Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 5:44 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote: On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 03:56:35PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Aug 2012, at 00:32, Russell Standish wrote: OK. But the question is: would an agent lost free-will in case no random oracle is available? I would have thought so. What about heuristics? When a question is to difficult to solve ideally, we fall back to easier or simpler strategies. In the end it might just be a raw vote between levels of firing activity in neurons considering the alternatives. This has nothing to do with randomness, and can be every bit as fast/efficient as a random oracle. Note that NO machine can ever distinguish a truly random sequence with some sequence which can be generated by machine more complex than themselves. That is true. But complex machines are expensive to run. Real random oracles, if available, are so much more convenient for evolution to use that to try to evolve sufficient complexity to achieve cryptographic strength in a pseudo random number generator. If we have access to such good random number generators in our brain, then why are people so bad at choosing random numbers? There would be no reason to publish books full of random numbers if people had anything approaching a statistically sound random number generator in their heads. Try and randomly choose 100 numbers between 1 and 10, and I bet you will find your results will be highly biased, and will fail most any statistical test for randomness. This article seems to confirm my point: http://forumserver.twoplustwo.com/47/science-math-philosophy/why-humans-so-bad-random-number-generation-327331/ Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 2:12 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote: On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 12:15:59PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Aug 2012, at 10:12, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 01:01:10PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Aug 2012, at 12:30, Russell Standish wrote: Assuming the coin is operating inside the agent's body? Why would that be considered non-free? In what sense would the choice be mine if it is random? It is mine if the random generator is part of me. It is not mine if the generator is outside of me (eg flipping the coin). I don't see this. Why would the generator being part of you make it your choice? You might define me and part of me before. It is The self-other distinction is a vital part of conscsiousness. I don't think precise definitions of this are needed for this discussion. not clear if you are using the usual computer science notion of me, or not, but I would say that if the root of the choice is a random oracle, then the random oracle makes the choice for me. It does not matter if the coin is in or outside my brain, which is a local non absolute notion. My brain make a choice, therefore it is my choice. My boss orders me to do something, its not really my choice (unless I decide to disobey :). Why would this be any different with random number generators? A coin flips, and I do something based on the outcome. It is not my choice (except insofar as I chose to follow an external random event). My brain makes a random choice based on the chaotic amplification of synaptic noise. This is still my brain and my choice. It is like letting someone else take the decision for you. I really don't see how randomness is related to with free will (the compatibilist one). Compatibilism, ISTM, is the solution to a non-problem: How to reconcile free will with a deterministic universe. The very idea that we have to reconcile free-will with determinism seems to be a red herring to me. Agreed. But that is what all the fuss seems to be about. I try not to engage with it, as it is so century-before-the-last. It is a non-problem, because the universe is not deterministic. (The multiverse is deterministic, of course, but that's another story). But then you have to reconcile free-will with indeterminacy, and that makes not much sense. I don't think free-will (as I defined it of course) has anything to do with determinacy or indeterminacy. The fact that someone else can predict my behavior does not make it less free. Um, yes it does. I don't follow this. Can you explain how? If super intelligent aliens secretly came to earth and predicted your actions, how has that diminished the freedom you had before their arrival? Someone asked why this concept is important. It isn't for me, per se, but I would imagine that someone implementing an agent that must survive in a messy real world environment (eg an autonomous robot) will need to consider this issue, and build something like it into their robot. I agree with Bruno. A mind can only be made less free if it is built from non-deterministic parts, it is less free to be itself in its full sense because with parts that do not behave in predictable ways, there is no way to perfectly realize a given personality. They will always have some level of capriciousness that will stand in the way of that person realizing the person they are meant/designed to be. The mind will never work perfectly as intended, at best it can only asymptotically approach some ideal. I do agree with Russell that there are evolutionary advantages for access to a source of good randomness. It would enable people to choose better passwords, be better poker players, pick lottery numbers with fewer collisions, and so on. But I am not convinced humans access to anything approaching a good random number generator. If we did, I would see it more as a sense which is external to the mind. The mind could determinsitically decide to make use of inputs from this sense, but even if the mind never drew on this random oracle it would still be every bit as free to exercise its will. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ?
OK, thanks. I do appreciate him, but I am not versed in semiotics vocabulary. In fact I am collaborating with him, and have recently published some collective work on biomathematics with him and others. It is too early to really see the connection with comp. Work in progress. Bruno On 16 Aug 2012, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote: On 8/16/2012 9:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:59, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: Are you reading Stanley Salthy? Know of his work in hierarchy theory? I don't find references. Please give a link, or do a summary, if possible explaining why that would be relevant. Thanks. Bruno He has some papers on his website. The name is Salthe though,not Salthy. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
On 16 Aug 2012, at 21:32, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 2:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one cannot solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm. And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable If it's undecidable that means its either false or true but contains no proof, that is to say it's truth can't be demonstrated in a finite number of steps. And Turing proved that there are a infinite number of undecidable statements that you can not know are undecidable. The halting problem is insolvable. This is an absolute notion, with Church's thesis. Undecidability is relative to the choice of a theory, but once rich enough, they all have undecidable sentences. But it is not the same from one theory to another. Bruno then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could decide on the halting of that algorithm. There might be such a algorithm for a given problem or there might not be, and if there isn't you can't know there isn't so you will keep looking for one forever and you will keep failing forever. If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe it will not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching forever. It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm Yes, but it is also true for *a lot* of algorithms. According to Godel some statements are true but un-provable, if The Goldbach Conjecture is one of these (and if its not there are a infinite number of similar statements that are) it means that it's true so we'll never find a every even integer greater than 4 that is not the sum of primes greater than 2 to prove it wrong, and it means we'll never find a proof to show it's correct. For a few years after Godel made his discovery it was hoped that we could at least identify statements that were either false or true but had no proof. If we could do that then we would know we were wasting our time looking for a proof and we could move on to other things, but in 1935 Turing proved that sometimes even that was impossible. If Goldbach is un-provable we will never know it's un-provable, we know that such statements exist, a infinite number of them, but we don't know what they are. A billion years from now, whatever hyper intelligent entities we will have evolved into will still be deep in thought looking, unsuccessfully, for a proof that Goldbach is correct and still be grinding away at numbers looking, unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to prove it wrong. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
On 16 Aug 2012, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote: On 8/16/2012 12:32 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 2:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one cannot solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm. And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable If it's undecidable that means its either false or true but contains no proof, that is to say it's truth can't be demonstrated in a finite number of steps. And Turing proved that there are a infinite number of undecidable statements that you can not know are undecidable. then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could decide on the halting of that algorithm. There might be such a algorithm for a given problem or there might not be, and if there isn't you can't know there isn't so you will keep looking for one forever and you will keep failing forever. If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe it will not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching forever. It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm Yes, but it is also true for *a lot* of algorithms. According to Godel some statements are true but un-provable, if The Goldbach Conjecture is one of these (and if its not there are a infinite number of similar statements that are) it means that it's true so we'll never find a every even integer greater than 4 that is not the sum of primes greater than 2 to prove it wrong, and it means we'll never find a proof to show it's correct. For a few years after Godel made his discovery it was hoped that we could at least identify statements that were either false or true but had no proof. If we could do that then we would know we were wasting our time looking for a proof and we could move on to other things, but in 1935 Turing proved that sometimes even that was impossible. Are there any explicitly known arithmetic propositions which must be true or false under Peanao's axioms, but which are known to be unprovable? If we construct a Godel sentence, which corresponds to This sentence is unprovable., in Godel encoding it must be an arithmetic proposition. I'm just curious as to what such an arithmetic proposition looks like. Some problem like that have been studied by Paris and Harrington. A famous problem by Ramsey has lead to undecidability in Peano Arithmetic. This is explained notably in the following book: http://www.ams.org/bookstore?fn=20arg1=whatsnewikey=CBMS-45 You can google on Ramsey undecidable Peano, for more on this. Bruno Brent If Goldbach is un-provable we will never know it's un-provable, we know that such statements exist, a infinite number of them, but we don't know what they are. A billion years from now, whatever hyper intelligent entities we will have evolved into will still be deep in thought looking, unsuccessfully, for a proof that Goldbach is correct and still be grinding away at numbers looking, unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to prove it wrong. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On 17 Aug 2012, at 01:43, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 05:06:31PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Aug 2012, at 09:12, Russell Standish wrote: Why would this be any different with random number generators? A coin flips, and I do something based on the outcome. It is not my choice (except insofar as I chose to follow an external random event). My brain makes a random choice based on the chaotic amplification of synaptic noise. This is still my brain and my choice. So you identify yourself with a brain, like Searle. With comp I would say that only a person makes choice, the solid material brain is already a construct from an infinity of random choice, but none can be said to mine, like if I found myself in Moscow instead of Washington after a WM-duplication, I can't say that I have chosen to be in Moscow. Via supervenience, yes. I'm not sure this is particularly Searle's position, though - I disagree with his diagnosis of the Chinese room, and rather follow Dennett in that. ... stuff elided, because we're in agreement ... I don't think free-will (as I defined it of course) has anything to do with determinacy or indeterminacy. The fact that someone else can predict my behavior does not make it less free. Um, yes it does. Why? Why would I be less free to eat blueberries in case everybody can predict that I will eat them. In the case everybody could predict that, then I would be able to predict it, and I would feel less free as a result. OK. I am no sure I agree. It is the point of disagreement. I can predict that I will take coffee each morning, but I do it freely, with minor exception (sometimes I do take tea instead, which gives sense to the fact that it is a constant free morning choice, as I am never entirely sure of what I will take. I don't see opposition between predictable and free-will, except that from the first person view we are confronted with some spectrum. In fact people vindicated free will in particular circumstance often say I am determined to do this or that. Free-will is basically self-determination in front of a choices spectrum. It is not a big deal, and I can easily throw the notion for will, responsibility, etc. I agree on the rest of your post, and so, don't comment either. Bruno In the case where some super intelligent observer could predict my actions, but I could not, and wasn't aware of the super intelligent observer's predictions, then we have an interesting case. I can't say whether I would feel less free in that situation or not. Alas, its a bit hard to perform the experiment. I don't think Libet-like experiments count - a machine capable of reading my decision before I become aware of my decision still does not evacuate the proposition that I freely made the decision. I do understand its a bit freaky, though... You did not reply my question: take the iterated WM-self-duplication. All the resulting people lives the experience of an random oracle. Why would they be more free than someone outside the duplication boxes? How could they use that random oracle for being more free than someone not using them, as they cannot select the outcome? In the setup of your teleporters, the source of randomness comes from outside of the person, so no, that doesn't have anything to with free will. But if you move the source of randomness to inside somehow, then sure it might do. I don't see what inside and outside have anything to do with the fact that a choice can't be helped with a random coin. A choice is driven by many factors like my personality, my culture, my life, my current appetite, and thousand of parameters. Sure, and also by completely random factors. If you only made completely random choices, it wouldn't seem like execising free will at all. One can perform this experiment, although curiously, humans make poor random number generators, statistically speaking. I don't see how my form of free will is non-comp. With comp everything is deterministic from the 3p view, like arithmetical truth is definite. Then from the 1-view, there are mainly two type of indeterminacy. The one due to self-multiplication in UD* (alias arithmetical truth), which, as you agree above can't play a role in free-will. Then there is the self-indeterminacy based on Turing, which is the one playing a role in free-will. But in both case, there is no indeterminacy in the big picture. If free-will necessicate a real 3p-free will, comp would be false, as we cannot Turing emulate it. Definitely not. Free will is not a 3p (aka syntactic level) concept. To say it is would be a confusion of levels, or a category error, putting it bluntly. The QM indeterminacy cannot work here, as it is a self-multiplication like in the first person indeterminacy. By contrast, your UD argument seems to argue for its necessary appearance. Yes. Someone asked why this concept is important. It isn't for me, per se, but
Re: Theory of Existence
On 16 Aug 2012, at 18:42, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/16/2012 7:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: One must assume a mereology (whole-part relational scheme) in any ontological theory or else there is no way to explain or communicate it or about it. That is exactly what I told you. Any universal system has a mereology. But your existence theory has not, as you disallow properties for your neutral existence. So you are making my point here. Numbers have a rich mereology, actually infinitely many. Dear Bruno, Let me ask a question: Is there a name in your repertoire that denotes the totality of all that exists? The usual name is N. What exist primitively in the fixed theory is 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. Nothing else exist ontologically. I denote this as Existence it-self or Dasein. Dasein is fuzzy. It is closer to the 1-view. Does it have any particular properties or is the question of it having (or not having) properties simply inappropriate? How do you believe properties come to be associated with objects, concepts, things, entities, etc. By the passage from N to P(N), done at the epistemological level. [SPK] There is no unique canonical labeling set of entities. There is (at least!) an uncountable infinite equivalence class of them. Labels and valuations cannot be considered as separable from the entities that they act on as valuation. Therefore we cannot think of them as uniquely ontologically primitive. ? Proof? The proof that I can point to is derived from the theorems of quantum mechanics and the experimental evidence supporting them. Objects in the world simply cannot be said to have a particular set of properties associated with them and not the complementary set of properties. We can at best say that they have a superposition of all possible properties. Why would abstract objects be any different? So you do postulate QM. I don't, and can't in the comp theory, as UDA explains in detail. As long as you don't present your theory, it makes not much sense to discuss, given that I work in a theory. [SPK] You do not have an explanation of interactions in COMP [BM] I have only the quantum logic. This does not change the vaility of the reasoning. You reason like that, Darwin theory fail to predict the mass of the boson, and string theory ignore the problem of how doing a tasting pizza, so those theories are flawed. Comp explains already the quanta and the qualia, but not yet time, space, real numbers, nor pizza and boson. Works for next generations. Your example of Darwin's theory is deeply flawed, if only because Darwin's theory does not implicitly or explicitly make claims about the ontological status of entities. ? (animals exist in darwin, plants too, ...). Yours does! Only on the terms used in the theory. That is minimal conditional commitment, and is done in all theories using numbers (that is all physical theories for example). You claim that you don't need to postulate a physical world and yet the presentation of the theory itself requires a physical world, at least to communicate it between our minds. Level confusion. We have already discuss this. The theory does not assume a physical reality, but explain its appearance, and thus the communication of it. A physical world provides the means to communicate between us, without it nothing occurs. This argument needs non-comp, as UDA proved. There are no interactions definable without it and therefore comp's explanations are void and muted by your insistence that matter and physicality has to be primitive to be involved. Not primitive. I guess this is a typo. I prove that that physicality cannot be primitive to be involved. It is involved without being primitive: that is the point. I am only asking you to consider the possibility that both matter and numbers are on the same (non-primitive) level. In comp, matter and physical laws are an emerging pattern in the numbers psychological experience. You contradict your own statement that matter is not primitive. It is harder and harder to follow you. primitiveness of X means that we accept the existence, and some property of X in the starting assumption we make for a theory. Dear Roger and Bruno, I must point out that this definition assumes the prior existence and definiteness of the entities that are defining the theory itself. Same level confusion as above. This makes the theory contingent upon those priors in the sense that the theory should not be assumed to have meaningful content in the absence of those priors. But it has. Or comp and even Church's thesis stop to make any sense. The beliefs of the physicalist are contingent upon and even supervene upon the prior existence and definiteness of properties of the entities capable of being labeled as physicalist (or some alternative). This is true for all
Re: Why AI is impossible
On 16 Aug 2012, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote: On 8/16/2012 12:32 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 2:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one cannot solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm. And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable If it's undecidable that means its either false or true but contains no proof, that is to say it's truth can't be demonstrated in a finite number of steps. And Turing proved that there are a infinite number of undecidable statements that you can not know are undecidable. then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could decide on the halting of that algorithm. There might be such a algorithm for a given problem or there might not be, and if there isn't you can't know there isn't so you will keep looking for one forever and you will keep failing forever. If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe it will not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching forever. It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm Yes, but it is also true for *a lot* of algorithms. According to Godel some statements are true but un-provable, if The Goldbach Conjecture is one of these (and if its not there are a infinite number of similar statements that are) it means that it's true so we'll never find a every even integer greater than 4 that is not the sum of primes greater than 2 to prove it wrong, and it means we'll never find a proof to show it's correct. For a few years after Godel made his discovery it was hoped that we could at least identify statements that were either false or true but had no proof. If we could do that then we would know we were wasting our time looking for a proof and we could move on to other things, but in 1935 Turing proved that sometimes even that was impossible. Are there any explicitly known arithmetic propositions which must be true or false under Peanao's axioms, but which are known to be unprovable? If we construct a Godel sentence, which corresponds to This sentence is unprovable., in Godel encoding it must be an arithmetic proposition. I'm just curious as to what such an arithmetic proposition looks like. I forgot to mentioned also the famous Goodstein sequences: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodstein_theorem Goodstein sequences are sequences of numbers which always converge to zero, but PA cannot prove this, although it can be proved in second order arithmetic. You can google also on hercule hydra undecidable to find a game, which has a winning strategy, but again this is not provable in PA. But machine theologians are not so much interested in those extensional undecidable sentences (in PA), as they embrace the intensional interpretation of the undecidable sentence, like CON(t), (t). Bruno Brent If Goldbach is un-provable we will never know it's un-provable, we know that such statements exist, a infinite number of them, but we don't know what they are. A billion years from now, whatever hyper intelligent entities we will have evolved into will still be deep in thought looking, unsuccessfully, for a proof that Goldbach is correct and still be grinding away at numbers looking, unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to prove it wrong. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Digital dealing with subjective experience
- Have received the following content - Sender: Roger Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-17, 10:03:03 Subject: Re: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model Hi Craig Weinberg Bruno Marchal's Comment below on the possibility of digitally dealing with subjective experience has put a hold on my previous objections (such as you discuss at the bottom). BRUNO'S COMMENT __ From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 04:17:20 Subject: Re: Imprisoned by language (code) SNIP No problem for comp here. We have discovered that machine, when looking inward tend to perceive, or experience many truth which are beyond words. There is a logic (S4Grz) which formalize at the meta-level that non-formalizable (at the ontological level) informal process of though. I wrote (and published) recently a paper on this, (the mystical machine, in french) but it is what I try to explain here since a long time. Machines have already a non formalizable (by themselves) intuition. Indeed self-referentally correct machine have a rich, neoplatonist-like, theology. On my url front page, you can download my paper on an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, made possible (and necessary in some sense) by computer science. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 21:13:06 Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model On Saturday, August 11, 2012 3:01:41 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: Roger, You say computers are quantitative instruments which cannot have a self or feelings, but might you be attributing things at the wrong level? For example, a computer can simulate some particle interactions, a sufficiently big computer could simulate the behavior of any arbitrarily large amount of matter. The matter in the simulation could be arranged in the form of a human being sitting in a room. Does that mean that if I carefully scooped some salt or iron filings into a cymatic pattern, that we should have an expectation of a sound being produced automatically? Do you think this simulated human made of simulated matter, all run within the computer not have a self, feelings, and intuition? The simulated human won't even have an 'it'-ness. The simulation only exists for us because it is designed specifically to exploit our expectations. There is no simulation, just millions of little salt scoopers. After all, we are made up of material which lacks feelings, nonetheless, we have feelings. That's like saying that a photograph is made up of pixels which lack image. Since the nature of consciousness is privacy, we are not the best judge of non-human consciousness. There is no reason to trust our naive realism in assuming that non-humans lack proto-feelings. Complex behavior is not confined to metazoans. Both amoebae and ciliates show purposive coordinated behaviour, as do individual human cells, such as macrophages. The multi-nucleate slime mould Physarum polycephalum can solve shortest path mazes and demonstrate a memory of a rhythmic series of stimuli, apparently using a biological clock to predict the next pulse (Nakagaki et. al. 2000, Ball 2008). - http://www.dhushara.com/cosfcos/cosfcos2.html Where do you believe these feelings originate? Feelings may not originate, but like the colors of the spectrum are accessed privately but have no public origination. As long as we assume that experience is something which occurs as the product of a mechanism, then we are limited to making sense of the universe as a meaningless mechanism of objects. If we think of time and space as the experiential cancellations, I think we have a better chance of understanding how it all fits together. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/rfpVcQ4KDaEJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Earthquakes
Hi Jason Resch Right. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 19:37:15 Subject: Re: Earthquakes On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:07 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 8/14/2012 10:45 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King ? Leibniz' best possible world is a conjecture based on L's two worlds of logic: ? 1) There is logic that is either always true or false, called the logic of reason or necessity. One could call this theory ? 2) The logic of contingency, also called the logic of fact,?xperimental result,? ???r praxis, which can be true or false -- depending on the perfection? of the entity ??or the time of occurrence.?actuality ? Most people who acccuse God of injustice or unfairness by a supposedly loving God confuse theory with actuality. Earthquakes do occur because the world has imperfections or? cracks ior the cointinental plaes don't fit perfectly together. ? And any fact must be that way for a reason, the reason also may be contingent, etc. up the line. ? Everything that is possible demands to exist. -- Leibniz If everything possible exists (in Plato's heaven / the omniscient mind of God) then so do all universes, all possible histories, all possible observations and experiences, all points of view, all traces of the execution of all programs, etc. ?hus, if God is omniscient, he can't help the fact that bad things happen. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Leibniz on the Good, the Bad and the Ugly
Hi Jason Resch Yes, bad things can happen in this contingent world, just because it's contingent. And contingency breeds contingency. That's a good reason for the establishment beforehand of Perfect Harmony. Contingency and Perfect harmony must go together. But if it's any reason for you not to hate God if bad things happen to you, Leibniz makes the point that what is good for the whole does not guarantee that it would be good for each part. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 19:37:15 Subject: Re: Earthquakes On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:07 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 8/14/2012 10:45 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King ? Leibniz' best possible world is a conjecture based on L's two worlds of logic: ? 1) There is logic that is either always true or false, called the logic of reason or necessity. One could call this theory ? 2) The logic of contingency, also called the logic of fact,?xperimental result,? ???r praxis, which can be true or false -- depending on the perfection? of the entity ??or the time of occurrence.?actuality ? Most people who acccuse God of injustice or unfairness by a supposedly loving God confuse theory with actuality. Earthquakes do occur because the world has imperfections or? cracks ior the cointinental plaes don't fit perfectly together. ? And any fact must be that way for a reason, the reason also may be contingent, etc. up the line. ? Everything that is possible demands to exist. -- Leibniz If everything possible exists (in Plato's heaven / the omniscient mind of God) then so do all universes, all possible histories, all possible observations and experiences, all points of view, all traces of the execution of all programs, etc. ?hus, if God is omniscient, he can't help the fact that bad things happen. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense
Hi Craig,
On 15 Aug 2012, at 11:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:
in case the special characters don't come out...
I was thinking about your primitive of arithmetic truth (numbers, 0,
+, and *, right?) and then your concept of ‘the dreams of
numbers’, interviewing Lobian Machines, etc and came up with this.
One single irreducible digit ॐ (Om) which represents a self-
dividing continuum of infinite perpendicular dialectics between
eidetic dream states (in which dream~numbers escape their numerical
identities as immersive qualitative experiences) and entopic non-
dream states (in which number~dreams escape their dream nature as
literal algebra-geometries).
I use such term more literally. I am not sure I can understand this,
even if there is some genuine analogy.
The dreaming number are usually very big concrete number. They dream
by encoding computational state of person, relatively to some
universal number, which are encoding universal machine relatively to
some other one, and the initial one can be chosen arbitrary. Those are
not symbolic number, but real encoding number, a bit like the genome
if you want.
This continuum f (ॐ(Om)), runs from infinitely solipsistic/private
first person subjectivity (calling that Aleph ℵ)to infinitely
discrete/public third person mechanism (calling that Omega Ω), so
that at ℵ,any given dream is experienced as 99.99…9% dream and
0.00…1% number and at Ω (Omega), any given machine or number is
presented as 99.99…9% number and 0.00…1% dream.
?
The halfway point between the ℵ (Aleph) and Ω (Omega) axis is the
perpendicular axis f (-ॐ(Om)) which is the high and low
correspondence between the literal dream and figurative number (or
figurative dream and literal number depending on whether you are
using the dream-facing epistemology or the number-facing
epistemology). This axis runs from tight equivalence (“=”
equality) to broadly elliptical potential set membership (“…”
ellipsis)
So it looks something like this:
f(ॐ) ⊇ {ℵ “…” ⊥ “=” Ω}
function (Om) is superset or equal to the continuum ranging from
Aleph to ellipsis perpendicular/orthogonal to the inverse range from
equality to Omega).
To go further, it could be said that at Ω(Omega), ॐ (Om) expresses
as 10|O (one, zero, line segment, circle referring to the
quantitative algebraic and geometric perpendicular primitives) while
at ℵ (Aleph), ॐ (Om) expresses as
יהוה (tetragrammaton or yod, hay, vov, hay, or in perhaps more
familiar metaphor, ♣♠♥♦(clubs, spades, hearts, diamonds)
where:
♣ clubs (wands) =Fire, spiritual, tactile
♠ spades (swords) = Air, mental, auditory
♥ hearts (cups) =Water, emotional, visual
♦ diamonds (pentacles/coins) = Earth, physical, olfactory-gustatory
Note that tactile and auditory modalities tune us into ourselves and
each others sensemaking (selves and minds), while the visual and
olfactory/gustatory sense modalities are about objectifying realism
of the world (egos or objectified selves/self-images and bodies). It
should be obvious that ♣ clubs (wands) and ♠ spades (swords) are
stereotypically masculine and abstracting forces, while ♥ hearts
(cups) and ♦ diamonds (pentacles/coins) are stereotypically
feminine objectified fields.
Sorry for the mumbo jumbo, but it is the only way to be non-
reductive when approaching the qualitative side.
I don't think so. Aristotle invented modal logic to treat in the
quantitative way non reductive qualitative notion.
We can’t pretend to talk about the eidetic, dream like
perpendicular of number logic while using the purely empirical terms
of arithmetic reduction. We need symbols that can only refer to
named qualities rather than enumerated quantities.
This is exactly what happen when you define the first person by the
knower. Bp p, or if you prefer
provable(p) and true(p),
gives a modality which can provably be shown qualitative, and non
formalizable in arithmetic. It leads to a logic (know as S4Grz) which
describes something which is absolutely impossible to reduce to any
number relations or even anything third person describable notion,
even infinite one.
You might think I just described it, by Bp p, or by provable(p) and
true(p), but this is not the case, as I use some of your intuition
about truth, which cannot be arithmetized by itself, by a famous
result of Gödel and Tarski (independently).
It happens that we do have a good intuition of many truth, and machine
can indeed describe better and better approximations of the truth
concept, but the limit of it, used here, cannot be. So by using both
the comp hypothesis, and by studying simple (Löbian) machine (simpler
than us) we can develop a formal (quantitative in some sense, at some
level, from some point of view) theory concerning the non formal, and
even non-formalizable-at-all-by-the-machine, qualities that machine
can still refer about. And this can be used to
Re: Why AI is impossible
On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 4:04 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: But there's also a different meaning of undecidable: a statement that can be added as an axiom or it's negation can be added as an axiom Axioms are important, you've got to be very careful with them! If you go around adding axioms at the drop of a hat it's a waste of time to prove anything because even if you are successful all you'll know is that there is a proof in a crappy logical system, you still will have no idea if it's true or not. For example, suppose you added the Goldbach Conjecture as a axiom and then a computer found a even integer greater than 4 that is not the sum of primes greater than 2, it would be a disaster, everything you've proved under that system would be nonsense. Axioms are supposed to be simple and self evidently true and Goldbach is not. e.g. the continuum hypothesis within ZFC. In 1940 Kurt Godel himself proved that if you add the continuum hypothesis to standard Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory you will get no contradictions. Then in 1962 Paul Cohen proved that if you add the NEGATION of the Continuum Hypothesis to standard set theory you won't get contradictions either. Together Godel and Cohen proved that the ability to come up with a proof of the Continuum Hypothesis depends on the version of set theory used. We were lucky with the Continuum Hypothesis, we know it's unprovable under Zermelo-Fraenkel so nobody spins their wheels trying to prove or disprove it, but not all unprovable statements are like that, Turing tells us that there are a infinite number of propositions that are unprovable that we can never know are unprovable. Are there any explicitly known arithmetic propositions which must be true or false under Peanao's axioms, but which are known to be unprovable? I think you mean propositions about numbers that are true but cannot be shown to be true with Peano, if they are true or false under Peanao (and not true AND false!) then they are not unprovable. We know from Godel there must be a infinite number of such statements and we know from Turing there is no surefire way of detecting them all, and that's what makes them so dangerous, they are a endless time sink. And in fact although they are infinite in number as far as I know nobody has been able to point to a single one. So maybe trying to prove or disprove Goldbach is utterly pointless and maybe it is not, there is no way to know. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the Holy Grail
On 16 Aug 2012, at 18:45, Roger wrote: Wow ! If true this would be the Holy Grail I've sought, Well, you make me hoping it is true, then. and the irony is that I could not understand what to do with it. It is the major weakness. I just open a little bit a door in a new direction (or in a very old one, the platonist one), and show how to proceed from there, by studying a lot of math, which few people in the philosophy of mind field are ready to study, even the computationalists, and despite the obvious link between comp and computer science. But you can also contemplate, and since recently, there are some feature you might even experiment, or better experience, if you are lucky enough to be in a free country, where you can test salvia divinorum. The Salvia experience seems to be able to sum up some of the most startling aspect of comp in less than 2 minutes. (Or you can move to do that, salvia is only illegal in less than 20 states and countries). So the choice is perhaps between 40 years of math, or two minutes in the 'salvia space'. Note that some aspects of the salvia experience challenge, also, the comp hypothesis, but this is what makes it particularly interesting. Of course it is only an hallucination, but the experience can challenge the very meaning of what is an hallucination, and what is real. Unfortunately we live in a period where such experience are not well seen, but this is coherent with the way human so often disrespect themselves. Salvia is non toxic and non addictive (even anti-addictive: it is a cure to quit drugs), but the experience can be *quite* overwhelming if not quite shocking, especially for people who believe in total self-control, or in a too much literal idea of what is real. Provocatively, some describes salvia as a cure to atheism! If you try salvia, start from leaves and increment only with concentrated extracts slowly, with a sober sitter to minimize risk. The first thing most forget when trying salvia, is that they have taken salvia, and some people have some sleep-walking behavior. You can search salvia on youtube, but don't do like the young people there, who use salvia only to make a funny video, and give strong extracts to first timer, and eventually disgust them of it, if not of all psychedelic plants. For anyone interested in consciousness and spirituality, that plant is a godsend. It can be frustrating, as it gives a *lot* of new data, which are hard to swallow. To be sure, few people like it, but then most people dislike being challenged on their deepest conception of reality. To be clear, I have published all my work before trying salvia. You can also train yourself in lucidity during sleep, notably the REM sleep. This is what I have done for many years. This can provide many informations too. Consciousness is private and individual, at first sight, and we are our own guinea pig. Take care, Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 04:17:20 Subject: Re: Imprisoned by language (code) Hi Roger, On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:26, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Well, I feel like Daniel must have felt when before the Giant. And I can't even find a rock to sling. Nevertheless, as I see it, computers are imprisoned by language (computer code). Like our social selves. But like Kierkegaard, I believe that ultimate truth is subjective (can, like meaning, only be experienced). Life cannot truly be expressed or experienced in code. No problem for comp here. We have discovered that machine, when looking inward tend to perceive, or experience many truth which are beyond words. There is a logic (S4Grz) which formalize at the meta- level that non-formalizable (at the ontological level) informal process of though. I wrote (and published) recently a paper on this, (the mystical machine, in french) but it is what I try to explain here since a long time. Machines have already a non formalizable (by themselves) intuition. Indeed self-referentally correct machine have a rich, neoplatonist-like, theology. On my url front page, you can download my paper on an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, made possible (and necessary in some sense) by computer science. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:13:01 Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model On 11 Aug 2012, at 12:47, Roger wrote: Hi Alberto G. Corona Agreed. Computers are quantitative instruments and so cannot have a self or feelings, which are qualitative. And intution is non-computable IMHO. Computer have a notion of self. I can explain someday (I
Turing vs Godel
Hi Jason Resch Wouldn't Godel incompleteness be the fatal flaw in at least some Turing machines ? Meaning, they cannot have a full set of instructions or data. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 11:11:45 Subject: Re: Is matter real ? Hi Roger, When I used the term universal system, I meant it in the sense of Turing universality ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_universality ). It is universal in the same sense of the word as a universal remote. A Turing universal system is one that can be used to define/emulate any finite process. In Bruno's proof, if one believes in digital mechanism, he says that the theory of everything need only be something that provides Turing universality. My question to him was whether there might be different probabilities of expectation based on which Turing universal system is assumed at the start. I have some comments interleaved below: On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 9:08 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Personally I believe that the physical universe out there is physical, What makes something real? Do, you believe, for instance that there could be other physical universes out there, which we may never be able to access, but nonetheless, seem real to any life forms which might develop intelligence and consciousness in those universes? What, in your theory, delineates possibility from actuality? in the traditional sense of the word, and can be characterized for example by physical experiment. So science is fine, as far as it goes. But what we experience of the physical universe is a psychological or mental construction, so as far as our minds are concerned, it is a phenomenon. From there on, things get a little tricky. There is a related, hotly contested point of debate which seems to some (but not me) to be a fundamental flaw in Leibniz' metaphysics. Leibniz was brilliant, but we have learned a great deal since his time. We should not expect all of his theories to be correct. Leibniz discarded the atomic view of matter and let it stand that all matter can be divided infinitety many times, so there was nothing finally that one could point to, thus something one could call real. I am told that the 12 fundamental physical particles cannot be divided so that the divisibility argument above does not work. I would agree, but just change my definition of real, not as some thing one could point to, but the possibility of finding something there to point to. Heisenber's Uncertainty Theorem rules that out, so in the end I agree with Leibniz's conclusion -- that matter is not real. Bruno might say it is real, but not fundamental. It can be explained by something else. Also, are you familiar with the many-worlds, or many-minds interpretation of quantum mechanics? If not, I think this video provides a great introduction: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc The basis of Leibniz's metaphysics is that, instead, only the monads are real, since they refer to unitary substances and that these substances, taken logically, have no parts. What do you think about the idea that information is Leibniz's monad? Perhaps everything from consciousness to physical particles can be explained as an informational phenomena. Information cannot be explained in terms of anything else, and in this sense it has no parts. John Archibald Wheeler: It from bit. Otherwise put, every it — every particle, every field of force, even the space-time continuum itself — derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely — even if in some contexts indirectly — from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary choices, bits. It from bit symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom — a very deep bottom, in most instances — an immaterial source and explanation; that which we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes — no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and that this is a participatory universe. Jason Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-13, 11:04:33 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: William, On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote: The physical universe is purely subjective. That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the means to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any first order logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws of physics and the laws
The difference betrween abstract and concrete
Hi Jason Resch One -- especially a computer -- cannot experience abstractions. One (ie only living entities) can only experience the concrete. ab穝tract adjective 1. thought of apart from concrete realities, specific objects, or actual instances: an abstract idea. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 11:26:21 Subject: Re: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 9:29 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi John Clark ? ? 1) I can experiencre redness (a qualitative property) while computers cannot, all they can know are 0s and 1s. This statement suggests to me that you are not familiar with the levels of abstraction that are common in computer programming. ?our statement is equivalent to saying: The human brain can't tell good wine from bad, it is made of atoms, and all atoms are aware of are inter-atomic forces. ?t ignores the cell structures, the?nter-neuronal?onnections, the large scale structures of the brain. ?ll the neurons know are 1's and 0's (are my neighbors firing or not?) yet the very complex large scale structures of neurons can be aware of much more intricate patterns. ?he same is true of computer programs. ? computer program might be able to tell if a picture is of a man or woman, this certainly requires more than just knowing 1's and 0's. While at its most fundamental level, a computer program manipulates and compares 1's and 0's, you can build any system on top of this. ?onsider that redness does not course its way down your optic nerve. ?ll your brain?eceives?s a digital flickering of electrical pulses from nerve cells, not unlike a Morse code sent down a telegraph wire. ?t some level of description, the input of redness to your brain is nothing but 0's and 1's. Google's self driving cars know to stop at a red light and go on green. ?an you be so certain that these cars cannot see some kind of difference between red and green? ?ven though the experience might be quite different from our experience of it, the car (if it had reflection and intelligence) might similarly struggle to explain how red is different from green, or how it can know they are fundamentally different. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Some difficulties with comp
Hi Jason Resch Ultimately you might be able to do something useful emulating the mind with a computer, apparently Bruno has, but to me it would be a miracle or at least very tricky. But what do I k now ? Tthey said that human flight was impossible, so keep at it. But consider these possdible sources of error in your train of evidence sotospeak: 1) In reality you have things happening, but the brain cannot experience such things directly. 2) All that the brain can experience are what its senses tell it subjectively (phenomenologically). 3) One then tries (within the limits of your abilities) to express this subjective experience objectively, abstractly, in words. 4) The meanings of these words in turn are socially constructed through use and through childhood learning. Words are thus pragmatic, cultural artifacts. 5) Mistakenly you treat these words as concrete realities and 6) Use a computer program to do what you want. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-13, 21:16:54 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible William, I hope these might help: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/MPI_15-MAI-91.pdf http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm Jason On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:05 PM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com wrote: Please, a few foundational references on COMP that I might follow the discussion on Google EverythingList. ? wrb -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Turing vs Godel
On Aug 17, 2012, at 10:23 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Wouldn't Godel incompleteness be the fatal flaw in at least some Turing machines ? A flaw in what sense? Meaning, they cannot have a full set of instructions or data. It doesn't matter how many instructions a particular architecture has. Turing machines can emulate any other Turing machine, even those that have different instruction sets. I am not sure what data you are referring to above. Jason Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 11:11:45 Subject: Re: Is matter real ? Hi Roger, When I used the term universal system, I meant it in the sense of Turing universality ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_universali ty ). It is universal in the same sense of the word as a universal remote. A Turing universal system is one that can be used to define/emulate any finite process. In Bruno's proof, if one bel ieves in digital mechanism, he says that the theory of everything ne ed only be something that provides Turing universality. My question to him was whether there might be different probabilities of expect ation based on which Turing universal system is assumed at the start. I have some comments interleaved below: On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 9:08 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Jason Resch Personally I believe that the physical universe out there is physical, What makes something real? Do, you believe, for instance that there could be other physical universes out there, which we may never be able to access, but nonetheless, seem real to any life forms which m ight develop intelligence and consciousness in those universes? Wha t, in your theory, delineates possibility from actuality? in the traditional sense of the word, and can be characterized for example by physical experiment. So science is fine, as far as it go es. But what we experience of the physical universe is a psychological or mental construction, so as far as our minds are concerned, it is a phenomenon. From there on, things get a little tricky. There is a related, hotly contested point of debate which seems to some (but not me) to be a fundamental flaw in Leibniz' metaphysics. Leibniz was brilliant, but we have learned a great deal since his time. We should not expect all of his theories to be correct. Leibniz discarded the atomic view of matter and let it stand that all matter can be divided infinitety many times, so there was nothing finally that one could point to, thus something one could call real. I am told that the 12 fundamental physical particles cannot be divided so that the divisibility argument above does not work. I would agree, but j ust change my definition of real, not as some thing one could point to, but the possibility of finding something there to point to. Heisenb er's Uncertainty Theorem rules that out, so in the end I agree with Leibniz's conclusion -- that matter is not real. Bruno might say it is real, but not fundamental. It can be explaine d by something else. Also, are you familiar with the many-worlds, or many-minds interpretation of quantum mechanics? If not, I think this video provides a great introduction: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEq fc The basis of Leibniz's metaphysics is that, instead, only the monad s are real, since they refer to unitary substances and that these substances, taken logically, have no parts. What do you think about the idea that information is Leibniz's monad? Perhaps everything from consciousness to physical particles can be explained as an informational phenomena. Information cannot be explained in terms of anything else, and in this sense it has no parts. John Archibald Wheeler: It from bit. Otherwise put, every it — every particle, every field of force, even the space-time continuu m itself — derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely — even if in some contexts indirectly — from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary choices, b its. It from bit symbolizes the idea that every item of the physic al world has at bottom — a very deep bottom, in most instances — an immaterial source and explanation; that which we call reality a rises in the last analysis from the posing of yes — no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that al l things physical are information-theoretic in origin and that this is a participatory universe. Jason Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-13, 11:04:33 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno
Re: The I Ching, a cominatorically complete hyperlinked semantic field (mind).
Thanks Roger,
Your work on this looks very interesting. I think I get the gist of it but
I will have to take a closer look.
I wonder how would fortune telling not include weather reports, actuarial
tables, financial forecasts, etc? Historically there doesn't seem to be any
meaningful correlation between fortune telling and any particular danger to
people as a whole. Certainly no more danger than drinking wine or eating
ice cream.
Craig
On Friday, August 17, 2012 9:49:24 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
I was into the esoteric a decade ago, including the Tarot, and especially
the Yi Ching.
whose ability to transform and embed and interlink metaphors is very
powerful. Being combinatorically
constructed, it is a complete, homogeneous and interlinked (hyperlinked)
semantic field (to a certain
resolution). You can do things with it not even dreamed of in western
semantics and language processing.
Leibniz almost discovered these properties. I developed a theory of story
ujsing it (in the form of the Feng Shui).
See
http://tap3x.net/EMBTI/j8clough.html
Similarly I studied the time based version of the Yi Jing called the Tai
Xuan Jing (T'ai Hsuan Ching)
which is ternary in form and especially mysterious and beautiful.
Then I went back tio the Lutheran Church and being conservative, and being
advised and believing that such esoteric topics
(unfortunately used in fortune telling, forbidden by the Bible) are not a
healthy pursuit, I gave up all of that stuff.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net javascript:
8/17/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
*From:* Craig Weinberg javascript:
*Receiver:* everything-list javascript:
*Time:* 2012-08-15, 05:05:44
*Subject:* Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense
Hi Bruno,
I was thinking about your primitive of arithmetic truth (numbers, 0, +,
and *, right?) and then your concept of 'the dreams of numbers',
interviewing Lobian Machines, etc and came up with this.
One single irreducible digit 锟斤拷 which represents a self-dividing
continuum of infinite perpendicular dialectics between eidetic dream states
(in which dream~numbers escape their numerical identities as immersive
qualitative experiences) and entopic non-dream states (in which
number~dreams escape their dream nature as literal algebra-geometries).
This continuum f(锟斤拷), runs from infinitely solipsistic/private first
person subjectivity (calling that Aleph *锟斤拷*)* *to infinitely
discrete/public third person mechanism (calling that Omega *锟斤拷*), so
that at *锟斤拷*,any given dream is experienced as 99.99...9% dream and
0.00...1% number and at *锟斤拷*, any given machine or number is presented
as 99.99...9% number and 0.00...1% dream.
The halfway point between the *锟斤拷 *and* **锟斤拷* axis is the perpendicular
axis f(-锟斤拷) which is the high and low correspondence between the literal
dream and figurative number (or figurative dream and literal number
depending on whether you are using the dream-facing epistemology or the
number-facing epistemology). This axis runs from tight equivalence (=) to
broadly elliptical potential set membership (...)
So it looks something like this:
f(锟斤拷) 锟斤拷 *{锟斤拷** ...** 锟斤拷** =** 锟斤拷**}*
To go further, it could be said that at *锟斤拷*(Omega), 锟斤拷 (Om) expresses
as *10|O* (one, zero, line segment, circle referring to the quantitative
algebraic and geometric perpendicular primitives) while at *锟斤拷* (Aleph),
锟斤拷(Om) expresses as
锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷锟斤拷 (tetragrammaton or yod, hay, vov, hay, or in perhaps more
familiar metaphor, 锟斤拷**锟斤拷锟斤拷**锟斤拷(clubs, spades, hearts, diamonds)
where:
锟斤拷 clubs (wands) =Fire, spiritual, tactile
锟斤拷 spades (swords) = Air, mental, auditory
锟斤拷 hearts (cups) =Water, emotional, visual
锟斤拷 diamonds (pentacles/coins) = Earth, physical, olfactory-gustatory
Note that tactile and auditory modalities tune us into ourselves and each
others sensemaking (selves and minds), while the visual and
olfactory/gustatory sense modalities are about objectifying realism of the
world (egos or objectified selves/self-images and bodies). It should be
obvious that 锟斤拷 clubs (wands) and 锟斤拷 spades (swords) are stereotypically
masculine and abstracting forces, while 锟斤拷 hearts (cups) and 锟斤拷 diamonds
(pentacles/coins) are stereotypically feminine objectified fields.
Sorry for the mumbo jumbo, but it is the only way to be non-reductive when
approaching the qualitative side. We can't pretend to talk about the
eidetic, dream like perpendicular of number logic while using the purely
empirical terms of arithmetic reduction. We need symbols that can only
refer to named qualities rather than enumerated quantities.
Let the ignoring and insulting begin!
Craig
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Peirce's categories and the subjective-- objective transformation
Hi William R. Buckley Yes. Peirce's categories could also be used as a framework for a theory of subjectivity/objectivity. I is subjective (observing) II is subjective to objective (recognizing) II is objective (expressing) Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: William R. Buckley Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 11:04:07 Subject: RE: Peirce on subjectivity Roger and Bruno: Peirce抯 philosophy is the strong basis for semiotic theory. wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 5:00 AM To: everything-list Subject: Peirce on subjectivity Hi Bruno Marchal I'm way out of touch here. What is comp ? I don't think you can have a symbolic theory of subjectivity, for theories are contructed in symbols, and subjectivity is awareness of the symbols and hopefully what they mean. CS Peirce differentiates the triadic connections between symbol and object and awareness in his theory of categories: FIRSTNESS (perceiving an object privately) -- raw experience of an apple SECONDNESS (comparing inner and outer worlds) - looking up the proper word symbol for the image in your memory [Comparing is the basis of thinking.] THIRDNESS: (doing or expressing publicly in words) - saying That's an apple. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-13, 11:53:51 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi Jason, On 13 Aug 2012, at 17:04, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: William, On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote: The physical universe is purely subjective. That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the means to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any first order logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws of physics and the laws of mind are not dependent of the choice of the initial universal system. Bruno, Does the universal system change the measure of different programs and observers, or do programs that implement programs (such as the UDA) end up making the initial choice of system of no consequence? The choice of the initial universal system does not matter. Of course it does matter epistemologically. If you choose a quantum computing system as initial system, the derivation of the physical laws will be confusing, and you will have an hard time to convince people that you have derived the quantum from comp, as you will have seemed to introduce it at the start. So it is better to start with the less looking physical initial system, and it is preferable to start from one very well know, like number + addition and multiplication. So, let us take it to fix the thing. The theory of everything is then given by the minimal number of axioms we need to recover Turing universality. Amazingly enough the two following axioms are already enough, where the variable are quantified universally. I assume also some equality rules, but not logic! x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x * 0 = 0 x*s(y) = (x *y) + x This define already a realm in which all universal number exists, and all their behavior is accessible from that simple theory: it is sigma_1 complete, that is the arithmetical version of Turing-complete. Note that such a theory is very weak, it has no negation, and cannot prove that 0 ? 1, for example. Of course, it is consistent and can't prove that 0 = 1 either. yet it emulates a UD through the fact that all the numbers representing proofs can be proved to exist in that theory. Now, in that realm, due to the first person indeterminacy, you are multiplied into infinity. More precisely, your actual relative computational state appears to be proved to exist relatively to basically all universal numbers (and some non universal numbers too), and this infinitely often. So when you decide to do an experience of physics, dropping an apple, for example, the first person indeterminacy dictates that what you will feel to be experienced is given by a statistic on all computations (provably existing in the theory above) defined with respect to all universal numbers. So if comp is correct, and if some physical law is correct (like 'dropped apples fall'), it can only mean that the vast majority of computation going in your actual comp state compute a state of affair where you see the apple falling. If you want, the reason why apple fall is that it happens in the majority of your computational extensions, and this has to be verified in the space of all computations. Everett confirms this very weird self-multiplication (weird with respect to the idea that we are unique
Re: Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense
On Friday, August 17, 2012 10:48:04 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Craig,
On 15 Aug 2012, at 11:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:
in case the special characters don't come out...
I was thinking about your primitive of arithmetic truth (numbers, 0,
+, and *, right?) and then your concept of ‘the dreams of
numbers’, interviewing Lobian Machines, etc and came up with this.
One single irreducible digit ॐ (Om) which represents a self-
dividing continuum of infinite perpendicular dialectics between
eidetic dream states (in which dream~numbers escape their numerical
identities as immersive qualitative experiences) and entopic non-
dream states (in which number~dreams escape their dream nature as
literal algebra-geometries).
I use such term more literally. I am not sure I can understand this,
even if there is some genuine analogy.
Think of it like π, except that instead of circumference and diameter,
there is eidetic-figurative and entopic-literal presentation modalities.
The dreaming number are usually very big concrete number. They dream
by encoding computational state of person, relatively to some
universal number, which are encoding universal machine relatively to
some other one, and the initial one can be chosen arbitrary. Those are
not symbolic number, but real encoding number, a bit like the genome
if you want.
Why would that result in a dream? It seems shrouded in obfuscating
self-reference. Why would anything that has been encoded ever need to be
decoded if the machine can fluently process the encoded form? Why would it
need any other form - especially if it is all made of numbers?
What I am saying is that if you are going to invoke a possibility of
dreams, that has to be grounded in the terms that you are laying out as
primitive. Why would dreams leap out of mechanical relations? Even if there
was some purpose for it, how could that actually take place - what are the
dreamings made of?
My view is that it may be the case that everything that is not matter
across space is experience through time - by definition, ontologically.
There is no other form or content possible in the cosmos. Numbers are
experiences as they must be inferred by computational agents and cannot
exist independently of them. What my formulas do is to propose a precise
relation between dream-time (including logical algebras) and matter-space
(including topological geometries). To do this we need to invoke a
continuity between them which is a perpendicular axis which runs from the
literal (tight equivalence; induction is accomplished through linear
arithmetic logic) to the figurative/metaphorical (loose thematic
association; induction is accomplished through linear logic *as well as
*elliptical
cross-context leaps).
This continuum f (ॐ(Om)), runs from infinitely solipsistic/private
first person subjectivity (calling that Aleph ℵ)to infinitely
discrete/public third person mechanism (calling that Omega Ω), so
that at ℵ,any given dream is experienced as 99.99…9% dream and
0.00…1% number and at Ω (Omega), any given machine or number is
presented as 99.99…9% number and 0.00…1% dream.
?
I'm mapping out this literal to figurative axis, as it modifies the axis of
subject to object presentations. The more an experience extends
figuratively/metaphorically, the less it extends literally/mechanically.
The halfway point between the ℵ (Aleph) and Ω (Omega) axis is the
perpendicular axis f (-ॐ(Om)) which is the high and low
correspondence between the literal dream and figurative number (or
figurative dream and literal number depending on whether you are
using the dream-facing epistemology or the number-facing
epistemology). This axis runs from tight equivalence (“=”
equality) to broadly elliptical potential set membership (“…”
ellipsis)
So it looks something like this:
f(ॐ) ⊇ {ℵ “…” ⊥ “=” Ω}
function (Om) is superset or equal to the continuum ranging from
Aleph to ellipsis perpendicular/orthogonal to the inverse range from
equality to Omega).
To go further, it could be said that at Ω(Omega), ॐ (Om) expresses
as 10|O (one, zero, line segment, circle referring to the
quantitative algebraic and geometric perpendicular primitives) while
at ℵ (Aleph), ॐ (Om) expresses as
יהוה (tetragrammaton or yod, hay, vov, hay, or in perhaps more
familiar metaphor, ♣♠♥♦(clubs, spades, hearts, diamonds)
where:
♣ clubs (wands) =Fire, spiritual, tactile
♠ spades (swords) = Air, mental, auditory
♥ hearts (cups) =Water, emotional, visual
♦ diamonds (pentacles/coins) = Earth, physical, olfactory-gustatory
Note that tactile and auditory modalities tune us into ourselves and
each others sensemaking (selves and minds), while the visual and
olfactory/gustatory sense modalities are about
Wonder
Hi meekerdb A computer can not experience the wonder produced by the night sky, for example. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 14:08:42 Subject: Re: On the necessity of monads for perception On 8/14/2012 10:22 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Jason Resch ? No, the artificial man does not have a conscious self (subjectivity)? to experience (to feel) the world. And you know this how? You could show a movie of happenings in his mind, but there'd be nobody there to watch it. I don't think you can show a movie in a mind.? But you could emulate a mind watching a movie. ? Only a monad can do that. And a monad is?? a place holder word for 'we don't know'? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
concrete experiences vs abstract descriptions of experiences
Hi William R. Buckley But experience is concrete, but a computer can only deal in abstractions, which at best are descriptions of experience. It like the difference between having sex and just talking about it. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: William R. Buckley Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 14:16:47 Subject: RE: Why AI is impossible John: Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus universality, the Turing machine can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of its construction. wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Clark Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 9:39 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:09 PM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com wrote: Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient[...] Turing's entire reason for inventing what we now call a Turing Machine was to prove that computational omniscience is NOT possible. He rigorously proved that no Turing Machine, that is to say no computer, can determine in advance if any given computer program will eventually stop. For example, it would be very easy to write a program to look for the first even number greater than 2 that is not the sum of two prime numbers and then stop. But will the machine ever stop? The Turing Machine doesn't know, I don't know, you don't know, nobody knows. Maybe it will stop in the next 5 seconds, maybe it will stop in 5 billion years, maybe it will never stop. If you want to know what the machine will do you just have to watch it and see, and even the machine doesn't know what it will do until it does it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: A rat brain robot
Hi meekerdb why not what ? Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 14:25:31 Subject: Re: A rat brain robot On 8/14/2012 10:38 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb ? ? No, Why not? except in case anyone's interested, there is a hybrid, which might have a future, the Rat Brain Robot ? http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1QPiF4-iu6g So the neurons of a rat's brain can constitute a mind, but computer chips with the same functionality can't? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: the tribal self
It is explained by Donald Symons in the evolutioon of human sexuality : if everithing is cultural. Any mutant line of humans with some inmunity to social imprinted things will refine their innate self , generation after generation, to manipulate others for its own benefit by subverting the social norms. At the end no blank slate individual would remain. We try to manipulate and not being manipulated. There are norms that we may accept an even enforce for others but not for ourselves in a sinncere and effective way. Even we may intellectually accept that certain norms are good for ourselves too but out egoistic innate self force us to act otherwise. It would be no differencee between is and ought otherwise. El 16/08/2012 16:08, Roger rclo...@verizon.net escribió: Hi Alberto G. Corona Not if you select the best friends, the best woman, the best job, the best stocks and the best doctor to help you get rich, stay healthy, enjoy life, and raise a family. Or they select you. These would help in getting an upscale woman. And perhaps she has the social skills to seduce you. Maybe she reads Cosmoplitan magazine. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-15, 09:16:41 *Subject:* Re: the tribal self Social construction of the self is incompatible with natural selection. 2012/8/15 Roger rclo...@verizon.net Hi Bruno Marchal � I燿isagree about the self not being a social contruct. � It must燼t least be partly so, for to my mind, the self is your memory, and that includes to some extent the world. � And the self includes what your think your role is. At home a policeman may just be a father, but when he puts on his uniform and stops a car for speeding, he's a different person.� � � Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-14, 11:03:48 *Subject:* Re: on tribes On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:42, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal � I think that your soul is your identity in the form of point of view.� I agree. I use almost that exact definition. As we grow up we begin to define or find ourselves not out of any great insight but pragmatically, out of choosing what tribe we belong to. We define ourselves socially and culturally. We wear their indian feathers or display their tattoes and are only friendly to our own tribe or gang. So a liberal won't listen to a conservative and vice versa. It greatly simplifies thinking and speaking, and is a dispeller of doubt and tells us with some apparent certainty on who we are. OK, but that is not the root of the first person self, which can still exist even when completely amnesic. If not you make the first person I a social construct, which it is not. Bruno � So Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - *From:* Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-12, 10:47:23 *Subject:* Re: the unitary mind vs the modular brain On 12 Aug 2012, at 14:28, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal � As before, there is the natural, undeniable dualism between brain and mind: � brain牋 objective燼nd modular mind牋爏ubjective and unitary OK. You can even say: brain/body: � objective and doubtable soul/consciousness: subjective and undoubtable � The brain can be discussed, the mind can only be experienced. Exactly. I would say the soul, as the mind can be discussed in theories, but the soul is much more complex. We can discuss it through strong assumption like mechanism. � I� believe that the only subjective and unitary item in爐he universe is the monad.� It is the爀ye of the universe, although for us we can only perceive indirectly. I am open to this. The monad would be the center of the wheel, or the fixed point of the doubting consciousness.� The machines already agree with you on this : ) (to prove this you need to accept the most classical axiomatic (modal) definition of belief, knowledge, etc.) See my paper here for an introduction to the theology of the ideally correct machine: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Bruno � � Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/12/2012 - Receiving the following content - *From:* Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-11, 09:52:29 *Subject:* Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated! On 10 Aug 2012, at 14:04, Russell
Re: Re: Leibniz on the unconscious
Hi meekerdb In my view (perhaps not yours) things are as they are and move as they do for a reason, called sufficient reason. Science is the pursuit of sufficient reasons. Determinism is the belief that sufficient reasons exist. And God (or some other creator) is the sufficient reason for why there is a universe and not nothing. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 14:28:43 Subject: Re: Leibniz on the unconscious On 8/14/2012 10:42 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. And I'd say why can't everything just function by itself? If God is just a placeholder word for whatever it is that makes things work it doesn't add much. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: pre-established harmony
Hi Bruno, By ontologically primitive entity do you mean substance ? Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 15:02:45 Subject: Re: pre-established harmony Dear Roger, It was not Bruno that wrote what you are attributing to him below. It was me. I think that he might appreciate that you make attributions correctly. Let me fix the attributions. On 8/14/2012 7:36 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Stephen P. King: This musical score, does it require work of some kind to be created itself? ROGER: A Turing Machine (tapes with holes in them) would not be able to see the future, only intuition and other abilities might do that. So it could not create itself. It does not locally create itself, but it does participate in the process that does create it, thus in a sense it does indeed create itself. This is the most important point of Bruno's work, as he hows us a proof of concept of a theory that allows us to understand that the physical world is not an ontologically primitive entity. Stephen P. King: I argue that the Pre-Established Harmony (PEH) requires solving an NP-Complete computational problem that has an infinite number of variables. Additionally, it is not possible to maximize or optimize more than one variable in a multivariate system. Unless we are going to grant God the ability to contradict mathematical facts, which, I argue, is equivalent to granting violations of the basis rules of non-contradiction, then God would have to run an eternal computation prior to the creation of the Universe. This is absurd! How can the existence of something have a beginning if it requires an an infinite problem to be solved first? Here is the problem: Computations require resources to run, BRUNO: That makes sense, but you should define what you mean by resources, as put in this way, people might think you mean primitively physical resource. Stephen P. King: and if resources are not available then there is no way to claim access to the information that would be in the solution that the computation would generate. WE might try to get around this problem the way that Bruno does by stipulating that the truth of the solution gives it existence, but the fact that some mathematical statement or sigma_1 sentence is true (in the prior sense) does not allow it to be considered as accessible for use for other things. For example, we could make valid claims about the content of a meteor that no one has examined but we cannot have any certainty about those claims unless we actually crack open the rock and physically examine its contents. The state of the universe as moving harmoniously together was not exactly what the PEH was for Leibniz. It was the synchronization of the simple actions of the Monads. It was a coordination of the percepts that make up the monads such that, for example, my monadic percept of living in a world that you also live in is synchronized with your monadic view of living in a world that I also live in such that we can be said to have this email chat. Remember, Monads (as defined in the Monadology) have no windows and cannot be considered to either exchange substances nor are embedded in a common medium that can exchange excitations. The entire common world of appearances emerges from and could be said to supervene upon the synchronization of internal (1p subjective) Monadic actions. I argue that the only way that God could find a solution to the NP-Complete problem is to make the creation of the universe simulataneous with the computations so that the universe itself is the computer that is finding the solution. snip BRUNO: Even some non universal machine can solve NP-complete problem. ROGER: Your idea of incremental creation could possibly work, not sure. It is just a conjecture. It works only if it can explain features and phenomena in a way that is better than other alternative ontological theories. ROGER: But at least to my mind, the universe has to be a miracle from a physics (deterministic) point of view. No first physical cause. But that overlooks intelligence, which to my mind is nonphysical. To me, life is also a mirtacle as was painting the Mona Lisa. I agree! Our experience of a world is itself a miracle. It is sad that it is taken for granted. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-13, 09:19:40 Subject: Re: pre-established harmony On 12 Aug 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Roger, I will interleave some remarks. On 8/11/2012 7:37 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King As I understand it, Leibniz's pre-established harmony is analogous to a musical score with God, or
Re: Re: Earthquakes
Hi Stephen P. King That free will is consistent with a deterministic universe is the compatibilist point of view. There is also the opposite, the non-compatibilist p.o.v. They're both logical, given their different assumptions or posings of the issue. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 15:07:28 Subject: Re: Earthquakes On 8/14/2012 10:45 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Leibniz' best possible world is a conjecture based on L's two worlds of logic: 1) There is logic that is either always true or false, called the logic of reason or necessity. One could call this theory 2) The logic of contingency, also called the logic of fact, experimental result, or praxis, which can be true or false -- depending on the perfection of the entity or the time of occurrence. actuality Most people who acccuse God of injustice or unfairness by a supposedly loving God confuse theory with actuality. Earthquakes do occur because the world has imperfections or cracks ior the cointinental plaes don't fit perfectly together. And any fact must be that way for a reason, the reason also may be contingent, etc. up the line. Dear Roger, The best possible world that we have is only the one that is mutually consistent for the collections of mutually interacting (and thus communicating) observers (which we are a member of). All other features and valuations are not any kind of optimum other than the result of our collective choices. This is how free will is compatible with a deterministic physical universe. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 14:05:46 Subject: Re: pre-established harmony Hi Roger, I will interleave some remarks. On 8/11/2012 7:37 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King As I understand it, Leibniz's pre-established harmony is analogous to a musical score with God, or at least some super-intelligence, as composer/conductor. Allow me to use the analogy a bit more but carefully to not go too far. This musical score, does it require work of some kind to be created itself? This prevents all physical particles from colliding, instead they all move harmoniously together*. The score was composed before the Big Bang-- my own explanation is like Mozart God or that intelligence could hear the whole (symphony) beforehand in his head. I argue that the Pre-Established Harmony (PEH) requires solving an NP-Complete computational problem that has an infinite number of variables. Additionally, it is not possible to maximize or optimize more than one variable in a multivariate system. Unless we are going to grant God the ability to contradict mathematical facts, which, I argue, is equivalent to granting violations of the basis rules of non-contradiction, then God would have to run an eternal computation prior to the creation of the Universe. This is absurd! How can the existence of something have a beginning if it requires an an infinite problem to be solved first? Here is the problem: Computations require resources to run, and if resources are not available then there is no way to claim access to the information that would be in the solution that the computation would generate. WE might try to get around this problem the way that Bruno does by stipulating that the truth of the solution gives it existence, but the fact that some mathematical statement or sigma_1 sentence is true (in the prior sense) does not allow it to be considered as accessible for use for other things. For example, we could make valid claims about the content of a meteor that no one has examined but we cannot have any certainty about those claims unless we actually crack open the rock and physically examine its contents. The state of the universe as moving harmoniously together was not exactly what the PEH was for Leibniz. It was the synchronization of the simple actions of the Monads. It was a coordination of the percepts that make up the monads such that, for example, my monadic percept of living in a world that you also live in is synchronized with your monadic view of living in a world that I also live in such that we can be said to have this email chat. Remember, Monads (as defined in the Monadology) have no windows and cannot be considered to either exchange substances nor are embedded in a common medium that can exchange excitations. The entire common world of appearances emerges from and could be said to supervene upon the synchronization of internal (1p subjective) Monadic actions. I argue that the only way that God could find a solution to the NP-Complete problem is to make the creation of the universe simulataneous
Re: Re: Earthquakes
Hi Stephen P. King The possible only exists in this world given enough time. That is one practical argument against the creation of life in a deterministic world. Some say 19 billion years of random constructions isn't enough. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 23:17:02 Subject: Re: Earthquakes On 8/14/2012 7:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:07 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 8/14/2012 10:45 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Leibniz' best possible world is a conjecture based on L's two worlds of logic: 1) There is logic that is either always true or false, called the logic of reason or necessity. One could call this theory 2) The logic of contingency, also called the logic of fact, experimental result, or praxis, which can be true or false -- depending on the perfection of the entity or the time of occurrence. actuality Most people who acccuse God of injustice or unfairness by a supposedly loving God confuse theory with actuality. Earthquakes do occur because the world has imperfections or cracks ior the cointinental plaes don't fit perfectly together. And any fact must be that way for a reason, the reason also may be contingent, etc. up the line. Everything that is possible demands to exist. -- Leibniz If everything possible exists (in Plato's heaven / the omniscient mind of God) then so do all universes, all possible histories, all possible observations and experiences, all points of view, all traces of the execution of all programs, etc. Thus, if God is omniscient, he can't help the fact that bad things happen. Jason Hi Jason, Yes, all that is necessarily possible exists. This makes existence neutral and having nothing to do with anything else. Properties arise from partitioning portions of what exists against each other. Properties, like truth values and locations, are not a priori. They are contextual and thus contingent. Existence is not contingent on anything other than raw necessary possibility. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
My solution to the Chicken vs the Egg paradox
Hi meekerdb In my view, this is the Chicken vs Egg paradox, my solution to it being that life has been present even before the Big Bang in the fiorm of (cosmic) intelligence. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 23:23:19 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On 8/14/2012 7:22 PM, William R. Buckley wrote: Dear Russell: When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice. Every machine that built itself was not built by Russell. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On 8/17/2012 12:51 AM, Jason Resch wrote: I don't follow this. Can you explain how? If super intelligent aliens secretly came to earth and predicted your actions, how has that diminished the freedom you had before their arrival? Someone asked why this concept is important. It isn't for me, per se, but I would imagine that someone implementing an agent that must survive in a messy real world environment (eg an autonomous robot) will need to consider this issue, and build something like it into their robot. I agree with Bruno. A mind can only be made less free if it is built from non-deterministic parts, it is less free to be itself in its full sense because with parts that do not behave in predictable ways, there is no way to perfectly realize a given personality. They will always have some level of capriciousness that will stand in the way of that person realizing the person they are meant/designed to be. The mind will never work perfectly as intended, at best it can only asymptotically approach some ideal. That's an interesting take, but why isn't caprice part of a personality? What's the standard of perfectly as intended if the intention were to be upredictable? And given that one's knowledge is never complete, game theory shows that being able to make a random choice is optimum in many situations. I do agree with Russell that there are evolutionary advantages for access to a source of good randomness. It would enable people to choose better passwords, be better poker players, pick lottery numbers with fewer collisions, and so on. But I am not convinced humans access to anything approaching a good random number generator. But good is relative. Humans aren't very good at arithmetic either, but they can do it and it's useful. If we did, I would see it more as a sense which is external to the mind. The mind could determinsitically decide to make use of inputs from this sense, but even if the mind never drew on this random oracle it would still be every bit as free to exercise its will. I agree with that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
0s and 1s
Hi John Clark You're wrong. 1) Very few if any high school students would even believe -- less claim -- that all that we know must come through the senses. I don't think it's taught in science class. 2) Your comment about 0s and 1s and ascii characters has nothing to do with living experience or thought. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 11:39:24 Subject: Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ? On Tue, Aug 14, 2012? Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: ? What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? Who cares? Today a bright high school physics or biology student understands far more about the inter workings of the universe than either Locke or Hume. Turing machines cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s. And you can only experience the firings of the neurons in your brain and Shakespeare only produced a sequence of ASCII characters. Do you fine anything a bit simplistic in this worldview? ? ? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Descartes and the turf war between science and religion
Hi guys, Regarding Descartes. There has always been, and still is, a turf war between science and religion, each wanting to claim superiority over the other. And there's a bit of fear because most people believe that there's only one truth or that truth comes in only one form, either in science or in the Bible. But IMHO this is a woefully confused debate on both sides, because the Bible is not a science textbook, it is a manual of spiritual and moral practice. IMHO early genesis is a spiritual allegory, not a textbook on cosmology. It was written not for scientists, for scientists do not have any concept of meaning, but a spiritual manual for the children of God. By allegory I don't mean that the Bible is fiction, for higher truths cannot be conveyed very well in scientific language, they are better suited to poetry and allegory. And science cannot convey meaning at all. Meaning can only be conveyed in story form. Not that the story is false, but that meaning requires a story form. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 12:09:45 Subject: Re: Misusing Descartes' model On 8/15/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Aug 2012, at 19:14, Roger wrote: Hi Jason Resch ? You got it right. Descartes never troubled to explain how two completely different substances-- mind and body-- could interact. And Leibniz was too hard to understand. And it was also easy to follow Newton, because?odies acted as if they transferred energy or momentum. ? In Descartes' model, God was external to the mind/body issue, being essentially left out. Not in the meditation. God is needed, actually the goodness of God is needed to avoid the dream argument consequence. When you feel something real, it is real, because God will not lie to you, basically. I don't follow Descartes, on this, but his text In search of the truth makes me think that Descartes was himself not quite glad with this. Dear Bruno and Roger, ?? We can avoid the intentionally not a liar question by noticing that a physical world requires incontrovertibly (no contradictions) so that there could be persistent objects. My conjecture is that this obtain automatically if all interactions require a floor or level where all statements that might be communicated are representable by a Boolean algebra. I suspect that the substitution level of COMP is a version of this idea. So using the Descartes model, God (or some Cosmic Mind), who actually did these adjustments, could be left out of the universe. And mind was then treated as material. ? At the time of Descartes and Leibniz, there was a fork in the road, and science took the more convenient path of Newton and Descartes (materialism), which works quite well if you gloss over the unsolved mind/body problem --- until you look for a self or a God or a Cosmic Mind. Not there, as in Dennet's materialism. ? No wonder scientists are mostly atheists, since God doesn't fit into their model of the universe. While in Leibniz, God is necessary. for the universe In my opinion, Descartes too, but was perhaps willingly unclear to avoid problems with the authorities. ?? Many writers in that epoch had to moderate their words, especially given the example that was made of Giordano Bruno. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model
Hi John Clark Tell me then, John, what is the difference between red and redness ? Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 13:47:56 Subject: Re: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 10:29 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: ? 1) I can experiencre redness (a qualitative property) while computers cannot, Computers can distinguish between red and blue just like you can. And I know that I can but I have no direct evidence that either you or a computer can experience anything at all. all they can know are 0s and 1s. And your post was just a sequence of 0s and 1s sent to my computer, and the only relationship your parents gave you involved a rather long (about 3.2 billion) sequence of nucleotides. But one cannot tell other than by tasting it if a wine is truly a good vintage or not. Early chemists analyzes substances by tasting them, later they found safer more accurate ways of doing the same thing. ? A computer can't do that. Sure it can. ? ? And any creative act comes out of the blue if it is truly creative People don't fully understand how their mind works and computer's don't know if the program they're running will ever stop. ? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The difference betrween abstract and concrete
On 8/17/2012 8:30 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Jason Resch One -- especially a computer -- cannot experience abstractions. One (ie only living entities) can only experience the concrete. Except physics tells us that concrete is mostly empty space and a ray in an enormous Hilbert space. Brent Riddle: What's has four legs, fur, meows and is made of concrete? Answer: A cat. I just threw in the concrete to make it hard. ab·stract adjective 1. thought of apart from concrete realities, specific objects, or actual instances: an abstract idea. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Wonder
On 8/17/2012 10:18 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb A computer can not experience the wonder produced by the night sky, for example. Many assertions...no proofs. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
The two types of truth and computability
From Leibniz The world we live in has a curious connection between time and truth in that the only truths we can know in this world of time and space are facts, truths that need not be always true nor true everywhere. Contingent truths. To me, the halting issue is a characteristic of these time-based contingent truths. It may not always work, you may or may not get a result, and so forth. On the other hand, if I can use the metaphor above this world, are truths called necessary truths, or truths of logic or reason, which are always true. Such truths can be identified as true or false and are always are such. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: William R. Buckley Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 16:58:05 Subject: RE: Why AI is impossible Let抯 not ignore the most important point. The machine has Turing closure solely due to the details of its construction. wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Quentin Anciaux Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 11:25 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible 2012/8/15 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:16 PM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com wrote: Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience I don't dislike the term, in fact I think I'd rather enjoy being omniscient but unfortunately I'm not. the Turing machine can compute all computable computations, Yes, and thus Turing proved that in general determining if a computer program will ever stop is not computable; all you can do is watch it and see what it does. No, all you can know is that no *general* algorithm (as you pointed out) can solve that. And I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one cannot solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm. And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable, then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could decide on the halting of that algorithm. If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe it will not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching forever. It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm Quentin John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Leibniz on the unconscious
On 8/17/2012 10:30 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb In my view (perhaps not yours) things are as they are and move as they do for a reason, called sufficient reason. Science is the pursuit of sufficient reasons. I doubt that. I think science is about finding good explanations, and good means having scope, consilience, and predictive power - not necessarily deterministic. Determinism is the belief that sufficient reasons exist. Then it is a false belief since it has been found that some events are random. And God (or some other creator) is the sufficient reason for why there is a universe and not nothing. Then what's the sufficient reason for God? You slip in extra baggage by adding creator. Either God is just a placeholder for what we don't know yet (God of the gaps) or we can terminate the inference chain without it. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: 0s and 1s
Sorry, Roger: The universe is purely subjective. wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Sent: Friday, August 17, 2012 11:11 AM To: everything-list Subject: 0s and 1s Hi John Clark You're wrong. 1) Very few if any high school students would even believe -- less claim -- that all that we know must come through the senses. I don't think it's taught in science class. 2) Your comment about 0s and 1s and ascii characters has nothing to do with living experience or thought. Roger , mailto:rclo...@verizon.net rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com Receiver: everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-08-15, 11:39:24 Subject: Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ? On Tue, Aug 14, 2012� Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: � What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? Who cares? Today a bright high school physics or biology student understands far more about the inter workings of the universe than either Locke or Hume. Turing machines cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s. And you can only experience the firings of the neurons in your brain and Shakespeare only produced a sequence of ASCII characters. Do you fine anything a bit simplistic in this worldview? � � John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: My solution to the Chicken vs the Egg paradox
On 8/17/2012 10:52 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb In my view, this is the Chicken vs Egg paradox, my solution to it being that life has been present even before the Big Bang in the fiorm of (cosmic) intelligence. And what testable consequences are implied by that 'solution'? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: 0s and 1s
The universe is purely subjective. Is that statement purely subjective? Maybe you meant: other than this statement, the universe is purely subjective. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense
On 8/17/2012 10:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Craig, On 15 Aug 2012, at 11:21, Craig Weinberg wrote: in case the special characters don't come out... I was thinking about your primitive of arithmetic truth (numbers, 0, +, and *, right?) and then your concept of ‘the dreams of numbers’, interviewing Lobian Machines, etc and came up with this. One single irreducible digit ॐ (Om) which represents a self-dividing continuum of infinite perpendicular dialectics between eidetic dream states (in which dream~numbers escape their numerical identities as immersive qualitative experiences) and entopic non-dream states (in which number~dreams escape their dream nature as literal algebra-geometries). I use such term more literally. I am not sure I can understand this, even if there is some genuine analogy. The dreaming number are usually very big concrete number. They dream by encoding computational state of person, relatively to some universal number, which are encoding universal machine relatively to some other one, and the initial one can be chosen arbitrary. Those are not symbolic number, but real encoding number, a bit like the genome if you want. Dear Bruno, Could you elaborate as to how you explain the means by which an encoding (which is an equivalence relation of sorts between one set and another) is a generative action such that dreams obtain? I would very much like to better understand how you obtain the appearance of chance from purely static relations. I ask this as I simply do not see how you can claim to explain actions in terms of purely non-active relations. Craig's ideas assume activity at a primitive level and thus puts his considerations at odds with yours in an almost irreconcilable way. snip -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Descartes and the turf war between science and religion
On 8/17/2012 11:32 AM, Roger wrote: Hi guys, Regarding Descartes. There has always been, and still is, a turf war between science and religion, each wanting to claim superiority over the other. And there's a bit of fear because most people believe that there's only one truth or that truth comes in only one form, either in science or in the Bible. WHOA! Talk about parochial. I guess Roger hasn't heard of the Quran, the Tao, the Eightfold Way, Dianetics, Wicca, the Torah,... The interesting thing is that wars are fought over divine TRUTHs, be not over scientific knowledge. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
On 8/17/2012 2:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Aug 2012, at 22:11, meekerdb wrote: On 8/16/2012 12:32 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 2:24 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote: I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one cannot solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm. And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable If it's undecidable that means its either false or true but contains no proof, that is to say it's truth can't be demonstrated in a finite number of steps. And Turing proved that there are a infinite number of undecidable statements that you can not know are undecidable. then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could decide on the halting of that algorithm. There might be such a algorithm for a given problem or there might not be, and if there isn't you can't know there isn't so you will keep looking for one forever and you will keep failing forever. If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe it will not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching forever. It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm Yes, but it is also true for *a lot* of algorithms. According to Godel some statements are true but un-provable, if The Goldbach Conjecture is one of these (and if its not there are a infinite number of similar statements that are) it means that it's true so we'll never find a every even integer greater than 4 that is not the sum of primes greater than 2 to prove it wrong, and it means we'll never find a proof to show it's correct. For a few years after Godel made his discovery it was hoped that we could at least identify statements that were either false or true but had no proof. If we could do that then we would know we were wasting our time looking for a proof and we could move on to other things, but in 1935 Turing proved that sometimes even that was impossible. Are there any explicitly known arithmetic propositions which must be true or false under Peanao's axioms, but which are known to be unprovable? If we construct a Godel sentence, which corresponds to This sentence is unprovable., in Godel encoding it must be an arithmetic proposition. I'm just curious as to what such an arithmetic proposition looks like. I forgot to mentioned also the famous Goodstein sequences: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodstein_theorem Goodstein sequences are sequences of numbers which always converge to zero, but PA cannot prove this, although it can be proved in second order arithmetic. I'd say they are not part of arithmetic, since they are generated by substituting one number for another - not an arithmetic operation. So I find it hard to see Goodstein sequences terminate in zero. as a proposition of arithmetic or number theory. It seems that they depend on positional notation. Brent You can google also on hercule hydra undecidable to find a game, which has a winning strategy, but again this is not provable in PA. But machine theologians are not so much interested in those extensional undecidable sentences (in PA), as they embrace the intensional interpretation of the undecidable sentence, like CON(t), (t). Bruno Brent If Goldbach is un-provable we will never know it's un-provable, we know that such statements exist, a infinite number of them, but we don't know what they are. A billion years from now, whatever hyper intelligent entities we will have evolved into will still be deep in thought looking, unsuccessfully, for a proof that Goldbach is correct and still be grinding away at numbers looking, unsuccessfully, for a counterexample to prove it wrong. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe
Re: Earthquakes
On 8/17/2012 1:49 PM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King The possible only exists in this world given enough time. HI Roger, I would say that the possible is only expressed and/or actualize in the physical worlds, but it itself must be eternally prior to all expressions. That is one practical argument against the creation of life in a deterministic world. I disagree, if only because determinism is only approximate and never absolute. The computational resources required by a Laplacean demon are infinite even if we assume a purely Newtonian universe (which we know that we do not exist in). Some say 19 billion years of random constructions isn't enough. Random constructions can only be ergodic. Do not neglect the role of selection that self-reproducing systems engender. This is the concept that creationists ignore to their peril. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-14, 23:17:02 *Subject:* Re: Earthquakes On 8/14/2012 7:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:07 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 8/14/2012 10:45 AM, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Leibniz' best possible world is a conjecture based on L's two worlds of logic: 1) There is logic that is either always true or false, called the logic of reason or necessity. One could call this theory 2) The logic of contingency, also called the logic of fact, experimental result, or praxis, which can be true or false -- depending on the perfection of the entity or the time of occurrence. actuality Most people who acccuse God of injustice or unfairness by a supposedly loving God confuse theory with actuality. Earthquakes do occur because the world has imperfections or cracks ior the cointinental plaes don't fit perfectly together. And any fact must be that way for a reason, the reason also may be contingent, etc. up the line. Everything that is possible demands to exist. -- Leibniz If everything possible exists (in Plato's heaven / the omniscient mind of God) then so do all universes, all possible histories, all possible observations and experiences, all points of view, all traces of the execution of all programs, etc. Thus, if God is omniscient, he can't help the fact that bad things happen. Jason Hi Jason, Yes, all that is necessarily possible exists. This makes existence neutral and having nothing to do with anything else. Properties arise from partitioning portions of what exists against each other. Properties, like truth values and locations, are not a priori. They are contextual and thus contingent. Existence is not contingent on anything other than raw necessary possibility. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Descartes and the turf war between science and religion
Hear Hear! On 8/17/2012 2:32 PM, Roger wrote: Hi guys, Regarding Descartes. There has always been, and still is, a turf war between science and religion, each wanting to claim superiority over the other. And there's a bit of fear because most people believe that there's only one truth or that truth comes in only one form, either in science or in the Bible. But IMHO this is a woefully confused debate on both sides, because the Bible is not a science textbook, it is a manual of spiritual and moral practice. IMHO early genesis is a spiritual allegory, not a textbook on cosmology. It was written not for scientists, for scientists do not have any concept of meaning, but a spiritual manual for the children of God. By allegory I don't mean that the Bible is fiction, for higher truths cannot be conveyed very well in scientific language, they are better suited to poetry and allegory. And science cannot convey meaning at all. Meaning can only be conveyed in story form. Not that the story is false, but that meaning requires a story form. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Stephen P. King mailto:stephe...@charter.net *Receiver:* everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-15, 12:09:45 *Subject:* Re: Misusing Descartes' model On 8/15/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Aug 2012, at 19:14, Roger wrote: Hi Jason Resch � You got it right. Descartes never troubled to explain how two completely different substances-- mind and body-- could interact. And Leibniz was too hard to understand. And it was also easy to follow Newton, because燽odies acted as if they transferred energy or momentum. � In Descartes' model, God was external to the mind/body issue, being essentially left out. Not in the meditation. God is needed, actually the goodness of God is needed to avoid the dream argument consequence. When you feel something real, it is real, because God will not lie to you, basically. I don't follow Descartes, on this, but his text In search of the truth makes me think that Descartes was himself not quite glad with this. Dear Bruno and Roger, 牋� We can avoid the intentionally not a liar question by noticing that a physical world requires incontrovertibly (no contradictions) so that there could be persistent objects. My conjecture is that this obtain automatically if all interactions require a floor or level where all statements that might be communicated are representable by a Boolean algebra. I suspect that the substitution level of COMP is a version of this idea. So using the Descartes model, God (or some Cosmic Mind), who actually did these adjustments, could be left out of the universe. And mind was then treated as material. � At the time of Descartes and Leibniz, there was a fork in the road, and science took the more convenient path of Newton and Descartes (materialism), which works quite well if you gloss over the unsolved mind/body problem --- until you look for a self or a God or a Cosmic Mind. Not there, as in Dennet's materialism. � No wonder scientists are mostly atheists, since God doesn't fit into their model of the universe. While in Leibniz, God is necessary. for the universe In my opinion, Descartes too, but was perhaps willingly unclear to avoid problems with the authorities. 牋� Many writers in that epoch had to moderate their words, especially given the example that was made of Giordano Bruno http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giordano_Bruno. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Homunculi
Hi Bruno Marchal More simply, materialism contains no concept of a singular focussed agent, the self. So it cannot explain very much, for the self perceives, feels, and does. It is me, although in the living flesh, something radically different. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-16, 05:02:41 Subject: Re: Homunculi On 15 Aug 2012, at 14:16, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal The materialists don't seem to have a very specific idea of what governs us (the self) and its actual (live) governing. The self is something like a homunculus, which as Dennet correctly remarks, leads to an infinite regress in materialism. He is wrong. here materialism can work, in a first approximation, by the use of the Dx = xx idea that I just briefly explain. I use materialism in the weak sense: doctrine according to which matter exists primitively or ontologically. It is that weak hypothesis which is contradict by the mechanist hypothesis. If we are machine, matter is *only* a derivative of the mind of the numbers (in the general sense, or not). But there's no such problem with the monad, which is nonmaterial, nonphysical. Non materiality helps, but does not solve all problem per se. The word monad is not very precise. How would you explain it to a fourteen years old? Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 11:01:03 Subject: Re: Peirce on subjectivity On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:00, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm way out of touch here. What is comp ? Roughly speaking comp is the idea that we can survive with a computer for a brain, like we already believe that we can survive with a pump in place of a heart. This is the position of the materialist, but comp actally contradicts the very notion of matter, or primitive ontological matter. That is not entirely obvious. I don't think you can have a symbolic theory of subjectivity, for theories are contructed in symbols, and subjectivity is awareness of the symbols and hopefully what they mean. We can use symbols to refer to existing non symbolic object. We don't confuse them. CS Peirce differentiates the triadic connections between symbol and object and awareness in his theory of categories: FIRSTNESS (perceiving an object privately) -- raw experience of an apple SECONDNESS (comparing inner and outer worlds) - looking up the proper word symbol for the image in your memory [Comparing is the basis of thinking.] THIRDNESS: (doing or expressing publicly in words) - saying That's an apple. No problem. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-13, 11:53:51 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi Jason, On 13 Aug 2012, at 17:04, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: William, On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote: The physical universe is purely subjective. That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the means to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any first order logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws of physics and the laws of mind are not dependent of the choice of the initial universal system. Bruno, Does the universal system change the measure of different programs and observers, or do programs that implement programs (such as the UDA) end up making the initial choice of system of no consequence? The choice of the initial universal system does not matter. Of course it does matter epistemologically. If you choose a quantum computing system as initial system, the derivation of the physical laws will be confusing, and you will have an hard time to convince people that you have derived the quantum from comp, as you will have seemed to introduce it at the start. So it is better to start with the less looking physical initial system, and it is preferable to start from one very well know, like number + addition and multiplication. So, let us take it to fix the thing. The theory of everything is then given by the minimal number of axioms we need to recover Turing universality. Amazingly enough the two following axioms are already enough, where the variable are quantified universally. I assume also some equality rules, but not logic! x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x * 0 = 0 x*s(y) = (x *y) + x This define already a realm in which all universal number exists, and all their behavior is
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On Fri, Aug 17, 2012 at 12:54 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 8/17/2012 12:51 AM, Jason Resch wrote: I don't follow this. Can you explain how? If super intelligent aliens secretly came to earth and predicted your actions, how has that diminished the freedom you had before their arrival? Someone asked why this concept is important. It isn't for me, per se, but I would imagine that someone implementing an agent that must survive in a messy real world environment (eg an autonomous robot) will need to consider this issue, and build something like it into their robot. I agree with Bruno. A mind can only be made less free if it is built from non-deterministic parts, it is less free to be itself in its full sense because with parts that do not behave in predictable ways, there is no way to perfectly realize a given personality. They will always have some level of capriciousness that will stand in the way of that person realizing the person they are meant/designed to be. The mind will never work perfectly as intended, at best it can only asymptotically approach some ideal. That's an interesting take, but why isn't caprice part of a personality? Caprice, as an element of personality can be simulated using chaotic, but deterministic, processes. But if the operation of, rather than external inputs to, a mind random, the mind will not be able to express itself 100% of the time. X% of the time you may be interacting with the flawlessly operating mind, and the (1 - X%) of the time, the mind fails to operate correctly due to a random failure of the mind's underlying platform. It is a bit like the difference between a computer with working memory, and one with a fault memory that occasionally causes bits to flip. A properly operating program can still exhibit unpredictable behavior because its internal operation can be hidden from inspection, but you never know what you might do if you have non-deterministic hardware. A computer with an internal hardware-based random number generator can still exercise its will 100% of the time, because the logical decisions made by the computer's processor remain 100% deterministic, and thus its program code retains its meaning. What's the standard of perfectly as intended if the intention were to be upredictable? A deterministic mind faced with the goal would have to use pseudo randomness. It is not difficult to remain unpredictable. For every n bits of of memory, a pseudo-random algorithm can produce on the order of 2^n bits of output before repeating. And given that one's knowledge is never complete, game theory shows that being able to make a random choice is optimum in many situations. One's will can remain free, and choose to defer to a random source. E.g., I choose to flip a coin to determine which shirt to wear. But if one loses the choice to decide what to do, due to randomness, then they have lost some freedom for their will: it wasn't their choice, it was that of the random process. E.g., I chose to wear the blue shirt not because my mind decided to, but because a cosmic ray hit my neuron and cause a cascade of other firings leading to the selection of the blue shirt. You can see this clearly if you imagine a sliding scale, on one side, decision making is made on 100% deterministic processes, on the other, 100% random. One obviously has no freedom if all decisions are made by something else (the random process), so my question is, at what point on this scale is maximum freedom achieved? I do agree with Russell that there are evolutionary advantages for access to a source of good randomness. It would enable people to choose better passwords, be better poker players, pick lottery numbers with fewer collisions, and so on. But I am not convinced humans access to anything approaching a good random number generator. But good is relative. Humans aren't very good at arithmetic either, but they can do it and it's useful. It is certainly worse than random oracles, cryptographically secure rngs, statistically sound but insecure rngs, and it seems much worse than even the very faulty C's rand() function. Therefore, I don't buy the argument that true randomness is an integral part of the mind, at least it isn't at a level we can use when we try to be random. Jason If we did, I would see it more as a sense which is external to the mind. The mind could determinsitically decide to make use of inputs from this sense, but even if the mind never drew on this random oracle it would still be every bit as free to exercise its will. I agree with that. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at
Re: [SPAM] Re: Re: Homunculi
On 8/17/2012 12:35 PM, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal More simply, materialism contains no concept of a singular focussed agent, the self. So it cannot explain very much, On the contrary, it has the hope of explaining the self - whereas assuming the self does not. Brent for the self perceives, feels, and does. It is me, although in the living flesh, something radically different. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Dasein
Hi Bruno Marchal This also needs looking into by mne. Thanks. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-16, 05:19:45 Subject: Re: Dasein On 15 Aug 2012, at 15:13, Roger wrote: Heidegger tried to express the point I tried to make below by using the word dasein. Being there . Not merely describing a topic or item, but seeing the world from its point of view. Being inside it. Being there. I agree. This is what I call the first person point of view, and if you read the UDA proof, you will see that it is a key notion. Then in the technical part I explain that the first person view of a machine, is NOT a machine, and cannot even been describe in term of machine, or in any third person objective term. Hi Bruno Marchal This is hard to put into words. No offense, and I may be wrong, but you seem to speak of the world and mind as objects. But like a coin, I believe they have a flip side, the world and mind as we live them, not as objects but as subjects. Entirely different worlds. The person are subject. OK. The mind or spirit are too general term, with objective and subjective property. It is as if you talk about swimming in the water without actually diving in. Or treating a meal as that which is on the menu, but not actually eating it. But you are doing that very mistake with machine. You reduce them to their appearance instead of listening to what they say, and more importantly to what they stay mute about. More on this later, but please read the papers as it shows that we are deadly wrong in theology since more than 1500 years, with or without comp. And with comp, the physical reality is a non computational appearance obeying very precise law that we can test. So my main point is that comp is a testable theory. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 05:38:31 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi William, On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe seems rather obvious. I don't think anything is obvious here. What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming? What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind? Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational universality entails the impossibility of omniscience. solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why, Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable computations. ? Somehow, where information is concerned, context is king. I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Dasein
Bruno, I admire your perseverence and also of others keeping pace of Roger's incredible flood of posts. I confess to have fallen out if not by other reasons: lack of time to read (not to mention: comprehend) all that 'wisdom' he includes into this list over the past week or so. One remark - and I am not so sure about being right: DASEIN in my (almost mothertongue German) may not reflect the DA = *there* plus SEIN *to be*, rather (- and again I hide behind my second 'almost' of half century in the US:) - - *THE EXISTENCE*. I feel Heidegger (whom I did not study) does not imply a spacial, or locational momentum by using 'Dasein' for a simple 'Sein'. He might have in mind the difference between the existing vs. the not existing. It also has a rythmical ease vs. a short 'sein' what the English put by the 'to' and the French in a longer 1.5-syllable(?) etre. JohnM On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 5:19 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 15 Aug 2012, at 15:13, Roger wrote: Heidegger tried to express the point I tried to make below by using the word dasein. Being there . Not merely describing a topic or item, but seeing the world from its point of view. Being inside it. Being there. I agree. This is what I call the first person point of view, and if you read the UDA proof, you will see that it is a key notion. Then in the technical part I explain that the first person view of a machine, is NOT a machine, and cannot even been describe in term of machine, or in any third person objective term. Hi Bruno Marchal This is hard to put into words. No offense, and I may be wrong, but you seem to speak of the world and mind as objects. But like a coin, I believe they have a flip side, the world and mind as we live them, not as objects but as subjects. Entirely different worlds. The person are subject. OK. The mind or spirit are too general term, with objective and subjective property. It is as if you talk about swimming in the water without actually diving in. Or treating a meal as that which is on the menu, but not actually eating it. But you are doing that very mistake with machine. You reduce them to their appearance instead of listening to what they say, and more importantly to what they stay mute about. More on this later, but please read the papers as it shows that we are deadly wrong in theology since more than 1500 years, with or without comp. And with comp, the physical reality is a non computational appearance obeying very precise law that we can test. So my main point is that comp is a testable theory. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Cs. Knowing that one knows.
Hi Bruno Marchal 1) For wine-tasting -- What one must have is knowing that one knows that the wine tastes good. Such as one can prove that 1+1 =2 but one still has to accept that as true. 2) mo穘ad (mnd) n. 1. Philosophy An indivisible, impenetrable unit of substance viewed as the basic constituent element of physical reality in the metaphysics of Leibniz. Substance: A being that subsists by itself; a separate or distinct thing. Contingent truth: A truth whose opposite is possible Entelechy: Something having in it a certain perfection, a completeness- a term taken from Aristotle's definition of the soul Appetition: The internal principle which prepares for change; rudimentary desire. Monad: The simple substance. Blind and passive by itself, but obtains its perceptions from God who also can animate it and cause it to feel. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-16, 11:40:34 Subject: Re: ? On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:21, Roger wrote: BRUNO: I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid. ROGER: What point ? And emulate in what sense ? Ie could a computer ever be a good wine taster ? As I said, it seems they are. the french have succeeded in making a wine testing machine which according to experts in the field is better than the average qualified wine tester. Does such machine get the human qualia of drinking wine. i doubt so, for this you need to have a longer human history, and higher reflexive abilities. But there is no reason why machine could'n get them in principle (obvious for a computationalist which bet that he is himself a machine relatively to its more probable neighborhood). BRUNO: If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite regression. ROGER: Infinite regression of what ? Consciousness ? The monad does away with that problem, except of course it's just philosophy, not hardware. It might be math, also. Could you explain what a monad is without too much jargon? BRUNO: It might have a solution, but it begs the question of comp/non-comp, and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are substantial actual infinities. ROGER: I think I said and believe what you said I said, but I don't understand your main point just above, even vaguely. At any rate, emulation is not the real thing. If the brain is a universal emulator, as it surely is at least, then when a computer emulates an emulation done by the brain, at the right level, emulation is the real thing. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 03:53:59 Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computersinAIordescribing life On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:47, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal You say, a non living computer can supported a living self-developing life form Do you mean support instead of supported ? Or what do you mean ? I mean support. Sorry. I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual self-modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid. If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite regression. It might have a solution, but it beg the question of comp/non-comp, and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are substantial actual infinities. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:17:45 Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers inAIordescribing life On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:07, Roger wrote: Hi Russell Standish When I gave in to the AI point of view that computers can posess intelligence, I had overlooked the world of experience, which is not quantitative. Only living things can experience the world. You are right. But a non living computer can supported a living self-developing life form, unless you postulate that infinitely complex substances are at play in the mind. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You
Fascinating ....Re: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model
Hi Bruno Marchal Hmm... I might explain later why machines are necessarily confronted to the same problem, and even why some machine will lie to themselves to hide that problem, for example by becoming adult and wanting to reassure the children or something. Arithmetical truth can be seen from many points of view, and about the half of them cannot be described with numbers or words. Indeed, that is why they give plausible candidate for a theory of qualia, intuition, consciousness, impression, sensations, etc. Bruno Fascinating ... Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-16, 12:52:55 Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model Hi Roger, On 16 Aug 2012, at 17:40, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal You have a much more rational view of the mind/brain than I do. You seem to believe that reason must always be involved, but IMHO it need not and in faxct rarely is involved. I can walk up stairs without looking at my feet or thinking right or left foot. That seems to me quite reasonable. You are just used to the reasons than you need no more to concentrate your attention to it. This happens a lot of time. This hides reason, but they are still there. And when I see a red apple, I see its redness without invoking the word red. I am used to think without words. I am not verbal. Reason does not use words, only the communication from one person to another might need them. Or say I hold up shirts of different colors against me to see how well they look with my complexion or mood. I may not even technically know the difference between off-white and a sort of beige-ish white, Or white-ish beige. There is a name for it, but it escapes my mind right now. Maybe it's a light tan ? Hmm... I might explain later why machines are necessarily confronted to the same problem, and even why some machine will lie to themselves to hide that problem, for example by becoming adult and wanting to reassure the children or something. Arithmetical truth can be seen from many points of view, and about the half of them cannot be described with numbers or words. Indeed, that is why they give plausible candidate for a theory of qualia, intuition, consciousness, impression, sensations, etc. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 03:30:22 Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model On 14 Aug 2012, at 16:29, Roger wrote: Hi John Clark 1) I can experiencre redness (a qualitative property) while computers cannot, all they can know are 0s and 1s. That is not valid. You could say that abrain can know only potential differences and spiking neuron. Of course you confuse level of description. In both case, brain an computer, it is a higher level entity which do the thinking. 2) One can use methods such as statistics to infer something in a practical or logical sense, eg if a bottle of wine has a french label one can infer that it might well be an excellent wine. A computer could do that. But one cannot tell other than by tasting it if a wine is truly a good vintage or not. A computer can't do that. Actually this is already refuted. I read that some program already taste wine better than french experts. And any creative act comes out of the blue if it is truly creative (new). new is relative. Improved jazs would be a good example of that. I believe that John Coltrane's solos came out of the Platonic world. Google on MUSINUM to see, and perhaps download, a very impressive software composing music (melody and rhythm) from the numbers. Numbers love music, I would say. Natural numbers can be said to have been discovered in waves and music, in great part. You must not compare humans and present machines, as the first originate from a long (deep) computational history, and the second are very recent. Better to reason from the (mathematical, abstract) definition of (digital) machine. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 13:24:42 Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 6:47 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Computers are quantitative instruments and so cannot have a self or feelings Do you have any way of proving that isn't also true of your fellow human beings? I don't. intution is non-computable Not true. Statistical laws and rules of thumb can be and are incorporated into software, and so can induction which is easier to
Re: Re: Self-image and self-identity
Hi Bruno Marchal What if I put on a fake moustache ? Or glasses ? Would the computer still know it's me ? Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-16, 12:40:04 Subject: Re: Self-image and self-identity On 16 Aug 2012, at 17:09, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Can this machine recognize its self in a mirror or line-up ? No problem. Self-image would be a critical part of self-identity. It might be a delusion too, I think. (they fall in that delusion trap in the movie Source Code if you have seen it, where someone accept the idea that he is dead, after indeed losing its self-image. I find this absurd, even if I agree that loosing your self-image might be very psychologically troubling, but then loosing your legs too). Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 05:46:49 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On 15 Aug 2012, at 04:22, William R. Buckley wrote: Dear Russell: When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice. See my paper planaria, amoeba and dreaming machine (in the publication part in my url). Reproduction regeneration and embryogenesis are easily solved through a theorem due to Kleene in theoretical computer science. They have all be implemented, so it is also practical computer science. As I said: the notion of self is where computer science is at its best. I can sketch the main idea, if you desire. Bruno wrb -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 4:11 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 11:16:47AM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote: John: Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus universality, the Turing machine can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of its construction. wrb John is right - omniscience is a different concept to universality. For the sake of clearer conversation, it is better to keep that in mind, rather than arbitrarily redefining words Humpty Dumpty like. Of course, if there is no accepted definition for a concept, it is OK to propose another one. But please restrict it to concepts that are logically sound, and be prepared to drop your own definition if a better one comes along. Cheers -- --- - Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au --- - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
The two requirements of life
Hi Bruno Marchal I donb't seem to be able to convince Stanley Salthe of this, but I think that life must have two irreplaceable qualities: 1) Autonomous intelligence, that intelligence of nature found in our fine-tuned world. 2) What amounts to the same thing, the freedom to pick and choose - usually what one desires. (self-determination, not exactly free will). Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-16, 12:09:48 Subject: Re: Is life computable ? On 16 Aug 2012, at 16:47, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Has anybody ever provided a proof that life is a computable entity ? Nobody agrees on what life is. If it is material, then life is not emulable. If it is a more abstract information exchange, then it might be. Keep in mind that, contrarily to a widespread belief, comp makes consciousness and matter not being emulable by a computer. Indeed, consciousness and matter are based on the statistics on all computations going through my actual state, and that is a complex infinite set, which can not even be described in any finite way. Life is a fuzzy notion, so it is hard to answer precisely. I usually define it by self-reproduction, and in that sense, life is easy to emulate, unlike consciousness. But if you attach consciousness to the notion of life, then the answer in the comp theory is that life is in platonia/God/arithmetical truth, not on earth, and we cannot emulate it. We can still accept an artificial brain, as they might be a level where the emulation of it will make it possible for my consciousness (in Platonia) to manifest itself relatively to you. With comp, the mind body relation is not the one we usually believe in. We can, rather conventionally, ascribe a mind to a body, but we cannot ascribe a body to a mind: only an infinity of bodies. With comp, my consciousness is in platonia, and manifests itself in infinities of incarnation, that is local implementation relatively to stabilizing universal number/machine, if they exist. To be sure, such existence remains to be proved, but evidences already exists and are rather strong, imo. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 04:44:09 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On 14 Aug 2012, at 20:16, William R. Buckley wrote: John: Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus universality, the Turing machine can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of its construction. It is deeper than that. It is in virtue of the fact that the set of computable functions, unlike all other sets in math, is closed for the diagonalization, and the price for this is incompleteness. It is not trivial, and makes computational universality rather exceptional and unexpected. The discovery of the universal machine is a very big discovery, of the type: it changes everything we knew. I think. For beliefs, knowledge, proofs, definability, etc. This never happens, and the corresponding formal systems can always been extended. Bruno wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Clark Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 9:39 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:09 PM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com wrote: Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient[...] Turing's entire reason for inventing what we now call a Turing Machine was to prove that computational omniscience is NOT possible. He rigorously proved that no Turing Machine, that is to say no computer, can determine in advance if any given computer program will eventually stop. For example, it would be very easy to write a program to look for the first even number greater than 2 that is not the sum of two prime numbers and then stop. But will the machine ever stop? The Turing Machine doesn't know, I don't know, you don't know, nobody knows. Maybe it will stop in the next 5 seconds, maybe it will stop in 5 billion years, maybe it will never stop. If you want to know what the machine will do you just have to watch it and see, and even the machine doesn't know what it will do until it does it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at
Re: Re: Re: the tribal self
Hi Alberto G. Corona Sorery, again I oversimplified things. I don't know about a blank slate, but we are products bioth of heredity and society. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-17, 13:28:34 Subject: Re: Re: the tribal self It is explained by Donald Symons in the evolutioon of human sexuality : if everithing is cultural. Any mutant line of humans with some inmunity to social imprinted things will refine their innate self , generation after generation, to manipulate others for its own benefit by subverting the social norms. At the end no blank slate individual would remain. We try to manipulate and not being manipulated. There are norms that we may accept an even enforce for others but not for ourselves in a sinncere and effective way. Even we may intellectually accept that certain norms are good for ourselves too but out egoistic innate self force us to act otherwise. It would be no differencee between is and ought otherwise. El 16/08/2012 16:08, Roger rclo...@verizon.net escribió: Hi Alberto G. Corona Not if you select the best friends, the best woman, the best job, the best stocks and the best doctor to help you get rich, stay healthy, enjoy life, and raise a family. Or they select you. These would help in getting an upscale woman. And perhaps she has the social skills to seduce you. Maybe she reads Cosmoplitan magazine. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/16/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 09:16:41 Subject: Re: the tribal self Social construction of the self is incompatible with natural selection. 2012/8/15 Roger rclo...@verizon.net Hi Bruno Marchal I?isagree about the self not being a social contruct. It must?t least be partly so, for to my mind, the self is your memory, and that includes to some extent the world. And the self includes what your think your role is. At home a policeman may just be a father, but when he puts on his uniform and stops a car for speeding, he's a different person. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 11:03:48 Subject: Re: on tribes On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:42, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think that your soul is your identity in the form of point of view. I agree. I use almost that exact definition. As we grow up we begin to define or find ourselves not out of any great insight but pragmatically, out of choosing what tribe we belong to. We define ourselves socially and culturally. We wear their indian feathers or display their tattoes and are only friendly to our own tribe or gang. So a liberal won't listen to a conservative and vice versa. It greatly simplifies thinking and speaking, and is a dispeller of doubt and tells us with some apparent certainty on who we are. OK, but that is not the root of the first person self, which can still exist even when completely amnesic. If not you make the first person I a social construct, which it is not. Bruno So Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 10:47:23 Subject: Re: the unitary mind vs the modular brain On 12 Aug 2012, at 14:28, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal As before, there is the natural, undeniable dualism between brain and mind: brain? objective?nd modular mind??ubjective and unitary OK. You can even say: brain/body: objective and doubtable soul/consciousness: subjective and undoubtable The brain can be discussed, the mind can only be experienced. Exactly. I would say the soul, as the mind can be discussed in theories, but the soul is much more complex. We can discuss it through strong assumption like mechanism. I believe that the only subjective and unitary item in?he universe is the monad. It is the?ye of the universe, although for us we can only perceive indirectly. I am open to this. The monad would be the center of the wheel, or the fixed point of the doubting consciousness. The machines already agree with you on this : ) (to prove this you need to accept the most classical axiomatic (modal) definition of belief, knowledge, etc.) See my paper here for an introduction to the theology of the ideally correct machine: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/12/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list
Re: Re: The I Ching, a cominatorically complete hyperlinked semantic field(mind).
Hi Craig Weinberg
You are right in a sense. Weather prediction is a form of fortune-telling.
But the reason traditional fortune-telling is frowned on by the Bible is that
it invokes powers outside of God or over God (Thou shalt have no other
God before me).
I don't consider weather prediction as a replacement for God, so no problem.
A more common false God however is your career, and we're all guilty of that.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/17/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-17, 12:35:03
Subject: Re: The I Ching, a cominatorically complete hyperlinked semantic
field(mind).
Thanks Roger,
Your work on this looks very interesting. I think I get the gist of it but I
will have to take a closer look.
I wonder how would fortune telling not include weather reports, actuarial
tables, financial forecasts, etc? Historically there doesn't seem to be any
meaningful correlation between fortune telling and any particular danger to
people as a whole. Certainly no more danger than drinking wine or eating ice
cream.
Craig
On Friday, August 17, 2012 9:49:24 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
I was into the esoteric a decade ago, including the Tarot, and especially the
Yi Ching.
whose ability to transform and embed and interlink metaphors is very powerful.
Being combinatorically
constructed, it is a complete, homogeneous and interlinked (hyperlinked)
semantic field (to a certain
resolution). You can do things with it not even dreamed of in western
semantics and language processing.
Leibniz almost discovered these properties. I developed a theory of story
ujsing it (in the form of the Feng Shui).
See
http://tap3x.net/EMBTI/j8clough.html
Similarly I studied the time based version of the Yi Jing called the Tai Xuan
Jing (T'ai Hsuan Ching)
which is ternary in form and especially mysterious and beautiful.
Then I went back tio the Lutheran Church and being conservative, and being
advised and believing that such esoteric topics
(unfortunately used in fortune telling, forbidden by the Bible) are not a
healthy pursuit, I gave up all of that stuff.
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/17/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-15, 05:05:44
Subject: Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense
Hi Bruno,
I was thinking about your primitive of arithmetic truth (numbers, 0, +, and *,
right?) and then your concept of 'the dreams of numbers', interviewing Lobian
Machines, etc and came up with this.
One single irreducible digit which represents a self-dividing continuum of
infinite perpendicular dialectics between eidetic dream states (in which
dream~numbers escape their numerical identities as immersive qualitative
experiences) and entopic non-dream states (in which number~dreams escape their
dream nature as literal algebra-geometries).
This continuum f( ), runs from infinitely solipsistic/private first person
subjectivity (calling that Aleph ) to infinitely discrete/public third person
mechanism (calling that Omega ), so that at ,any given dream is experienced as
99.99...9% dream and 0.00...1% number and at , any given machine or number is
presented as 99.99...9% number and 0.00...1% dream.
The halfway point between the and axis is the perpendicular axis f(- ) which is
the high and low correspondence between the literal dream and figurative number
(or figurative dream and literal number depending on whether you are using the
dream-facing epistemology or the number-facing epistemology). This axis runs
from tight equivalence (=) to broadly elliptical potential set membership
(...)
So it looks something like this:
f( ) { ... = }
To go further, it could be said that at (Omega), (Om) expresses as 10|O (one,
zero, line segment, circle referring to the quantitative algebraic and
geometric perpendicular primitives) while at (Aleph), (Om) expresses as
(tetragrammaton or yod, hay, vov, hay, or in perhaps more familiar metaphor,
(clubs, spades, hearts, diamonds)
where:
clubs (wands) =Fire, spiritual, tactile
spades (swords) = Air, mental, auditory
hearts (cups) =Water, emotional, visual
diamonds (pentacles/coins) = Earth, physical, olfactory-gustatory
Note that tactile and auditory modalities tune us into ourselves and each
others sensemaking (selves and minds), while the visual and olfactory/gustatory
sense modalities are about objectifying realism of the world (egos or
objectified selves/self-images and bodies). It should be obvious that clubs
(wands) and spades (swords) are stereotypically masculine and abstracting
forces, while hearts (cups) and diamonds (pentacles/coins) are stereotypically
feminine objectified fields.
Sorry for
Mornings and afternoons
Hi William R. Buckley To an idealist, the real universe is subjective, it is made up of forms of mind. But to a realist, sticks and stones can break your bones --- but thinking to do so usually doesn't work. In the morning I can be an idealist, in the afternoon go out and enjoy nature as a realist. Sex is also much better as a realist. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: William R. Buckley Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-17, 14:53:30 Subject: RE: 0s and 1s Sorry, Roger: The universe is purely subjective. wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Sent: Friday, August 17, 2012 11:11 AM To: everything-list Subject: 0s and 1s Hi John Clark You're wrong. 1) Very few if any high school students would even believe -- less claim -- that all that we know must come through the senses. I don't think it's taught in science class. 2) Your comment about 0s and 1s and ascii characters has nothing to do with living experience or thought. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-15, 11:39:24 Subject: Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ? On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? Who cares? Today a bright high school physics or biology student understands far more about the inter workings of the universe than either Locke or Hume. Turing machines cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s. And you can only experience the firings of the neurons in your brain and Shakespeare only produced a sequence of ASCII characters. Do you fine anything a bit simplistic in this worldview? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Dasein
Hi John Mikes I think Heidegger simply made up a new word for his purposes, where since da=there, and sein = being, then dasein is in Heideggers glossary being there. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: John Mikes Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-17, 16:10:53 Subject: Re: Dasein Bruno, I admire your perseverence and also of others keeping pace of Roger's incredible flood of posts. I confess to have fallen out if not by other reasons: lack of time to read (not to mention: comprehend) all that 'wisdom' he includes into this list over the past week or so. ? One remark - and I am not so sure about being right: DASEIN in my (almost mothertongue German)?ay not reflect the DA = there plus SEIN to be, rather (- and again I hide behind my second 'almost' of half century in the US:)? - - ?THE EXISTENCE. ? I feel Heidegger (whom I did not study) does not imply a spacial, or locational momentum by using 'Dasein' for a simple 'Sein'. He might have in mind the difference between the ?xisting?s. the not existing. It also has a rythmical ease vs. a short 'sein' what the English put by the 'to' and the French in a longer 1.5-syllable(?) etre. ? JohnM ? On Thu, Aug 16, 2012 at 5:19 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 15 Aug 2012, at 15:13, Roger wrote: Heidegger tried to express the point I tried to make below by using the word dasein.? Being there . Not merely describing a topic or item, but seeing the world from its point of view. Being inside it. Being there. I agree. This is what I call the first person point of view, and if you read the UDA proof, you will see that it is a key notion.? Then in the technical part I explain that the first person view of a machine, is NOT a machine, and cannot even been describe in term of machine, or in any third person objective term. ? ? ? ? Hi Bruno Marchal ? This is hard to put into words. No offense, and I may be wrong, but you seem to speak of the world and mind as objects.? But like a coin, I believe they have a flip side, the world and mind as we live them, not as objects but as subjects. Entirely different worlds. The person are subject. OK. The mind or spirit are too general term, with objective and subjective property.? ? It is as if you talk about swimming in the water without actually diving in.? ? Or treating a meal as that which is on the menu, but?ot actually eating it. But you are doing that very mistake with machine. You reduce them to their appearance instead of listening to what they say, and more importantly to what they stay mute about. More on this later, but please read the papers as it shows that we are deadly wrong in theology since more than 1500 years, with or without comp. And with comp, the physical reality is a non computational appearance obeying very precise law that we can test. So my main point is that comp is a testable theory. Bruno ? ? Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. ? http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: My solution to the Chicken vs the Egg paradox
Hi meekerdb I can't think of any tests to prove that life existed (in principle) before the big bang, only that what or who made the universe in the BB had to know beforehand (or by chance or guess) what is needed for life to survive, since the biology seems to say that life is very improbable in any case. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-17, 14:56:25 Subject: Re: My solution to the Chicken vs the Egg paradox On 8/17/2012 10:52 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb In my view, this is the Chicken vs Egg paradox, my solution to it being that life has been present even before the Big Bang in the fiorm of (cosmic) intelligence. And what testable consequences are implied by that 'solution'? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: Mornings and afternoons
In all your statements, you are expressing subjectivity. wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Sent: Friday, August 17, 2012 2:55 PM To: everything-list Subject: Mornings and afternoons Hi William R. Buckley To an idealist, the real universe is subjective, it is made up of forms of mind. But to a realist, sticks and stones can break your bones --- but thinking to do so usually doesn't work. In the morning I can be an idealist, in the afternoon go out and enjoy nature as a realist. Sex is also much better as a realist. Roger , mailto:rclo...@verizon.net rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: William R. Buckley mailto:bill.buck...@gmail.com Receiver: everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-08-17, 14:53:30 Subject: RE: 0s and 1s Sorry, Roger: The universe is purely subjective. wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Roger Sent: Friday, August 17, 2012 11:11 AM To: everything-list Subject: 0s and 1s Hi John Clark You're wrong. 1) Very few if any high school students would even believe -- less claim -- that all that we know must come through the senses. I don't think it's taught in science class. 2) Your comment about 0s and 1s and ascii characters has nothing to do with living experience or thought. Roger , mailto:rclo...@verizon.net rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com Receiver: everything-list mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com Time: 2012-08-15, 11:39:24 Subject: Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ? On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? Who cares? Today a bright high school physics or biology student understands far more about the inter workings of the universe than either Locke or Hume. Turing machines cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s. And you can only experience the firings of the neurons in your brain and Shakespeare only produced a sequence of ASCII characters. Do you fine anything a bit simplistic in this worldview? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Monads as computing elements
Monads as computing elements, the supreme monad as the central processing computer chip. I think that Leibniz's monads are in some ways similar to computer calculations, for they exist in logical, rather than physical space, and all are capable of communications to various extents. If I might say it this way, they exist in holographic space, just as many think the mind exists in the brain. Each monad contains a knowledge of all or most but with limited resoljution (clarithy of vision). Monads are inherently blind, but constantly changing, the Supreme monad of all (God or perhaps a computer chip) constantly and instantly updating their perceptions to reflect the perceptions of all the other monads, so that each monad contains in principle a complete knowledge of the universe -- the universe being made up entirely of monads. But an imperfect knowledge. Why imperfect ? Each monad is a passive, near-sighted homunculus. The distances between monads have to do with their similarities and the perceptions given to them by intellect and vision , and all monads have some weaknesses of vision (being near-sighted). And clarity of vision drops off with distances (differences between monads). Because of these imperfections, the monadic computer could operate somewhat perfectly in communication with nearbymonads but imperfectly with regard to the whole computing program. This all happening in a sea of perfect harmony. In a contingent computing world. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Monads as computing elements
Dear Roger, How would you explain the mans by which monads communicate given that they do not exchanges substances as they have no windows? On 8/17/2012 9:40 PM, Roger wrote: *Monads as computing elements, the supreme monad* *as the central processing computer chip.* I think that Leibniz's monads are in some ways similar to computer calculations, for they exist in logical, rather than physical space, and all are capable of communications to various extents. If I might say it this way, they exist in holographic space, just as many think the mind exists in the brain. Each monad contains a knowledge of all or most but with limited resoljution (clarithy of vision). Monads are inherently blind, but constantly changing, the Supreme monad of all (God or perhaps a computer chip) constantly and instantly updating their perceptions to reflect the perceptions of all the other monads, so that each monad contains in principle a complete knowledge of the universe -- the universe being made up entirely of monads. But an imperfect knowledge. Why imperfect ? Each monad is a passive, near-sighted homunculus. The distances between monads have to do with their similarities and the perceptions given to them by intellect and vision , and all monads have some weaknesses of vision (being near-sighted). And clarity of vision drops off with distances (differences between monads). Because of these imperfections, the monadic computer could operate somewhat perfectly in communication with nearbymonads but imperfectly with regard to the whole computing program. This all happening in a sea of perfect harmony. In a contingent computing world. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net 8/17/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
