Thanks for clearing that up for us, Jerry.
Gary f.
From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: 25-May-16 13:18
Gary F and list,
I fail to see why you picked out that portion of the quote. So, if the
logician looks to the ethicist for the aims of action... the ethicist
nt:* 24-May-16 22:29
> *To:* g...@gnusystems.ca
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> gf: OK, I guess we have a case of polyversity here. To me, “experiencing
ultimate aim is … the logician has to accept the teaching
of ethics in this regard.”
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 24-May-16 22:29
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inf
Gary F., List:
gf: OK, I guess we have a case of polyversity here. To me, “experiencing
the irritation” of doubt IS a “particular *feeling* of dissatisfaction.” My
point was that if you classify even something like playfulness as “a form
of dissatisfaction,” “its being so consists merely in our
Gary f and list,
You said, “Critical consideration of ends is what ethics is all about”
That’s not correct. Critical consideration of ends is the business of
esthetics. Ethics follows esthetics. “Spiritedness faces justice and
desire faces beauty.”
“611. What does right reasoning
Jon, Ben, list,
Js: I did not say anything about a particular feeling of dissatisfaction, only
that we engage in inquiry when we are dissatisfied with our current knowledge;
i.e., when we experience the irritation of (genuine) doubt.
gf: OK, I guess we have a case of polyversity here. To
Gary F., List:
Gf: Are you claiming that everyone has to be aware enough of “the current
state of their knowledge” to make such a judgment on it before undertaking
any investigation? The fact that curiosity etc. *can be understood* as
forms of dissatisfaction doesn’t imply that any feeling of
Helmut, list,
The analogy is:
object - source
sign (or representamen) - encoding
interpretant - decoding
recognizant - destination.
I haven't discussed it in any detail at peirce-l in many years, and
whatever I've written on it at my websites is rather old. So I'm not
eager to launch into a
*Then what is your meaning? When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean
those which do not pass from one sensation to the opposite; inviting
objects are those which do; in this latter case the sense coming upon the
object, whether at a distance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything
in
Gary F., Jon A.S., list,
I'm not sure why an argument has developed over whether human activity
proceeds from dissatisfaction or positive desire, etc. Usually we regard
those as various ways of talking about the same multifaceted phenomena.
A desire for something implies dissatisfaction with
Ben, list,
"Recognizant" is a good term, I think. Recognizant and interpretant, like source and destination too, describe a continuity, which is a trait of thirdness. Maybe another example of fourism is Talcott Parsons AGIL- scheme, the four necessities of an acting system, esp. a social one:
Stephen Rose, List ~
"Dissatisfaction (or bemused acceptance) comes when things established (habits)
are somehow not able to get the job done. Resolving that is among the gifts of
conscious thinking."
The habit-signs (3ns) of an object must reflect its quality/endowment-signs and
Dissatisfaction (or bemused acceptance) comes when things established
(habits) are somehow not able to get the job done. Resolving that is among
the gifts of conscious thinking. But there are many other gifts as well.
ᐧ
Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU
On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 8:58 AM,
Helmut, list,
My fours don't align with Peirce's four methods of inquiry. In
https://tetrast2.blogspot.com/2013/04/methods-of-learning.html , you'll
find Peirce's three inferior methods scattered around a large table at
the post's end. Peirce's fourth method, the scientific method, is also
Ben, list,
Your fourism I find interesting, and it reminds me of Peirces four methods of fixating belief. Would that be justified, and, to loosely do the following connections: Will with tenacity, ability with authority, affectivity with a-priori, and cognition with the scientific method?
Now,
Jon A.S., list,
I discussed it many years ago on peirce-l. I don't know how much of what
I said then I'd still say now. Generally I'm doubtful of ideas of the
true as a species of the good or vice versa. I suspect that that's like
trying to see momentum as a species of energy, or vice versa.
Ben U., List:
You hinted at what I think is the key issue for me right now--if logic is a
species of ethics (theory), then it seems to me that inquiry is a species
of ingenuity (practice), rather than the other way around. With that in
mind ...
BU: For my own part, I already would do the
Gary F., List:
Gf: Now I’m seeing the limitations of your hypothesis that ALL human
endeavor is rooted in dissatisfaction. It seems to ignore more positive
motivations such as curiosity, participation and playfulness in all its
forms. The quest for knowledge can be much more than an escape from a
Helmut, list,
Yep, Pound was a fascist who, through the intercession of influential
friends, managed to receive nothing more than commitment to an
institution for the insane after broadcasting propaganda for the Axis in
WW2 (unlike William Joyce, "Lord Haw-Haw", who got hanged). Oddly
lli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns
John,
that is interesting to me, as I did not know, that reverse engineering is
merely about the result or function, but not about the cod
gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns
List,
when I read about the comparison of science / mathematics with engineering, the term "reverse-engineering" comes into my mind. Perhaps a hyp
edu>
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns
List,
when I read about the comparison of science / mathematics with engineering, the
term "reverse-engineering" comes into my mind. Perhaps a hypothesis in physics
is an attempt to reverse-engineer an
>
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns
Jon,
Ben’s post has said a lot of what I would have said, so I’ll just add a few notes by insertion here …
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 19-May-16 09:13
Gary F., List:
Gf: Science
Jon,
Ben’s post has said a lot of what I would have said, so I’ll just add a few
notes by insertion here …
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 19-May-16 09:13
Gary F., List:
Gf: Science as a discipline of engineering? That’s too much of a stretch for me
Gary F., List:
I re-read Chiasson's paper last night, and can definitely see some
similarities; most notably, the idea of nesting one cycle of
abduction/deduction/induction within another. However, my impression is
that she is still talking mainly about inquiry (gaining knowledge), rather
than
Ben U., List:
These are great comments, and I need to take more time than I have at the
moment to digest and respond to them. Just a few quick hits for now.
- Suggesting that science is a discipline of engineering is mainly
intended to prompt reevaluation of the widespread notion that
physics. Only more so. ☺
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 17-May-16 21:27
To: Gary Richmond
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns
Gary R., List:
GR: As to the most recent discussion of abduction as it might
relate
Gary F., List:
Science as a discipline of engineering? That’s too much of a stretch for me
> ... It would be like claiming that mathematics is a discipline of
> physics. Only more so. J
>
Well, I acknowledged that it is a provocative notion. The point is that
science is pursued with the same
Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 17-May-16 21:27
To: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns
Gary R., List:
GR: As to the most recent discussion of abduction
“In the *1980s*, the study of abduction found a new home in Artificial
Intelligence…Abduction has been used in a host of areas such as fault
diagnosis…belief revision…as well as scientific discovery, legal reasoning:
natural language understanding, and model-based reasoning…
…Gabbay and Woods
Gary F., List:
I suppose that it is possible; I would have to go back and re-read her
paper, then give it some further thought. Inquiry vs. ingenuity is
probably more a difference in emphasis than anything terribly substantive.
CSP: "Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we
Jon, is it possible that your “logic of ingenuity” is Phyllis Chiasson’s
“retroduction”?
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 17-May-16 21:27
To: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEI
Jon S, List,
Jon, I think I'm quasi-surprising myself and finding that I more or less
agree with your somewhat "different approach." You wrote:
Rather than Rule/Result/Case, I see it as abduction/deduction/induction in
the sense that I have identified as the logic of ingenuity. The abductive
Gary R., List:
GR: As to the most recent discussion of abduction as it might relate not
only to science but to the arts, Jon, Gary F, and I have momentarily at
least moved the discussion rather far from logic as semeiotic, even into an
entirely different branch of science, *applied science*, and
Jerry R wrote: "So, what now of beans and bags? p's and q's, even..."
Jerry, I can't, of course, be certain exactly what your
not-quite-a-question is or even the basic intent if it, but at first blush
it appears philosophically naive, especially when considered from the
Peircean perspective.
So, what now of beans and bags? p's and q's, even...
Best,
Jerry R
On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 4:17 PM, Gary Richmond
wrote:
> Gary F, Jon S, List,
>
> Gary F. wrote: "maybe [artists] are driven to think this way by an
> irrational urge to create, to do something that
Gary F, Jon S, List,
Gary F. wrote: "maybe [artists] are driven to think this way by an
irrational urge to create, to do something that hasn’t been done before, or
show us something we haven’t seen before …
Or even, perhaps, to show *themselves* that they can do something
previously not
Jon A.S. proposes
that both inquiry and ingenuity are motivated more fundamentally by
dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs.
Agreed. And this could apply to artistic creation as well: the artist looks out
at what’s been done in his or her field and thinks “There must be more to
ll, whatever- helpful or confusing this was...
Best,
Helmut
Gesendet: Montag, 16. Mai 2016 um 03:29 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
An: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inferenc
Jerry R., List:
JR: Your situation with Jon S, that is, whether to start with the object
or the sign, is a critical problem of philosophy.
I do not understand this comment. Gary R. and I have recently been
discussing whether abduction more properly begins with the Rule (3ns) or
the Result; and
oo is a cycle: his commissioned work gets performed, the audience
>>> like what they hear or see, and this attracts more commissions and more
>>> audiences. Once the cycle is established, it may continue even if parts of
>>> it are missing — I think Mozart’s last three sym
logy between art and inquiry too far, for
>> instance into the question of what role deductive inference plays in
>> artistic creativity, but I do think this cyclic pattern runs very deep in
>> all semiosis and in life itself. (Which reminds me that I first came across
>> this patt
across
> this pattern and diagram in Robert Rosen’s book *Life Itself* — but
> that’s another story.)
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 14-May-16 23:08
> *To:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *Cc:* Pei
Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 14-May-16 23:08
To: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns
Gary R., List:
I am probably as big a fan of Mozart's music as the
Jon S, List,
You wrote:
Attributing the same vector to abduction as to a complete inquiry makes
some sense in light of Phyllis Chiasson's suggestion to use the term
"retroduction" for the latter, rather than the former (
Gary R., List:
I am probably as big a fan of Mozart's music as there is, but I am
struggling to understand your assignment of Peirce's inference terminology
to one of his compositions. Maybe I just need to ponder it for a bit. For
now, I want to focus on what I think is the crux of our
Jerry R, list,
Jerry asked: "In what sense are you using the term "complete" of *complete
inquiry*?
That is, are you using it colloquially or are you referring to something
that ought to have a technical definition?"
I'm away from my desk for the remainder of the weekend and I haven't any
books,
Jerry R, list,
Jerry asked: "In what sense are you using the term "complete" of *complete
inquiry*?
That is, are you using it colloquially or are you referring to something
that ought to have a technical definition?"
I'm away from my desk for the remainder of the weekend and I haven't any
books,
Hi Gary, Jon and list,
In what sense are you using the term "complete" of *complete inquiry*?
That is, are you using it colloquially or are you referring to something
that ought to have a technical definition?
Thanks,
Jerry R
On Sat, May 14, 2016 at 5:04 PM, Gary Richmond
Jon, list,
Jon wrote: "I would express hope that you enjoy the concert, but I already
know that you will, because a Mozart piece is on the program."
Although, surely *de gustibus non est disputandum*, for me, as regards
music of the classical period, Mozart has no peer, and this particular
Jon A and list,
Yes, it's true that you told me off-list that
A = antecedent and C = consequent.
Yet, I persist in asserting that B = commens. So, why do I bother?
Well, because I happen to think of all the consequences that result from
believing that B represents the mind of the community in
Gary R., List:
I would express hope that you enjoy the concert, but I already know that
you will, because a Mozart piece is on the program. :-)
GR: I don't really think Peirce attaches any particular significance to
this order.
I agree; but that being the case, how sure can we be that he
Jon, List,
I'm running off to hear the New Orchestra present one of the chamber
symphonies of Schoenberg and the Great C-minor Mass of Mozart at Carnegie
Hall in a very few minutes, so I'll just drop a comment or two here for now
and try to say more (and add some textual citations when I get a
Gary R., List:
Are we perhaps conflating feeling with emotion? Peirce consistently
associates the former with Firstness, but is that appropriate for the
latter? An *actual *emotion seems more like an example of Secondness, an
experience that occurs over time.
Regarding CP 1.485, I agree that
Jerry R.:
Setting aside whether it is proper to classify the formulation in CP 5.189
as a syllogism--Peirce defined a "conditional syllogism" in CP 2.571 as "a
syllogism containing a conditional premiss, especially the Modus Ponens and
Modus Tollens, although some logicians refuse to these
Gary R., List:
GR: At the moment I am imagining that they might have a rather direct
bearing on the psychology of inquiry ("a feeling of surprise;" "a feeling
of satisfaction").
Does "feeling," understood in this context as a manifestation of
Firstness, entail psychology? Of course, Peirce was
Jon S wrote:
"The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief."
(CP 5.374)
The first phase of inquiry is abduction, which begins when an established
habit of expectation (3ns) is confounded by an act of observation (2ns),
which produces a feeling of surprise (1ns).
The
https://woodybelangia.com/tag/dialectic/
(4) *Noetic wholeness* (*noesis*) is the transcendent goal of all thinking,
the satisfaction of *eros* in true knowledge. *Noesis* is the full
integration of doubt and belief. All relevant questions are answered and
satisfied, without remainder.
hth,
J
Gary R., List:
Quick thought ...
"The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief."
(CP 5.374)
The first phase of inquiry is abduction, which begins when an established
habit of expectation (3ns) is confounded by an act of observation (2ns),
which produces a feeling of
Jon, List,
Thanks for the additional Peirce quotations. I'll be mulling over them (all
of which I'm familiar with) for some time, but now in the light of your
comments.
I don't know whether or not "we're any closer to being on the same page
regarding abduction," but since, as Peirce notes,
Gary R., List:
I understand your point about the Rule coming first in deduction, and while
I am still not 100% convinced that this is truly *necessary*, I am content
to let it pass and focus on abduction. If I have pushed you hard on the
latter, then Jerry R. also deserves credit for repeatedly
Jon S, List,
Jon wrote: [re: deduction] "Hence, that sequence (3ns/2ns/1ns) is to
be preferred, even if it is not strictly required."
Since we seem to be on pretty much the same page regarding deduction, I
would probably leave your comment alone, that is, not take issue with your
remark that,
JAS, List:
Yes, I was using "surprising result" interchangeably with "surprising
fact". By "next" or "new category" I refer to the new category in the
process of categorization generally described by Peirce in CP 1.490 and
CP 5.72 (note, I am *NOT* using "categories in the sense of the three
Mike, List:
Sorry, I am not following you. Peirce refers to a "surprising fact," not a
"surprising result"; and he typically categorizes facts under Secondness,
not Thirdness. What do you mean by "next category" and "new category"?
What do you mean by "potentials" in this context?
Thanks,
Jon
JAS, List:
On 5/6/2016 4:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Gary R., List:
. . .
So besides
having three different conclusions, the three forms of inference have
three different starting points--Rule/Case/Result for deduction,
Case/Result/Rule for induction, and Result/Rule/Case for abduction.
Gary, Jon, list:
I’m really enjoying your latest exchange. Nice questions and responses!
Here is something I found today in “Encounters and Reflections,
Conversations with Seth Benardete”:
*Seth*: It goes back to a point in the preface to Hegel’s *Phenomenology*,
about the distinction
Gary R., List:
Thanks for your patience and persistence. You make a good case (no pun
intended) that the logic of deduction is more clearly presented by giving
the Rule first, followed by the Case as something that necessarily falls
under it; and that this was one of the specific points that
Jon, List,
At CP 2.619, after commenting that "It is capable of strict proof [. . .]
that all arguments whatever can be put into [*Barbara*]" Peirce gives a
rather tortured example of an induction taking that form, putting it in the
Procrustean bed of *Barbara*.
These beans are two-thirds white,
o me in this case.
>
>
>
> Auke
>
>
>
> *Van:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Verzonden:* donderdag 5 mei 2016 22:41
> *Aan:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *CC:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Onderwer
Gary R., List:
I do not believe that we are talking past each other, just sharing thoughts
from our different perspectives.
I acknowledge that CP 2.623 presents the Rule as the first premiss of both
Deduction and Hypothesis. However, does Peirce say anything there--or
anywhere else, for that
Gary R., List:
Just a few quick observations for the moment ...
- According to CP 5.189, abduction begins with the Result, the
surprising fact (C); not with the Rule, the circumstances of its occurrence
(B), which comes second.
- Logically, the sequence of the two premisses makes no
Jon, List,
You wrote: "how the three forms of inference themselves are presented in CP
2.623. That text seems to indicate that ANY reasoning process that
concludes with a Rule is (by definition) induction."
That is true. So, for all 3 inference patterns:
Result, 1ns
|> Rule, 3ns
Case, 2ns
nderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns
Gary R., List:
Perhaps we are simply coming up against a limitation of not only the bean
example, but also how the three forms of inference themselves are presented in
CP 2.623. That text seems to indicate that ANY reaso
Gary R., List:
Perhaps we are simply coming up against a limitation of not only the bean
example, but also how the three forms of inference themselves are presented
in CP 2.623. That text seems to indicate that ANY reasoning process that
concludes with a Rule is (by definition) induction.
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