Re: QM Turing Universality (was: MGA 2)

On 12 Jan 2009, at 17:24, Mirek Dobsicek wrote: > > Thank you for a quick answer! I'll take a look at it, my curiosity > approves additional items on my TODO list :-) Manage keeping finite your todo list :) I have finished the reading of the paper I mentioned (Deutsch's Universal Quantum Tu

Re: QM Turing Universality (was: MGA 2)

Thank you for a quick answer! I'll take a look at it, my curiosity approves additional items on my TODO list :-) Best, mirek > The classical universal > dovetailer generates easily all the quantum computations, but I find > hard to just define *one* unitary transformation, without measurement,

Re: MGA 2

Hi Mirek, On 12 Jan 2009, at 15:36, Mirek Dobsicek wrote: > > Hello Bruno, > I think you are correct, but allowing the observer to be mechanically described as obeying the wave equation (which solutions obeys to comp), >>> >>> Hmm well if you have a basis, yes; - but "nak

Re: MGA 2

Hello Bruno, >>> I think you are correct, but allowing the observer to be mechanically >>> described as obeying the wave equation (which solutions obeys to comp), >> >> Hmm well if you have a basis, yes; - but "naked" infinite-dimensional >> Hilbert Space (the "everything" in QM)? > > > You pu

Re: MGA 2

2008/12/7 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > I see what you mean. But I'm uncomfortable with (what I perceive as) > the resulting vagueness in the platonic view of consciousness. You've > indicated that you think of consciousness as fundamentally > computational and Platonic - that's it's an essen

Re: MGA 2

On Dec 3, 2008, at 5:02 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > I struggle with the question of what a platonic object actually is, > even for something very simple. Let's say the implementation of a > circle supports roundness in the same way that a certain computation > supports consciousness. We can

Re: MGA 2

2008/12/1 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > Ok, I'm with you so far. But I'd like to get a better handle your > concept of a computation in Platonia. Here's one way I've been > picturing "platonic computation": > > Imagine an infinite 2-dimensional grid filled with the binary digits > of PI. Now

Re: MGA 2

On Nov 30, 2008, at 3:19 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Yes, and I think of consciousness as an essential side-effect of the > computation, as addition is an essential side-effect of the sum of two > numbers. Ok, I'm with you so far. But I'd like to get a better handle your concept of a comp

Re: MGA 2

On 30 Nov 2008, at 16:31, Günther Greindl wrote: > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> I realise this coming close to regarding consciousness as akin to the >> religious notion of a disembodied soul. But what are the >> alternatives? >> As I see it, if we don't discard computationalism the o

Re: MGA 2

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > I realise this coming close to regarding consciousness as akin to the > religious notion of a disembodied soul. But what are the alternatives? > As I see it, if we don't discard computationalism the only alternative > is to deny that consciousness exists at all, whi

Re: MGA 2

2008/11/30 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > On Nov 29, 2008, at 7:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> Threeness, computations and consciousness >> exist eternally and necessarily, and can't be created, destroyed or >> localised. > > I understand (I think) how threeness and computations exist

Re: MGA 2

On Nov 29, 2008, at 7:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Threeness, computations and consciousness > exist eternally and necessarily, and can't be created, destroyed or > localised. I understand (I think) how threeness and computations exist eternally in Platonia, but I don't understand your

Re: MGA 2

2008/11/28 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > I still feel like I don't have a handle on how you feel the move to > Platonia solves these problems. If we imagine the mathematical > description of filling a 3D grid with the binary digits of PI, > somewhere within it we will find some patterns of bi

Re: MGA 2

refox thought experiments don't help me answer that question. > > > If by "Unification" you mean the idea that two identical brains with > > identical input will result in only one consciousness, I don't see how > > this solves the conceptual problem o

Re: MGA 2

dea that two identical brains with > identical input will result in only one consciousness, I don't see how > this solves the conceptual problem of partial zombies. What would > happen if an identical part of both brains were replaced with a > non-concious but otherwise identically fun

Re: MGA 2

2008/11/27 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > Doesn't this antinomy arise because we equivocate on "running Firefox". Do we > mean a causal chain of events in the computer according to a certain program > specification or do we mean the appearance on the screen of the same thing > that > the c

Re: MGA 2

Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2008/11/26 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >> >> On Nov 24, 2008, at 5:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> The question turns on what is a computation and why it should have >>> magical properties. For example, if someone flips the squares on a >>> Life board at rand

Re: MGA 2

2008/11/26 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > On Nov 24, 2008, at 5:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> The question turns on what is a computation and why it should have >> magical properties. For example, if someone flips the squares on a >> Life board at random and accidentally duplicates t

Re: MGA 2

On Nov 24, 2008, at 5:40 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > The question turns on what is a computation and why it should have > magical properties. For example, if someone flips the squares on a > Life board at random and accidentally duplicates the Life rules does > that mean the computation is c

Re: MGA 2

it. >>>> >>> >>> This I don't follow. I would have thought it implies the opposite. >> >> >> MGA 1 shows that MEC+MAT implies lucky Alice is conscious (during the >> exam). OK? >> MGA 2 shows that MEC+MAT implies Alice is dreaming (an

Re: MGA 2

up recording of conscious > >>> activity is not conscious. > >> > >> > >> > >> I agree with you. The point here is just that MEC+MAT implies it. > >> > > > > This I don't follow. I would have thought it implies the opposite. >

Re: MGA 2

Kory Heath wrote: > On Nov 24, 2008, at 5:26 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> Kory Heath wrote: >> >>> On Nov 23, 2008, at 11:24 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> Kory Heath wrote: > Or maybe I'm still misdiagnosing the problem. Is anyone arguing > that, > whe

Re: MGA 2

On Nov 24, 2008, at 5:26 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > Kory Heath wrote: >> On Nov 23, 2008, at 11:24 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> Kory Heath wrote: Or maybe I'm still misdiagnosing the problem. Is anyone arguing that, when you play back the lookup table like a movie, this counts as >

Re: MGA 2

2008/11/24 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your >> objection to saying that the looked up computation is also conscious? >> How would that be inconsistent with observation,

Re: MGA 2

Kory Heath wrote: > > On Nov 23, 2008, at 11:24 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: >> Kory Heath wrote: >>> Or maybe I'm still misdiagnosing the problem. Is anyone arguing that, >>> when you play back the lookup table like a movie, this counts as >>> performing all of the Conway's Life computations a second

Re: MGA 2

Kory Heath wrote: > > On Nov 24, 2008, at 3:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> MGA 1 shows that MEC+MAT implies lucky Alice is conscious (during the >> exam). OK? >> MGA 2 shows that MEC+MAT implies Alice is dreaming (and thus >> conscious) >> when the film is

Re: MGA 2

On Nov 24, 2008, at 3:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > MGA 1 shows that MEC+MAT implies lucky Alice is conscious (during the > exam). OK? > MGA 2 shows that MEC+MAT implies Alice is dreaming (and thus > conscious) > when the film is projected. OK? I don't mean to hold up the

Re: MGA 2

On Nov 23, 2008, at 11:24 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: > Kory Heath wrote: >> Or maybe I'm still misdiagnosing the problem. Is anyone arguing that, >> when you play back the lookup table like a movie, this counts as >> performing all of the Conway's Life computations a second time? > > Why shouldn't i

Re: MGA 2

Hi Günther, >> >> I think you are correct, but allowing the observer to be mechanically >> described as obeying the wave equation (which solutions obeys to >> comp), > > Hmm well if you have a basis, yes; - but "naked" infinite-dimensional > Hilbert Space (the "everything" in QM)? You put t

Re: MGA 2

On 24 Nov 2008, at 16:11, Günther Greindl wrote: > > > > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> If infinities are at play... what is a MAT-history ? it can't even be >> "written". > > Agreed. And that is why we should be more reluctant to drop COMP > than to > drop MAT. > > But IF we drop COMP, we could

Re: MGA 2

Hi Bruno, > I think you are correct, but allowing the observer to be mechanically > described as obeying the wave equation (which solutions obeys to comp), Hmm well if you have a basis, yes; - but "naked" infinite-dimensional Hilbert Space (the "everything" in QM)? With MAT we do not only co

Re: MGA 2

Quentin Anciaux wrote: > If infinities are at play... what is a MAT-history ? it can't even be > "written". Agreed. And that is why we should be more reluctant to drop COMP than to drop MAT. But IF we drop COMP, we could "accept" unwriteable MAT-histories. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~-

Re: MGA 2

ree with you. The point here is just that MEC+MAT implies it. >> > > This I don't follow. I would have thought it implies the opposite. MGA 1 shows that MEC+MAT implies lucky Alice is conscious (during the exam). OK? MGA 2 shows that MEC+MAT implies Alice is dreaming (and thus co

Re: MGA 2

On Sun, Nov 23, 2008 at 03:59:02PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > I would side with Kory that a looked up recording of conscious > > activity is not conscious. > > > > I agree with you. The point here is just that MEC+MAT implies it. > This I don't follow. I would have thought it impli

Re: MGA 2

On 23 Nov 2008, at 22:09, Günther Greindl wrote: > > Bruno, > >> From this we can extract a logic of the observable proposition and >> compare with the empirical quantum logic, making comp testable, and >> already tested on its most weird consequences, retrospectively. > > you could refute COMP (

Re: MGA 2

Hi, Le dimanche 23 novembre 2008 à 22:09 +0100, Günther Greindl a écrit : > Bruno, > > > From this we can extract a logic of the observable proposition and > > compare with the empirical quantum logic, making comp testable, and > > already tested on its most weird consequences, retrospectiv

Re: MGA 2

Bruno, > From this we can extract a logic of the observable proposition and > compare with the empirical quantum logic, making comp testable, and > already tested on its most weird consequences, retrospectively. you could refute COMP (MEC) if it would contradict empirical QM, but QM (and e

Re: MGA 2

On 23 Nov 2008, at 21:21, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> On 23 Nov 2008, at 15:48, Kory Heath wrote: >> >>> >>> On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your objection to saying that the loo

Re: MGA 2

Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 23 Nov 2008, at 15:48, Kory Heath wrote: > >> >> On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your >>> objection to saying that the looked up computation is also conscious? >>> How would that

Re: MGA 2

Kory Heath wrote: > > On Nov 22, 2008, at 1:10 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: >> So why should it make a difference >> whether those state changes are decided by gates in the cpu or a >> huge look-up table? > > The difference is in the number of times that the relevant computation > was physically

Re: MGA 2

On 23 Nov 2008, at 17:23, A. Wolf wrote: > >>> Since when can consciousness be an instantaneous event? >> >> Oops! replace with (Dx,Dt). I have no deltas. > > Yeah, but still. I don't think consciousness can be freeze-framed > mathematically like this. I haven't been reading the conversation,

Re: MGA 2

>> Since when can consciousness be an instantaneous event? > > Oops! replace with (Dx,Dt). I have no deltas. Yeah, but still. I don't think consciousness can be freeze-framed mathematically like this. I haven't been reading the conversation, though...I should probably try to catch up. Anna

Re: MGA 2

On 23 Nov 2008, at 15:48, Kory Heath wrote: > > > On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your >> objection to saying that the looked up computation is also conscious? >> How would that be inconsistent with observati

Re: MGA 2

On 23 Nov 2008, at 16:06, A. Wolf wrote: > >> We have to go from consciousness at (dx,dt) > > Since when can consciousness be an instantaneous event? Oops! replace with (Dx,Dt). I have no deltas. Bruno > > > Anna > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~--

Re: MGA 2

On Nov 22, 2008, at 1:10 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > So why should it make a difference > whether those state changes are decided by gates in the cpu or a > huge look-up table? The difference is in the number of times that the relevant computation was physically implemented. When you query the

Re: MGA 2

> We have to go from consciousness at (dx,dt) Since when can consciousness be an instantaneous event? Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email

Re: MGA 2

On 23 Nov 2008, at 04:46, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 8:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > wrote: > > 2008/11/23 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > If we apply the Conway's Life rule to all the cells, it seems like > the > > creatures in the grid ought to

Re: MGA 2

On Nov 22, 2008, at 6:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Which leads again to the problem of partial zombies. What is your > objection to saying that the looked up computation is also conscious? > How would that be inconsistent with observation, or lead to logical > contradiction? I can only an

Re: MGA 2

On Nov 22, 2008, at 1:56 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > But how would they agree on this? If we knew the answer to that we > wouldn't > need to be considering these (nomologically) impossible thought > experiments. They would use the same criteria that they use to decide that humans are consci

Re: MGA 2

On 22 Nov 2008, at 22:10, Brent Meeker wrote: >> If we apply the Conway's Life rule to all the cells, it seems like >> the >> creatures in the grid ought to be conscious. If we don't apply the >> Life rule to any of the cells, but just pull the data from our >> previously-created lookup table,

Re: MGA 2

, this has to be extracted from the MEC part of the MEC+MAT hypothesis, which is the point. But yes in that case you can postulate a sort of primitive matter having some relevance with your consciousness. (Making them both very mysterious, and making their link also rather mysterious, btw). M

Re: MGA 2

On 22 Nov 2008, at 17:27, Kory Heath wrote: > > > On Nov 22, 2008, at 7:26 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that >> potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's >> suppose >> for example that quantum particles are the fundam

Re: MGA 2

2008/11/23 Jason Resch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > I would side with Kory that a looked up recording of conscious activity is > not conscious. My argument being that static information has no implicit > meaning because there are an infinite number of ways a bit string can be > interpreted. However i

Re: MGA 2

Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 8:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > wrote: > > > 2008/11/23 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED] >: > > > If we apply the Conway's Life rule to all the cells, it seems >

Re: MGA 2

On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 8:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote: > > 2008/11/23 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > If we apply the Conway's Life rule to all the cells, it seems like the > > creatures in the grid ought to be conscious. If we don't apply the > > Life rule to any of

Re: MGA 2

2008/11/23 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > If we apply the Conway's Life rule to all the cells, it seems like the > creatures in the grid ought to be conscious. If we don't apply the > Life rule to any of the cells, but just pull the data from our > previously-created lookup table, it seems lik

Re: MGA 2

Kory Heath wrote: > > On Nov 22, 2008, at 7:26 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that >> potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's suppose >> for example that quantum particles are the fundamental building >> blocks, i.e. the

Re: MGA 2

Kory Heath wrote: > > On Nov 22, 2008, at 7:26 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that >> potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's suppose >> for example that quantum particles are the fundamental building >> blocks, i.e. the

Re: MGA 2

Telmo Menezes wrote: > Quentin, > > Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that > potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's suppose > for example that quantum particles are the fundamental building > blocks, i.e. the hardware, and that consciousness is a com

Re: MGA 2

On Nov 22, 2008, at 7:26 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > Ok, but what if consciousness is a computational process that > potentially depends on the entire state of the universe? Let's suppose > for example that quantum particles are the fundamental building > blocks, i.e. the hardware, and that consci

Re: MGA 2

> Well what is the entire state of the universe ? if it is an infinite > string then it cannot be computational, it is not simulable. I tend to think our universe is finite. The multiverse, that's another story... But even in an infinite universe, we could have a finite consciousness computation

Re: MGA 2

On Nov 21, 2008, at 10:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > So let us suppose that poor Alice got, again, a not very good optical > plane graph, so that some (1 to many to all, again) NOR gates break > down, in that precise computation corresponding to her dream > experience. And let us project, in real

Re: MGA 2

; entire sequence of states of the universe during her dream and play > >> them back. Obviously, the same universe where the dream takes place > >> cannot also contain the film (you get infinite recursion). I can't see > >> a way out of this in a single universe. What do yo

Re: MGA 2

e you would have to film the >> entire sequence of states of the universe during her dream and play >> them back. Obviously, the same universe where the dream takes place >> cannot also contain the film (you get infinite recursion). I can't see >> a way out of this in a s

Re: MGA 2

universe where the dream takes place > cannot also contain the film (you get infinite recursion). I can't see > a way out of this in a single universe. What do you think? > > Cheers, > Telmo Menezes. > > On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 6:33 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROT

Re: MGA 2

ROTECTED]> wrote: > > MGA 2 > > > The second step of the MGA, consists in making a change to MGA 1 so > that we don't have to introduce that unreasonable amount of cosmic > luck, or of apparent randomness. It shows the "lucky" aspect of the > coming informa

Re: MGA 2

Bruno Marchal wrote: > MGA 2 > > > The second step of the MGA, consists in making a change to MGA 1 so > that we don't have to introduce that unreasonable amount of cosmic > luck, or of apparent randomness. It shows the "lucky" aspect of the > comin

MGA 2

MGA 2 The second step of the MGA, consists in making a change to MGA 1 so that we don't have to introduce that unreasonable amount of cosmic luck, or of apparent randomness. It shows the "lucky" aspect of the coming information is not relevant. Jason thought on this s