the various types can? be 
reestablished and the new configuration can? do as much work as the prior 
configuration was capable of doing. [Second Law of Thermodynamics] 

5) Time is not a factor: Once a flow of energy is possible it will take place 
immediately. 

6) Conclusion (1): Since life is an energy flow conduit, wherever the 
possibility of life exists life will appear as rapidly as possible. The ?rigin? 
of life herein. 

7) Some energy flows are prevented by what are known [in my memory] as ?nergy 
Flow Hang-up Barriers? such as nuclear bonding coefficient issues, spatial 
configuration, spin, other spatial dynamics, ignition temperature requirements, 
electromagnetic repulsion, etc. [?nergy Flow Hang-up Barriers? is not my 
terminology ? I think there was a twenty year or so old article in Scientific 
American I am looking for and a quick Internet search found a discussion of the 
repulsion hang-up in ?osmology The Science of the Universe? by Edward Robert 
Harrison. 

8) Once life is present it will immediately punch as many holes in as many 
Energy Hang-up Barriers as the details of the particular life entity involved 
allows ? this is how it realizes its energy flow conduit character. The 
?urpose? of life herein. In other words life? purpose is to hasten the heat 
death of its host universe. 

9) Now add in evolution which is a random walk with a lower but no upper bound. 

A discussion of the possible consequences [such as qualia levels of particular 
life entities - like degrees of consciousness] should await a critique and 
possibly a revision of the above. 

Comments are eagerly sought. 

Thank you 

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numbers as not the primary entities- because they can do nothing by themselves

Hi Stephen P. King  

The reason why I think of numbers as not being
primary to being is that they act as objects
in a sea of intelligence.  It is the intelligence that
is primary because intelligence is subjective.
Intelligence operates on numbers. By themselves,
numbers can do nothing except indicate what
the driving force of intelligence is doing to them.  

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/2/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-31, 19:35:04 
Subject: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be 
aproblem ? 

On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
> 1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One). 
> 
> 2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic 
> homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind, 
> then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that 
> other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access 
> (the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse 
> theories ? 
> 
> 
> Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  
> 10/31/2012 
Dear Roger, 

 I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers  
float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an  
infinite regress. That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of  
the One to be Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator,  
but if not it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be  
distinguishable from to have individual values. The totality of numbers  
is an infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot  
be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish this?  
It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is conscious of the  
numbers and that makes the numbers something "different" from the One  
for 1) to work and this is no different from what a finite mind does. My  
point here is that a mind cannot be infinite because it would be  
incapable of distinguishing it's self from any of its proper parts -  
making it the ultimate solipsist. Do there exist maps between the  
totality of an infinite set to an improper part? If yes, what are their  
necessary properties? 

 The idea of 2) seems to be demolished by Dennett's argument against  
the homunculus or else the One is strictly a solipsist as I argued  
above. I suspect that the mapping between wholes and improper parts is  
the same as Bruno's measure problem. 

--  
Onward! 

Stephen 

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numbers are static, geometry is dynamic

Hi Stephen P. King et al,  

For what it's worth, in the philosophy of mathematics,
numbers are considered as static entities (they don't change). 
Instead, change is a property of geometry.  I suppose
because angles can change.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/2/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-01, 09:25:50 
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm 


On 11/1/2012 6:54 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: 




On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 1:42 AM, Stephen P. King  wrote: 

On 10/31/2012 6:14 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: 




On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 7:59 PM, Stephen P. King  wrote: 






  [SPK] 
One problem that I have discovered (I thank Brent for bringing this up!) is 
that in our reasoning we set up constructions - such as the person on the 
desert island - that blur the very distinction that I am trying to frame. We 
should never assume temporal situations to argue for relations that are 
atemporal unless we are prepared to show the morphisms between the two 
situations. 



Isn't this already physical framework when you seem to be arguing for time as 
primitive ("n incompatible with comp to begin with, after which you seek to 
carve out a distinction, when you've already mixed at the base?  



My argument is that it is impossible to 'derive" Becoming from Being, but 
we can derive Being from Becoming. So why not work with the latter idea? I am 
trying to get Bruno to admit, among other things, that he has to assume a 
non-well founded logic for his result to work.;-)  



I see less and less how you'd be able to do that, as I said, by making 
process/linear time primitive in comp, and by assuming physical universe with 
so many statements. Quantum Logic is part of the picture (see SANE 2004). 


Hi Cowboy, 

I think of it this way: Change is fundamental (ala Heraclitus and Bergson) 
and Being is its automorphism. Is that a bit more clear? "Linear time" (why 
'linear'? Is there such a thing as non-linear time? Cyclic time is still 
linear, AFAIK...) is, IMHO, change + a measure. Without a measure of change, 
there is no time; there is just change. If we take relativity seriously, we 
might even claim that there is no difference between change minus measure and 
staticness... I should mention that any change that has no measure associated 
with it is "zeroth" order change. 
Without the means to compare two different things to each other, does it 
make any sense to be able to make coherent statements about some change in one 
relative to the other. If there is just one thing, how do we know anything 
about its possible change(s) unless we are looking at it and gauging 
(measuring) its change against some thing else that has some measure associated 
- but our observation of it violates the stipulation of "if there is just one 
thing". 

The idea that somehow the observer is irrelevant in physics and philosophy 
is, IMHO, one of the worse errors ever. Sure, we need to minimize and even 
eliminate observer bias and preferred reference framing, but eliminating the 
observer and replacing it with some ambiguous 'view from nowhere' is undiluted 
hogwash. This is where "realist" chafe me, they act as if the universe of 
objects is out there and has definite properties in the complete absence of any 
clear explanation for how those properties came to be defined in the first 
place. OK, OK, I will stop ranting... 






Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a concrete robust 
physical universe". He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we 
reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds given that he can 
'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from irreducible - and thus 
ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are 
"operating" somehow in an atemporal way.  

UDA does not contradict itself here. Restraints on processing power, on memory 
and print capacities, implying time as some illusion emanating from eternal 
primitives, don't exist when framed non-constructively, more like sets of 
assignments, rather than operations in your sense, by which you seem to mean 
"physically primitive operations" on par with ontologically primitive arrow of 
time. Isn't this like cracking open the axioms, and then complaining that the 
building has cracks in it? 



There are simply a pile of concepts that are just assumed without 
explanation in any discussion of philosophy/logic/math. My point is that a 
theory must be have the capacity of being communicable ab initio for it to even 
be considered. When I am confronted with a theory or a "result" or an argument 
that seems to disallow for communicability I am going to baulk at it!  



And the possibility that you are baulking at your preconceptions rather than 
engaging the theory has never happened to you? Happens to

Re: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be aproblem ?

ROGER: 
> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> 1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One). 

BRUNO: The ONE is much more than the universal mind, as it is where the  
universal minds compete, perhaps before eventually recognizing  
themselves and reuniting, or fusing, and coming back to the ONE  
(Plotinus' conversion). 

ROGER: OK, but this is different from Leibniz, where the supreme monad
is really the only mind, at least the only acting mind, although it
observes/adjusts the individual monads and their minds. I suppose
the changes in the monadic minds could be considered as thinking,
but more in the mode of computers. The monads are essentially
computer operations, the supreme monad more like the
computer CPU chip. 

Plotinus' concept of the outgoing and incoming of the many minds is
practically identical to the Tao = the One, out of which yin and
yang elements go out to operate the world and then return. 



> 
> 2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic 
> homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind, 
> then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that 
> other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access 
> (the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse 
> theories ? 

Not really because the "multiverse illusion" emerges from the  
statistical interference in all realities/dreams. But what you say  
might be locally true, if our substitution level is very low, like if  
a difference in the 10^(10^1000) decimal of h-bar would prevents  
consciousness to occur, or make it completely different (no need of  
zombies here). That would be astonishing, given the evidence, but comp  
certainly does not exclude, yet, such weird possibility. This would  
give a multi-multi-verse, at the least, as we already have evidence  
that our branches in the quantum multiverse can, and mostly, do  
interfere. 

Bruno 





> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/31/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> - Receiving the following content - 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-10-30, 12:38:34 
> Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 30 Oct 2012, at 14:23, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> 
> 
> On 10/30/2012 7:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> 
> 
> 
> On 29 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> 
> 
> On 10/29/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> 
> 
> On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> 
> [Bruno Marchal wrote:] So numbers are universal and can be treated  
> mathematically as always. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the  
> existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is  
> equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false  
> even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Dear Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers. 
> 
> 
> No, I do not. My claim is that Numbers are objects in the mind of  
> conscious beings. 
> 
> 
> This contradicts what you said before. It contradicts comp  
> immediately, as comp needs the understanding of what a computer can  
> do, even in absence of any conscious observer. 
> 
> Dear Bruno, 
> 
> It contradicts your version of comp, yes, but not mine, as I see  
> minds and numbers as co-existing simultaneously, there is no  
> ontological priority between them in my version. 
> 
> 
> 
> Comp is only the assumption that the brain is a machine, to be  
> short. Then it is proved that the TOE is arithmetic (or recursively  
> equivalent). Matter and mind arise from the numbers (and + and *).  
> If you reintroduce a mind assumption, mind will be epiphenomenal. It  
> you reintroduce matter, it will be epinomenal. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If there does not exist worlds where entities to whom numbers are  
> concepts then there is no such thing as a concept of numbers in such  
> worlds. 
> 
> 
> But with comp, a conscious observer is explained by number  
> relations. We explain the concept of numbers, and of human  
> understanding of numbers, by number relations (computations). 
> 
> 
> 
> Sure, but we should be able to 'go the other way' as well! You  
> seem to insist on a well founded relation where as I do not! 
> 
> 
> 
> I derive proposition. I suggest nothing, nor do I insist on nothing,  
> except on reasoning validly. I am not a philosopher. you must  
> understand the technical result before philosophising on it. It is  
> subtle as comp makes a part of philosophy of mind into a branch of  
> science (indeed, arithmetic/computer science). 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems  
> apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not  
> to numbers themselves. 
> 
> 
> 
> Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for  
> some machine/numbers. If not,

Re: Solipsism = 1p

2012-11-02 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 2:51 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it.
>>
>
> So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm
> not shooting the gun by pulling the trigger?
>

You are external to the gun, but you are not external to your brain unless
substance dualism is true.

>
> You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular
>> configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that
>> configuration is determined by physical factors.
>>
>
> The movement of the molecules of your brain *is* your decision. That's
> what I am telling you but you won't see it. You are only able to see it as
> a one way street which makes no sense. What you are saying is like 'water
> is ice but ice is not water'. If I feel something when something happens in
> my brain, then that means that whatever happens in my brain is also an
> event in the universe when something is felt. That means molecules feel and
> see. You could say that groups of molecules feel and see, and that's ok
> too, but you think it's the 'groupiness' that sees and not the physical
> reality of the molecules themselves. I am saying that there is no
> independent groupiness... it is a fantasy. Incorrect.
>

That the movement of the molecules of your brain *is* the decision is
eliminative materialism, or perhaps epiphenomenalism. In any case, the
behaviour of the molecules is entirely consistent with chemistry. An ion
channel opens because it changes conformation due to neurotransmitters
binding to it or the transmembrane voltage. Any subjectivity it may have
does not enter into the equation.

> What this means is that molecules as we see them are not the whole story,
> just as the brain and its actions are not the whole story. We are the other
> half of the story and we are not made of neurotransmitters or cells any
> more than a song we make up is our body. Two different ontological schemas.
> Two opposite schemas twisted orthogonally by the private time to public
> space juxtaposition.
>

That may be, but the molecules *entirely* determine the behaviour of the
brain. If you know chemistry and you know what molecule is where, you know
what chemical reactions will occur, and if you know that you know how the
person is going to move. You don't know about the person's subjectivity,
but you do know about his behaviour.

> My phone has a one year guarantee, so that it if it fails and can't be
>> repaired Apple will replace it with an identical phone. Are they opening
>> themselves up to legal challenge if this is ontologically impossible?
>>
>
> I would imagine that their legal department has defined 'identical' in a
> commercially feasible way. They can probably send you a phone with similar
> but not identical parts even. If you look at the serial numbers in your
> replacement phone, you will readily see that identical is not to be taken
> absolutely literally. 'Similar enough for you' is what they mean.
>

That is the sort of identity I am interested in if the phone is to be
replaced: if it is different in some way I can't detect in normal use I
don't care. Similarly if I were to have parts of my body replaced: if I
can't tell any difference after a few days, that's good enough for me.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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computationalism and the construction of ideas


To borrow a couple of playing pieces from kant, 
two basic , or the two basic, pieces of
pre-existence in spacetime are the intuitions
time and space.  I think these are more
useful than numbers because things are
actually made of them. 

Perhaps these are 0 (yin) and 1 (yang) or perhaps
they are yang (time)  and yin (space).
By themselves nothing, but everything is
constructed of them (brought into spacetime). 

There are 8 basic trigrams in the yi.
Reading that right to left is upward we have:

111 = father or heaven or energy
000 = mother or earth or container
011 = daughter or bubbing laughter 
001 = thunder or anger
100 = mountain or halting

etc. so that snippets of binary sequences can have meaning.

Another way of stating this is that perhaps the only the binary 0 and 1
may be used to construct ideas. But the other numbers can
be expressed in binary form.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/2/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

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Making meaningful computations


Any image can be written as a string of binary numbers
and similarly with sound. In mp4 we can have both image
and sound.  Some of these sounds and images would be meaningful,
for example mozart's requiem as a video, or a nightly news
broadcast.

In principle any string of binary numbers can be created,
I suppose with a Turing machine. So I don't know how, but
in principle at least the digital mp4 strings of binary numbers
could be calculated with a Turing machine. The actual calculator
could also be a digital camera with a microphone turned on.

Would that not be a meaningful computation ?



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/2/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

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Re: Solipsism = 1p

2012-11-02 Thread Craig Weinberg

On Friday, November 2, 2012 8:18:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 2:51 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>  
>
>> But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it. 
>>>
>>
>> So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm 
>> not shooting the gun by pulling the trigger?
>>
>
> You are external to the gun, but you are not external to your brain unless 
> substance dualism is true.
>

The problem with substance dualism is that it is redundant and has an 
infinite regress problem connecting the two substances. With dual aspect 
monism, you don't have those issues so that I can be internal to my brain 
in some senses, external to my brain in some senses, both internal and 
external in some senses, and neither internal and external in some senses. 

Regardless though, even if we said that the sense in which you are 
literally internal to the brain of this moment also necessarily means that 
your brain is identical to you. It has to be a two way street. 

It is completely arbitrary to privilege the spatial-object description of 
the phenomenon and marginalize the temporal-subject description. It's like 
saying that a movie exists entirely because there are pixels changing. It 
is not true. Movies exist because humans make them to tell stories to each 
other, and the pixels are there to help tell that storytelling. 

This is the primordial relation of all nature. It gets complicated, and as 
human beings we are equal parts personal story sequences and impersonal 
non-story consequences, but nevertheless, it is ultimately the story which 
is driving the bus. The coin has two sides, but the heads side is the side 
of the 'genuine leader'.

>
>>
>> You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the 
>>> particular configuration consistent with that decision, and the 
>>> movement into that configuration is determined by physical factors. 
>>>
>>
>> The movement of the molecules of your brain *is* your decision. That's 
>> what I am telling you but you won't see it. You are only able to see it as 
>> a one way street which makes no sense. What you are saying is like 'water 
>> is ice but ice is not water'. If I feel something when something happens in 
>> my brain, then that means that whatever happens in my brain is also an 
>> event in the universe when something is felt. That means molecules feel and 
>> see. You could say that groups of molecules feel and see, and that's ok 
>> too, but you think it's the 'groupiness' that sees and not the physical 
>> reality of the molecules themselves. I am saying that there is no 
>> independent groupiness... it is a fantasy. Incorrect. 
>>
>
> That the movement of the molecules of your brain *is* the decision is 
> eliminative materialism, or perhaps epiphenomenalism. 
>

No, your view has it upside down. The mindset which generates that view is 
so absolutely biased that it cannot conceive of turning this simple picture 
right side up. 

If something looks like particles moving on the outside but feels like 
remembering a fishing trip on the inside, that doesn't mean that the memory 
is the epiphenomenon. The memory is the whole point of the particles. They 
have nothing else to do sitting in your skull but to provide the grunt work 
of organizing your access to your own human experiences. 

It is not eliminative materialism to say that object and subject are the 
same thing from different views, it is dual aspect monism. When I say 
'there are two sides to this coin', your mind keeps responding 'but coins 
are tails'. He keeps looking at the universe from an external perspective 
and then projecting that world of objects-within-objects as some kind of 
explanation of the subject who he actually is. My view is that it cannot 
work that way.

> In any case, the behaviour of the molecules is entirely consistent with 
> chemistry. An ion channel opens because it changes conformation due to 
> neurotransmitters binding to it or the transmembrane voltage. Any 
> subjectivity it may have does not enter into the equation.
>  
>
>> What this means is that molecules as we see them are not the whole story, 
>> just as the brain and its actions are not the whole story. We are the other 
>> half of the story and we are not made of neurotransmitters or cells any 
>> more than a song we make up is our body. Two different ontological schemas. 
>> Two opposite schemas twisted orthogonally by the private time to public 
>> space juxtaposition.
>>
>
> That may be, but the molecules *entirely* determine the behaviour of the 
> brain. 
>

When I say the words "bright blue liquid" I have changed the behavior of 
the molecules of your brain *entirely*. It was not anything but my 
intention to write these words to you which made that change. Your brain, 
it's neurons and molecules dutifully *follow* my commands from across the 
internet with no biochemistry connecting us whatsoever. The reasoning you 
are using is ci

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-02 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 5:19 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> let's presume that in 999 out of 1,000 almost identical standard models
> that exist in string theory, the half-life is 1 us. But in 1 out of those
> 1,000, the half life is 10 us. If you are the experimenter what can physics
> tell you about the particle's half life?
>

That it's half life is really 1.01 not 1.

> Until the experiment is performed, even the laws of physics are not in
> stone.
>

And in Bruno's thought experiment until the subjects open the door of the
duplicating machine and observe the different environments of Washington
and Moscow and thus are changed differently there is still only one
consciousness regardless of how many bodies there are.

> This is a main point of Bruno's result:
>

Bruno's main point is that we should be amazed and draw deep philosophical
conclusions from the fact that the Washington man is the man who saw
Washington, and be flabbergasted by the fact that he didn't become the
Moscow man because he didn't see Moscow. I'm sorry but I just don't see any
grand mystery here.

> physics is not at the bottom of the explanatory ladder
>

Physics is at the bottom of all non-mathematical things that have an
explanation, but we now know that some things have no explanation. We now
know that some things are random.

  John K Clark

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-02 Thread Jason



On Friday, November 2, 2012 10:07:36 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 5:19 PM, Jason Resch 
> > wrote:
>
>  > let's presume that in 999 out of 1,000 almost identical standard 
>> models that exist in string theory, the half-life is 1 us. But in 1 out of 
>> those 1,000, the half life is 10 us. If you are the experimenter what can 
>> physics tell you about the particle's half life?  
>>
>
> That it's half life is really 1.01 not 1.
>

I'm not sure about this.  I think after making a few of these measurements, 
the experimenter will partition themselves into two different sets of 
universes, one where the particle is consistently measured with 1 and 
another with 10.  After which it is not likely for them 
to re-intersect with the other universes where it actually is the other 
value.   

(Perhaps an already random process like half life was not a good example, 
let's say it was the particle's rest mass.)
 

>
> > Until the experiment is performed, even the laws of physics are not in 
>> stone. 
>>
>   
> And in Bruno's thought experiment until the subjects open the door of the 
> duplicating machine and observe the different environments of Washington 
> and Moscow and thus are changed differently there is still only one 
> consciousness regardless of how many bodies there are.
>
> > This is a main point of Bruno's result:
>>
>
> Bruno's main point is that we should be amazed and draw deep philosophical 
> conclusions from the fact that the Washington man is the man who saw 
> Washington, and be flabbergasted by the fact that he didn't become the 
> Moscow man because he didn't see Moscow. I'm sorry but I just don't see any 
> grand mystery here.
>

No, that is only a step in the proof.  If you had spent the 30 minutes to 
read all the steps, you would see the conclusion is that the apparent laws 
of physics are determined by math (assuming arithmetical realism and the 
computational theory of mind).
 

>
> > physics is not at the bottom of the explanatory ladder
>>
>
> Physics is at the bottom of all non-mathematical things that have an 
> explanation,
>

Physics isn't at the bottom if it is explained by a more fundamental 
concept. (Conscious machines and their existence in mathematics)
 

> but we now know that some things have no explanation. We now know that 
> some things are random. 
>
>
Yes, but only from a first person perspective.

Jason

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Re: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"



On 01 Nov 2012, at 19:13, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 01.11.2012 18:30 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 11:09, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...


“Absolute Spirit is the fundamental reality. But in order to create
the world, the Absolute manifests itself, or goes out of itself in
a sense, the Absolute forgets itself and empties itself into
creation (although never really ceasing to be itself). Thus the
world is created as a “falling away” from Spirit, as a
“self-alienation” of Spirit, although the Fall is never anything
but a play of Spirit itself.”


Yes. This remind me of my quoting of Aurobindo, which suits so well
something in both comp, and, swim has to say, the salvia divinorum
experience:

<< What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?

And it is this ... Existence that multiplied itself For sheer delight
of being And plunged into numberless trillions of forms So that it
might Find Itself Innumerably (Aurobindo)








“Having “fallen” into the manifest and material world, Spirit
begins the process of returning to itself, and this process of the
return of Spirit to Spirit is simply development or evolution
itself. The original “descent” (or involution) is a forgetting, a
fall, a self-alienation of Spirit; and the reverse movement of
“ascent” (or evolution) is thus the self-remembering and
self-actualization of Spirit. And yet, the Idealists emphasized,
all of Spirit is fully present at each and every stage of evolution
as the process of evolution itself. ”


I can't agree more, Evgenii.

It is also very close to Plotinus' emanation/conversion, which has
influenced the Christians a lot, even if this has often taken the
shape of fairy tales (which obviously should never been taken
literally).

In Plotinus, and in comp we can say more: it is the process of
conversion of the Soul toward the Spirit, which literally create the
material reality. It is the indeterminateness of the border of the
universal mind, where God loss control, so to speak, which makes it
possible for the soul to start the conversion, and come back to the
source. That conception of matter is already in Aristotle, but
Plotinus gives the Platonist correction which makes it consistent,
and even necessary I would say, with the theology, including physics,
of the universal machines. Each individual universal machines is a
window for the arithmetical truth to discover (partially) itself, but
also losing itself, in itself. This entails  a double amnesia: God
has to forget his identity to explore itself, and the creatures have
to forget the window and the exploration  (the body and the
environment) to remember who they are. Likewise with salvia: you
forget who you are here to remind who you are there, and vice versa,
apparently from many reports, although you can also just disconnect,
instead of forgetting (which is handy when the phone rings).

Indeed, the same with comp once you accept the greek definition of
knowledge and dream---roughly speaking: true belief (knowledge) and
consistent belief (dream).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




Then you may like


This you cannot know. I just said that computer science shows that  
Plotinus and Plato, and perhaps the German idealists (which I find  
difficult to interpret, greek is more easy than german) are closer to  
the consequence of comp, than aritstotle and naturalism.
I am mute on the fact that I like that or not. Comp is elegant, like  
Everett-QM, but admittedly shocking and even frightening by many  
aspect (besides being "new").

But science tries to avoid wishful thinking.






Ken Wilber, The Marriage of Sense and Soul: Integrating Science and  
Religion


I will try to take a look. Nice titles, and the quotes were very nice  
(= close to comp's consequences).






as the quotes have been from this book. There is nothing about comp  
there but the book is not that bad.


I should say that the author understands the religion pretty  
general: as spirit and contemplation.


OK, that is already close to Plato, Plotinus and the mystics  
throughout the world.




It is an interesting overview  of how science has started to  
dominate over art and moral and what could be done against it. The  
different would-be solutions from history are also considered.  
Wilber’s solution, if I have understood correctly, goes like a  
combination of German idealism (that you like) + Joga.


There are many paths. But in the type of consumerism based on lies of  
today, none can even begin. We have simpler problems to solve before,  
like stopping criminals to think for us.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a
concrete robust physical universe".

Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I
explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality.

In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum.

Dear Bruno,

I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you
still didn't understand... From: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf

"...what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe?"
"Actually the 8th present step will explain
that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the
notion of concrete and
existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power.
It will follow that a much
weaker and usual form of Ockham’s razor can be used to conclude that
not only physics has
been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that
‘‘matter’’ has been
ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as the
object study of fundamental

machine psychology."

My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any
other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically
primitive. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither
and has no particular properties.

How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic?

[SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we
reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds

Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I
just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of
metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp).

Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable
aspects of multiple sheaves of computations?

This is what I have shown to be a consequence of comp.

[SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or
derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive -
Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are "operating" somehow in
an atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run
without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of
'realism'. In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be
a TOE and run the TOE to generate our world, then that power
should be obvious. My problem is that it looks tooo much like the
'explanation' of creation that we find in mythology, whether it is
the Ptah of ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu or whatever other
myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the
sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any different?

I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this
entails the sue of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by
Solovay. All correct machine whose beliefs extend RA obeys to G and
G*. There is no choice in the matter.

That is not changed or involved by my argument.

[SPK] I agree 10% with your point about 'miracles'. I
am very suspicions of "special explanations' or 'natural
conspiracies'. (This comes from my upbringing as a "Bible-
believing Fundamentalist" and eventual rejection of that
literalist mental straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition
or situation that can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually
difficult condition or situation should be either universal in
that they apply anywhere and anytime

But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by
something more primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot
be the fundamental theory, given that the physical reality is not
primitive.

The concepts of "where" and "when" (positions in a space-time)
would seem to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or
observers/measurements to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think
that we disagree that "physics cannot be the fundamental theory".
Physics requires measurements/observations to be meaningful. Where I
agree with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer
indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the question of
resources. Resources are required for computations to "run" so there
has to be the availability of resources involved in *any*
consideration of computations. Ignoring these considerations by only
considering computations as Platonic objects is wrong, IMHO.
You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects
(in Platonia) that are such that somehow we finite entities can
create physical objects that can implement (in their dynamical
functions) instances of such, while I claim that computations are
equivalence classes of functions that physical systems can implement
*and* abstract objects. I see these two views as two poles of a
spectrum. There is a lot more detail in my considerations that I do
not have time to go into at this t

Re: Against Mechanism

On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:25, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 2:21 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

>> the you before the duplication or the you after the duplication?

> All the you after, are the you before, by definition of comp.

OK, but the you before is not the you after. The Helsinki man knows  
nothing about Moscow or Washington, not even if he still exists  
after the duplication,

He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp.

but both the Moscow man and the Washington man know all about  
Helsinki even if they don't know about each other.

> what you will live, as a first person.

If your mind works deterministically then what you will live to  
think you see will depend on the external environment.

Sure.

If your mind does NOT work deterministically then what you will live  
to think you see will depend on absolutely nothing, in other words  
it is random. There is no new sort of indeterminacy involved just  
the boring old sort, and how you expect to draw profound  
philosophical  conclusions from such a flimsy foundation is a mystery.

Here 3-determinacy entails, by simple logic. You are the only one in  
the list (and out of the list) who have a problem (but which one?)  
with this. I do not draw any philosophical conclusion: but a theorem.  
The theorem is that the physical laws emerges, in a precise and  
testable way, from arithmetic/computer science. test have already been  
performed, and you can read the math part which explains all this.

> You know by comp that [...]

I don't know anything by "comp".

Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the brain.

At one time I thought I knew what you meant by the term,

I thought so.

but then you say consciousness was there before Evolution produced  
brains and that "the owner [of a brain] itself must attach his  
consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic". So I was wrong,  
I don't know what "comp" means.

You were just not aware of the logical consequences, and as long as  
you are stuck in step 3, it is normal you can't get the consequences  
of comp.

>> Before the duplication the you is the Helsinki man, after the  
duplication the you is the Helsinki man and the Washington man and  
the Moscow man. What is the probability the Helsinki man will write  
in his diary that he sees Washington? 0%.

> The guy reconstituted in Washington will say: "Gosh I was wrong".

That's the problem, you're not clear who "I" is.

This is not relevant. the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy  
in H, by definition of comp. This is enough to get the 1_indeterminacy.

The Washington man made no error because he made no predictions of  
any sort, only the Helsinki man did that. The Washington man and  
Helsinki man have identical memories up to the point of duplication  
but after that they diverge.

That is known by the guy in Helsinki. That is why he can make a bet,  
on what he can possibly live, given that he knows he will remain alive  
(betting on comp and the default hypothesis, with the given protocol).

>> What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary  
he sees Helsinki? 100%.

> No. In the protocol that I have described to you many times, the  
probability here is 0%, as he is cut and pasted. Not copy and pasted.

If the Helsinki man had never seen Helsinki then he's not the  
Helsinki man, if he has seen that city then he wrote so in his diary.

And?

> And it is not "he sees" but what will he see. And the protocol  
assures that he will only see washington, or Moscow.

Who is "he"?

The guy in Helsinki, which will be in both M and W, but which will  
feel being in only once city, as both the W and M guy will concede.  
And the guy in Helsinki, if he can reason like any Löbian machine, can  
know that in advance, and that is why he can be aware that he does not  
know in advance where he will feel. It is simple math.

>> What is the probability the Washington man will write in his  
diary he sees Washington? 100%.

> The question was asked to the Helsinki man.

But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got a  
rather severe case of writers block and is writing very little in  
his diary.

The body of the guy in Helsinki is destroyed, but by comp, we have  
already accept that the guy itself survives. With comp we already know  
that we can survive an annihilation of the body.

>>  And if the duplicating process destroys the Helsinki man then  
the probability the Helsinki man will write anything at all in his  
diary is 0%.

> Then comp is false.

OK if you say so, its your invention so whatever "comp" means its  
false; although I am a little surprised that you expect a man who no  
longer exists to write stuff in his diary.

The simple teleprtation kills us, and then a brain substitution kills  
us too, and this is what I mean by comp is false.

> The question is about your first perso

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:33, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/1/2012 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?

Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012

Dear Roger,

I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers
float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation
an infinite regress.

Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress
disappear.

Dear Bruno,

Only if arithmetic truth is theory independent,

Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth is so independent of any
effective theory that no such theory can get it. mathematical logic,
and math, cannot have any meaning without arithmetical truth being
independent of theories.

but that ruins your result! It truth is theory independent then it
is impossible for us to be able to know of it.

That is mathematical solipsism. It is obviously false. Theories are
lantern on little pieces of the truth, which does not depend on the
theory, even if the lantern can bring shadows, and also hid some other
piece of truth. All this makes sense only because such truth does not
depend on us and on our theories.

All knowledge is 'theory laden' - as David Deutsch explains well.

They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some
provably, some non provably). No problem.

Maybe you might write up an explanation of how arithmetic truth
is independent of any ability to prove it.

Gödel's proof explains this very well. The idea that truth = proof is
intuitionism, and technically, it changes nothing for arithmetic (only
for analysis).

Bruno

That might support your idea of "arithmetic realism" against my
claim against it.

That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to
be Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if
not it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be
distinguishable from to have individual values. The totality of
numbers is an infinity and thus have the property that their
proper parts cannot be distinguished from their totality. How does
the One accomplish this? It seems to me that we have to assume
that the One is conscious of the numbers and that makes the
numbers something "different" from the One for 1) to work and this
is no different from what a finite mind does. My point here is
that a mind cannot be infinite because it would be incapable of
distinguishing it's self from any of its proper parts - making it
the ultimate solipsist. Do there exist maps between the totality
of an infinite set to an improper part? If yes, what are their
necessary properties?

The One is solipsist, as the one is unique and alone. But I don't
see why it should be conscious. It might be, but I see no evidence
for this.

I agree 100% with you on this.

Bruno

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Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic

On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:42, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/1/2012 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the
equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call
those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i)

Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number.

The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the
equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and
phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they
are both undefined.

In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the
data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program
(machine, ...) x on the input y.

OK, but this does not answer my question. What is the
ontological level mechanism that distinguishes the u and the x and
the y from each other?

The one you have chosen above. But let continue to use elementary
arithmetic, as everyone learn it in school. So the answer is:
elementary arithmetic.

Dear Bruno,'

If there is no entity to chose the elementary arithmetic, how is
it chosen or even defined such that there exist arithmetic
statements that can possibly be true or false?

Nobody needs to do the choice, as the choice is irrelevant for the
truth. If someone choose the combinators, the proof of "1+1= 2" will
be very long, and a bit awkward, but the proof of KKK = K, will be
very short. If someone chose elementary arithmetic, the proof of 1+1=2
will be very short (Liz found it on FOAR), but the proof that KKK = K,
will be long and a bit awkward.
The fact is that 1+1=2, and KKK=K, are true, independently of the
choice of the theory, and indeed independently of the existence of the
theories.

We can assume some special Realm or entity does the work of choosing
the consistent set of arithmetical statements or, as I suggest, we
can consider the totality of all possible physical worlds

As long as you make your theory clearer, I can't understand what you
mean by "physical world", "possible", "totality", etc.

as the implementers of arithmetic statements and thus their
"provers". Possible physical worlds, taken as a single aggregate, is
just as timeless and non-located as the Platonic Realm and yet we
don't need any special pleading for us to believe in them. ;-)

Bruno

My thinking here follows the reasoning of Jaakko Hintikka. Are
you familiar with it? Game theoretic semantics for Proof theory

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Re: Communicability



On 01 Nov 2012, at 22:34, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/1/2012 11:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 01:01, Stephen P. King wrote:


Dear Bruno,

  Exactly what do these temporal concepts, such as "explain",  
"solve", "interacting" and " emulating", mean in an atemporal  
setting? You are mixing temporal and atemporal ideas. ...


Study a good book in theoretical computer science. You told me that  
you have the book by Matiyazevich. he does explicitly emulate  
Turing machine, which have a quite physical look, with a moving  
head, and obeying instruction is a temporal manner, and yet they  
can be shown to be emulated by a the existence or non existence of  
solution of Diophantine equations.


Dear Bruno,

   That book, full of wonderful words and equations, is a physical  
object.


True, but non relevant.


That physical object is, in my thinking, an example of an  
implementation of the "emulation of a Turing Machine..." just as the  
image on my TV of Rainbow Dash and her friends is a physical  
implementation of magical Ponies. You seem to ignore the obvious...


You assume physical objects, but this contradict your own theory (on  
which you point to, but without ever giving it).









But this is already no more an enigma for many physicists which  
agree that temporality is just an illusion resulting from  
projection from higher dimension.


   Those physicists are wrong in their belief. This is argued well  
in this paper http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/9708055 and in any other  
places. I recall a long chat that I had with Julian Barbor. In it I  
tried to ask him about the computational complexity of implementing  
his 'time capsule' and 'best matching' ideas, he seemed to not  
understand what the heck I was talking about and yet bemoaned the  
very problem at length in one of his papers on the idea!


From pg 52 of http://www.platonia.com/barbour_hrp2003.pdf

"About ten years ago, I did some computer calculations to find such
configurations with the Macintosh computer I then possessed. I was  
able to
do exhaustive calculations up to N = 27, which took the computer  
about three
days. Because the number of combinations that must be checked out  
grows

exponentially with N, even with a modern supercomputer I doubt that
calculations much beyond N = 50 would be feasible."

   BTW, it was reading this paper that opened my eyes to the NP-Hard  
problem of Leibniz' Pre-Established Harmony.





I thought you agree that physics (and thus time) is not primitive.


   I agree, physics (and all that it such as particles, forces,  
matter, energy) impels cannot be ontologically primitive. But it  
must exist nonetheless. My challenge is showing how. I start with a  
notion of a property neutral "totality of all that exists"


But what exists has properties, and besides, we don't know what exists  
(beside our consciousness), so you take for granted much too much,  
exactly what we have to explain.






and consider how from that ground two aspects emerge simultaneously,  
the physical and the mental as mutually distinct dual aspects that  
when added together yield back the neutrality. This idea is very  
similar to Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing.


I have no clue what you mean.






This means that they can and need to be explain from non temporal  
notion.


Arithmetic is the bloc mindspace.


   Is it a Singleton?


No.




Can it be exactly represented by a Boolean Algebra?


Yes.




I see 'mindspace" as one half of the dual aspects.


You pretend to see a flaw. I am not interested in your "theory". You  
have to work in the theory you are criticizing, to find the flaw in  
that theory. If not you are like someone pretending that abelian group  
are ridiculous as you know a non abelian group. Use comp, without  
adding any other axioms, please.






There is nothing more dynamical than the notion of computations,  
yet, they have been discovered in statical math structure.


   Mathematical objects are the epitome of static objects. I think  
that this view of math is blinkered. A description of a dynamic  
process may be static, but the evolutionaly Becoming aspect is still  
there, just hidden. Just as a photograph acts to freeze a moment in  
time...


So you assume a primitive time. This contradicts your "theory" (the  
few I ahve grasped, but which becomes more and more confused, when you  
try to escape some comp's consequence, for reason which eludes me, as  
in some post you seem to have agreed with them.






This is made possible as the statical sequence 0, 1, 2, 3, ...  
reintroduces a lot of quasi-time notion, and it is explained how  
some of them will play the role of the "observable timing of  
events" locally, by relative numbers.


   This is where you make the mistake. You are assuming that the  
ordering of numbers *is* the dynamic.


No.




I claim that the ordering of numbers *is a representation* of the  
dynamic.


It can be. But the confusio

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm



On 01 Nov 2012, at 22:50, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/1/2012 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 01:18, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/31/2012 12:45 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 can stop reading as you need to assume the numbers (or anything  
Turing equivalent) to get them.


Dear Bruno,

So it is OK to assume that which I seek to explain?



You can't explain the numbers without assuming the numbers. This  
has been foreseen by Dedekind, and vert well justified by many  
theorem in mathematical logic. Below the number, you are lead to  
version of ultrafinitism, which is senseless in the comp theory.


 Dear Bruno,

I disagree with ultrafinitists, they seem to be the mathematical  
equivalent of "flat-earthers'.










*and* having some particular set of values and meanings.


I just assume

x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)

 x *0 = 0
 x*s(y) = x*y + x

And hope you understand.



I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way  
to physically implement them.


Those notion have nothing to do with "physical implementation".


So your thinking about them is not a physical act?


Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer "yes" and "no".
Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events.
No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by  
platonic arithmetical truth.






Implementation and physical will be explained from them. A natural  
thing as they are much more complex than the laws above.


Numbers are meaningless in the absence of a means to define  
them. Theories do not free-float.


Truth is free floating, and theories lived through truth, they are  
truth floating, even when false.








In the absence of some common media, even if it is generated by  
sheaves of computations, there simply is no way to understand  
anything.


Why ?


Because there is not way to know of them otherwise.


Our knowing as nothing to do with truth. If an asteroid would have  
destroy Earth before the Oresme bishop dicovered that the harmonic  
series diverge, she would have still diverge, despite no humans would  
know it.




Unless you can communicate with me, I have no way of knowing  
anything about your ideas. Similarly if there is no physical  
implementation of a mathematical statement, there is no meaning to  
claims to "truth" ofsuch statements.


To claim, no. To be true is independent of the claim of the apes.







You must accept non-well foundedness for your result to work, but  
you seem fixated against that.


1004.


Pfft. Nice custom made quip.


You are often escaping answers by inappropriate mathematical  
precision, which meaning contradicts your mathematical super- 
relativism. It is really 1004+contradiction.













A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are  
said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are  
multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on  
the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a  
statement independently of any particular entity capable of  
"understanding" the statement, there is no meaning to the  
concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a  
statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological  
condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs  
the question of meaningfulness!
   You are taking for granted some things that your arguments  
disallow.



Do you agree that during the five seconds just after the Big Bang  
(assuming that theory) there might not have been any possible  
observers. But then the Big Bang has no more sense.


No, I don't. Why? Because that concept of "the five seconds  
just after the Big Bang" is an assumption of a special case or  
pleading. I might as well postulate the existence of Raindow Dash  
to act as the entity to whom the Truth of mathematical statements  
have absolute meaning. To be frank, I thing that the Big Bang  
theory, as usually explained is a steaming pile of rubbish, as it  
asks us to believe that thetotality of all that exists  
sprang into being from Nothing.


I actually agree, by accident, on this. But this is not relevant  
for my point.


It is very relevant to mine.

Imagine that we can show that some solution to GR equantion have  
universe so poor that life cannot exist in there, would you say  
that such universe cannot exist?


If there does not exist a means to "show the solution" there is  
no solution.


Mathematical solipsism.








I believe that the totality of what exists is eternal, having no  
beginning and no end.


I am OK with that. It is close to Platonism. But with comp we can  
restrict this to the arithmetical truth (a highly non computable  
structure, but still conceivable by universal numbers, relatively).


Well, can we work with that agreement?


Come on, you say that you can escape the consequence of comp, you have  
to find the flaw

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be aproblem ?



On 02 Nov 2012, at 10:34, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Thanks. Then the numbers are noit separate but
included in the truth.


Losely speaking, OK. Numbers are objects, truth concerns only  
propositions.




My feeling is that the truth
then may be the truth(s) of information theory.


Information theory is just a tiny part of computer science. The word  
"information" is very dangerous and overused, as people will confuse  
Shannon information with the meaningful information (best handled by  
model theory in logic).

Note that computer science is essentially a tiny part of arithmetic.
You must understand that after Gödel, we know that arithmetical truth  
is *very* big, and if we are machine (comp) then we cannot distinguish  
arithmetical truth from the outer God (the ONE).


Bruno






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/2/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-01, 11:36:18
Subject: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would  
this be aproblem ?



On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012

Dear Roger,

I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers
float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an
infinite regress.


Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress
disappear.

They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some
provably, some non provably). No problem.






That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to be
Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if not
it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be distinguishable
from to have individual values. The totality of numbers is an
infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot
be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish
this? It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is
conscious of the numbers and that makes the numbers something
"different" from the One for 1) to work and this is no different
from what a finite mind does. My point here is that a mind cannot be
infinite because it would be incapable of distinguishing it's self
from any of its proper parts - making it the ultimate solipsist. Do
there exist maps between the totality of an infinite set to an
improper part? If yes, what are their necessary properties?


The One is solipsist, as the one is unique and alone. But I don't see
why it should be conscious. It might be, but I see no evidence for  
this.


Bruno





The idea of 2) seems to be demolished by Dennett's argument
against the homunculus or else the One is strictly a solipsist as I
argued above. I suspect that the mapping between wholes and improper
parts is the same as Bruno's measure problem.

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Re: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"



On 02 Nov 2012, at 10:42, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno,

Could it not be that there is nothing especially sacred
about the natural numbers, that these are, as Hobbes
put it regarding words, "but counterfeit tokens" ?


Numbers, with + and * laws, is mainly the same things than digital  
machines, and the laws making them working.






And the real controlling force which uses them is
information theory ?   That is to say, intelligence.


Here you are far too quick.  I can make sense, because I have some  
favorable imagination. As I said, information theory is a tiny part of  
computer science. It exploits the duality between immune/simple set,  
where the self-reference logic exploits the duality creative/ 
productive set. The two dualities plays some rôle, but the creative/ 
productive set duality (the theory of universal machine) is much more  
rich. The mathematical notion of information still disallows meaning  
and person. It is more used for communication of signals, treatment of  
noise, compression of data, etc.
You will also have the problem between choosing classical information  
or quantum information, and how to relate them, etc.


Bruno






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/2/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


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From: Evgenii Rudnyi
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-01, 06:09:50
Subject: Re: Self-ascription and "Perfect Model Model"


On 30.10.2012 16:25 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 30 Oct 2012, at 12:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...



You talk for example about integers as a framework for everything.
Fine. Yet, I would like to understand how mankind through it
development has invented integers. How comp would help to answer
this?


Comp might not been able to answer that, in any better way than, say,
evolution theory. Numbers are important in nature, as everything is
born from them, and to survive with bigger chance, the universal
numbers, us in particular, have to be able to recognize them, and
manipulate them accordingly. Comp is not a theory aimed at explaining
everything directly. It is just, at the start, an hypothesis in
philosophy of mind, and then it appears that it reduces the mind-body
problem to an explanation of quanta and qualia from
arithmetic/computer science.

Its main value in the human science, is, imo, that he forces us to be
more modest, and more aware that we know about nothing, if only
because we have wrongly separate the human science (including
theology, afterlife, metaphysics) and the exact sciences. Comp
provides a way to reunite them. Comp can be seen as an abstract
corpus callosum making a bridge between the formal and the informal,
before bridging mind and matter.


Below there is a couple of quotes about German idealism. Please  
replace
Absolute Spirit by Natural Numbers there. Then it may give one  
possible

answer to my question.

?bsolute Spirit is the fundamental reality. But in order to create the
world, the Absolute manifests itself, or goes out of itself in a  
sense,

the Absolute forgets itself and empties itself into creation (although
never really ceasing to be itself). Thus the world is created as a
?alling away? from Spirit, as a ?elf-alienation? of Spirit, although
the Fall is never anything but a play of Spirit itself.?

?aving ?allen? into the manifest and material world, Spirit begins the
process of returning to itself, and this process of the return of  
Spirit

to Spirit is simply development or evolution itself. The original
?escent? (or involution) is a forgetting, a fall, a self-alienation of
Spirit; and the reverse movement of ?scent? (or evolution) is thus the
self-remembering and self-actualization of Spirit. And yet, the
Idealists emphasized, all of Spirit is fully present at each and every
stage of evolution as the process of evolution itself. ?

Evgenii
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http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/10/evolution-and-german-idealism.html


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Re: The One is not a number but a metaphor



On 02 Nov 2012, at 11:50, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

When I refer to the One, I think of it not as a number 1
but as a metaphor.



Well, the ONE is not the number 1. OK.


The Soul is the identity of a monad, including the
supreme monad. The soul does not change, even though
the monad is constantly (rapidly) changing. The river
keeps changing, but the man standing in it remains the same.


Hmm why not. Too much fuzzy to be sure. Only the universal  
soul can be sais not changing.
But once the soul has fallen, it forgets its universal origin, and  
undergone quite big changes.






So in like manor, we can consider the One (as a metaphor,
not as a number) as the Soul of the universe, the Universal
Soul.


I don't think so. the soul is the inner God, the one you can awake by  
different technic. The outer God, is beyond conceivability, even if  
comp can identify it with the very complex set of code of the  
arithmetical truth.

At least in the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus.

Bruno


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Re: Against Mechanism

On 02 Nov 2012, at 16:07, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 5:19 PM, Jason Resch
wrote:

> let's presume that in 999 out of 1,000 almost identical standard
models that exist in string theory, the half-life is 1 us. But in 1
out of those 1,000, the half life is 10 us. If you are the
experimenter what can physics tell you about the particle's half life?

That it's half life is really 1.01 not 1.

> Until the experiment is performed, even the laws of physics are
not in stone.

And in Bruno's thought experiment until the subjects open the door
of the duplicating machine and observe the different environments of
Washington and Moscow and thus are changed differently there is
still only one consciousness regardless of how many bodies there are.

> This is a main point of Bruno's result:

Bruno's main point is that we should be amazed and draw deep
philosophical conclusions from the fact that the Washington man is
the man who saw Washington, and be flabbergasted by the fact that he
didn't become the Moscow man because he didn't see Moscow. I'm sorry
but I just don't see any grand mystery here.

Nobody talk on being amazed, or on deep mystery. The thought
experience is used just to illustrates the notion of 1P indeterminacy,
and this is used to get a result. No mystery, no paradox. Just a
logical consequence.

Bruno

> physics is not at the bottom of the explanatory ladder

Physics is at the bottom of all non-mathematical things that have an
explanation, but we now know that some things have no explanation.
We now know that some things are random.

John K Clark

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Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm


On 11/2/2012 5:29 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:
On Thu, Nov 1, 2012 at 10:55 PM, Stephen P. King 
mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:


On 11/1/2012 12:23 PM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:


Don't get me started on reductionism! I don't believe in it
as I don't believe in ontologically primitive objects that
have particular properties.


Then I don't see how you can make an ontological bet. You're at
the table, betting on 24 or whatever, but you won't place your chips.

Hi Cowboy,

Where is the Doctor's Office? I want to make an appointment!
Until its tech is proven, I am taking Dr. McCoy's stance:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HxKJyeCRVek


Dear Stephen,

That's funny. I'll follow you. But I know that show and all its 
incarnations since my childhood. Bad red herring to evade the bet 
question ;)


The thing about "where is the Doctors office?" is a guarded 
agreement on my saying Yes to the Doctor. So, I do accept the betting.




This fictional universe, and the doctor, accept UDA step 8 eventually, 
as I will demonstrate through examples:


1) The transporter did work in the end, so the original series does 
assume comp in this sense.


2) Kirk is probably not aware of reconstitution delay, when he gets 
back, and they've all learned to live with this weirdness.


3) McCoy, or the doctor, also uses the transporter throughout the 
series. So if you took an appointment and told him that you don't want 
to be transported and cited this video: "Just get up on that platform 
and do it. We all do and it works in this fictional universe. Or are 
you out of your Vulcan mind?"


4) McCoy is simultaneously "occupied" by his soul and Spock's soul in 
"search for Spock" which slowly kills him + makes him act very 
strangely until Spock's soul is given a new body in Vulcan.


=> Dr. McCoy understands after this, that his materialist bias is 
offset by Vulcan's spiritual practice, who are all logicians since 
childhood, and that spirit is transferable and independent of 
particular physical bodies.


5) With the Doctor in "Voyager" extension of the show (who is a pure 
medical doctor hologram/program, but realizes his universality and 
demands his freedom, which the crew eventually grant him) => program, 
strings of code, becomes conscious.


6) And the total denial of physical resources, in line with UDA step 
8, needed for consciousness is here:


The species "Q" in "the next Generation" version of the show, 
completely eliminate the need for physical resources to maintain or 
run them. This species is clearly not limited by physical resources, 
space, or time restraints.


Thus, your portrayal of McCoy's stance is not faithful to the 
fictional universe of that television series, which does support Step 
8 on numerous occasions :)


I agree with a weak version Step 8, one that allows for the 
"appearance of a robust physical universe" but in the way I explained in 
my posts yesterday.




Spacecowboy


Buckaroo? Banzai!

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Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm


On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a 
concrete robust physical universe".


?

Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I 
explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality.

In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum.


Dear Bruno,

   I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you 
still didn't understand... From: 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf 



"...what  if we  don’t  grant a concrete robust  physical universe?"
"Actually the 8th present step will  explain
that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the 
notion of concrete and
existing universe completely devoid of  any  explicative power.  It  
will  follow  that  a  much
weaker and usual form of Ockham’s razor can be used to conclude that 
not only physics has
been  epistemologically reduced  to  machine  psychology, but that  
‘‘matter’’ has  been
ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined  as the  
object study of fundamental

machine psychology."

My claim is that _/*neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any 
other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically 
primitive*/_. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither 
and has no particular properties.


How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic?


 Dear Bruno,

No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be 
complete and consistent simultaneously, thus it must stratify itself 
into Many. Each of the Many is claimed to have aspects that when 
recombined cancel to neutrality.










[SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we 
reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds


Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I 
just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of 
metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp).


Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable 
aspects of multiple sheaves of computations?


This is what I have shown to be a consequence of comp.


I agree.









[SPK]  given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or 
derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - 
Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are "operating" somehow in 
an atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run 
without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 
'realism'. In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a 
TOE and run the TOE to generate our world, then that power should 
be obvious. My problem is that it looks tooo much like the 
'explanation' of creation that we find in mythology, whether it is 
the Ptah  of ancient 
Egypt or  the egg of Pangu  
or whatever other myth one might like. What makes an explanation 
framed in the sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any 
different?


I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this 
entails the sue of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay. 
All correct machine whose beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There 
is no choice in the matter.


That is not changed or involved by my argument.





[SPK] I agree 10% with your point about 'miracles'. I 
am very suspicions of "special explanations' or 'natural 
conspiracies'.  (This comes from my upbringing as a 
"Bible-believing Fundamentalist" and eventual rejection of that 
literalist mental straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition 
or situation that can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually 
difficult condition or situation should be either universal in that 
they apply anywhere and anytime


But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by 
something more primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot 
be the fundamental theory, given that the physical reality is not 
primitive.


The concepts of "where" and "when" (positions in a space-time) 
would seem to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or 
observers/measurements to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think that 
we disagree that "physics cannot be the fundamental theory". Physics 
requires measurements/observations to be meaningful. Where I agree 
with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer indeterminacy. 
Where you and I disagree is on the question of resources. Resources 
are required for computations to "run" so there has to be the 
availability of resources involved in *any* consideration of 
computations. Ignoring these considerations by only considering 
computations as Platonic objects is wrong, IMHO.
You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects 
(in Platonia) t

Re: Emergence of Properties


On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic?


Dear Bruno,

Why do you consider "magic" as a potential answer to your question? 
After thinking about your question while I was waiting to pick up my 
daughter from school, it occurred to me that we see in the Big Bang 
model and in almost all cosmogenesis myths 
 
before it, an attempt to answer your question. Do you believe that 
properties are innate in objects? If so, how do you propose the 
dependency on measurement, to 'make definite' the properties of objects 
that we see in quantum theory, works?
My pathetic claim is that properties emerge from a 'subtractive 
process' (hat tip to Craig) between observers and that the One (totality 
of what exists) has all possible properties simultaneously (hat tip to 
Russell Standish).
I have never understood what aspects of QM theory are derivable 
from COMP. Do you have any result that show the general 
non-commutativity between observables of QM, or do you just show that 
the linear algebraic structure of observables (as we see in Hilbert 
spaces) can be derived from 1p indeterminacy? The linear properties and 
the general non-commutativity properties of operators (representing 
physical observables) are not the same thing...


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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?


On 11/2/2012 12:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/1/2012 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  10/31/2012

Dear Roger,

  I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers 
float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation 
an infinite regress.


Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress 
disappear.


Dear Bruno,

   Only if arithmetic truth is theory independent,


Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth is so independent of any 
effective theory that no such theory can get it. mathematical logic, 
and math, cannot have any meaning without arithmetical truth being 
independent of theories.




Dear Bruno,

"Truth is Independence of theories" cannot mean that truth is a 
meaningful value in the primitive ontological level. The relation 'Gödel 
+ Tarski => Arithmetical Truth' cannot even exist as a meaningful 
expression because there is no differentiation of expression at the 
ontologically primitive level. The same argument that disallows for the 
existence of a self-aware Universal mind applies. Let me step through a 
crude sketch of the argument here.


A Universal 
 collection 
of facts is such that there is no facts that is not included, it must 
cover all possible worlds (ala Kripke), it must be Complete.
The universal set of all facts is not a self-consistent set as 
there exists facts in one world that are inconsistent with facts in some 
other possible world.
A mind is such that its facts are mutually consistent or else it is 
insane or non-self-aware.
A self-aware mind must have some knowledge of facts concerning its 
existence or else it is not self-aware.
A universal 
 mind must 
"know all facts of all possible worlds" or else it would not be universal.

   A Universal mind is thus either insane (inconsistent) or non-self-aware.



but that ruins your result! It truth is theory independent then it is 
impossible for us to be able to know of it.


That is mathematical solipsism.


I know! My point is that comp implies the singular existence of a 
mind (universal number that is the sum of all other universal numbers) 
that is incapable of knowing what it is as there is nothing within its 
preview that is it not. It is a Universal Mind



It is obviously false.


We disagree.

Theories are lantern on little pieces of the truth, which does not 
depend on the theory, even if the lantern can bring shadows, and also 
hid some other piece of truth.


You insist on the concept of truth as a Platonic Object with innate 
properties. I disagree with this concept as I see it as incoherent.


All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend on us and 
on our theories.


No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be meaningful 
in the absence of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness. In the 
absence of a means to determine some property, it is incoherent and 
sometimes inconsistent to claim that the property has some particular 
value and the absence of all other possible values. This is like 
claiming to know exactly what is in a black box that cannot ever be 
opened or even located.





All knowledge is 'theory laden' - as David Deutsch explains well.



They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some 
provably, some non provably). No problem.


   Maybe you might write up an explanation of how arithmetic truth is 
independent of any ability to prove it.


Gödel's proof explains this very well. The idea that truth = proof is 
intuitionism, and technically, it changes nothing for arithmetic (only 
for analysis).




Wrong. Gödel's proof does not prove that truth has a particular 
value independent of the means to know that value. Gödel's proof tells 
is that theories what (as individuals) include Arithmetic will contain 
statements that cannot be evaluated by those theories as individuals. We 
can build infinite towers of theories that allow evaluation of the truth 
of statments, but int he absence of those towers, there is no such thing 
as definiteness for truths.


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RE: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

2012-11-02 Thread Hal Ruhl

Hi Stephen:

-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Stephen P. King
Sent: Thursday, November 01, 2012 11:50 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

On 10/31/2012 9:48 PM, Hal Ruhl wrote:
> Hi Everyone:
>
> I would like to restart my participation on the list by having a 
> discussion regarding the aspects of what we call "life" in our 
> universe starting in a simple manner as follows: [terms not defined 
> herein have the usual "Laws of Physics" definition]
>
> 1) Definition (1):  Energy (E) is the ability to subject a mass to a
force.
>
> 2) There are several types of energy currently known:
>
>   a) Mass itself via the conversion: [M <=> E/(c*c)]
>   b) Gravitational
>   c) Electromagnetic
>   d) Nuclear [Strong and Weak forces]
>   e) Dark Energy

Hi Hal,

 Nice post!

Thank you.

 Any way that the energy/force/work relation can be considered as a broken
symmetry restoration concept?

I had not thought of the "unfolding" of the scene I propose in terms of
symmetry.  But now that you mention it is seems that our universe may have
started with full rotational symmetry [a point] and may end up with the same
symmetry based on an infinite uniform and quite cold gas. 

>
> 3) Definition (2) Work (W)  Work is the flow of energy amongst the various
types by means of a change in the spatial configuration, dynamics and/or
amount of mass in a system brought about by an actual application of a force
to a mass.
>
> 4) The exact original distribution of energy amongst the various types 
> can't be reestablished and the new configuration can't do as much work 
> as the prior configuration was capable of doing. [Second Law of 
> Thermodynamics]

 Isn't the maximum entropy of a system a type of symmetry, where all
equiprobable states "look the same"?

See above response.

>
> 5) Time is not a factor: Once a flow of energy is possible it will take
place immediately.
>
> 6) Conclusion (1):  Since life is an energy flow conduit, wherever the
possibility of life exists life will appear as rapidly as possible.  The
"origin" of life herein.

 Let me refer you to a very old paper of mine: 
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/life.html

I took a quick look.  I may need some help understanding it fully.  I
occasionally play with the idea that Dark Energy is a spatially uniform leak
of information from "outside" combined with a maximum information packing
density in our universe.

>
> 7) Some energy flows are prevented by what are known [in my memory] as
"Energy Flow Hang-up Barriers" such as nuclear bonding coefficient issues,
spatial configuration, spin, other spatial dynamics, ignition temperature
requirements, electromagnetic repulsion, etc.  ["Energy Flow Hang-up
Barriers" is not my terminology - I think there was a twenty year or so old
article in Scientific American I am looking for and a quick Internet search
found a discussion of the repulsion hang-up in "Cosmology The Science of the
Universe" by Edward Robert Harrison.
>
> 8) Once life is present it will immediately punch as many holes in as many
Energy Hang-up Barriers as the details of the particular life entity
involved allows - this is how it realizes its energy flow conduit character.
The "purpose" of life herein.  In other words life's purpose is to hasten
the heat death of its host universe.
>
> 9) Now add in evolution which is a random walk with a lower but no upper
bound.

 Do you see mutation as a one-to-many map and selection as a many
-to-one map?

Well the DNA strings we know of are finite [n characters] so a particular
example is a "one" in some sense and this string's finite number of
mutations 4 ^ n+ is a "many".  However, I do not see that selection will
always produce just "one" successor.   

My intent with #9 was to open the door a crack on what I would like to post
next.

Slightly larger crack: I too have been chewing on these concepts for many
years.  I have several unpublished works expressing versions of these ideas
such as "A Path to Socioeconomic Sustainability", 1992, Library of Congress
deposit # TXu 554 900 among others and a very few published tiny pieces.

My goal here is to make sure the underling engine of what I will now try to
publish is sound.  As potential returns to the list some of the engine's
consequences seem of interest here such as consciousness distribution in an
ecosystem and the engine's impact on the concept of freewill.  

>
> A discussion of the possible consequences [such as qualia levels of
particular life entities - like degrees of consciousness] should await a
critique and possibly a revision of the above.

>
> Comments are eagerly sought.
>
> Thank you
>
 Nice!

   Thanks again
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   Indeed!

Stephen

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Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-02 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Nov 2, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp.
>

People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a reason
for doing so. And I no longer know what "comp" means.

> Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the brain.
>

I have no difficulty with that, but now you tell me that it means a great
many other things too, things that are clearly untrue; like consciousness
was there before Evolution produced brains or  "the owner [of a brain]
itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic".

> you are stuck in step 3
>

And I will remain stuck there until you fix the blunders you made in step
3; after that perhaps the additional steps that were built on that fatally
flawed foundation would be worth reading.

 > the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy in H

Yes.

> by definition of comp.
>

I don't know what that is.

> This is enough to get the 1_indeterminacy.
>

You don't know what your environment will be, what's new and mysterious
about that? I have no duplicating machine but I still don't know if my
environment will include rain tomorrow, but I can't find anything of
philosophical interest in that fact .

> And the guy in Helsinki, if he can reason like any Löbian machine,
>

Like your other invention "comp" I don't know what a  "Löbian machine" is.

  What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary he
 sees Washington? 100%.

>>>
>>> >>> The question was asked to the Helsinki man.
>>>
>>
>> >> But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got a
>> rather severe case of writers block and is writing very little in his diary.
>>
>
> > The body of the guy in Helsinki is destroyed, but by comp, we have
> already accept that the guy itself survives.
>
 So when you say "The question was asked to the Helsinki man" you are
asking a question to a man who's body has been destroyed. Yes the Helsinki
man is also the Washington man so you could say there is a 100% chance the
Helsinki man will write in his diary "I see Washington".  Of course the
Helsinki man is also the Moscow man so there is a 100% chance the Helsinki
man will write in his diary "I DO NOT see Washington". There is no
contradiction because you have been duplicated.

> >> If Bruno Marchal's body is duplicated and sent to Washington and Moscow
> but inside identical boxes then Bruno Marchal's consciousness has not been
> duplicated and will not be until the boxes are opened and different things
> are observed by the Brunos, at that point they will no longer be each other
> but both will still beBruno Marchal
>
> > Exactly. This contradict what you say above though.
>

I said a great deal above but I'll be damned if I see any contradiction .

> It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not.
>>
>
> > Of course it does matter. That the point of step 4, 5, 6, 7.
>

Which are useless because they were built on top of a step that does not
work.

  John K Clark

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Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic


On 11/2/2012 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:42, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/1/2012 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the 
equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call 
those functions:  phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ...  (the phi_i)

Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number.

The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the 
equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and  phi_x(y) 
are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both 
undefined.


In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the 
data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, 
...) x on the input y.




   OK, but this does not answer my question. What is the 
ontological level mechanism that distinguishes the u and the x and 
the y from each other?


The one you have chosen above. But let continue to use elementary 
arithmetic, as everyone learn it in school. So the answer is: 
elementary arithmetic.



Dear Bruno,'

If there is no entity to chose the elementary arithmetic, how is 
it chosen or even defined such that there exist arithmetic statements 
that can possibly be true or false?



Nobody needs to do the choice, as the choice is irrelevant for the 
truth. If someone choose the combinators, the proof of "1+1= 2" will 
be very long, and a bit awkward, but the proof of KKK = K, will be 
very short. If someone chose elementary arithmetic, the proof of 1+1=2 
will be very short (Liz found it on FOAR), but the proof that KKK = K, 
will be long and a bit awkward.
The fact is that 1+1=2, and KKK=K, are true, independently of the 
choice of the theory, and indeed independently of the existence of the 
theories.


Dear Bruno,

No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if 
the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore 
there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity.




We can assume some special Realm or entity does the work of choosing 
the consistent set of arithmetical statements or, as I suggest, we 
can consider the totality of all possible physical worlds


As long as you make your theory clearer, I can't understand what you 
mean by "physical world", "possible", "totality", etc.


I use the same definitions as other people use. I am not claiming a 
private language and/or set of definitions, even if I have tried to 
refine the usual definition more sharply than usual.


Physical world:

http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/physical?q=Physical

"adjective
1) relating to the body as opposed to the mind:
/a range of physical and mental challenges/
2) relating to things perceived through the senses as opposed to the 
mind; tangible or concrete:

the physical world
3) relating to physics or the operation of natural forces generally:
/physical laws/"

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world

"Those theorists who use the concept of possible worlds consider the 
actual world to be one of the many possible worlds. For each distinct 
way the world could have been, there is said to be a distinct possible 
world; the actual world is the one we in fact live in. Among such 
theorists there is disagreement about the nature of possible worlds; 
their precise ontological status is disputed, and especially the 
difference, if any, in ontological status between the actual world and 
all the other possible worlds."


Totality: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/totality
*
1:*an aggregate amount*:*sum 
,whole 


 2
/a/*:*the quality or state of beingtotal 
*:*wholeness 






as the implementers of arithmetic statements and thus their 
"provers". Possible physical worlds, taken as a single aggregate, is 
just as timeless and non-located as the Platonic Realm and yet we 
don't need any special pleading for us to believe in them. ;-)


?


I refuse to believe that you cannot make sense of what I wrote. Can 
you understand that I find your interpretation of Plato's Realm of 
Ideals to be incorrect? You seem to have read one book or taken one 
lecture on the subject and not read any more philosophical discussion of 
the ideas involved. I have asked you repeatedly to merely read Bertrand 
Russell's small book on philosophy - with is available on-line here 
http://www.ditext.com/russell/russell.html, but you seem unwilling to do 
that. Why?




Bruno



My thinking here follows the reasoning of Jaakko Hintikka. Are 
you familiar with it? Game theoretic semantics for Proof theory
 


--
How about considering that there are alternatives to your idea of 
timeless Truths? Jaakko Hintikka does a nice

Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

2012-11-02 Thread John Mikes

Dear Hal,
nice to read you again after all those years.
Life is a topic I brought up many times (as a question of course) and have
only a vague idea - opposing the conventional scientific stance based on
the carbon-etc. foundational "bio"/"physiological restrictions.

In my *speculations* 'life' is *much more* than a material-based
process-type - not to mention upon definitions of our (classic?) physical
terms.
I had a hard time to draw the line between a pretty open life concept and
my thinking about *consciousness* (which is in my view something like:
 *"response to relations" * without a proper definition of relation.

I appreciate *your* rule to keep the definitions congruent to those in the
physical sciences: I step beyond those in my agnostic view, considering an
infinite complexity as the 'Everything' from which some details keep
filtrating into our knowledge-base (mind content?) and we construct from
these the 'model' of our (physical?) world (continuously) over the
millennia.   I do not argue: I try to spell out whatever I can for the
argument.
(I find your restriction of your 'energy' to mass too narrow, since mass
and matter are figment of our physical explanations (mostly by tools of
mathematics)  about phenomena originally poorly understood. (Cf: mental
energy). Also I find the inclusion of 'dark energy' premature which serves
to explain (round up?) some mathematical mishaps in our conventional
cosmology to complement them by some dark matter.

I like your #5.

In #6 I find you just as vague as in your definition under #1 where
'ability" is a hard-to-apply quale in physically stated science-talk. -
"Since"? it may be the proposition ti discuss. Also it does not state how
the 'flow' turns into life - or what it may be to begin with.

To Stephen's excellent remark I have one word:

*1.  Nice post! Any way that the energy/force/work relation can be
considered as a broken symmetry restoration concept?*
*2.  Isn't the maximum entropy of a system a type of symmetry, where all
equiprobable states "look the same"?*
*
*
In my speculative story of a "logically lesser mind-boggling" explanation
about the Big Bang fables (around 1990) I presumed the "everything" (called
it Plenitude after Plato) as a (now I use newer language) complexity in
free exchange relation and perfect equilibrium (symmetry?), where
compilations of 'similars' (whatever - unidentified) are not excludible,
consequently 'knots' occur. Such knots - indeed violations of the perfect
symmetry - dissipate back into the homogeneity. I called such 'knots
universes and the re-dissipation their life-path.
I assumed a tendency for restoring the symmetry - something what our
physicists may call 'energy'. The result you may call the maximum entropy
(which is abused in conventional sciences into diverse figments, partial
changes - like e.g. the 2nd law).
Please forgive me the unscientific views in my agnostic stance. I consider
ALL we know a partial input of the "Everything" - adjusted to the
capabilities of our mind.
Beyond that ("The Model")  the rest of the everything is also influencing
OUR experienced changes without our knowledge WHAT they are and HOW they
work. During my successful 50 year career in polymer sciences I believed in
atoms, forces, molecular connections & other figments. Then I became
agnostic.

With best regards

John Mikes

On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 9:48 PM, Hal Ruhl  wrote:

> Hi Everyone:
>
> I would like to restart my participation on the list by having a
> discussion regarding the aspects of what we call “life” in our universe
> starting in a simple manner as follows: [terms not defined herein have the
> usual “Laws of Physics” definition]
>
> 1) Definition (1):  Energy (E) is the ability to subject a mass to a force.
>
> 2) There are several types of energy currently known:
>
>  a) Mass itself via the conversion: [M <=> E/(c*c)]
>  b) Gravitational
>  c) Electromagnetic
>  d) Nuclear [Strong and Weak forces]
>  e) Dark Energy
>
> 3) Definition (2) Work (W)  Work is the flow of energy amongst the various
> types by means of a change in the spatial configuration, dynamics and/or
> amount of mass in a system brought about by an actual application of a
> force to a mass.
>
> 4) The exact original distribution of energy amongst the various types
> can’t be reestablished and the new configuration can’t do as much work as
> the prior configuration was capable of doing. [Second Law of Thermodynamics]
>
> 5) Time is not a factor: Once a flow of energy is possible it will take
> place immediately.
>
> 6) Conclusion (1):  Since life is an energy flow conduit, wherever the
> possibility of life exists life will appear as rapidly as possible.  The
> “origin” of life herein.
>
> 7) Some energy flows are prevented by what are known [in my memory] as
> “Energy Flow Hang-up Barriers” such as nuclear bonding coefficient issues,
> spatial configuration, spin, other spatial dynamics, ignition temperature
> requirements, e

Re: Against Mechanism

2012-11-02 Thread Jason Resch

On Nov 2, 2012, at 4:02 PM, John Clark  wrote:

On Fri, Nov 2, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp.

People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a  
reason for doing so. And I no longer know what "comp" means.

It is just short for computationalism, the computational theory of  
mind.  The idea that your consciousness is the result of a computation.

> Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the  
brain.

I have no difficulty with that, but now you tell me that it means a  
great many other things too, things that are clearly untrue; like  
consciousness was there before Evolution produced brains or  "the  
owner [of a brain] itself must attach his consciousness to all  
states existing in arithmetic".

As Bruno explained these are the implications of computationalism, not  
in the definition and not usually realized by most of those who  
ascribe to computationalism.

> you are stuck in step 3

And I will remain stuck there until you fix the blunders you made in  
step 3; after that perhaps the additional steps that were built on  
that fatally flawed foundation would be worth reading.

 > the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy in H

Yes.

> by definition of comp.

I don't know what that is.

> This is enough to get the 1_indeterminacy.

You don't know what your environment will be, what's new and  
mysterious about that?

As Bruno told you, but you erased from your reply, there is no  
mystery, no paradox.  The only point of that step is to show  
interdeterminacy exists from a first person view.  You seemed to have  
agreed with this in previous posts.

I have no duplicating machine but I still don't know if my  
environment will include rain tomorrow, but I can't find anything of  
philosophical interest in that fact .

> And the guy in Helsinki, if he can reason like any Löbian machine,

Like your other invention "comp" I don't know what a  "Löbian machin 
e" is.

  What is the probability the Washington man will write in his  
diary he sees Washington? 100%.

>>> The question was asked to the Helsinki man.

>> But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got  
a rather severe case of writers block and is writing very little in  
his diary.

> The body of the guy in Helsinki is destroyed, but by comp, we have  
already accept that the guy itself survives.

So when you say "The question was asked to the Helsinki man" you are  
asking a question to a man who's body has been destroyed. Yes the  
Helsinki man is also the Washington man so you could say there is a  
100% chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I see  
Washington".  Of course the Helsinki man is also the Moscow man so  
there is a 100% chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I  
DO NOT see Washington". There is no contradiction because you have  
been duplicated.
>> If Bruno Marchal's body is duplicated and sent to Washington and  
Moscow but inside identical boxes then Bruno Marchal's  
consciousness has not been duplicated and will not be until the  
boxes are opened and different things are observed by the Brunos,  
at that point they will no longer be each other but both will still  
beBruno Marchal

> Exactly. This contradict what you say above though.

I said a great deal above but I'll be damned if I see any  
contradiction .

Your contradiction is that at some times you accept survival and other  
times you deny there is survival.

> It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not.

> Of course it does matter. That the point of step 4, 5, 6, 7.

Which are useless because they were built on top of a step that does  
not work.

Sometimes I wonder if you are just playing a game with all of us.

Jason

  John K Clark

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Re: AGI

2012-11-02 Thread John Mikes

Bruno:
you got me.
I wrote about things we cannot know - we have no capability to think of it
- and you deny that based on products of the human mind (math - logic)
saying YES, we can know everything (that we or our products DO know).
You claimed to be agnostic ("more than myself") - now I don't see it.
*
As I stated: Bohm never went back to his metaphysical ideas while in London
and Hiley - posthumusly - composed their book upon this (London) period, so
you I doubt whether you can read anything in THAT book -
JM

On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:32 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 21 Oct 2012, at 23:46, John Mikes wrote:
>
>
>> Bruno: my apologies for this late late reply, I am slow to decipher the
>> listpost from the daily inundation of Roger-stuff so I miss some more
>> relevant list-post sometimes.
>>
>> You wrote about the U-M:
>> "...an entity capable of computing all partial computable functions..."
>>
>> I would be cautios with "all" since we know only SOME.
>>
>
> Not with Church Thesis (CT). It is here that a "miracle occur". For all
> notion of "all" in mathematics, we can refute the universality pretension
> by a tool known as diagonalisation. But there is one exception: the notion
> of computation, which seems (and "is" with CT) close for the
> diagonalization. this is how, mainly, the mathematical discovery of the
> universal machine arrived.
>
>
>
>
>
>  I plead ignorance to the difference of a Loeb and another type(?) Univ.
>> Machine. Is the Leobian restricted?
>>
>
> In logic; restriction on the axioms leads to unrestriction of the models.
> and vice versa. Loebian machines are
>
> - universal (for computability)
> - they have the cognitive ability to know (in some sense) that they are
> universal (and thus they know that they are infinitely ignorant, even if
> only with respect to the arithmetical truth).
>
> They have less models, but more knowledge, which of course lessen the
> models.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  In what sense? BTW: What is 'universal'?
>> I would think twice to deem something as
>>
>
> It is a precise mathematical notion, and it correspond indeed to what
> computers are, but also, brain, cells, etc. Even without comp (comp assume
> that brain cells are not more than universal, at some level).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> "... it might be intrinsically complex..."
>>
>> EVERYTHING is intrinsically (too!) complex. We just take simplified
>> versions - adjusted to OUR mindful capabilities.
>>
>> "intelligence vs competence"?
>>
>> The 'oldies' (from yesterday back to the Greeks/Indians etc.) were
>> 'competent' in the actual (then) inventory of the knowledge base of their
>> time. That gave their 'intelligence' (the way I defined it) so: no
>> controversy.
>>
>> Bohm discussed with Krishnamurty before his association in London with
>> Hiley. The posthumous book the latter wrote in their combined(?) authorship
>> includes Bohm's earlier physical stances (~1952)  even before his Brazilian
>> escape.
>> I do not accuse Hiley of improperness, but he left out all the
>> Krishnamurtian mystique embraced by Bohm. Granted: Bohm taught later
>> advanced physical science in London but as far as I know never went back on
>> his interim (call it: metaphysical?) philosophy.
>>
>
> I should certainly reread this. Want to comment, but I am not sure, need
> to reread some part. I will see.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ 
>
>
>
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Re: Communicability


On 11/2/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 22:34, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/1/2012 11:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 01:01, Stephen P. King wrote:


Dear Bruno,

  Exactly what do these temporal concepts, such as "explain", 
"solve", "interacting" and " emulating", mean in an atemporal 
setting? You are mixing temporal and atemporal ideas. ...


Study a good book in theoretical computer science. You told me that 
you have the book by Matiyazevich. he does explicitly emulate Turing 
machine, which have a quite physical look, with a moving head, and 
obeying instruction is a temporal manner, and yet they can be shown 
to be emulated by a the existence or non existence of solution of 
Diophantine equations.


Dear Bruno,

   That book, full of wonderful words and equations, is a physical 
object.


True, but non relevant.


Dear Bruno,

Yes it is relevant as it is the essence of my proof. But let me 
quote Russell: http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus12.html


*
   "..a belief is/true/when it/corresponds/to a certain associated
   complex, and/false/when it does not. Assuming, for the sake of
   definiteness, that the objects of the belief are two terms and a
   relation, the terms being put in a certain order by the 'sense' of
   the believing, then if the two terms in that order are united by the
   relation into a complex, the belief is true; if not, it is false.
   This constitutes the definition of truth and falsehood that we were
   in search of. Judging or believing is a certain complex unity of
   which a mind is a constituent; if the remaining constituents, taken
   in the order which they have in the belief, form a complex unity,
   then the belief is true; if not, it is false.
   Thus although truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs, yet
   they are in a sense extrinsic properties, for the condition of the
   truth of a belief is something not involving beliefs, or (in
   general) any mind at all, but only the/objects/of the belief. A
   mind, which believes, believes truly when there is
   a/corresponding/complex not involving the mind, but only its
   objects. This correspondence ensures truth, and its absence entails
   falsehood. Hence we account simultaneously for the two facts that
   beliefs (/a/) depend on minds for their/existence/, (/b/) do not
   depend on minds for their/truth/.
   We may restate our theory as follows: If we take such a belief as
   'Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio', we will call
   Desdemona and Cassio the/object-terms/, and loving
   the/object-relation/. If there is a complex unity 'Desdemona's love
   for Cassio', consisting of the object-terms related by the
   object-relation in the same order as they have in the belief, then
   this complex unity is called the/fact corresponding to the belief/.
   Thus a belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and is
   false when there is no corresponding fact.
   It will be seen that minds do not create truth or falsehood. They
   create beliefs, but when once the beliefs are created, the mind
   cannot make them true or false, except in the special case where
   they concern future things which are within the power of the person
   believing, such as catching trains. _/What makes a belief true is
   a/__//__/fact/__/, and this fact does not (except in exceptional
   cases) in any way involve the mind of the person who has the belief/_.  *"

I do not see Russell accepting the idea that Truths have definite 
valued in the absence of beliefs and the definiteness of belief in the 
absence of minds. Why do you accept such an idea? Facts require possible 
worlds.




That physical object is, in my thinking, an example of an 
implementation of the "emulation of a Turing Machine..." just as the 
image on my TV of Rainbow Dash and her friends is a physical 
implementation of magical Ponies. You seem to ignore the obvious...


You assume physical objects, but this contradict your own theory (on 
which you point to, but without ever giving it).


I do not pretend to have a "theory of Everything". I am merely 
trying to show you where there is an obstruction in your result that 
results in the problem of an arithmetic body. It is strange that you 
openly admit to a problem but do anything to prevent its solution!









But this is already no more an enigma for many physicists which 
agree that temporality is just an illusion resulting from projection 
from higher dimension.


   Those physicists are wrong in their belief. This is argued well in 
this paper http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/9708055 and in any other 
places. I recall a long chat that I had with Julian Barbor. In it I 
tried to ask him about the computational complexity of implementing 
his 'time capsule' and 'best matching' ideas, he seemed to not 
understand what the heck I was talking about and yet bemoaned the 
very problem at length in one of his papers on the idea!


From pg 52 of http:/

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm


On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to 
physically implement them.


Those notion have nothing to do with "physical implementation".


So your thinking about them is not a physical act?


Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer "yes" and "no".
Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events.
No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by 
platonic arithmetical truth.

Dear Bruno,

Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? The 
mere self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence but the idea must 
be understood by a multiplicity of entities with the capacity to 
distinguish truth from falsehood to have any coherence as an idea! We 
cannot just assume that the mere existence of some undefined acts to 
determine the properties of the undefined. Truth and falsity are 
possible properties, they are not ontological aspects of existence.


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Stephen


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Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm


On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
bundles of arithmetic statements generate many individual observers 
that in turn "interact" (which I model via a combination of cyclic 
gossiping on graphs and bisimulations) with each other to define a 
common physical world which in turn acts to "implement" the 
arithmetic. It is a loop, an eternal cyclical process that never 
exactly repeats. It is in this infinite loop that I see your UD.


It is not a loop. It is more like a recurring abyss, like the 
Mandelbrot set.


Sure! I like the idea of a recurrent abyss!

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Stephen


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Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm


On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

You are the one saying that truth is limited to the means of knowing!!!


Yes and no, Truth is limited to the *possibility* of knowledge of 
it. In the absence of the possibility of a statement being true (or 
false), there is not such thing as true or false.



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Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm


On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Are you familiar with Jaakko Hintikka's ideas? I am using his concept 
of game theoretic semantics to derive truth valuations.


I read this. yes. I don't see relevant at all.
I do appreciate his linking of intention and intension, but it is a 
bit trivial in the comp theory.



Dear Bruno,

Hintikka's idea is to show how truth values can be coherently 
considered to be the result of a process and not necessarily just some a 
priori valuation. This makes Truth an emergent valuation, just as I 
content all definite properties are emergent from mutual agreements 
between entities. Properties, in the absence of the possibility of 
measurement or apprehension of some type, do not exist; they are what 
the 1p project onto existence. Nothing more.


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Stephen


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Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum


On 11/2/2012 4:27 PM, Hal Ruhl wrote:

  Let me refer you to a very old paper of mine:
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/life.html

I took a quick look.  I may need some help understanding it fully.  I
occasionally play with the idea that Dark Energy is a spatially uniform leak
of information from "outside" combined with a maximum information packing
density in our universe.

Hi Hal,

Could it be that information is being created and "forcing" the 
physical universe to make room for its instantiation? After all, space 
is not a conserved quantity!


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Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum


On 11/2/2012 4:27 PM, Hal Ruhl wrote:

  [SPK]   Do you see mutation as a one-to-many map and selection as a many
-to-one map?

Well the DNA strings we know of are finite [n characters] so a particular
example is a "one" in some sense and this string's finite number of
mutations 4 ^ n+ is a "many".  However, I do not see that selection will
always produce just "one" successor.

Hi Hal,

One DNA stand mutates into many... Only a few survive and create 
more copies of themselves...




My intent with #9 was to open the door a crack on what I would like to post
next.

Slightly larger crack: I too have been chewing on these concepts for many
years.  I have several unpublished works expressing versions of these ideas
such as "A Path to Socioeconomic Sustainability", 1992, Library of Congress
deposit # TXu 554 900 among others and a very few published tiny pieces.

My goal here is to make sure the underling engine of what I will now try to
publish is sound.  As potential returns to the list some of the engine's
consequences seem of interest here such as consciousness distribution in an
ecosystem and the engine's impact on the concept of freewill.


I am with you. This WORK is a collective effort, each of us working 
individually to make the new paradigm real. ;-)


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Stephen


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RE: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

2012-11-02 Thread Hal Ruhl

Hi Stephen:

-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Stephen P. King
Sent: Friday, November 02, 2012 6:37 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

On 11/2/2012 4:27 PM, Hal Ruhl wrote:
>   Let me refer you to a very old paper of mine:
> http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/life.html
>
> I took a quick look.  I may need some help understanding it fully.  I 
> occasionally play with the idea that Dark Energy is a spatially 
> uniform leak of information from "outside" combined with a maximum 
> information packing density in our universe.
Hi Hal,

 Could it be that information is being created and "forcing" the
physical universe to make room for its instantiation? After all, space is
not a conserved quantity!

I think that what you mention is at least part of the source of Dark Energy
but I wonder if the members of the multiverse are completely isolated. 

Hal

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Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

2012-11-02 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2012/11/2 Stephen P. King 

> On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>  I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to
> physically implement them.
>

 Those notion have nothing to do with "physical implementation".

>>>
>>> So your thinking about them is not a physical act?
>>>
>>
>> Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer "yes" and "no".
>> Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events.
>> No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by
>> platonic arithmetical truth.
>>
> Dear Bruno,
>
> Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? The mere
> self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence but the idea must be
> understood by a multiplicity of entities with the capacity to distinguish
> truth from falsehood to have any coherence as an idea! We cannot just
> assume that the mere existence of some undefined acts to determine the
> properties of the undefined. Truth and falsity are possible properties,
> they are not ontological aspects of existence.
>

Either  you can have emerging properties of nothing or you can't. Either
there is infinite regress or not, whatever is true (and one or the other
is), it's not an obstacle.

Quentin

>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
>
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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-02 Thread meekerdb


On 11/2/2012 3:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/2/2012 12:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/1/2012 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  10/31/2012

Dear Roger,

  I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers float in a sea of 
universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an infinite regress.


Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress disappear.


Dear Bruno,

   Only if arithmetic truth is theory independent,


Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth is so independent of any effective theory that no 
such theory can get it. mathematical logic, and math, cannot have any meaning without 
arithmetical truth being independent of theories.




Dear Bruno,

"Truth is Independence of theories" cannot mean that truth is a meaningful value in 
the primitive ontological level. The relation 'Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth' 
cannot even exist as a meaningful expression because there is no differentiation of 
expression at the ontologically primitive level. The same argument that disallows for 
the existence of a self-aware Universal mind applies. Let me step through a crude sketch 
of the argument here.


A Universal  collection 
of facts is such that there is no facts that is not included, it must cover all possible 
worlds (ala Kripke), it must be Complete.
The universal set of all facts is not a self-consistent set as there exists facts in 
one world that are inconsistent with facts in some other possible world.
A mind is such that its facts are mutually consistent or else it is insane or 
non-self-aware.
A self-aware mind must have some knowledge of facts concerning its existence or else 
it is not self-aware.
A universal  mind must 
"know all facts of all possible worlds" or else it would not be universal.

   A Universal mind is thus either insane (inconsistent) or non-self-aware.


I don't see any 'either/or'.  Your premises imply an universal mind is impossible - one 
cannot KNOW contradictory propositions; whether one is self-aware or not.






but that ruins your result! It truth is theory independent then it is impossible for 
us to be able to know of it.


That is mathematical solipsism.


I know! My point is that comp implies the singular existence of a mind (universal 
number that is the sum of all other universal numbers) that is incapable of knowing what 
it is as there is nothing within its preview that is it not. It is a Universal Mind



It is obviously false.


We disagree.

Theories are lantern on little pieces of the truth, which does not depend on the 
theory, even if the lantern can bring shadows, and also hid some other piece of truth.


You insist on the concept of truth as a Platonic Object with innate properties. I 
disagree with this concept as I see it as incoherent.



All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend on us and on our 
theories.


No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be meaningful in the absence 
of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness. 



So what means do you used to evaluate, "Either snow is white or snow is not 
white."?

Brent

In the absence of a means to determine some property, it is incoherent and sometimes 
inconsistent to claim that the property has some particular value and the absence of all 
other possible values. This is like claiming to know exactly what is in a black box that 
cannot ever be opened or even located.





All knowledge is 'theory laden' - as David Deutsch explains well.



They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some provably, some non 
provably). No problem.


   Maybe you might write up an explanation of how arithmetic truth is independent of 
any ability to prove it.


Gödel's proof explains this very well. The idea that truth = proof is intuitionism, and 
technically, it changes nothing for arithmetic (only for analysis).




Wrong. Gödel's proof does not prove that truth has a particular value independent of 
the means to know that value. Gödel's proof tells is that theories what (as individuals) 
include Arithmetic will contain statements that cannot be evaluated by those theories as 
individuals. We can build infinite towers of theories that allow evaluation of the truth 
of statments, but int he absence of those towers, there is no

Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm


On 11/2/2012 8:25 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Either  you can have emerging properties of nothing or you can't. 
Either there is infinite regress or not, whatever is true (and one or 
the other is), it's not an obstacle.

Hi Questin,

It depends on whether you think of Nothing as merely an absence of 
properties or a complete lack of existence. I believe in the former 
case. I don't have problems with infinite regress as I understand that 
an actual regress requires infinite "stuff" to be real. Explanation that 
push the problem behind a insurmountable curtain are not infinite 
regressive, they are merely evasions of the problem. They are attempt to 
get people to stop asking hard questions.
I will not ever stop asking questions as I am not afraid of being 
wrong or foolish.


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?


On 11/2/2012 10:48 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/2/2012 3:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/2/2012 12:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/1/2012 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012

Dear Roger,

  I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers 
float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation 
an infinite regress.


Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress 
disappear.


Dear Bruno,

   Only if arithmetic truth is theory independent,


Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth is so independent of any 
effective theory that no such theory can get it. mathematical logic, 
and math, cannot have any meaning without arithmetical truth being 
independent of theories.




Dear Bruno,

"Truth is Independence of theories" cannot mean that truth is a 
meaningful value in the primitive ontological level. The relation 
'Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth' cannot even exist as a 
meaningful expression because there is no differentiation of 
expression at the ontologically primitive level. The same argument 
that disallows for the existence of a self-aware Universal mind 
applies. Let me step through a crude sketch of the argument here.


A Universal 
 
collection of facts is such that there is no facts that is not 
included, it must cover all possible worlds (ala Kripke), it must be 
Complete.
The universal set of all facts is not a self-consistent set as 
there exists facts in one world that are inconsistent with facts in 
some other possible world.
A mind is such that its facts are mutually consistent or else it 
is insane or non-self-aware.
A self-aware mind must have some knowledge of facts concerning 
its existence or else it is not self-aware.
A universal 
 mind 
must "know all facts of all possible worlds" or else it would not be 
universal.
   A Universal mind is thus either insane (inconsistent) or 
non-self-aware.


I don't see any 'either/or'.  Your premises imply an universal mind is 
impossible - one cannot KNOW contradictory propositions; whether one 
is self-aware or not.


I like the way you think!  ;-)







but that ruins your result! It truth is theory independent then it 
is impossible for us to be able to know of it.


That is mathematical solipsism.


I know! My point is that comp implies the singular existence of a 
mind (universal number that is the sum of all other universal 
numbers) that is incapable of knowing what it is as there is nothing 
within its preview that is it not. It is a Universal Mind



It is obviously false.


We disagree.

Theories are lantern on little pieces of the truth, which does not 
depend on the theory, even if the lantern can bring shadows, and 
also hid some other piece of truth.


You insist on the concept of truth as a Platonic Object with 
innate properties. I disagree with this concept as I see it as 
incoherent.


All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend on us 
and on our theories.


No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be 
meaningful in the absence of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness. 



So what means do you used to evaluate, "Either snow is white or snow 
is not white."?


My eyes can still discriminate colors from each other... I use them.


--
Onward!

Stephen

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RE: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

2012-11-02 Thread Hal Ruhl

Hi Stephen:

I think this got lost so I sending it again.

-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Stephen P. King
Sent: Friday, November 02, 2012 6:37 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum

On 11/2/2012 4:27 PM, Hal Ruhl wrote:
>   Let me refer you to a very old paper of mine:
> http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/life.html
>
> I took a quick look.  I may need some help understanding it fully.  I 
> occasionally play with the idea that Dark Energy is a spatially 
> uniform leak of information from "outside" combined with a maximum 
> information packing density in our universe.
Hi Hal,

 Could it be that information is being created and "forcing" the
physical universe to make room for its instantiation? After all, space is
not a conserved quantity!

I think that what you mention is at least part of the source of Dark Energy
but I wonder if the members of the multiverse are completely isolated from
each other.


Hal
--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum