Tom Caylor wrote:
>
>I'm talking about ultimate meaning, meaning which is ultimately based
>on truth. Purpose would go along with that. I think that this
>situation is similar (metaphysically isomorphic? :) to the "primary
>matter" situation. I think you maintain that experience is enough. I
ld distance from the BH, then
an observer falling in will see each successive buoy flying past him at
closer to C, with the measured speed of the buoy approaching C in the limit
as the buoy's distance from the horizon approaches 0.
Jesse Mazer
>From: James N Rose <[EMAIL PROTECT
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>What you seem to be suggesting is that not all computations are equivalent:
>some give rise to mind, >while others, apparently similar, do not. Isn't
>this similar to the reasoning of people who say that a >computer could
>never be conscious because even if it exact
1Z wrote:
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
> > But "natural laws" are usually taken to be contingent, we can imagine
> > possible worlds where they are different--can you have "supervenience"
>under
> > logical laws, or any other laws which must be the same
1Z wrote:
> >
> > Even with the consciousness-is-computation computationalism, it depends
>on
> > what your definition of "is" is...if you understand it to mean that a
> > conscious experience is nothing more than an alternate way of describing
>a
> > certain computation, I suppose Chalmers wou
1Z wrote:
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
>
> > >Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing
> > >emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an
> > >explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
>Le 19-juil.-06, à 17:30, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
>
>
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Bruno Marchal writes:
> >>
> >>>> I think I have more basic difficulties also, like
Stathis Papaioannou:
>
>
>Bruno Marchal writes:
>
> > > I think I have more basic difficulties also, like the Maudlin
> > > argument re the handling of counterfactuals for consciousness to
> > > occur:
> >
> >
> > It is a bit harder, no doubt. And, according to some personal basic
> > everything
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>Hi, thank you for your answer.
>
>But then I have another question, N is usually said to contains positive
>integer number from 0 to +infinity... but then it seems it should contains
>infinite length integer number... but then you enter the problem I've
>shown,
>so N sh
1Z wrote:
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> >
>
> > > > But it is a straw man to say "everything-theories makes the
>prediction
> > >that
> > > > Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones",
> >
>I would say ontology is about the most exhaustive possible
>list of objective truths, and any entity referred to in this exhaustive
>list
>of objectively true statements "exists" by definition. With something like
>a
>unicorn, once you have all true statements about peoples' *concepts* of
>unic
1Z wrote:
>
>
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > IZ wrote:
> >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > > > IZ wrote:
> > > >
> > >
> > > > >And mathematical MWI *w
IZ wrote:
>
>
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > IZ wrote:
> >
>
> > >And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
> > >it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
> > >
> > >However, in the absence of a sat
IZ wrote:
>
>
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> > >
> > >The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
> > >as predicted by Platonic theories.
> > >
> > >It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
> > >i
1Z wrote:
>
>The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
>as predicted by Platonic theories.
>
>It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
>it is falsified.
But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to
the view that every possible world or observer-m
Brent Meeker:
>
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >
> >>
> >>1Z wrote:
> >>
> >>>Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>1Z wrote:
> >>>>
&
Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>1Z wrote:
> >
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >
> >>1Z wrote:
> >>
> >>>Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> You misunderstand "population models". It's not a question of what
>members of a species think or
> vote for; it's a matter of whether their logic will
Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>1Z wrote:
> >
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >
> >>You misunderstand "population models". It's not a question of what
>members of a species think or
> >>vote for; it's a matter of whether their logic will lead to their
>survival in the evolutionary
> >>biological sense.
Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >>Lennart Nilsson wrote:
> >>
> >>We use mathematics as a meta-language, just like you kan describe what
>is
> >>said in latin by using italian. That does not make italian
> >>logically/evolu
>Lennart Nilsson wrote:
>
>We use mathematics as a meta-language, just like you kan describe what is
>said in latin by using italian. That does not make italian
>logically/evolutionary prior to latin of course.
But in this case we are using mathematics to describe actual events in the
real world
Lennart Nilsson wrote:
>
>No, you have the burden of showing what possible worlds could possibly mean
>outside a real biological setting.
>
>Cooper shows that logical laws are dependent on which population model they
>refer to. Of course that goes for the notion of possibility also...
That sound
Tom Caylor wrote:
>
>So apparently we are still missing something. You need to tell us
>*why* this is not the right reason. The set of instructions for g is
>precisely a big "case" statement (if you will) on n, like this:
>
>switch n:
>begin
>case 1:
>set of instructions for f1:
>case 2:
>set o
Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
>Indeed obtaining the tape with Omega on it would be equivalent to solving
>the Halting problem, but obtaining an arbitrary random noncomputable
>sequence
>tape is as simple as hooking up a random source to your TM.
>
>In what way is the random source not a program?
Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
>On Thu, Jun 08, 2006 at 04:24:51AM +0200, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> >
> > Le Jeudi 8 Juin 2006 02:56, Russell Standish a écrit :
> > > On Wed, Jun 07, 2006 at 03:56:32PM +0200, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > > Hi Bruno,
> > > >
> > > > what I undestand about the UD is th
Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
>On Wed, May 31, 2006 at 07:53:35PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> >
> > Anyway, I agree with your basic point--although practical possibility is
>not
> > important to philosophical thought-experiments, *logical* possibility
> > certa
Hal Finney wrote:
>Jesse Mazer writes:
> > The dovetailer is only supposed to generate all *computable* functions
> > though, correct? And the diagonalization of the (countable) set of all
> > computable functions would not itself be computable.
>
>The dovetailer I kno
and west in an
>interrupted chain that circumnavigates the pole. (Sorry I may not be
>explaining the concept of ring species too well - look up Wikipedia).
>
>In such a case, perhaps "ring identities" such as Jesse Mazer <->
>Bruno Marchal do exist - but I'd like
George Levy wrote:
>
>
>Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >Meanwhile, I
> >would like to ask George and the others if they have a good
> >understanding of the present thread, that is on the fact that growing
> >functions has been well defined, that each sequence of such functions
> >are well defined, and
Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
>On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> > I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through
> > non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all,
> > there is a continuous sequence of intermed
Kim Jones wrote:
>
>Well, in the case of schizoid mathematician John Nash, his
>"psychotic" behaviour was also clearly linked to his maths ability.
>After imbibing anti-psychotic medication, not only did his "unreal"
>friends disappear, but his mathematical perception as well.
I don't think that
Tom Caylor wrote:
>
>Actually, in reviewing the definition of Turing machine (it's been over
>2 decades since I studied it) I agree with you. The Turing machine
>leaves behind a memory of its past through its "writes" to the tape.
>Maybe I don't understand what Wei Dai was saying with his settin
Russell Standish wrote:
>
>Also note that exact measurements of microstates is *in principle*
>incompatible with the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.
Well, that's why I defined microstates as "detailed descriptions of the
positions and momenta of all the particles, within the limits of the
un
>From: "Wei Dai" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Reply-To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>To:
>Subject: Re: why can't we erase information?
>Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 16:11:28 -0700
>
>
>Jesse Mazer wrote:
> > As for the question of why we live in a univer
>From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Reply-To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>Subject: Re: why can't we erase information?
>Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 18:34:42 +1000
>
>
>On Mon, Apr 10, 2006 at 12:03:47AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> > Russell S
Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
>
>How would an observer know he is living in a universe in which information
>is lost? Information loss means that time evolution can map two different
>initial states to the same final state. The observer in the final state
>thus
>cannot know that information really has b
George Levy wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
George Levy writes:
One more point for Stathis: If atheism is not a religion, then zero is
not a number.
There is a clear difference between, on the one hand, believing x despite
the lack of any supporting evidence and, on the other hand, n
Benjamin Udell wrote:
Bruno, list,
The most that I can say about responding so lengthily to Bruno's lengthy
response to my lengthy comment, is that I've kept it in one post!
[Ben]>> Bruno, list,
>> I've looked over Bruno's recent replies and, though I don't understand
much about Bruno's w
Tom Caylor wrote:
Saibal Mitra wrote:
http://physicsweb.org/articles/world/18/12/2/1
Not that there aren't enough discussions going on already, I wanted to know
what people think about Paul Davies' argument using Seth Lloyd's
calculations, concluding that a quantum computer can never be
George Levy wrote:
Jesse,
the infinite number of histories refer to the continuum of histories. The
first person observer can only perceive through his own experiments that
physics in his own world, provides a infinite number of histories as large
as the continuum. All he knows is that his o
George Levy wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
George Levy:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
we are "conscious" only because we belong to a continuum of infinite
never ending stories ...
...that's what the lobian machine's "guardian angel" G* says about
that: true and strict
George Levy:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
we are "conscious" only because we belong to a continuum of infinite never
ending stories ...
...that's what the lobian machine's "guardian angel" G* says about that:
true and strictly unbelievable.
Bruno
Since you agree that the number of histories is on
Tom Caylor wrote:
The reason why you don't buy lottery tickets could just as easily be
explained in a single universe.
I short-changed my argument. I should've said, "The reason why you don't
buy lottery tickets can only be explained in a single universe."
Tom Caylor
If you don't a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I was thinking of people who accept some ensemble theory such as MWI, but
don't believe in QTI. I must admit, I find it difficult to understand how
even a dualist might justify (a) as being correct. Would anyone care to
help?
What do you think of my argument here?
From: "Stephen Paul King" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Subject: Re: Goldilocks world
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2005 19:29:39 -0500
Dear Jesse, Stathis, Bruno et al,
- Original Message ----- From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Se
Russell Standish wrote:
That is the logical argument against omnipotence. IIRC, Aquinas knew
of these arguments, and so I gather omnipotence and omniscience are
not actually part of christian theological creed.
Disclaimer: IANAC (I am not a christian) :)
Are you sure about that? I'm pretty s
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
George Levy writes:
Along the line of Jorge Luis Borges a blackboard covered in chalk contains
the library of Babel (everything) but no information. Similarly a white
board covered with ink also contains no information.
Interestingly, information is minimized or act
Tom wrote:
Perhaps there needs to be a new thread for the new topic (Game of Life,
etc.).
It seems my original inquiry has been left unanswered, but this is my
point. My challenge was that multiverse theory is just pulling things out
of thin air just as much as any other metaphysical theor
There is also the "Crackpot Index" by physicist John Baez:
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/crackpot.html
Stephen Hawkins in his book The Theory of Everything complained that
science had become too complicated for philosophers and in conclusion
had this to say:
from the index:
"8. 5 points for
Russell Standish wrote:
Very good! If we ever get around to making a FAQ for this group, this
link should be right up front.
Cheers
On Fri, Oct 14, 2005 at 12:18:19AM +0200, Saibal Mitra wrote:
> You clearly forgot to read this:
> http://insti.physics.sunysb.edu/~siegel/quack.html
"How to
Ben Goertzel wrote:
My own understanding is that whether Fred, a pigeon or a printer is
involved
in the experiment should be basically irrelevant. That is, I don't think
"registration in consciousness" (whatever that means) is the important
thing, but rather registration in the sense of "sta
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Thanks very much Jesse!
You answered the question I *would have* asked had I rememberd my quantum
physics better ;-)
I think your answer is related to a paradox a friend mentioned to me.
The paradox is as follows:
"One does the EPR thing of creating two particles with o
scerir wrote:
From: "Ben Goertzel"
> [...] but still the records
> could be kept somewhere,
> and one can ask what would happen
> if the records were kept somewhere else [...]
Not sure, but the quote below - about the information
'in principle' - might be helpful.
"The superposition of amplit
Hal Finney wrote:
Ben Goertzel writes:
> Hal,
> > It won't make any difference, because the CC is not used in the way
you
> > imagine. It doesn't have to produce a record and it doesn't have to
erase
> > any records.
>
> OK, mea culpa, maybe I misunderstood the apparatus and it was not the
Tom Caylor wrote:
I am entertained by the discussion with John Ross, and can think of more
entertaining questions for him (such as how about travelling by firing a
neutrino gun at objects that you want to travel to? sorry I couldn't help
it), but I believe it is off topic.
For those who ag
John Ross wrote:
Another solution is for you to ignore my comments, or maybe me yours.
This isn't just about me personally not being interested in your posts, it's
about the discussion of your "alternative physics" ideas being *off-topic*
on this list, just as much so if you came here and s
Hal Ruhl wrote:
Hi Jesse:
In FCC ABC layering the distance between the centers of any two adjacent
regions is always the same.
Now if we get to motion the question is whether or not the model allows
motion. In a discrete state evolving universe there is no motion while a
universe is in a
pt to overturn theories about neutrinos based only
on eyeballing some pictures of particle tracks.
Again, please take this discussion elsewhere, it's off-topic on this list.
Jesse
-Original Message-
From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, October 10, 2
A discrete lattice structure would also violate Lorentz-symmetry, since the
mimimum distance would look different in different reference frames, and
there would be one preferred frame where the distance was maximized.
Jesse
From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: John Ross <[EMAIL PROT
John Ross:
Are you kicking me off the site? What if it turns out that I am right?
Or are you all just interested in alternatives to the truth?
I don't have the power to kick you off, I'm just telling you this sort of
thing is off-topic here, so the polite thing to do would take the discussi
This comment shows that you have very little understanding of the basics of
relativity, and thus would not be in a position to say that your theory can
reproduce its successful predictions since you obviously haven't studied
them in any detail. In GR nothing can exceed the speed of light *locall
John Ross wrote:
To the best of my knowledge and belief, my theory successfully predicts
all known experimental knowledge of physics, chemistry and optics and
does so better and simpler than any other theory. I am working on a
list of predictions of new things that can be proved experimentally
John Ross:
Thanks for the response.
Yes my theory involves a lot of math. Have you read my patent
application? For example, I have a quantitative description of Coulomb
forces acting inside photons. These integrated forces represent the
photon's energy.
Do these equations allow you to pred
John Ross wrote:
Thanks for the paper relating to detection of "low energy" neutrinos.
However, according to my model, neutrinos are very, very high energy
photons (off everybody's chart, except mine).
Therefore, if my model is correct, then low energy neutrinos would
merely be the photons we
George Levy wrote:
Jesse wrote
Well, you're free to define "negative mass" however you like, of
course--but this is not how physicists would use the term. When you plug
negative values of mass or energy into various physics equations it leads
to weird consequences that we don't see in every
daddycaylor wrote:
John Ross wrote:
Neutrinos and Gravity
[0010] Neutrinos are very high-energy photons. Each neutrino
comprises a
high-energy, high frequency entron. Neutrinos, like other photons,
travel in substantially straight lines at the speed of light with its
entron circling within
John M wrote:
Jesse and George:
the cobbler apprentice speaketh:
you, mathematically high-minded savants look for a
primitive realization of 'negative mass' etc, while
you find it natural to use negative numbers. If I was
185lb last week and now 180 lb, then I have 5 lb in
negative.
Of course
George Levy wrote:
Negative matter/energy however are different. If negative matter/energy
could exist they would give space a negative curvature.
The issue of negative curvature is somewhat separate from negative mass,
though--if the density of matter/energy in our universe was below the
c
danny mayes wrote:
Fair enough. But if we accept those parameters does it make any sense to
even talk about "reality."? Maybe in a philosophical sense, but certainly
not in a scientific sense as by (your) definition objective reality, the
only reality you say, is forever separated from wh
Lee Corbin wrote:
Jesse writes
> > I meant that your perceptions have physiological causes
> > because your brain is a part of an obviously successful
> > survival machine designed by evolution.
>
> Sure, but all of this is compatible with an idealist philosophy where
> reality is made up of n
Lee Corbin wrote:
Jesse writes
> Lee Corbin wrote:
> >
> >Chris writes
> >
> > > >>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley.
> > >
> > > The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show
> > > that sensory perception is
> > > indirect, and therefore the existence of a
> > > material cause for those p
Lee Corbin wrote:
Chris writes
> >>Samuel Johnson did refute Berkeley.
>
> The main thrust of Berkley's argument is to show that sensory perception
is
> indirect, and therefore the existence of a material cause for those
> perceptions is an unjustified inference in contravention of Occam's
r
chris peck wrote:
Thats why I make an appeal to something more intuitive. The A List as
concieved by McTaggart may lead to incoherence, but nevertheless, we are
embedded in the present. To meddle with its order is to conjure up paradox.
Reality can not be like that.
But are you just expres
Hal Finney wrote:
> True, it isn't always necessary to compute things in the same order--if
> you're simulating a system that obeys time-symmetric laws you can always
> reverse all the time-dependent quantities (like the momentum of each
> particle) in the final state and use that as an initial
chris peck wrote:
Hi Jesse;
we can just understand it in terms of our brains having different memories
and anticipations of the future at different points along our worldline.
I think that is necessary for an understanding of time, but insufficient.
What governs which set of memories and a
chris peck wrote:
Im fairly sure you are attacking a straw man. We can just say that 'now'
races towards the future rather than the opposite without us exerting any
effort, whilst 'here' doesnt really move at all. Especially for a rock. At
least the a priori notions of each spatial dimension d
Hal Finney wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Hal Finney wrote:
> >I imagine that multiple universes could exist, a la Schmidhuber's
ensemble
> >or Tegmark's level 4 multiverse. Time does not play a special role in
> >the descriptions of these universes.
>
&
Hal Finney wrote:
I imagine that multiple universes could exist, a la Schmidhuber's ensemble
or Tegmark's level 4 multiverse. Time does not play a special role in
the descriptions of these universes.
Doesn't Schmidhuber consider only universes that are the results of
computations? Can't we
I wrote:
And when they say the performance is "variable", I think they're talking
about some measure of performance during a single execution of a given
program, not about repeating the execution of the same program multiple
times and finding variations from one run to another.
Looks like I
Eugen Leitl wrote:
On Mon, Jul 11, 2005 at 04:45:21PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> I don't think that paper is talking about computations being
> nonrepeatable--they say that they're not talking about "stochastic
> variations" (which I think refers to genuine phy
Norman Samish wrote:
http://arxiv.org/abs/nlin.AO/0506030 shows the following abstract,
suggesting that complex computations are not precisely repeatable. Doesn't
Bruno's Computation Hypothesis imply that computations ARE precisely
repeatable?
"Modern computer microprocessors are composed of
Lee Corbin wrote:
Jesse writes
>
> For me, it's not that I think it's meaningful to imagine a universe just
> like ours but without causality, rather it's that I think causality is
> probably important to deciding whether a particular system in our
universe
> counts as a valid "instantiation
Hal Finney wrote:
So again, is it enough to look at the natural laws of our universe in
order to decide whether the consciousnesses within it are real? Or do we
need more? Can we imagine a universe like ours, which follows exactly the
same natural laws, but where time doesn't really exist (in
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Nevertheless, I still think it would be *extremely* difficult to emulate a
whole brain. Just about every physical parameter for each neuron would be
relevant, down to the atomic level. If any of these parameters are slightly
off, or if the mathematical model is sligh
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You might say that in the last example the states were "causally
connected", while in the first they were not. But why should that make any
difference, especially to a solipsist?
If one believes in "psychophysical laws" (to use Chalmers' term) relating
3rd-person p
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Recent theory based on the work of Eric Kandel is that long term memory is
mediated by new protein synthesis in synapses, which modulates the
responsiveness of the synapse to neurotransmitter release; that is, it
isn't just the "wiring diagram" that characterises a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
George Levy wrote:
[quoting Stathis]
You would also need to know the electrical potential at every point of
every cell membrane; the ionic gradients (Na, K, Ca, pH and others)
across every cell membrane, including intracellular membranes; the type,
position and con
chris peck wrote:
For a moment consider Mr. Einstein. Now he just assumed space/time was
relative. He had no evidence to suppose it was, Newton's stuff predicted
celestial orbits fine. Well, within a narrow margin of error, the kind of
margin all theories need, but his equations are as worka
Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
> >I do not equate my identity with the matter that composes my body at
all.
> >I would say that my personal identity cannot be defined in a
> >communicable way, in the way I see it. I believe there is something
> >fundamental about consciousness.
>
> If you don't equate
e it would be possible to find a continuum of minds with
memories and lives intermediate between me and George Bush. There's not
going to be a rigorous, totally well-defined procedure you can use to
distinguish minds which belong to the set "Jesse-Mazer-kinda-guys" from
minds wh
Lee Corbin wrote:
Jesse writes
> Lee Corbin wrote:
>
> > If I, on the other hand, knew that this wonderful room was going to
> > be available to me on a specific date,... I would enthusiastically
> > pay a good fraction of my net worth for this opportunity.
> >
> >Why? Why would I do it? Beca
Lee Corbin wrote:
If I, on the other hand, knew that this wonderful room was going to
be available to me on a specific date, I would collect all my favorite
movies, my best books, some certain chemicals that it is best not to
describe in detail, and would look forward to the most wonderful
after
"New Agers"? Few of us on this list believe in stuff like ESP, the only
exceptions I know of are rmiller and Stephen Paul King. Most of us believe
in a completely reductionist view of how the brain produces intelligent
behavior (ie we think a sufficiently detailed simulation of a brain would
be
rmiller wrote:
Jesse wrote
In reality the molecules in your brain are constantly being recycled--if
you believe that the changes that make up memories happen at the synapses,
the article at http://www.sci-con.org/articles/20040601.html suggests all
the molecules at the synapses are replac
Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
> If I were to be consistent, I
> would have to wonder whether the person I was a few months ago was
"really
> me", because the atoms comprising my body today are probably completely
> different. In fact, in *every respect* the person I was a few months ago
> differs mor
Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
In fact, I believe that in your example "Eric the copy" would probably
agree
that he is a copy after seing evidence of that, and would live with his
life
without claiming the rights of the original. That would make him very
unhappy
and confused, of course, and then "Eric
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Eugen Leitl wrote:
>> (JC) Now, the funny thing is, if you replace "torture" by
>"getting shot in
>> the head", then I will pick (2). That's interesting, isn't it?
>
>Why is that interesting? It's indistinguishable from a
>teleportation scenario.
Before thinking about it,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then in another post you just say:
It's a bit hard for me to come up with a satisfactory answer to this
problem, because I don't start from the assumption of a physical universe
at all--like Bruno, I'm trying to start from a measure on observer-moments
and hope that som
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Hi Jesse,
I was still trying to put some sort of reply together to your last post,
but I think your water analogy is making me more rather than less confused
as to your actual position on these issues, which is obviously something
you have thought deeply about. Wit
Hal Finney wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Would you say that because you think running multiple identical copies
of a
> given mind in parallel doesn't necessarily increase the absolute measure
of
> those observer-moments (that would be my opinion)...
...
Suppose we are g
Saibal Mitra wrote:
- Original Message -
From: "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 11:37 PM
Subject: Measure, Doomsday argument
> Hi everyone,
>
> I have some questions about measure...
>
> As I understand the DA, it is based on conditionnal probabili
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