Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 6:45 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > 1) Continuity is an integral component of 'community'. I've never heard of a > 'finite community, at least in the natural world. The artificial world that > includes 'identity politics' and their 'finite

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 8:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > EDWINA: I understand your point but I'll have a problem with the > identification of 'community' only in the present tense. The very nature of > Thirdness is its focus on the future existentiality of the 'type' - a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 8:20 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > I don’t think so. What makes a Dynamic Object dynamic — and efficient — (as > in “efficient cause”) — is its genuine Secondness to the sign, and the > Immediate Object has only a degenerate secondness to it. I think the specific >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 6, 2016, at 3:18 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >> If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this >> compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is >> in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the

Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> But you’re quite right, there is more than one way to analyze these things, > and different analyses sometimes appear to describe semiosis differently. I > don’t think Peirce was ever satisfied to stick with a single mode of > analysis, and that the immediate/dynamic object distinction was a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 30, 2016, at 10:37 AM, wrote: > > I agree, and likewise the Dynamic Interpretant determines the Final > Interpretant in the sense that it constrains the possible habits resulting > from its repetition; at least, that is my hypothesis at the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 30, 2016, at 12:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Just to clarify, I am actually the one who wrote what is quoted below from > Gary F.'s subsequent reply. > > CG: What Peirce wants to argue is that ultimately a kind of convergence at > infinity happens

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [Sadhu Sanga] "Sentient Science," "Spiritual Biology"--what is our "program"?

> On Aug 31, 2016, at 10:20 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > I have tried several times to get through on this list with the third point > you have. But I think some of my mails on fundamentalism has been censured > away. We must be aware when we pass from empirically based science

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

While I couldn’t find the Peirce quote I was searching for I did find this from Joe Ransdell: Qualities are not what philosophers sometimes call "the given" to which "interpretation" is somehow to be added to form cognitive units; for qualities are not objects of predication but rather that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On 9/13/2016 3:29 AM, John Collier wrote: >> I used Peirce’s ideas fairly prominently in my philosophy of science courses >> in the 1980s and 90s. I also used his work to cast light on Kuhnian issues >> both in my classes and in my doctoral dissertation. Although the last was >> accepted

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

(Sorry I thought I sent this before I left my office yesterday only to find it still on my screen. I know the discussion has moved on but I figured I’d post it anyway) > On Sep 13, 2016, at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark- yes, I think that the disagreements in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 8, 2016, at 4:08 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Clark wrote: The old joke of 90% of any philosophical argument consists of > coming to agreement over the semantics of terms is all too often true. > > And in a logically narrow sense, this is what Peirce suggests

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

My sense is that there’s some equivocation (perhaps even by Peirce) over the term existence. It seems to me that Peirce’s use of “real” is really about predication. Part of the confusion is things like mathematical objects. To follow Quine you can quantify over them but as soon as you start

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 10, 2016, at 7:57 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Edwina wrote: And I recall a Nobel Laureate in physics, in a conference, > declaring that Peircean semiotics was a vital analytic framework for physics. > > This might very well have been Ilya Prigogine, the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 10, 2016, at 8:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Thank you for sharing these helpful reflections. As others have pointed out > before, how we talk about the categories depends on what type of analysis we > are performing. I am content to accept your

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 10, 2016, at 8:03 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > I wonder, though, how many Peirceans even know what Prigogine means by > pluralism in physical laws, never mind physicists. I confess I had to look it up even though it’s right down my alley. Latour and Prigogine have

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 8, 2016, at 3:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > My use of the term 'universal' refers to its use in the analysis of reality. > > i frequently refer to that 4.551 quote about Mind - but, in my view, Mind is > not the same as Thirdness. Thirdness is a semiosic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 23, 2016, at 2:24 PM, Eugene Halton wrote: > > And what if you allowed yourself to enter the realm of musement > and found your Indo-European or related noun-centered language left behind? A > realm where your noun-God, your concept-God, could

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we > variously may think for our own parts. I do think it’s worth asking how the argument itself fares given the social changes

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 16, 2016, at 11:28 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > This to me suggests that at least some of the force of the NA is “extracted” > not from the concept of God as defined by Peirce but from the vernacular > concept. Peirce does distinguish between the two concepts, right at the >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 19, 2016, at 9:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark- thanks for your very nice outline of the NA - I certainly agree with > your view, that as Chiasson says, it's not just about a 'belief in God', > because it's not deductive but is, as noted, abductive.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 22, 2016, at 3:09 AM, Ben Novak wrote: > > I went to Craigslist where I found a laptop with a Vista operating system, > called the seller, and drove 50 miles to test it out. It worked like a charm. > For $70, and a hundred miles worth of gasoline, I have my

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 9:04 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > > GF: “Virtual Object” would not serve to replace “Immediate Object” here, > because a virtual object would have the “efficiency” of an object without > being one, while the immediate objects of both

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > My outline of the same situation brings in the categories, where > > 1) The Dynamic Object is the existential nature of the weather - which > interacts with my eyes [both are dynamic objects]; both are

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 10:24 AM, wrote: > > in the case of Peirce’s conversation with his wife about the weather, the > immediate object of his reply (“the notion of the present weather so far as > this is common to her mind and mine”) will partially

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:23 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: The immediate object would be the environment of speakers relevant to > the use. > > How do we reconcile this with the Immediate Object being internal to the Sign? I don’t see the problem. Don’t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 10:06 AM, Bev Corwin wrote: > > Hello everyone, I follow the discussions somewhat, however, not consistently. > Many interesting thoughts and wondering how they would apply in situational > case scenarios. So I have a question: How would you apply

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 8:33 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > JS: As for the Final Interpretant, "I confess [with Peirce] that my own > conception of this interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536, > 1906); but I am starting to think of it as perhaps

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 11:17 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > On your suggestions, let's make some smaller steps. You say: "Now, as others > have pointed out, Peirce did not introduce the distinction between immediate > and dynamic object until around 1904, and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 2:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > If this is the case, then what accounts for Peirce's consistent assignment of > "Dynamic" to the actual Object and Interpretant, rather than the possible > (Immediate) Object and Interpretant? Because the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 20, 2016, at 3:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > ET: I don't see that the Immediate Object is internal to that external > Dynamic Object! Not at all. > > Again, no one is arguing otherwise. Clark's comment was that the Dynamic > Object virtually

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 1:59 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > >> As for Clark's comment 'that the Dynamic Object virtually contains the >> Immediate Object' - I still don't see this, for how could the Dynamic Object >> determine how I, or the plant o

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 20, 2016, at 12:56 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > First, thanks for providing those many Peirce snippets on the three > interpretants. May I ask, how did you do that, that is, find so many so > quickly? Or, perhaps, you've been gathering them for some time? Or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 1:45 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > While he doesn’t make this distinction clearly until the 19th century I tend > to think it is there in his earlier thought latently. Especially in his > notions of continuity with signs. The connect

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Sorry. I meant to include this quote of Peirce’s and neglected to. This I think is the textual evidence for what I’m saying. Emphasis mine. …it is easy to see that the object of the sign, that to which it virtually at least professes to be applicable, can itself only be a sign. For example, the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark, list - thanks, I see your point, but my quibble is with the > interpretation of the 'Immediate Object'. > > I see it as a personal rather than common meaning. That is - you define the > immediate object as

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 12:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: Don’t confuse the sign with the sign-vehicle. > > I generally avoid the term "sign-vehicle," because Peirce did not use it. > The closest I could find was in CP 1.339 (undated), where he wrote, "A

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 4:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > I'm not referring to the action of communication but to the triadic semiosic > process of developing meaning. > > Let's say that I hear a frog. That frog or rather, the sound of the frog, is > the Dynamic Object.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 12:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: We say the immediate object is internal to the sign because it’s in > understanding in use. > > I do not understand what you mean here. Please clarify, or perhaps provide > citations from Peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 28, 2016, at 7:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), not abduction; which is > why it contributes to security, but not to uberty. I wonder if another way > to highlight the distinction is to assign the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 26, 2016, at 7:42 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Actually, seven volumes of the Writings have been published (1-6 and 8), now > extending through July 1892. As I understand it, work is currently in > progress on three additional volumes. > W7 will

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 26, 2016, at 11:56 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > Just perhaps with quite the genealogical mythic etymology that besets > Heideggers and others in that particular phenomenological tradition. Sorry autocorrect was not my friend. I should have proo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 27, 2016, at 10:29 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > I guess that the question whether there is God or not leads to the assumtion > that there is God: Given that there is no God, everything has evolved by > itself, but this self-creation requires a mechanism, which is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 28, 2016, at 2:17 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Thank you, Clark, for this nutshell summary of God-concepts since the Greek > abstraction. After I wrote it I worried I’d come off as being patronizing as I know many here knew all this. I just put it in that form

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Super-Order and the Logic of Continuity (was Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

> On Nov 8, 2016, at 10:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Yesterday I came across an interesting paper by Nicholas Guardiano, "The > Categorial Logic of Peirce's Metaphysical Cosmogony" (The Pluralist 10:3, > Fall 2015, 313-334; early version at >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 9:46 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos pre-the Big Bang > (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't really > bring such very much later notions into the picture, which

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Super-Order and the Logic of Continuity (was Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

> On Nov 7, 2016, at 12:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > The long quote from "A Guess at the Riddle" dates to 1887-1888. As I > indicated in my correction, W 8:22 is from 1890. CP 5.90-92 is from the 1903 > Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism. > > As I have said

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Super-Order and the Logic of Continuity (was Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

> On Nov 7, 2016, at 11:04 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > Let's take up Peirce's rejoinder to Hegel about the character of the > absolute. He says: "Hegel is possessed with the idea that the Absolute is > One. Three absolutes he would regard as a ludicrous

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions. My > understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that > she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme. > On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 10:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > At this point, it seems appropriate to shift this conversation to the > spin-off thread that I started last week based on Ben Novak's post and the > ones to which he was responding, which I have

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within matter/concepts? Depends. Are numbers real even when not embedded within matter/concepts? After all there are numbers that have never been formally thought

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 25, 2016, at 9:43 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > I’m slowly working through the posts I missed. Allow me to repost the > relevant quote. This is 6.202-209. I think you quoted the paragraph referring > to platonism. (See the other quotes at the bo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 10:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Clark, List: > > At this point, it seems appropriate to shift this conversation to the > spin-off thread that I started last week based on Ben Novak's post and the > ones to which he was responding,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 25, 2016, at 10:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CP 6.185-213 is the manuscript text for the eighth and final Cambridge > Conferences lecture and actually dates from 1898, not 1892-1893--thus coming > after Peirce became a full-blown three-category

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 6:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot > depends upon what we mean by the terms. > > Fisch argued, convincingly I think, that Peirce did not accept the reality of >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 25, 2016, at 11:53 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: I usually prefer to quote from EP 2 or RLT rather than CP for reasons > like this. (It’s just a pain to figure out the dates - although perhaps > that’s me) > > It is not just you--I have come to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 20, 2016, at 10:23 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > I can find no easy way from phenomenology alone - not even from Peirce’s > triadic phaneroscophy - to the reality of an outer world and other embodied > conscious subjects. I do not think Peirce solves this problem. Do you?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 21, 2016, at 11:55 AM, John F Sowa > wrote: > > But the modern word has become specialized to the single sense of efficient > cause. I’d add that we have to distinguish the idea of efficient causation as determinate from what came to be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 21, 2016, at 1:30 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > That is true of all the sciences, especially physics. When I used > the word 'modern', I meant the informal use by Hume. But as early > as the 17th century, physicists discovered that the differential > equations by

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

> On Oct 20, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Now we have "Modes of Being" or "modes of reality" that are identified as > "three Universes" and correspond to "Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or > Freedom from

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 11:47 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > All conceptual knowledge need language of some sort and -as Wittgenstein > says – there are no private language. Thus you must assume the existence of > other embodied experiential conscious subject in language, - and you

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 8:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Edwina, List: > > ET: After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order within > a collection of bits of unorganized matter. > > Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 10:14 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > As far as I can tell, Peirce never stopped talking about the categories in > the context of the phenomenology or phaneroscopy. Furthermore, he never > stopped talking about the categories in the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > The problem is, Gary, that you and Jon are both theists and both of you > reject the 'Big Bang'. I am an atheist and support the 'Big Bang'. Therefore, > both sides in this debate select sections from Peirce to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Nov 23, 2016, at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > The context for Peirce thinking about democracy and political economy are > obviously his religious ideas. Central concepts in this context are love and > greed/ altruism and egoism. This brings immediatly

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Nov 20, 2016, at 1:38 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > You may recall that I concluded my message which began this thread with this > question: can anyone on the list offer some Peirce quotations which might > help quickly clarify his views on democracy? > I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Nov 28, 2016, at 12:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > That strikes me as a sensible application of Peirce's self-proclaimed > "sentimental conservatism" (CP 1.661). If "philosophical science" should be > allowed to "influence religion and morality ... only

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Nov 28, 2016, at 1:29 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > My first impression is that you may be on to something here, Clark, that > Peirce's understanding would tend toward a kind of federalism as needed to > ensure that no single hypothesis be adopted too quickly for

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Nov 26, 2016, at 2:39 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Meanwhile, my own sense is that one possible strength of Peirce's theory lies > in his philosophical summum bonum, namely, the notion of our seeking the > 'reasonable in itself'. It follows that--and here one

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Nov 28, 2016, at 2:57 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > I prefer to find a value in the 'tension' between bottom-up and top-down > solutions which Clark hinted at. I'm not at all sure what Peirce's > preferences would be in this matter. As I said Peirce (especially

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Nov 25, 2016, at 12:17 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > So, if Peirce wrote things about democracy, was opposed to female suffrage, > and thought that a community should be ruled by an authoritative government, > then I think that this is not relevant. He was out on a limb

Re: CSP and Spinoza (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

I don’t have my library handy, but the following link might be useful for seeing that Kabbalistic/Spinoza tie that I think is relevant to Peirce. https://books.google.com/books?id=gZEgOxy_hXoC=PA186=PA186#v=onepage=false

Re: CSP and Spinoza (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

> On Oct 30, 2016, at 8:37 AM, jerry_lr_chand...@me.com wrote: > > To what extend did Spinoza’s effort to express meta-physics in terms of > Euclid’s geometrical mathematics, excite CSP to express his meta-physics in > terms of continuous mathematics and graph theory (as a dualism between >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 29, 2016, at 5:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Jon wrote: "With that in mind, a unique aspect of Christianity is its > startling affirmation that God Himself entered into Actuality--" > > I don't think that the concept of 'god entering into actuality' is unique

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Religious Views (was Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

> On Oct 31, 2016, at 3:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > I also share Clark's interest in learning more, if possible, about what > Peirce thought regarding the divinity Jesus. The only published comment on > it that I could find is CP 6.538 (c.1901). > > CSP:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 2, 2016, at 10:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges" following the > creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang, so to loosely speak) > is *not* the same as the 3ns which is the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 7:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of > 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this > 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Religious Views (was Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

> The first paragraph tells us that Peirce's approach to Scripture was that of > "modern Biblical criticism," and he expected "the liberal parties" to triumph > accordingly. This is not surprising; I also discovered that he wrote in R > 851 (1911) that "the reader will find me a scientific man

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 10:59 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the > historic ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical > ones (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > While I personally disagree with process theology itself, I actually agree > with Clark that Peirce's writings can plausibly be interpreted from a process > theology perspective. Peirce clearly rejected

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:23 PM, Søren Brier wrote: > > Quantum filed theory seems to have arrived at such a foundational > ur-continuity. I’m not sure that’s right. There’s certainly a type of continuity in quantum field theory but it’s unlike Peirce’s ur-continutiy because

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the term > of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of habit. > Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 3:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Is it helpful at all to refer to "actualization," rather than "cause"? > Edwina's position, as I understand it, is that our existing universe is not > only self-organizing but also self-generating or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 5:01 PM, Søren Brier wrote: > > I agree that Pierce claims that to do science you must have faith in the > possibility of finding truth and that knowing is connected to thirdness. I > wonder if it has anything to do with agapism? I think in the places he

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 2, 2016, at 3:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > At first glance, it seems to me that mapping John 1:1 to Peirce's Categories > gives us something like, "In the beginning was the Word [Thirdness], and the > Word was with God [Secondness], and the Word was

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 2, 2016, at 2:07 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Potter writes: > > I would like to add here on my account that when it coms to understanding the > conditions of possibility of special disclosure or revelation in holy persons > or historical events, disclosure

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Religious Views (was Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

> On Nov 1, 2016, at 10:59 AM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/evolove/evolove.htm > > > But this link brings us to Joe's edition (really just a formatting)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 1, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > This is an interesting point indeed. We've discussed in at least one of the > cosmological threads of late the way in which Peirce does ascribe one sort of > being to God, namely, Reality. On the other hand,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 26, 2016, at 12:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: They don’t have 8 up on their web page for purchase yet. > > Which web page? It was published way back in 2009, and may be purchased > directly from IUP at >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 26, 2016, at 10:01 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > I am wondering, whether it is helpful at all to ponder about "nothing", > because I doubt that it can be more than a myth. Same with beginning, > creation, tychism, and platonic ideas. I have the hypothesis, that >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Democracy

> On Tue, Nov 29, 2016 at 11:42 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com > <mailto:cl...@lextek.com>> wrote: >> one should note that in the 1890’s Peirce shifted from a moderate realist >> largely following Duns Scotus to a stronger realist largely on the basis of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

(Changing the Subject by request so years from now when people are doing a search they have an idea what’s being discussed) > On Dec 7, 2016, at 10:04 AM, John F Sowa > wrote: > > Clark and Jerry, > > Every branch of science has four kinds of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

> On Dec 7, 2016, at 10:48 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Peirce similarly divided the physical sciences into nomological, > classificatory, and descriptive, and considered engineering to be a practical > science. > > CSP: Nomological physics discovers the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

> On Dec 12, 2016, at 12:24 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > My impression is that Smolin has drawn on some Peircean ideas, such as that > of habits or laws evolving in nature, but that he is less Peircean than he > initially seems, what with Smolin's views on discrete space

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

> On Dec 12, 2016, at 3:17 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> > wrote: > >> On Dec 12, 2016, at 3:48 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com >> <mailto:cl...@lextek.com>> wrote: >> >> >>> On Dec 12, 2016, at 12

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

> On Dec 12, 2016, at 5:16 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > Clark, please read more carefully what I wrote. > > Obviously, atoms are presupposed logically to be symmetric in order to derive > QM eqn for spectra. > But, this belief is mathematically grounded on the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

> On Dec 13, 2016, at 9:37 AM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > I agree with Edwina. There have now been a number of studies comparing > Wikipedia and Britannica, such as this published in Nature > https://www.cnet.com/news/study-wikipedia-as-accurate-as-britannica/ >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

> On Dec 12, 2016, at 12:10 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > I think we need to distinguish between pragmaticist meaningfulness, - clarity > of conceivable, imaginable practical implications - and questions of > methodeutic economy of inquiry > Oh, I agree that’s the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

> On Dec 12, 2016, at 12:20 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > One critical fact that is “the elephant in the room” is the intrinsic > asymmetry of nearly all biomolecules. Life Itself depends on the asymmetries > entailed from parent to offspring and the

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