Re: On differentiation of universes in MWI
On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/20/2014 5:56 PM, Pierz wrote: A second question/thought on MWI. MWI proposes that the entire universe splits at the point of wave collapse, or rather that it is continually and infinitely splitting with every possible quantum state. This has been understandably criticised as a vastly extravagant explanation. A whole universe, or even infinity of universes, for every quantum interaction seems a high price to play to eliminate the weirdness of wave collapse. Yet it seems to me that we can still get the explanatory benefits of MWI without this extravagance by seeing the situation slightly differently. I'll explain by analogy. I'm a coder. In the old days I used to back up my work by making a complete copy of it and putting it in an archive folder. Nowadays I use git, a source control system that keeps track of the history of my code and allows me to revert back changes to an earlier point in time. Depending on how often I commit my work, I can have an arbitrarily fine level of versioning. If git was stupid, it would copy my whole code repository every time I committed a change, and my disk would rapidly fill up. It would also be impossible to merge the work of another programmer working on the same code base because the system would only have complete individual snapshots. It would have no information about *what* changed between snapshots. But git is smarter than that. It records only what I changed in each commit. Thus I don't have to worry about my disk filling up, and I can happily merge someone else's changes - just so long as we don't both try to change the same line of code. To think that in MWI, a *whole other universe* is created when a binary quantum event occurs is like imagining the multiverse works like my old backup system. One thing changed, so if I want to keep a record of the earlier state, I have to copy *everything*. This is the way that Deutsch seems to talk about the situation. But it makes more sense to me to think of it as like git. If the universes diverged by only bit of information, that one bit is the only thing that is recorded so to speak. When the spin of a particle is measured here on earth, causing the universe to split, there is no need at this point to think that there are suddenly two Plutos, one for each spin state. What does Pluto know about the change? Later, this one bit change will ramify out, causing divergent information flows in the two universes which will eventually lead (possibly? necessarily?) to two completely different universes. But to the extent that any region of one universe is identical to a region of another universe in the multiverse, shouldn't we regard those regions as belonging to one and the same universe, merely with the potential to differentiate from one another? In other words, we're better off thinking about locally branching information flows than an infinite filo-pastry of universes. We can still answer the question of where the computations of a quantum computer take place - they occur in a multi-dimensional local information space. Each calculation line that contributes to the final result occurs on its own information thread as it were, but it does not require a whole universe to occur in. Maybe this economical view is the way MWI theorists actually do see the situation? If so, I wish they'd talk that way. It makes the theory a lot easier to swallow in my view. I agree that the multiple worlds generally differ only microscopically and so the count as the same world so far as we're concerned. But the changes/divergences are not discrete. A radioactive atom is in a superposition of decayed and not-decayed and on the decayed side there is change of the wave-function propagating at c or less that is gradually differentiating one world from the other at a microscopic level UNTIL in some world the decay is detected and amplified (say by a geiger counter). And so when I am approaching a fork in the road while driving and on one fork I will get into an an accident and on the other I will not, does that choice count as a superposition? Richard Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
RE: everything list note :)
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Platonist Guitar Cowboy Sent: Sunday, January 19, 2014 7:53 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: everything list note :) On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com wrote: Mostly lurking here. and have off and on for years Love some of the ideas floating here and the discussions; it can flow fast and furious here. keeping up is like a full-time job lol Recently from time to time I have been poking in; hope you don't mind me; perhaps on occasion I can bring a perspective. Personally I think the cosmos is a musical entity even more profoundly than it is a mathematical entity Vibration - perhaps is -- the motive enabler of operations, which are the actors on values in all equations. What is vibration, if not music? Numbers relating to numbers, made of numbers, which are made of numbers, etc. with some numbers relating to this through what they've called hearing in some language, perhaps. But I don't want to blah anybody on this. The score I am currently analyzing, eventually to translate these kinds of harmonies onto the guitar (hopefully ;-)), is currently listenable in the link that follows. Nobody has to keep their eyes open, unless you're following the score for technical reasons. It's one of the Bach Cantatas. The title of which translates to Wake up, calls out to us, the voice. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3sj-NKqR0tw In hopes that just one person effin lays themselves down with eyes closed, and permits a few minutes of this gorgeous wash of sound to inform every fiber of their being, without doing other things. Reducing the world to just one unnecessary distraction for once; at least for 7 minutes. PGC :-) As you say. reducing the world of distraction; perhaps also expressed as quieting the mind, so that it may hear. Beautiful piece of music as well; a soaring escape from the contemporary for me, which is where I root musically. Ahhh this mysterious vibration. this inner agitator of being, what is it where is it? Hard to pin down eh? What is the observer? Why is it a given that we exist at all? What if our certainty of self is but a splendid illusion. When we speak of self; we infer identity, separateness, a dichotomy between - that which we perceive as self - and the universe the self observes. A lot of the spiritual traditions. and the psychedelic experience. and perhaps some empirical evidence as well allude to an un-nameable, ineffable un-seeable yet manifest something. The Vibe! What if the universe is a symphony written large and the multiverse a veritable panoply of musical styles and compositions. Hehe. please take all this in the light hearted spirit in which it is given (some might say spewed) I have tripped more and further than most.. music can sometimes on occasion, especially when I sing bring me to a state of exceptional being and presence and clarity of moment in moment. the idea of vibration animating and being all does not seem all that weird or strange to me. and the tie in to math is so elegant. harmony is math; music is about sets. The physics of music gets right into the physics of waves and we all know that goes deep. You could say it is the essential metaphor I prefer. we all have our metaphors and notional constructs that support our beings and our sense of our own selves. This is one I can rock on, and being a rocker it's not surprising that it rocks me. Give it away; it's free! (cryptic) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)
On 20 Jan 2014, at 23:47, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 08:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If you remember Cantor, you see that if we take all variables into account, the multiverse is already a continuum. OK? A world is defined by a infinite sequence like true, false, false, true, true, true, ... corresponding to p, q, r, p1, q1, r1, p2, q2, ... I assume it's a continuum, rather than a countable infinity because if it was countable we could list all the worlds, but of course we can diagonalise the list by changing each truth value. Very good. (Those who does not get this can ask for more explanations). On 21 Jan 2014, at 01:32, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 08:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Are the following laws? I don't put the last outer parenthesis for reason of readability. p - p This is a law because p - q is equivalent to (~p V q) and (p V ~p) must be (true OR false), or (false OR true) which are both true (p q) - p using (~p V q) gives (~(p q) V q) ... using 0 and 1 for false and true ... (0,0), (0,1) and (1,0) give 1, (1,1) gives 1 ... so this is true. So it is a law. I think. (p q) - q Hmm. (~(p q) V q) is ... the same as above. p - (p V q) (~p V (p V q)) must be true because of the p V ~p that's in there (as per the first one) q - (p V q) Is the same...hm, these are all laws (apparently). I feel as though I'm probably missing something and getting this all wrong. Have I misunderstood something ? No, it is all good, Liz! What about: (p V q) - p and p - (p q) What about (still in CPL) the question: is (p q) - r equivalent with p - (q - r) Oh! You did not answer: ((COLD WET) - ICE) - ((COLD - ICE) V (WET - ICE)) So what? Afraid of the logician's trick? Or of the logician's madness? Try this one if you are afraid to be influenced by your intuition aboutCOLD, WET and ICE: ((p q) - r) - ((p - r) V (q - r)) Is that a law? And what about the modal []p - p ? What about the []p - [][]p, and p - []p ? Is that true in all worlds? Let me an answer the first one: []p - p. The difficulty is that we can't use the truth table, (can you see why) but we have the meaning of []p. Indeed it means that p is true in all world. Now, p itself is either true in all worlds, or it is not true in all worlds. Note that p - p is true in all world (as you have shown above, it is (~p V p), so in each world each p is either true or false. If p is true in all worlds, then p is a law. But if p is true in all world, any A - p will be true too, given that for making A - p false, you need p false (truth is implied by anything, in CPL). So if p itself is a law, []p - is a law. For example (p-p) is a law, so [] (p-p) - (p-p) for example. But what if p is not a law? then ~[]p is true, and has to be true in all worlds. With this simple semantic of Leibniz, []p really simply means that p is true in all world, that is automatically true in all world. If p is not a law, ~[]p is true, and, as I said, this has to be true in all world (in all world we have that p is not a law). So []p is false in all worlds. But false - anything in CPL. OK? So []p - p is always satisfied in that case too. So, no matter what, p being a law or not, in that Leibnizian universe: []p - p *is* a law. In Leibniz semantic, you have just a collection of worlds. If []p is true, it entails that p is true in all worlds, so []p is true in all world too. Can you try to reason for []p - [][]p, and p - []p ? What about p - []p ? What about this one: ([]p [](p - q)) - []q ? Ask any question, up to be able to find the solution. tell me where you are stuck, in case you are stuck. I might go too much quickly, you have to speed me down, by questioning! It may seem astonishing, but with the simple Leibnizian semantic, we can answer all those questions. With Kripke semantics, the multiverse will get more structure. But in Leibniz, all worlds are completely independent, so if p is a law, the fact that it is a law is itself a law, and []p will be true in all worlds, and be a law itself. Indeed if []p was not a law, there would be a world where ~p is true, and p would not be a law, OK? Take those questions as puzzle, or delicious torture :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: what is the definition of computation?
Liz, Richard: I´m not talking about global reduction of entropy neither of the universe neither a star, planet of black hole, but a local decrease of entropy at the cost of a (bigger) increase of entropy in the surroundings, so that the global entropy grows. I mean local. A computation becomes whatever that permit the pumping of entropy from inwards to outwards and thus maintain the integrity of the entity that computes to do further computations. That is the definition of life in physical terms. so that life and computation are entangled in some way. The byproduct of this activity is an increase of entropy of the surroundings. No thermodynamical or any other physical law is violated. Within this definition, a computer alone does not perform computations a man that uses the computer to calculate his VAT declaration is performing a computation, because doing so the man has the information to deal with entropy increase produced by law enforcers. The semaphore system in a city perform computations when considering the system as the city as a whole. for the same reason. but also any living being computes as well. There hasn´t to be digital. analogic, chemical computations, for example, hormone levels can be part of a computation. Neurons are not digital. the activation potentials are not quantized to certains discrete levels. Digital computation, for example in DNA encoding-decoding or in the case of digital computers are good for storing and communicating information for a long time against environmental noise. Shannon law demonstrate why it is so. there is nothing magic about digital. But when noise is not a concern, analogical paths of chemical reactions with protein catalizers perform fine computations. More often than not, computation is analogic-digital. Living beings do it so. But also human systems, a car with a man inside, keeps entropy so there is a analogico-digital computation going on. So computation in this sense means not only computation as such but also perception or data input -or information intake- and a proper response (as result of the computation) in the physical world that keeps the internal entropy. 2014/1/20, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com: Computation is understood as whatever made by a digital computer or something that can be emulated (or aproximated) by a digital computer. So everything is a computation. That is a useless definition. because it embrace everything. Everything is legoland because everything can be emulated using lego pieces? No, my dear legologist. What about this definition? Computation is whatever that reduces entropy. In information terms, in the human context, computation is whatever that reduces uncertainty producing useful information and thus, in the environment of human society, a computer program is used ultimately to get that information and reduce entropy, that is to increase order in society, or at least for the human that uses it. A simulation is an special case of the latter. So there are things that are computations: what the living beings do at the chemical, physiological or nervous levels (and rational, social and technological level in case of humans) . But there are things that are not computations: almost everything else. -- Alberto. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 20 Jan 2014, at 18:23, meekerdb wrote: On 1/20/2014 12:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 21:07, meekerdb wrote: On 1/19/2014 2:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I also find it unlikely that the subst level is above the quantum level. Or at least I think that if it's at the quantum level then we can guarantee that the duplication arguments would work (assuming we could duplicate objects at that level, which we can't due to a fundamental principle...!) It can, just above that level. And also below, because the UD does not need to duplicate your body,only the part of the body doing the computations, and so the UD needs only to prepeare the multiple copies, so the UD argument go through at step seven, even if the subst level is below the quantum uncertainty level. There is not only the level of substitution, there is the scope. I include the scope in the level, usually invoking the generalized brain. When you say 'yes' to the doctor, the doctor is only going to replace a part of you and leave the rest of the world intact. By definition, it replaces your generalized brain (that is the whole part of the universe that you need to simulate at some right level, to let the consciousness invariant). If you think that your consciousness supervene on your biological brain + the galaxy, let it be. It makes step 1-6 harder to imagine, but not invalid, and that should be clear at step 7, because the UD will go infinitely often through your state, no matter how the scope is large and the level is low, as long as it exists (and it exists as we assume comp). But the rest of the world also contributes to your computation. When you write, only the part of the body doing the computations you are implicitly ignoring computation done in other parts of your body - Not at all. I don't even exclude a priori that we might simulate the entire observable or even non observable physical universe. The reasoning does not depend on the choice of the level/scope, only that it exists (and then is Turing emulable). which may not be important for mathematical theorizing but may be important for deciding to take your finger out of the fire. This is the source of my dissatisfaction with the MGA. It implicitly assumes you can cut off this interface between the part of you doing computations and the rest of the world by anticipating all the possible interface events. I don't think that can be done. If such cut-off cannot be done, then comp is false or the level is so low that we have to simulate the entire physical universe at some level. If that simulation does not exist, then comp is false. If it exists, then it is done infinitely often in arithmetic, and the reasoning go through. OK? Yes, I understood that. But I think that scope of the simulation must be very large. If it is essentially the physical universe then it seems to me that means there is no distinction between simulated and real. They are not distinguishable by a machine, but they might still conceivably be different. Peter Jones, would say that the non emulated one is real, the emulated one is fiction. Of course he needs to reify matter. The simulated physics is the same as real physics in a different world. Yet a significant part of your thesis is that the (conscious?) mind is independent of the physics and can be realized in different physics. Not at all. Actually the direct contrary. Yes, comp implies that there is a level of substitution such that I would not see the difference after the substitution, but then the whole UDA explains that this makes the physical laws invariant for all possible computational mind. That's the inference you draw from saying yes to the doctor. Yes. I'm challenging the validity of that inference. Then the game, is that you have to find a flaw. or to prove that there is a contradiction between the premise and the conclusion, like it seems you argue here. I think part of one's confidence in saying yes relies on the fact that whatever the doctor does it's going to function within your old physics. Yes, and the reasoning shows that this intuition is jeopardized indeed, so some people just abandon comp because they think that we have got a contradiction. But that is just a feeling. On the contrary, (and you are close to the conclusion) here, comp will work because the laws of physics will appear to be the same for all machines. We will never leave our old physics. On the contrary we will justify them as theorem in arithmetic, so they become more solid in some sense. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 20 Jan 2014, at 18:32, meekerdb wrote: On 1/20/2014 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And to answer this properly, you have to define physical existence of Brent without using arithmetic. Brent:=the being who typed this sentence. (Or next time you're in California, come by and I'll give an ostensive definition - and a cup of coffee.) Thanks very much for the coffee cup, I appreciate. But frankly this will not work. If I need to define number by invoking a being typing a sentence in a post dated the 19 janvier 2014, oops: I am using some numbers here. You didn't ask to define a number, you asked to define physical existence of Brent. The existence is defined by the use of E in the (first order) logical theory of what I assume to exist. You assume Brent, and I assume the number. You need to define number from Brent, and I need to define Brent from number. And 19 January 2014 can easily be defined as when Brent typed the above message. And how will we interpret it? I think you (understandably as a logician) are so immersed in the axiomatic method that you lose of sight of its connection to the physical world. It is because physics fails on the mind-body problem, when it does not simply eliminate person and consciousness, that I study comp, and there logic is very useful. Definitions become nothing but relations between symbols if you never ground them in pointing. But pointing on something does not make it real, as we know since the greco-indian dream argument. Don't ask someone who want to compute 2+2=4 to come in California and drink four cups of coffee, if all computers have to do that I am afraid the net will become extremely slow ... I find much more plausible that I can explain numbers behavior, and Brent's brain and ideas, from elementary arithmetical axioms, than explain arithmetic from Brent and other humans ideas. Come on ... I'm quite sure you can explain Brent's brain and ideas without using any number bigger than 10^100. OK, but then you make the ultrafinitist move of step seven. You need to reify a little universe, and you get the ad-hocness suggested by the step 8. You need to invent something nobody can ever point to, like primitive matter (and how do you define it) to prevent a reasoning to go through. That is what the creationist does with evolution, by reifying God. It is begging the question or abandoning the problem. The mind-body problem is very hard, and it asks indeed for a serious revision of theology (not physics, this one needs only to be re-justified on more serious grounds that inferring from things we point too). With comp, the physical laws have a reason. That is what I like in comp: it explains why they are physical laws, and this constructively, making it testable. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 20 Jan 2014, at 18:36, meekerdb wrote: On 1/20/2014 12:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote: On 1/19/2014 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why should that imply *existence*. It does not. Unless we believe in the axioms, which is the case for elementary arithmetic. But what does believe in the axioms mean. Do we really believe we can *always* add one more? I find it doubtful. It's just a good model for most countable things. So I can believe the axioms imply thetheorems and that 17 is prime is a theorem, but I don't think that commits me to any existence in the normal sense of THAT exists. Because you are chosing the physicalist ostensive definition of what exists, like Aristotelians, but you beg the question here. The point is that, in that case, you should not say yes to the doctor. Why not. The doctor is going install a physical prosthetic. As you've agreed before, it will not be *exactly* like me - but I'm not exactly the same from day to day anyway. But you overlook the UDA here. The UDA is the explanation why if you say yes to the doctor qua computatio, the physical must be recovered from arithmetic, in some special way. You can always add magic of course. This can be used for any theory of physics. I think your critics can be sum up by the belief that step 8 is non valid. But step 8 talks about reality, so it is not purely logical, and step 8 just shows how ad hoc that move is. It is made equivalent to the way creationist reason, except it is done for the creation instead of the creator. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)
Thanks for the info. It is very interesting and It helps in many ways. The problem with mathematical notation is that it is good to store and systematize knowledge, not to make it understandable. The transmission of knowledge can only be done by replaying the historical process that produces the discovery of that knowledge, as Feyerabend said. And this historical process of discovery-learning-transmission can never have the form of some formalism, but the form of concrete problems and partial steps to a solution in a narrative in which the formalism is nothing but the conclussion of the history, not the starting point. Doing it in the reverse order is one of the greatest mistake of education at all levels that the positivist rationalsim has perpetrated and it is a product of a complete misunderstanding that the modern rationalism has about the human mind since it rejected the greek philosophy. Another problem of mathematical notation, like any other language, is that it tries to be formal, but part of the definitions necessary for his understanding are necessarily outside of itself. Mathematics may be a context-free language, but philosophy is not, as well as mathematics when it is applied to something outside of itself. but that is only an intuition that I have not entirely formalized. 2014/1/21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 20 Jan 2014, at 23:47, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 08:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If you remember Cantor, you see that if we take all variables into account, the multiverse is already a continuum. OK? A world is defined by a infinite sequence like true, false, false, true, true, true, ... corresponding to p, q, r, p1, q1, r1, p2, q2, ... I assume it's a continuum, rather than a countable infinity because if it was countable we could list all the worlds, but of course we can diagonalise the list by changing each truth value. Very good. (Those who does not get this can ask for more explanations). On 21 Jan 2014, at 01:32, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 08:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Are the following laws? I don't put the last outer parenthesis for reason of readability. p - p This is a law because p - q is equivalent to (~p V q) and (p V ~p) must be (true OR false), or (false OR true) which are both true (p q) - p using (~p V q) gives (~(p q) V q) ... using 0 and 1 for false and true ... (0,0), (0,1) and (1,0) give 1, (1,1) gives 1 ... so this is true. So it is a law. I think. (p q) - q Hmm. (~(p q) V q) is ... the same as above. p - (p V q) (~p V (p V q)) must be true because of the p V ~p that's in there (as per the first one) q - (p V q) Is the same...hm, these are all laws (apparently). I feel as though I'm probably missing something and getting this all wrong. Have I misunderstood something ? No, it is all good, Liz! What about: (p V q) - p and p - (p q) What about (still in CPL) the question: is (p q) - r equivalent with p - (q - r) Oh! You did not answer: ((COLD WET) - ICE) - ((COLD - ICE) V (WET - ICE)) So what? Afraid of the logician's trick? Or of the logician's madness? Try this one if you are afraid to be influenced by your intuition aboutCOLD, WET and ICE: ((p q) - r) - ((p - r) V (q - r)) Is that a law? And what about the modal []p - p ? What about the []p - [][]p, and p - []p ? Is that true in all worlds? Let me an answer the first one: []p - p. The difficulty is that we can't use the truth table, (can you see why) but we have the meaning of []p. Indeed it means that p is true in all world. Now, p itself is either true in all worlds, or it is not true in all worlds. Note that p - p is true in all world (as you have shown above, it is (~p V p), so in each world each p is either true or false. If p is true in all worlds, then p is a law. But if p is true in all world, any A - p will be true too, given that for making A - p false, you need p false (truth is implied by anything, in CPL). So if p itself is a law, []p - is a law. For example (p-p) is a law, so [] (p-p) - (p-p) for example. But what if p is not a law? then ~[]p is true, and has to be true in all worlds. With this simple semantic of Leibniz, []p really simply means that p is true in all world, that is automatically true in all world. If p is not a law, ~[]p is true, and, as I said, this has to be true in all world (in all world we have that p is not a law). So []p is false in all worlds. But false - anything in CPL. OK? So []p - p is always satisfied in that case too. So, no matter what, p being a law or not, in that Leibnizian universe: []p - p *is* a law. In Leibniz semantic, you have just a collection of worlds. If []p is true, it entails that p is true in all worlds, so []p is true in all world too. Can you try to reason for []p - [][]p, and p - []p ? What about p - []p ? What about this one: ([]p [](p - q)) - []q ? Ask any
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:19, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, Is it possible for a Computation to be a Model also? What is the obstruction? ? Is it possible for an apple to be an orange? Computation are very special abstract, yet of a syntactical nature, relations (between numbers, say, or combinators, lisp expressions, etc.) I have defined them by a sequence phi_i(j)^n, with n = 0, 1, 2, ... Model are structured set (or arrows in some category) satisfying formula. Those are quite different things. It does not mean that there are not some relation. Usually the computations can be represented by some object in some model of some Turing complete theory, like RA, PA, or ZF. Models are semantic notions, studied in model theory. Computations are more syntactical objects (finite or infinite, though) studied in recursion or computability theory, or in computation theory. Bruno On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Jan 2014, at 07:27, Stephen Paul King wrote: No! This is not unknown. I am cobbling ideas together, sure, think about it! What are we thinking? If the UD implements or emulates all computations then it implements all worlds, ala Kripke. That would include all models of self-consistent theories. It is not that simple, alas. A computation is not a model. I have try hard to get a relation like that, because this would simplify the relation between UDA and AUDA. I progress on this, but that problem is not yet solved. Bruno On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 1:22 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/19/2014 10:01 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Exactly, what about all the models of all the worlds that follow different axioms? Those can possibly exist, thus they must. What is not impossible, is compulsory! Did you just make that up? :-) Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 21 Jan 2014, at 02:25, meekerdb wrote: On 1/20/2014 5:00 PM, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 06:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/20/2014 1:11 AM, LizR wrote: On 20 January 2014 18:51, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: You seem not to appreciate that this dissipates the one essential advantage of mathematical monism: we understand mathematics (because, I say, we invent it). But if it's a mere human invention trying to model the Platonic ding and sich then PA may not be the real arithmetic. And there will have to be some magic math stuff that makes the real arithmetic really real. Surely the real test is whether it works better than any other theory. (The phrase unreasonable effectiveness appears to indicate that it does.) Would it work any less well if there were a biggest number? I don't know. I would imagine so, because that would be a theory with an ad hoc extra clause with no obvious justification, so every calculation would have to carry extra baggage around. If I raise a number to the power of 100, say, I have to check first that the result isn't going to exceed the biggest number, and take appropriate action - whatever that is - if it will... what would be the point of that? Just make it an axiom that the biggest number is bigger than any number you calculate. In other words just prohibit using those ... and so forth in your theorems. Just to be sure, step 8 shows that a physicalist form of ultrafinitism (there is a primitively ontological universe, and it is small) is a red herring. If you assume a mathematical ultrafinitism, then yes, UDA does no more go through. But mathematical ultrafinitism makes it impossible to even define comp, so that is really a stopping at step zero. So, yes, an ultrafinitist *mathematician* can say yes to the doctor (without knowing what it does), and survive, and this is one little universe. If UDA leads to mathematical ultrafinitism, that is enough a reductio ad absurdo to me. God created 0, 1, ... and when getting 10^100, he felt tired and stop. Then he *has* to create a primitive physical universe, if he want see Adam and Eve indeed. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 21 Jan 2014, at 04:20, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 14:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/20/2014 5:00 PM, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 06:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/20/2014 1:11 AM, LizR wrote: On 20 January 2014 18:51, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: You seem not to appreciate that this dissipates the one essential advantage of mathematical monism: we understand mathematics (because, I say, we invent it). But if it's a mere human invention trying to model the Platonic ding and sich then PA may not be the real arithmetic. And there will have to be some magic math stuff that makes the real arithmetic really real. Surely the real test is whether it works better than any other theory. (The phrase unreasonable effectiveness appears to indicate that it does.) Would it work any less well if there were a biggest number? I don't know. I would imagine so, because that would be a theory with an ad hoc extra clause with no obvious justification, so every calculation would have to carry extra baggage around. If I raise a number to the power of 100, say, I have to check first that the result isn't going to exceed the biggest number, and take appropriate action - whatever that is - if it will... what would be the point of that? Just make it an axiom that the biggest number is bigger than any number you calculate. In other words just prohibit using those ... and so forth in your theorems. So you are saying there's a biggest number, but we don't know what it is. But it's big. Really big. You may think it's a long way down the road to the chemist, but that's peanuts copared to this number. You just can't imagine how vastly, mind-boggling huge it is... Or words to that effect (with thanks to the late and occasionally great Douglas Adams). Why would you want to do that? It seems like an unnecessary extra axiom that doesn't have any purpose or utility. Only to make the UDA non valid. It works, if Brent meant a mathematical ultrafinitism. But this change comp, like it changes elementary arithmetic (which suppose at least that 0 ≠ s(x), and x ≠ y implies s(x) ≠ s(y), which can't be true in ultrafinitism). Ultrafinitism makes all current physical theories meaningless. That is asking a lot to escape the UDA. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A humble suggestion to the group
On 20 Jan 2014, at 20:18, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, There are obviously a lot of very intelligent members here who are well read in modern science. I think everyone would agree with this. However the usual MO of group members (true of most groups) is simply to argue for their own theories and to criticize those of others, and as a result no one changes their views and no significant progress is made. Let me humbly suggest that we can do better than that... What would really be nice if we could work together cooperatively, in the way that actual working science teams do, to build consenses towards areas of agreement. The way this works is that first we see what we can agree upon, state that clearly in a way all can agree upon, and take that as the basis for further progress. Second work to clearly define areas of disagreement and actively analyze and clarify them to prune the disagreements to the minimum possible. Third, devise mutually acceptable tests to resolve these disagreements. Fourth, run the tests and add the results to the areas of agreement. Fifth, use this process iteratively to progress to the maximum areas of agreement possible towards agreement on the most comprehensive theory possible. Now obviously this is probably more doable among small groups that already have significant areas of agreement to start with. But as each of these groups make progress defining what they do agree upon they can then join to debate the areas of agreement and disagreement between groups and how best to resolve those differences. For example I was pleased to learn that Stephen and I agree that block time is BS, even though Stephen doesn't seem to actively want to argue that here. So e.g. Stephen and I could try to clearly define our area of agreement here and when we clarify that we could then debate it with the supporters of block time and the UDA who believe differently once they clarify their areas of agreement. My basic point is that instead of just forever arguing our differences, it would be great to actively work on defining and clarifying the theories that we could agree upon. It seems to me that would be a truly worthwhile mutual endeavor that would progress all our understandings. How about it guys? Anyone interested in working on this? But this is what some of us keep asking you to do since the beginning. You have just not answered any posts where we ask you what are your hypotheses. You are also using the term obvious. But the obvious things are what we assumed, or derived from other obvious thing which are explicitely assumed. And we don't present an assumption as an obvious truth, but simply as an assumption. It is more polite and leads to much more clarity. Then, the UDA is something which has been already peer reviewed, during a period of more than 30 years, as the scientists who did the job have to study other fields than their own. Don't take this as an argument of authority, but as the fact that even when you convince scientists of something, a result can be ignored, or misunderstood. It is normal when science handles what is considered as being philosophical or theological. Then, many people get at least an idea of the UDA, and it seems to contradicts directly your assumption. So I suggest that the simplest way to convince us would be in showing at which step of the UDA reasoning you think that your theory will be in conflict with UDA. I am open to the idea that there is flaw in the reasoning, despite let us say hundreds of independent verification by different scientists of different domain (physicians, logicians, computer scientists) have been done. My thesis was initially rejected in some university, but the jury decided to let the decision in the hand of a unique literary philosopher. I have defended it without problem in another university, by asking explicitly to have no literary philosophers in the jury (no problem with analytical philosophers, or with serious philosopher of science, although there many seems worst than the literary one). I made a lot of works to explain that result, which is of course not easy, and counter-intuitive. The least you can do is to study the posts and build your theoretical defense from that. A problem I see with your attitude, is that you just ignore the critics already done, notably on your conception of SR. Your answer seems to illustrate some absence of doubt in your (still very unclear) assumptions. Let me ask you just one question. Does it makes sense in your approach to accept the proposition of a doctor who estimates that you will die clinically unless you accept a transplant of your brain by some artificial machine. Could that machine be a computer, or be emulated by a computer? You said already no and yes in different posts. So what? Consider the posts by Craig. He said clearly no to
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:11, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: Brent, as much as I like the idea of quantum effects being true, and the Hameroff-Penrose thesis that microtubules are da' bomb, There is a big difference between Penrose and Hameroff. Penrose disbelieve comp. The soul in Penrose is not even emulable by a quantum computer. The mircotubules are just used by him to suggest a role for the quantum, but that role is in the non computable wave packet reduction, that Penrose speculates to be related to gravity. It is a non comp theory. Hameroff does not go that far, and accepts comp. He believed that the microtubules defined some quantum computer in the brain. For example, in that case the UD proof goes through. Notably. I feel we have to ask what good this does us? Medically, or philosophically, I am not certain. How does knowing that one of the moons of Neptune is called Neirid? Exactly! It don't. Am I screaming for the cause of willful ignorance? Not intentionally, but I still want all scientific analysis to benefit humankind. Call it a super-goal. Most of the human misery might be due to people who want the good for the humankind. Science, even ethical science, should be neutral. Then the good appears when we learn to no more hide the possible truth. Happiness is very simple, once it is not made into a goal. For the human kind, people should do their job, and correct it when it hurts. The problem is when we put bandits at the top, which will professionally hides the truth and the suffering for personal benefits. We have to fight that indeed, but in a spirit of self- defense, not in the spirit of imposing new views on the world, because that leads to unhappiness and lies. Keep in mind that when we have discovered a cure for cancer, it has been made illegal at once, even the research on it. That illustrates the kind of barbaric world we live in. Bruno -Original Message- From: meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Jan 20, 2014 2:27 pm Subject: Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis On 1/20/2014 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Jan 2014, at 10:50, LizR wrote: On 20 January 2014 22:39, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: The point about acting randomly is that clearly you are not optimising your utility. You a choosing something other than the optimum action, so are behaving irrationally by definition. Yet, it could be a beneficial strategy to do so, for all the reasons raised (fooling your opponents, making a timely decision, and so on). Sorry to be dense, but I still don't see this. When I say acting randomly, I assume we don't mean just doing anything, deciding to go swimming in the arctic or declaring yourself to be Napoleon, I assume we mean picking one of a number of options that appear to have equal utility. Let's say we're playing scissors-paper-rock. The best strategy - the one that gives you the best chance of winning at least half the time - is to choose randomly. Anyone who doesn't choose randomly is open to having their moves predicted, and losing more often than they otherwise would. So in this case acting randomly is rational... isn't it? OK. But now acting randomly is not that simple, and studies have shown that the humans are very bad at that. A machine can easily distinguish a human from a good pseudorandom generator. Humans have a tendency to homogenize adding an order implicitly. Most humans get wrong when shown ten pictures of random and non random pictures. When presented with true randomness, humans extract order which are not there. Most people are amazed of the presence of long sequence of 1 and 0, and 10, ... in the binary development of PI (11.001001110110101010001000110110100011...). Can we act randomly? Well, we might do that when panicking. Or we can use some random generator, or the rest of coffee in a cup, or the shape of the clouds, ... Of course what we need to do is to act unpredictably, and random is just a limit of extreme unpredictability. In an actual finite sequence of actions there's no way to distinguish true random from just sufficiently random. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On 20 Jan 2014, at 23:40, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 12:33:31PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Jan 2014, at 10:39, Russell Standish wrote: The point about acting randomly is that clearly you are not optimising your utility. You a choosing something other than the optimum action, so are behaving irrationally by definition. Would that not mean that Solovay algorithm to find prime factors is irrational? Adding random oracle (and sometimes even just pseudo-random like in Solovay algorithm) can make a non tractable problem into a tractable one, with a low price (the result can be false with a low probability). Strictly speaking, rationality applies to agents, not algorithms. But just as stochastic algorithms can provide good enough tractable solutions to NP-hard problems, irrational strategies can provide good enough solutions to NP-hard environmental problems. OK. That's my point. Yet, it could be a beneficial strategy to do so, for all the reasons raised (fooling your opponents, making a timely decision, and so on). OK. But that shows that it was rational, after all. I think it is just means that you might have used a too much contrived notion of rationality. It is the definition employed in economics, agent modelling, game theory, cognitive science. It is at least precisely defined, as opposed to the fuzzy notion you and others seem to be defending. I have not given any notion of rationality in this thread. Now that you mention this, I usually defined rational by B(p-q) - (Bp - Bq). It makes the belief in the propositions within G* minus G, irrational, for a machine, and I explain the power and key role of those irrational power. (the theological, in a large sense, beliefs). In a sense rationality, with comp, makes rational (at the meta-level) a lot of non rational propositions, at the lower level. It has, without doubt, some considerable problems too, in being unrealistic, and perhaps even paradoxical, as has been highlighted in this discussion, for example. IMO, the obsession of optimization is what makes life very hard, and non sensical. It might be part of the materialist delusion. Eventually it is only a minority of people who optimizes only their bank accounts, by *all* (dishonest) means. May be the economist definition of rationality will be useful to define irrationalism ... Maybe indeed! :) :) Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On 20 Jan 2014, at 23:54, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 11:35:13AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:14, Russell Standish wrote: Well yes, that is certainly arguable, and I'm indeed somewhat critical of the notion myself. But is not my concept - it is the accepted concept from economics, game theory, decision theory, and artificial intelligence - see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rational_agent. a rational agent is an agent which has clear preferences, models uncertainty via expected values, and always chooses to perform the action with the optimal expected outcome for itself from among all feasible actions. If you think I am miscontruing anything on that page, I'd appreciate it being pointed out. (note the term utility is called preferences in the Wikipedia article. I would not trust wikipedia on such topics. Nor probably any dictionary, which seems to me to be deeply irrational when addressing the notion of rationality, or are just taking the definition in fashion for some school of thought. Sure - you're welcome to provide a citation to an alterative formulation, and we can debate that, but the Wikipedia version appears to be consistent with how the concept is used in the literature, and also with a sample of pages from Plato.stanford. The stanford dictionary is the less grave, imo. I will accept evidence of a different interpretation where it is clearly widely used. I don't see such evdence at present. Making up your own definition doesn't count :). Sure. But in a thread we can accept momentary definition for the sake of the argument. The problem of rationalism is that it is a very large and complex notion. My definition is that a machine is rational when, each time it believes p and p - q, he will not deny q. That is very large, and probably not related with this thread. I still feel that rationality and predictability are rather orthogonal notion, though. Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
2014/1/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:11, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: Brent, as much as I like the idea of quantum effects being true, and the Hameroff-Penrose thesis that microtubules are da' bomb, There is a big difference between Penrose and Hameroff. Penrose disbelieve comp. The soul in Penrose is not even emulable by a quantum computer. The mircotubules are just used by him to suggest a role for the quantum, but that role is in the non computable wave packet reduction, that Penrose speculates to be related to gravity. It is a non comp theory. Hameroff does not go that far, and accepts comp. He believed that the microtubules defined some quantum computer in the brain. For example, in that case the UD proof goes through. Notably. I feel we have to ask what good this does us? Medically, or philosophically, I am not certain. How does knowing that one of the moons of Neptune is called Neirid? Exactly! It don't. Am I screaming for the cause of willful ignorance? Not intentionally, but I still want all scientific analysis to benefit humankind. Call it a super-goal. Most of the human misery might be due to people who want the good for the humankind. Science, even ethical science, should be neutral. Then the good appears when we learn to no more hide the possible truth. Happiness is very simple, once it is not made into a goal. For the human kind, people should do their job, and correct it when it hurts. The problem is when we put bandits at the top, which will professionally hides the truth and the suffering for personal benefits. We have to fight that indeed, but in a spirit of self-defense, not in the spirit of imposing new views on the world, because that leads to unhappiness and lies. Keep in mind that when we have discovered a cure for cancer, it has been made illegal at once, even the research on it. That illustrates the kind of barbaric world we live in. Well cannabis has not been shown *to cure* cancer, but it has anti-cancer properties, but it doesn't cure it... also canabis around the wolrd is becoming legal (or the consumption depenalized). Anyway, I think you put to much faith and virtue in only one thing... Sure cannabis has good side, but it also has bad one when consumed with no moderation, hiding that and singing lalala saying that it's big thief/bandits and so on that are responsible for that is just lies... I'm for the legalisation of the consumption and selling of cannabis, but that *won't* solve all the problems in the world and without a proper usage prevention it can do more harms than good... Quentin Bruno -Original Message- From: meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Mon, Jan 20, 2014 2:27 pm Subject: Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis On 1/20/2014 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Jan 2014, at 10:50, LizR wrote: On 20 January 2014 22:39, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote: The point about acting randomly is that clearly you are not optimising your utility. You a choosing something other than the optimum action, so are behaving irrationally by definition. Yet, it could be a beneficial strategy to do so, for all the reasons raised (fooling your opponents, making a timely decision, and so on). Sorry to be dense, but I still don't see this. When I say acting randomly, I assume we don't mean just doing anything, deciding to go swimming in the arctic or declaring yourself to be Napoleon, I assume we mean picking one of a number of options that appear to have equal utility. Let's say we're playing scissors-paper-rock. The best strategy - the one that gives you the best chance of winning at least half the time - is to choose randomly. Anyone who doesn't choose randomly is open to having their moves predicted, and losing more often than they otherwise would. So in this case acting randomly is rational... isn't it? OK. But now acting randomly is not that simple, and studies have shown that the humans are very bad at that. A machine can easily distinguish a human from a good pseudorandom generator. Humans have a tendency to homogenize adding an order implicitly. Most humans get wrong when shown ten pictures of random and non random pictures. When presented with true randomness, humans extract order which are not there. Most people are amazed of the presence of long sequence of 1 and 0, and 10, ... in the binary development of PI (11.001001110110101010001000110110100011...). Can we act randomly? Well, we might do that when panicking. Or we can use some random generator, or the rest of coffee in a cup, or the shape of the clouds, ... Of course what we need to do is to act unpredictably, and random is just a limit of extreme unpredictability. In an actual finite sequence of actions there's no way
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On 21 Jan 2014, at 01:05, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 11:28:03AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 22:24, Russell Standish wrote: Re the creativity question - it is still an open problem, ISTM. I think this is solved. Creativity = Universality. (Turing universality). Post gave a definition of creativity, related to Gödel's incompleteness. Then It has been shown equivalent with universality. Creativity, in Post sense, is a form of ability to compute limits, and move to something else. It is related with the ability to refute all theories about oneself (the universal dissidence). Of course our laptops do not seem quite creative, but this is because they are programmed that way. The universality is hidden by the many aps. A bit like the over-heavy programs in some secondary schools can suffocate the natural creativity of children. It is not solved until someone demonstrates a computer program that unambigously exhibits open-ended creativity. (Or someone proves this is not possible, an outcome I think is unlikely). With some competence, I guess you mean. Without competence, and giving time to the creature, any universal machine do have an open-ended creativity. Well, certainly in the sense of Post (I can explain this, but it is a bit technical). The best example I think of todate is some work by John Koza which lead to some patents being awarded for electrical circuits designed by a genetic programming algorithm. But such examples are still bounded and rather limited scope. OK. I haven't had a chance to study and understand Post's definition (sure I've looked at it, but didn't grok it), but if you say it is equivalent to universality, then its not really going to contribute to the solution. I am not sure. Open ended creativity seems to me well captured by Post. It makes the machine able to defeat all effective complete theories about itself. It gives what I often called the comp vaccine against reductionism. This is a hard problem, though hopefully not as hard as The Hard Problem. It's resolution may give some insight on The Hard Problem, though :). I think that comp provides the best solution possible to the hard problem. We can come back on this. There is just no solution to the hard problem, but a meta-solution explaining completely why there is no solution. Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Bruno, To answer your questions sequentially. I don't see any way the arithmetical true relations compute or emulate anything. I agree this is not obvious. But it is known by all experts in the field. That is already present in Gödel 1931, and today we know that even just one diophantine (on integeres) polynomial of degree four can emulated all computations; or be Turing universal. They just sit there motionless and nothing happens. But that is not a problem for those who accept a relativistic or indexical notion of time. You seems to believe that such a notion is contradictory. But well, it is, with the assumption of a present time. But that is already contradictory with the comp's consequence. You haven't explained how motion arises from non-motion and no one else here understands that either. Many understand this. beyond this, the number of people who understand an argument has no role in the argument itself. Everybody knows that ... is never an argument. Reality is one continuous program I guess you mean active program. I is the activity which is continued, not the program. OK? but every information element actively computes its evolution. ? Which program is it? It's the program that it is of course. ? You seem to think there are a bunches of software reality can pick off some magical shelf and run. I assume that the brain or body, in some general sense, can be emulated by a computer. then the emulation is in arithmetic (as arithmetic is provably Turing complete (the well known non obvious fact that I can explain if you ask)), then it is the consciousness which pick up its local possible software among all those already active (relatively) in arithmetic. Ain't so. Reality runs the program that it actually is that actually computes actual reality. Which reality? Yes, the program is Turing compute and Godel complete, If it is Turing complete, it has to be Gödel incomplete. That's a theorem. or more properly those concepts don't apply since every state is immediately computed from the prior state and that can ALWAYS be done, just as it IS always done in ALL software. In arithmetic yes. In my local computer no. There are software that are not executed. Sorry you can't make sense of the necessity that the computations have to happen SOMEWHERE. So you assume some physical space? I do not. That somewhere is the present moment of reality, So you assume some physical moment/time? I do not. where else would the computations that compute reality take place? In arithmetic. The existence of (finite) computations are theorems in very elementary arithmetic. They follow from the modud ponens and the laws of addition and multiplication, like the distribution of the prime numbers is entirely determined by those laws. The reason your Platonia doesn't work is because it LACKS such an actual present moment that provides the happening that makes my computations real and actual and provides the movement that makes them happen It certainly lacks a present moment, but it explains all by itself why there are machine believing in local correct way in present moment and present space. It explains also why those belief can be knowledge, and sometimes irrational sort of non communicable or rationally justifiable knowledge. And the theory is testable. Anyway, if your theory is clear, you should use it to find a flaw in the UDA, and everybody will learn something if you succeed in the task of finding that flaw. But you must work *in* the theory comp, and use you theory at some other level to find the flaw. You cannot just oppose your theory with the consequence of the reasoning, unless to say that comp is false. But the, like Craig, you must say clearly that your theory is not a computationalist theory, in the sense that it should imply that you will say no to the doctor, or reify a notion of primitive matter with an ad hoc small finite and very special physical reality. Bruno Edgar On Sunday, January 19, 2014 10:50:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Jan 2014, at 19:51, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Stephen, I agree with your criticism of Bruno's UDA. It has no explanation for becoming, for anything ever happening. I've also pointed this out. However, this is equally true of block time, which you seem to believe in. In block time there is no convincing way anything can ever actually happen. I agree. Stephen seems to be contradictory on that issue. On the other hand my model solves this fundamental problem by positing an actively computing reality How can I distinguish it from the actively computing reality emulated by the arithmetical true relations? Is reality one program? Can you tell which one? Is your computation framework Turing complete? If not is less or more
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:14, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:48 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 21:09, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 11:25 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 Jan 2014, at 22:52, Stephen Paul King wrote: I will write it again. Block Universes are an incoherent idea. It only seems to work because we imagine tem as existing out there and subject to our inspection from the outside. As if we are God or something... This very idea is the problem, there is no God's eye view that can map faithfully to any 1p view we might have. In which theory? It is an assumption that is smuggled into science and math. An unjustified extension of the 1p to cover all of the universe. Laplace's Demon is a good example of this. That does not give a theory. I am not attempting to define a formal theory. I don't ask for a formal theory. A clear theory would be enough at first. I am looking for the ontological ideas and assumptions; those things that are believed to be true - like axioms but informal ones- that go into the thinking. yes, informal axiom; but not just one word, especially existence, which has no meaning per se. It looks like god. In the case of Laplace, it was assumed that it was possible for an entity to exist that would have the entire universe laid out before it in its full spatial and temporal extent. OK. Like in QM, except that we get a full multiverse. The block multiverse, so to speak. We know a few more facts than did Laplace. Only that we are multiple. But the 3p picture is the same. The speed of light is finite, the energy of interactions is quantized, measurement requires interactions and work. No problem with this, until we get a contradiction, but none have been shown in nature. Unless we are going to assume the existence of entities that are not subject to these limitations and restrictions, then our assumptions about what the universe is and how our knowledge of it is constructible needs to be corrected of errors, such as those of Laplace. Are we to assume that supernatural entities can communicate with us? Many people actually do! Not sure to see the point here. As a student philosopher of science, I see ontology as extremely important as the foundation upon which our notions of physics are built. If our explanations of the universe assumes impossible entities from the start, the results our reasoning will be rubbish, G.I.G.O. principle, not matter how correct out formalism may be. Obviously. But what is impossible in the comp TOE, which assumes only 0, s, + and * and few axioms? You are just communicating a personal conviction or feeling. Sure, but I think you can see for yourself what its error is. It is most difficult to question assumptions that we believe to be true and have no simple physical falsification. The problem is not the assumption, as you seem to defend comp (unlike me). the point is the validity of a reasoning. By definition of validity, that does not depend of the truth or falsity of the assumptions. Indeed! My complaint is not comp's reasoning, it is the assumptions that it is built on. Comp, thus. It assumes what is known to be impossible; that Becoming can emerge from Being. What is impossible here? On the contrary, comp explains well why arithmetic will contains infinitely many version of a Stephen P. King asserting sincerely that this is impossible, and even explains why King is correct on this in the first person picture. A physical primitive becoming is indeed impossible to extract from a static being. But a psychological feeling of becoming is entirely explained by comp using only addition and multiplication (and logic). You confuse a primitive becoming with becoming. My argument is that it is easy to show the converse case: how Being can emerge from Becoming. What is becoming without any static being? Thus I argue that the Perfection of Platonia emerges from the infinity of temporal processes and interactions. But Platonia (the arithmetical one used by comp) is infinitely simpler than any notion of processes I can imagine. how do you define a processes without using elementary arithmetic? Numbers become eternal, static and perfect in the limit of all possible manifestations of them. We can avoid all the problems of actual infinities and the problem of time, etc. if we do this. Your result would still obtain and the solution to the arithmetic body problem would appear. That's promise, but just define becoming without assuming platonia. I ask for a mathematical definition that anyone can understand when reading it, and thus not relying on any personal intuition of yours. I am OK with that, but not if you oppose it to pretend that there is a flaw in
Re: On differentiation of universes in MWI
On 21 Jan 2014, at 06:47, Pierz wrote:
The question is whether a whole universe is created for each state
in a superposition. Deutsch seems unequivocal that it is.
Hmm, Deutsch might have change his mind. he was also sure that there
is a base problem, but he changes on it.
Liz is right. The differentiation of the universe is a local
phenomenon. But the universe is full of intracting things, and this
made the differentiation spreading (at sub-light speed though).
I'm just questioning a) whether that's what he really means and b)
whether that is necessary.
Deutsch prefers to abandon the idea of splitting universe. I follow
him on that, but this is almost a problem of vocabulary, and in
english what happens is hard to simplify.
Imagine a particle in the state up + down, and imagine me, not looking
at the particle.
The quantum state me X (up + down) is the same state as (me X up +
me X down). Is there one me, or two me. Deustch would say two me, but
two fungible me. There is only one 1p, but you have the choice of two
3p or one, according to the equality
me X (up + down) = (me X up + me X down).
The same happens for the rest of the universe. If I look at the
particle, in the {up, down} base, then I will differentiate (the two
3p me get two 1p me), or I will bifurcate, that is there is one more
3p me.
In fact those wording are exactly equivalent by linearity.
I don't dig on that issue for two reasons.
- One general: I just do not find an infinity of universe extravagant.
A finite numbers of universe would seem more extravagant to me (and to
most everythingers, by definition).
- One with comp: there is zero such universe in that case, which
nullifies that extravagance problem. There is only {0, 1, 2,
3, ...}. Or {K, S, KK, KS, SK, SS, ...}. It is equivalent.
Bruno
It's necessary that that local states be able to decohere, but that
doesn't to me seem to necessitate the duplication of the entire
universe. The splitting can be a diversion of information states at
an entirely local level, mediated by local interactions. The
multiverse only needs to be big enough to accommodate the
information required at each local branch point. Why bring the whole
rest of the universe into it?
On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 3:01:13 PM UTC+11, yanniru wrote:
My understanding is that a different universe really means a
different spacetime.
On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 10:53 PM, LizR liz...@gmail.com wrote:
Yeah, I believe that's how it's supposed to work. They're all in the
same background spacetime but once detangled have no influence on
each other. (However a TOE might have something to say about
background spacetime)
On 21 January 2014 16:45, Richard Ruquist yan...@gmail.com wrote:
I prefer a theory where every superimposed quantum state is realized
physically but in the same spacetime.
Is that theory feasible and does one already exist?
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Re: what is the definition of computation?
On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Computation is understood as whatever made by a digital computer or something that can be emulated (or aproximated) by a digital computer. OK. That's a good definition, and it is correct if ... we assume Church's thesis. So everything is a computation. Goddam! Why. Even just about what is true in arithmetic cannot be emulated by any computer. I am afraid you might not really grasp what a computer is, conceptually. See my answer to stephen yesterday, which shows wahy Church thesis entails that most attribute of *machines* cannot be computed by a machine. Or think about Cantor theorem. The set of functions from N top N is not enumerable, yet the set of *computable* functions is enumerable. That is a useless definition. because it embrace everything. For a mathematician, the computable is only a very tiny part of the truth. Everything is legoland because everything can be emulated using lego pieces? No, my dear legologist. Not veything can be emulated by a computer. few things actually in usual math. Some constructivist reduces math so that everything becomes computable, but even there, few agree. In Brouwer intuitionist analysis he uses the axiom all function are continuous or all functions are computable, but this is very special approach, and not well suited to study computationalism (which becomes trivial somehow there). What about this definition? Computation is whatever that reduces entropy. It will not work, because all computation can be done in a way which does not change the entropy at all. See Landauer, Zurek, etc. Only erasing information change entropy, and you don't need to erase information to compute. In information terms, in the human context, computation is whatever that reduces uncertainty producing useful information and thus, in the environment of human society, a computer program is used ultimately to get that information and reduce entropy, that is to increase order in society, or at least for the human that uses it. The UD generates uncertainty (from inside). A simulation is an special case of the latter. So there are things that are computations: what the living beings do at the chemical, physiological or nervous levels (and rational, social and technological level in case of humans) . But there are things that are not computations: almost everything else. That is the case with the definition you started above, and which is the one used by theoretical computer scientist. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: what is the definition of computation?
On 21 Jan 2014, at 05:22, Richard Ruquist wrote: The notion that computation produces information contradicts the notion that information is conserved made famous by the black hole paradox http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_hole_information_paradox The evolution of the wave function is determined by a unitary operator, and unitarity implies that information is conserved in the quantum sense. This is the strictest form of determinism. I wonder how that jives with MWI? Richard It means that you survive, from your 1p view, even if falling in a black hole. I doubt it could be a pleasant experience, though. We will have to do a lot of work to prevent the human falling in a black hole, when the Milky Way and Andromeda will collide. Hot gas and Black Hole, we should avoid them. Bruno On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 10:04 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: A process which transforms information? Ultimately, digital computation comes down to the NAND operation, I'm told, which means it's a lot of bit twiddling which ultimately transforms one lots of bits into another. I guess versions with non-binary data (like DNA I assume?) can be reduced in principle to binary... Not sure about the entropy definition. Since nothing reduces entropy globally, I assume you mean only locally... Or at the cosmic scale? The expansion of the universe supposedly reduces entropy, or makes more states available to matter at least (I think it increases the maximum available entropy, as per Beckenstein, rather than reducing it). Well, life does that, I guess, temporarily... On 21 January 2014 09:17, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: Computation is understood as whatever made by a digital computer or something that can be emulated (or aproximated) by a digital computer. So everything is a computation. That is a useless definition. because it embrace everything. Everything is legoland because everything can be emulated using lego pieces? No, my dear legologist. What about this definition? Computation is whatever that reduces entropy. In information terms, in the human context, computation is whatever that reduces uncertainty producing useful information and thus, in the environment of human society, a computer program is used ultimately to get that information and reduce entropy, that is to increase order in society, or at least for the human that uses it. A simulation is an special case of the latter. So there are things that are computations: what the living beings do at the chemical, physiological or nervous levels (and rational, social and technological level in case of humans) . But there are things that are not computations: almost everything else. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 20 Jan 2014, at 20:49, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, The idea that I am pursuing here is how to think of Becoming in a way that is consistent with comp. You have to think about it as an indexical. The logic of becoming, and why it is so crucial for us, is guven by S4Grz1. So far all we have are eternal static infinite entities. Yes, but they have clear notion of internal indexical histories. Measures are hard to define. But the one we need has to exists, or comp is false. bruno On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:38 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 21:01, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, Thank you for writing this remark! It is very helpful. You are welcome. I could see where there could be some debate on the constructability claim, as the set of all programs in L could be infinite and thus the lexicographic ordering would be a supertask in that case, but that can be ignored for now. Well, the set of all programs is *always* infinite, for universal and non universal languages. The point is that it can always be generate by one program (it is recursively or computably enumerable). But the subset of all programs computing *total* functions, everywhere defined, is also infinite but is not a recursively or computably enumerable set. It is not computable, necessarily so if the language is universal. My interest now is in the computational Word Problem. I have more homework to do. That is a particular case. By the way, the diffeomorphism of 4- variety is non computable, like the word problem in group theory, or the semantic of programs in computer science. factorial(x) is a computable function, but the adjective being the code of the factorial function is a non computable predicate. There are no algorithm capable to decide if, given an arbitrary programs, it computes the factorial function. This is easy to prove with the Dx = xx method, but you can intuitively understand this by meditating on the following question. Does the following program compute the factorial function: Define factorial read x If x = 0 output 1 else search for a formal proof of the Goldbach conjecture in ZF, and if you find it compute x * factorial(x-1), else print I don't compute factorial You see that the question how knowing if that code (which is executable, it is really a program) codes for the factorial function, is equivalent with solving the Goldbach conjecture. Bruno On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 6:33 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Stephen, Liz, On 18 Jan 2014, at 00:02, LizR wrote: On 18 January 2014 11:39, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear John, I invite your comment on a statement and question: There is not observable difference between X is non-computable and there does not exist sufficient resources to complete the computation of Y. Are X and Y effectively the same thing, everything else being equal? If there is a difference that makes a difference, what might it be? In other words, is anything non-computable because of some theoretical reason, rather than merely local geographical ones (which might cease to be restrictions if, say, our local even horizon expands, or we construct wormholes to other universe) ? Surely the halting problem? Of more easily the totality problem. It is more complex than halting, and thus more easily shown to be non computable. Let me do it here, as I promise to Stephen. It is almost a direct consequence of Church thesis. I recall that a function (from N to N) is said TOTAL computable if you can explain in a finite set of words, in one formal language, with a decidable simple grammar, how to compute it on each (cf TOTAL) natural numbers, in a finite time, and this to a sufficiently dumb person. Church's thesis: there is a universal language L in which all TOTAL functions can be described/coded, and my language lambda calculus is such a language. Theorem: Church's thesis entails that L describes more than just all TOTAL functions. Proof: suppose that L describes only the TOTAL functions. We can lexicographically order all programs in L (due to the clear decidable grammar) p0, p1, p2, p3, Let us call f_i the function computed by p_i Then we can define a function g such that g(n) = f_n(n) + 1. Indeed we can even program it in L. (To compute it on n, generate the list up to p_n and apply p_n on n, then add 1. As all f_n are total, this gives a total function (everywhere defined on N). So that function g as some program p_k, and thus compute some function f_k belonging to the list (L is universal). But then, let us apply g on its own code k, we have g(k) = f_k(k), given that g = f_k. But we have also that g(k) = f_k(k) + 1, by definition of g. So f_k(k) = f_k(k) + 1. And, by totality, f_k(k) is a number. So I can subtract it from both
Re: On differentiation of universes in MWI
On 21 Jan 2014, at 09:43, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/20/2014 5:56 PM, Pierz wrote: A second question/thought on MWI. MWI proposes that the entire universe splits at the point of wave collapse, or rather that it is continually and infinitely splitting with every possible quantum state. This has been understandably criticised as a vastly extravagant explanation. A whole universe, or even infinity of universes, for every quantum interaction seems a high price to play to eliminate the weirdness of wave collapse. Yet it seems to me that we can still get the explanatory benefits of MWI without this extravagance by seeing the situation slightly differently. I'll explain by analogy. I'm a coder. In the old days I used to back up my work by making a complete copy of it and putting it in an archive folder. Nowadays I use git, a source control system that keeps track of the history of my code and allows me to revert back changes to an earlier point in time. Depending on how often I commit my work, I can have an arbitrarily fine level of versioning. If git was stupid, it would copy my whole code repository every time I committed a change, and my disk would rapidly fill up. It would also be impossible to merge the work of another programmer working on the same code base because the system would only have complete individual snapshots. It would have no information about *what* changed between snapshots. But git is smarter than that. It records only what I changed in each commit. Thus I don't have to worry about my disk filling up, and I can happily merge someone else's changes - just so long as we don't both try to change the same line of code. To think that in MWI, a *whole other universe* is created when a binary quantum event occurs is like imagining the multiverse works like my old backup system. One thing changed, so if I want to keep a record of the earlier state, I have to copy *everything*. This is the way that Deutsch seems to talk about the situation. But it makes more sense to me to think of it as like git. If the universes diverged by only bit of information, that one bit is the only thing that is recorded so to speak. When the spin of a particle is measured here on earth, causing the universe to split, there is no need at this point to think that there are suddenly two Plutos, one for each spin state. What does Pluto know about the change? Later, this one bit change will ramify out, causing divergent information flows in the two universes which will eventually lead (possibly? necessarily?) to two completely different universes. But to the extent that any region of one universe is identical to a region of another universe in the multiverse, shouldn't we regard those regions as belonging to one and the same universe, merely with the potential to differentiate from one another? In other words, we're better off thinking about locally branching information flows than an infinite filo-pastry of universes. We can still answer the question of where the computations of a quantum computer take place - they occur in a multi-dimensional local information space. Each calculation line that contributes to the final result occurs on its own information thread as it were, but it does not require a whole universe to occur in. Maybe this economical view is the way MWI theorists actually do see the situation? If so, I wish they'd talk that way. It makes the theory a lot easier to swallow in my view. I agree that the multiple worlds generally differ only microscopically and so the count as the same world so far as we're concerned. But the changes/divergences are not discrete. A radioactive atom is in a superposition of decayed and not-decayed and on the decayed side there is change of the wave-function propagating at c or less that is gradually differentiating one world from the other at a microscopic level UNTIL in some world the decay is detected and amplified (say by a geiger counter). And so when I am approaching a fork in the road while driving and on one fork I will get into an an accident and on the other I will not, does that choice count as a superposition? Richard If you choice is determined by a quantum event. But if your brain is classical, then it will not. But note that if you decide by throwing a coin, the heisenberg uncertainty makes it that if you shake the coin enough, it will add up, and become a quantum choice, and so, even if your brain is classical, I can imagine processes leading to quantum superposition. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Monday, January 20, 2014 4:01:03 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, Here's one more theory from the many in my book on Reality: As Misner, Thorne and Wheeler note briefly in their book on Gravitation, INTERgalactic space is continually expanding with the Hubble expansion, however INTRAgalactic space is NOT expanding because it is gravitationally bound. Now the obvious effect of this (as I'm the first to have pointed out so far as I know) is that space will necessarily be warped at the boundaries of galaxies, and as is well know from GR any curvature of space produces gravitational effects, and of course dark matter halos around the EDGES of galaxies were invented to explain the otherwise unexplained extra gravitational effects on the rotation of galaxies. Thus, this simple effect of space warps around the boundaries of galaxies caused by the Hubble expansion may be the explanation for the dark matter effect. It may or may not be the cause of the entire effect, but it certainly must be having SOME effect, and over the lifetime of the universe one would expect that warping effect to be quite large. And there is nothing to prevent these warps, once they are created, to have a life and movement of their own, as we now know that dark matter is not just concentrated around galactic halos but may indicate where they used to be I'd be interested to see if anyone else sees how this effect might explain dark matter... Edgar It's an idea but I don't really get why expanding one side and not the other translates to a physical gradient. Conceptual presentations of the difference in gradient terms are feasible, but nothing is carried by that alone. I don't personally endorse comparing one theory to another with a view to keep one and delete the other. I do think there is good method and bad method though. What your idea looks like to me, is a seed insight. That is the very first step on a pretty long road to a theory. IMHO it's really poor form to burn someone else's seed insight. But it's terrible form to present a seed insight as if it's more. There needs to be a translation to some basic independent reality check. It doesn't have to be a lot, but getting a foothold there delivers something a million eloquent words will not. The idea is checkable in various ways. Whole clusters of galaxies may be gravitationally bound. Are you able to translate your idea to an expectation of some kind of distinction between halos around those galaxies? Or, can your idea explain the unique properties of the galaxy + halo. Why is the result a gradient of gravity near enough from the centre to the edge, such that the orbital speed of bodies the orbital speed is near enough constant throughout? Why the correlations with the supermassive black hole I'm not trying to teach you to suck eggs. I respect your idea, and also your wider theory, that you fulfilled a life long dream to accomplish that. The most significant development - for me - about the 'Edgar' chapter in the voluminously unwritten History of Everything (list) is the by product of almost no progress being made, that saw variability and veneer fall away allowing distinctive traits to become much clearer to see. A significant fraction of yours are arguably negative or counter-productive. But what they did real nail, is the basic authenticity of your story, because a lot of them are reasonable as offsets for the shortfalls of long term intellectual projects in effective isolation. While others go a long way to authenticating your ideas are substantially your own work, for example, that you find it hard to be interested in other peoples ideas, and that despite your obvious gifts and interest in precisely that, you never learned the core mainstream theories beyond the level of a well informed amateur (there's a definite worsening progression to your responses to hardening challenges). It is a negative in this context, but by the same coin, it all comes together as a substantial authentication of you as your claims about you. The significance of that is actually considerable, Your idea about p-time looks wrong to me, and I think it's probably explained by the fact you had a really good seed insight about everything having to be massively more synchronized , with massively more sameness. I definitely buy that. But the consequence you computed about a single logical structure was slightly flawed because that is not the only possible explantion. Then you moved too quickly to a consequence for that before you had time (or perhaps maturity as this section you were really young) That was p-time. It's possibly one of the least powerful insights of your whole theory, but it came right at the start, and got locked in because intuition became locked in by the character of the sequence. You don't have to agree...it's just part of what I think. But the other part
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On 21 Jan 2014, at 12:50, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014/1/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:11, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: Brent, as much as I like the idea of quantum effects being true, and the Hameroff-Penrose thesis that microtubules are da' bomb, There is a big difference between Penrose and Hameroff. Penrose disbelieve comp. The soul in Penrose is not even emulable by a quantum computer. The mircotubules are just used by him to suggest a role for the quantum, but that role is in the non computable wave packet reduction, that Penrose speculates to be related to gravity. It is a non comp theory. Hameroff does not go that far, and accepts comp. He believed that the microtubules defined some quantum computer in the brain. For example, in that case the UD proof goes through. Notably. I feel we have to ask what good this does us? Medically, or philosophically, I am not certain. How does knowing that one of the moons of Neptune is called Neirid? Exactly! It don't. Am I screaming for the cause of willful ignorance? Not intentionally, but I still want all scientific analysis to benefit humankind. Call it a super-goal. Most of the human misery might be due to people who want the good for the humankind. Science, even ethical science, should be neutral. Then the good appears when we learn to no more hide the possible truth. Happiness is very simple, once it is not made into a goal. For the human kind, people should do their job, and correct it when it hurts. The problem is when we put bandits at the top, which will professionally hides the truth and the suffering for personal benefits. We have to fight that indeed, but in a spirit of self- defense, not in the spirit of imposing new views on the world, because that leads to unhappiness and lies. Keep in mind that when we have discovered a cure for cancer, it has been made illegal at once, even the research on it. That illustrates the kind of barbaric world we live in. Well cannabis has not been shown *to cure* cancer, but it has anti- cancer properties, but it doesn't cure it I can give you reference. In 1974 the americans have discovered that it does indeed cure different sort of mice cancer. the cancerous cells dies by eating themselves. The tumor shrinks and disappears. Since then, the studies have shown that it can cures *or* slow down 173 type of cancer (and my study of this is old, so it might be a larger number. ... also canabis around the wolrd is becoming legal (or the consumption depenalized). It s about time, and not yet done. The prohibition of any drug is a total nonsense. In fact the word drug has no meaning at all. It is an imaginary enemy, build with pure propaganda. It is out of the topic, but I can send you tuns of reference. Prohibition of edible or consumable products has always been a trick to augment artficially the consumption and the price of a product. Anyway, I think you put to much faith and virtue in only one thing... Sure cannabis has good side, but it also has bad one when consumed with no moderation, As a teacher, I have seen problem with cannabis only among tobacco smokers, or worse, alcohol drinkers. Illegality makes it impossible to explain the danger of mixing an hard drug like tobacco or alcohol with cannabis. Joint can be highly addictive, but not cannabis without tobacco. I am not a big fan of recreative cannabis. But since I use it as a medication (that is since 40 years), my pharma budget is about zero. I did cure a strong sciatica with it, after all normal treatment fails, and that the doctors press me to do a surgical operation, but with cannabis, I could come back at work after one week. I have and will verified, but cannabis has been made schedule one in 1970, just 4 years before the discovery that it can cure cancer (1974), and it remained such! This shows the amount of lack of scrupulousness in the mind of those who lead the country (in this case senior Bush), and that was my point. Things consume without moderation can always be bad, for any things. When mixed with other hard drug that can be real bad. hiding that and singing lalala saying that it's big thief/bandits and so on that are responsible for that is just lies... http://www.mapinc.org/newstcl/v01/n572/a11.html I can give you all the original references. It was known than cannabis is far less dangerous than alcohol since the start. All papers showing a serious threat for a health have been debunked. Brain damages have been shown result of lack on air (indeed Nahas experiences have been lately shown to have involved rabbit smoking dozen of cigarettes 24h/ 24h, etc.) I have seen student using cannabis to pretext problems, but once you stop playing their game, it stops being a problem, or the student stop by themselves. In most case the problem is the tobacco behind. I'm for the
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
2014/1/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 21 Jan 2014, at 12:50, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014/1/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:11, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: Brent, as much as I like the idea of quantum effects being true, and the Hameroff-Penrose thesis that microtubules are da' bomb, There is a big difference between Penrose and Hameroff. Penrose disbelieve comp. The soul in Penrose is not even emulable by a quantum computer. The mircotubules are just used by him to suggest a role for the quantum, but that role is in the non computable wave packet reduction, that Penrose speculates to be related to gravity. It is a non comp theory. Hameroff does not go that far, and accepts comp. He believed that the microtubules defined some quantum computer in the brain. For example, in that case the UD proof goes through. Notably. I feel we have to ask what good this does us? Medically, or philosophically, I am not certain. How does knowing that one of the moons of Neptune is called Neirid? Exactly! It don't. Am I screaming for the cause of willful ignorance? Not intentionally, but I still want all scientific analysis to benefit humankind. Call it a super-goal. Most of the human misery might be due to people who want the good for the humankind. Science, even ethical science, should be neutral. Then the good appears when we learn to no more hide the possible truth. Happiness is very simple, once it is not made into a goal. For the human kind, people should do their job, and correct it when it hurts. The problem is when we put bandits at the top, which will professionally hides the truth and the suffering for personal benefits. We have to fight that indeed, but in a spirit of self-defense, not in the spirit of imposing new views on the world, because that leads to unhappiness and lies. Keep in mind that when we have discovered a cure for cancer, it has been made illegal at once, even the research on it. That illustrates the kind of barbaric world we live in. Well cannabis has not been shown *to cure* cancer, but it has anti-cancer properties, but it doesn't cure it I can give you reference. In 1974 the americans have discovered that it does indeed cure different sort of mice cancer. the cancerous cells dies by eating themselves. The tumor shrinks and disappears. Since then, the studies have shown that it can cures *or* slow down 173 type of cancer (and my study of this is old, so it might be a larger number. It has not been shown that it *cures* cancer, only that it has some anti-cancer property...reread your so called 1974 study. ... also canabis around the wolrd is becoming legal (or the consumption depenalized). It s about time, and not yet done. The prohibition of any drug is a total nonsense. I agree In fact the word drug has no meaning at all. It is an imaginary enemy, build with pure propaganda. It is out of the topic, but I can send you tuns of reference. Prohibition of edible or consumable products has always been a trick to augment artficially the consumption and the price of a product. Anyway, I think you put to much faith and virtue in only one thing... Sure cannabis has good side, but it also has bad one when consumed with no moderation, As a teacher, I have seen problem with cannabis only among tobacco smokers, As I said you only want to see what you believe... your assertion is false. Various studies (not debunked) show that it increase depressive behavior... you can assert no, but it's true, and I know it first hand. or worse, alcohol drinkers. I didn't say that alcohol wasn't worse, but you are denying that cannabis usage can lead to problematic usage (that's singing lalala). Illegality makes it impossible to explain the danger of mixing an hard drug like tobacco or alcohol with cannabis. Abusive usage is not because cannabis is illegal. Joint can be highly addictive, but not cannabis without tobacco. That's not true... Quentin I am not a big fan of recreative cannabis. But since I use it as a medication (that is since 40 years), my pharma budget is about zero. I did cure a strong sciatica with it, after all normal treatment fails, and that the doctors press me to do a surgical operation, but with cannabis, I could come back at work after one week. I have and will verified, but cannabis has been made schedule one in 1970, just 4 years before the discovery that it can cure cancer (1974), and it remained such! This shows the amount of lack of scrupulousness in the mind of those who lead the country (in this case senior Bush), and that was my point. Things consume without moderation can always be bad, for any things. When mixed with other hard drug that can be real bad. hiding that and singing lalala saying that it's big thief/bandits and so on that are responsible for that is just lies... http://www.mapinc.org/newstcl/v01/n572/a11.html
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On Jan 21, 2014, at 12:32 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/20/2014 6:28 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 6:59 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/20/2014 4:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 11:32 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/20/2014 12:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And to answer this properly, you have to define physical existence of Brent without using arithmetic. Brent:=the being who typed this sentence. (Or next time you're in California, come by and I'll give an ostensive definition - and a cup of coffee.) Thanks very much for the coffee cup, I appreciate. But frankly this will not work. If I need to define number by invoking a being typing a sentence in a post dated the 19 janvier 2014, oops: I am using some numbers here. You didn't ask to define a number, you asked to define physical existence of Brent. And 19 January 2014 can easily be defined as when Brent typed the above message. I think you (understandably as a logician) are so immersed in the axiomatic method that you lose of sight of its connection to the physical world. Definitions become nothing but relations between symbols if you never ground them in pointing. Don't ask someone who want to compute 2+2=4 to come in California and drink four cups of coffee, if all computers have to do that I am afraid the net will become extremely slow ... I find much more plausible that I can explain numbers behavior, and Brent's brain and ideas, from elementary arithmetical axioms, than explain arithmetic from Brent and other humans ideas. Come on ... I'm quite sure you can explain Brent's brain and ideas without using any number bigger than 10^100. Just the sentence: I'm quite sure you can explain Brent's brain and ideas without using any number bigger than 10^100. Takes a number larger than 10^100 to represent. No, the sentence only uses the description any number bigger than 10^100. It's logically equivalent to, Every explanation of Brent's brain and ideas uses only number less than 10^100. Okay, then you should have clarified no single number bigger than 10^100. It is possible to represent your ideas as a series of much smaller numbers, however their combined product will almost certainly be bigger than 10^100, even for very short sentences. (10^100 is less than 42 bytes of information.) But you don't need the product to explain my brain. And in any case there is still an unbound on the biggest number you will need. You will never need ... or and so forth. Through my computer scientist eyes it just seems like a meaningless distinction. If your brain is backed up on a computer you can look at that file as a large number of bytes (numbers from 0 to 255) or simply as one very big number. On the order of 256^(10^16). I agree there is some finite upper bound, but this whole tangent began when Bruno speculated that your brain might not appear until the 10^10^1000th step of the UD which is also a finite number. Jason Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
PIerz, No, you are wrong here. Space doesn't expand around objects without the objects moving along with it. The positions of objects are positions IN space. Thus there is not a smooth expansion but the warping around galaxies I've pointed out. If you were correct the Hubble expansion of space wouldn't carry far galaxies along with it and redshift them. You are simply wrong here. Please remember that the next time you accuse me of being wrong about something! Edgar On Monday, January 20, 2014 10:12:54 PM UTC-5, Pierz wrote: I don't know why the warping effect is obvious. All space is expanding, including that inside galaxies but the gravity effect keeps the expansion from causing the galaxy to spread out. Imagine a soft disk sitting on top of a balloon that is being blown up. The balloon surface (space) both under and around the disk is expanding, but the object keeps its size because of its internal forces. It's not as if there's some boundary at the edge of galaxies at which expansion starts. On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 3:01:03 AM UTC+11, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, Here's one more theory from the many in my book on Reality: As Misner, Thorne and Wheeler note briefly in their book on Gravitation, INTERgalactic space is continually expanding with the Hubble expansion, however INTRAgalactic space is NOT expanding because it is gravitationally bound. Now the obvious effect of this (as I'm the first to have pointed out so far as I know) is that space will necessarily be warped at the boundaries of galaxies, and as is well know from GR any curvature of space produces gravitational effects, and of course dark matter halos around the EDGES of galaxies were invented to explain the otherwise unexplained extra gravitational effects on the rotation of galaxies. Thus, this simple effect of space warps around the boundaries of galaxies caused by the Hubble expansion may be the explanation for the dark matter effect. It may or may not be the cause of the entire effect, but it certainly must be having SOME effect, and over the lifetime of the universe one would expect that warping effect to be quite large. And there is nothing to prevent these warps, once they are created, to have a life and movement of their own, as we now know that dark matter is not just concentrated around galactic halos but may indicate where they used to be I'd be interested to see if anyone else sees how this effect might explain dark matter... Edgar -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On 21 Jan 2014, at 16:55, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014/1/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 21 Jan 2014, at 12:50, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014/1/21 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:11, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: Brent, as much as I like the idea of quantum effects being true, and the Hameroff-Penrose thesis that microtubules are da' bomb, There is a big difference between Penrose and Hameroff. Penrose disbelieve comp. The soul in Penrose is not even emulable by a quantum computer. The mircotubules are just used by him to suggest a role for the quantum, but that role is in the non computable wave packet reduction, that Penrose speculates to be related to gravity. It is a non comp theory. Hameroff does not go that far, and accepts comp. He believed that the microtubules defined some quantum computer in the brain. For example, in that case the UD proof goes through. Notably. I feel we have to ask what good this does us? Medically, or philosophically, I am not certain. How does knowing that one of the moons of Neptune is called Neirid? Exactly! It don't. Am I screaming for the cause of willful ignorance? Not intentionally, but I still want all scientific analysis to benefit humankind. Call it a super-goal. Most of the human misery might be due to people who want the good for the humankind. Science, even ethical science, should be neutral. Then the good appears when we learn to no more hide the possible truth. Happiness is very simple, once it is not made into a goal. For the human kind, people should do their job, and correct it when it hurts. The problem is when we put bandits at the top, which will professionally hides the truth and the suffering for personal benefits. We have to fight that indeed, but in a spirit of self- defense, not in the spirit of imposing new views on the world, because that leads to unhappiness and lies. Keep in mind that when we have discovered a cure for cancer, it has been made illegal at once, even the research on it. That illustrates the kind of barbaric world we live in. Well cannabis has not been shown *to cure* cancer, but it has anti- cancer properties, but it doesn't cure it I can give you reference. In 1974 the americans have discovered that it does indeed cure different sort of mice cancer. the cancerous cells dies by eating themselves. The tumor shrinks and disappears. Since then, the studies have shown that it can cures *or* slow down 173 type of cancer (and my study of this is old, so it might be a larger number. It has not been shown that it *cures* cancer, only that it has some anti-cancer property...reread your so called 1974 study. In that sense, OK. But then in science we ner proves anything. The fact is that when you inject THC on tumors of certain type, they statistically shrink. Another studies have shown that the tar of cannabis contains stronger oncogene (much oncogene than tobacco), but the statistics shows that smoker of joint have less cancers than smoker of tobacco, and this is explain by the fact that cannabis has anti-cancer properties. Then many video have been made by people who cure their cancers after all treatment failed. But there is no statistics for them. My point is that we did have strong evidence that cannabis cures many diseases, and has efficacious cancer effect, and that it remained in schedule one, that is even forbidding research (which is already a total nonsense, like if the danger was a reasn o not sudy something, in nuclear times ...). But we were discussing rationalism, and I was just pointing how poorly rational are the political decision, illustrating with health. ... also canabis around the wolrd is becoming legal (or the consumption depenalized). It s about time, and not yet done. The prohibition of any drug is a total nonsense. I agree OK. This helps for the point I was considering. In fact the word drug has no meaning at all. It is an imaginary enemy, build with pure propaganda. It is out of the topic, but I can send you tuns of reference. Prohibition of edible or consumable products has always been a trick to augment artficially the consumption and the price of a product. Anyway, I think you put to much faith and virtue in only one thing... Sure cannabis has good side, but it also has bad one when consumed with no moderation, As a teacher, I have seen problem with cannabis only among tobacco smokers, As I said you only want to see what you believe... your assertion is false. Various studies (not debunked) show that it increase depressive behavior... you can assert no, but it's true, and I know it first hand. I think you did not answer, on previous talk on this, if your were smoking it with tobacco, or when drinking alcohol. But I was not lying at all. As a teacher, I have never seen any problem with cannabis. I have seen problem
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Bruno, You continue to avoid the actual question. How does a static reality of all true arithmetic in Platonia actually result in change and the flow of time? You just claim everyone knows it. Until you can give a convincing answer to that your theory can't be taken seriously. Just claiming that different observers have different perspectives on that reality doesn't make those perspectives active, they would still be static. And of course block time has the exact same problem Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 7:33:50 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Bruno, To answer your questions sequentially. I don't see any way the arithmetical true relations compute or emulate anything. I agree this is not obvious. But it is known by all experts in the field. That is already present in Gödel 1931, and today we know that even just one diophantine (on integeres) polynomial of degree four can emulated all computations; or be Turing universal. They just sit there motionless and nothing happens. But that is not a problem for those who accept a relativistic or indexical notion of time. You seems to believe that such a notion is contradictory. But well, it is, with the assumption of a present time. But that is already contradictory with the comp's consequence. You haven't explained how motion arises from non-motion and no one else here understands that either. Many understand this. beyond this, the number of people who understand an argument has no role in the argument itself. Everybody knows that ... is never an argument. Reality is one continuous program I guess you mean active program. I is the activity which is continued, not the program. OK? but every information element actively computes its evolution. ? Which program is it? It's the program that it is of course. ? You seem to think there are a bunches of software reality can pick off some magical shelf and run. I assume that the brain or body, in some general sense, can be emulated by a computer. then the emulation is in arithmetic (as arithmetic is provably Turing complete (the well known non obvious fact that I can explain if you ask)), then it is the consciousness which pick up its local possible software among all those already active (relatively) in arithmetic. div ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: what is the definition of computation?
On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 2:51 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Computation is understood as whatever made by a digital computer or something that can be emulated (or aproximated) by a digital computer. OK. That's a good definition, and it is correct if ... we assume Church's thesis. So everything is a computation. Goddam! Why. Even just about what is true in arithmetic cannot be emulated by any computer. I am afraid you might not really grasp what a computer is, conceptually. See my answer to stephen yesterday, which shows wahy Church thesis entails that most attribute of *machines* cannot be computed by a machine. Or think about Cantor theorem. The set of functions from N top N is not enumerable, yet the set of *computable* functions is enumerable. That is a useless definition. because it embrace everything. For a mathematician, the computable is only a very tiny part of the truth. Everything is legoland because everything can be emulated using lego pieces? No, my dear legologist. Not veything can be emulated by a computer. few things actually in usual math. Some constructivist reduces math so that everything becomes computable, but even there, few agree. Like the guys from Erlangen and Lorenzen. I gave myself some time with this, until I decided it was just prohibition/denial: We just all pretend that weird stuff does not exist. Only not-weird stuff is real because we have clarity, is what I remember... I am still amazed by how popular and how much support this seemed to get. Difficult to stay open and build understanding of these approaches for me. PGC In Brouwer intuitionist analysis he uses the axiom all function are continuous or all functions are computable, but this is very special approach, and not well suited to study computationalism (which becomes trivial somehow there). What about this definition? Computation is whatever that reduces entropy. It will not work, because all computation can be done in a way which does not change the entropy at all. See Landauer, Zurek, etc. Only erasing information change entropy, and you don't need to erase information to compute. In information terms, in the human context, computation is whatever that reduces uncertainty producing useful information and thus, in the environment of human society, a computer program is used ultimately to get that information and reduce entropy, that is to increase order in society, or at least for the human that uses it. The UD generates uncertainty (from inside). A simulation is an special case of the latter. So there are things that are computations: what the living beings do at the chemical, physiological or nervous levels (and rational, social and technological level in case of humans) . But there are things that are not computations: almost everything else. That is the case with the definition you started above, and which is the one used by theoretical computer scientist. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: what is the definition of computation?
On 21 Jan 2014, at 17:45, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 2:51 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Computation is understood as whatever made by a digital computer or something that can be emulated (or aproximated) by a digital computer. OK. That's a good definition, and it is correct if ... we assume Church's thesis. So everything is a computation. Goddam! Why. Even just about what is true in arithmetic cannot be emulated by any computer. I am afraid you might not really grasp what a computer is, conceptually. See my answer to stephen yesterday, which shows wahy Church thesis entails that most attribute of *machines* cannot be computed by a machine. Or think about Cantor theorem. The set of functions from N top N is not enumerable, yet the set of *computable* functions is enumerable. That is a useless definition. because it embrace everything. For a mathematician, the computable is only a very tiny part of the truth. Everything is legoland because everything can be emulated using lego pieces? No, my dear legologist. Not veything can be emulated by a computer. few things actually in usual math. Some constructivist reduces math so that everything becomes computable, but even there, few agree. Like the guys from Erlangen and Lorenzen. I gave myself some time with this, until I decided it was just prohibition/denial: We just all pretend that weird stuff does not exist. Only not-weird stuff is real because we have clarity, is what I remember... It is a nice way to look at this. I am still amazed by how popular and how much support this seemed to get. Difficult to stay open and build understanding of these approaches for me. PGC I think it is a form of solipsism, and Brouwer was openly solipsist. Intuitionism is almost the logic of the first person, which is solipsist about its own mental space. It is the logic of the guy who think he is really in W, and not in M, which is correct from the 1p view, (well, in W), but non communicable, as his doppelganger in M will confirmed. But this shows that intuitionism and solipsism have some interest in psychology. I agree yet, that they become empty and non sensical when they are transformed in theory of everything. We can't deny the others, despite that notion is not constructive. Bruno In Brouwer intuitionist analysis he uses the axiom all function are continuous or all functions are computable, but this is very special approach, and not well suited to study computationalism (which becomes trivial somehow there). What about this definition? Computation is whatever that reduces entropy. It will not work, because all computation can be done in a way which does not change the entropy at all. See Landauer, Zurek, etc. Only erasing information change entropy, and you don't need to erase information to compute. In information terms, in the human context, computation is whatever that reduces uncertainty producing useful information and thus, in the environment of human society, a computer program is used ultimately to get that information and reduce entropy, that is to increase order in society, or at least for the human that uses it. The UD generates uncertainty (from inside). A simulation is an special case of the latter. So there are things that are computations: what the living beings do at the chemical, physiological or nervous levels (and rational, social and technological level in case of humans) . But there are things that are not computations: almost everything else. That is the case with the definition you started above, and which is the one used by theoretical computer scientist. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 4:22:34 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: PIerz, No, you are wrong here. Space doesn't expand around objects without the objects moving along with it. The positions of objects are positions IN space. Thus there is not a smooth expansion but the warping around galaxies I've pointed out. If you were correct the Hubble expansion of space wouldn't carry far galaxies along with it and redshift them. You are simply wrong here. Please remember that the next time you accuse me of being wrong about something! Edgar Edgar, the opposite is true. The hubble effect is constant if the comparison is between any two pairs of adjacent galaxies, one pair compared to the other, obviously controlling for distance between them. It's constant in that sense whether or not the overall effect is accelerating as it is at the moment. If the galaxies are independently moving in space, the distance to adjacent galaxies is changing, and has to be controlled for, to keep that constant effect. If you skip a galaxy and want the rate of expansion between a galaxy and the second galaxy along, then you have to add the two adjacent rates together, controlling for changes in distance caused by independent movement of galaxies in space. If you want the next galaxy after that, it's adding 3 adjacent values. This is why the hubble rate can keep on going, passing the speed of light barrier, and forever onward and upward. Because, and precisely because, it's not generated by a physical translation in space. On Monday, January 20, 2014 10:12:54 PM UTC-5, Pierz wrote: I don't know why the warping effect is obvious. All space is expanding, including that inside galaxies but the gravity effect keeps the expansion from causing the galaxy to spread out. Imagine a soft disk sitting on top of a balloon that is being blown up. The balloon surface (space) both under and around the disk is expanding, but the object keeps its size because of its internal forces. It's not as if there's some boundary at the edge of galaxies at which expansion starts. On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 3:01:03 AM UTC+11, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, Here's one more theory from the many in my book on Reality: As Misner, Thorne and Wheeler note briefly in their book on Gravitation, INTERgalactic space is continually expanding with the Hubble expansion, however INTRAgalactic space is NOT expanding because it is gravitationally bound. Now the obvious effect of this (as I'm the first to have pointed out so far as I know) is that space will necessarily be warped at the boundaries of galaxies, and as is well know from GR any curvature of space produces gravitational effects, and of course dark matter halos around the EDGES of galaxies were invented to explain the otherwise unexplained extra gravitational effects on the rotation of galaxies. Thus, this simple effect of space warps around the boundaries of galaxies caused by the Hubble expansion may be the explanation for the dark matter effect. It may or may not be the cause of the entire effect, but it certainly must be having SOME effect, and over the lifetime of the universe one would expect that warping effect to be quite large. And there is nothing to prevent these warps, once they are created, to have a life and movement of their own, as we now know that dark matter is not just concentrated around galactic halos but may indicate where they used to be I'd be interested to see if anyone else sees how this effect might explain dark matter... Edgar -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 21 Jan 2014, at 17:34, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Bruno, You continue to avoid the actual question. How does a static reality of all true arithmetic in Platonia actually result in change and the flow of time? You just claim everyone knows it. Where. I just said (see below) that everybody knows it is never an argument. You misread me. On the contrary I said that I can explain it, but then it is long. Then, I point on the literature, and mention that the fact that arithmetic is Turing complete is known by experts. Do you agree that arithmetic emulates all computations? I guess not. Until you can give a convincing answer to that your theory can't be taken seriously. By who? I have never have any problem with that. On the contrary, most physicists already believe that the theory of relativity go in that direction (even more so in Gödel's solution of Einstein's GR equation, with looping time. I can give you an answer, except I am not sure you will study it. I will explain it to you when you answer the questions I asked about your theory. What does it assume, and how do you use it to prevent the UD Argument to proceed? Just claiming that different observers have different perspectives on that reality doesn't make those perspectives active, they would still be static. Seen from the big picture (arithmetical truth) you are right. Seen from the perspective of the internal creatures, you are wrong, at least in the sense, that those creatures have all reason to infer time and space, etc. They will talk about that like you and me. Do you think that a machine can distinguish being a living person inhabiting on Earth, and being a living person on Earth emulated on some computer, or in arithmetic. And of course block time has the exact same problem of course is a symptom of lack of argument. You are just looking at the 3p picture, and not at the 1p views of the entities in that 3p reality. You could as well say that a brain has no relation with consciousness, as there is no 1p sensations observed when we look at a brain. But comp associates consciousness, including consciousness of time to the 1p that we can associate to computation. That's a complex relation between number and truth about number, ans it cannot be described in any 3p view. Do you agree that if we simulate today, your brain evolution of yesterday, you will feel today the 1p moment of yesterday? is that not enough to doubt that the notion of absolute 1p moment makes sense? Bruno PS I am late in some work, so I might take time to answer the next posts. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 7:33:50 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Bruno, To answer your questions sequentially. I don't see any way the arithmetical true relations compute or emulate anything. I agree this is not obvious. But it is known by all experts in the field. That is already present in Gödel 1931, and today we know that even just one diophantine (on integeres) polynomial of degree four can emulated all computations; or be Turing universal. They just sit there motionless and nothing happens. But that is not a problem for those who accept a relativistic or indexical notion of time. You seems to believe that such a notion is contradictory. But well, it is, with the assumption of a present time. But that is already contradictory with the comp's consequence. You haven't explained how motion arises from non-motion and no one else here understands that either. Many understand this. beyond this, the number of people who understand an argument has no role in the argument itself. Everybody knows that ... is never an argument. Reality is one continuous program I guess you mean active program. I is the activity which is continued, not the program. OK? but every information element actively computes its evolution. ? Which program is it? It's the program that it is of course. ? You seem to think there are a bunches of software reality can pick off some magical shelf and run. I assume that the brain or body, in some general sense, can be emulated by a computer. then the emulation is in arithmetic (as arithmetic is provably Turing complete (the well known non obvious fact that I can explain if you ask)), then it is the consciousness which pick up its local possible software among all those already active (relatively) in arithmetic. div ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
Gibbsa, No, you misunderstand what I'm saying. Of course the hubble rate can keep on going, passing the speed of light barrier, and forever onward and upward. Because, and precisely because, it's not generated by a physical translation in space. I agree with that and that's exactly what I'm saying. It's Pierz that is disagreeing with you. Pierz thinks space is expanding without taking any physical objects along with that expansion. If that were true nothing there would be no red shift and there would be no particle horizon beyond which the expansion of space carries galaxies so they can no longer be observed. Things move both IN space and WITH the expansion of space. Things moving with the expansion of space red shifts them, things moving RELATIVE TO the expansion of space gives variations of red and blue shifts for objects at the same distances in expanding space. The expansion of space occurs only in intergalactic space, but the space within galaxies, solar systems, etc. is gravitationally bound and is not expanding. Refer to Misner, Thorne and Wheeler's 'Gravitation' if you don't believe me Our solar system is not expanding due to the Hubble expansion because it is gravitationally bound... If it was you'd have a violation of the laws of orbital motion. Therefore there must be a space warping at the boundaries of galaxies which must produce a significant gravitational effect over time which could explain the dark matter effect Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 12:11:25 PM UTC-5, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 4:22:34 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: PIerz, No, you are wrong here. Space doesn't expand around objects without the objects moving along with it. The positions of objects are positions IN space. Thus there is not a smooth expansion but the warping around galaxies I've pointed out. If you were correct the Hubble expansion of space wouldn't carry far galaxies along with it and redshift them. You are simply wrong here. Please remember that the next time you accuse me of being wrong about something! Edgar Edgar, the opposite is true. The hubble effect is constant if the comparison is between any two pairs of adjacent galaxies, one pair compared to the other, obviously controlling for distance between them. It's constant in that sense whether or not the overall effect is accelerating as it is at the moment. If the galaxies are independently moving in space, the distance to adjacent galaxies is changing, and has to be controlled for, to keep that constant effect. If you skip a galaxy and want the rate of expansion between a galaxy and the second galaxy along, then you have to add the two adjacent rates together, controlling for changes in distance caused by independent movement of galaxies in space. If you want the next galaxy after that, it's adding 3 adjacent values. This is why the hubble rate can keep on going, passing the speed of light barrier, and forever onward and upward. Because, and precisely because, it's not generated by a physical translation in space. On Monday, January 20, 2014 10:12:54 PM UTC-5, Pierz wrote: I don't know why the warping effect is obvious. All space is expanding, including that inside galaxies but the gravity effect keeps the expansion from causing the galaxy to spread out. Imagine a soft disk sitting on top of a balloon that is being blown up. The balloon surface (space) both under and around the disk is expanding, but the object keeps its size because of its internal forces. It's not as if there's some boundary at the edge of galaxies at which expansion starts. On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 3:01:03 AM UTC+11, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, Here's one more theory from the many in my book on Reality: As Misner, Thorne and Wheeler note briefly in their book on Gravitation, INTERgalactic space is continually expanding with the Hubble expansion, however INTRAgalactic space is NOT expanding because it is gravitationally bound. Now the obvious effect of this (as I'm the first to have pointed out so far as I know) is that space will necessarily be warped at the boundaries of galaxies, and as is well know from GR any curvature of space produces gravitational effects, and of course dark matter halos around the EDGES of galaxies were invented to explain the otherwise unexplained extra gravitational effects on the rotation of galaxies. Thus, this simple effect of space warps around the boundaries of galaxies caused by the Hubble expansion may be the explanation for the dark matter effect. It may or may not be the cause of the entire effect, but it certainly must be having SOME effect, and over the lifetime of the universe one would expect that warping effect to be quite large. And there is nothing to prevent these warps, once they are created, to have a life and movement of their own,
Re: what is the definition of computation?
On 21 Jan 2014, at 15:45, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It is a phisical definition of computation in the physical world, to distinguish what physical phenomena are computations and what are not. I don´t care about mathematical oddities. But nobody has found such a definition. Physical computation are only recognized as computation in machine that we can build, from subset of physical laws, to implement the mathematical definition. Then it is a theorem that we cannot recognize something as being a computation, even in the arithmetical reality. We can build one and recognize those we built, or we can bet that some process computes, like when saying yes to a doctor. But there is no general means to see if something is a computation or not, and this will depends in part of we look at it. Computability is a notion discovered in math. It is related to the key discovery of Turing (also some others) of the universal (Turing) machine. You can defend naturalism, or physicalism, and you have the right to believe in a primitive physical universe. I am agnostic, and I have to be, if only because we have not yet decided between Plato and Aristotle. We are very ignorant, notably on the mind-body question. I do not defend computationalism. I just show that IF we assume it, then we get a constructive and testable platonic theology, which explains physics. And I have done a piece of the derivation and tested it. If you are right on metaphysical naturalism, with a real ontological universe, then comp is wrong. That is all what I say. Computation in this sense is a manifestation of teleological entities capable of maintaining his internal structure. I can accept this as a putative truth about a notion of physical computation, but this has not yet been defined. reducing entropy was a good try, less wrong than quantum computation (despite here Turing universality is verifiable), but it does not work as nature can compute without dissipating energy (indeed quantum computers requite that). Math do not compute. That does not make a lot of sense. Computers do not compute, Only computers compute. That's almost tautological. For example universal computers compute anything computable. I often use the word computer in the sense of the french ordinateur, which means all purpose computer or universal computer. Books do not compute. We agree on this! Is people that compute with the help of them. That makes sense, if only because the Turing machine describe very well how a person compute with pencil and paper, going through different state of mind. Yes, people can compute, but computer compute too, with the standard mathematical definition. Bruno marchall invoking church thesis to convince us flooding the list with comp theory Well, many people agree with the comp axioms, and are interested in thinking on the conceptual consequences. Then Church thesis is rather important to understand the generality of the notion. talking about non computability does compute too . I don't understand the sentence. as well as any living being. That definition of computation is more restrictive and wider that the traditional one. Is more restrictive for obvious reasons. It is wider because it depart from the legomania of digitalism. But that is the essence of computation. Then it is a beautiful miracle in AUDA (but implicit in the UDA) that the first person appears not to be computable or even nameable from her first person point of view. In fact S4Grz exists by an arithmetical tour de force. It is a formal logic of the non-formalizable. It explains why, from the 1p view, we cannot avoid the depart from the legomania of digitalism. But comp explains the why and the how. Moreover it is an operational definition closer to everyday reality and includes all that is traditionally called computer science and biology (and sociology) within a wider physical framework. May be. You did not provide a definition of physical computation. Nor of physical, which might help a skeptic like me. The only one you gave was reducing entropy. But it does not work. It might work for life perhaps. It is certainly an interesting idea. But it is not computation. You can't change definition at will, or we are talking about different things. The mathematical notion of computation is NOT controversial. The physical notion of computation is not even existing, and most attempts are controversial. Bruno 2014/1/21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Computation is understood as whatever made by a digital computer or something that can be emulated (or aproximated) by a digital computer. OK. That's a good definition, and it is correct if ... we assume Church's thesis. So everything is a computation. Goddam! Why. Even just about what is true in arithmetic cannot be emulated
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Bruno, Again you avoid the question. You need to give everyone a clear and convincing reason in English. Just requoting some abstract mathematical proof won't suffice unless you can prove it actually applies. If there is really a way to get motion from stasis you should be able to simply state the core of the argument in plain English. There simply is no way to get motion from non-motion, either in your theory or in block timeYou can look at it from any perspective you want to but unless something moves nothing moves... Of course you can use the same 'cop out' that block time does when it claims that an observer in every static frame of block time perceives a sequence of events, but that doesn't work to move anything. It's still just a sequence of cartoon frames which are obviously completely static. A static motionless observer sees them as a motionless sequence. Only an ACTIVELY MOVING reader of the cartoon can provide the apparent sequence of the cartoon frames that makes them meaningful. But of course actually both observer and universe are actively moving as they are continually being recomputed in the present moment of p-time If the sequence seems to move it's only because that cartoon reader is already moving himself. So without a moving observer rather than a static 1p observer, to use your terminology, there can be no motion. Unless the 1p observer is himself alive and moving there can be no motion in his perspective. There is simply no way around that. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 12:27:59 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jan 2014, at 17:34, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Bruno, You continue to avoid the actual question. How does a static reality of all true arithmetic in Platonia actually result in change and the flow of time? You just claim everyone knows it. Where. I just said (see below) that everybody knows it is never an argument. You misread me. On the contrary I said that I can explain it, but then it is long. Then, I point on the literature, and mention that the fact that arithmetic is Turing complete is known by experts. Do you agree that arithmetic emulates all computations? I guess not. Until you can give a convincing answer to that your theory can't be taken seriously. By who? I have never have any problem with that. On the contrary, most physicists already believe that the theory of relativity go in that direction (even more so in Gödel's solution of Einstein's GR equation, with looping time. I can give you an answer, except I am not sure you will study it. I will explain it to you when you answer the questions I asked about your theory. What does it assume, and how do you use it to prevent the UD Argument to proceed? Just claiming that different observers have different perspectives on that reality doesn't make those perspectives active, they would still be static. Seen from the big picture (arithmetical truth) you are right. Seen from the perspective of the internal creatures, you are wrong, at least in the sense, that those creatures have all reason to infer time and space, etc. They will talk about that like you and me. Do you think that a machine can distinguish being a living person inhabiting on Earth, and being a living person on Earth emulated on some computer, or in arithmetic. And of course block time has the exact same problem of course is a symptom of lack of argument. You are just looking at the 3p picture, and not at the 1p views of the entities in that 3p reality. You could as well say that a brain has no relation with consciousness, as there is no 1p sensations observed when we look at a brain. But comp associates consciousness, including consciousness of time to the 1p that we can as ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A humble suggestion to the group
Pierz, How about a $100 bet on whose theory of On Monday, January 20, 2014 6:42:59 PM UTC-5, Pierz wrote: Haha. Edgar, I have also modified my views through participation on this list. As it has for Liz, Bruno's comp has become borderline credible to me, though I am far from a true believer. I've also been educated in a lot of philosophy of mind and had my grasp of key concepts in physics refined and sharpened. My fundamental position on AI has been altered significantly. The process of changing one's core beliefs is a slow, iterative one. Everyone's world view is a work in progress, or should be. But necessarily and rightly, we change by doing our best to defend our ideas against attack and critique. There's a certain irony to your remarks, because I have certainly seen not an iota of willingness on your part to change *your*views. It seems rather that you think it your business to bring enlightenment to everyone else here without truly opening your eyes and ears to competing or contradictory ideas. And it's rather disingenuous of you to talk about subjecting our ideas to a regime of tests when you completely ignored my $100 challenge to define any way to experimentally falsify your Universal Present Moment. That whole thread was the most exhausting, prolonged piece of head-against-the-wall-bashing I've encountered on this list, and believe me I've seen a few! On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 9:25:58 AM UTC+11, Brent wrote: On 1/20/2014 11:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen wrote: There are obviously a lot of very intelligent members here who are well read in modern science. I think everyone would agree with this. Except for a few that are unfamiliar with relativity theory. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A humble suggestion to the group
Pierz, How about a $100 bet on who's right about spacetime expansion? You or Misner, Thorne, Wheeler and me? :-) Edgar On Monday, January 20, 2014 6:42:59 PM UTC-5, Pierz wrote: Haha. Edgar, I have also modified my views through participation on this list. As it has for Liz, Bruno's comp has become borderline credible to me, though I am far from a true believer. I've also been educated in a lot of philosophy of mind and had my grasp of key concepts in physics refined and sharpened. My fundamental position on AI has been altered significantly. The process of changing one's core beliefs is a slow, iterative one. Everyone's world view is a work in progress, or should be. But necessarily and rightly, we change by doing our best to defend our ideas against attack and critique. There's a certain irony to your remarks, because I have certainly seen not an iota of willingness on your part to change *your*views. It seems rather that you think it your business to bring enlightenment to everyone else here without truly opening your eyes and ears to competing or contradictory ideas. And it's rather disingenuous of you to talk about subjecting our ideas to a regime of tests when you completely ignored my $100 challenge to define any way to experimentally falsify your Universal Present Moment. That whole thread was the most exhausting, prolonged piece of head-against-the-wall-bashing I've encountered on this list, and believe me I've seen a few! On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 9:25:58 AM UTC+11, Brent wrote: On 1/20/2014 11:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen wrote: There are obviously a lot of very intelligent members here who are well read in modern science. I think everyone would agree with this. Except for a few that are unfamiliar with relativity theory. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A humble suggestion to the group
Jason, this link doesn't work... Edgar On Monday, January 20, 2014 6:49:20 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: It looks like I need to update the database connection information: http://everythingwiki.gcn.cx/wiki/ If others are interested, I will try to find time for that. I think as useful as any page would be Bio pages of members, which state where people fall on a number of questions, and we can trend that overtime to see if anyone's mind's change. Jason On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 3:52 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: wrote: Good luck with that! We tried a wiki project a few years ago to do exactly what you propose, but it died of neglect. I'm not sure if the results of that effort is still around, even. Cheers On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 11:18:37AM -0800, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, There are obviously a lot of very intelligent members here who are well read in modern science. I think everyone would agree with this. However the usual MO of group members (true of most groups) is simply to argue for their own theories and to criticize those of others, and as a result no one changes their views and no significant progress is made. Let me humbly suggest that we can do better than that... What would really be nice if we could work together cooperatively, in the way that actual working science teams do, to build consenses towards areas of agreement. The way this works is that first we see what we can agree upon, state that clearly in a way all can agree upon, and take that as the basis for further progress. Second work to clearly define areas of disagreement and actively analyze and clarify them to prune the disagreements to the minimum possible. Third, devise mutually acceptable tests to resolve these disagreements. Fourth, run the tests and add the results to the areas of agreement. Fifth, use this process iteratively to progress to the maximum areas of agreement possible towards agreement on the most comprehensive theory possible. Now obviously this is probably more doable among small groups that already have significant areas of agreement to start with. But as each of these groups make progress defining what they do agree upon they can then join to debate the areas of agreement and disagreement between groups and how best to resolve those differences. For example I was pleased to learn that Stephen and I agree that block time is BS, even though Stephen doesn't seem to actively want to argue that here. So e.g. Stephen and I could try to clearly define our area of agreement here and when we clarify that we could then debate it with the supporters of block time and the UDA who believe differently once they clarify their areas of agreement. My basic point is that instead of just forever arguing our differences, it would be great to actively work on defining and clarifying the theories that we could agree upon. It seems to me that would be a truly worthwhile mutual endeavor that would progress all our understandings. How about it guys? Anyone interested in working on this? Edgar -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Edgar, We can get to the root of the obstruction, perhaps, is the nature of perception. If perception, physically speaking, is the mere matching between some bit of the world to some bit in the brain (or whatever is running the recursively enumerable functions) then this would match up with the Block Universe concept. The representational (or numerical or computational) picture would involve a mapping between identical bits in a way that is parallel to the physical picture. If, on the other hand, there is some form of irreducible transitional action required for perception then both the Platonic notions and the Block Universe have a fatal flaw. Real world computations do not occur in zero time. There is a delay. In the case of humans this delay has been measured to be between 50 and 100 milliseconds. The world you perceive is an image of the world up to 100ms in the past. There is evidence for irreducible time in perception. Cogito ergo eram: I think, therefore I was. Computing the universe separately, as you propose, does not solve this obstruction in the nature of perception. On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 1:27 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Bruno, Again you avoid the question. You need to give everyone a clear and convincing reason in English. Just requoting some abstract mathematical proof won't suffice unless you can prove it actually applies. If there is really a way to get motion from stasis you should be able to simply state the core of the argument in plain English. There simply is no way to get motion from non-motion, either in your theory or in block timeYou can look at it from any perspective you want to but unless something moves nothing moves... Of course you can use the same 'cop out' that block time does when it claims that an observer in every static frame of block time perceives a sequence of events, but that doesn't work to move anything. It's still just a sequence of cartoon frames which are obviously completely static. A static motionless observer sees them as a motionless sequence. Only an ACTIVELY MOVING reader of the cartoon can provide the apparent sequence of the cartoon frames that makes them meaningful. But of course actually both observer and universe are actively moving as they are continually being recomputed in the present moment of p-time If the sequence seems to move it's only because that cartoon reader is already moving himself. So without a moving observer rather than a static 1p observer, to use your terminology, there can be no motion. Unless the 1p observer is himself alive and moving there can be no motion in his perspective. There is simply no way around that. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 12:27:59 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jan 2014, at 17:34, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Bruno, You continue to avoid the actual question. How does a static reality of all true arithmetic in Platonia actually result in change and the flow of time? You just claim everyone knows it. Where. I just said (see below) that everybody knows it is never an argument. You misread me. On the contrary I said that I can explain it, but then it is long. Then, I point on the literature, and mention that the fact that arithmetic is Turing complete is known by experts. Do you agree that arithmetic emulates all computations? I guess not. Until you can give a convincing answer to that your theory can't be taken seriously. By who? I have never have any problem with that. On the contrary, most physicists already believe that the theory of relativity go in that direction (even more so in Gödel's solution of Einstein's GR equation, with looping time. I can give you an answer, except I am not sure you will study it. I will explain it to you when you answer the questions I asked about your theory. What does it assume, and how do you use it to prevent the UD Argument to proceed? Just claiming that different observers have different perspectives on that reality doesn't make those perspectives active, they would still be static. Seen from the big picture (arithmetical truth) you are right. Seen from the perspective of the internal creatures, you are wrong, at least in the sense, that those creatures have all reason to infer time and space, etc. They will talk about that like you and me. Do you think that a machine can distinguish being a living person inhabiting on Earth, and being a living person on Earth emulated on some computer, or in arithmetic. And of course block time has the exact same problem of course is a symptom of lack of argument. You are just looking at the 3p picture, and not at the 1p views of the entities in that 3p reality. You could as well say that a brain has no relation with consciousness, as there is no 1p sensations observed when we look at a brain. But comp associates consciousness, including consciousness of time to the 1p that we can as ...
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Stephen, It's an error to assume that perception has anything to do with things moving. The current information state of the entire universe is continually being computed whether it's being perceived by anyone or not. Perception has nothing to do with it except apparently in the erroneous block time and UD theories which seem to claim that without things being perceived there is no motion, and that therefore there is no 'actual' motion which is anthropomorphic nonsense The perceptions of individual organisms are just subsets of the overall universal computation. They have nothing to do with the fact that the whole universe is being actively computed. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 1:50:03 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, We can get to the root of the obstruction, perhaps, is the nature of perception. If perception, physically speaking, is the mere matching between some bit of the world to some bit in the brain (or whatever is running the recursively enumerable functions) then this would match up with the Block Universe concept. The representational (or numerical or computational) picture would involve a mapping between identical bits in a way that is parallel to the physical picture. If, on the other hand, there is some form of irreducible transitional action required for perception then both the Platonic notions and the Block Universe have a fatal flaw. Real world computations do not occur in zero time. There is a delay. In the case of humans this delay has been measured to be between 50 and 100 milliseconds. The world you perceive is an image of the world up to 100ms in the past. There is evidence for irreducible time in perception. Cogito ergo eram: I think, therefore I was. Computing the universe separately, as you propose, does not solve this obstruction in the nature of perception. On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 1:27 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Bruno, Again you avoid the question. You need to give everyone a clear and convincing reason in English. Just requoting some abstract mathematical proof won't suffice unless you can prove it actually applies. If there is really a way to get motion from stasis you should be able to simply state the core of the argument in plain English. There simply is no way to get motion from non-motion, either in your theory or in block timeYou can look at it from any perspective you want to but unless something moves nothing moves... Of course you can use the same 'cop out' that block time does when it claims that an observer in every static frame of block time perceives a sequence of events, but that doesn't work to move anything. It's still just a sequence of cartoon frames whi ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Edgar, On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, It's an error to assume that perception has anything to do with things moving. No, No! Not moving in a space- changing position coordinates, but some form of motion. For example, the spin of an electron is a form of motion, but it is not moving in the usual sense. The current information state of the entire universe is continually being computed whether it's being perceived by anyone or not. Perception has nothing to do with it except apparently in the erroneous block time and UD theories which seem to claim that without things being perceived there is no motion, and that therefore there is no 'actual' motion which is anthropomorphic nonsense If the computation is the perception? My beef with your thinking is that you take perception as a passive relation and not an action. The perceptions of individual organisms are just subsets of the overall universal computation. They have nothing to do with the fact that the whole universe is being actively computed. Sure, it is being computed piece-wise by all of its participants. There is not need to propose a separate computational space, until we get into specifics of physics. A mind for this simplistic toy model of what I advocate, is the computation and involves self-modeling at some level. Self-modeling need not be complete self-simulation, it only need to compute the relative position of the fingers and toes, for example. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 1:50:03 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, We can get to the root of the obstruction, perhaps, is the nature of perception. If perception, physically speaking, is the mere matching between some bit of the world to some bit in the brain (or whatever is running the recursively enumerable functions) then this would match up with the Block Universe concept. The representational (or numerical or computational) picture would involve a mapping between identical bits in a way that is parallel to the physical picture. If, on the other hand, there is some form of irreducible transitional action required for perception then both the Platonic notions and the Block Universe have a fatal flaw. Real world computations do not occur in zero time. There is a delay. In the case of humans this delay has been measured to be between 50 and 100 milliseconds. The world you perceive is an image of the world up to 100ms in the past. There is evidence for irreducible time in perception. Cogito ergo eram: I think, therefore I was. Computing the universe separately, as you propose, does not solve this obstruction in the nature of perception. On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 1:27 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Bruno, Again you avoid the question. You need to give everyone a clear and convincing reason in English. Just requoting some abstract mathematical proof won't suffice unless you can prove it actually applies. If there is really a way to get motion from stasis you should be able to simply state the core of the argument in plain English. There simply is no way to get motion from non-motion, either in your theory or in block timeYou can look at it from any perspective you want to but unless something moves nothing moves... Of course you can use the same 'cop out' that block time does when it claims that an observer in every static frame of block time perceives a sequence of events, but that doesn't work to move anything. It's still just a sequence of cartoon frames whi ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: Tegmark's New Book
2014/1/21 Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net Bruno, Again you avoid the question. You need to give everyone a clear and convincing reason in English. As we say in french C'est l'hôpital qui se fout de la charité... Quentin Just requoting some abstract mathematical proof won't suffice unless you can prove it actually applies. If there is really a way to get motion from stasis you should be able to simply state the core of the argument in plain English. There simply is no way to get motion from non-motion, either in your theory or in block timeYou can look at it from any perspective you want to but unless something moves nothing moves... Of course you can use the same 'cop out' that block time does when it claims that an observer in every static frame of block time perceives a sequence of events, but that doesn't work to move anything. It's still just a sequence of cartoon frames which are obviously completely static. A static motionless observer sees them as a motionless sequence. Only an ACTIVELY MOVING reader of the cartoon can provide the apparent sequence of the cartoon frames that makes them meaningful. But of course actually both observer and universe are actively moving as they are continually being recomputed in the present moment of p-time If the sequence seems to move it's only because that cartoon reader is already moving himself. So without a moving observer rather than a static 1p observer, to use your terminology, there can be no motion. Unless the 1p observer is himself alive and moving there can be no motion in his perspective. There is simply no way around that. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 12:27:59 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jan 2014, at 17:34, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Bruno, You continue to avoid the actual question. How does a static reality of all true arithmetic in Platonia actually result in change and the flow of time? You just claim everyone knows it. Where. I just said (see below) that everybody knows it is never an argument. You misread me. On the contrary I said that I can explain it, but then it is long. Then, I point on the literature, and mention that the fact that arithmetic is Turing complete is known by experts. Do you agree that arithmetic emulates all computations? I guess not. Until you can give a convincing answer to that your theory can't be taken seriously. By who? I have never have any problem with that. On the contrary, most physicists already believe that the theory of relativity go in that direction (even more so in Gödel's solution of Einstein's GR equation, with looping time. I can give you an answer, except I am not sure you will study it. I will explain it to you when you answer the questions I asked about your theory. What does it assume, and how do you use it to prevent the UD Argument to proceed? Just claiming that different observers have different perspectives on that reality doesn't make those perspectives active, they would still be static. Seen from the big picture (arithmetical truth) you are right. Seen from the perspective of the internal creatures, you are wrong, at least in the sense, that those creatures have all reason to infer time and space, etc. They will talk about that like you and me. Do you think that a machine can distinguish being a living person inhabiting on Earth, and being a living person on Earth emulated on some computer, or in arithmetic. And of course block time has the exact same problem of course is a symptom of lack of argument. You are just looking at the 3p picture, and not at the 1p views of the entities in that 3p reality. You could as well say that a brain has no relation with consciousness, as there is no 1p sensations observed when we look at a brain. But comp associates consciousness, including consciousness of time to the 1p that we can as ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Stephen, Yes, I understand not necessarily moving in space but just moving in the sense of being actively computed. That's what I am talking about. Thought that was understood... And I do NOT take perception as passive. It's an ACTIVE computation, a computational interaction with the program of an organism with that of sensory information input from the external world's computations. I thought that was understood also.. And there is no SEPARATE computational space (that needs to be proposed). There is ONLY computational space. All actual reality is the current computational results of that computational space. There is no actual classical physical world. The notion of a physical material world is an INTERPRETATION of the information results of the computational space in the mind of some observer. It's the way the information is modeled or simulated by a mind. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 2:05:38 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Stephen, It's an error to assume that perception has anything to do with things moving. No, No! Not moving in a space- changing position coordinates, but some form of motion. For example, the spin of an electron is a form of motion, but it is not moving in the usual sense. The current information state of the entire universe is continually being computed whether it's being perceived by anyone or not. Perception has nothing to do with it except apparently in the erroneous block time and UD theories which seem to claim that without things being perceived there is no motion, and that therefore there is no 'actual' motion which is anthropomorphic nonsense If the computation is the perception? My beef with your thinking is that you take perception as a passive relation and not an action. The perceptions of individual organisms are just subsets of the overall universal computation. They have nothing to do with the fact that the whole universe is being actively computed. Sure, it is being computed piece-wise by all of its participants. There is not need to propose a separate computational space, until we get into specifics of physics. A mind for this simplistic toy model of what I advocate, is the computation and involves self-modeling at some level. Self-modeling need not be complete self-simulation, it only need to compute the relative position of the fingers and toes, for example. Edgar On Tuesday, Jan ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/21/2014 2:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Jan 2014, at 18:36, meekerdb wrote: On 1/20/2014 12:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote: On 1/19/2014 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why should that imply *existence*. It does not. Unless we believe in the axioms, which is the case for elementary arithmetic. But what does believe in the axioms mean. Do we really believe we can *always* add one more? I find it doubtful. It's just a good model for most countable things. So I can believe the axioms imply the theorems and that 17 is prime is a theorem, but I don't think that commits me to any existence in the normal sense of THAT exists. Because you are chosing the physicalist ostensive definition of what exists, like Aristotelians, but you beg the question here. I don't see that you've explained what question I begged. Just because I define things ostensively does not entail that reject explanations of their existence - if that's what you are implying. The point is that, in that case, you should not say yes to the doctor. Why not. The doctor is going install a physical prosthetic. As you've agreed before, it will not be *exactly* like me - but I'm not exactly the same from day to day anyway. But you overlook the UDA here. The UDA is the explanation why if you say yes to the doctor qua computatio, the physical must be recovered from arithmetic, in some special way. But that seems me an example of the misplaced concrete. I have a lot more confidence in the physical functionality of a well tested artificial neuron than I have in the UDA. So I may well say yes to the doctor without accepting arithmetical realism, the mathematical definition of exists, or the running of a UD. You can always add magic of course. This can be used for any theory of physics. I think your critics can be sum up by the belief that step 8 is non valid. I am suspicious that it only proves that a zero-physics simulation is possible in a different world where the physics is simulated too. In other words it's conclusion is only valid if the scope is made arbitrarily large and the MG, in effect, becomes a different world. Brent But step 8 talks about reality, so it is not purely logical, and step 8 just shows how ad hoc that move is. It is made equivalent to the way creationist reason, except it is done for the creation instead of the creator. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)
On 1/21/2014 2:14 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Thanks for the info. It is very interesting and It helps in many ways. The problem with mathematical notation is that it is good to store and systematize knowledge, not to make it understandable. The transmission of knowledge can only be done by replaying the historical process that produces the discovery of that knowledge, as Feyerabend said. And this historical process of discovery-learning-transmission can never have the form of some formalism, but the form of concrete problems and partial steps to a solution in a narrative in which the formalism is nothing but the conclussion of the history, not the starting point. Right, learning the formalism must ultimately be grounded in examples and ostensive definitions. Doing it in the reverse order is one of the greatest mistake of education at all levels that the positivist rationalsim has perpetrated and it is a product of a complete misunderstanding that the modern rationalism has about the human mind since it rejected the greek philosophy. On the contrary positivism denigrated formalism as mere talk connecting one observation to another. It over emphasized the role of observations and ostensive definition. Brent Another problem of mathematical notation, like any other language, is that it tries to be formal, but part of the definitions necessary for his understanding are necessarily outside of itself. Mathematics may be a context-free language, but philosophy is not, as well as mathematics when it is applied to something outside of itself. but that is only an intuition that I have not entirely formalized. 2014/1/21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 20 Jan 2014, at 23:47, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 08:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: If you remember Cantor, you see that if we take all variables into account, the multiverse is already a continuum. OK? A world is defined by a infinite sequence like true, false, false, true, true, true, ... corresponding to p, q, r, p1, q1, r1, p2, q2, ... I assume it's a continuum, rather than a countable infinity because if it was countable we could list all the worlds, but of course we can diagonalise the list by changing each truth value. Very good. (Those who does not get this can ask for more explanations). On 21 Jan 2014, at 01:32, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 08:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Are the following laws? I don't put the last outer parenthesis for reason of readability. p - p This is a law because p - q is equivalent to (~p V q) and (p V ~p) must be (true OR false), or (false OR true) which are both true (p q) - p using (~p V q) gives (~(p q) V q) ... using 0 and 1 for false and true ... (0,0), (0,1) and (1,0) give 1, (1,1) gives 1 ... so this is true. So it is a law. I think. (p q) - q Hmm. (~(p q) V q) is ... the same as above. p - (p V q) (~p V (p V q)) must be true because of the p V ~p that's in there (as per the first one) q - (p V q) Is the same...hm, these are all laws (apparently). I feel as though I'm probably missing something and getting this all wrong. Have I misunderstood something ? No, it is all good, Liz! What about: (p V q) - p and p - (p q) What about (still in CPL) the question: is (p q) - r equivalent with p - (q - r) Oh! You did not answer: ((COLD WET) - ICE) - ((COLD - ICE) V (WET - ICE)) So what? Afraid of the logician's trick? Or of the logician's madness? Try this one if you are afraid to be influenced by your intuition aboutCOLD, WET and ICE: ((p q) - r) - ((p - r) V (q - r)) Is that a law? And what about the modal []p - p ? What about the []p - [][]p, and p - []p ? Is that true in all worlds? Let me an answer the first one: []p - p. The difficulty is that we can't use the truth table, (can you see why) but we have the meaning of []p. Indeed it means that p is true in all world. Now, p itself is either true in all worlds, or it is not true in all worlds. Note that p - p is true in all world (as you have shown above, it is (~p V p), so in each world each p is either true or false. If p is true in all worlds, then p is a law. But if p is true in all world, any A - p will be true too, given that for making A - p false, you need p false (truth is implied by anything, in CPL). So if p itself is a law, []p - is a law. For example (p-p) is a law, so [] (p-p) - (p-p) for example. But what if p is not a law? then ~[]p is true, and has to be true in all worlds. With this simple semantic of Leibniz, []p really simply means that p is true in all world, that is automatically true in all world. If p is not a law, ~[]p is true, and, as I said, this has to be true in all world (in all world we have that p is not a law). So []p is false in all worlds. But false - anything in CPL. OK? So []p - p is always satisfied in that case too. So, no matter what, p being a law or not, in that Leibnizian universe: []p - p *is* a law. In Leibniz
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/21/2014 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:19, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, Is it possible for a Computation to be a Model also? What is the obstruction? ? Is it possible for an apple to be an orange? Computation are very special abstract, yet of a syntactical nature, relations (between numbers, say, or combinators, lisp expressions, etc.) I have defined them by a sequence phi_i(j)^n, with n = 0, 1, 2, ... Model are structured set (or arrows in some category) satisfying formula. Of course this a quite different meaning than scientists and engineers have in mind when they say model. They mean a theory which they do not assume to be complete but to only make predictions within some limited domain - and so it may be regarded as a function or a set of possible computations combined with an interpretation, e.g. an elastic model of a structure. Brent Those are quite different things. It does not mean that there are not some relation. Usually the computations can be represented by some object in some model of some Turing complete theory, like RA, PA, or ZF. Models are semantic notions, studied in model theory. Computations are more syntactical objects (finite or infinite, though) studied in recursion or computability theory, or in computation theory. Bruno On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Jan 2014, at 07:27, Stephen Paul King wrote: No! This is not unknown. I am cobbling ideas together, sure, think about it! What are we thinking? If the UD implements or emulates all computations then it implements all worlds, ala Kripke. That would include all models of self-consistent theories. It is not that simple, alas. A computation is not a model. I have try hard to get a relation like that, because this would simplify the relation between UDA and AUDA. I progress on this, but that problem is not yet solved. Bruno On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 1:22 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/19/2014 10:01 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Exactly, what about all the models of all the worlds that follow different axioms? Those can possibly exist, thus they must. What is not impossible, is compulsory! Did you just make that up? :-) Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 tel:%28864%29%20567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com mailto:stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/21/2014 2:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jan 2014, at 02:25, meekerdb wrote: On 1/20/2014 5:00 PM, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 06:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/20/2014 1:11 AM, LizR wrote: On 20 January 2014 18:51, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: You seem not to appreciate that this dissipates the one essential advantage of mathematical monism: we understand mathematics (because, I say, we invent it). But if it's a mere human invention trying to model the Platonic ding and sich then PA may not be the real arithmetic. And there will have to be some magic math stuff that makes the real arithmetic really real. Surely the real test is whether it works better than any other theory. (The phrase unreasonable effectiveness appears to indicate that it does.) Would it work any less well if there were a biggest number? I don't know. I would imagine so, because that would be a theory with an ad hoc extra clause with no obvious justification, so every calculation would have to carry extra baggage around. If I raise a number to the power of 100, say, I have to check first that the result isn't going to exceed the biggest number, and take appropriate action - whatever that is - if it will... what would be the point of that? Just make it an axiom that the biggest number is bigger than any number you calculate. In other words just prohibit using those ... and so forth in your theorems. Just to be sure, step 8 shows that a physicalist form of ultrafinitism (there is a primitively ontological universe, and it is small) is a red herring. If you assume a mathematical ultrafinitism, then yes, UDA does no more go through. But mathematical ultrafinitism makes it impossible to even define comp, so that is really a stopping at step zero. So, yes, an ultrafinitist *mathematician* can say yes to the doctor (without knowing what it does), and survive, and this is one little universe. But he can't know what it does in an infinitist universe either. I thought that's why you've always emphasized that saying yes to the doctor was a bet, not something one could be certain of. Brent If UDA leads to mathematical ultrafinitism, that is enough a reductio ad absurdo to me. God created 0, 1, ... and when getting 10^100, he felt tired and stop. Then he *has* to create a primitive physical universe, if he want see Adam and Eve indeed. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/21/2014 2:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Only to make the UDA non valid. It works, if Brent meant a mathematical ultrafinitism. But this change comp, like it changes elementary arithmetic (which suppose at least that 0 ≠ s(x), and x ≠ y implies s(x) ≠ s(y), which can't be true in ultrafinitism). Ultrafinitism makes all current physical theories meaningless. How can that be when all current physical theories are tested by computation on finite digital computers and all observations are finite rational numbers? I'd say the meaning of theories comes in their application - not from an axiom system. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 06:18:16AM -0800, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, January 20, 2014 4:01:03 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, Here's one more theory from the many in my book on Reality: As Misner, Thorne and Wheeler note briefly in their book on Gravitation, INTERgalactic space is continually expanding with the Hubble expansion, however INTRAgalactic space is NOT expanding because it is gravitationally bound. Now the obvious effect of this (as I'm the first to have pointed out so far as I know) is that space will necessarily be warped at the boundaries of galaxies, and as is well know from GR any curvature of space produces gravitational effects, and of course dark matter halos around the EDGES of galaxies were invented to explain the otherwise unexplained extra gravitational effects on the rotation of galaxies. Thus, this simple effect of space warps around the boundaries of galaxies caused by the Hubble expansion may be the explanation for the dark matter effect. It may or may not be the cause of the entire effect, but it certainly must be having SOME effect, and over the lifetime of the universe one would expect that warping effect to be quite large. And there is nothing to prevent these warps, once they are created, to have a life and movement of their own, as we now know that dark matter is not just concentrated around galactic halos but may indicate where they used to be I'd be interested to see if anyone else sees how this effect might explain dark matter... Edgar It's an idea but I don't really get why expanding one side and not the other translates to a physical gradient. Conceptual presentations of the difference in gradient terms are feasible, but nothing is carried by that alone. I don't personally endorse comparing one theory to another with a view to keep one and delete the other. I do think there is good method and bad method though. What your idea looks like to me, is a seed insight. That is the very first step on a pretty long road to a theory. IMHO it's really poor form to burn someone else's seed insight. But it's terrible form to present a seed insight as if it's more. There needs to be a translation to some basic independent reality check. It doesn't have to be a lot, but getting a foothold there delivers something a million eloquent words will not. The idea is checkable in various ways. Whole clusters of galaxies may be gravitationally bound. Are you able to translate your idea to an expectation of some kind of distinction between halos around those galaxies? This para of Al's hits the nail on the head for me. To be convincing, one needs to do the actual stress-strain calculations to see if it can reproduce the well known empirical rotation curve of the Milky Way. Realistically, this is beyond my capabilities at present, and beyond my interest levels to learn :). My gut feeling here is that space doesn't wrinkle near galactic boundaries, but rather there would be a smooth pressure that increases the further you are from the galactic centre, due to the expansion of the universe. It boggles the mind that that would have been overlooked by cosmologists, though. Another thing to bear in mind is that all galaxies within the local group are gravitationally bound, including the two best know members, Andromeda and our own Galaxy. Taking your interpretation of MTW's comment literally would imply we shouldn't see the affect of space wrinking until we get to the halo of the local group, but the dark matter problem is clearly observed in the rotation curve of the Milky Way. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 1/21/2014 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: That is already present in Gödel 1931, and today we know that even just one diophantine (on integeres) polynomial of degree four can emulated all computations; or be Turing universal. Just to check that I understand what that means: There is a diophantine equation such that you can parse a solution set of the equation into an input and a result such that the set of all such solutions sets correspond to all possible functions (in arithmetice). Right? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A humble suggestion to the group
How would you guys collect on this friendly bet? What evidence would definitively prove who is right? -Original Message- From: Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tue, Jan 21, 2014 1:47 pm Subject: Re: A humble suggestion to the group Pierz, How about a $100 bet on who's right about spacetime expansion? You or Misner, Thorne, Wheeler and me? :-) Edgar On Monday, January 20, 2014 6:42:59 PM UTC-5, Pierz wrote: Haha. Edgar, I have also modified my views through participation on this list. As it has for Liz, Bruno's comp has become borderline credible to me, though I am far from a true believer. I've also been educated in a lot of philosophy of mind and had my grasp of key concepts in physics refined and sharpened. My fundamental position on AI has been altered significantly. The process of changing one's core beliefs is a slow, iterative one. Everyone's world view is a work in progress, or should be. But necessarily and rightly, we change by doing our best to defend our ideas against attack and critique. There's a certain irony to your remarks, because I have certainly seen not an iota of willingness on your part to change your views. It seems rather that you think it your business to bring enlightenment to everyone else here without truly opening your eyes and ears to competing or contradictory ideas. And it's rather disingenuous of you to talk about subjecting our ideas to a regime of tests when you completely ignored my $100 challenge to define any way to experimentally falsify your Universal Present Moment. That whole thread was the most exhausting, prolonged piece of head-against-the-wall-bashing I've encountered on this list, and believe me I've seen a few! On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 9:25:58 AM UTC+11, Brent wrote: On 1/20/2014 11:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen wrote: There are obviously a lot of very intelligent members here who are well read in modern science. I think everyone would agree with this. Except for a few that are unfamiliar with relativity theory. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A humble suggestion to the group
Spud, We could always ask Kip Thorne who is a of course a leading authority on gravitation to judge. I'm just repeating what his book says. If anyone has the book Gravitation, Misner, Thorne and Wheeler explain this on page 718. I also ran this dark matter theory by Leonard Susskind a couple years back and he said it was certainly a possibility.. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 3:53:07 PM UTC-5, spudb...@aol.com wrote: How would you guys collect on this friendly bet? What evidence would definitively prove who is right? -Original Message- From: Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript: To: everything-list everyth...@googlegroups.com javascript: Sent: Tue, Jan 21, 2014 1:47 pm Subject: Re: A humble suggestion to the group Pierz, How about a $100 bet on who's right about spacetime expansion? You or Misner, Thorne, Wheeler and me? :-) Edgar On Monday, January 20, 2014 6:42:59 PM UTC-5, Pierz wrote: Haha. Edgar, I have also modified my views through participation on this list. As it has for Liz, Bruno's comp has become borderline credible to me, though I am far from a true believer. I've also been educated in a lot of philosophy of mind and had my grasp of key concepts in physics refined and sharpened. My fundamental position on AI has been altered significantly. The process of changing one's core beliefs is a slow, iterative one. Everyone's world view is a work in progress, or should be. But necessarily and rightly, we change by doing our best to defend our ideas against attack and critique. There's a certain irony to your remarks, because I have certainly seen not an iota of willingness on your part to change *your* views. It seems rather that you think it your business to bring enlightenment to everyone else here without truly opening your eyes and ears to competing or contradictory ideas. And it's rather disingenuous of you to talk about subjecting our ideas to a regime of tests when you completely ignored my $100 challenge to define any way to experimentally falsify your Universal Present Moment. That whole thread was the most exhausting, prolonged piece of head-against-the-wall-bashing I've encountered on this list, and believe me I've seen a few! On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 9:25:58 AM UTC+11, Brent wrote: On 1/20/2014 11:18 AM, Edgar L. Owen wrote: There are obviously a lot of very intelligent members here who are well read in modern science. I think everyone would agree with this. Except for a few that are unfamiliar with relativity theory. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A theory of dark matter...
Russell, Sure of course. To repeat what I've already said above, the actual effects will be extremely complex simply because the actual distribution of matter is extremely complex and varies with time. One would need to actually calculate the cumulative effects over time of the warping and compare with the observed distribution of dark 'matter'. I was careful to state this is a POSSIBLE dark matter effect, and not necessarily the only one. Nevertheless it should be a quite significant effect if the Hubble expansion has been producing it for 13.7 billion years. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 3:51:54 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 06:18:16AM -0800, ghi...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Monday, January 20, 2014 4:01:03 PM UTC, Edgar L. Owen wrote: All, Here's one more theory from the many in my book on Reality: As Misner, Thorne and Wheeler note briefly in their book on Gravitation, INTERgalactic space is continually expanding with the Hubble expansion, however INTRAgalactic space is NOT expanding because it is gravitationally bound. Now the obvious effect of this (as I'm the first to have pointed out so far as I know) is that space will necessarily be warped at the boundaries of galaxies, and as is well know from GR any curvature of space produces gravitational effects, and of course dark matter halos around the EDGES of galaxies were invented to explain the otherwise unexplained extra gravitational effects on the rotation of galaxies. Thus, this simple effect of space warps around the boundaries of galaxies caused by the Hubble expansion may be the explanation for the dark matter effect. It may or may not be the cause of the entire effect, but it certainly must be having SOME effect, and over the lifetime of the universe one would expect that warping effect to be quite large. And there is nothing to prevent these warps, once they are created, to have a life and movement of their own, as we now know that dark matter is not just concentrated around galactic halos but may indicate where they used to be I'd be interested to see if anyone else sees how this effect might explain dark matter... Edgar It's an idea but I don't really get why expanding one side and not the other translates to a physical gradient. Conceptual presentations of the difference in gradient terms are feasible, but nothing is carried by that alone. I don't personally endorse comparing one theory to another with a view to keep one and delete the other. I do think there is good method and bad method though. What your idea looks like to me, is a seed insight. That is the very first step on a pretty long road to a theory. IMHO it's really poor form to burn someone else's seed insight. But it's terrible form to present a seed insight as if it's more. There needs to be a translation to some basic independent reality check. It doesn't have to be a lot, but getting a foothold there delivers something a million eloquent words will not. The idea is checkable in various ways. Whole clusters of galaxies may be gravitationally bound. Are you able to translate your idea to an expectation of some kind of distinction between halos around those galaxies? This para of Al's hits the nail on the head for me. To be convincing, one needs to do the actual stress-strain calculations to see if it can reproduce the well known empirical rotation curve of the Milky Way. Realistically, this is beyond my capabilities at present, and beyond my interest levels to learn :). My gut feeling here is that space doesn't wrinkle near galactic boundaries, but rather there would be a smooth pressure that increases the further you are from the galactic centre, due to the expansion of the universe. It boggles the mind that that would have been overlooked by cosmologists, though. Another thing to bear in mind is that all galaxies within the local group are gravitationally bound, including the two best know members, Andromeda and our own Galaxy. Taking your interpretation of MTW's comment literally would imply we shouldn't see the affect of space wrinking until we get to the halo of the local group, but the dark matter problem is clearly observed in the rotation curve of the Milky Way. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message
Re: On differentiation of universes in MWI
On 1/21/2014 5:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jan 2014, at 06:47, Pierz wrote:
The question is whether a whole universe is created for each state in a superposition.
Deutsch seems unequivocal that it is.
Hmm, Deutsch might have change his mind. he was also sure that there is a base problem,
but he changes on it.
Liz is right. The differentiation of the universe is a local phenomenon. But the
universe is full of intracting things, and this made the differentiation spreading (at
sub-light speed though).
I'm just questioning a) whether that's what he really means and b) whether that is
necessary.
Deutsch prefers to abandon the idea of splitting universe. I follow him on that, but
this is almost a problem of vocabulary, and in english what happens is hard to simplify.
Imagine a particle in the state up + down, and imagine me, not looking at the
particle.
The quantum state me X (up + down) is the same state as (me X up + me X down). Is
there one me, or two me. Deustch would say two me, but two fungible me. There is only
one 1p, but you have the choice of two 3p or one, according to the equality
me X (up + down) = (me X up + me X down).
The same happens for the rest of the universe. If I look at the particle, in the {up,
down} base, then I will differentiate (the two 3p me get two 1p me), or I will
bifurcate, that is there is one more 3p me.
In fact those wording are exactly equivalent by linearity.
And it is not only you, but any subset of the environment which big enough to effect
decoherence. Since there is lots of decoherence happening at a level below your conscious
recognition, these 'decohered, semi-classical worlds' are still the same world to you, or
put the other way 'you' are spread across these slightly different worlds. So there are
degrees or levels of splitting.
I don't dig on that issue for two reasons.
- One general: I just do not find an infinity of universe extravagant. A finite numbers
of universe would seem more extravagant to me (and to most everythingers, by definition).
I don't know about infinite, but there must be many making up the level of observation;
otherwise it would be hard to realize probabilities like 1/pi.
Brent
- One with comp: there is zero such universe in that case, which nullifies that
extravagance problem. There is only {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}. Or {K, S, KK, KS, SK, SS, ...}.
It is equivalent.
Bruno
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Re: Tegmark's New Book
Stephen, OK, with these clarifications let's see what we can agree on so far. 1. Block time is a BS theory. We know we agree on that. 2. Do you agree that Bruno's USA can also be discounted for the same reason block time can be, that there is no way to get movement out of it? 3. Do you agree that there must be some fundamental notion of movement (not movement in space, but in the sense of things happening) at the fundamental level? 4. Do you agree that implies some notion of time flowing? 5. Do you agree that reality is fundamentally computational? That in some sense or other the universe is the result of a computational process? The advantages are that this immediately explains the unreasonable effectiveness of math and solves the problem of how there can be laws of nature that somehow mysteriously control an assumed physical universe from some nether realm outside that universe (a problem Penrose grapples with unsuccessfully in his 'Road to Reality'). Assuming a computational reality immediate incorporates the laws of nature as an actual part of that reality that actively compute it. Let's stop here for now and see if we can agree on these 5 to begin with. And feel free to suggest some points of your own if you like... Best, Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 2:34:39 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Stephen, Yes, I understand not necessarily moving in space but just moving in the sense of being actively computed. That's what I am talking about. Thought that was understood... And I do NOT take perception as passive. It's an ACTIVE computation, a computational interaction with the program of an organism with that of sensory information input from the external world's computations. I thought that was understood also.. And there is no SEPARATE computational space (that needs to be proposed). There is ONLY computational space. All actual reality is the current computational results of that computational space. There is no actual classical physical world. The notion of a physical material world is an INTERPRETATION of the information results of the computational space in the mind of some observer. It's the way the information is modeled or simulated by a mind. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 2:05:38 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Stephen, It's an error to assume that perception has anything to do with things moving. No, No! Not moving in a space- changing position coordinates, but some form of motion. For example, the spin of an electron is a form of motion, but it is not moving in the usual sense. The current information state of the entire universe is continually being computed whether it's being perceived by anyone or not. Perception has nothing to do with it except apparently in the erroneous block time and UD theories which seem to claim that without things being perceived there is no motion, and that therefore there is no 'actual' motion which is anthropomorphic nonsense If the computation is the perception? My beef with your thinking is that you take perception as a passive relation and not an action. bl ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Stephen, Typo alert. That should obviously be Bruno's UDA, not USA! Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 4:24:24 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Stephen, OK, with these clarifications let's see what we can agree on so far. 1. Block time is a BS theory. We know we agree on that. 2. Do you agree that Bruno's USA can also be discounted for the same reason block time can be, that there is no way to get movement out of it? 3. Do you agree that there must be some fundamental notion of movement (not movement in space, but in the sense of things happening) at the fundamental level? 4. Do you agree that implies some notion of time flowing? 5. Do you agree that reality is fundamentally computational? That in some sense or other the universe is the result of a computational process? The advantages are that this immediately explains the unreasonable effectiveness of math and solves the problem of how there can be laws of nature that somehow mysteriously control an assumed physical universe from some nether realm outside that universe (a problem Penrose grapples with unsuccessfully in his 'Road to Reality'). Assuming a computational reality immediate incorporates the laws of nature as an actual part of that reality that actively compute it. Let's stop here for now and see if we can agree on these 5 to begin with. And feel free to suggest some points of your own if you like... Best, Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 2:34:39 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Stephen, Yes, I understand not necessarily moving in space but just moving in the sense of being actively computed. That's what I am talking about. Thought that was understood... And I do NOT take perception as passive. It's an ACTIVE computation, a computational interaction with the program of an organism with that of sensory information input from the external world's computations. I thought that was understood also.. And there is no SEPARATE computational space (that needs to be proposed). There is ONLY computational space. All actual reality is the current computational results of that computational space. There is no actual classical physical world. The notion of a physical material world is an INTERPRETATION of the information results of the computational space in the mind of some observer. It's the way the information is modeled or simulated by a mind. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 2:05:38 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Stephen, It's an error to assume that perception has anything to do with things moving. No, No! Not moving in a space- changing position coordinates, but some form of motion. For example, the spin of an electron is a form of motion, but it is not moving in the usual sense. The current information state of the entire universe is continually being computed whether it's being perceived by anyone or not. Perception has nothing to do with it except apparently in the erroneous block time and UD theories which seem to claim that without things being perceived there is no motion, and that therefore there is no 'actual' motion which is anthropomorphic nonsense If the computation is the perception? My beef with your thinking is that you take perception as a passive relation and not an action. bl ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/21/2014 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Why would you want to do that? It seems like an unnecessary extra axiom that doesn't have any purpose or utility. It prevents the paradoxes of undeciability, Cantor diagonalization, and it corresponds more directly with how we actually use arithmetic. I'm not sure it helps. What you may gain from avoiding paradoxes makes many of our accepted proofs false. E.g. Euclids proof of infinite primes. Or Euler's identity. Most of math would be ruined. A circle's circumference would not even be pi*diameter. Would this biggest number be different for different beings in different universes? What is it contingent on? You're taking an Platonic view that there really is an arithmetic and whether there's a biggest number is an empirical question. I'm saying it's an invention. We invented an system in which you can always add 1 because that was convenient; you don't have to think about whether you can or not. But if it leads to paradoxes or absurdities we should just modify our invention keeping the good part and avoiding the paradoxes if we can. Peano's arithmetic will still be there in Platonia and sqrt(2) will be irrational there. But the diagonal of a unit square may depend on how we measure it or what it's made of. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Edgar, Cool! We are making progress in understanding each other. :-) Let me get into some details, where the devil is! On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 2:34 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, Yes, I understand not necessarily moving in space but just moving in the sense of being actively computed. That's what I am talking about. Thought that was understood... And I do NOT take perception as passive. It's an ACTIVE computation, a computational interaction with the program of an organism with that of sensory information input from the external world's computations. I thought that was understood also.. And there is no SEPARATE computational space (that needs to be proposed). There is ONLY computational space. All actual reality is the current computational results of that computational space. There is no actual classical physical world. The notion of a physical material world is an INTERPRETATION of the information results of the computational space in the mind of some observer. It's the way the information is modeled or simulated by a mind. Did you understand my argument that we can only use the notion of a single computational space if we wish to consider a timeless version of Computation? My argument follows the way that the Wheeler-Dewitt equationhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wheeler%E2%80%93DeWitt_equationshows that if we consider the Universe in terms of a single QM system, its wavefunction will be stationary. (Julian Barbour argues this well in his book http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_End_of_Time_(book).) From there we notice that this wave function lives in a Hilbert space that has infinitely many degrees of freedom and so can be partitioned up an infinite numbers of ways as sets of tensor products of Hilbert spaces. (The evolution of the phase of the wavefunctionhttp://www.pitt.edu/~afreitas/phy1370/qm_time_tutorial.pdfcan be identified with the computational action.) If we consider only those subsets of Hilbert spaces that are of finite degree of freedom (to avoid the measure and basis problems), we find that it is possible to obtain a notion of time that we can match up to a thermodynamic 'arrow' of entropy. We need this! Our notion of computations need some relation to thermodynamics or else we are risking thinking of computations as actions that do not require any association to physical actions. (Bruno does exactly this risky act, IMHO.) The disassociation of computation with physical action may seem to be a desirable item but it has a very bad consequence: it makes the perception of physical actions to lack a ontological necessitation! Why even have the appearance of a physical world if it is unnecessary (and can be chopped out of our reasoning using Occam's Razor as we see done in UDA step 8)? The fact is that we do perceive a physical world and ourselves as in it. To regard this as some accident or illusion is to throw away the very thing that is necessary to communicate between minds (that are defined computationally). Physical actions act as a means to partition up universal computations into separable entities and allows for the existence of local computations that are not universal that can perform tasks that would otherwise require too many resources to implement. There is a question that I throw at believers in the concept of reincarnation of a single Soul: Why is are multiple bodies necessary to the Soul? My tentative answer is: A body is the means by which one aspect of the Soul interacts with another and thus the Soul can evolve. To recap, I think that it is a mistake to assume that there is only a single computation going on. Single computations (ala a Universal Turing Machine, Lambda Calculus, Combinators, etc.) face insolvable problems when it comes to Concurrencyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concurrency_(computer_science). Using multiple, separable and distributed computations and logics that do not force ACID http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACID absolutely are a solution. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 2:05:38 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Stephen, It's an error to assume that perception has anything to do with things moving. No, No! Not moving in a space- changing position coordinates, but some form of motion. For example, the spin of an electron is a form of motion, but it is not moving in the usual sense. The current information state of the entire universe is continually being computed whether it's being perceived by anyone or not. Perception has nothing to do with it except apparently in the erroneous block time and UD theories which seem to claim that without things being perceived there is no motion, and that therefore there is no 'actual' motion which is anthropomorphic nonsense If the computation is the perception? My beef with your thinking is that you take perception as a passive
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 22 January 2014 07:27, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Bruno, Again you avoid the question. You need to give everyone a clear and convincing reason in English. Excuse me while I pick myself up off the floor. Talk about pot and kettle! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Edgar, On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 4:24 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, OK, with these clarifications let's see what we can agree on so far. 1. Block time is a BS theory. We know we agree on that. good! 2. Do you agree that Bruno's USA can also be discounted for the same reason block time can be, that there is no way to get movement out of it? No, the UDA serves a good purpose to show that there is some ontological merit in the idea that Numbers can serve as a fundamental ground for Mind as a Platonic Form. It is the timeless spacial case. 3. Do you agree that there must be some fundamental notion of movement (not movement in space, but in the sense of things happening) at the fundamental level? Yes, I denote this as Becoming is Fundamental. 4. Do you agree that implies some notion of time flowing? The imposition of finite measures onto the Becoming is the creation of a clock. Clocks are strictly local entities. It has been repeatedly proven that a single clock cannot order all possible events of space-time. Thus a singular Present Moment is an oxymoron, a self-contradicting idea. 5. Do you agree that reality is fundamentally computational? Yes, with caveats. That in some sense or other the universe is the result of a computational process? Yes, since I define a computation generally as any transformation of Information. The advantages are that this immediately explains the unreasonable effectiveness of math and solves the problem of how there can be laws of nature that somehow mysteriously control an assumed physical universe from some nether realm outside that universe (a problem Penrose grapples with unsuccessfully in his 'Road to Reality'). Assuming a computational reality immediate incorporates the laws of nature as an actual part of that reality that actively compute it. Sure, but we have to wrestle with the initial conditions Problem! If we assume multiple computations that compete for reality, we can start with the set of all possible computations and end up with a disjoint collection of realities, each semi-complete and self-consistent (up to some finite measure). Let's stop here for now and see if we can agree on these 5 to begin with. And feel free to suggest some points of your own if you like... Sure! Please see my other post where I get into more devilish details. Best, Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 2:34:39 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Stephen, Yes, I understand not necessarily moving in space but just moving in the sense of being actively computed. That's what I am talking about. Thought that was understood... And I do NOT take perception as passive. It's an ACTIVE computation, a computational interaction with the program of an organism with that of sensory information input from the external world's computations. I thought that was understood also.. And there is no SEPARATE computational space (that needs to be proposed). There is ONLY computational space. All actual reality is the current computational results of that computational space. There is no actual classical physical world. The notion of a physical material world is an INTERPRETATION of the information results of the computational space in the mind of some observer. It's the way the information is modeled or simulated by a mind. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 2:05:38 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net wrote: Stephen, It's an error to assume that perception has anything to do with things moving. No, No! Not moving in a space- changing position coordinates, but some form of motion. For example, the spin of an electron is a form of motion, but it is not moving in the usual sense. The current information state of the entire universe is continually being computed whether it's being perceived by anyone or not. Perception has nothing to do with it except apparently in the erroneous block time and UD theories which seem to claim that without things being perceived there is no motion, and that therefore there is no 'actual' motion which is anthropomorphic nonsense If the computation is the perception? My beef with your thinking is that you take perception as a passive relation and not an action. bl ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 21 January 2014 17:51, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, Did the notion of an Eigenform, as defined, make sense to you? Heinz performs the magic trick of convincing us that the familiar objects of our existence can be seen to be nothing more than tokens for the behaviors of the organism that apparently create stable forms. These stabilities persist, for that organism, as an observing system. This is not to deny an underlying reality that is the source of objects, but rather to emphasize the role of process, and the role of the organism in the production of a living map, a map that is so sensitive that map and territory are conjoined. Von Foerster’s (1981a-d) book and papers were instrumental in pioneering the field of second-order cybernetics. The notion of an eigenform is inextricably linked with second-order cybernetics. One starts on the road to such a concept as soon as one begins to consider a pattern of patterns, the form of form or the cybernetics of cybernetics. Such concepts appear to close around upon themselves, and at the same time they lead outward. They suggest the possibility of transcending the boundaries of a system from a locus that might have been within the system until the circular concept is called into being. But then the boundaries have turned inside out, and the inside is the outside. Forms are created from the concatenation of operations upon themselves and objects are not objects at all, but rather indications of processes. Upon encountering an object as such a form of creation, you are compelled to ask: How is that object created? How is it designed? What do I do to produce it? What is the network of productions? Where is the home of that object? In what context does it exist? How am I involved in its creation? The above hints at some sort of sense - it isn't something I could (quite) dismiss as postmodern nonsense, for example - but I think I can safely answer your question - no, please resubmit in plain English! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear LizR, Plain English explanations are the problem: they carry a set of ontological assumptions built it. Kauffman is challenging these assumptions and thus as to use a mixture of poetry and math to explain and elaborate the idea. On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 5:35 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 21 January 2014 17:51, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, Did the notion of an Eigenform, as defined, make sense to you? Heinz performs the magic trick of convincing us that the familiar objects of our existence can be seen to be nothing more than tokens for the behaviors of the organism that apparently create stable forms. These stabilities persist, for that organism, as an observing system. This is not to deny an underlying reality that is the source of objects, but rather to emphasize the role of process, and the role of the organism in the production of a living map, a map that is so sensitive that map and territory are conjoined. Von Foerster’s (1981a-d) book and papers were instrumental in pioneering the field of second-order cybernetics. The notion of an eigenform is inextricably linked with second-order cybernetics. One starts on the road to such a concept as soon as one begins to consider a pattern of patterns, the form of form or the cybernetics of cybernetics. Such concepts appear to close around upon themselves, and at the same time they lead outward. They suggest the possibility of transcending the boundaries of a system from a locus that might have been within the system until the circular concept is called into being. But then the boundaries have turned inside out, and the inside is the outside. Forms are created from the concatenation of operations upon themselves and objects are not objects at all, but rather indications of processes. Upon encountering an object as such a form of creation, you are compelled to ask: How is that object created? How is it designed? What do I do to produce it? What is the network of productions? Where is the home of that object? In what context does it exist? How am I involved in its creation? The above hints at some sort of sense - it isn't something I could (quite) dismiss as postmodern nonsense, for example - but I think I can safely answer your question - no, please resubmit in plain English! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
(This and a few other everything-list messages were sent to my email box, and I noticed that I hadn't seen them on the Google Groups website. Sure enough, they're not visible there. I searched for them, and they show up in the search list, but if I click on them, Google Groups crashes. Any idea what's up?) On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 9:02 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 *Neil Gershenfeld* http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB* Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. Party’s over. Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
Dear Gage, Are you attempting to view the Google group from a Google+ or Gmail environment? On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 5:39 PM, Gabe Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.com wrote: (This and a few other everything-list messages were sent to my email box, and I noticed that I hadn't seen them on the Google Groups website. Sure enough, they're not visible there. I searched for them, and they show up in the search list, but if I click on them, Google Groups crashes. Any idea what's up?) On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 9:02 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 *Neil Gershenfeld* http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB* Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. Party’s over. Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: First Ever Universe-Wide Cosmic Web Filaments Captured on Keck Observatory
Wow! Cool. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
Hi Stephen, I'm viewing these emails from Gmail. They don't show up on the list at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/everything-list whether I am logged out or logged in. However, I can search for them on that webpage. If I click the search results, a fresh installation of Chrome fails to load it (but fortunately does not crash). If it were just a privacy settings issue, then presumably the posts shouldn't show up in my email. :) -Gabe On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 4:42 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear Gage, Are you attempting to view the Google group from a Google+ or Gmail environment? On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 5:39 PM, Gabe Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.com wrote: (This and a few other everything-list messages were sent to my email box, and I noticed that I hadn't seen them on the Google Groups website. Sure enough, they're not visible there. I searched for them, and they show up in the search list, but if I click on them, Google Groups crashes. Any idea what's up?) On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 9:02 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 *Neil Gershenfeld* http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB* Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. Party’s over. Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer Science
Dear Gabe, You may need to purge your browser's cache. Google Groups tend to turn the browser into a resource hog. On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 5:47 PM, Gabe Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Stephen, I'm viewing these emails from Gmail. They don't show up on the list at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/everything-list whether I am logged out or logged in. However, I can search for them on that webpage. If I click the search results, a fresh installation of Chrome fails to load it (but fortunately does not crash). If it were just a privacy settings issue, then presumably the posts shouldn't show up in my email. :) -Gabe On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 4:42 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear Gage, Are you attempting to view the Google group from a Google+ or Gmail environment? On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 5:39 PM, Gabe Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.comwrote: (This and a few other everything-list messages were sent to my email box, and I noticed that I hadn't seen them on the Google Groups website. Sure enough, they're not visible there. I searched for them, and they show up in the search list, but if I click on them, Google Groups crashes. Any idea what's up?) On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 9:02 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 *Neil Gershenfeld* http://www.edge.org/memberbio/neil_gershenfeld *Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB* Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 years ago. We failed for 60 years to make an inorganic brain. Computer “Science” was never and never will be an empirical science at all. It is 100% the experimental exploration of theoretical models and has been generationally systemically confused with empirical science. Party’s over. Cheers Colin -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher
Re: A humble suggestion to the group
On 22 January 2014 10:02, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Spud, We could always ask Kip Thorne who is a of course a leading authority on gravitation to judge. I'm just repeating what his book says. If anyone has the book Gravitation, Misner, Thorne and Wheeler explain this on page 718. I do, so I can check that. I also ran this dark matter theory by Leonard Susskind a couple years back and he said it was certainly a possibility.. Did he have anything to say about your theory of P-time? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal Logic (Part 1: Leibniz)
On 21 January 2014 22:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Oh! You did not answer: ((COLD WET) - ICE) - ((COLD - ICE) V (WET - ICE)) So what? Afraid of the logician's trick? Or of the logician's madness? Try this one if you are afraid to be influenced by your intuition aboutCOLD, WET and ICE: No, I will get back to you on the rest when I have time. I ran out of time (plus I thought maybe I was going up the wrong path...you have reassured me about that now!) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: On differentiation of universes in MWI
On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 04:08:23PM +1300, LizR wrote: They talk about changes spreading out, perhaps gradually. ISTM that some changes aren't going to propagate very far or very fast. So the universe is full of bubbles in which there are a lot of local branches and I guess spaces in which they don't make enough difference to spread, or not much... Which sounds more like your source contol system, well, sort of. On 21 January 2014 14:56, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote: A second question/thought on MWI. MWI proposes that the entire universe splits at the point of wave collapse, or rather that it is continually and infinitely splitting with every possible quantum state. This has been understandably criticised as a vastly extravagant explanation. A whole universe, or even infinity of universes, for every quantum interaction seems a high price to play to eliminate the weirdness of wave collapse. Yet it seems to me that we can still get the explanatory benefits of MWI without this extravagance by seeing the situation slightly differently. An alternative interpretation, which I've long espoused, is that universe or world is an observer-relative or observer-defined thing. When a split or differentiation event occurs, what is actually happening is that one mind becomes two minds, each of which has an additional bit of information added to their respective observed worlds. A completely local process, to the extent that minds are local, but nothing gets propagated at the speed of light. The actual Multiverse, of course, is completely unchanged in this process, it continues on its unitary course, conserving information and all that. Nothing ontological (I carefully chose this word instead of physical) gets created. I believe this interpretation goes by the name of Many Minds, but I haven't found a clear enough explication of Many Minds to be sure. However, it is a distinctly different interpretation to the einselection model of Deutsch, Zeilinger and co, although I know of no physical situation where the interpretations can be distinguished, so it ultimately comes down to personal taste as to what strange pill you are prepared to swallow. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A humble suggestion to the group
No bet I'm afraid. I'm happy to concede on this point. When I think about it further, it makes sense that space must not expand in zones where gravity keeps objects from separating due to cosmological expansion. As a very well educated non-physicist/cosmologist, I've had occasion to be wrong several times on this list and I'm always prepared to revise my views. However, I'd still make the following points with regard to your dark matter theory. The observed optical warping of distant galaxies, in my understanding, was used to determine the location of dark matter; it was not the primary argument for the existence of it. That came from numerous observations of matter being more gravitationally bound than the observable matter could explain. Much more so. Crinkles around the edges of galaxies clearly do nothing to explain why galaxies seem hold together as if they had five times as much mass in them as we can see. Secondly, any such warping would be very easy to see in computer modelling. So why don't you use one of these tools: http://arxiv.org/abs/1212.4661 to check if your theory holds water? Funny that nobody has noticed it though. With regards to the remark: You're wrong on this. Remember that the next time you accuse me of being wrong about something. it's another example of your dismal grasp of logic and debate. Rightness or wrongness is a property of statements, not of people. I have no self-satisfied conviction of my intrinsic rightness and, contrary to remarks you've made before, I *love* to come across ideas that force me to revise my fundamental understandings. It's exciting and challenging. It's why I'm on this list. When I first read your universal present moment argument I did so with genuine open-mindedness. I'd have really enjoyed it if you'd succeeded in rocking my world. Unfortunately however you utterly failed to address the arguments put to you and you consistently exhibited a patronising, paternalistic attitude that merely ended up convincing me that you're an arrogant crackpot. But thanks for raising that $100. Because it's the first time you've acknowledged the fact that I challenged you to provide even a theoretical means of falsifying your theory. It wasn't even a bet. It was a free offer. The fact that you didn't respond was clearly a tacit acknowledgement of your incapacity to do so. So I ask: why should anyone be interested in a theory of time that a) solves no known scientific problems, b) contradicts all established empirical science and c) cannot be falsified experimentally? No, don't bother to answer. I've totally lost interest in what you have to say. On Wednesday, January 22, 2014 8:02:12 AM UTC+11, Edgar L. Owen wrote: Spud, We could always ask Kip Thorne who is a of course a leading authority on gravitation to judge. I'm just repeating what his book says. If anyone has the book Gravitation, Misner, Thorne and Wheeler explain this on page 718. I also ran this dark matter theory by Leonard Susskind a couple years back and he said it was certainly a possibility.. Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 3:53:07 PM UTC-5, spudb...@aol.com wrote: How would you guys collect on this friendly bet? What evidence would definitively prove who is right? -Original Message- From: Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net To: everything-list everyth...@googlegroups.com Sent: Tue, Jan 21, 2014 1:47 pm Subject: Re: A humble suggestion to the group Pierz, How about a $100 bet on who's right about spacetime expansion? You or Misner, Thorne, Wheeler and me? :-) Edgar On Monday, January 20, 2014 6:42:59 PM UTC-5, Pierz wrote: Haha. Edgar, I have also modified my views through participation on this list. As it has for Liz, Bruno's comp has become borderline credible to me, though I am far from a true believer. I've also been educated in a lot of philosophy of mind and had my grasp of key concepts in physics refined and sharpened. My fundamental position on AI has been altered significantly. The process of changing one's core beliefs is a slow, iterative one. Everyone's world view is a work in progress, or should be. But necessarily and rightly, we change by doing our best to defend our ideas against attack and critique. There's a certain irony to your remarks, because I have certainly seen not an iota of willingness on your part to change *your* views. It seems rather that you think it your business to bring enlightenment to everyone else here without truly opening your eyes and ears to competing or contradictory ideas. And it's rather disingenuous of you to talk about subjecting our ideas to a regime of tests when you completely ignored my $100 challenge to define any way to experimentally falsify your Universal Present Moment. That whole thread was the most exhausting, prolonged piece of head-against-the-wall-bashing I've encountered on this list, and believe me I've seen
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 3:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/21/2014 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Why would you want to do that? It seems like an unnecessary extra axiom that doesn't have any purpose or utility. It prevents the paradoxes of undeciability, Cantor diagonalization, and it corresponds more directly with how we actually use arithmetic. I'm not sure it helps. What you may gain from avoiding paradoxes makes many of our accepted proofs false. E.g. Euclids proof of infinite primes. Or Euler's identity. Most of math would be ruined. A circle's circumference would not even be pi*diameter. Would this biggest number be different for different beings in different universes? What is it contingent on? You're taking an Platonic view that there really is an arithmetic and whether there's a biggest number is an empirical question. I'm saying it's an invention. We invented an system in which you can always add 1 because that was convenient; you don't have to think about whether you can or not. So to use this same line of reasoning, would you say there is no definite (a priori) fact of the matter of whether or not a given program terminates, unless we actually build a machine executing that program and observe it terminate? If that is the case, when is it determined (for us) that a certain program terminates? Is it when the first being anywhere in any universe tests it, when someone in our universe tests it, when someone in our past light cone tests it, when you test it yourself or read about someone who did? Would it ever be possible for two beings in two different universes to find different results regarding the same program? If not, then what enforces this agreement? But if it leads to paradoxes or absurdities we should just modify our invention keeping the good part and avoiding the paradoxes if we can. Peano's arithmetic will still be there in Platonia and sqrt(2) will be irrational there. But the diagonal of a unit square may depend on how we measure it or what it's made of. Does this instrumentalist approach prevents one from having a theory of reality? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/21/2014 3:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 3:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/21/2014 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Why would you want to do that? It seems like an unnecessary extra axiom that doesn't have any purpose or utility. It prevents the paradoxes of undeciability, Cantor diagonalization, and it corresponds more directly with how we actually use arithmetic. I'm not sure it helps. What you may gain from avoiding paradoxes makes many of our accepted proofs false. E.g. Euclids proof of infinite primes. Or Euler's identity. Most of math would be ruined. A circle's circumference would not even be pi*diameter. Would this biggest number be different for different beings in different universes? What is it contingent on? You're taking an Platonic view that there really is an arithmetic and whether there's a biggest number is an empirical question. I'm saying it's an invention. We invented an system in which you can always add 1 because that was convenient; you don't have to think about whether you can or not. So to use this same line of reasoning, would you say there is no definite (a priori) fact of the matter of whether or not a given program terminates, unless we actually build a machine executing that program and observe it terminate? That's kind of mixing categories since 'program' (to you) means something in Platonia and there you don't need a machine to run it. In the physical world there is no question, all programs running on a machine terminate, for one reason or another. Non-terminating programs are the result of over idealization. If that is the case, when is it determined (for us) that a certain program terminates? Is it when the first being anywhere in any universe tests it, when someone in our universe tests it, when someone in our past light cone tests it, when you test it yourself or read about someone who did? Would it ever be possible for two beings in two different universes to find different results regarding the same program? If not, then what enforces this agreement? But if it leads to paradoxes or absurdities we should just modify our invention keeping the good part and avoiding the paradoxes if we can. Peano's arithmetic will still be there in Platonia and sqrt(2) will be irrational there. But the diagonal of a unit square may depend on how we measure it or what it's made of. Does this instrumentalist approach prevents one from having a theory of reality? Who said it's instrumentalist? Just because it considers a finite model of reality? When Bruno proposes to base things on arithmetic and leave analysis and set theory alone, does that make him an instrumentalist? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A humble suggestion to the group
Liz, Didn't ask him about p-time... Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 6:13:43 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 22 January 2014 10:02, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.net javascript:wrote: Spud, We could always ask Kip Thorne who is a of course a leading authority on gravitation to judge. I'm just repeating what his book says. If anyone has the book Gravitation, Misner, Thorne and Wheeler explain this on page 718. I do, so I can check that. I also ran this dark matter theory by Leonard Susskind a couple years back and he said it was certainly a possibility.. Did he have anything to say about your theory of P-time? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 10:18:32PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: But I see nothing that would imply that a rational agent is predictable or that he could not make a random choice. Brent Because assuming that more than one choice is available, and that they all having differing values of utility, making a random choice has only a probability of 1/n of being the rational choice. I can concede that making a random choice amongst options of equal and optimal utility could satisfy the definition of rational as a borderline case, but I like the picture of Robby the robot saying that doesn't compute and promptly blowing a fuse. (Let me know if I've got my SciFi wires crossed here, please). But it is still the case that a strategy of sometimes choosing less optimal actions at random can in some situations lead to a better payoff than always playing the rational choice. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: what is the definition of computation?
On 21 January 2014 17:22, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: The notion that computation produces information contradicts the notion that information is conserved I suggested that computation *transforms* information, not *produces* it. Most logical operations lose information (NAND does, reducing two inputs to one output, and all (non-reversible) computation can be done with NAND gates I believe). What a computation does is make explicit information that was implicit in the input, generally throwing away some of it in the process. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: what is the definition of computation?
On 21 January 2014 22:44, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, Richard: I´m not talking about global reduction of entropy neither of the universe neither a star, planet of black hole, but a local decrease of entropy at the cost of a (bigger) increase of entropy in the surroundings, so that the global entropy grows. That seems fine to me. I would think most processes associated with life do this (digestion, for example) ... ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The multiverse and the arrow of time - MWI experts please?
On 1/21/2014 4:01 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 02:41:46PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 14:18, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote: I have been thinking about this and it occurs to me that firstly, the single history is only partially true. Since quantum interference patterns occur in MWI due to interference between universes, which can only occur if universes can merge again after splitting, then at least at this level, the past is not well defined. If a universe merges back with another from which it had temporarily diverged, then an observer within that universe cannot say which path he followed to get there. She followed all possible paths. Of course those divergent universes were only trivially different, or else decoherence would have made the merging impossible. But of course in any real universe, there will be a vast number of such nanohistories, because of the immense number of quantum interactions where merging occurs. So at this very short time/space scale level at least, it is impossible to define a single history. Correct? Imho, that is correct. The reason universes tend to diverge more than they merge would be that the multiverse is far from thermodynamic equilibrium this close to the Big Bang. However at a macroscopic scale, it appears difficult for history to be intrinsically ambiguous. In other words the network of nodes of the multiverse is like a tree not a net. There may be tiny branches that rejoin one another at the smallest scale, but the limbs of the tree cannot merge back together. I can always define a single route back to the trunk, though if I go further up the tree, I will be forced to decide repeatedly which way to go. This branching is defined by time, so doesn't this effectively give an arrow of time? Yet the laws of physics are not supposed to be directional in time except through aggregation of effects as entropy. Are these two arrows related? How? See above. I didn't realise I was answering your later question when I wrote that! To expand slightly... My opinion is that branching exceeds merging for the same reason that there is a thermodynamic arrow of time. To see this, imagine a universe at thermodynamic equilibrium. All processes can play out equally in either time direction in such a universe (every googolplex years a Boltzman brain pops up for a split second - but its time sense could go either way along the time axis, they're now equally (un)likely). There is no reason why the quantum processes involved in the MWI would not be similarly balanced once there was no thermodynamic arrow of time. In my Many Minds interpretation, splitting corresponds with learning some fact about the world, and merging corresponds with forgetting it. This is also roughly the view Saibal Mitra has been arguing for too. Throughout most of our lives, we tend to remember more than we forget, which leads to the above imbalance, although once alzheimers sets in, I guess the imbalance will run the other way. The problem with that is that it make mysterious all the intersubjective agreement we found in naive and pre-quantum physics. You have the paradox of Wigner's friend. Instead of trying to explain that directly from the wave function it seems much more perspicuous to explain decoherence which in turn explains both out observation and the fact that others agree with our observation and that there are reliable records of it. Another example I have put to this list (but didn't mention in my book, AFAICR) is to say that we exist in a superposition of worlds where T. Rexes are blue and T. Rexes are green. There is always a possibility of a measurement that actually decides the issue (perhaps they were actually brown), in which case the universe differentiates, but contra the Deutsch interpretation, its is not a matter of fact, albeit unknown, what colour a T. Rex is. But when the record is found it will imply that the universe differentiated long ago and that dinosaurs already observed that were green. Brent Ms Schroedinger: What happened to that poor cat? It looks half dead. Erwin: I don't know. Ask Wigner. Eugene: I just looked in and it collapsed. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 02:32:23PM +1300, LizR wrote: I am beginning to think that Russell is using a very narrow or perhaps formal definition of rationality, in which case perhaps objections that random (or unpredictable) behaviour can be rational don't fit it, even though most people think that such actions are at times the most rational choice. Yes - of course it is the formal definition of rationality. Do you mean there is some informal everyday use of the term that means something different? Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 12:53:33PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: With some competence, I guess you mean. Without competence, and giving time to the creature, any universal machine do have an open-ended creativity. Well, certainly in the sense of Post (I can explain this, but it is a bit technical). I'm interested to hear your explanation, but if its what I suspect it will be, I'll be disappointed :). Basically stating that the universal dovetailer emulates creative conscious being does not demonstrate a creative program, which needs to be creative relative to us (as observers). But if your idea is something different, I'm all ears! I haven't had a chance to study and understand Post's definition (sure I've looked at it, but didn't grok it), but if you say it is equivalent to universality, then its not really going to contribute to the solution. I am not sure. Open ended creativity seems to me well captured by Post. It makes the machine able to defeat all effective complete theories about itself. It gives what I often called the comp vaccine against reductionism. Well - maybe if you explain more? Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On 22 January 2014 13:33, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 02:32:23PM +1300, LizR wrote: I am beginning to think that Russell is using a very narrow or perhaps formal definition of rationality, in which case perhaps objections that random (or unpredictable) behaviour can be rational don't fit it, even though most people think that such actions are at times the most rational choice. Yes - of course it is the formal definition of rationality. Do you mean there is some informal everyday use of the term that means something different? The informal usage (as several people have pointed out) implies that it would be rational, under some circumstances, to make a random decision. For example, Nasrudin's Ass is caught exactly half way between two bales of hay. Each bale is equally attractive, so it has no reason to prefer one to the other, and gets stuck in the middle. It seems ridiculous that it is more rational for the ass to remain half way between the bales until it starves to death, than to randomly select one bale to eat. That's why I assumed you must be using some formal definition of rationality that made that sort of action reasonable. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On 22 January 2014 13:13, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: I can concede that making a random choice amongst options of equal and optimal utility could satisfy the definition of rational as a borderline case, but I like the picture of Robby the robot saying that doesn't compute and promptly blowing a fuse. (Let me know if I've got my SciFi wires crossed here, please). Danger, Will Robinson...! I think you got it right. Wasn't Robbie from Forbidden Planet ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: On differentiation of universes in MWI
It seems to me that differentiation is local, and spreads slowly, and that there is always going to be some remerging (but only in proportion to the chances of entropy reversing). The an atom starts in a superposition of decayed and non-decayed. Now a cat is in a superposition of alive and dead. Now an experimenter is in a superposition of having seen an alive and dead cat... now everyone who reads Nature is in a superposition ... but none of this affects Jupiter for a long time, it may be centuries before it has any noticeable effect, particularly if in both branches human civilisation collapses, so there is less chance of us sending things to Jupiter ... and it may be millions of years before any other stars in our galaxy are affected. Maybe as history goes on and civilisations come and go and new species evolve, some of the branches that were split by the experiment merge again, and eventually the universe gets back to where it was originally, in terms of the degree of splitting. Of course it might be a long time - say a googol years - before all traces of human influence vanish completely. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A humble suggestion to the group
iirc Dark Matter was discovered around 1933 by measuring the velocities of galaxies in clusters. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The multiverse and the arrow of time - MWI experts please?
On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 04:14:49PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: The problem with that is that it make mysterious all the intersubjective agreement we found in naive and pre-quantum physics. You have the paradox of Wigner's friend. Instead of trying to explain that directly from the wave function it seems much more perspicuous to explain decoherence which in turn explains both out observation and the fact that others agree with our observation and that there are reliable records of it. Intersubjective agreement is not so surprising, as the minds we can communicate with necessarily must have observed the same, or at least consistent information. I know this is skating perilously close to its all in your mind and solipsism, but it isn't. What is ultimately mysterious is why observed reality is consistent with us as observers - the occam catastrophe problem, I mention in my book. But this problem is faced by all idealist theories, and the opposing realist theories have different, but rather larger problems. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: A humble suggestion to the group
On 22 January 2014 13:06, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Liz, Didn't ask him about p-time... That's a shame. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Stephen, A lot of good stuff in your post. I'll come back to some of it later after I think more on it but first wanted to clarify a couple of your points. You say the UDA serves a good purpose to show that there is some ontological merit in the idea that Numbers can serve as a fundamental ground for Mind as a Platonic Form. It is the timeless spacial case. By timeless special case it seems like you are implying the UDA is not an ACTUAL case describing a reality that we agree necessarily must move. So it seems like you are saying that though the UDA might somehow shed some light on reality it is not actually describing reality as it actually is. Is that correct? Another problem with the UDA is I see no way a Platonia consisting of pure arithmetic can possible know how to actually compute what is actually occurring in the universe. How does pure static arithmetic truth know anything about what is actually happening where and how to compute which particles are interacting with which particles in what ways? I see no way that works at all. Can we agree on something like Bruno's UDA is not an applicable description of a reality we agree actually moves, that actually includes the notion of 'becoming'? Second point in this post is I AGREE with you that it is a mistake to assume that there is only a single computation going on. for a number of reasons. I've never claimed that. Sorry if that wasn't clear before. I think the most reasonable model is a single computational REALITY (not a single computation) that contains myriads of computations each computing the current state of reality in computational interaction with its information environment (environment in a logical sense, not a dimensional or spatial sense). This model avoids your concurrency problem, and a single computational reality allows computational continuity and consistency across the entire computational universe (again a logical, not physical dimensional spatial universe). Can we agree on something like There is a single computational reality which includes myriads of ongoing computations which together continually compute the current state of the universe? Edgar On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 5:17:44 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Edgar, On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 4:24 PM, Edgar L. Owen edga...@att.netjavascript: wrote: Stephen, OK, with these clarifications let's see what we can agree on so far. 1. Block time is a BS theory. We know we agree on that. good! 2. Do you agree that Bruno's USA can also be discounted for the same reason block time can be, that there is no way to get movement out of it? No, the UDA serves a good purpose to show that there is some ontological merit in the idea that Numbers can serve as a fundamental ground for Mind as a Platonic Form. It is the timeless spacial case. 3. Do you agree that there must be some fundamental notion of movement (not movement in space, but in the sense of things happening) at the fundamental level? Yes, I denote this as Becoming is Fundamental. 4. Do you agree that implies some notion of time flowing? The imposition of finite measures onto the Becoming is the creation of a clock. Clocks are strictly local entities. It has been repeatedly proven that a single clock cannot order all possible events of space-time. Thus a singular Present Moment is an oxymoron, a self-contradicting idea. 5. Do you agree that reality is fundamentally computational? div ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
On 22 January 2014 11:38, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, Plain English explanations are the problem: they carry a set of ontological assumptions built it. Kauffman is challenging these assumptions and thus as to use a mixture of poetry and math to explain and elaborate the idea. I know, I know ... I was a bit tongue in cheek - but even so, he *does*seem to be going out of his way to make what he is saying hard to follow. It is possible to explain a complex theory, and to point out / remove the assumptions, and still be intelligible to an audience which doesn't have a degree in advanced hand-waving. You don't get away from ontological assumptions by obfuscation, you just hide them! Anyway, as I said, it seems to be suggesting something sensible, but I couldn't work out what it was, probly because I don't have time to gvie it the attention it deserves. So a plain English version (with ontological assumptions addressed in plain English) would be preferable. On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 5:35 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 21 January 2014 17:51, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, Did the notion of an Eigenform, as defined, make sense to you? Heinz performs the magic trick of convincing us that the familiar objects of our existence can be seen to be nothing more than tokens for the behaviors of the organism that apparently create stable forms. These stabilities persist, for that organism, as an observing system. This is not to deny an underlying reality that is the source of objects, but rather to emphasize the role of process, and the role of the organism in the production of a living map, a map that is so sensitive that map and territory are conjoined. Von Foerster’s (1981a-d) book and papers were instrumental in pioneering the field of second-order cybernetics. The notion of an eigenform is inextricably linked with second-order cybernetics. One starts on the road to such a concept as soon as one begins to consider a pattern of patterns, the form of form or the cybernetics of cybernetics. Such concepts appear to close around upon themselves, and at the same time they lead outward. They suggest the possibility of transcending the boundaries of a system from a locus that might have been within the system until the circular concept is called into being. But then the boundaries have turned inside out, and the inside is the outside. Forms are created from the concatenation of operations upon themselves and objects are not objects at all, but rather indications of processes. Upon encountering an object as such a form of creation, you are compelled to ask: How is that object created? How is it designed? What do I do to produce it? What is the network of productions? Where is the home of that object? In what context does it exist? How am I involved in its creation? The above hints at some sort of sense - it isn't something I could (quite) dismiss as postmodern nonsense, for example - but I think I can safely answer your question - no, please resubmit in plain English! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe
Re: The multiverse and the arrow of time - MWI experts please?
On 22 January 2014 14:03, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: What is ultimately mysterious is why observed reality is consistent with us as observers - the occam catastrophe problem, I mention in Do you mean consistent between us (i.e. it's mysterious that we agree on what we're observing) ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 21 January 2014 08:49, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear Bruno, The idea that I am pursuing here is how to think of Becoming in a way that is consistent with comp. So far all we have are eternal static infinite entities. Pigeon holes ... yes ... but they seem to make sense to me, even without the flashlight. What more do we need to identify the present moment than our present memories? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The multiverse and the arrow of time - MWI experts please?
On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 02:08:52PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 22 January 2014 14:03, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: What is ultimately mysterious is why observed reality is consistent with us as observers - the occam catastrophe problem, I mention in Do you mean consistent between us (i.e. it's mysterious that we agree on what we're observing) ? No - that it is consistent with oneself, as an observer. Why couldn't we be a disembodied observer playing a virtual reality game? A p-ghost as someone put it recently. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The multiverse and the arrow of time - MWI experts please?
On 22 January 2014 14:24, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: No - that it is consistent with oneself, as an observer. Why couldn't we be a disembodied observer playing a virtual reality game? A p-ghost as someone put it recently. Do you mean consistent with (apparently) having a body, and (apparently) being immersed in a universe that (more or less) makes sense? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The multiverse and the arrow of time - MWI experts please?
On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 02:23:12PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 22 January 2014 14:24, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: No - that it is consistent with oneself, as an observer. Why couldn't we be a disembodied observer playing a virtual reality game? A p-ghost as someone put it recently. Do you mean consistent with (apparently) having a body, and (apparently) being immersed in a universe that (more or less) makes sense? Basically that's it! -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The multiverse and the arrow of time - MWI experts please?
On 22 January 2014 14:35, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 02:23:12PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 22 January 2014 14:24, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: No - that it is consistent with oneself, as an observer. Why couldn't we be a disembodied observer playing a virtual reality game? A p-ghost as someone put it recently. Do you mean consistent with (apparently) having a body, and (apparently) being immersed in a universe that (more or less) makes sense? Basically that's it! Phew, I got there in the end :) I can only assume that having an (apparent) body etc is more probable than being a disembodied p-ghost, but explaining this in comp (or any Theory of Nothing) sounds like it may be a measure problem over an infinite set. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear Edgar, On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 8:00 PM, Edgar L. Owen edgaro...@att.net wrote: Stephen, A lot of good stuff in your post. I'll come back to some of it later after I think more on it but first wanted to clarify a couple of your points. You say the UDA serves a good purpose to show that there is some ontological merit in the idea that Numbers can serve as a fundamental ground for Mind as a Platonic Form. It is the timeless spacial case. By timeless special case it seems like you are implying the UDA is not an ACTUAL case describing a reality that we agree necessarily must move. So it seems like you are saying that though the UDA might somehow shed some light on reality it is not actually describing reality as it actually is. Is that correct? Umm, sorta. I have philosophical problems with the notion of reality as it is commonly used. I have my own definition:* A reality is that which is incontrovertible for some collection of mutually communicating observers*. In other words, there is no such thing as a reality independent of observation. Such a concept would be, logically, unobservable, and thus at best a figment of our imagination, but as such I can work with the concept. I come at these things as a student of philosophy, learning on my own outside of academic settings. I have found problems in almost every ontology going all the way back to the pre-socratics. My eyes where opened when I read a paper by a computer scientist named Vaughan Pratt that offered a neat way of solving the mind-body problem, but it required a totally different way of thinking. Another problem with the UDA is I see no way a Platonia consisting of pure arithmetic can possible know how to actually compute what is actually occurring in the universe. How does pure static arithmetic truth know anything about what is actually happening where and how to compute which particles are interacting with which particles in what ways? I see no way that works at all. Platonia is like a Ideal case, where all imperfections (imagined) vanish all all that remains is Perfection. Sadly, it was assumed that change was an imperfection. Time then becomes a illusion to be explained away for those that buy into that type of thinking. I found the work of Hitoshi Kitada that offered a solution to the problem of time in physics and I have been working to dovetail these two thesis together ever since. Can we agree on something like Bruno's UDA is not an applicable description of a reality we agree actually moves, that actually includes the notion of 'becoming'? All Becoming is represented (Represented!) as the natural ordering of the Integers in Bruno's thesis. This would explain the ordering of events that we associate with Time but it completely ignores the flow of time. This follows from the previously described ontological idea that change is something that is imperfect. Second point in this post is I AGREE with you that it is a mistake to assume that there is only a single computation going on. for a number of reasons. I've never claimed that. Sorry if that wasn't clear before. OK. I think the most reasonable model is a single computational REALITY (not a single computation) that contains myriads of computations each computing the current state of reality in computational interaction with its information environment (environment in a logical sense, not a dimensional or spatial sense). You need to figure out a more detailed explanation. There are many explanations of Reality in competition with yours. You have to give some justification as to why yours should be considered more than others. Details help. This model avoids your concurrency problem, and a single computational reality allows computational continuity and consistency across the entire computational universe (again a logical, not physical dimensional spatial universe). I have not seen any details as to how the concurrency problem is avoided! It is not a trivial problem. The best one that I have seen, that can be compared to yours, is Leibniz' monadology. It has a fatal flaw: Its Pre-established Harmony concept requires an eternal computation to occur prior to the creating of the monads. Obviously that is impossible. A solution is for the computations to run concurrently: the physical systems, in a literal sense, are the computations of themselves as they evolve and interact. No need for a separate realm to exist in addition to this one. Things get complicated when we shift to take Relativity and QM into account. As I have mentioned previously, QM requires a separate domain that can be used as a computational domain, but it has a Scylla of constraints to be navigated. Can we agree on something like There is a single computational reality which includes myriads of ongoing computations which together continually compute the current state of the universe? Yes. It is the evolution of the wavefunctions of the
Re: Discovery of quantum vibrations in brain microtubules confirms Hameroff/Penrose consciousness theory basis
On 1/21/2014 4:13 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 10:18:32PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: But I see nothing that would imply that a rational agent is predictable or that he could not make a random choice. Brent Because assuming that more than one choice is available, and that they all having differing values of utility, making a random choice has only a probability of 1/n of being the rational choice. I can concede that making a random choice amongst options of equal and optimal utility could satisfy the definition of rational as a borderline case, So what do you make of Nash's theorem which says every finite game has an equilibrium in a *mixed* strategy? Brent but I like the picture of Robby the robot saying that doesn't compute and promptly blowing a fuse. (Let me know if I've got my SciFi wires crossed here, please). But it is still the case that a strategy of sometimes choosing less optimal actions at random can in some situations lead to a better payoff than always playing the rational choice. Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Tegmark's New Book
Dear LizR, On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 8:06 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 22 January 2014 11:38, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, Plain English explanations are the problem: they carry a set of ontological assumptions built it. Kauffman is challenging these assumptions and thus as to use a mixture of poetry and math to explain and elaborate the idea. I know, I know ... I was a bit tongue in cheek - but even so, he *does*seem to be going out of his way to make what he is saying hard to follow. It is possible to explain a complex theory, and to point out / remove the assumptions, and still be intelligible to an audience which doesn't have a degree in advanced hand-waving. You don't get away from ontological assumptions by obfuscation, you just hide them! Not really. Lou does not intentionally unfathomable explanation . His ideas demand meditation, not quick jumps to comprehension. Anyway, as I said, it seems to be suggesting something sensible, but I couldn't work out what it was, probably because I don't have time to give it the attention it deserves. So a plain English version (with ontological assumptions addressed in plain English) would be preferable. Try this: http://www.gwu.edu/~rpsol/preconf/wmsci/kaufman2.pdf On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 5:35 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 21 January 2014 17:51, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, Did the notion of an Eigenform, as defined, make sense to you? Heinz performs the magic trick of convincing us that the familiar objects of our existence can be seen to be nothing more than tokens for the behaviors of the organism that apparently create stable forms. These stabilities persist, for that organism, as an observing system. This is not to deny an underlying reality that is the source of objects, but rather to emphasize the role of process, and the role of the organism in the production of a living map, a map that is so sensitive that map and territory are conjoined. Von Foerster’s (1981a-d) book and papers were instrumental in pioneering the field of second-order cybernetics. The notion of an eigenform is inextricably linked with second-order cybernetics. One starts on the road to such a concept as soon as one begins to consider a pattern of patterns, the form of form or the cybernetics of cybernetics. Such concepts appear to close around upon themselves, and at the same time they lead outward. They suggest the possibility of transcending the boundaries of a system from a locus that might have been within the system until the circular concept is called into being. But then the boundaries have turned inside out, and the inside is the outside. Forms are created from the concatenation of operations upon themselves and objects are not objects at all, but rather indications of processes. Upon encountering an object as such a form of creation, you are compelled to ask: How is that object created? How is it designed? What do I do to produce it? What is the network of productions? Where is the home of that object? In what context does it exist? How am I involved in its creation? The above hints at some sort of sense - it isn't something I could (quite) dismiss as postmodern nonsense, for example - but I think I can safely answer your question - no, please resubmit in plain English! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send
