On 7/22/2011 9:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 22, 10:18 pm, meekerdb wrote:
Of course if you
have to model it at the quark level, you might as well make your
artificial neuron out of quarks and it won't be all that "artificial".
Actually, I think it would have to be a real qua
On 7/22/2011 8:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 22, 10:18 pm, meekerdb wrote:
Well at least we've got the contradiction compressed down into one
sentence: "Degradation is preserved with high fidelity."
Is it a contradiction to say that someone is having a bad conversation
over cl
On Jul 22, 10:18 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> Of course if you
> have to model it at the quark level, you might as well make your
> artificial neuron out of quarks and it won't be all that "artificial".
Actually, I think it would have to be a real quark (if quarks even
'exist'). The bottom line is that
On Jul 22, 10:18 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> Well at least we've got the contradiction compressed down into one
> sentence: "Degradation is preserved with high fidelity."
Is it a contradiction to say that someone is having a bad conversation
over clear telephones?
> > ...A neuron is more than it's co
On 7/22/2011 6:35 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 22, 6:25 pm, meekerdb wrote:
But that's contradicting your assumption that the "pegs" are transparent
to the neural communication:
"If the living
cells are able to talk to each other well through the prosthetic
network, then functionality
On Jul 22, 8:40 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> That would just mean that the neuronal level is too much high for
> being the substitution level. Better to chose the DNA and metabolic
> level.
Right. If you make tweaked real cells out of real atoms that are
arranged as an alternative to DNA, I th
On Jul 22, 7:26 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Comp embraces the non computable. If you study the work you will
> understand that both matter and mind arise from the non computable,
> with comp.
> See the second part of sane04. Ask question if there are problems.
I know you must have gone over
On Jul 22, 6:25 pm, meekerdb wrote:
>But that's contradicting your assumption that the "pegs" are transparent
>to the neural communication:
>
>"If the living
>cells are able to talk to each other well through the prosthetic
>network, then functionality should be retained"
Neurological functional
On 23 Jul 2011, at 00:25, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:55 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'm saying that if you kept randomly replaced neurons it would
eventually look like dementia or some other progressive brain wasting
disease.
But that's contradicting your assumption that the "pegs" are
t
On 22 Jul 2011, at 22:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2011 9:40 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Before that question, you need the question: does maths exist
independently.
If you want to debate this question I am happy to. It is the
assumption made by most mathematicians and scientists.
Jason
Ac
On 22 Jul 2011, at 21:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.
Why?
The point is
Hi Terren,
On 22 Jul 2011, at 20:51, terren wrote:
I have done some thinking and reformulated my thoughts about our
ongoing
discussion.
To sum up my (intuitive) objection, I have struggled to understand
how you
make the leap from the consciousness of abstract logical machines to
human
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 4:54 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>
> Hi Jason,
>
> None of those papers address the concern of narratability that I am
> considering. In fact they all assume narratability. I am pointing out that
> thinking of time as a dimension has a big problem! It only works if all
On 22 Jul 2011, at 16:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Bruno has a strong point here. So long as one is dealing with a
system
that can be described such that that description can be turned into a
recipe to represent all aspects of the system, then it is, by
definition
computable!
The recipe is
On 22 Jul 2011, at 14:17, 1Z wrote:
On Jul 22, 10:08 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.
Why?
The point is that
On 22 Jul 2011, at 20:52, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But what is a world? Also, assuming computationalism, you need
only to believe that you interact with a "world/reality",
whatever that is, like in dream. If not you *do* introduce some
magic in both con
On 7/22/2011 2:55 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'm saying that if you kept randomly replaced neurons it would
eventually look like dementia or some other progressive brain wasting
disease.
But that's contradicting your assumption that the "pegs" are transparent
to the neural communication:
"If
Are you positing a universal substance of resemblance? How does it
work?
If i see two mounds of dirt they might look the same to me, but maybe
they host two different ant colonies. Is the non-subjective
resemblance more like mine or the ants?
On Jul 22, 4:41 pm, 1Z wrote:
> On Jul 22, 3:49 pm, C
I'm saying that if you kept randomly replaced neurons it would
eventually look like dementia or some other progressive brain wasting
disease. If it were possible to spare certain areas or categories of
neurons then I would expect more of a fragmented subject whose means
of expression are intact, bu
On 7/22/2011 9:40 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
Before that question, you need the question: does maths exist
independently.
If you want to debate this question I am happy to. It is the
assumption made by most mathematicians and scientists.
Jason
Actually I was friends with two professo
On 7/22/2011 10:46 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 3:30 AM, Stephen P. King
mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:11 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 12:44 AM, Stephen P. King
mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:
On 7/22/20
On Jul 22, 3:49 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> There is no objective quality of resemblance without a
> subjective intepreter
says who?
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On 7/22/2011 4:16 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I have already addressed this point - you can have a living person
with a prosthetic limb but you can't replace a person's brain with a
prosthetic and have it still be that person. The limb only works
because there is enough of the body left to telegrap
On 7/22/2011 2:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.
Why?
The point is that ostensive definition does not work for j
On 7/22/2011 2:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But what is a world? Also, assuming computationalism, you need only
to believe that you interact with a "world/reality", whatever that
is, like in dream. If not you *do* introduce some magic in both
consciousness and world.
So I need to believe some
Hey Bruno,
I have done some thinking and reformulated my thoughts about our ongoing
discussion.
To sum up my (intuitive) objection, I have struggled to understand how you
make the leap from the consciousness of abstract logical machines to human
consciousness. I now have an argument that I think
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 11:31 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
>
> On Jul 22, 3:59 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> > On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, 1Z wrote:
> >
> > > > Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well
> defined
> > > > relations between the bits.
> >
> > > And every computation eith
On Jul 22, 4:04 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:08 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Jul 22, 6:24 am, Jason Resch wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:
> > > > **
> > > > On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meeke
On Jul 22, 3:59 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined
> > > relations between the bits.
>
> > And every computation either stops or doens't? There seems
> > to me a mismatch between ti
>Unless you believe in zombie, the point is that there *is* enough
>phenomenological qualia and subjectivity, and contingencies, in the
>realm of numbers. The diffrent 1-views (the phenomenology of mind, of
>matter, etc.) are given by the modal variant of self-reference. This
>has been done and thi
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:08 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
>
> On Jul 22, 6:24 am, Jason Resch wrote:
> > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:
> > > **
> > > On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> >
> > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb
> wrote:
> >
> > >> On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, J
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 7:01 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
>
> > Things don't need to move to compute, there just need to be well defined
> > relations between the bits.
>
> And every computation either stops or doens't? There seems
> to me a mismatch between timelessness and computation.
>
Not at all. Consi
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 6:55 AM, 1Z wrote:
>
> >
> > If they are not contingent then you accept they exist even without the
> > existence of the physical universe?
>
> No. They are epistemically necessary. That says nothing about
> their existence. The argument is that since they can make no
> di
>Bruno has a strong point here. So long as one is dealing with a system
>that can be described such that that description can be turned into a
>recipe to represent all aspects of the system, then it is, by definition
>computable!
The recipe is computable, (as is the menu, description, chemical
ana
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 3:30 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
> On 7/22/2011 2:11 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 12:44 AM, Stephen P. King
> wrote:
>
>> On 7/22/2011 1:24 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> All the relevant parts of relativity which imply block time have been
>>>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> But I can have an hard time to separate my ego from that pure
> consciousness. That's why we can meditate, etc.
I'm not sure we can totally seperate it. The ego itself is an
app
On Jul 22, 12:06 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >Regardless of what the nerve cells experience individually, if it can't be
> >communicated it to other nerve cells, it can't be talked about, thought
> >about, or wondered about.
>
> I think it could be shared between nerve cells, I'm saying it's not
>> But it can only be emulated in a virtual environment interfacing with
>> a computer literate human being though.
>
>Why. That's begging the question.
Are you suggesting that a virtual emulation of petroleum will someday
be usable in real world cars?
>But a virtual mouse will (I will talk *in*
On Jul 22, 10:08 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
>
> > On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic
> >>> definition and rejecting ostensive ones.
>
> >> Why?
> >> The point is that ostensive de
On Jul 22, 6:24 am, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 11:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:
> > **
> > On 7/21/2011 8:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb wrote:
>
> >> On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> >> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerd
On Jul 22, 4:08 am, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:29 PM, meekerdb wrote:
> > **
> > On 7/21/2011 1:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 1:30 PM, meekerdb wrote:
>
> >> On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> >> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meeker
On Jul 22, 1:53 am, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 7:43 PM, 1Z wrote:
>
> > On Jul 21, 11:55 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z wrote:
>
> > > > > Assume both matter and number relations exist. With comp, the
> > existence
> > > > of
> > > > > numb
>No doubt it would be technically difficult to make an artificial
>replacement for a neuron in a different substrate, but there is no
>theoretical reason why it could not be done, since there is no
>evidence for any magical processes inside neurons.
Subjectivity is the magic processes inside livin
>Regardless of what the nerve cells experience individually, if it can't be
>communicated it to other nerve cells, it can't be talked about, thought
>about, or wondered about.
I think it could be shared between nerve cells, I'm saying it's not
shared with us. We are a political partition of a livi
On 22 Jul 2011, at 11:24, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Bruno and Craig,
On 7/22/2011 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 16:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:
if you think molecules are needed, that is, that the level of
substitution includes molecular activity, this too can be
emulated
On 21 Jul 2011, at 20:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 10:54 AM, meekerdb
wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Axiomatics are already in Platonia so of course that forces
computation to be there.
The computations a
Hi Bruno and Craig,
On 7/22/2011 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 16:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:
if you think molecules are needed, that is, that the level of
substitution includes molecular activity, this too can be emulated by
a computer
But it can only be emulated in a virt
On 22 Jul 2011, at 00:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
that doesn't need any
complex logic behind it,
Why? This is just like saying "we can't explain it". I am OK with
that, but then I look for better definitions and assumptions, with
the
goal of at least finding an explanation of why it seems li
On 21 Jul 2011, at 22:54, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 3:35 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Jul 11, 4:51 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> > automatic consequences which
> > arise unbidden from "from relations that are defined by
> > computations".
>
> Yes, as you say below, it is a result of proc
On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:59, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 00:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/20/2011 2:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
What does consciousness require?
Interaction with the world.
But what is a world? Also, assuming computationalism,
On 21 Jul 2011, at 17:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/21/2011 2:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I think you beg the question by demanding an axiomatic
definition and rejecting ostensive ones.
Why?
The point is that ostensive definition does not work for justifying
an ontology.
That seems to be
On 21 Jul 2011, at 16:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:
if you think molecules are needed, that is, that the level of
substitution includes molecular activity, this too can be emulated by
a computer
But it can only be emulated in a virtual environment interfacing with
a computer literate human being
On 7/22/2011 2:11 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 12:44 AM, Stephen P. King
mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:
On 7/22/2011 1:24 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
All the relevant parts of relativity which imply block time
have been confirmed. The above is like
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