RE: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

Bernard, the “converse” you refer to, stated exactly, would be that what is or is not true of the world of existences can be scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning. You are asking whether we can “ascertain” that. Well, there is a cedar tree just outside the window

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Tribalism (was André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25)

Jon, yes, that’s pretty much the sociological phenomenon I refer to as “tribalism.” I might add that in the present case, those who indulge in it typically interpret criticism of their expressed opinions as criticism of themselves, and often claim they are defending themselves, their personal

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

List, before even looking at what’s been posted since my own post below, I feel I should apologize to Bernard Morand for saying that “the concept of a “dynamic object” plays no part in your philosophy of language,” based solely on the two-sentence statement that I quoted from his previous post.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

Bernard, thanks for this clarification; it shows that my comment about the “dynamic object” of the term “phaneroscopy” was completely wrong. Indeed you’ve shown that the concept of a “dynamic object” plays no part in your philosophy of language. BM: To my sense, be it a technical or standard

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

Bernard, I wish I could converse about this aspect of language in French, but unfortunately I don’t have that ability. BM: But I am wholly astonished by the rigorus property you are attaching to definitions or descriptions made by Peirce. He was not God the Father. Surely we have to refer to

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

Bernard, list, I just noticed that the point I was trying to make below (about “experience”) is more fully explained by Peirce in this 1893 text: Experiencing (TS ·7) (gnusystems.ca) Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

Bernard, list, Yes, you can regard De Tienne’s statement about mathematicians in a non-existing world as a logical blunder; I regard it as a manifestation of his peculiar sense of humor. As for the experience of mathematicians doing pure mathematics, you can indeed call it “experience,” but

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 24

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Gary f. Text: * What mathematicians observe (and construct and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

Bernard, thank you for a thoughtful post (and thanks to Jon S for an equally thoughtful reply to it). I especially appreciate your tacit acknowledgement of the emotional basis of your own response to De Tienne’s choice of language at “the starting point in slide 23.” But my own response will be

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 23

Jon S, list, Slide 23 does indeed contain a careless error in citation, but the words “inserted” are in fact Peirce’s, not André’s. They come from CP 1.247 (part of the “Minute Logic”): “Mathematics is engaged solely in tracing out the consequences of hypotheses. As such, she never at all

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 22

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. As this slide ends with a question, I will post the next slide (giving De Tienne’s

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Mathematical phaneroscopy (was slow read...

JFS: Phenomenology/phaneroscopy analyzes experiences in the phaneron in order to classify and determine the elements of experience. But as Peirce said, the same kinds of experiences may comefrom external sensation, from imagination, or from memories. GF: The phrase "kinds of experiences" is

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Mathematical phaneroscopy (was slow read...

John, list, According to Peirce, "The actual world cannot be distinguished from a world of imagination by any description" (EP1:227, W5:164, CP 3.363, 1885). As we have all repeated many times, mathematics itself does not and cannot distinguish between the actual world and a world of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 21

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. This is the beginning of part 4, “From Mathematics to Phaneroscopy.” Gary f.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 20

Jon S, Perhaps it was misleading of André to label it a “paradox” that scholars might be doing phaneroscopy without being aware of it — after all, if bats and other beasts can “do calculations” without being aware that they are doing so, maybe it’s no paradox at all. Still, the brevity of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 20

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Gary f. Text: Paradox Few scholars are aware that they ought to study,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 19

Gary R, Jon S, list, Thanks for the welcome back, though as you suggest, Gary, my bodymind is still not ‘up to speed.’ For this and other reasons I don’t have much to say about previous posts in this thread. I can see why André’s choice of the word “drives” in this sentence could be

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 18

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. (Please excuse the two-week delay since the previous slide was posted. A bout of viral

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 17

Thanks, Jon, for transcribing that part of R 284, which I didn’t have time to search out yesterday. It’s similar to his detailed procedural and pragmatic ‘definition’ of lithium in the “Syllabus” (EP2:286): CSP: “The peculiarity of this definition,— or rather this precept that is more

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 17

André De Tienne: “a science that happens to make use of a principle formulated in a more abstract science … may provide that prior science with corrective feedback, reasons to revise generalizations, and reasons to redesign formal possibilities. Thus, a science may also be said to precede another

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 14

List, CSP: ... every man inhabits two worlds. These are directly distinguishable by their different appearances. But the greatest difference between them, by far, is that one of these two worlds, the Inner World, exerts a comparatively slight compulsion upon us, though we can by direct

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 16

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Comments, questions and counter-arguments are welcome. (Personal attacks are not. This is peirce-l, not

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 15

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Here begins Part 3 of the presentation. The next two slides will follow shortly. Gary f.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 14

Well, I guess I underestimated how eager we are to focus on the classification of sciences! A couple of brief questions before I post the slides on that: Robert, thanks for attaching the Tommi Vehkavaara diagram. In it mathematics is labelled “negative science.” This is a new term for me, and I

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 14

List, Slide 14 is the last in Part 2 of the slideshow, and I’m sure many of us are eager to start on Part 3, which is about “the place of phaneroscopy in Peirce’s mature classification of the sciences.” So unless questions arise today about the specific content of this slide, I’d like to post the

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 14

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Now that we have definitions of the three universal categories, the next step in chronological order is

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 13

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Below the text of the slide, I have also included Peirce’s definition of Thirdness from the Century

RE: [PEIRCE-L] : André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Robert, you wrote yesterday: RM: here is section 5 of my preprint in which I point out that Peirce proposes a name to designate each category and a derived name to designate the elements (phanerons) belonging to each of these categories. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On

RE: [PEIRCE-L] : André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Jack, list, I should point out (to avoid further confusion) that Robert’s brand of category theory is a post-Peircean development and does not adhere strictly to Peirce’s phaneroscopic terminology. Peirce never refers to phanerons as “elements,” or to elements as “phanerons.” He refers to the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Helmut, list, A memory of a past event is present to the mind in a way that the past event itself is NOT present to the mind. The quality of that memory is its Firstness, but as a qualisign it does NOT represent the quality of the event, because the object and interpretant of a qualisign can

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Jack, list, First, I should clarify that it is only the universal categories that are “ubiquitous,” to use Peirce’s term. He mentions several times that there are other sets of categories, or elements, that the practice of phenomenology/phaneroscopy could bring to light; but he preferred to focus

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Helmut, A phenomenon is anything that appears, or is present to the mind. The phaneron is the collective total of whatever appears or could appear or be present to the mind generically (not to a particular mind). The phaneron, or any phenomenon, always has three elements, Firstness,

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 12

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Below the text of the slide, I have also included Peirce’s definition of Secondness from the Century

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 10

Helmut, John, Robert, list, Yes, Helmut, there is a metaphysical aspect to Peirce’s 1867 “New List” essay; there is even a psychological aspect, even though Peirce insisted that logic has nothing to learn from psychology. But for Peirce, even at this early date, metaphysics is dependent on

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

Thank you, Robert, for providing two more Peirce quotes in confirmation of the three in my post, all clarifying the role of formal, mathematical, deductive logic in philosophy. Here is one more that might clarify it still further: CSP: If the whole business of mathematics consists in deducing

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

Point of clarification: CSP: Formal logic, however developed, is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic, or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned as a part of logic proper. Logic has to define its aim; and in doing so is even more dependent upon

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 9

Jack, list, I’ll start with a few general comments on Peircean epistimology and semiotics before I insert my comments into your post below. First, all knowledge is fallible, relative and incomplete. We can directly experience things that we have no prior knowledge of; but we can’t know anything

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8

Welcome to the conversation on the Peirce list, Jack! I hope your post will inspire some of the other “novices” to join in as well. You may get a reply from Jon when he has the time, but for now I’ll just offer my own response to one key point in your post: JC: Isn't it a fact, though, that

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8

Helmut, list, HR: So, in short: Dissociation, prescission, discrimination is imagining, supposing, representing one thing without the other. GF: That’s a bit too short, in the case of prescission, which Peirce says is supposing *a state of things* in which one element is present without the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 8

Helmut, list, I think it’s important to discriminate between logical processes, or kinds of argument (deduction, induction, abduction), and “kinds of separation” (dissociation, prescission, discrimination), which are pre-logical in the sense that no reasoning is involved, just a kind of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 7

Robert, I can see how your Categorical Theoretic Structuralism is a way of establishing the credentials of phaneroscopy as a science. But it doesn’t explain why Peirce’s classification places it first among all positive sciences, prior to logic and semiotic. Almost any positive science can call on

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 7

List, Robert, except for a few inaccuracies (like the misspelling of prescission), your account of the discovery of the categories is very much in line with André’s, although the terminology is different. If I may focus on one sentence of your summary, I have a question about your usage of the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

Robert, that’s good, I’ll post slide 7 shortly so everyone knows what we’re talking about. I haven’t heard back from André about your previous post. One more comment on slide 6. Jon has suggested that “Perhaps André is merely attempting to preclude the misconception that Peirce's three

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

List, I think my previous post on this slide may have overemphasized the difference between Peirce’s 1867 view of the categories and his later “phaneroscopic” view of them, and I’d like to correct that before we leave slide 6, which refers to Peirce’s early discovery that the “set of genuinely

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

List, Part 2 of the slide presentation introduces Peirce’s “universal categories” with an outline of the 1867 paper in which he first presented his “New List of Categories.” This was decades before he started referring to them as Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, and 35 years before he started

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

Robert, your criticism is duly noted and has been forwarded to André De Tienne. Whether he responds to you or to the list is of course up to him. Since no one (including you) has expressed an interest in having Peirce’s texts on the issue (other than the one you quoted) posted to the list, I’ll

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

Robert, your prescription of “mutual respect” apparently doesn’t oblige you to extend respect to André De Tienne. The subject of mathematics and its relation to phaneroscopy has not come up yet in the slow read; it doesn’t come up until slide 18, with Peirce’s classification of the sciences.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

Auke, posting of the next slide does not cut off discussion of the previous slide. Gary can still answer your question “Why consciousness and not awareness or apperception?” if that’s what you are referring to as “unsettled.” Maybe you can clarify: are you asking why Gary chose the word

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 6

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Gary f. Text: Necessary assumption for the purposes of this talk: You are already

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 5

Jon, Gary R, list, As you said, Gary, this post of Jon’s is a very rich one, and after reading it through three times I’m still learning from it. I don’t have much to add, or any particular objections to it, and don’t have strong feelings on the terminological issue. But something about your

RE: [PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

Helmut, yes, that’s exactly why I didn’t use the word “type”, and only used the word “token” because I couldn’t think of a better word to get the idea across. Gary f. From: Helmut Raulien Sent: 20-Jun-21 02:26 To: gary.richm...@gmail.com Cc: Peirce-L ; Gary Fuhrman Subject: Aw: Re:

RE: [PEIRCE-L] AndrÃ(c) De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

Thanks for fixing that up, Gary. I’m still baffled by this white-text thing, because it never comes back to me from the list that way, and in this case the quotes were not copied from TS but from another file that is not formatted white-on-black. Strange. I hope this post doesn’t come out

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

Auke, I’m not suggesting anything different from what Peirce said about phaneroscopy. The trouble is that in order to grasp what it is, you have to take Peirce at his word rather than translating his ideas into habitual categories such as “Cartesian thought experiment,” “absolute doubt” and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

Helmut, that’s a good question, but I don’t much care for any of your answers. Here’s mine: In CP 1.286-7 (which has been quoted before in this thread), Peirce speaks of phaneroscopy as a science which, being public like any other science, depends on multiple observations. He therefore refers

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

AVB: I think I never had you. So how could I lose you? GF: I guess that’s right! I naively trusted that your question related to the nature of phaneroscopy as Peirce defines it, and not to some metaphysical issue which does not exist for phaneroscopy. Gary f. From: Auke van Breemen

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

John, everything you say here was taken for granted in my post (and is one of the central ideas in my book): that most communication has to rely on trusting one’s dialogue partner to be speaking from experience. Auke’s question was about the word veracity in comparison with honesty and other terms

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would mean by stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I must have missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition that

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

Auke, Gary R, list, For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that are publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do so honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any independent observer of the dream (or of my

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

Helmut, Auke, list, I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated): it’s very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently to a word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus on the object of the sign or the subject under

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

Jon AS, list, I’m looking forward to the part of our slow read that delves into Peirce’s classification of sciences, as I think that will explain what André means by saying that phaneroscopists are “pre-truthists.” But you’re right, some of the ideas floated in the other thread show what

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 3

Cathy, I’m impressed with your awareness of phaneroscopy as an activity, a practice which informs our way of “continuing on with the business of life.” As slide 3 observes, this aspect of it seems to escape notice because of its association with Peirce’s theory of categories. Part of the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 3

Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of Andre De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. (The first one I posted was actually slide 2 because I skipped the title slide.) Gary f.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

Welcome Cathy, and thank you for placing the renewed interest in Peircean phaneroscopy into its current social context. Also for providing the quotation from CP 1.286-287, which is an important one for developing the practice of phaneroscopy. We need to distinguish this practice from that of

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read

As Gary R announced, we’re starting a slow read of Andre De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site. Here’s the first slide (a table of contents, actually). I’ll probably post the next slide here this

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic Logic

Helmut, my book has a lot to say about relations between time and logic, but probably the most relevant to your question is here: Objecting and Realizing (TS ·12) (gnusystems.ca) . Actually there’s more of Peirce than of me in it, but I hope

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic Logic

Helmut, on this point you seem to disagree with Peirce about logical relations. Peirce in 1880 (W4:170) identified illation as the basic or ‘primitive’ logical relation, and in his 1906 ‘PAP’ (MS 293) he identified it with ‘the form of the relation of two instants of time, or what is the same

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Objective Idealism

Gary R, list, Apparently the list guidelines do not forbid posting an “interpretation” that flatly contradicts the text it claims to be interpreting. Nor is there any objection to pointing out the fact that said “interpretation” does contradict the text it claims to be interpreting. But when

RE: [PEIRCE-L] EG Introduction (was Intuitionistic logic)

Thanks for that response, Jon. After tweaking my draft a bit and inserting a link to a list of the sources you mentioned, I’ve now put up the whole chapter which includes the section on EGs (Turning Signs 13: Meaning Spaces (gnusystems.ca) and taken

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic Logic

Jon A, according to Peirce it’s true for Philonians but not for Diodorans. See text inserted into Lowell Lecture 2 (gnusystems.ca) . Gary f From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Jon Awbrey Sent: 19-May-21 19:13 To: Helmut Raulien

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic

Gary R and list, Being a non-mathematician myself, I’ve been drafting an introduction to Peirce’s EGs for the likes of us. I have the current draft online now here: EG introduction (gnusystems.ca) It includes many links both to Peirce’s own

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Intuitionistic logic

John, I appreciate the clarification in your post: when you wrote that intuitionist logic "blocks the way of inquiry", what you really meant was that it "blocks the way" of using the most convenient, efficient, and flexible methods of reasoning. Peirce's idea of inquiry, and specifically of the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Scroll vs Nested Ovals (was Existential Graphs in 1911)

Jon, I think your posts in this thread and its predecessors are the most valuable contributions to the list that we’ve seen in the past year or so. You’ve illuminated one of Peirce’s most philosophically important contributions to logic, one that I must admit I had previously overlooked, and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

Jon Alan, list, GF: a relation of negation can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. I wonder which case applies to this early (1868) remark of Peirce’s: “The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

Thanks, Jon Alan, I think I’m aboard this train of thought, although it’s taking me into unfamiliar territory. I hadn’t really considered that a relation of negation can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. I wonder which case applies to this early (18) remark of Peirce’s: “The individual

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

Jerry, the following paragraph from Harvard Lecture 6 (1903, EP2:218, CP5.176) might help to explain Peirce’s usage of ampliative (his translation of Kant’s erweiternde): [[ I may presume that you are all familiar with Kant's reiterated insistence that necessary reasoning does nothing but

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

Jon Alan, list, Three years ago when I posted my transcription of Lowell Lecture 2 on my website (https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm) I was quite baffled by Peirce’s derivation of the negating signification of the cut from the signification of the scroll with a blackened inner close or

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Kindle editions of Writings

And thanks for mentioning that, Gary R! I don’t have a Kindle either, I read Kindle books using the free app on my laptop. This has several advantages over printed books (and manuscripts): e-books (either Kindle or PDF) are searchable, you can copy text from them for pasting into other

[PEIRCE-L] Kindle editions of Writings

Aloha Peirceans, I just noticed that Kindle editions of all 7 volumes of the Writings Chronological Edition are selling for $9.99 each. (At least they are on Amazon.ca, I haven’t checked Amazon.com.) I bought and downloaded one of them at it appears to be all there (compared to the

[PEIRCE-L] Mathematical evolution

This newly revised patch from Turning Signs may be of interest concerning relations between mathematics and experience, in a biosemiotic context. It contains a 3-paragraph Peirce quote plus a number of links to other quotes: http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/xrp.htm#x23 . Gary F. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

John S, Nobody here is disputing that “eg1911, as specified in L231, is complete” for the pedagogical purpose of teaching classical first-order logic. Do you really think that was Peirce’s purpose in developing EGs? Or that eg1911 completely accomplishes the purposes which Peirce explicitly

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

D’accord! ☺ gf From: robert marty Sent: 9-Aug-20 14:31 Gary, I'm 9 years older than you! So I have more excuses?  Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs)

Jon AS, you quoted me at the end of your post, but now I’d like to qualify what I said there by quoting Peirce: “we cannot make ourselves understood if we merely say what we mean.” Here’s the context: [[ The acquiring [of] a habit is nothing but an objective generalization taking place in

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

Robert, your apology is accepted, and I don’t blame you for defending mathematics when you thought it was being disrespected by a non-mathematician. We agree, I think, that both mathematics and experience of the external world are essential to scientific reasoning, and the semiotic explanation

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

Robert, you've certainly shown that semiotics is a blood sport for you, but you've also shown how that kind of methodology can twist a scholar's thinking. John's post about the Eisele article omitted any mention of the role of actual experience in scientific reasoning. I did not attack John

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

Robert, answering your attack on a straw man would hardly be worthwhile, as it is apparently based on a misquotation of my post and your own hostile reaction to the word “imaginary.” Rather than unleash a barrage of quotes, i will just give one example where Peirce uses that word as i did in my

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's methodology

Jon et al., The basic point of my post was that the interpreter of a sign can keep its dynamic object “in view” only by means of the indexical function of the sign, which connects it to actual experience. Diagrammatic signs are not so good at that. The relevance to John's original post, as i

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [Peirce's methodology

Jon, list, “The object in view”? Which object is that? A turn back to basics: Semiosis is a kind of triadic action. Peirce (CP 5.472-3, c. 1906) explains that the difference between ‘dynamical, or dyadic, action’ and ‘intelligent, or triadic action’ is that the latter involves the use of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Pragmatic Trivium

Gary R, list, My apologies for taking ten days to reply to your post, Gary, because I had to figure out what I really meant by “the primacy of esthetics.” What I had in mind (rather vaguely) was the “aesthetic contemplation” which is one form of “Musement” or “Pure Play” as Peirce called it

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Pragmatic Trivium

John, your post arrived just as I was about to post this one, and I’ll have to study it for awhile before I can reply. (Same with Gary’s post quoting Walt Whitman.) Here I’m just following up on my post to the list this morning. In a footnote to his 1911 essay A Sketch of Logical Critics,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Pragmatic Trivium

List, Perhaps I can try to bring this thread back to its stated subject by spelling out some implications of my concluding sentence at http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/snc.htm#x14

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Pragmatic Trivium

Gary R, list, I just came across a piece of the reverse side of Turning Signs that strikes me as relevant to the “ways in which Peirce's philosophical trivium might help inform the aesthetics, ethics, and critical thinking of the world as it emerges from the coronavirus pandemic” — and

correction RE: [PEIRCE-L] diagrams of semiosis

Jon, sorry, I meant to reply to your final paragraph but got distracted. (New rule: never try to compose a post while you have a chatty 6-year-old bouncing around you.) I also fixed an omission in my post below. JAS: I agree, but I believe that we must still carefully distinguish an

RE: [PEIRCE-L] diagrams of semiosis

Jon, sorry, I meant to reply to your final paragraph but got distracted. (New rule: never try to compose a post while you have a chatty 6-year-old bouncing around you.) I also fixed an omission in my post below. From: g...@gnusystems.ca Sent: 23-Jun-20 08:26 To:

[PEIRCE-L] diagrams of semiosis

Jon, list, I decided to change the subject line, as we’re not really talking about communication here. JAS: In CP 1.345-347 (1903), Peirce is talking about genuine triadic relations, and "representing" or (more generally) "mediating" is just such a relation with three subjects--the sign, its

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Communicating An Idea

Jon AS, list, I anticipated this kind of puzzlement on the part of some readers, and that’s why I inserted this warning just before the Merrell quote: “(He uses the word ‘subject’ here in reference to the experiencing bodymind , not to the part of a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Communicating An Idea

Jon, Gary, list, For my purposes in Turning Signs (other than quoting Peirce), the term “retroduction” works better than “abduction” because its prefix is more metaphorical, so that it integrates better with the central diagram of biosemiosis which I call the meaning cycle

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Communicating an Idea (was Interpreter-Interpretant and Possible-Actual)

Jon AS, list, What caught my attention so far in your transcript of R787 was this paragraph, which comes just before the one I’d quoted earlier from NEM 4:ix: [[ There are, however, observations which are not only open to all men; but which are necessarily open to all intelligences capable of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Communicating An Idea

Jon AS, Thanks as always for tracing out the full history of Peirce’s own usage of the two terms. I too have treated them as synonymous in Turning Signs, and I don’t think Gary R was suggesting otherwise — just that the different terms are somewhat different in their suitability for

RE: [PEIRCE-L] (Interpreter → Interpretant) and (Possible → Actual)

Jon A, list, I was curious about what was omitted by the ellipses in your quotation from Peirce’s Lowell Lecture VII of 1866, and when I turned back a page for the context, decided it might be worthwhile to post the whole passage from W1:465-67 without omissions. For two or three reasons …

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Communicating An Idea

Gary R, I think yours is a very astute and context-sensitive way of communicating the idea abduction/retroduction. To a logician, I guess it would make “abduction” a “looser” or more vague term than “retroduction”. Or we might say that abduction is more preconscious than retroduction. This

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