Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> COL
> >> Yes. Causal chains, no matter how improbable, executed at the tiniest
> of
> >> scales the same ones that make LUCY our literal ancestor. connect
> us.
> >
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
COL
>> Yes. Causal chains, no matter how improbable, executed at the tiniest
of
>> scales the same ones that make LUCY our literal ancestor. connect
us.
>
LZ
> It depends what you , mean by "connect"
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> >
> >
> > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> >> >> The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through
> >> being
> >> >> observed with our phenomenal consciousness.
> >> >
> >> > Not "only". Cognition and instrumentation are needed too.
> >>
> >> Yes. But th
>
>
> Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
>> >> The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through
>> being
>> >> observed with our phenomenal consciousness.
>> >
>> > Not "only". Cognition and instrumentation are needed too.
>>
>> Yes. But the instruments are observed. All the instruments
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> >> The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through being
> >> observed with our phenomenal consciousness.
> >
> > Not "only". Cognition and instrumentation are needed too.
>
> Yes. But the instruments are observed. All the instruments do is extend
>
>> The problem is that cells are defined and understood only through being
>> observed with our phenomenal consciousness.
>
> Not "only". Cognition and instrumentation are needed too.
Yes. But the instruments are observed. All the instruments do is extend
the causal chain between your phenomenali
Colin Hales wrote:
> 1Z
> >
> > Colin Hales wrote:
> > > >
> > > > So I ask again HOW would we act DIFFERENTLY if we acted "as-if" MIND
> > > > EXISTED. So far
> > > > the only difference I SEE is writing a lot of stuff in CAPS.
> > > >
> > > > Brent Meeker
> > > >
> > >
> > > FIRSTLY
> > > Form
1Z
>
> Colin Hales wrote:
> > >
> > > So I ask again HOW would we act DIFFERENTLY if we acted "as-if" MIND
> > > EXISTED. So far
> > > the only difference I SEE is writing a lot of stuff in CAPS.
> > >
> > > Brent Meeker
> > >
> >
> > FIRSTLY
> > Formally we would investigate new physics of unde
Colin Hales wrote:
> >
> > So I ask again HOW would we act DIFFERENTLY if we acted "as-if" MIND
> > EXISTED. So far
> > the only difference I SEE is writing a lot of stuff in CAPS.
> >
> > Brent Meeker
> >
>
> FIRSTLY
> Formally we would investigate new physics of underlying reality such as
> th
Colin Hales wrote:
> 1Z
>
> > Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 3:19 AM
> > > >> > Brent Meeker
> > > >> It wouldn't make any difference: if solipsism were true, people would
> > > behave exactly as they do behave,
> > > >> most of them not giving the idea that there is no external world any
> >
--- Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
(among a lot other things, quoted and replied to):
>I disagree and can show empirical proof that we
scientists only THINK we are not being solipsistic.<
I wrote in this sense lately (for the past say 40
years) but now I tend to change my solipsistic m
>
> So I ask again HOW would we act DIFFERENTLY if we acted "as-if" MIND
> EXISTED. So far
> the only difference I SEE is writing a lot of stuff in CAPS.
>
> Brent Meeker
>
FIRSTLY
Formally we would investigate new physics of underlying reality such as
this:
--
Colin Hales wrote:
>
>
> 1Z
>
>
>>Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 3:19 AM
>>
>>Brent Meeker
>
>It wouldn't make any difference: if solipsism were true, people would
>>>
>>>behave exactly as they do behave,
>>>
>most of them not giving the idea that there is no external world a
1Z
> Sent: Monday, September 25, 2006 3:19 AM
> > >> > Brent Meeker
> > >> It wouldn't make any difference: if solipsism were true, people would
> > behave exactly as they do behave,
> > >> most of them not giving the idea that there is no external world any
> > consideration at all, the rest d
On Sun, Sep 24, 2006 at 12:11:54PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> In my narrative for a substitute Big Bang I called the originating
> zero-info-'object' Plenitude, as I realize from your words (thank you) it is
> close to the Old Greek Chaos. In that narrative Universes occur by
> 'differentia
On Sun, Sep 24, 2006 at 03:23:44PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Le 23-sept.-06, 07:01, Russell Standish a crit :
>
>
> > Anything provable by a finite set of axioms is necessarily a finite
> > string of
> > symbols, and can be found as a subset of my Nothing.
>
>
> You told us that
On Sun, Sep 24, 2006 at 08:05:14AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
> > The Nothing itself does not have any properties in itself to speak
> > of. Rather it is the PROJECTION postulate that means we can treat it
> > as the set of all strings, from which any conscious viewpoint must
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >> Brent meeker writes:
> >> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >> > > John,
> >> > >
> >> > > Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all
> >> under the impression that everything is a
> >> > > construction of his
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 2:16 AM
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
> (upon Bruno's question)...
>To be more precise, I identify Nothing with
> undiffe
Russell Standish wrote:
> The Nothing itself does not have any properties in itself to speak
> of. Rather it is the PROJECTION postulate that means we can treat it
> as the set of all strings, from which any conscious viewpoint must
> correspond to a subset of strings.
That sounds rather like th
del view.
But we all pretend to be smart liars.
*
Your last paragraph paved my way to the nuthouse.
Thanks
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Colin Geoffrey Hales" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Saturday, September 23, 2006 11:11 PM
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature o
Le 23-sept.-06, 07:01, Russell Standish a crit :
> Anything provable by a finite set of axioms is necessarily a finite
> string of
> symbols, and can be found as a subset of my Nothing.
You told us that your Nothing contains all strings. So it contains all
formula as "theorems". But a th
Peter Jones writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Brent meeker writes:
> >
> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > > John,
> > > >
> > > > Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under
> > > > the impression that everything is a
> > > > construction of his own mind. Pe
On Sat, Sep 23, 2006 at 03:26:21PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Please allows me at this stage to be the most precise as possible. From
> a logical point of view, your theory of Nothing is equivalent to
> Q1 + Q2 + Q3. It is a very weaker subtheory of RA. It is not sigma1
> complete, you don
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> Brent meeker writes:
>> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> > > John,
>> > >
>> > > Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all
>> under the impression that everything is a
>> > > construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief i
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > John,
> > >
> > > Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under
> > > the impression that everything is a
> > > construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in or
Le 22-sept.-06, à 19:18, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 12:18:37PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> ...
>
>>
>> It is really the key to understand that if my 3-person I is a machine,
>> then the I, (the 1-person I) is not! This can be used to explain why
>> the 1-person is
Le 22-sept.-06, à 19:10, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 02:59:09PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> Any person's experience is obtained by
>>> differentiating - selecting something from that "nothing".
>>>
>>> The relationship between this zero information object, and
>
> real world. From Hitler to a nun.
> I was not thinking on the "intermittent solips" as pointed to by some
> (reasonable) list-colleagues.
> John
> - Original Message -
> From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To:
> Sen
Brent meeker writes:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > John,
> >
> > Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under the
> > impression that everything is a
> > construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in order
> > to indulge in fiction or compute
to a nun.
I was not thinking on the "intermittent solips" as pointed to by some
(reasonable) list-colleagues.
John
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Friday, September 22, 2006 10:59 PM
Subject: RE: Reality, the bogus n
On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 12:18:37PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
>
> It is really the key to understand that if my 3-person I is a machine,
> then the I, (the 1-person I) is not! This can be used to explain why
> the 1-person is solipsist, although the 1-person does not need to be
> doctri
On Fri, Sep 22, 2006 at 02:59:09PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > Any person's experience is obtained by
> > differentiating - selecting something from that "nothing".
> >
> > The relationship between this zero information object, and
> > arithmetical platonia is a bit unclear, but I would say
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> John,
>
> Even a real solipsist might eat, sleep, talk to people etc., all under the
> impression that everything is a
> construction of his own mind. People willingly suspend disbelief in order to
> indulge in fiction or computer
> games, and a solipsist may beli
OTECTED]
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
> Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2006 09:51:28 -0400
>
>
> Stathis:
> wouod a "real" solipsist even talk to you?
> John M
> - Original Message -
> From: "Sta
Le 22-sept.-06, à 08:16, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> On Thu, Sep 21, 2006 at 04:16:53PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Russell, when you say "nothing external exist", do you mean "nothing
>> primitively material" exist, or do you mean there is no independent
>> reality at all, not even an
Le 20-sept.-06, à 21:06, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
>>
>>
>>> This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
>>> matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
>>> while the existence of matter might dis
On Thu, Sep 21, 2006 at 04:16:53PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Russell, when you say "nothing external exist", do you mean "nothing
> primitively material" exist, or do you mean there is no independent
> reality at all, not even an immaterial one? (I ordered your book but I
> am still wai
Russell Standish wrote:
> It makes absolute sense to me, and it is really one of the central
> themes of my book "Theory of Nothing". The only points of view are
> interior ones, because what is external is just "nothing".
>
> But I know that Colin comes from a different ontological bias, since
>
About solipsism I think it is useful to distinguish:
- the (ridiculous) *doctrine* of solipsism. It says that I exist and
you don't.
- the quasi trivial fact that any pure first person view is
solipsistic. This makes the doctrine of solipsism non refutable, and
thus non scientific in Popper
]>
To:
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 7:51 PM
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
>
> Colin Hales wrote:
> >
> >
> >>-Original Message-
> >>From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> >>[EMAIL PROTECTED
Stathis:
wouod a "real" solipsist even talk to you?
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Bruno Marchal"
Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2006 7:21 PM
Subject: RE: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing te
On Thu, Sep 21, 2006 at 10:36:00AM -, David Nyman wrote:
>
> I think we will never be able to engage with the issues you describe
> until we realise that what we are faced with is a view from the inside
> of a situation that has no outside. Our characterisation of 'what
> exists' as 'outside'
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> This paradoxical situation I have analysed out and, I hope, straightened
> out. The answer lies not in adopting/rejecting solipsism per se (although
> solipsism is logically untenable for subtle reasons) , but in merely
> recognising what scientific evidence is actua
Peter,
I am afraid we are in a loop. I have already answer most of your
comments, except this one:
>
>> Again, from a strictly logical point
>
> As opposed to ?
As opposed to the common sense needed for the choice of the axioms of
the (logical) theory.
To be sure I have not yet commented an
> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker
> Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 9:52 AM
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing
Colin Hales wrote:
>
>
>>-Original Message-
>>From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
>>[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker
>>Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 9:31 AM
>>To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>Sub
> -Original Message-
> From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker
> Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2006 9:31 AM
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing te
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>
>>About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
>>to me nobody defend it in the list.
>
>
> Is anyone out there really a solipsist? Has anyone ever met or talked to a
> real solipsist?
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
Wi
Bruno Marchal writes:
> About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
> to me nobody defend it in the list.
Is anyone out there really a solipsist? Has anyone ever met or talked to a
real solipsist?
Stathis Papaioannou
__
sage -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, September 19, 2006 9:23 AM
Subject: Re: Reality, the bogus nature of the Turing test
>
> On Tue, Sep 19, 2006 at 04:02:36PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote:
> >
> >
> > BACK TO THE REAL ISS
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
> >
> >
> >>This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
> >>matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
> >>while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
>>This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
>>matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
>>while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
>>it doesn't prove the exist
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> "1Z" wrote:
>
>>Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>>It would be a problem if the actual infinities or infinitesimals were
>
> thrid person describable *and* playing some role in the process of
> individuating consciousness. In that case comp is false.
>
>>>About solipsis
"1Z" wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> It would be a problem if the actual infinities or infinitesimals were
thrid person describable *and* playing some role in the process of
individuating consciousness. In that case comp is false.
>> About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
> > matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
> > while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
> > it doesn't prove the exi
Le 20-sept.-06, à 14:08, 1Z a écrit :
> This isn't the only way COMP couldbe false. For instance, if
> matter exists, consciousness could be dependent on it. Thus,
> while the existence of matter might disprove the Bruno version of comp,
> it doesn't prove the existence of actual infintities.
I
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> It would be a problem if the actual infinities or infinitesimals were
> thrid person describable *and* playing some role in the process of
> individuating consciousness. In that case comp is false.
>
>
> About solipsism I am not sure why you introduce the subject. It seems
Colin Hales wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I'm overrun with stuff at uni, but I have this one issue - solipsism- which
> is hot and we seem to be touching on, so I thought you may help me collect
> my thoughts before I run off. gotta leave all those threads hanging
> there.and I left them in an awfully under e
Le 19-sept.-06, à 08:02, Colin Hales a écrit :
Hi,
I’m overrun with stuff at uni, but I have this one issue – solipsism- which is hot and we seem to be touching on, so I thought you may help me collect my thoughts before I run off… gotta leave all those threads hanging there…and I left them in an
On Tue, Sep 19, 2006 at 04:02:36PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote:
>
>
> BACK TO THE REAL ISSUE (solipsism)
>
> I am confused as to what the received view of the solipsist is. As us usual
> in philosophical discourse, definitions disagree:
>
>
>
> "An epistemological position that one's own per
Hi,
I’m overrun with
stuff at uni, but I have this one issue – solipsism- which is hot and we seem to be
touching on, so I thought you may help me collect my thoughts before I run off… gotta leave all those
threads hanging there…and I left them in an awfully under
engineered state…sorry!
Le 16-sept.-06, à 23:37, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
Bruno wrote
Colin Geoffrey Hales a ��it :
5) Re a fatal test for the Turing machine? Give it exquisite novelty by
asking it to do science on an unknown area of the natural world. Proper
science. It will fail because it does not know there is
Bruno wrote
> Colin Geoffrey Hales a 飲it :
>> 5) Re a fatal test for the Turing machine? Give it exquisite novelty by
asking it to do science on an unknown area of the natural world. Proper
science. It will fail because it does not know there is an outside
world.
>
>
> And you *know* that?
>
> We
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