Re: I think Monads may be the strategy to allow internal changes within Platonia
On 11 Oct 2012, at 15:40, Roger Clough wrote: This might be of possible importance with regard to comp. First of all, there are a fixed number of monads in this world, since they cannot be created or destroyed. Fixed number? You mean a finite number or an infinite cardinal? While, as I understand it, the identities or Souls of monads do not change, they do change internally. This is because their contents represent the rapidly changing (in time and space as well as internally) corporeal bodies in the changing physical world. This seems to be Leibniz's solution to the problem raised by the question, How can monads, being ideas, belong to unchanging Platonia, if the monads at the same time represent rapidly changing coporeal bodies in this contingent, ever-changing world ? The answer seems to be that only the identities or souls of the monads, not their contents, belong to Platonia. Here comp can be much precise. With regard to comp, presumably there are a fixed number of sets or files, each with a fixed identity, each of which contains rapidly changing data. The the data in each file instantly reflects the data in all of the other files, each data set from a unique perspective. Something like that, yes. Will explain more asap. It is hard to explain as few people knows enough of logics/computer science. You might read my relatively recent explanation to the FOAR list, or in the archive of this list, or in the papers on my url. I agree with this post, but it is not yet clear if you would agree or just appreciate the reason why I am agreeing with you. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The non-existence of spacetime
On 11 Oct 2012, at 16:09, Richard Ruquist wrote: Craig Roger, Here is a possible middle ground. Just like quantum waves may be virtual and not physical, dimensions may be virtual, including the multiple dimensions of string theory. So the particles of compactified dimensions would be virtual and spacetime would be virtual as well. Spacetime still is part of reality just as virtual particles created at the Planck scale must exist. But spacetime is more like wave functions than physical particles. In fact in Bohm theory both quantum probability waves the elementary particles and in GR warped spacetime guide ponderable bodies. I think of quantum waves or states as belonging in the mind of god, so to speak, along with virtual Planck-scale particles, CYM monads, and now presumably, spacetime. I am willing to admit that spacetime does not have physical existence, nor do any multiple dimensions. But I extend this thinking to multiple worlds. IMO MWI exists in the mind of god and only 1p is physical, as following Leibniz, god chooses the best possible world from all the quantum possibilities. However, I believe that god is the collective nature of the CYM monads, which following Godel and perhaps comp, manifests consciousness and I believe makes the choice of what quantum state becomes physical in every interaction.of physical particles. According to string theory, the CYMs contain the laws and constants of physics, ie., they are omnipotent. I conjecture that they are as well omniscient based on Green's 2-d solution that each CYM maps the entire universe, just like the monads of Leibniz and Indra's Pearls. The CYMs are of course omnipresent since they fill the universe. Enough preaching, Richard If comp is correct, whatever is physical must be justified entirely in elementary arithmetic. Strictly speaking, there are non physical universe, only a physical reality which is a view from inside the big thing (arithmetic). String theory might have a role indeed, as it has many features related to number theory. In particular string theory do have non trivial applications on numbers. One which is well know is the proof of Jacobi theorem: that the number of ways we can write a positive integer as the ordered sum of integers square is 24*(the sum of the odd divisors), for the even numbers, and 8*(the sum of all divisors) for the odd integers. The proof by Jacobi is very complex, and used the famous modular forms, but there is an elegant (and not so simple too) proof using the bosonic string theory. Then the Moonshine phenomenon and the Monster Group which points on interesting relationships between numbers and physics. At the heart of the mind-body problem, all fields meet. Bruno On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 9:01 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, October 11, 2012 8:26:03 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Craig, I think Roger has an incorrect interpretation the physics of Leibniz and Einstein. I'm not sure. Spacetime can be warped, just as the cost of living can 'rise'. If Einstein understands that spacetime is the relation between objects and nothing more, then it would make sense that he also understands that by curvature or warping he means only the warping of the paths which objects take. I am going to try to read his original manuscript: http://www.ibiblio.org/ebooks/Einstein/Einstein_Relativity.pdf so far I find no mention of 'warp' or 'curvature'. I also think this discussion has reached beyond diminishing returns. See, that's the thing, I could talk about this stuff forever. I used to have the conventional view of spacetime, but the more people I talk to, and the more knoweldgeable they are, the more I can see clearly that their basis for disagreeing with me is purely out of dread, and not out of any particular counterfactual scientific observation or understanding that they have. I am considering offering $1000 to the first person who can explain to me in a way that I can agree with why my conjecture is wrong. Craig I will stick with the conventional definition of space and time. Richard On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 8:18 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, October 11, 2012 8:03:15 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Roger: So neither space and time nor spacetime physically exist. Richard: That is unscientific. Physics could be entirely wrong. But I will bet on physics being correct and you and Craig being incorrect. But you are entitled to your opinion however absolute you make it sound like. Craig: If we are right, then it is the Physics of Leibniz and Einstein (and probably others...Bohm?) are correct. Why does your interpretation speak for Physics but these others do not? Try this. Imagine universe with nothing but a ping pong ball in a vacuum. There really is no 'space' there. Without some other object to provide a frame of reference, there is literally no way to
Re: Re: Conscious robots
life, consciousness, free will, intelligence I try to give a phsical definition of each one: Life: whathever that maintain its internal entropy in a non trivial way (A diamant is not alive). That is, to make use of hardwired and adquired information to maintain the internal entropy by making use of low entropic matter in the environment. Consciousness: To avoid dangers he has to identify chemical agents, for example, but also (predators that may consider him as a prey. While non teleológical dangers, like chemicals, can be avoided with simple reactions, teleológical dangers, like the predators are different. He has to go a step further than automatic responses, because he has to deliberate between fight of flight, depending on its perceived internal state: healt, size, wether he has breeding descendence to protect etc. He needs to know the state of himself, as well as the boundary of his body. He has to calibrate the menace by looking at the reactions of the predator when he see its own reactions. there is a processing of I do this- he is responding with that, at some level. So a primitive consciouness probably started with predation. that is not self consciousness in the human sense. Self consciousness manages an history of the self that consciousness do not. Free will: There are many dylemmas that living beings must confront, like fight of flight: For example, to abandon an wounded cub or not, to pass the river infested of crocodriles in orde to reach the green pastures in the other side etc. many of these reactions are automatic, like fight and fligh. because speed of response is very important (Even most humans report this automatism of behaviour when had a traumatic experience). But other dilemmas are not. A primitive perception of an internal conflict (that is free will) may appear in animals who had the luxury of having time for considerating either one course of action or the other, in order to get enough data. This is not very common in the animal kingdom, where life is short and decission have to be fast. Probably only animals with a long life span with a social protection can evolve such internal conflict. When there is no time to spend, even humans act automatically. If you want to know how an animal feel, go to a conflict zone. Intelligence: The impulse of curiosity and the hability to elaborate activities with the exclusive goal of learning and adquiring experience, rather than direct survivival. of course that curiositiy is not arbitrary but focused in promising activities that learn something valuable for survival. A cat would inspect a new furniture. Because its impulse for curiosity is towards the search of locations for hiding, watch and shelter and for the knowledge of the surroundings. That is intelligence, but a focused intelligence. It is not general intelligence.We have also a focused curiosity but it is not so narrow. Alberto 2012/10/11 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 10:13:06AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Evgenii Rudnyi The following components are inextricably mixed: life, consciousness, free will, intelligence you can't have one without the others, I disagree. You can have life without any of the others. Also, I suspect you can have intelligence without life, and intelligence without consciousness. and (or because) they're all nonphysical, all subjective. Yes - they share those in common, as do a lot of other concepts such as emergence, complexity, information, entropy, creativity and so on. So only the computer can know for sure if it has any of these. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/11/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Evgenii Rudnyi Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 07:58:57 Subject: Re: Conscious robots On 11.10.2012 11:36 Evgenii Rudnyi said the following: On 26.09.2012 20:35 meekerdb said the following: An interesting paper which comports with my idea that the problem of consciousness will be solved by engineering. Or John Clark's point that consciousness is easy, intelligence is hard. Consciousness in Cognitive Architectures A Principled Analysis of RCS, Soar and ACT-R I have started reading the paper. Thanks a lot for the link. I have finished reading the paper. I should say that I am not impressed. First, interestingly enough p. 30 The observer selects a system according to a set of main features which we shall call traits. Presumably this means that without an observer a system does not exist. In a way it is logical as without a human being what is available is just an ensemble of interacting strings. Now let me make some quotes to show you what the authors mean by consciousness in the order they appear in the paper. p. 45 This makes that, in reality, the state of the environment, from the point of
Re: Re: Re: Impossible connections
Hi Richard Ruquist So what's your problem ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 11:35:29 Subject: Re: Re: Impossible connections Roger, I know Brian Greene personally and have read his book, Fabric of the Cosmos. He was a postdoc at my school. He is not a founder of string theory, Max Green is. His view of space is quite conventional except for the extra dimensions of string theory. Richard On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard, The most entertaining way to understand the views of modern physics on space (same as that of Leibniz) would be to watch NOVA | The Fabric of the Cosmos: What Is Space (Brian Greene, a founder of sgtring theory) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CD5tBIqJU4Uplaynext=1list=PLYslgvtKtawg5gknf6QmpFRqdqkwYAs7Hfeature=results_main or go to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_relativity Concepts introduced by the theories of relativity include: Measurements of various quantities are relative to the velocities of observers. In particular, space and time can dilate. Spacetime: space and time should be considered together and in relation to each other. The speed of light is nonetheless invariant, the same for all observers. or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space In the seventeenth century, the philosophy of space and time emerged as a central issue in epistemology and metaphysics. At its heart, Gottfried Leibniz, the German philosopher-mathematician, and Isaac Newton, the English physicist-mathematician, set out two opposing theories of what space is. Rather than being an entity that independently exists over and above other matter, Leibniz held that space is no more than the collection of spatial relations between objects in the world space is that which results from places taken together.[5] Unoccupied regions are those that could have objects in them, and thus spatial relations with other places. For Leibniz, then, space was an idealised abstraction from the relations between individual entities or their possible locations and therefore could not be continuous but must be discrete.[6] Space could be thought of in a similar way to the relations between family members. Although people in the family are related to one another, the relations do not exist independently of the people.[7] Leibniz argued that space could not exist independently of objects in the world because that implies a difference between two universes exactly alike except for the location of the material world in each universe. But since there would be no observational way of telling these universes apart then, according to the identity of indiscernibles, there would be no real difference between them. According to the principle of sufficient reason, any theory of space that implied that there could be these two possible universes, must therefore be wrong.[8] Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/11/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 08:11:17 Subject: Re: Impossible connections I agree with Roger on this one (except for the insults). I did not know that Einstein recognized that spacetime was a true void - I had assumed that his conception of gravitational warping of spacetime was a literal plenum or manifold, but if it's true that he recognized spacetime as an abstraction, then that is good news for me. It places cosmos firmly in the physics of private perception and spacetime as the participatory realizer of public bodies. Craig PS Roger, you wouldn't happen to have any citations or articles where Einstein's view on this are discussed, would you? I'll Google it myself, but figured I'd ask just in case. Thanks. On Thursday, October 11, 2012 7:59:39 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Roger, You are entitled to your opinion, but that is all it is. Richard On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:31 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist Here you go again. Monads are basically ideas. The BECs are physical. No physical connection is possible between ideas and things. Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 10/11/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-10, 14:32:39 Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls Craig, The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary. The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On 11 Oct 2012, at 16:20, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Oct 2012, at 13:31, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think that consciousness, intelligence and some measure of free will are necessary and inseparable parts of life itself. consciousness / \ / \ / \ / life \ /\ / \ free will--intelligence I agree with this. I'm curious what there is in free will that you agree with, I neither agree nor disagree with it. Keep in mind that I use the compatibilist definition of free will, which is the (machine) ability to exploits its self-indetermination (with indetermination in the Turing sense, (not in the comp first person sense, nor the quantum one). It is basically the ability to do conscious choice. Then I propose the following semi-axiom for consciousness: that it is true and undoubtable, and non justifiable rationally (+ invariant for some digital transformations, but I don't use this here). Then I can argue (and have done so already in different places) that: Intelligence implies free will, and free will implies consciousness. The reverse are more delicate. Of course here intelligence is used in the sense of Krishnamurti, not in the sense of competence. Intelligence is needed to *develop* competence, but competence has most often a negative feedback on intelligence. People can be aware of their competence, but not really of their intelligence. Intelligence is almost nothing more than an awareness of our limitations, related to an ability of changing one's mind. Like consciousness, intelligence cannot be formally defined. I conjecture that intelligence is a natural product of love, at least for the humans, although this seems confirmed by the study of rats and chimpanzees (but only through competence test, which can show the presence of intelligence, but cannot show the absence of it). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Survey of Consciousness Models
On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:31, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 11.10.2012 17:20 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 10 Oct 2012, at 21:27, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 10.10.2012 17:16 Craig Weinberg said the following: http://s33light.org/post/33296583824 Have a look. Objections? Suggestions? I am not sure if vitalism is a model of consciousness. Eliminativism is not Epiphenomenalism. The small difference is that epiphenomenalism assumes mental phenomena and eliminativism not. Epiphenomenalism acknowledge that mental phenomena do exist but they just do not have causal power on human behavior. Then there is Reductive Physicalisms: Mental states are identical to physical states. It is not functionalism though, as everything goes through physical states directly. The difference with eliminativism is subtle. There is Property Dualism and there is Externalism. You will find nice podcasts about it at Most assume, without knowing, more infinities in both matter and comp, than the infinities Turing recoverable by the machines in her first person perspective on arithmetic. Still Aristotelian. Perhaps one of them is correct (certainly not eliminativism, I think), but none are logically and epistemologically compatible with the quite weak form of computationalism we can use in cognitive science. This podcast reviews physicalism-based models of consciousness, hence one could refer to it as Aristotelian models of consciousness indeed. As long as you don't use comp (implicitly and explicitly), which is often the case. The problem is that most physicalist believes in comp, or can be shown to believe (perhaps unconsciously) in comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: more firewalls
On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, Richard: Please explain why not. It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/ brain (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing- complete ontology. So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view (except for truth). It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult. Or you can look at my paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Or other paper that you can find on my URL. But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as I am in a super-busy period. Bruno On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote: Craig, I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory monads.. For example take the binding problem where: There are an almost infinite number of possible, different objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each one. (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) However, at a density of 10^90/cc (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial location ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) So the monads and the neurons experience the same things because of the BEC entanglement connection. These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads perhaps to solve the binding problem and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. Richard BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, only, by making the level that low, you can get, perhaps, that substance dualism will look very probable in our neighborhood. Bruno On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 8:51:50 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Roger, To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. More specifically, I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical brain and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement. BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate. It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different substances can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space, crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is also a physical BEC in the brain. So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad BEC is substantive, are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. Richard What advantage does a BEC explanation really have over substance dualism though? How dies it solve the hard problem? Why do BECs experience things and nothing else does? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/kEWP_Mi0G4IJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more
Re: more firewalls
Bruno, Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes electrons, protons, neutrons, neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string theory models. It's like saying that god is everything, which is next to saying nothing. Richard On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, Richard: Please explain why not. It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology. So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view (except for truth). It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult. Or you can look at my paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Or other paper that you can find on my URL. But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as I am in a super-busy period. Bruno On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote: Craig, I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory monads.. For example take the binding problem where: There are an almost infinite number of possible, different objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each one. (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) However, at a density of 10^90/cc (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial location ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) So the monads and the neurons experience the same things because of the BEC entanglement connection. These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads perhaps to solve the binding problem and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. Richard BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, only, by making the level that low, you can get, perhaps, that substance dualism will look very probable in our neighborhood. Bruno On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 8:51:50 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Roger, To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. More specifically, I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical brain and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement. BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate. It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different substances can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space, crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is also a physical BEC in the brain. So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad BEC is substantive, are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. Richard What advantage does a BEC explanation really have over substance dualism though? How dies it solve the hard problem? Why do BECs experience things and nothing else does? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit
Re: Re: Re: Impossible connections
Roger, Brian definitely thinks that spacetime exists. You have said otherwise. Richard On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 6:48 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist So what's your problem ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 11:35:29 Subject: Re: Re: Impossible connections Roger, I know Brian Greene personally and have read his book, Fabric of the Cosmos. He was a postdoc at my school. He is not a founder of string theory, Max Green is. His view of space is quite conventional except for the extra dimensions of string theory. Richard On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard, The most entertaining way to understand the views of modern physics on space (same as that of Leibniz) would be to watch NOVA | The Fabric of the Cosmos: What Is Space (Brian Greene, a founder of sgtring theory) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CD5tBIqJU4Uplaynext=1list=PLYslgvtKtawg5gknf6QmpFRqdqkwYAs7Hfeature=results_main or go to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_relativity Concepts introduced by the theories of relativity include: Measurements of various quantities are relative to the velocities of observers. In particular, space and time can dilate. Spacetime: space and time should be considered together and in relation to each other. The speed of light is nonetheless invariant, the same for all observers. or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space In the seventeenth century, the philosophy of space and time emerged as a central issue in epistemology and metaphysics. At its heart, Gottfried Leibniz, the German philosopher-mathematician, and Isaac Newton, the English physicist-mathematician, set out two opposing theories of what space is. Rather than being an entity that independently exists over and above other matter, Leibniz held that space is no more than the collection of spatial relations between objects in the world space is that which results from places taken together.[5] Unoccupied regions are those that could have objects in them, and thus spatial relations with other places. For Leibniz, then, space was an idealised abstraction from the relations between individual entities or their possible locations and therefore could not be continuous but must be discrete.[6] Space could be thought of in a similar way to the relations between family members. Although people in the family are related to one another, the relations do not exist independently of the people.[7] Leibniz argued that space could not exist independently of objects in the world because that implies a difference between two universes exactly alike except for the location of the material world in each universe. But since there would be no observational way of telling these universes apart then, according to the identity of indiscernibles, there would be no real difference between them. According to the principle of sufficient reason, any theory of space that implied that there could be these two possible universes, must therefore be wrong.[8] Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/11/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 08:11:17 Subject: Re: Impossible connections I agree with Roger on this one (except for the insults). I did not know that Einstein recognized that spacetime was a true void - I had assumed that his conception of gravitational warping of spacetime was a literal plenum or manifold, but if it's true that he recognized spacetime as an abstraction, then that is good news for me. It places cosmos firmly in the physics of private perception and spacetime as the participatory realizer of public bodies. Craig PS Roger, you wouldn't happen to have any citations or articles where Einstein's view on this are discussed, would you? I'll Google it myself, but figured I'd ask just in case. Thanks. On Thursday, October 11, 2012 7:59:39 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Roger, You are entitled to your opinion, but that is all it is. Richard On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:31 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist Here you go again. Monads are basically ideas. The BECs are physical. No physical connection is possible between ideas and things. Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 10/11/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-10, 14:32:39 Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls Craig, The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are
Simulation and comp
Hi Bruno Marchal Not all simulations that work in Platonia can work down here in Contingia. For example, time in principle can flow backward up there but it can not flow backward down here.That's why theories have to be tested. Simulation would not always actually work. This does not seem to bode well for comp. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 11:08:04 Subject: Re: Universe on a Chip On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:14:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Oct 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 9, 2012 11:04:51 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: If the universe were a simulation, would the constant speed of light correspond to the clock speed driving the simulation? In other words, the ?PU speed?? As we are ?nside? the simulation, all attempts to measure the speed of the simulation appear as a constant value. Light ?xecutes? (what we call ?ovement?) at one instruction per cycle. Any device we built to attempt to measure the speed of light is also inside the simulation, so even though the ?utside? CPU clock could be changing speed, we will always see it as the same constant value. A ?ycle? is how long it takes all the information in the universe to update itself relative to each other. That is all the speed of light really is. The speed of information updating in the universe? (more here http://www.quora.com/Physics/If-the-universe-were-a-simulation-would-the-constant-speed-of-light-correspond-to-the-clock-speed-driving-the-simulation-In-other-words-the-CPU-speed?) I can make the leap from CPU clock frequency to the speed of light in a vacuum if I view light as an experienced event or energy state which occurs local to matter rather than literally traveling through space. With this view, the correlation between distance and latency is an organizational one, governing sequence and priority of processing rather than the presumed literal existence of racing light bodies (photons). This would be consistent with your model of Matrix-universe on a meta-universal CPU in that light speed is simply the frequency at which the computer processes raw bits. The change of light speed when propagating through matter or gravitational fields etc wouldn? be especially consistent with this model?hy would the ghost of a supernova slow down the cosmic computer in one area of memory, etc? The model that I have been developing suggests however that the CPU model would not lead to realism or significance though, and could only generate unconscious data manipulations. In order to have symbol grounding in genuine awareness, I think that instead of a CPU cranking away rendering the entire cosmos over and over as a bulwark against nothingness, I think that the cosmos must be rooted in stasis. Silence. Solitude. This is not nothingness however, it is everythingness. A universal inertial frame which loses nothing but rather continuously expands within itself by taking no action at all. The universe doesn? need to be racing to mechanically redraw the cosmos over and over because what it has drawn already has no place to disappear to. It can only seem to disappear through? ? ? ? latency. The universe as we know it then arises out of nested latencies. A meta-diffraction of symmetrically juxtaposed latency-generating methodologies. Size, scale, distance, mass, and density on the public side, richness, depth, significance, and complexity on the private side. Through these complications, the cosmic CPU is cast as a theoretical shadow, when the deeper reality is that rather than zillions of cycles per second, the real mainframe is the slowest possible computer. It can never complete even one cycle. How can it, when it has all of these subroutines that need to complete their cycles first? ? If the universe is a simulation (which it can't, by comp, but let us say), then if the computer clock is changed, the internal creatures will not see any difference. Indeed it is a way to understand that such a time does not need to be actualized. Like in COMP and GR. I'm not sure how that relates to what I was saying about the universe arising before even the first tick of the clock is finished, but we can talk about this instead if you like. What you are saying, like what my friend up there was saying about the CPU clock being invisible to the Sims, I have no problem with. That's why I was saying it's like a computer game. You can stop the game, debug the program, start it back up where you left off, and if there was a Sim person actually experiencing that, they would not experience any interruption. Fine. The problem is the meanwhile
Re: Simulation and comp
On the contrary Roger, Feynman had to allow time to flow backwards for some particles in order to complete his Quantum ElectroDynamics QED theory. On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:39 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Not all simulations that work in Platonia can work down here in Contingia. For example, time in principle can flow backward up there but it can not flow backward down here.That's why theories have to be tested. Simulation would not always actually work. This does not seem to bode well for comp. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 11:08:04 Subject: Re: Universe on a Chip On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:14:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Oct 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 9, 2012 11:04:51 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: If the universe were a simulation, would the constant speed of light correspond to the clock speed driving the simulation? In other words, the ?PU speed?? As we are ?nside? the simulation, all attempts to measure the speed of the simulation appear as a constant value. Light ?xecutes? (what we call ?ovement?) at one instruction per cycle. Any device we built to attempt to measure the speed of light is also inside the simulation, so even though the ?utside? CPU clock could be changing speed, we will always see it as the same constant value. A ?ycle? is how long it takes all the information in the universe to update itself relative to each other. That is all the speed of light really is. The speed of information updating in the universe? (more here http://www.quora.com/Physics/If-the-universe-were-a-simulation-would-the-constant-speed-of-light-correspond-to-the-clock-speed-driving-the-simulation-In-other-words-the-CPU-speed?) I can make the leap from CPU clock frequency to the speed of light in a vacuum if I view light as an experienced event or energy state which occurs local to matter rather than literally traveling through space. With this view, the correlation between distance and latency is an organizational one, governing sequence and priority of processing rather than the presumed literal existence of racing light bodies (photons). This would be consistent with your model of Matrix-universe on a meta-universal CPU in that light speed is simply the frequency at which the computer processes raw bits. The change of light speed when propagating through matter or gravitational fields etc wouldn? be especially consistent with this model?hy would the ghost of a supernova slow down the cosmic computer in one area of memory, etc? The model that I have been developing suggests however that the CPU model would not lead to realism or significance though, and could only generate unconscious data manipulations. In order to have symbol grounding in genuine awareness, I think that instead of a CPU cranking away rendering the entire cosmos over and over as a bulwark against nothingness, I think that the cosmos must be rooted in stasis. Silence. Solitude. This is not nothingness however, it is everythingness. A universal inertial frame which loses nothing but rather continuously expands within itself by taking no action at all. The universe doesn? need to be racing to mechanically redraw the cosmos over and over because what it has drawn already has no place to disappear to. It can only seem to disappear through? ? ? ? latency. The universe as we know it then arises out of nested latencies. A meta-diffraction of symmetrically juxtaposed latency-generating methodologies. Size, scale, distance, mass, and density on the public side, richness, depth, significance, and complexity on the private side. Through these complications, the cosmic CPU is cast as a theoretical shadow, when the deeper reality is that rather than zillions of cycles per second, the real mainframe is the slowest possible computer. It can never complete even one cycle. How can it, when it has all of these subroutines that need to complete their cycles first? ? If the universe is a simulation (which it can't, by comp, but let us say), then if the computer clock is changed, the internal creatures will not see any difference. Indeed it is a way to understand that such a time does not need to be actualized. Like in COMP and GR. I'm not sure how that relates to what I was saying about the universe arising before even the first tick of the clock is finished, but we can talk about this instead if you like. What you are saying, like what my friend up there was saying about the CPU clock being invisible to the Sims, I have no problem with. That's why I
Re: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather thanis
Hi John Clark I have no money on this issue. I'd be very happy if you could tell me how to determine if a computer has intelligence, free will, consciousness or life. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 13:30:44 Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather thanis On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 5:50 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Comp seems to avoid this insurmountable problem by avoiding the issue of whether the computer actually had an experience, only that it appeared to have an experience. ?o comp's requirement is as if rather than is. In other words exactly precisely the same procedure you have used every hour of every day of every year of your waking life to determine if your fellow human beings are behaving as if they are conscious or not. ? John K Clark ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
The missing agent of materialism
Hi John Clark IMHO everything that happens happens for a reason. The reason can be physical or IMHO mental. The former is not free will, the latter has some possibility of being free to some extent, that is to say, to be self-intentioned. My claim is that self-intentioned acts are the products of intelligence. Which is IMHO why life, intelligence and free will are inseparable. Only living entities can perform self-intentioned choices or acts. Now self-intentioned acts require, obviously, an agent, a self, meaning that which intends to act or does act. In Leibniz's metaphysics, the self is a monad. Materialism does not seem to have such an agent. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 13:14:54 Subject: Re: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at? Roger Clough wrote: Free Will-- You need enough freedom My difficulty with the free will noise is not the will part, you want to do some things and don't want to do others and that's clear, my difficulty is with the free part; and all you're saying is that free will is a will that is free so that does not help me. to make a choice of your own. A choice made for a reason or a choice made for no reason; it's deterministic or it's random. ? Strictly speaking, I prefer the term self-determination meaning by anything inside your skin. And that thing inside your skin that made you choose X rather than Y came to be there for a reason (memory, your DNA, environmental factors, etc)? or it came to be inside your skin for no reason at all in which case it was random. I still have absolutely no idea what the free will noise is supposed to mean and a very much doubt that you or anybody else does either; and yet despite not having the slightest idea of what it means they will continue to passionately believe it. Weird. I neither believe nor disbelieve in free will.? ? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Conscious robots
Hi Russell Standish Life cannot survive without making choices, like where to go next. To avoid an enemy. To get food. This act of life obviously requires an autonomous choice. Nobody can make it for you. It can't be pre-programmed. Free autonomous choice is a description in my view of intelligence. QED Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 16:53:42 Subject: Re: Re: Conscious robots On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 10:13:06AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Evgenii Rudnyi The following components are inextricably mixed: life, consciousness, free will, intelligence you can't have one without the others, I disagree. You can have life without any of the others. Also, I suspect you can have intelligence without life, and intelligence without consciousness. and (or because) they're all nonphysical, all subjective. Yes - they share those in common, as do a lot of other concepts such as emergence, complexity, information, entropy, creativity and so on. So only the computer can know for sure if it has any of these. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/11/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Evgenii Rudnyi Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 07:58:57 Subject: Re: Conscious robots On 11.10.2012 11:36 Evgenii Rudnyi said the following: On 26.09.2012 20:35 meekerdb said the following: An interesting paper which comports with my idea that the problem of consciousness will be solved by engineering. Or John Clark's point that consciousness is easy, intelligence is hard. Consciousness in Cognitive Architectures A Principled Analysis of RCS, Soar and ACT-R I have started reading the paper. Thanks a lot for the link. I have finished reading the paper. I should say that I am not impressed. First, interestingly enough p. 30 The observer selects a system according to a set of main features which we shall call traits. Presumably this means that without an observer a system does not exist. In a way it is logical as without a human being what is available is just an ensemble of interacting strings. Now let me make some quotes to show you what the authors mean by consciousness in the order they appear in the paper. p. 45 This makes that, in reality, the state of the environment, from the point of view of the system, will not only consist of the values of the coupling quantities, but also of its conceptual representations of it. We shall call this the subjective state of the environment. p. 52 These principles, biologically inspired by the old metaphor ?r not so metaphor but an actual functional definition? of the brain-mind pair as the controller-control laws of the body ?he plant?, provides a base characterisation of cognitive or intelligent control. p. 60 Principle 5: Model-driven perception ? Perception is the continuous update of the integrated models used by the agent in a model-based cognitive control architecture by means of real-time sensorial information. p. 61 Principle 6: System awareness? system is aware if it is continuously perceiving and generating meaning from the countinuously updated models. p. 62 Awareness implies the partitioning of predicted futures and postdicted pasts by a value function. This partitioning we call meaning of the update to the model. p. 65 Principle 7: System attention ? Attentional mechanisms allocate both physical and cognitive resources for system processes so as to maximise performance. p. 116 From this perspective, the analysis proceeds in a similar way: if modelbased behaviour gives adaptive value to a system interacting with an object, it will give also value when the object modelled is the system itself. This gives rise to metacognition in the form of metacontrol loops that will improve operation of the system overall. p. 117 Principle 8: System self-awareness/consciousness ? A system is conscious if it is continuously generating meanings from continously updated self-models in a model-based cognitive control architecture. p. 122 'Now suppose that for adding consciousness to the operation of the system we add new processes that monitor, evaluate and reflect the operation of the ?nconscious? normal processes (Fig. fig:cons-processes). We shall call these processes the ?onscious? ones.' If I understood it correctly, the authors when they develop software just mark some bits as a subjective state and some processes as conscious. Voil?! We have a conscious robot. Let us see what happens. Evgenii --
Re: Re: Simulation and comp
Hi Richard Ruquist OK. If Feynman said it, it's got to be right. Now I recall that theoretically it has to be that time can locally flow backwards, for growing life has to reverse entropy into energy to produce cellular structure. So Brian Greene was wrong, time in some special cases can locally flow backwards. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-12, 07:45:19 Subject: Re: Simulation and comp On the contrary Roger, Feynman had to allow time to flow backwards for some particles in order to complete his Quantum ElectroDynamics QED theory. On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Not all simulations that work in Platonia can work down here in Contingia. For example, time in principle can flow backward up there but it can not flow backward down here.That's why theories have to be tested. Simulation would not always actually work. This does not seem to bode well for comp. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 11:08:04 Subject: Re: Universe on a Chip On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:14:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Oct 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 9, 2012 11:04:51 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: If the universe were a simulation, would the constant speed of light correspond to the clock speed driving the simulation? In other words, the ?PU speed?? As we are ?nside? the simulation, all attempts to measure the speed of the simulation appear as a constant value. Light ?xecutes? (what we call ?ovement?) at one instruction per cycle. Any device we built to attempt to measure the speed of light is also inside the simulation, so even though the ?utside? CPU clock could be changing speed, we will always see it as the same constant value. A ?ycle? is how long it takes all the information in the universe to update itself relative to each other. That is all the speed of light really is. The speed of information updating in the universe? (more here http://www.quora.com/Physics/If-the-universe-were-a-simulation-would-the-constant-speed-of-light-correspond-to-the-clock-speed-driving-the-simulation-In-other-words-the-CPU-speed?) I can make the leap from CPU clock frequency to the speed of light in a vacuum if I view light as an experienced event or energy state which occurs local to matter rather than literally traveling through space. With this view, the correlation between distance and latency is an organizational one, governing sequence and priority of processing rather than the presumed literal existence of racing light bodies (photons). This would be consistent with your model of Matrix-universe on a meta-universal CPU in that light speed is simply the frequency at which the computer processes raw bits. The change of light speed when propagating through matter or gravitational fields etc wouldn? be especially consistent with this model?hy would the ghost of a supernova slow down the cosmic computer in one area of memory, etc? The model that I have been developing suggests however that the CPU model would not lead to realism or significance though, and could only generate unconscious data manipulations. In order to have symbol grounding in genuine awareness, I think that instead of a CPU cranking away rendering the entire cosmos over and over as a bulwark against nothingness, I think that the cosmos must be rooted in stasis. Silence. Solitude. This is not nothingness however, it is everythingness. A universal inertial frame which loses nothing but rather continuously expands within itself by taking no action at all. The universe doesn? need to be racing to mechanically redraw the cosmos over and over because what it has drawn already has no place to disappear to. It can only seem to disappear through? ? ? ? latency. The universe as we know it then arises out of nested latencies. A meta-diffraction of symmetrically juxtaposed latency-generating methodologies. Size, scale, distance, mass, and density on the public side, richness, depth, significance, and complexity on the private side. Through these complications, the cosmic CPU is cast as a theoretical shadow, when the deeper reality is that rather than zillions of cycles per second, the real mainframe is the slowest possible computer. It can never complete even one cycle. How can it, when it has all of these subroutines that need to
Re: Re: Re: Re: Impossible connections
Hi Richard Ruquist I don't think he meant that spacetime physically exists. Spacetime is a formalism. Formalisms don't physically exist. In fact nothing theoretical physically exists. The pythagorean theorem doesn't physically exist. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-12, 07:28:42 Subject: Re: Re: Re: Impossible connections Roger, Brian definitely thinks that spacetime exists. You have said otherwise. Richard On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 6:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist So what's your problem ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 11:35:29 Subject: Re: Re: Impossible connections Roger, I know Brian Greene personally and have read his book, Fabric of the Cosmos. He was a postdoc at my school. He is not a founder of string theory, Max Green is. His view of space is quite conventional except for the extra dimensions of string theory. Richard On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard, The most entertaining way to understand the views of modern physics on space (same as that of Leibniz) would be to watch NOVA | The Fabric of the Cosmos: What Is Space (Brian Greene, a founder of sgtring theory) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CD5tBIqJU4Uplaynext=1list=PLYslgvtKtawg5gknf6QmpFRqdqkwYAs7Hfeature=results_main or go to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_relativity Concepts introduced by the theories of relativity include: Measurements of various quantities are relative to the velocities of observers. In particular, space and time can dilate. Spacetime: space and time should be considered together and in relation to each other. The speed of light is nonetheless invariant, the same for all observers. or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space In the seventeenth century, the philosophy of space and time emerged as a central issue in epistemology and metaphysics. At its heart, Gottfried Leibniz, the German philosopher-mathematician, and Isaac Newton, the English physicist-mathematician, set out two opposing theories of what space is. Rather than being an entity that independently exists over and above other matter, Leibniz held that space is no more than the collection of spatial relations between objects in the world space is that which results from places taken together.[5] Unoccupied regions are those that could have objects in them, and thus spatial relations with other places. For Leibniz, then, space was an idealised abstraction from the relations between individual entities or their possible locations and therefore could not be continuous but must be discrete.[6] Space could be thought of in a similar way to the relations between family members. Although people in the family are related to one another, the relations do not exist independently of the people.[7] Leibniz argued that space could not exist independently of objects in the world because that implies a difference between two universes exactly alike except for the location of the material world in each universe. But since there would be no observational way of telling these universes apart then, according to the identity of indiscernibles, there would be no real difference between them. According to the principle of sufficient reason, any theory of space that implied that there could be these two possible universes, must therefore be wrong.[8] Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/11/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 08:11:17 Subject: Re: Impossible connections I agree with Roger on this one (except for the insults). I did not know that Einstein recognized that spacetime was a true void - I had assumed that his conception of gravitational warping of spacetime was a literal plenum or manifold, but if it's true that he recognized spacetime as an abstraction, then that is good news for me. It places cosmos firmly in the physics of private perception and spacetime as the participatory realizer of public bodies. Craig PS Roger, you wouldn't happen to have any citations or articles where Einstein's view on this are discussed, would you? I'll Google it myself, but figured I'd ask just in case. Thanks. On Thursday, October 11, 2012 7:59:39 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Roger, You are entitled to your opinion, but that is all it is. Richard On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:31 AM, Roger Clough
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On 11 Oct 2012, at 23:47, Russell Standish wrote: That's serious cool! I love the comment posted Stephen Wolfram is very angry! They do discrete time (Euler integration), but one could easily make it continuous by replacing it with a Runge-Kutta integration scheme. Thanks for posting this. Very cool videos indeed. Although those are no more cellular automata, those are still featuring digital phenomena, even with a Runge-Kutta integration scheme. I guess this remark is obvious, despite the notion of computation on the real does not have standard definition, nor the equivalent of Church thesis. Of course some people search for that. I bet those smooth life game are Turing universal, but that might not be so easy to prove. I guess the simplest way to do that consists in finding the good subrange of phenomena need to get the elementary part of a von Neumann sort of machine, like with the usual GOL. Bruno On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 04:14:15PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: http://www.jwz.org/blog/2012/10/smoothlifel/ Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Continuous Game of Life
They are certainly cool looking and biomorphic. The question I have is, at what point do they begin to have experiences...or do you think that those blobs have experiences already? Would it give them more of a human experience if an oscillating smiley-face/frowny-face algorithm were added graphically into the center of each blob? Craig On Thursday, October 11, 2012 5:14:17 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: http://www.jwz.org/blog/2012/10/smoothlifel/ Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/efk__ExlmJwJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The missing agent of materialism
On Friday, October 12, 2012 8:15:42 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Hi John Clark IMHO everything that happens happens for a reason. The reason can be physical or IMHO mental. Ok, but why are there any 'reasons' to begin with? If there can be reasons which did not exist before, then something must be able to create new reasons. We are one of those things. We can create our own reasons by clutching a bundle of sub-personal reasons and tying them together with a strand of super-personal reasons and harness that rope for *our own personal reason* which is not reducible to either sub, super, or impersonal exteriors. This is free will, or at least will with degrees of freedom. Craig The former is not free will, the latter has some possibility of being free to some extent, that is to say, to be self-intentioned. My claim is that self-intentioned acts are the products of intelligence. Which is IMHO why life, intelligence and free will are inseparable. Only living entities can perform self-intentioned choices or acts. Now self-intentioned acts require, obviously, an agent, a self, meaning that which intends to act or does act. In Leibniz's metaphysics, the self is a monad. Materialism does not seem to have such an agent. Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net javascript: 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 13:14:54 Subject: Re: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at? Roger Clough wrote: Free Will-- You need enough freedom My difficulty with the free will noise is not the will part, you want to do some things and don't want to do others and that's clear, my difficulty is with the free part; and all you're saying is that free will is a will that is free so that does not help me. to make a choice of your own. A choice made for a reason or a choice made for no reason; it's deterministic or it's random. ? Strictly speaking, I prefer the term self-determination meaning by anything inside your skin. And that thing inside your skin that made you choose X rather than Y came to be there for a reason (memory, your DNA, environmental factors, etc)? or it came to be inside your skin for no reason at all in which case it was random. I still have absolutely no idea what the free will noise is supposed to mean and a very much doubt that you or anybody else does either; and yet despite not having the slightest idea of what it means they will continue to passionately believe it. Weird. I neither believe nor disbelieve in free will.? ? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript:. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Notvj624mi0J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
How many monads are there ?
Hi Bruno Marchal A) I do see the phrase an infinite number of monads at numerous places on the internet. So I assume that there are an infinite number of monads, or at least as many monads as there are corporeal bodies in the universe. B) On the other hand, 'each created Monad represents the whole Universe', which implies that an individual monad contains an infinity of other, universally distinct, monads, which must then in turn contain an infinite number of monads, etc. C) Yet on the large scale there is only one monad, which platonists call the One. Leibniz says thus that everything is connected (although non-interacting). D) There is no way a monad can be created or destroyed through natural means* (but presumably can be by God). But let us say there are a fixed number of monads (I don't know if that can be infinite, I am not a mathematician). --- *from the Monadology: 1. The monad, of which we will speak here, is nothing else than a simple substance, which goes to make up compounds; by simple, we mean without parts. 2. There must be simple substances because there are compound substances; for the compound is nothing else than a collection or aggregatum of simple substances. 3. Now, where there are no constituent parts there is possible neither extension, nor form, nor divisibility. These monads are the true atoms of nature, and, in a word, the elements of things. 4. Their dissolution, therefore, is not to be feared and there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance can perish through natural means. 5. For the same reason there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance might, through natural means, come into existence, since it can not be formed by composition. 6. We may say then, that the existence of monads can begin or end only all at once, that is to say, the monad can begin only through creation and end only through annihilation. Compounds, however, begin or end by parts. 7. There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed in its inner being by any other created thing, since there is no possibility of transposition within it, nor can we conceive of any internal movement which can be produced, directed, increased or diminished within it, such as can take place in the case of compounds where a change can occur among the parts. The monads have no windows through which anything may come in or go out. The Attributes cannot detach themselves or go forth from the substances, as could sensible species of the Schoolmen. In the same way neither substance nor attribute can enter from without into a monad. --- Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-12, 06:28:03 Subject: Re: I think Monads may be the strategy to allow internal changeswithin Platonia On 11 Oct 2012, at 15:40, Roger Clough wrote: This might be of possible importance with regard to comp. First of all, there are a fixed number of monads in this world, since they cannot be created or destroyed. Fixed number? You mean a finite number or an infinite cardinal? While, as I understand it, the identities or Souls of monads do not change, they do change internally. This is because their contents represent the rapidly changing (in time and space as well as internally) corporeal bodies in the changing physical world. This seems to be Leibniz's solution to the problem raised by the question, How can monads, being ideas, belong to unchanging Platonia, if the monads at the same time represent rapidly changing coporeal bodies in this contingent, ever-changing world ? The answer seems to be that only the identities or souls of the monads, not their contents, belong to Platonia. Here comp can be much precise. With regard to comp, presumably there are a fixed number of sets or files, each with a fixed identity, each of which contains rapidly changing data. The the data in each file instantly reflects the data in all of the other files, each data set from a unique perspective. Something like that, yes. Will explain more asap. It is hard to explain as few people knows enough of logics/computer science. You might read my relatively recent explanation to the FOAR list, or in the archive of this list, or in the papers on my url. I agree with this post, but it is not yet clear if you would agree or just appreciate the reason why I am agreeing with you. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because
Re: more firewalls
Hi Richard, On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes electrons, protons, neutrons, neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string theory models. Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations. It's like saying that god is everything, which is next to saying nothing. The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature behave in a quantum MW way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and why they have the current shape. (*) x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators. All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the quanta/qualia distinction. Bruno On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, Richard: Please explain why not. It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology. So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view (except for truth). It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult. Or you can look at my paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Or other paper that you can find on my URL. But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as I am in a super-busy period. Bruno On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote: Craig, I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory monads.. For example take the binding problem where: There are an almost infinite number of possible, different objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each one. (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) However, at a density of 10^90/cc (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial location ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) So the monads and the neurons experience the same things because of the BEC entanglement connection. These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads perhaps to solve the binding problem and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. Richard BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, only, by making the level that low, you can get, perhaps, that substance dualism will look very probable in our neighborhood. Bruno On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg
Re: Simulation and comp
Hi Roger Clough, On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:39, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Not all simulations that work in Platonia can work down here in Contingia. I doubt this. For example, time in principle can flow backward up there but it can not flow backward down here. I have never seen a physical law which does not imply reversibility (except the infamous wave packet collapse, which does not make sense for me). Even black holes evaporate, and you can retrieve information which felt in it (that is plausible, not yet proved to be sure). That's why theories have to be tested. All theories must be tested. OK. Simulation would not always actually work. This does not seem to bode well for comp. You fail to convince me on this. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 11:08:04 Subject: Re: Universe on a Chip On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:14:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Oct 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 9, 2012 11:04:51 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: If the universe were a simulation, would the constant speed of light correspond to the clock speed driving the simulation? In other words, the ?PU speed?? As we are ?nside? the simulation, all attempts to measure the speed of the simulation appear as a constant value. Light ?xecutes? (what we call ?ovement?) at one instruction per cycle. Any device we built to attempt to measure the speed of light is also inside the simulation, so even though the ?utside? CPU clock could be changing speed, we will always see it as the same constant value. A ?ycle? is how long it takes all the information in the universe to update itself relative to each other. That is all the speed of light really is. The speed of information updating in the universe? (more here http://www.quora.com/Physics/If-the-universe-were-a-simulation-would-the-constant-speed-of-light-correspond-to-the-clock-speed-driving-the-simulation-In-other-words-the-CPU-speed?) I can make the leap from CPU clock frequency to the speed of light in a vacuum if I view light as an experienced event or energy state which occurs local to matter rather than literally traveling through space. With this view, the correlation between distance and latency is an organizational one, governing sequence and priority of processing rather than the presumed literal existence of racing light bodies (photons). This would be consistent with your model of Matrix-universe on a meta-universal CPU in that light speed is simply the frequency at which the computer processes raw bits. The change of light speed when propagating through matter or gravitational fields etc wouldn? be especially consistent with this model?hy would the ghost of a supernova slow down the cosmic computer in one area of memory, etc? The model that I have been developing suggests however that the CPU model would not lead to realism or significance though, and could only generate unconscious data manipulations. In order to have symbol grounding in genuine awareness, I think that instead of a CPU cranking away rendering the entire cosmos over and over as a bulwark against nothingness, I think that the cosmos must be rooted in stasis. Silence. Solitude. This is not nothingness however, it is everythingness. A universal inertial frame which loses nothing but rather continuously expands within itself by taking no action at all. The universe doesn? need to be racing to mechanically redraw the cosmos over and over because what it has drawn already has no place to disappear to. It can only seem to disappear through? ? ? ? latency. The universe as we know it then arises out of nested latencies. A meta-diffraction of symmetrically juxtaposed latency-generating methodologies. Size, scale, distance, mass, and density on the public side, richness, depth, significance, and complexity on the private side. Through these complications, the cosmic CPU is cast as a theoretical shadow, when the deeper reality is that rather than zillions of cycles per second, the real mainframe is the slowest possible computer. It can never complete even one cycle. How can it, when it has all of these subroutines that need to complete their cycles first? ? If the universe is a simulation (which it can't, by comp, but let us say), then if the computer clock is changed, the internal creatures will not see any difference. Indeed it is a way to understand that such a time does not need to be actualized. Like in COMP and GR. I'm not sure how that relates to what I was saying about the universe arising before even the first tick of the clock is
The bdi model of life-- as assigned to the monad
Hi Alberto G. Corona There is a computer robot program or language called the bdi model, where b=belief d= desire i = intention In my thinking consciousness might sort of fit into such a model, b=belief = thinking or intelligence (sort of) d= desire = Missing from my model. i = intention = free will or will In Leibniz's monad, these could possivbly be associated to b=belief = the monad's perceptions d= desire = the monad's appetite i = intention = free will or will = if we take this as doing, it might be the monad's internal energy source. These might also replace the three realms of the human monad's homunculus. G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-12, 06:40:53 Subject: Re: Re: Conscious robots ?ife, consciousness, free will, intelligence I try to give a phsical definition of each one: Life: whathever that maintain its internal entropy in a non trivial way (A diamant is not alive). That is, to make use of hardwired ?nd adquired information to maintain the internal entropy by making use of low entropic matter in the environment. Consciousness: To avoid dangers he has to identify chemical agents, for example, but also (predators that may consider him as a prey. While non teleol?ical dangers, like chemicals, can be avoided with simple reactions, teleol?ical dangers, like the predators are different. He has to go a step further than automatic responses, because he has to deliberate between fight of flight, depending on its perceived internal state: healt, size, wether he has breeding descendence to protect etc. He needs to know the state of himself, as well as the boundary of his body. ? He has to calibrate the menace by looking at the reactions of the predator when he see its own reactions. there is a processing of I do this- he is responding with that, at some level. So a primitive consciouness probably started with predation. that is not self consciousness in the human sense. Self consciousness manages an history of the self that consciousness do not.? Free will: There are many dylemmas that living beings must confront, like fight of flight: For example, to abandon an wounded cub or not, ?o pass the river infested of crocodriles in orde to reach the green pastures in the other side etc. ?any of these reactions are automatic, like fight and fligh. because speed of response is very important (Even most humans report this automatism of behaviour when had a traumatic experience). But other dilemmas are not. A primitive perception of an internal conflict (that is free will) may appear in animals who had the luxury of having time for considerating either one course of action or the other, in order to get enough data. This is not very common in the animal kingdom, where life is short and decission have to be fast. Probably only animals with a long life span with a social protection can evolve such internal conflict. When there is no time to spend, even humans act automatically. If you want to know how an animal feel, go to a conflict zone. Intelligence: The impulse of curiosity and the hability to elaborate activities with the exclusive goal of learning and adquiring experience, rather than direct survivival. of course that curiositiy is not arbitrary but focused in promising activities that learn something valuable for survival. ? cat would inspect a new furniture. Because its impulse for curiosity is towards the search of locations for hiding, watch and shelter and for the knowledge of the surroundings. That is intelligence, but a focused intelligence. It is not general intelligence.We have also a focused curiosity but it is not so narrow.? Alberto 2012/10/11 Russell Standish On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 10:13:06AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Evgenii Rudnyi The following components are inextricably mixed: life, consciousness, free will, intelligence you can't have one without the others, I disagree. You can have life without any of the others. Also, I suspect you can have intelligence without life, and intelligence without consciousness. and (or because) they're all nonphysical, all subjective. Yes - they share those in common, as do a lot of other concepts such as emergence, complexity, information, entropy, creativity and so on. So only the computer can know for sure if it has any of these. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/11/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Evgenii Rudnyi Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 07:58:57 Subject: Re: Conscious robots On 11.10.2012 11:36 Evgenii Rudnyi said the following: On 26.09.2012 20:35 meekerdb said the following: An interesting paper which comports with my idea that the problem of consciousness will be solved by engineering. Or John Clark's point that consciousness is easy, intelligence is hard.
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On 12 Oct 2012, at 14:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: They are certainly cool looking and biomorphic. The question I have is, at what point do they begin to have experiences...or do you think that those blobs have experiences already? Would it give them more of a human experience if an oscillating smiley-face/frowny-face algorithm were added graphically into the center of each blob? Here is a deterministic simple phenomenon looking amazingly alive (non-newtonian fluid): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3zoTKXXNQIU Is it alive? That question does not make sense for me. Yes with some definition, no with other one. Unlike consciousness or intelligence life is not a definite concept for me. I use usually the definition has a reproductive cycle. But this makes cigarettes and stars alive. No problem for me. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: more firewalls
Wiki: In philosophy of mind, dualism is the assumption that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,[1] or that the mind and body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, and is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism, in the mind–body problem.[1][2] Bruno, It seems that your comp negates both substance dualism (ie., that the mind is composed of a non-physical substance) and now physicalism.. What is left? Richard On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 9:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Richard, On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes electrons, protons, neutrons, neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string theory models. Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations. It's like saying that god is everything, which is next to saying nothing. The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature behave in a quantum MW way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and why they have the current shape. (*) x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators. All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the quanta/qualia distinction. Bruno On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, Richard: Please explain why not. It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology. So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view (except for truth). It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult. Or you can look at my paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Or other paper that you can find on my URL. But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as I am in a super-busy period. Bruno On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote: Craig, I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory monads.. For example take the binding problem where: There are an almost infinite number of possible, different objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each one. (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) However, at a density of 10^90/cc (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial location ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) So the monads and the neurons experience the
Re: Re: Simulation and comp
Roger, Brian for sure knows and understands Feynman's QED. He could not get that wrong. You probably misunderstood him. Richard On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 8:37 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist OK. If Feynman said it, it's got to be right. Now I recall that theoretically it has to be that time can locally flow backwards, for growing life has to reverse entropy into energy to produce cellular structure. So Brian Greene was wrong, time in some special cases can locally flow backwards. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-12, 07:45:19 Subject: Re: Simulation and comp On the contrary Roger, Feynman had to allow time to flow backwards for some particles in order to complete his Quantum ElectroDynamics QED theory. On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Not all simulations that work in Platonia can work down here in Contingia. For example, time in principle can flow backward up there but it can not flow backward down here.That's why theories have to be tested. Simulation would not always actually work. This does not seem to bode well for comp. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 11:08:04 Subject: Re: Universe on a Chip On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:14:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Oct 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 9, 2012 11:04:51 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: If the universe were a simulation, would the constant speed of light correspond to the clock speed driving the simulation? In other words, the ?PU speed?? As we are ?nside? the simulation, all attempts to measure the speed of the simulation appear as a constant value. Light ?xecutes? (what we call ?ovement?) at one instruction per cycle. Any device we built to attempt to measure the speed of light is also inside the simulation, so even though the ?utside? CPU clock could be changing speed, we will always see it as the same constant value. A ?ycle? is how long it takes all the information in the universe to update itself relative to each other. That is all the speed of light really is. The speed of information updating in the universe? (more here http://www.quora.com/Physics/If-the-universe-were-a-simulation-would-the-constant-speed-of-light-correspond-to-the-clock-speed-driving-the-simulation-In-other-words-the-CPU-speed?) I can make the leap from CPU clock frequency to the speed of light in a vacuum if I view light as an experienced event or energy state which occurs local to matter rather than literally traveling through space. With this view, the correlation between distance and latency is an organizational one, governing sequence and priority of processing rather than the presumed literal existence of racing light bodies (photons). This would be consistent with your model of Matrix-universe on a meta-universal CPU in that light speed is simply the frequency at which the computer processes raw bits. The change of light speed when propagating through matter or gravitational fields etc wouldn? be especially consistent with this model?hy would the ghost of a supernova slow down the cosmic computer in one area of memory, etc? The model that I have been developing suggests however that the CPU model would not lead to realism or significance though, and could only generate unconscious data manipulations. In order to have symbol grounding in genuine awareness, I think that instead of a CPU cranking away rendering the entire cosmos over and over as a bulwark against nothingness, I think that the cosmos must be rooted in stasis. Silence. Solitude. This is not nothingness however, it is everythingness. A universal inertial frame which loses nothing but rather continuously expands within itself by taking no action at all. The universe doesn? need to be racing to mechanically redraw the cosmos over and over because what it has drawn already has no place to disappear to. It can only seem to disappear through? ? ? ? latency. The universe as we know it then arises out of nested latencies. A meta-diffraction of symmetrically juxtaposed latency-generating methodologies. Size, scale, distance, mass, and density on the public side, richness, depth, significance, and complexity on the private side. Through these complications, the cosmic CPU is cast as a theoretical shadow, when the deeper reality is that rather than zillions of cycles per second, the real mainframe is
Re: The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet
On 12 Oct 2012, at 10:27, Brett Hall wrote: On 12/10/2012, at 16:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Oct 2012, at 10:44, a b wrote: On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 2:04 AM, Brett Hall brhal...@hotmail.com wrote: On 09/10/2012, at 16:38, hibbsa asb...@gmail.com wrote: http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-real-reasons-we-dont-have-agi-yet Ben Goertzel's article that hibbsa sent and linked to above says in paragraph 7 that,I salute David Deutsch’s boldness, in writing and thinking about a field where he obviously doesn’t have much practical grounding. Sometimes the views of outsiders with very different backgrounds can yield surprising insights. But I don’t think this is one of those times. In fact, I think Deutsch’s perspective on AGI is badly mistaken, and if widely adopted, would slow down progress toward AGI dramatically. The real reasons we don’t have AGI yet, I believe, have nothing to do with Popperian philosophy, and everything to do with:... (Then he listed some things). That paragraph quoted seems an appeal to authority in an underhanded way. In a sense it says (in a condescending manner) that DD has little practical grounding in this subject and can probably be dismissed on that basis...but let's look at what he says anyways. As if practical grounding by the writer would somehow have made the arguments themselves valid or more valid (as though that makes sense). The irony is, Goertzel in almost the next breath writes that AGI has nothing to do with Popperian philosophy... Presumably, by his own criterion, he can only make that comment with any kind of validity if he has practical grounding in Popperian epistemology? It seems he has indeed written quite a bit on Popper...but probably as much as DD has written on stuff related to AI. So how much is enough before you should be taken seriously? I'm also not sure that Goertzel is expert in Popperian *epistemology*. Later he goes on to write, I have conjectured before that once some proto-AGI reaches a sufficient level of sophistication in its behavior, we will see an “AGI Sputnik” dynamic — where various countries and corporations compete to put more and more money and attention into AGI, trying to get there first. The question is, just how good does a proto-AGI have to be to reach the AGI Sputnik level?I'm not sure what proto-AGO means? It perhaps misses the central point that intelligence is a qualitative, not quantitative thing. Sputnik was a less advanced version of the International Space Station (ISS)...or a GPS satellite. But there is no less advanced version of being a universal explainer (i.e a person, i.e: intelligent, i.e: AGI) is there? So the analogy is quite false. As a side point is the A in AGI racist? Or does the A simply mean intelligently designed as opposed to evolved by natural selection? I'm not sure...what will Artificial mean to AGI when they are here? I suppose we might augment our senses in all sorts of ways so the distinction might be blurred anyways as it is currently with race.So I think the Sputnik analogy is wrong. A better analogy would be...say you wanted to develop a *worldwide communications system* in the time of (say) the American Indians in the USA (say around 1200 AD for argument's sake). Somehow you knew *it must be possible* to create a communications system that allowed transmission of messages across the world at very very high speeds but so far your technology was limited to ever bigger fires and more and more smoke. Then the difference between (say) a smoke signal and a real communications satellite that can transmit a message around the world (like Sputnik) would be more appropriate. Then the smoke signal is the current state of AGI...and Sputnik is real AGI - what you get once you understand something brand new about orbits, gravity and radio waves...and probably most importantly - that the world was a giant *sphere* plagued by high altitude winds and diverse weather systems and so forth that would never even have entered your mind. Things you can't even conceive of if all you are doing in trying to devise a better world-wide communications system is making ever bigger fires and more and more smoke...because *surely* that approach will eventually lead to world-wide communications. After all - it's just a matter of bigger fires create more smoke which travels greater distance. Right?But even that analogy is no good really because the smoke signal and the satellite still have too much in common, perhaps. They are *both ways of communicating*. And yet, current AI and real I do *not* have in common intelligence or thinking. What on Earth could proto-agi be in Ben's Goertzel's world? What would be the criterion for recognising it as distinct from actual AGI? I get the impression Ben might have missed the point that intelligeatnce is just qualitatively different from non- intelligence because
Re: more firewalls
On 12 Oct 2012, at 16:30, Richard Ruquist wrote: Wiki: In philosophy of mind, dualism is the assumption that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,[1] or that the mind and body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, and is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism, in the mind–body problem.[1][2] Bruno, It seems that your comp negates both substance dualism (ie., that the mind is composed of a non-physical substance) and now physicalism.. What is left? Arithmetical dreams. Some can cohere enough to generate, from the machines' or numbers' point of view, persistant sharable video games. It is a form or mathematicalism, or arithmeticalism, with an unavoidable zest of theologicalism separating truth from proof. I am not sure that is true, but I give argument that it is testable. Also, I derive it from the assumption that there is a level where my body/brain is Turing emulable. So I don't propose a new theory: it is a proposition derived in a very old theory. If you are correct on the BEC, then comp will force to extract BEC from computer science and/or arithmetic. They have to win some measure battle on the set of all computations, to be short. Nothing disappears, but some things get a new epistemological status, as belonging to numbers dreams. It makes eventually physics more solid, as it become a necessary view of arithmetic as seen from inside. Bruno On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 9:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Richard, On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes electrons, protons, neutrons, neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string theory models. Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations. It's like saying that god is everything, which is next to saying nothing. The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature behave in a quantum MW way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and why they have the current shape. (*) x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators. All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the quanta/qualia distinction. Bruno On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, Richard: Please explain why not. It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology. So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view (except for truth). It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult. Or you can look at my paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Or other paper that you can find on my URL. But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as I am in a super-busy period. Bruno On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote: Craig, I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if consciousness resides in a
The monad somewhat resembles a platonic form (platonic substance)
What is a substance=monad in Leibniz ? Leibniz's substances (monads) more resemble Plato's forms than being defined by their material makeup. This comes from his use of parts to define substances, or monads. Parts are unified regions with borders. Monads or substances are mental (therefore nonextended ) representations of singular material (therefore extended) bodies which are unique, and have no parts, so that they can not be subdivided. However, they may have variations within and may change within. The elementary particles, being indivisible, might seemingly qualify as substances or monads, but in our view, these particles have no substantial existence, since they cannot be located to any precision according to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. There's no there there. Thus a corporeal body can not qualify as a monad due to the fact that the material of which the body is made can not be subdivided, but rather because its bulk may be considered a unity. How about a cheese sandwich? This could not be a monad because its slices of cheese or bread can be cut in half. How about a man ? My argument here is that his body is a whole as long as he is alive. So his monad must be the whole man. Which is indicated by his monads' rating as being a soul (here technically called a spirit by Leibniz) . Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Simulation and comp
ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal Not all simulations that work in Platonia can work down here in Contingia. BRUNO: I doubt this. ROGER: Things do not change in Platonia but they do on earth. (previously) For example, time in principle can flow backward up there but it can not flow backward down here. BRUNO: I have never seen a physical law which does not imply reversibility (except the infamous wave packet collapse, which does not make sense for me). Even black holes evaporate, and you can retrieve information which felt in it (that is plausible, not yet proved to be sure). ROGER: I think time is reversible in most physical theories. But a baseball does not return to the bat after a home run is hit. That's why theories have to be tested. All theories must be tested. OK. Simulation would not always actually work. This does not seem to bode well for comp. You fail to convince me on this. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 11:08:04 Subject: Re: Universe on a Chip On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:14:44 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Oct 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 9, 2012 11:04:51 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: If the universe were a simulation, would the constant speed of light correspond to the clock speed driving the simulation? In other words, the ?PU speed?? As we are ?nside? the simulation, all attempts to measure the speed of the simulation appear as a constant value. Light ?xecutes? (what we call ?ovement?) at one instruction per cycle. Any device we built to attempt to measure the speed of light is also inside the simulation, so even though the ?utside? CPU clock could be changing speed, we will always see it as the same constant value. A ?ycle? is how long it takes all the information in the universe to update itself relative to each other. That is all the speed of light really is. The speed of information updating in the universe? (more here http://www.quora.com/Physics/If-the-universe-were-a-simulation-would-the-constant-speed-of-light-correspond-to-the-clock-speed-driving-the-simulation-In-other-words-the-CPU-speed?) I can make the leap from CPU clock frequency to the speed of light in a vacuum if I view light as an experienced event or energy state which occurs local to matter rather than literally traveling through space. With this view, the correlation between distance and latency is an organizational one, governing sequence and priority of processing rather than the presumed literal existence of racing light bodies (photons). This would be consistent with your model of Matrix-universe on a meta-universal CPU in that light speed is simply the frequency at which the computer processes raw bits. The change of light speed when propagating through matter or gravitational fields etc wouldn? be especially consistent with this model?hy would the ghost of a supernova slow down the cosmic computer in one area of memory, etc? The model that I have been developing suggests however that the CPU model would not lead to realism or significance though, and could only generate unconscious data manipulations. In order to have symbol grounding in genuine awareness, I think that instead of a CPU cranking away rendering the entire cosmos over and over as a bulwark against nothingness, I think that the cosmos must be rooted in stasis. Silence. Solitude. This is not nothingness however, it is everythingness. A universal inertial frame which loses nothing but rather continuously expands within itself by taking no action at all. The universe doesn? need to be racing to mechanically redraw the cosmos over and over because what it has drawn already has no place to disappear to. It can only seem to disappear through? ? ? ? latency. The universe as we know it then arises out of nested latencies. A meta-diffraction of symmetrically juxtaposed latency-generating methodologies. Size, scale, distance, mass, and density on the public side, richness, depth, significance, and complexity on the private side. Through these complications, the cosmic CPU is cast as a theoretical shadow, when the deeper reality is that rather than zillions of cycles per second, the real mainframe is the slowest possible computer. It can never complete even one cycle. How can it, when it has all of these subroutines that need to complete their cycles first? ? If the universe is a simulation (which it can't, by comp, but let us say), then if the computer
Re: Re: more firewalls
Hi Bruno Marchal life= freedom= self-autonomy What do I know, but IMHO if comp has any constraints-- follows any rules or has language contraints-- it does not have free will to that extent. It is somewhat predictable. But it may be possible, as you have hinted, that things can happen (as they supposedly do) that are unpredictable. But whether this is truly free is the big question. Perhaps it may only depend on your definition of freedom. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-12, 11:55:31 Subject: Re: more firewalls On 12 Oct 2012, at 16:30, Richard Ruquist wrote: Wiki: In philosophy of mind, dualism is the assumption that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,[1] or that the mind and body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, and is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism, in the mind?ody problem.[1][2] Bruno, It seems that your comp negates both substance dualism (ie., that the mind is composed of a non-physical substance) and now physicalism.. What is left? Arithmetical dreams. Some can cohere enough to generate, from the machines' or numbers' point of view, persistant sharable video games. It is a form or mathematicalism, or arithmeticalism, with an unavoidable zest of theologicalism separating truth from proof. I am not sure that is true, but I give argument that it is testable. Also, I derive it from the assumption that there is a level where my body/brain is Turing emulable. So I don't propose a new theory: it is a proposition derived in a very old theory. If you are correct on the BEC, then comp will force to extract BEC from computer science and/or arithmetic. They have to win some measure battle on the set of all computations, to be short. Nothing disappears, but some things get a new epistemological status, as belonging to numbers dreams. It makes eventually physics more solid, as it become a necessary view of arithmetic as seen from inside. Bruno On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 9:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Richard, On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes electrons, protons, neutrons, neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string theory models. Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations. It's like saying that god is everything, which is next to saying nothing. The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature behave in a quantum MW way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and why they have the current shape. (*) x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators. All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the quanta/qualia distinction. Bruno On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, Richard: Please explain why not. It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology. So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of
Re: Re: Continuous Game of Life
Hi Bruno Marchal Life is whatever operates autonomously, not following any rules, laws, or programs. Thus a Turing machine cannot be part of a live creature. Even if it reprograms itself, it must be constrained by the computer language and operating system. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-12, 10:23:52 Subject: Re: Continuous Game of Life On 12 Oct 2012, at 14:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: They are certainly cool looking and biomorphic. The question I have is, at what point do they begin to have experiences...or do you think that those blobs have experiences already? Would it give them more of a human experience if an oscillating smiley-face/frowny-face algorithm were added graphically into the center of each blob? Here is a deterministic simple phenomenon looking amazingly alive (non-newtonian fluid): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3zoTKXXNQIU Is it alive? That question does not make sense for me. Yes with some definition, no with other one. Unlike consciousness or intelligence life is not a definite concept for me. I use usually the definition has a reproductive cycle. But this makes cigarettes and stars alive. No problem for me. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Continuous Game of Life
Hi Craig Weinberg I would begin to believe that that life-game is conscious if there is some sort of shepherding done by a shepherd. A watcher and director. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-12, 08:50:11 Subject: Re: Continuous Game of Life They are certainly cool looking and biomorphic. The question I have is, at what point do they begin to have experiences...or do you think that those blobs have experiences already? Would it give them more of a human experience if an oscillating smiley-face/frowny-face algorithm were added graphically into the center of each blob? Craig On Thursday, October 11, 2012 5:14:17 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: http://www.jwz.org/blog/2012/10/smoothlifel/ Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/efk__ExlmJwJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: The missing agent of materialism
Hi Craig Weinberg There's no proof, only a very reasonable expectation. Science could not work if things happened for no reason. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-12, 08:56:38 Subject: Re: The missing agent of materialism On Friday, October 12, 2012 8:15:42 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Hi John Clark IMHO everything that happens happens for a reason. The reason can be physical or IMHO mental. Ok, but why are there any 'reasons' to begin with? If there can be reasons which did not exist before, then something must be able to create new reasons. We are one of those things. We can create our own reasons by clutching a bundle of sub-personal reasons and tying them together with a strand of super-personal reasons and harness that rope for *our own personal reason* which is not reducible to either sub, super, or impersonal exteriors. This is free will, or at least will with degrees of freedom. Craig The former is not free will, the latter has some possibility of being free to some extent, that is to say, to be self-intentioned. My claim is that self-intentioned acts are the products of intelligence. Which is IMHO why life, intelligence and free will are inseparable. Only living entities can perform self-intentioned choices or acts. Now self-intentioned acts require, obviously, an agent, a self, meaning that which intends to act or does act. In Leibniz's metaphysics, the self is a monad. Materialism does not seem to have such an agent. Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 10/12/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 13:14:54 Subject: Re: Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at? Roger Clough wrote: Free Will-- You need enough freedom My difficulty with the free will noise is not the will part, you want to do some things and don't want to do others and that's clear, my difficulty is with the free part; and all you're saying is that free will is a will that is free so that does not help me. to make a choice of your own. A choice made for a reason or a choice made for no reason; it's deterministic or it's random. ? Strictly speaking, I prefer the term self-determination meaning by anything inside your skin. And that thing inside your skin that made you choose X rather than Y came to be there for a reason (memory, your DNA, environmental factors, etc)? or it came to be inside your skin for no reason at all in which case it was random. I still have absolutely no idea what the free will noise is supposed to mean and a very much doubt that you or anybody else does either; and yet despite not having the slightest idea of what it means they will continue to passionately believe it. Weird. I neither believe nor disbelieve in free will.? ? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/Notvj624mi0J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Conscious robots
On 10/12/2012 3:40 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: life, consciousness, free will, intelligence I try to give a phsical definition of each one: Life: whathever that maintain its internal entropy in a non trivial way (A diamant is not alive). That is, to make use of hardwired and adquired information to maintain the internal entropy by making use of low entropic matter in the environment. Consciousness: To avoid dangers he has to identify chemical agents, for example, but also (predators that may consider him as a prey. While non teleológical dangers, like chemicals, can be avoided with simple reactions, teleológical dangers, like the predators are different. He has to go a step further than automatic responses, because he has to deliberate between fight of flight, depending on its perceived internal state: healt, size, wether he has breeding descendence to protect etc. He needs to know the state of himself, as well as the boundary of his body. He has to calibrate the menace by looking at the reactions of the predator when he see its own reactions. there is a processing of I do this- he is responding with that, at some level. So a primitive consciouness probably started with predation. that is not self consciousness in the human sense. Self consciousness manages an history of the self that consciousness do not. Free will: There are many dylemmas that living beings must confront, like fight of flight: For example, to abandon an wounded cub or not, to pass the river infested of crocodriles in orde to reach the green pastures in the other side etc. many of these reactions are automatic, like fight and fligh. because speed of response is very important (Even most humans report this automatism of behaviour when had a traumatic experience). But other dilemmas are not. A primitive perception of an internal conflict (that is free will) may appear in animals who had the luxury of having time for considerating either one course of action or the other, in order to get enough data. This is not very common in the animal kingdom, where life is short and decission have to be fast. Probably only animals with a long life span with a social protection can evolve such internal conflict. When there is no time to spend, even humans act automatically. If you want to know how an animal feel, go to a conflict zone. I generally agree with your analysis. And I think you are right that what is called 'free will' is a feeling about conflicting internal values. This comports with the legal idea of coerced (not-free) choice. Coercion externally imposes a cost on your decision so that values are shifted and what would have had a negative value has a positive value competing with normally dominant alternatives. Intelligence: The impulse of curiosity and the hability to elaborate activities with the exclusive goal of learning and adquiring experience, rather than direct survivival. of course that curiositiy is not arbitrary but focused in promising activities that learn something valuable for survival. A cat would inspect a new furniture. Because its impulse for curiosity is towards the search of locations for hiding, watch and shelter and for the knowledge of the surroundings. That is intelligence, but a focused intelligence. It is not general intelligence. But if you define 'general intelligence' as not having any goal, you are defining it out of existence. Our own goals may not be consciously present, but I don't think they are any less motivated than the cats. Brent We have also a focused curiosity but it is not so narrow. Alberto -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: more firewalls
My opinion for what that is worth is that arithmetical dreams describe what happens in heaven where whatever we think becomes reality and if enough of us think the same thing it becomes a video game we can play together. My opinion is that inanimate physical things are more concrete even if consciousness is not. Richard On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 11:55 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Oct 2012, at 16:30, Richard Ruquist wrote: Wiki: In philosophy of mind, dualism is the assumption that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,[1] or that the mind and body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, and is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism, in the mind–body problem.[1][2] Bruno, It seems that your comp negates both substance dualism (ie., that the mind is composed of a non-physical substance) and now physicalism.. What is left? Arithmetical dreams. Some can cohere enough to generate, from the machines' or numbers' point of view, persistant sharable video games. It is a form or mathematicalism, or arithmeticalism, with an unavoidable zest of theologicalism separating truth from proof. I am not sure that is true, but I give argument that it is testable. Also, I derive it from the assumption that there is a level where my body/brain is Turing emulable. So I don't propose a new theory: it is a proposition derived in a very old theory. If you are correct on the BEC, then comp will force to extract BEC from computer science and/or arithmetic. They have to win some measure battle on the set of all computations, to be short. Nothing disappears, but some things get a new epistemological status, as belonging to numbers dreams. It makes eventually physics more solid, as it become a necessary view of arithmetic as seen from inside. Bruno On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 9:58 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Hi Richard, On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes electrons, protons, neutrons, neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string theory models. Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations. It's like saying that god is everything, which is next to saying nothing. The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature behave in a quantum MW way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and why they have the current shape. (*) x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms ((K, x), y) = x (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators. All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the quanta/qualia distinction. Bruno On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, Richard: Please explain why not. It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology. So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view (except for truth). It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult. Or you can look at my paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Or other paper that you can find on my
Re: The missing agent of materialism
On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 , Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: IMHO everything that happens happens for a reason. Opinions, humble or otherwise, really don't count for much, the universe will continue doing what it is doing regardless of your opinion; and modern physics tells us that it is EXTREMELY unlikely that everything that happens happens for a reason. But for the sake of argument let's assume you're correct, then you are as deterministic a cuckoo clock. The reason can be physical or IMHO mental. It makes perfect sense to say I picked X and not Y just because I wanted to, in that case there was a reason for me doing what I did just as there was a reason for the cuckoo clock doing what it did. And because everything happens for a reason then there must be a reason I wanted to pick X not Y. Which is IMHO why life, intelligence and free will are inseparable. It's astonishing how so many people say that free will is of central importance and yet not one of them can give a coherent explanation of what the hell it's supposed to mean. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Keep in mind that I use the compatibilist definition of free will, which is the (machine) ability to exploits its self-indetermination (with indetermination in the Turing sense, (not in the comp first person sense, nor the quantum one). It is basically the ability to do conscious choice. I can't keep it in mind because the above sounds very much like gibberish. Intelligence implies free will, and free will implies consciousness. And even if it wasn't gibberish it would be circular because your definition of free will involves consciousness. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So you see no reason to draw a legal distinction between a banker to takes money from his bank to support a more lavish life style and one who does it to keep a bank robber from shooting him? No. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On 10/12/2012 1:39 PM, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So you see no reason to draw a legal distinction between a banker to takes money from his bank to support a more lavish life style and one who does it to keep a bank robber from shooting him? No. So do you think we should send both to prison or neither? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Conscious robots
On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 08:23:33AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish Life cannot survive without making choices, like where to go next. To avoid an enemy. To get food. This act of life obviously requires an autonomous choice. Nobody can make it for you. It can't be pre-programmed. Free autonomous choice is a description in my view of intelligence. QED The algorithm employed by certain bacteria is to travel in a straight line if nutrient concentration is below a certain threshold, and to tumble randomly if the nutrient concentration is above a certain threshold. Why is this effective? Ballistic motion (straight line case) exhibits \Delta x proportional to \Delta t (average position change is proportional to time), so its a good way to somewhere where resources are more plentiful. By contrast chaotic motion has \Delta x proportional to sqrt\Delta t, which means you stick around longer and hoover up more of the good stuff. Is this autonomous? You bet. Is it living? Yes - it's bacteria, although a robot doing the same thing would not necessarily be living. Is it intelligent? - nup. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Continuous Game of Life
On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 05:50:11AM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote: They are certainly cool looking and biomorphic. The question I have is, at what point do they begin to have experiences...or do you think that those blobs have experiences already? Would it give them more of a human experience if an oscillating smiley-face/frowny-face algorithm were added graphically into the center of each blob? Craig Assuming this system exhibits universality like the original GoL, and assuming COMP, then some patterns will exhibit consciousness. However, the patterns will no doubt be astronomical in size. The movies you see here would be like taking an electron microscopic movie of the inner workings of part of one cell in the human body. I was more struck by the apparent similarity of the movie to the formation of bilipid membranes. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Conscious robots
On 10/12/2012 1:54 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 08:23:33AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish Life cannot survive without making choices, like where to go next. To avoid an enemy. To get food. This act of life obviously requires an autonomous choice. Nobody can make it for you. It can't be pre-programmed. Free autonomous choice is a description in my view of intelligence. QED The algorithm employed by certain bacteria is to travel in a straight line if nutrient concentration is below a certain threshold, and to tumble randomly if the nutrient concentration is above a certain threshold. Why is this effective? Ballistic motion (straight line case) exhibits \Delta x proportional to\Delta t (average position change is proportional to time), so its a good way to somewhere where resources are more plentiful. By contrast chaotic motion has\Delta x proportional tosqrt\Delta t, which means you stick around longer and hoover up more of the good stuff. Is this autonomous? You bet. Is it living? Yes - it's bacteria, although a robot doing the same thing would not necessarily be living. Is it intelligent? - nup. I'd say a little; it's smarter than just ballistic motion alone. Intelligent behavior isn't very well defined and admits of degrees. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Continuous Game of Life
Hi Russell, Even more suggestive is its similarity to Butschli protocells... see this video for example: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9tmTDvL1AUs and many others uploaded by Rachel Armstrong... as she describes them a simple self-organizing system that is formed by the addition of a drop of alkali to a field of olive oil - first described by Otto Butschli 1898 Terren On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 4:42 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 05:50:11AM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote: They are certainly cool looking and biomorphic. The question I have is, at what point do they begin to have experiences...or do you think that those blobs have experiences already? Would it give them more of a human experience if an oscillating smiley-face/frowny-face algorithm were added graphically into the center of each blob? Craig Assuming this system exhibits universality like the original GoL, and assuming COMP, then some patterns will exhibit consciousness. However, the patterns will no doubt be astronomical in size. The movies you see here would be like taking an electron microscopic movie of the inner workings of part of one cell in the human body. I was more struck by the apparent similarity of the movie to the formation of bilipid membranes. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
