Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 05 Apr 2013, at 11:17, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 1:09 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/4/2013 3:50 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 10:44 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of the total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not needed to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. Yes but one can imagine a situation where there is a simple (sufficiently-)general purpose algorithm that needs some place where to store memories and everything it has learned. In this case, we could implement such an algorithm in one of our puny laptops and get some results, and then just ride what's left of Moore's law all the way to the singularity. We don't know of any such algorithm. But it doesn't follow from human brain complexity that no such algorithm exists. Evolution doesn't necessarily do things efficiently. Because it can't start-over, it always depends on modification of what already works. But I think there are other theoretical and evolutionary reasons that would limit the scope of general intelligence. Just to take an example, mathematics is very hard for a lot of people. Mathematical thinking is not something that has been evolutionarily useful until recent times (and maybe not even now). Agreed. What puzzles me the most is not that evolution hasn't found it (although we're not sure, there's a lot we don't know about the brain still). It's that the swarm of smart people that have been looking for it haven't found it. I still have some hope that it's simple but highly counter-intuitive. All recursively enumerable class of total computable function is learnable. There is a simple algorithm: dovetail on that class, and output the programs which match the data. This will converge (in the computer science sense = eventually output something correct) to a program explaining the input-outputs given. That algorithm will already not work if they are strictly partial function in the class, and it will not work on non recursively enumerable class (like all total functions). Such an algorithm is of course not really a practical algorithm, but they can be accelerated, --- even more so, if we allow weakening of the identification criteria. Some previews knowledge and rule of thumbs can also accelerate them, with non computable (= huge) gain. The field of theoretical learning is very rich, and leads to the idea that competence is something never really universal, quite domain dependent, and speedable when allowing the usual things that evolution exploited all the time: the making of error, randomness, team or swarm of machines, etc. It leads to a large variety of possible implementation of competence, and exploits maximally the high general intelligence which exists already in the any universal machine. But as I said, such high competence can also restrict that intelligence. Intelligence is needed to develop competence, but competence tends to make that intelligence blind. With language and culture, that blindness can pass from a generation to another, so that babies can became more quickly stubborn than without, until the next paradigm shift. Bruno Telmo. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 05 Apr 2013, at 16:16, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, April 5, 2013 9:41:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2013, at 00:07, Craig Weinberg wrote (to Jason) There are algorithms for implementing anything that does not involve infinities. Why do you think so? What algorithm implements purple or pain? What make you think that purple or pain don't involve infinities? They might, but why does that make a difference? (Also, many algorithm does involve infinities. Machines can provide name for ordinals up to the Church-Kleene omega_1^CK ordinal, and they can reason in ZF like any of us. I don't see why computers cannot beat the humans in the naming of infinities, even if that task can be considered as the least algorithmic one ever conceived by humans). Why do you think that purple is a name? Why do you think I would think that purple is a name? Bruno Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 05 Apr 2013, at 16:30, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 8:41 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 05 Apr 2013, at 00:07, Craig Weinberg wrote (to Jason) There are algorithms for implementing anything that does not involve infinities. Why do you think so? What algorithm implements purple or pain? What make you think that purple or pain don't involve infinities? (Also, many algorithm does involve infinities. Machines can provide name for ordinals up to the Church-Kleene omega_1^CK ordinal, and they can reason in ZF like any of us. I don't see why computers cannot beat the humans in the naming of infinities, even if that task can be considered as the least algorithmic one ever conceived by humans). I should clarify what I meant by infinities. I meant there are algorithms that for computing anything that can be solved which does not require an infinite number of steps or infinite precision to do so. So unless infinite precision or infinite steps are required to emulate brain behavior, a computer should be capable of expressing all outwardly visisble behaviors any human can. (Craig has disputed this point before) OK, I guessed so. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 11:50 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/4/2013 3:35 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 11:44 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/3/2013 2:44 PM, Jason Resch wrote: You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Then do you think there could be philosophical zombies? Yes. Could it be that some humans are zombies, or do you assume that to be a zombie would mean being physically different from a human being? I don't know. How would you operationally test a robot to see whether it was (a) intelligent I don't see intelligence as a binary property, but relative to goals. The classical answer for human-like intelligence is something like the Turing test, but I don't like it. I don't think that a generic AI should be measured by it's ability to fool us into making us think it's human. Instead I'd have to ask you first what do you want the robot for? Personally I would want robots to free Humanity from unwanted labor. This is a high-level goal that requires what I consider to be generic AI. Can it learn all sorts of tasks like driving a car, working in a factory, following fuzzy requirements, etc Yes, I agree with that. I'd say intelligence is being able to learn to be competent at many tasks, but there is no completely general intelligence. Agreed. I think for social beings it includes being able to explain, to give reasons, which implies some empathy. No doubt. But could the ability to model other beings be sufficient for empathy? A sort of dispassionate empathy? I think so. etc? (b) conscious? I don't believe that such a test can exist. I don't even think we can know if a glass of water is conscious. Have you ever been unconscious? I don't know. All I know is that there are periods of my timeline that I cannot remember. During college, there where a couple of incidents that I cannot remember but my friends would tell you I was conscious. Telmo. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Monday, April 8, 2013 7:42:22 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 11:50 PM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.netjavascript: wrote: On 4/4/2013 3:35 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 11:44 PM, meekerdb meek...@verizon.netjavascript: wrote: On 4/3/2013 2:44 PM, Jason Resch wrote: You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Then do you think there could be philosophical zombies? Yes. Could it be that some humans are zombies, or do you assume that to be a zombie would mean being physically different from a human being? I don't know. Sociopaths are emotional zombies. Corruption or addiction can make people into moral zombies. Driving for a long time can make someone a highway zombie. Cults and brainwashing can make someone an intellectual zombie. There are many ways which aspects of personal human consciousness can become subconscious, sub-personal, and sub-human. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
If you see the image in the mirror and interact with it, then there has to be something conscious somewhere. Just like a human controlling a remote control car. The consciousness might exist somewhere else, but the car can behave as intelligently as a human. Jason On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 10:55 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Friday, April 5, 2013 10:30:29 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 8:41 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 05 Apr 2013, at 00:07, Craig Weinberg wrote (to Jason) There are algorithms for implementing anything that does not involve infinities. Why do you think so? What algorithm implements purple or pain? What make you think that purple or pain don't involve infinities? (Also, many algorithm does involve infinities. Machines can provide name for ordinals up to the Church-Kleene omega_1^CK ordinal, and they can reason in ZF like any of us. I don't see why computers cannot beat the humans in the naming of infinities, even if that task can be considered as the least algorithmic one ever conceived by humans). I should clarify what I meant by infinities. I meant there are algorithms that for computing anything that can be solved which does not require an infinite number of steps or infinite precision to do so. So unless infinite precision or infinite steps are required to emulate brain behavior, a computer should be capable of expressing all outwardly visisble behaviors any human can. (Craig has disputed this point before) A mirror can express all outwardly visible behaviors of a human already. Put a speaker at mouth level behind the mirror, a camera at eye level, a microphone at ear level, and voila, you have a mirror zombie. The only difference with an AI zombie is that the behaviors have been approximated statistically from correlations of analyzed recordings so that the mirroring is divided up into bits and controlled mathematically. Taking this to the level of brain behavior only makes the bits much more numerous. Craig Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Saturday, April 6, 2013 2:53:53 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: If you see the image in the mirror and interact with it, then there has to be something conscious somewhere. Just like a human controlling a remote control car. The consciousness might exist somewhere else, but the car can behave as intelligently as a human. No, there only has *to have been* consciousness at some time. The 'mirror' could be a recording that you made of yourself projected behind the glass in which you can appear to interview yourself for an hour about your childhood. Could an audience tell that you were not interviewing your identical twin? What computer programming does is allow us to record formalized functions which reflect our presence which are so fragmented and numerous that they can be reconstituted from the bottom-up rather than the top down. A spoken phrase is digitally synthesized not as a conscious thought or feeling being stepped down into a phrase made of words, but as an assembly of dumb phonemes associated quantitatively to a programmatic condition. It is an an a-signifying sequence which can be replayed as as needed, without intelligence, understanding, or responsibility, but as a logicalphonetic machine...a kind of crossword puzzle for a powered filing cabinet to fill out. The intelligence of a computer program is evidence of an intelligent, conscious programmer's efforts, but that's all. Everything else is the pathetic fallacy. Craig Jason On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 10:55 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Friday, April 5, 2013 10:30:29 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 8:41 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 05 Apr 2013, at 00:07, Craig Weinberg wrote (to Jason) There are algorithms for implementing anything that does not involve infinities. Why do you think so? What algorithm implements purple or pain? What make you think that purple or pain don't involve infinities? (Also, many algorithm does involve infinities. Machines can provide name for ordinals up to the Church-Kleene omega_1^CK ordinal, and they can reason in ZF like any of us. I don't see why computers cannot beat the humans in the naming of infinities, even if that task can be considered as the least algorithmic one ever conceived by humans). I should clarify what I meant by infinities. I meant there are algorithms that for computing anything that can be solved which does not require an infinite number of steps or infinite precision to do so. So unless infinite precision or infinite steps are required to emulate brain behavior, a computer should be capable of expressing all outwardly visisble behaviors any human can. (Craig has disputed this point before) A mirror can express all outwardly visible behaviors of a human already. Put a speaker at mouth level behind the mirror, a camera at eye level, a microphone at ear level, and voila, you have a mirror zombie. The only difference with an AI zombie is that the behaviors have been approximated statistically from correlations of analyzed recordings so that the mirroring is divided up into bits and controlled mathematically. Taking this to the level of brain behavior only makes the bits much more numerous. Craig Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 1:09 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/4/2013 3:50 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 10:44 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of the total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not needed to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. Yes but one can imagine a situation where there is a simple (sufficiently-)general purpose algorithm that needs some place where to store memories and everything it has learned. In this case, we could implement such an algorithm in one of our puny laptops and get some results, and then just ride what's left of Moore's law all the way to the singularity. We don't know of any such algorithm. But it doesn't follow from human brain complexity that no such algorithm exists. Evolution doesn't necessarily do things efficiently. Because it can't start-over, it always depends on modification of what already works. But I think there are other theoretical and evolutionary reasons that would limit the scope of general intelligence. Just to take an example, mathematics is very hard for a lot of people. Mathematical thinking is not something that has been evolutionarily useful until recent times (and maybe not even now). Agreed. What puzzles me the most is not that evolution hasn't found it (although we're not sure, there's a lot we don't know about the brain still). It's that the swarm of smart people that have been looking for it haven't found it. I still have some hope that it's simple but highly counter-intuitive. Telmo. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 05 Apr 2013, at 00:07, Craig Weinberg wrote (to Jason) There are algorithms for implementing anything that does not involve infinities. Why do you think so? What algorithm implements purple or pain? What make you think that purple or pain don't involve infinities? (Also, many algorithm does involve infinities. Machines can provide name for ordinals up to the Church-Kleene omega_1^CK ordinal, and they can reason in ZF like any of us. I don't see why computers cannot beat the humans in the naming of infinities, even if that task can be considered as the least algorithmic one ever conceived by humans). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Friday, April 5, 2013 9:41:40 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2013, at 00:07, Craig Weinberg wrote (to Jason) There are algorithms for implementing anything that does not involve infinities. Why do you think so? What algorithm implements purple or pain? What make you think that purple or pain don't involve infinities? They might, but why does that make a difference? (Also, many algorithm does involve infinities. Machines can provide name for ordinals up to the Church-Kleene omega_1^CK ordinal, and they can reason in ZF like any of us. I don't see why computers cannot beat the humans in the naming of infinities, even if that task can be considered as the least algorithmic one ever conceived by humans). Why do you think that purple is a name? Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 8:41 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 05 Apr 2013, at 00:07, Craig Weinberg wrote (to Jason) There are algorithms for implementing anything that does not involve infinities. Why do you think so? What algorithm implements purple or pain? What make you think that purple or pain don't involve infinities? (Also, many algorithm does involve infinities. Machines can provide name for ordinals up to the Church-Kleene omega_1^CK ordinal, and they can reason in ZF like any of us. I don't see why computers cannot beat the humans in the naming of infinities, even if that task can be considered as the least algorithmic one ever conceived by humans). I should clarify what I meant by infinities. I meant there are algorithms that for computing anything that can be solved which does not require an infinite number of steps or infinite precision to do so. So unless infinite precision or infinite steps are required to emulate brain behavior, a computer should be capable of expressing all outwardly visisble behaviors any human can. (Craig has disputed this point before) Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Friday, April 5, 2013 10:30:29 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 8:41 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript: wrote: On 05 Apr 2013, at 00:07, Craig Weinberg wrote (to Jason) There are algorithms for implementing anything that does not involve infinities. Why do you think so? What algorithm implements purple or pain? What make you think that purple or pain don't involve infinities? (Also, many algorithm does involve infinities. Machines can provide name for ordinals up to the Church-Kleene omega_1^CK ordinal, and they can reason in ZF like any of us. I don't see why computers cannot beat the humans in the naming of infinities, even if that task can be considered as the least algorithmic one ever conceived by humans). I should clarify what I meant by infinities. I meant there are algorithms that for computing anything that can be solved which does not require an infinite number of steps or infinite precision to do so. So unless infinite precision or infinite steps are required to emulate brain behavior, a computer should be capable of expressing all outwardly visisble behaviors any human can. (Craig has disputed this point before) A mirror can express all outwardly visible behaviors of a human already. Put a speaker at mouth level behind the mirror, a camera at eye level, a microphone at ear level, and voila, you have a mirror zombie. The only difference with an AI zombie is that the behaviors have been approximated statistically from correlations of analyzed recordings so that the mirroring is divided up into bits and controlled mathematically. Taking this to the level of brain behavior only makes the bits much more numerous. Craig Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 6:43 PM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: There probably isn't a general learning algorithm there are just lots of lesser learning algorithms, Then you need a higher-level algorithm to decide which lesser algorithm to use for each situation. Yes, or use a rule of thumb to decide on a algorithm, or use lots of algorithms and check for one that gives a reasonable sounding answer. and more important than any algorithm or even deduction in general are rules of thumb, like induction. I don't understand the distinction. Rules of thumb and induction seem algorithmic to me. Within their domain of applicability algorithms can be proven to ALWAYS work; rules of thumb USUALLY work and even that can not be proven but is know through induction and sometimes, not usually but sometimes, induction can be wrong. So just like us even a computerized Jupiter brain would not be immune from error. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 03 Apr 2013, at 16:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: snip Computationalism is the opposite of reductionism. It points on the failure of the reductionist conception on numbers and machines. But it does so by swallowing whole all phenomena which are not numbers and machines. Not at all. It does that by attributing consciousness to person when supported by the relevant arithmetical relations. Therefore it is also reductionist, Not at all. You are reductionist, as you reduce those person into inexistent and see only their local bodies/arithmetical relations. and *radically so* because all realism is reduced to the consequences of arithmetic. That is just because those consequences are enough for the ontology, once we assume comp, and we prove in detail that the epistemology is already not boundable by any mathematics. I think it's telling that you deny that it is reductionist and claim that it could be 'the opposite' of reductionism. It seems like you don't care that all of the universe including our experience is dehydrated into interchangeable granular sequences, as long as it elevates and liberates arithmetic. That is comp, and it liberate indeed the robots and many arithmetical creature from reductionism. We get a view from inside, mainly private and unknown from outside for those creature. You reduce them into zombie. What would a universe of numbers really want with personhood and sensation? It is an open question if the universe of numbers want something, but it is provable that it cannot avoid the universal numbers, relatively to each other, to develop complex multileveled public and private relationships and personhood. It should seem obvious that you are the reductionist here, as you attribute consciousness to less entities than a computationalist. Indeed you invoke a pathetic fallacy where a non reductionist, like a computationalist, will invoke a possibly genuine consciousness, sensation and personhood. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Thursday, April 4, 2013 12:08:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:54 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 8:58:37 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 6:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 5:44:24 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of the total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not needed to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. There's no question that human intelligence reflects an improved survival through learning, and that that is what makes the physiological investment pay off. Right, so my point is that we should not expect things like human intelligence or human learning to be trivial or easy to get in robots, when the human brain is the most complex thing we know, and can perform more computations than even the largest super computers of today. Absolutely, but neither should we expect that complexity alone I don't think anyone has argued that complexity alone is sufficient. What else are you suggesting makes the difference? can make an assembly of inorganic parts into a subjective experience which compares to that of an animal. Both are made of the same four fundamental forces interacting with each other, why should the number of protons in the nucleus of some atoms in those organic molecules make any difference to the subject? Why does arsenic have a different effect on the body than sugar? Different forms signify different possibilities and potentials on many different levels. The number of protons causes some things on some levels by virtue of its topological potentials, but that is not the cause of order in the the cosmos, or awareness. Gold could be any number of protons in a nucleus, it just happens to be using that configuration, just like the ip address of a website does not determine its content. What led you to chose the chemical elements as the origin of sense and feeling, as opposed to higher level structures (neurology, circuits, etc.) or lower level structures (quarks, gluons, electrons)? The chemical elements have nothing to do with the origin of sense and feeling at all, just like the letters of the alphabet have nothing to do with the origin of Shakespeare. Shakespeare used words, words are made of certain combinations of letters and not others, which is what makes them words. What I question is why that improvement would entail awareness. A human has to be aware to do the things it does, because zombies are not possible. That's begging the question. Not quite, I provided an argument for my reasoning. If your argument is A = B because B = A then you are still begging the question. What is your objection, that zombies are possible, or that zombies are not possible but that doesn't mean something that in all ways appears conscious must be conscious? My objection is that the premise of zombies is broken to begin with. It asks the wrong question and makes the wrong assumption about consciousness. There is no 'in all ways appears'...it is always 'in all ways appears to X under Y circumstance. Anything that is not exactly what it we might assume it is would be a 'zombie' to some extent. A human does not have to be aware to do the things that it does, which is proved by blindsight, sleepwalking, brainwashing, etc. A human may, in reality, have to be aware to perform all of the functions that we do, but if comp were true, that would not be the case. Your examples of blind sight are not a disproof of the separability of function and awareness, I understand why you think that, but ultimately it is proof of
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:06 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Thursday, April 4, 2013 12:08:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:54 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 8:58:37 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 6:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 5:44:24 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of the total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not needed to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. There's no question that human intelligence reflects an improved survival through learning, and that that is what makes the physiological investment pay off. Right, so my point is that we should not expect things like human intelligence or human learning to be trivial or easy to get in robots, when the human brain is the most complex thing we know, and can perform more computations than even the largest super computers of today. Absolutely, but neither should we expect that complexity alone I don't think anyone has argued that complexity alone is sufficient. What else are you suggesting makes the difference? To implement human learning an intelligence we need the right algorithm and sufficient computational power to implement it. can make an assembly of inorganic parts into a subjective experience which compares to that of an animal. Both are made of the same four fundamental forces interacting with each other, why should the number of protons in the nucleus of some atoms in those organic molecules make any difference to the subject? Why does arsenic have a different effect on the body than sugar? Different forms signify different possibilities and potentials on many different levels. The number of protons causes some things on some levels by virtue of its topological potentials, but that is not the cause of order in the the cosmos, or awareness. Gold could be any number of protons in a nucleus, it just happens to be using that configuration, just like the ip address of a website does not determine its content. If your theory is that sense is primitive then how do you justify your belief that certain materials are associated with certain possibilities of experience? What led you to chose the chemical elements as the origin of sense and feeling, as opposed to higher level structures (neurology, circuits, etc.) or lower level structures (quarks, gluons, electrons)? The chemical elements have nothing to do with the origin of sense and feeling at all, just like the letters of the alphabet have nothing to do with the origin of Shakespeare. Shakespeare used words, words are made of certain combinations of letters and not others, which is what makes them words. Exactly, I just think the alphabet for spelling different conscious states exists at a lower level than you do, e.g., in the logic of recursive relationships, rather than in atomic elements. What I question is why that improvement would entail awareness. A human has to be aware to do the things it does, because zombies are not possible. That's begging the question. Not quite, I provided an argument for my reasoning. If your argument is A = B because B = A then you are still begging the question. You are arguing it is possible to see without seeing, which I equate with zombies, and which I think is logically inconsistent. It is a proof by contradiction that shows it is not possible to see without seeing. What is your objection, that zombies are possible, or that zombies are not possible but that doesn't mean something that in all ways appears conscious must be conscious? My objection is that the premise of zombies is broken to begin with.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Thursday, April 4, 2013 2:31:09 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:06 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Thursday, April 4, 2013 12:08:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:54 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 8:58:37 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 6:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 5:44:24 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of the total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not needed to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. There's no question that human intelligence reflects an improved survival through learning, and that that is what makes the physiological investment pay off. Right, so my point is that we should not expect things like human intelligence or human learning to be trivial or easy to get in robots, when the human brain is the most complex thing we know, and can perform more computations than even the largest super computers of today. Absolutely, but neither should we expect that complexity alone I don't think anyone has argued that complexity alone is sufficient. What else are you suggesting makes the difference? To implement human learning an intelligence we need the right algorithm and sufficient computational power to implement it. There is a curious dualism to computation. All of computation is based on representation - on the ability of the computer to set equivalence arbitrarily between any two generic tokens. This is the power of computers - anything can be scanned, downloaded, typed, spoken, etc and be treated as collections of generic cardinality. At the same time, another important feature of computation is the ability to take those very same kinds of collections and treat them as operational commands - ordinal sequences. We have then this binary distinction between that which is treated with absolute indifference and that which is treated as unquestioned author. This lack of subtlety is what characterizes machines. What it means to be mechanical or robotic is not only the absence of nuanced gradation between literal obedience to each discrete order and anesthetic generalization of every input and output, but it also means the absence of the perpendicular range of feelings and emotions which non-machines use to modulate their sensitivity and motivation directly. The aesthetic dimension is missing entirely in any possible machine. It doesn't matter how clever or correct the algorithm, how plentiful the processing resources, no collection of representations can ever conjure an authentic presence which is proprietary, caring, feeling, understanding, motivated, inspired, etc. human or otherwise. These qualities do not fall within the categories of blind execution or blind equivalence, they require personal investment. An algorithm is by definition impersonal and automatic, so that it can only provide ever more sophisticated patterns of the same generic command-data structure. An algorithm can simulate learning because learning is a function of organization of experiences rather than experiences. Learning is a problem of acquiring and retrieving X rather than inventing or appreciating X. can make an assembly of inorganic parts into a subjective experience which compares to that of an animal. Both are made of the same four fundamental forces interacting with each other, why should the number of protons in the nucleus of some atoms in those organic molecules make any difference to the subject? Why does arsenic have a different effect on the body than sugar? Different forms signify different
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 10:39 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Thursday, April 4, 2013 2:31:09 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:06 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Thursday, April 4, 2013 12:08:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:54 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 8:58:37 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 6:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 5:44:24 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of the total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not needed to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. There's no question that human intelligence reflects an improved survival through learning, and that that is what makes the physiological investment pay off. Right, so my point is that we should not expect things like human intelligence or human learning to be trivial or easy to get in robots, when the human brain is the most complex thing we know, and can perform more computations than even the largest super computers of today. Absolutely, but neither should we expect that complexity alone I don't think anyone has argued that complexity alone is sufficient. What else are you suggesting makes the difference? To implement human learning an intelligence we need the right algorithm and sufficient computational power to implement it. There is a curious dualism to computation. All of computation is based on representation - on the ability of the computer to set equivalence arbitrarily between any two generic tokens. This is the power of computers - anything can be scanned, downloaded, typed, spoken, etc and be treated as collections of generic cardinality. At the same time, another important feature of computation is the ability to take those very same kinds of collections and treat them as operational commands - ordinal sequences. We have then this binary distinction between that which is treated with absolute indifference and that which is treated as unquestioned author. How data vs instruction memory is distinguished comes down to an implementation detail, for example, in the Harvard architecture they are physically distinct: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_architecture#Contrast_with_von_Neumann_architectures As a security measure, most modern processors distinguish data memory (which is writable but not executable) and program memory (which is executable but not writable), in essense, this feature implements a virtual Harvard architecture. In any event though, I don't see how this is related to human learning or intelligence. This lack of subtlety is what characterizes machines. What it means to be mechanical or robotic is not only the absence of nuanced gradation between literal obedience to each discrete order and anesthetic generalization of every input and output, but it also means the absence of the perpendicular range of feelings and emotions which non-machines use to modulate their sensitivity and motivation directly. The aesthetic dimension is missing entirely in any possible machine. It doesn't matter how clever or correct the algorithm, how plentiful the processing resources, no collection of representations can ever conjure an authentic presence which is proprietary, caring, feeling, understanding, motivated, inspired, etc. human or otherwise. You are assuming humans are not machines, for which I have seen no evidence. If you have any please share it. These qualities do not fall within the categories of blind execution or blind equivalence, they require personal investment. An algorithm is by definition impersonal What about an algorithm that implements a person?
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
Somebody wrote: You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. True, and a powerful brain won't help you if you have no education or memories. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. There probably isn't a general learning algorithm there are just lots of lesser learning algorithms, and more important than any algorithm or even deduction in general are rules of thumb, like induction. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 11:44 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/3/2013 2:44 PM, Jason Resch wrote: You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Then do you think there could be philosophical zombies? Yes. How would you operationally test a robot to see whether it was (a) intelligent I don't see intelligence as a binary property, but relative to goals. The classical answer for human-like intelligence is something like the Turing test, but I don't like it. I don't think that a generic AI should be measured by it's ability to fool us into making us think it's human. Instead I'd have to ask you first what do you want the robot for? Personally I would want robots to free Humanity from unwanted labor. This is a high-level goal that requires what I consider to be generic AI. Can it learn all sorts of tasks like driving a car, working in a factory, following fuzzy requirements, etc etc? (b) conscious? I don't believe that such a test can exist. I don't even think we can know if a glass of water is conscious. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 6:34 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Somebody wrote: You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. True, and a powerful brain won't help you if you have no education or memories. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. There probably isn't a general learning algorithm there are just lots of lesser learning algorithms, Then you need a higher-level algorithm to decide which lesser algorithm to use for each situation. It also has to be able to learn the correct algorithm to use from its repertoire when new situations are encountered. This ensamble of algorithms ends up being a general learning algorithm. and more important than any algorithm or even deduction in general are rules of thumb, like induction. I don't understand the distinction. Rules of thumb and induction seem algorithmic to me. Even instinct, assuming it comes from evolution (another algorithm). John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 4/4/2013 3:35 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 11:44 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/3/2013 2:44 PM, Jason Resch wrote: You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Then do you think there could be philosophical zombies? Yes. Could it be that some humans are zombies, or do you assume that to be a zombie would mean being physically different from a human being? How would you operationally test a robot to see whether it was (a) intelligent I don't see intelligence as a binary property, but relative to goals. The classical answer for human-like intelligence is something like the Turing test, but I don't like it. I don't think that a generic AI should be measured by it's ability to fool us into making us think it's human. Instead I'd have to ask you first what do you want the robot for? Personally I would want robots to free Humanity from unwanted labor. This is a high-level goal that requires what I consider to be generic AI. Can it learn all sorts of tasks like driving a car, working in a factory, following fuzzy requirements, etc Yes, I agree with that. I'd say intelligence is being able to learn to be competent at many tasks, but there is no completely general intelligence. I think for social beings it includes being able to explain, to give reasons, which implies some empathy. etc? (b) conscious? I don't believe that such a test can exist. I don't even think we can know if a glass of water is conscious. Have you ever been unconscious? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 10:44 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of the total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not needed to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. Yes but one can imagine a situation where there is a simple (sufficiently-)general purpose algorithm that needs some place where to store memories and everything it has learned. In this case, we could implement such an algorithm in one of our puny laptops and get some results, and then just ride what's left of Moore's law all the way to the singularity. We don't know of any such algorithm. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 4/4/2013 3:50 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 10:44 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.com wrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of the total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not needed to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. Yes but one can imagine a situation where there is a simple (sufficiently-)general purpose algorithm that needs some place where to store memories and everything it has learned. In this case, we could implement such an algorithm in one of our puny laptops and get some results, and then just ride what's left of Moore's law all the way to the singularity. We don't know of any such algorithm. But it doesn't follow from human brain complexity that no such algorithm exists. Evolution doesn't necessarily do things efficiently. Because it can't start-over, it always depends on modification of what already works. But I think there are other theoretical and evolutionary reasons that would limit the scope of general intelligence. Just to take an example, mathematics is very hard for a lot of people. Mathematical thinking is not something that has been evolutionarily useful until recent times (and maybe not even now). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of the total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not needed to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 4/3/2013 2:44 PM, Jason Resch wrote: You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Then do you think there could be philosophical zombies? How would you operationally test a robot to see whether it was (a) intelligent (b) conscious? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 5:44:24 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comjavascript: wrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of the total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not needed to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. There's no question that human intelligence reflects an improved survival through learning, and that that is what makes the physiological investment pay off. What I question is why that improvement would entail awareness. There are a lot of neurons in our gut as well, and assimilation of nutrients is undoubtedly complex and important to survival, yet we are not compelled to insist that there must be some conscious experience to manage that intelligence. Learning is complex, but awareness itself is simple. Craig Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
Brent, You're mail client is malfunctioning again, you are quoting something Telmo wrote as coming from me. My opinion on the matter of philosophical zombies is that they are logically inconsistent. Jason On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 5:44 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/3/2013 2:44 PM, Jason Resch wrote: You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Then do you think there could be philosophical zombies? How would you operationally test a robot to see whether it was (a) intelligent (b) conscious? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.comeverything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.**comeverything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_outhttps://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 6:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 5:44:24 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of the total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not needed to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. There's no question that human intelligence reflects an improved survival through learning, and that that is what makes the physiological investment pay off. Right, so my point is that we should not expect things like human intelligence or human learning to be trivial or easy to get in robots, when the human brain is the most complex thing we know, and can perform more computations than even the largest super computers of today. What I question is why that improvement would entail awareness. A human has to be aware to do the things it does, because zombies are not possible. Your examples of blind sight are not a disproof of the separability of function and awareness, only examples of broken links in communication (quite similar to split brain patients). There are a lot of neurons in our gut as well, and assimilation of nutrients is undoubtedly complex and important to survival, yet we are not compelled to insist that there must be some conscious experience to manage that intelligence. Learning is complex, but awareness itself is simple. I think the nerves in the gut can manifest as awareness, such as cravings for certain foods when the body realizes it is deficient in some particular nutrient. Afterall, what is the point of all those nerves if they have no impact on behavior? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
Hmm. You're right I was intending to ask Telmo that question. Brent On 4/3/2013 5:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote: Brent, You're mail client is malfunctioning again, you are quoting something Telmo wrote as coming from me. My opinion on the matter of philosophical zombies is that they are logically inconsistent. Jason On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 5:44 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/3/2013 2:44 PM, Jason Resch wrote: You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Then do you think there could be philosophical zombies? How would you operationally test a robot to see whether it was (a) intelligent (b) conscious? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.3267 / Virus Database: 3162/6222 - Release Date: 04/03/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 8:58:37 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 6:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 5:44:24 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of the total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not needed to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. There's no question that human intelligence reflects an improved survival through learning, and that that is what makes the physiological investment pay off. Right, so my point is that we should not expect things like human intelligence or human learning to be trivial or easy to get in robots, when the human brain is the most complex thing we know, and can perform more computations than even the largest super computers of today. Absolutely, but neither should we expect that complexity alone can make an assembly of inorganic parts into a subjective experience which compares to that of an animal. What I question is why that improvement would entail awareness. A human has to be aware to do the things it does, because zombies are not possible. That's begging the question. Anything that is not exactly what it we might assume it is would be a 'zombie' to some extent. A human does not have to be aware to do the things that it does, which is proved by blindsight, sleepwalking, brainwashing, etc. A human may, in reality, have to be aware to perform all of the functions that we do, but if comp were true, that would not be the case. Your examples of blind sight are not a disproof of the separability of function and awareness, I understand why you think that, but ultimately it is proof of exactly that. only examples of broken links in communication (quite similar to split brain patients). A broken link in communication which prevents you from being aware of the experience which is informing you is the same thing as function being separate from awareness. The end result is that it is not necessary to experience any conscious qualia to receive optical information. There is no difference functionally between a broken link in communication and separability of function and awareness. The awareness is broken in the dead link, but the function is retained, thus they are in fact separate. There are a lot of neurons in our gut as well, and assimilation of nutrients is undoubtedly complex and important to survival, yet we are not compelled to insist that there must be some conscious experience to manage that intelligence. Learning is complex, but awareness itself is simple. I think the nerves in the gut can manifest as awareness, such as cravings for certain foods when the body realizes it is deficient in some particular nutrient. Afterall, what is the point of all those nerves if they have no impact on behavior? Oh I agree, because my view is panexperiential. The gut doesn't have the kind of awareness that a human being has as a whole, because the other organs of the body are not as significant as the brain is to the organism. If we are going by the comp assumption though, then there is an implication that nothing has any awareness unless it is running a very sophisticated program. Craig Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:54 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 8:58:37 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 6:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 5:44:24 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote: On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 at 7:58 AM, Telmo Menezes te...@telmomenezes.comwrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? You're making the same mistake as John Clark, confusing the physical computer with the algorithm. Powerful computers don't help us if we don't have the right algorithm. The central mystery of AI, in my opinion, is why on earth haven't we found a general learning algorithm yet. Either it's too complex for our monkey brains, or you're right that computation is not the whole story. I believe in the former, but not I'm not sure, of course. Notice that I'm talking about generic intelligence, not consciousness, which I strongly believe to be two distinct phenomena. Another point toward Telmo's suspicion that learning is complex: If learning and thinking intelligently at a human level were computationally easy, biology wouldn't have evolved to use trillions of synapses. The brain is very expensive metabolically (using 20 - 25% of the total body's energy, about 100 Watts). If so many neurons were not needed to do what we do, natural selection would have selected those humans with fewer neurons and reduced food requirements. There's no question that human intelligence reflects an improved survival through learning, and that that is what makes the physiological investment pay off. Right, so my point is that we should not expect things like human intelligence or human learning to be trivial or easy to get in robots, when the human brain is the most complex thing we know, and can perform more computations than even the largest super computers of today. Absolutely, but neither should we expect that complexity alone I don't think anyone has argued that complexity alone is sufficient. can make an assembly of inorganic parts into a subjective experience which compares to that of an animal. Both are made of the same four fundamental forces interacting with each other, why should the number of protons in the nucleus of some atoms in those organic molecules make any difference to the subject? What led you to chose the chemical elements as the origin of sense and feeling, as opposed to higher level structures (neurology, circuits, etc.) or lower level structures (quarks, gluons, electrons)? What I question is why that improvement would entail awareness. A human has to be aware to do the things it does, because zombies are not possible. That's begging the question. Not quite, I provided an argument for my reasoning. What is your objection, that zombies are possible, or that zombies are not possible but that doesn't mean something that in all ways appears conscious must be conscious? Anything that is not exactly what it we might assume it is would be a 'zombie' to some extent. A human does not have to be aware to do the things that it does, which is proved by blindsight, sleepwalking, brainwashing, etc. A human may, in reality, have to be aware to perform all of the functions that we do, but if comp were true, that would not be the case. Your examples of blind sight are not a disproof of the separability of function and awareness, I understand why you think that, but ultimately it is proof of exactly that. only examples of broken links in communication (quite similar to split brain patients). A broken link in communication which prevents you from being aware of the experience which is informing you is the same thing as function being separate from awareness. The end result is that it is not necessary to experience any conscious qualia to receive optical information. There is no difference functionally between a broken link in communication and separability of function and awareness. The awareness is broken in the dead link, but the function is retained, thus they are in fact separate. So you take the split brain patient's word for it that he didn't see the word PAN flashed on the screen http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMLzP1VCANot=1m50s Perhaps his left hemisphere didn't see it, but his right hemisphere certainly did, as his right hemisphere is able to draw a picture of that pan (something in his brain saw it). I can't experience life through your eyes right now because our brains are disconnected, should you take my word for my assertion that you must not be experiencing anything because the I in Jason's skull doesn't experience any visual stimulus from Craig's eyes? There are a lot of neurons in our gut as well, and assimilation of nutrients is undoubtedly complex and important to survival, yet
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 02 Apr 2013, at 15:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 4:44:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Apr 2013, at 17:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, April 1, 2013 6:12:48 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 Mar 2013, at 21:54, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 31, 2013 10:59:22 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Mar 2013, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: If, instead of a video screen and joystick, I had an arcade game fitted with a speaker and microphone, I could have another computer programmed to play PacMan on the first machine using only modem-like screeching to satisfy the logic of the PacMan game. Instead of graphic ghosts and visible maze, there would be squealing sound representing what would have been the pixels on a screen. There would be no difference for this equipment at all. As long as the representation was isomorphic, it would make no difference to either computer that there was no visual experience of PacMan at all but instead just one dimensional noise streaming back and forth between two machines. If you want me to believe that a machine could support an experience, then you have to explain why and how that is even a remote possibility without begging the question by smuggling in our own experience. If I do not agree that we are only machines, then I do not agree that our experience is evidence of machine experience. I have never said it is an evidence. It is just by definition of comp, which is my working hypothesis. You are the one saying that comp is false. That means that from the start, the only way to suggest that machines can't be conscious is to suggest that people can't be conscious, This does not follow from what I said. All I say is that you make a stroing statement: machines cannot support thinking, but you don't provide any argument, at least none that I can understand. You refer to your experience, and indeed vindicate the right to do that in some post. The argument that I have provided (repeatedly) is that machines are necessarily assembled as a configuration of forms in space according to an agenda or motivation which is foreign to the assembly. A living organism is not assembled but rather its growth and reproduction are autopoietic and native to the circumstance of its initiation as an event in time. My position is that all natural bodies are a reflection of some set of sensory-motor experiences on some level of description (speed, scale) and that forms and functions are driven by sense and motive. Artificial systems are not biological bodies since they are assembled rather than reproduced from a single cell, therefore the quality of the sense experiences are limited to the inorganic range of quality. They lack the experience of caring about their own survival, and consequently have no capacity for empathy, warmth, understanding, or emotion, which are, IMO the roots of intelligence which cannot be substituted by abstract rules. I tend to agree with you, insofar as it looks like what the machines already tell me. You are good in phenomenology, but bad in logic, and it is sad, because it prevents you to appreciate that the machines might agree with you, somehow. But now you will have to convince those machines that they are machines, and some of them, like you, will have some serious difficulty to swallow the pill. Comp share this with the Gödelian sentence: it asserts at some level its own non believability. The more you understand comp, the less you can believe in it. It is normal. which would be sophistry. I'm not playing that game though. My interest is in understanding the nature of consciousness and its relation to physics and information. What I have come up with explains exactly why machine functions cannot be conflated with experience, and why presentations cannot arise from representations alone. If a machine works without an experience, why invent any such thing as experience? If you accept the antic theory of knowledge, then machines, once above the Löbian complexity threshold, cannot not have experience. What's the antic theory of knowledge? That knowing p - p, knowing p - knowing knowing p, that knowing (p - q) - knowing p - knowing q. . the modus ponens rule, and the necessitation rule from A infer knowing A. It the modal logic known as S4. What relates this to a complexity threshold and the possibility of experience? It is a bit technical, but in a nutshell, it means that such machines can refute Socrates' refutation of Theaetetus proposal to define knowledge by the true opinion. Church's thesis rehabilitates Pythagoras, and Gödel's incompleteness rehabilitates the Theaetetus theory of knowledge, and this by giving the classical theory of knowledge, with one axiom more, to be precise. I tried to look it up but nobody on the internet
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 31 Mar 2013, at 21:54, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, March 31, 2013 10:59:22 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Mar 2013, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: If, instead of a video screen and joystick, I had an arcade game fitted with a speaker and microphone, I could have another computer programmed to play PacMan on the first machine using only modem-like screeching to satisfy the logic of the PacMan game. Instead of graphic ghosts and visible maze, there would be squealing sound representing what would have been the pixels on a screen. There would be no difference for this equipment at all. As long as the representation was isomorphic, it would make no difference to either computer that there was no visual experience of PacMan at all but instead just one dimensional noise streaming back and forth between two machines. If you want me to believe that a machine could support an experience, then you have to explain why and how that is even a remote possibility without begging the question by smuggling in our own experience. If I do not agree that we are only machines, then I do not agree that our experience is evidence of machine experience. I have never said it is an evidence. It is just by definition of comp, which is my working hypothesis. You are the one saying that comp is false. If a machine works without an experience, why invent any such thing as experience? If you accept the antic theory of knowledge, then machines, once above the Löbian complexity threshold, cannot not have experience. If Donkey Kong works just as well without anyone seeing him, then why have a modem sound either? Just connect the two machines directly. The pathetic fallacy is not a logical fallacy. No, it's more important than logic. I think the pathetic fallacy is, as a fallacy, itself a pathetic fallacy. From which I can't conclude. I understand that is your position, but I think that is a radically theoretical view which doesn't apply to the universe in which we actually live. In this universe, not everything that can be programmed to smile on command has emotions. We cannot program emotion. We can program help yourself, or multiply yourself. Emotion have simple roots, but get quickly highly entangled in a non predictible way with the intensional variant of self- reference when emerging in long story. You just say that you believe that comp is false, but machines have naturally that belief, as comp is provably counter-intuitive. That's just comp feeding back on its own confirmation bias. Comp is a machine which can only see itself. It's the inevitable inversion meme which arises from mistaking forms and functions for reality rather than the capacity to project and receive them. Yes, comp feedback in this way. You don't like that, apparently, but that's not an argument. I am not defending comp, I am just criticizing the reason you provide to think that comp is false. I have repeatedly provided a whole list of reasons but your criticism is not really offering any criticism other than that you don't think my view has any merit. On the contrary. I do see merit in some serious non-comp theory. I am criticizing only your philosophy/opinion, and non valid defense of it, that it is obvious that machines cannot support persons. You don't explain why though. I am the one asking why. You are saying that a theory is wrong, and I just show that your reasoning is non valid. It only shows that it is hard for a person to believe she is locally supported by a machine. But hard to believe is not an argument. There is no specific challenge to all of the things I mentioned. I say pathetic fallacy, you say you don't respect it. I say the Map is not the Territory and the Menu is not the Meal but you don't seem to accept that these are comprehensible ideas. They just comfort opinion, without making a point. All seems to evaporate into a smoke screen and impatience. You don't take the argument seriously and always fall back on my ignorance of mathematical theory. My arguments question the foundation of math itself though. That makes your point even weaker. It is up to you to either abandon your strong assertion that comp is false. You can study non-comp without it. I respect and encourage alternative to comp. But you says that comp is false, and just explain why you believe so, without showing a contradiction in comp. I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't see that I am being careless at all. Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation, to be frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the theory of other people. I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness. What other people think and do is none of my business. You are asserting without argument that a
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 30 Mar 2013, at 13:58, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:52:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, March 27, 2013 1:03:27 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Craig, On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: From the Quora http://www.quora.com/Board-Games/What-are-some-fun-games-to-play-on-an-8x8-Checkerboard-besides-chess-checkers This is interesting because I think it shows the weakness of the one- dimensional view of intelligence as computation. Whether a program can be designed to win or not is beside the point, That's not really fair, is it? Why not? How else can I counter your argument against intelligence as computation if I am not allowed to use computation? My example would not prove that it's what the brain does, but it would prove that it can be. You are arguing that it cannot be. I'm arguing that a screw is not the same thing as a nail because when you hammer a screw it doesn't go in as easily as a nail and when you use a screwdriver on a nail it doesn't go in at all. Ok. Sometimes the hammer is a better tool and sometimes the driver is. As humans, we have a great hammer and a decent screwdriver. A computer can't hammer anything, but it has a power screwdriver with a potentially infinite set of tips. Ok, but if I understand your ideas, you're claiming that the hammer is also the fundamental stuff that reality is made of. Sorry if I'm misrepresenting what you're saying. If I'm not, I don't understand why computers can't have the hammer. as it is the difference between this game and chess which hints at the differences between bottom-up mechanism and top-down intentionality I see what you're saying but I disagree. It just highlights the weak points of tree-search approaches like min-max. What I gather from what happens when one plays Arimaa (or Go): due to combinatorial explosion, players (even human) play quite far away from the perfect game(s). The way we deal with combinatorial explosion is by mapping the game into something more abstract. How do you know that any such mapping is going on? It seems like begging the question. I don't know. I have a strong intuition in it's favor for a few reasons, scientific and otherwise. Have you tried thinking about it another way? Where does 'mapping' come from? Can you begin mapping without already having a map? Yes, I think I begin with a map based on previous experiences and then improve it as I discover it's weaknesses. I think the original map came from brute-force experimentation while my brain was developing in my early months of live. But this is just wild guessing, of course. The non-scientific one is introspection. I try to observe my own thought process and I think I use such mappings. Maybe you do. Maybe a lot of people do. I don't think that I do though. I think that a game can be played directly without abstracting it into another game. Ok, I believe you but I don't have the same experience. My wife does. She works in a creative field and she is very intuitive, with the typical aversion for math. She can beat me at chess quite easily, without appearing to resort to conscious strategic thinking. She describes it as doing what feels right. The scientific reason is that this type of approach has been used successfully to tackle AI problems that could not be solved with classical search algorithms. I don't doubt that this game is likely to be solved eventually, maybe even soon, but the fact remains that it exposes some fundamentally different aesthetics between computation and intelligence. This is impressive to me because any game is already hugely biased in favor of computation. A game is ideal to be reduced to a set of logical rules, it's turn play is already a recursive enumeration. A game is already a computer program. Even so, we can see that it is possible to use a game to bypass computational values - of generic, unconscious repetition, and hint at something completely different and opposite. Put another way, if there were top-down non-computational effort going into the game play, why would it look any different than what we see? Our brain seems to be quite good at generating such mappings. We do it with chess too, I'm sure. Notice that, when two humans play Arimaa, both can count on each other's inabilities to play close to the perfect game. As with games with incomplete information, like Poker, part of it is modelling the opponent. Perhaps not surprisingly, artificial neural networks are quite good at producing useful mappings of this sort, and on predicting behaviours with incomplete information. Great progress has been achieved lately with deep
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 30 Mar 2013, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 30, 2013 7:08:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:28:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of others. You can't do that. You can say something like,: I read some strong AI proponents and they dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make affirmative statement on a large class of people. That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about large classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers on the deep questions, or that they don't see themselves as machines. What if Strong AI is a program...a meme or spandrel? What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your hair you become a zombie? Then people would avoid cutting their hair I would imagine. Unless they were suffering. But seriously, what makes you think that Strong AI is not itself a rogue machine, implanted in minds to satisfy some purely quantitative inevitability? You are coherent because you search a physical theory of consciousness, and that is indeed incompatible with comp. I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more seek a sensory-motive theory of physics. I will wait for serious progresses. But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please. That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no more question than comp does. You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what you assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But you do something quite different; you pretend that comp is false. So we ask for an argument, and there you beg the question, by using all the time that comp must be false in your argument, and that is begging the question. Comp is false not because I want it to be or assume it is, but because I understand that experience through time can be the only fundamental principle, and bodies across space is derived. I have laid out these reasons for this many times - how easy it is to succumb to the pathetic fallacy, how unlikely it is for experience to have any possible utility for arithmetic, how absent any sign of personality is in machines, how we can easily demonstrate information processing without particular qualia arising, etc. These are just off the top of my head. Anywhere you look in reality you can find huge gaping holes in Comp's assumptions if you choose to look, but you aren't going to see them if you are only listening to the echo chamber of Comp itself. Indeed, if we limit ourselves to only mathematical logic to look at mathematical logic, we are not going to notice that the entire universe of presentation is missing. Comp has a presentation problem, and it is not going to go away. Well if you *understand* that time is fundamental, then comp is false for you. I understand that *experience* (through 'time') is fundamental, only because no other option ultimately makes as much sense. OK, but you never explain why. Of course experience are very important, but why could a machine not support one, when it can be shown that they will develop talk on their experience, and, if instrosoecive enough, be confronted to the same feeling that it has to be fundamental, and they are correct from the first person view. The pathetic fallacy is not a logical fallacy. No, it's more important than logic. I think the pathetic fallacy is, as a fallacy, itself a pathetic fallacy. From which I can't conclude. You just say that you believe that comp is false, but machines have naturally that belief, as comp is provably counter-intuitive. That's just comp feeding back on its own confirmation bias. Comp is a machine which can only see itself. It's the inevitable inversion meme which arises from mistaking forms and functions for reality rather than the capacity to project and receive them. Yes, comp feedback in this way. You don't like that, apparently, but that's not an argument. I am not defending comp, I am just criticizing the reason you provide to think that comp is false. I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't see that I am being careless at all. Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation, to be frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the theory of other people. I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness. What other people think and do is none of my
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Sun, Mar 31, 2013 at 4:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Mar 2013, at 13:58, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:52:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, March 27, 2013 1:03:27 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Craig, On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: From the Quora http://www.quora.com/Board-**Gam** es/What-are-some-fun-games-**to-**play-on-an-8x8-**Checkerboard-** besides-chess-**checkershttp://www.quora.com/Board-Games/What-are-some-fun-games-to-play-on-an-8x8-Checkerboard-besides-chess-checkers This is interesting because I think it shows the weakness of the one-dimensional view of intelligence as computation. Whether a program can be designed to win or not is beside the point, That's not really fair, is it? Why not? How else can I counter your argument against intelligence as computation if I am not allowed to use computation? My example would not prove that it's what the brain does, but it would prove that it can be. You are arguing that it cannot be. I'm arguing that a screw is not the same thing as a nail because when you hammer a screw it doesn't go in as easily as a nail and when you use a screwdriver on a nail it doesn't go in at all. Ok. Sometimes the hammer is a better tool and sometimes the driver is. As humans, we have a great hammer and a decent screwdriver. A computer can't hammer anything, but it has a power screwdriver with a potentially infinite set of tips. Ok, but if I understand your ideas, you're claiming that the hammer is also the fundamental stuff that reality is made of. Sorry if I'm misrepresenting what you're saying. If I'm not, I don't understand why computers can't have the hammer. as it is the difference between this game and chess which hints at the differences between bottom-up mechanism and top-down intentionality I see what you're saying but I disagree. It just highlights the weak points of tree-search approaches like min-max. What I gather from what happens when one plays Arimaa (or Go): due to combinatorial explosion, players (even human) play quite far away from the perfect game(s). The way we deal with combinatorial explosion is by mapping the game into something more abstract. How do you know that any such mapping is going on? It seems like begging the question. I don't know. I have a strong intuition in it's favor for a few reasons, scientific and otherwise. Have you tried thinking about it another way? Where does 'mapping' come from? Can you begin mapping without already having a map? Yes, I think I begin with a map based on previous experiences and then improve it as I discover it's weaknesses. I think the original map came from brute-force experimentation while my brain was developing in my early months of live. But this is just wild guessing, of course. The non-scientific one is introspection. I try to observe my own thought process and I think I use such mappings. Maybe you do. Maybe a lot of people do. I don't think that I do though. I think that a game can be played directly without abstracting it into another game. Ok, I believe you but I don't have the same experience. My wife does. She works in a creative field and she is very intuitive, with the typical aversion for math. She can beat me at chess quite easily, without appearing to resort to conscious strategic thinking. She describes it as doing what feels right. The scientific reason is that this type of approach has been used successfully to tackle AI problems that could not be solved with classical search algorithms. I don't doubt that this game is likely to be solved eventually, maybe even soon, but the fact remains that it exposes some fundamentally different aesthetics between computation and intelligence. This is impressive to me because any game is already hugely biased in favor of computation. A game is ideal to be reduced to a set of logical rules, it's turn play is already a recursive enumeration. A game is already a computer program. Even so, we can see that it is possible to use a game to bypass computational values - of generic, unconscious repetition, and hint at something completely different and opposite. Put another way, if there were top-down non-computational effort going into the game play, why would it look any different than what we see? Our brain seems to be quite good at generating such mappings. We do it with chess too, I'm sure. Notice that, when two humans play Arimaa, both can count on each other's inabilities to play close to the perfect game. As with games with incomplete information, like Poker, part of it is modelling the opponent. Perhaps not surprisingly, artificial neural networks
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Sunday, March 31, 2013 10:59:22 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Mar 2013, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, March 30, 2013 7:08:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:28:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of others. You can't do that. You can say something like,: I read some strong AI proponents and they dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make affirmative statement on a large class of people. That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about large classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers on the deep questions, or that they don't see themselves as machines. What if Strong AI is a program...a meme or spandrel? What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your hair you become a zombie? Then people would avoid cutting their hair I would imagine. Unless they were suffering. But seriously, what makes you think that Strong AI is not itself a rogue machine, implanted in minds to satisfy some purely quantitative inevitability? You are coherent because you search a physical theory of consciousness, and that is indeed incompatible with comp. I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more seek a sensory-motive theory of physics. I will wait for serious progresses. But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please. That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no more question than comp does. You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what you assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But you do something quite different; you pretend that comp is false. So we ask for an argument, and there you beg the question, by using all the time that comp must be false in your argument, and that is begging the question. Comp is false not because I want it to be or assume it is, but because I understand that experience through time can be the only fundamental principle, and bodies across space is derived. I have laid out these reasons for this many times - how easy it is to succumb to the pathetic fallacy, how unlikely it is for experience to have any possible utility for arithmetic, how absent any sign of personality is in machines, how we can easily demonstrate information processing without particular qualia arising, etc. These are just off the top of my head. Anywhere you look in reality you can find huge gaping holes in Comp's assumptions if you choose to look, but you aren't going to see them if you are only listening to the echo chamber of Comp itself. Indeed, if we limit ourselves to only mathematical logic to look at mathematical logic, we are not going to notice that the entire universe of presentation is missing. Comp has a presentation problem, and it is not going to go away. Well if you *understand* that time is fundamental, then comp is false for you. I understand that *experience* (through 'time') is fundamental, only because no other option ultimately makes as much sense. OK, but you never explain why. Of course experience are very important, but why could a machine not support one, when it can be shown that they will develop talk on their experience, and, if instrosoecive enough, be confronted to the same feeling that it has to be fundamental, and they are correct from the first person view. If, instead of a video screen and joystick, I had an arcade game fitted with a speaker and microphone, I could have another computer programmed to play PacMan on the first machine using only modem-like screeching to satisfy the logic of the PacMan game. Instead of graphic ghosts and visible maze, there would be squealing sound representing what would have been the pixels on a screen. There would be no difference for this equipment at all. As long as the representation was isomorphic, it would make no difference to either computer that there was no visual experience of PacMan at all but instead just one dimensional noise streaming back and forth between two machines. If you want me to believe that a machine could support an experience, then you have to explain why and how that is even a remote possibility without begging the question by smuggling in our own experience. If I do not agree that we are only machines, then I do not agree that our experience is evidence of machine experience. If a machine works without an experience, why invent any such thing as experience? If Donkey
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:28:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of others. You can't do that. You can say something like,: I read some strong AI proponents and they dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make affirmative statement on a large class of people. That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about large classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers on the deep questions, or that they don't see themselves as machines. What if Strong AI is a program...a meme or spandrel? What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your hair you become a zombie? Then people would avoid cutting their hair I would imagine. Unless they were suffering. But seriously, what makes you think that Strong AI is not itself a rogue machine, implanted in minds to satisfy some purely quantitative inevitability? You are coherent because you search a physical theory of consciousness, and that is indeed incompatible with comp. I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more seek a sensory-motive theory of physics. I will wait for serious progresses. But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please. That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no more question than comp does. You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what you assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But you do something quite different; you pretend that comp is false. So we ask for an argument, and there you beg the question, by using all the time that comp must be false in your argument, and that is begging the question. Comp is false not because I want it to be or assume it is, but because I understand that experience through time can be the only fundamental principle, and bodies across space is derived. I have laid out these reasons for this many times - how easy it is to succumb to the pathetic fallacy, how unlikely it is for experience to have any possible utility for arithmetic, how absent any sign of personality is in machines, how we can easily demonstrate information processing without particular qualia arising, etc. These are just off the top of my head. Anywhere you look in reality you can find huge gaping holes in Comp's assumptions if you choose to look, but you aren't going to see them if you are only listening to the echo chamber of Comp itself. Indeed, if we limit ourselves to only mathematical logic to look at mathematical logic, we are not going to notice that the entire universe of presentation is missing. Comp has a presentation problem, and it is not going to go away. Well if you *understand* that time is fundamental, then comp is false for you. The pathetic fallacy is not a logical fallacy. You just say that you believe that comp is false, but machines have naturally that belief, as comp is provably counter-intuitive. I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't see that I am being careless at all. Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation, to be frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the theory of other people. I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness. What other people think and do is none of my business. You are asserting without argument that a theory is incorrect, and you do this by assuming that it cannot do this or that, but with no argument that your personal feeling. I just explain to you that machines might have already that feeling, as it looks like when we listen to them. Bruno Craig Bruno Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:52:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, March 27, 2013 1:03:27 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Craig, On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: From the Quora http://www.quora.com/Board-**Gam** es/What-are-some-fun-games-**to-**play-on-an-8x8-**Checkerboard-** besides-chess-**checkershttp://www.quora.com/Board-Games/What-are-some-fun-games-to-play-on-an-8x8-Checkerboard-besides-chess-checkers This is interesting because I think it shows the weakness of the one-dimensional view of intelligence as computation. Whether a program can be designed to win or not is beside the point, That's not really fair, is it? Why not? How else can I counter your argument against intelligence as computation if I am not allowed to use computation? My example would not prove that it's what the brain does, but it would prove that it can be. You are arguing that it cannot be. I'm arguing that a screw is not the same thing as a nail because when you hammer a screw it doesn't go in as easily as a nail and when you use a screwdriver on a nail it doesn't go in at all. Ok. Sometimes the hammer is a better tool and sometimes the driver is. As humans, we have a great hammer and a decent screwdriver. A computer can't hammer anything, but it has a power screwdriver with a potentially infinite set of tips. Ok, but if I understand your ideas, you're claiming that the hammer is also the fundamental stuff that reality is made of. Sorry if I'm misrepresenting what you're saying. If I'm not, I don't understand why computers can't have the hammer. as it is the difference between this game and chess which hints at the differences between bottom-up mechanism and top-down intentionality I see what you're saying but I disagree. It just highlights the weak points of tree-search approaches like min-max. What I gather from what happens when one plays Arimaa (or Go): due to combinatorial explosion, players (even human) play quite far away from the perfect game(s). The way we deal with combinatorial explosion is by mapping the game into something more abstract. How do you know that any such mapping is going on? It seems like begging the question. I don't know. I have a strong intuition in it's favor for a few reasons, scientific and otherwise. Have you tried thinking about it another way? Where does 'mapping' come from? Can you begin mapping without already having a map? Yes, I think I begin with a map based on previous experiences and then improve it as I discover it's weaknesses. I think the original map came from brute-force experimentation while my brain was developing in my early months of live. But this is just wild guessing, of course. The non-scientific one is introspection. I try to observe my own thought process and I think I use such mappings. Maybe you do. Maybe a lot of people do. I don't think that I do though. I think that a game can be played directly without abstracting it into another game. Ok, I believe you but I don't have the same experience. My wife does. She works in a creative field and she is very intuitive, with the typical aversion for math. She can beat me at chess quite easily, without appearing to resort to conscious strategic thinking. She describes it as doing what feels right. The scientific reason is that this type of approach has been used successfully to tackle AI problems that could not be solved with classical search algorithms. I don't doubt that this game is likely to be solved eventually, maybe even soon, but the fact remains that it exposes some fundamentally different aesthetics between computation and intelligence. This is impressive to me because any game is already hugely biased in favor of computation. A game is ideal to be reduced to a set of logical rules, it's turn play is already a recursive enumeration. A game is already a computer program. Even so, we can see that it is possible to use a game to bypass computational values - of generic, unconscious repetition, and hint at something completely different and opposite. Put another way, if there were top-down non-computational effort going into the game play, why would it look any different than what we see? Our brain seems to be quite good at generating such mappings. We do it with chess too, I'm sure. Notice that, when two humans play Arimaa, both can count on each other's inabilities to play close to the perfect game. As with games with incomplete information, like Poker, part of it is modelling the opponent. Perhaps not surprisingly, artificial neural networks are quite good at producing useful mappings of this sort, and on predicting behaviours with incomplete information. Great progress has been
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Saturday, March 30, 2013 7:08:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:28:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of others. You can't do that. You can say something like,: I read some strong AI proponents and they dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make affirmative statement on a large class of people. That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about large classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers on the deep questions, or that they don't see themselves as machines. What if Strong AI is a program...a meme or spandrel? What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your hair you become a zombie? Then people would avoid cutting their hair I would imagine. Unless they were suffering. But seriously, what makes you think that Strong AI is not itself a rogue machine, implanted in minds to satisfy some purely quantitative inevitability? You are coherent because you search a physical theory of consciousness, and that is indeed incompatible with comp. I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more seek a sensory-motive theory of physics. I will wait for serious progresses. But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please. That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no more question than comp does. You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what you assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But you do something quite different; you pretend that comp is false. So we ask for an argument, and there you beg the question, by using all the time that comp must be false in your argument, and that is begging the question. Comp is false not because I want it to be or assume it is, but because I understand that experience through time can be the only fundamental principle, and bodies across space is derived. I have laid out these reasons for this many times - how easy it is to succumb to the pathetic fallacy, how unlikely it is for experience to have any possible utility for arithmetic, how absent any sign of personality is in machines, how we can easily demonstrate information processing without particular qualia arising, etc. These are just off the top of my head. Anywhere you look in reality you can find huge gaping holes in Comp's assumptions if you choose to look, but you aren't going to see them if you are only listening to the echo chamber of Comp itself. Indeed, if we limit ourselves to only mathematical logic to look at mathematical logic, we are not going to notice that the entire universe of presentation is missing. Comp has a presentation problem, and it is not going to go away. Well if you *understand* that time is fundamental, then comp is false for you. I understand that *experience* (through 'time') is fundamental, only because no other option ultimately makes as much sense. The pathetic fallacy is not a logical fallacy. No, it's more important than logic. You just say that you believe that comp is false, but machines have naturally that belief, as comp is provably counter-intuitive. That's just comp feeding back on its own confirmation bias. Comp is a machine which can only see itself. It's the inevitable inversion meme which arises from mistaking forms and functions for reality rather than the capacity to project and receive them. I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't see that I am being careless at all. Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation, to be frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the theory of other people. I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness. What other people think and do is none of my business. You are asserting without argument that a theory is incorrect, I have been asserting my arguments in writing for thousands of hours. Why do you say that it is without argument unless it is simply too awful to accept that there is no valid counter-argument? and you do this by assuming that it cannot do this or that, but with no argument that your personal feeling. Why are common sense observations shared by all people since the beginning of humanity reduced to 'my personal feeling', but esoteric works of mathematics from the last couple of centuries are are infallible? I just explain to you that machines might have already that feeling, as it looks
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Saturday, March 30, 2013 8:58:41 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:52:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, March 27, 2013 1:03:27 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Craig, On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: From the Quora http://www.quora.com/Board-**Gam** es/What-are-some-fun-games-**to-**play-on-an-8x8-**Checkerboard-** besides-chess-**checkershttp://www.quora.com/Board-Games/What-are-some-fun-games-to-play-on-an-8x8-Checkerboard-besides-chess-checkers This is interesting because I think it shows the weakness of the one-dimensional view of intelligence as computation. Whether a program can be designed to win or not is beside the point, That's not really fair, is it? Why not? How else can I counter your argument against intelligence as computation if I am not allowed to use computation? My example would not prove that it's what the brain does, but it would prove that it can be. You are arguing that it cannot be. I'm arguing that a screw is not the same thing as a nail because when you hammer a screw it doesn't go in as easily as a nail and when you use a screwdriver on a nail it doesn't go in at all. Ok. Sometimes the hammer is a better tool and sometimes the driver is. As humans, we have a great hammer and a decent screwdriver. A computer can't hammer anything, but it has a power screwdriver with a potentially infinite set of tips. Ok, but if I understand your ideas, you're claiming that the hammer is also the fundamental stuff that reality is made of. Sorry if I'm misrepresenting what you're saying. If I'm not, I don't understand why computers can't have the hammer. Yes exactly. The hammer is the fundamental stuff of reality, but computers are not real in the same sense as the parts they are made of are real. To overextend the metaphor, the fundamental stuff of reality would be tiny wax hammers which grow denser through time and hammering. Our sense and motive is like the 20lb sledge hammer, and we have hammered the wax hammers into a fragile, but very precise screwdriver. We can shape that screwdriver into a hammer instead, but no matter what we do, it is still going to be as soft as wax, because the density hasn't been aged into it. In reality, it isn't age, but experiences which accumulate as 'density' of significance. It's like leveling up. The materials of the computer have not graduated from physics to biological physics, so they can't participate in the biological levels of interaction. as it is the difference between this game and chess which hints at the differences between bottom-up mechanism and top-down intentionality I see what you're saying but I disagree. It just highlights the weak points of tree-search approaches like min-max. What I gather from what happens when one plays Arimaa (or Go): due to combinatorial explosion, players (even human) play quite far away from the perfect game(s). The way we deal with combinatorial explosion is by mapping the game into something more abstract. How do you know that any such mapping is going on? It seems like begging the question. I don't know. I have a strong intuition in it's favor for a few reasons, scientific and otherwise. Have you tried thinking about it another way? Where does 'mapping' come from? Can you begin mapping without already having a map? Yes, I think I begin with a map based on previous experiences and then improve it as I discover it's weaknesses. I think the original map came from brute-force experimentation while my brain was developing in my early months of live. But this is just wild guessing, of course. Is it really a map though, or do you just have access to condensed experiences of the territory? The non-scientific one is introspection. I try to observe my own thought process and I think I use such mappings. Maybe you do. Maybe a lot of people do. I don't think that I do though. I think that a game can be played directly without abstracting it into another game. Ok, I believe you but I don't have the same experience. My wife does. She works in a creative field and she is very intuitive, with the typical aversion for math. She can beat me at chess quite easily, without appearing to resort to conscious strategic thinking. She describes it as doing what feels right. That may be the key to understanding a lot of what happens on this list - we just have different psychological characteristics. It's unfortunate though, because split-brained experiments have shown us how left-brained dominance insists that on reductionist views, even when they are objectively delusional. Consciousness, in the
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You are asserting without argument that a theory is incorrect, and you do this by assuming that it cannot do this or that, but with no argument Bruno, did you really expect anything better? You are arguing with somebody who has publicly admitted that they believe astrology and numerology are valid methods of learning about the world. Given that Craig is in the habit of saying in nearly every post that consciousness is definitely X but consciousness is most certainly not Y I wondered what other methods he used to become so knowledgeable in the ways of philosophy; so I asked if he also believed that examining the entrails of a chicken can foretell the future but he did not answer. I think its a perfectly reasonable question given that all 3 were very popular during the medieval dark ages and prediction by means of chicken entrails is not one bit more imbecilic than astrology or numerology, so I just wondered if he had gone 2/3 of the way toward being a perfectly respectable member of the dark ages or if he had gone all the way. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Saturday, March 30, 2013 12:52:21 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness On Sat, Mar 30, 2013 Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript:wrote: You are asserting without argument that a theory is incorrect, and you do this by assuming that it cannot do this or that, but with no argument Bruno, did you really expect anything better? You are arguing with somebody who has publicly admitted that they believe astrology and numerology are valid methods of learning about the world. I never said that I believe anything. I said that astrology and numerology are the most interesting and useful topics which I have come across. That has nothing to do with your biased view of astrology as superstition, but with understanding the roots of discernment, and the depths of psychology. Given that Craig is in the habit of saying in nearly every post that consciousness is definitely X but consciousness is most certainly not Y I wondered what other methods he used to become so knowledgeable in the ways of philosophy; so I asked if he also believed that examining the entrails of a chicken can foretell the future but he did not answer. I'll pretend that you are really asking a question here, rather than just spreading your bigotry - which is insulting to Bruno btw, as you aren't even talking to him but just using his participation to leverage your tantrum. If you were genuinely asking about prediction and divination, then I would answer that anything can be used as an oracle as far as being a prop to access super-personal insights - changing channels on the TV, flipping coins for the I Ching, pulling cards, rolling dice, etc. The result however is not, in my experience, a prediction, but an impersonal commentary on the moment/circumstance in which you are participating. Using entrails or any other spooky aesthetics for this kind of thing might change your results if it helped put you into a more sensitive mood, but I wouldn't know. I think its a perfectly reasonable question given that all 3 were very popular during the medieval dark ages and prediction by means of chicken entrails is not one bit more imbecilic than astrology or numerology, so I just wondered if he had gone 2/3 of the way toward being a perfectly respectable member of the dark ages or if he had gone all the way. It would be reasonable coming from an honest person. When it comes from someone who values winning arguments over the truth, then it is just so much sniggering and spit. Craig John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of others. You can't do that. You can say something like,: I read some strong AI proponents and they dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make affirmative statement on a large class of people. That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about large classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers on the deep questions, or that they don't see themselves as machines. What if Strong AI is a program...a meme or spandrel? What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your hair you become a zombie? You are coherent because you search a physical theory of consciousness, and that is indeed incompatible with comp. I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more seek a sensory-motive theory of physics. I will wait for serious progresses. But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please. That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no more question than comp does. You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what you assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But you do something quite different; you pretend that comp is false. So we ask for an argument, and there you beg the question, by using all the time that comp must be false in your argument, and that is begging the question. I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't see that I am being careless at all. Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation, to be frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the theory of other people. Bruno Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:28:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of others. You can't do that. You can say something like,: I read some strong AI proponents and they dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make affirmative statement on a large class of people. That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about large classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers on the deep questions, or that they don't see themselves as machines. What if Strong AI is a program...a meme or spandrel? What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your hair you become a zombie? Then people would avoid cutting their hair I would imagine. Unless they were suffering. But seriously, what makes you think that Strong AI is not itself a rogue machine, implanted in minds to satisfy some purely quantitative inevitability? You are coherent because you search a physical theory of consciousness, and that is indeed incompatible with comp. I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more seek a sensory-motive theory of physics. I will wait for serious progresses. But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please. That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no more question than comp does. You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what you assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But you do something quite different; you pretend that comp is false. So we ask for an argument, and there you beg the question, by using all the time that comp must be false in your argument, and that is begging the question. Comp is false not because I want it to be or assume it is, but because I understand that experience through time can be the only fundamental principle, and bodies across space is derived. I have laid out these reasons for this many times - how easy it is to succumb to the pathetic fallacy, how unlikely it is for experience to have any possible utility for arithmetic, how absent any sign of personality is in machines, how we can easily demonstrate information processing without particular qualia arising, etc. These are just off the top of my head. Anywhere you look in reality you can find huge gaping holes in Comp's assumptions if you choose to look, but you aren't going to see them if you are only listening to the echo chamber of Comp itself. Indeed, if we limit ourselves to only mathematical logic to look at mathematical logic, we are not going to notice that the entire universe of presentation is missing. Comp has a presentation problem, and it is not going to go away. I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't see that I am being careless at all. Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation, to be frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the theory of other people. I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness. What other people think and do is none of my business. Craig Bruno Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
The game Arinaa was designed by Omar Syed to be difficult for computers to solve, he invented it to spur the improvement of artificial intelligence software and so offered a $10,000 prize to the inventor of a software program that could defeat any human player; however there were some restrictions on the offer. Syed believes that even now a supercomputer might be able to defeat any human so he insists that the program be run on inexpensive off the shelf components. Also the $10,000 prize offer is only good until 2020 because Syed figures that after that even a cheap home computer will have supercomputer ability and so writing a champion Arinaaprogram wouldn't be much of a challenge. None of this indicates a inherent weakness of computers to me, in fact just the opposite. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Friday, March 29, 2013 1:10:16 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: The game Arinaa was designed by Omar Syed to be difficult for computers to solve, he invented it to spur the improvement of artificial intelligence software and so offered a $10,000 prize to the inventor of a software program that could defeat any human player; however there were some restrictions on the offer. Syed believes that even now a supercomputer might be able to defeat any human so he insists that the program be run on inexpensive off the shelf components. Also the $10,000 prize offer is only good until 2020 because Syed figures that after that even a cheap home computer will have supercomputer ability and so writing a champion Arinaaprogram wouldn't be much of a challenge. None of this indicates a inherent weakness of computers to me, in fact just the opposite. It's not about computers being 'weak', just that computation is different from consciousness, or more to the point, it is the opposite of consciousness. Since any game is inherently pre-defined from quantitative axioms, it is not surprising to me that there would be no game which a computer could not outperform a human being. So what though? Computers can play by the rules, but people can cheat. People can make new rules or ignore them. The can pull the plug on computers, or drop junkyard magnets on top of them if they want to. Craig John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Fri, Mar 29, 2013 at 3:26 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: computation is different from consciousness, or more to the point, it is the opposite of consciousness. Did you learn that from astrology or numerology or by examining the entrails of a chicken? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Friday, March 29, 2013 8:46:34 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Mar 29, 2013 at 3:26 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: computation is different from consciousness, or more to the point, it is the opposite of consciousness. Did you learn that from astrology or numerology or by examining the entrails of a chicken? No, I learned it from listening to intellectual cowards parrot the prejudices of their betters. Craig John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Wednesday, March 27, 2013 1:03:27 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Craig, On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: From the Quora http://www.quora.com/Board-** Games/What-are-some-fun-games-**to-play-on-an-8x8-** Checkerboard-besides-chess-**checkershttp://www.quora.com/Board-Games/What-are-some-fun-games-to-play-on-an-8x8-Checkerboard-besides-chess-checkers This is interesting because I think it shows the weakness of the one-dimensional view of intelligence as computation. Whether a program can be designed to win or not is beside the point, That's not really fair, is it? Why not? How else can I counter your argument against intelligence as computation if I am not allowed to use computation? My example would not prove that it's what the brain does, but it would prove that it can be. You are arguing that it cannot be. as it is the difference between this game and chess which hints at the differences between bottom-up mechanism and top-down intentionality I see what you're saying but I disagree. It just highlights the weak points of tree-search approaches like min-max. What I gather from what happens when one plays Arimaa (or Go): due to combinatorial explosion, players (even human) play quite far away from the perfect game(s). The way we deal with combinatorial explosion is by mapping the game into something more abstract. How do you know that any such mapping is going on? It seems like begging the question. I don't know. I have a strong intuition in it's favor for a few reasons, scientific and otherwise. The non-scientific one is introspection. I try to observe my own thought process and I think I use such mappings. The scientific reason is that this type of approach has been used successfully to tackle AI problems that could not be solved with classical search algorithms. Put another way, if there were top-down non-computational effort going into the game play, why would it look any different than what we see? Our brain seems to be quite good at generating such mappings. We do it with chess too, I'm sure. Notice that, when two humans play Arimaa, both can count on each other's inabilities to play close to the perfect game. As with games with incomplete information, like Poker, part of it is modelling the opponent. Perhaps not surprisingly, artificial neural networks are quite good at producing useful mappings of this sort, and on predicting behaviours with incomplete information. Great progress has been achieved lately with deep learning. All this fits bottom-up mechanism and intelligence as computation. It doesn't prove anything because I can't attach the code for an excellent Arimaa player but, on the other hand, if I did I'm sure you'd come up with something else. :) Except that playing Arimaa is not particularly taxing on the human player. There is no suggestion of any complex algorithms and mappings, rather it seems to me, there is simplicity. The mappings don't have to be complex at all (in terms of leading to heavy computations). That's precisely their point. The human finds no fundamental difference between the difficulty between Arimaa and Chess, yet there is a clear difference for the computer. Yes, the classical chess algorithms are clearly not how we do it. I agree with you there. Again, if this does not indicate that there the model of intelligence as purely an assembly of logical parts, what actually would? In what way is the Strong AI position falsifiable? I agree, I don't think it's falsifiable and thus not a scientific hypothesis in the Popperian sense. I see it more as an ambitious goal that nobody even knows if it's achievable. You might be right, even if we manage to create an AI that is undistinguishable from human intelligence. I prefer to believe in Strong AI because I'm interested in it's consequences and in the intellectual challenge of achieving it. That's all, to be honest. On the other hand, your hypothesis is also not falsifiable. A lot of progress has been made in Poker, both in mapping the game to something more abstract and modelling opponents: http://poker.cs.ualberta.ca/ Cheers, Telmo. PS: The expression brute force annoys me a bit. It implies that traditional chess algorithms blindly search the entire space. That's just not true, they do clever tree-pruning and use heuristics. Still, they are indeed defeated by combinatorial explosion. It was a generalization, but I understood what they meant. The important thing is that the approach of computation is fundamentally passive and eliminative. Games which do not hinge on human intolerance for tedious recursive processes are going to be easier for computers because machines have no capacity for intolerance. The more tedious the better. Games which de-emphasize this as a criteria for success are less
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Thursday, March 28, 2013 5:52:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 6:29 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Wednesday, March 27, 2013 1:03:27 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Craig, On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: From the Quora http://www.quora.com/Board-** Games/What-are-some-fun-games-**to-play-on-an-8x8-** Checkerboard-besides-chess-**checkershttp://www.quora.com/Board-Games/What-are-some-fun-games-to-play-on-an-8x8-Checkerboard-besides-chess-checkers This is interesting because I think it shows the weakness of the one-dimensional view of intelligence as computation. Whether a program can be designed to win or not is beside the point, That's not really fair, is it? Why not? How else can I counter your argument against intelligence as computation if I am not allowed to use computation? My example would not prove that it's what the brain does, but it would prove that it can be. You are arguing that it cannot be. I'm arguing that a screw is not the same thing as a nail because when you hammer a screw it doesn't go in as easily as a nail and when you use a screwdriver on a nail it doesn't go in at all. Sometimes the hammer is a better tool and sometimes the driver is. As humans, we have a great hammer and a decent screwdriver. A computer can't hammer anything, but it has a power screwdriver with a potentially infinite set of tips. as it is the difference between this game and chess which hints at the differences between bottom-up mechanism and top-down intentionality I see what you're saying but I disagree. It just highlights the weak points of tree-search approaches like min-max. What I gather from what happens when one plays Arimaa (or Go): due to combinatorial explosion, players (even human) play quite far away from the perfect game(s). The way we deal with combinatorial explosion is by mapping the game into something more abstract. How do you know that any such mapping is going on? It seems like begging the question. I don't know. I have a strong intuition in it's favor for a few reasons, scientific and otherwise. Have you tried thinking about it another way? Where does 'mapping' come from? Can you begin mapping without already having a map? The non-scientific one is introspection. I try to observe my own thought process and I think I use such mappings. Maybe you do. Maybe a lot of people do. I don't think that I do though. I think that a game can be played directly without abstracting it into another game. The scientific reason is that this type of approach has been used successfully to tackle AI problems that could not be solved with classical search algorithms. I don't doubt that this game is likely to be solved eventually, maybe even soon, but the fact remains that it exposes some fundamentally different aesthetics between computation and intelligence. This is impressive to me because any game is already hugely biased in favor of computation. A game is ideal to be reduced to a set of logical rules, it's turn play is already a recursive enumeration. A game is already a computer program. Even so, we can see that it is possible to use a game to bypass computational values - of generic, unconscious repetition, and hint at something completely different and opposite. Put another way, if there were top-down non-computational effort going into the game play, why would it look any different than what we see? Our brain seems to be quite good at generating such mappings. We do it with chess too, I'm sure. Notice that, when two humans play Arimaa, both can count on each other's inabilities to play close to the perfect game. As with games with incomplete information, like Poker, part of it is modelling the opponent. Perhaps not surprisingly, artificial neural networks are quite good at producing useful mappings of this sort, and on predicting behaviours with incomplete information. Great progress has been achieved lately with deep learning. All this fits bottom-up mechanism and intelligence as computation. It doesn't prove anything because I can't attach the code for an excellent Arimaa player but, on the other hand, if I did I'm sure you'd come up with something else. :) Except that playing Arimaa is not particularly taxing on the human player. There is no suggestion of any complex algorithms and mappings, rather it seems to me, there is simplicity. The mappings don't have to be complex at all (in terms of leading to heavy computations). That's precisely their point. Then shouldn't a powerful computer be able to quickly deduce the winning Arimaa mappings? The human finds no fundamental difference between the difficulty between Arimaa and Chess, yet there is a clear difference for the computer. Yes, the classical chess algorithms are
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Wednesday, March 27, 2013 9:32:46 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 2:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: From the Quora http://www.quora.com/Board-Games/What-are-some-fun-games-to-play-on-an-8x8-Checkerboard-besides-chess-checkers This is interesting because I think it shows the weakness of the one-dimensional view of intelligence as computation. Whether a program can be designed to win or not is beside the point, as it is the difference between this game and chess which hints at the differences between bottom-up mechanism and top-down intentionality. In Arimaa, the rules invite personal preference as a spontaneous initiative from the start - thus it does not make the reductionist assumption of intelligence as a statistical extraction or 'best choice'. Game play here begins intuitively and strategy is more proprietary-private than generic-public. In addition the interaction of the pieces and inclusion of the four trap squares suggests a game geography which is rooted more in space-time sensibilities than in pure arithmetic like chess. I'm not sure which aspects are the most relevant in the difference between how a computer performs, but it seems likely to me that the difference is specifically *not* related to computing power. To wit: There are tens of thousands of possibilities in each turn in Arimaa. The 'brute force approach' to programming Arimaa fails miserably. Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down. This to me suggests that Arimaa does a good job of sniffing out the general area where top-down consciousness differs fundamentally from bottom up simulated intelligence. If this game shows where top-down consciousness differs fundamentally from bottom up simulated intelligence would you accept a computer beating a human at Arimaa as evidence that computers had the top-down consciousness? No, that's why I wrote Whether a program can be designed to win or not is beside the point.. You may be able to build a screwdriver that is big enough to use as a hammer in some situations, but that doesn't mean that it is an actual claw hammer. Would you accept an AI matching a human in any task whatsoever as evidence of the computer having consciousness? If not, why bother pointing out computers' failings if you believe they are a priori incapable of consciousness or even intelligence? I point out the computers failings to help discern the difference between consciousness and simulated intelligence. I'm interested in that because I have a hypothesis about what awareness actually is, and that hypothesis indicates that awareness cannot necessarily be assembled from the outside. I think computers are great, I use them all day every day by choice and by profession, but that doesn't make them the same thing as a person, or a proto-person. Not only are they not that, they are, in my hypothesis, the precise opposite of that. Machines are impersonal. Trying to build a person from impersonal parts is like trying to find some combination of walking north and south which will eventually take you east. Thanks, Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
Hi Craig, On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: From the Quora http://www.quora.com/Board-Games/What-are-some-fun-games-to-play-on-an-8x8-Checkerboard-besides-chess-checkers This is interesting because I think it shows the weakness of the one-dimensional view of intelligence as computation. Whether a program can be designed to win or not is beside the point, That's not really fair, is it? as it is the difference between this game and chess which hints at the differences between bottom-up mechanism and top-down intentionality I see what you're saying but I disagree. It just highlights the weak points of tree-search approaches like min-max. What I gather from what happens when one plays Arimaa (or Go): due to combinatorial explosion, players (even human) play quite far away from the perfect game(s). The way we deal with combinatorial explosion is by mapping the game into something more abstract. Our brain seems to be quite good at generating such mappings. We do it with chess too, I'm sure. Notice that, when two humans play Arimaa, both can count on each other's inabilities to play close to the perfect game. As with games with incomplete information, like Poker, part of it is modelling the opponent. Perhaps not surprisingly, artificial neural networks are quite good at producing useful mappings of this sort, and on predicting behaviours with incomplete information. Great progress has been achieved lately with deep learning. All this fits bottom-up mechanism and intelligence as computation. It doesn't prove anything because I can't attach the code for an excellent Arimaa player but, on the other hand, if I did I'm sure you'd come up with something else. :) A lot of progress has been made in Poker, both in mapping the game to something more abstract and modelling opponents: http://poker.cs.ualberta.ca/ Cheers, Telmo. PS: The expression brute force annoys me a bit. It implies that traditional chess algorithms blindly search the entire space. That's just not true, they do clever tree-pruning and use heuristics. Still, they are indeed defeated by combinatorial explosion. . In Arimaa, the rules invite personal preference as a spontaneous initiative from the start - thus it does not make the reductionist assumption of intelligence as a statistical extraction or 'best choice'. Game play here begins intuitively and strategy is more proprietary-private than generic-public. In addition the interaction of the pieces and inclusion of the four trap squares suggests a game geography which is rooted more in space-time sensibilities than in pure arithmetic like chess. I'm not sure which aspects are the most relevant in the difference between how a computer performs, but it seems likely to me that the difference is specifically *not* related to computing power. To wit: There are tens of thousands of possibilities in each turn in Arimaa. The 'brute force approach' to programming Arimaa fails miserably. Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down. This to me suggests that Arimaa does a good job of sniffing out the general area where top-down consciousness differs fundamentally from bottom up simulated intelligence. -- *Arimaa, the strategy game that confounds computers! * It can be played, not only on an 8x8 chess board, but with the same chess pieces as well! The pieces are : 1. 8 Rabbits (Pawns) 2. 1 Elephant (King) 3. 1 Camel (Queen) 4. 2 Horses (Rooks) 5. 2 Dogs (Bishops) 6. 2 Cats (Knights) It doesn't matter in what way you want the 2 horses/dogs/cats to be designated by the 2 bishops/knights/rooks. *What sets apart Arimaa from Chess?* - There is no draw in Arimaa. Good news for elimination tournaments. - In Arimaa, a player has 64,864,400 choices for the first turn. Thus unlike chess, memorizing openings is not gonna help you. - There are tens of thousands of possibilities in each turn in Arimaa. The 'brute force approach' to programming Arimaa fails miserably. Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down. - It places less emphasis on tactics. I believe Arimaa is *way* better than chess in terms of abstract strategical thinking. It needs a higher level of intuition and understanding, discourages memorization and is simple to learn and play. It took me some time to play good chess, but it took me a small fraction of that time to learn and play good Arimaa. The Arimaa community is offering $10,000 for anyone who can come up with a program able to beat a top-level human Arimaa player, by 2020 : The Arimaa Challenge http://arimaa.com/arimaa/challenge/ This will help us to attain the next pinnacle in Artificial Intelligence Programming. *Rules :* In the starting, both players
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Wednesday, March 27, 2013 1:03:27 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: Hi Craig, On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 4:03 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: From the Quora http://www.quora.com/Board-Games/What-are-some-fun-games-to-play-on-an-8x8-Checkerboard-besides-chess-checkers This is interesting because I think it shows the weakness of the one-dimensional view of intelligence as computation. Whether a program can be designed to win or not is beside the point, That's not really fair, is it? Why not? as it is the difference between this game and chess which hints at the differences between bottom-up mechanism and top-down intentionality I see what you're saying but I disagree. It just highlights the weak points of tree-search approaches like min-max. What I gather from what happens when one plays Arimaa (or Go): due to combinatorial explosion, players (even human) play quite far away from the perfect game(s). The way we deal with combinatorial explosion is by mapping the game into something more abstract. How do you know that any such mapping is going on? It seems like begging the question. Put another way, if there were top-down non-computational effort going into the game play, why would it look any different than what we see? Our brain seems to be quite good at generating such mappings. We do it with chess too, I'm sure. Notice that, when two humans play Arimaa, both can count on each other's inabilities to play close to the perfect game. As with games with incomplete information, like Poker, part of it is modelling the opponent. Perhaps not surprisingly, artificial neural networks are quite good at producing useful mappings of this sort, and on predicting behaviours with incomplete information. Great progress has been achieved lately with deep learning. All this fits bottom-up mechanism and intelligence as computation. It doesn't prove anything because I can't attach the code for an excellent Arimaa player but, on the other hand, if I did I'm sure you'd come up with something else. :) Except that playing Arimaa is not particularly taxing on the human player. There is no suggestion of any complex algorithms and mappings, rather it seems to me, there is simplicity. The human finds no fundamental difference between the difficulty between Arimaa and Chess, yet there is a clear difference for the computer. Again, if this does not indicate that there the model of intelligence as purely an assembly of logical parts, what actually would? In what way is the Strong AI position falsifiable? A lot of progress has been made in Poker, both in mapping the game to something more abstract and modelling opponents: http://poker.cs.ualberta.ca/ Cheers, Telmo. PS: The expression brute force annoys me a bit. It implies that traditional chess algorithms blindly search the entire space. That's just not true, they do clever tree-pruning and use heuristics. Still, they are indeed defeated by combinatorial explosion. It was a generalization, but I understood what they meant. The important thing is that the approach of computation is fundamentally passive and eliminative. Games which do not hinge on human intolerance for tedious recursive processes are going to be easier for computers because machines have no capacity for intolerance. The more tedious the better. Games which de-emphasize this as a criteria for success are less vulnerable to any recursive elimination. The more a game can reward spontaneous creativity, versatility, style, grace, broadminded eclectic interpretations, the more a computer will fail to duplicate a person's success. Craig . In Arimaa, the rules invite personal preference as a spontaneous initiative from the start - thus it does not make the reductionist assumption of intelligence as a statistical extraction or 'best choice'. Game play here begins intuitively and strategy is more proprietary-private than generic-public. In addition the interaction of the pieces and inclusion of the four trap squares suggests a game geography which is rooted more in space-time sensibilities than in pure arithmetic like chess. I'm not sure which aspects are the most relevant in the difference between how a computer performs, but it seems likely to me that the difference is specifically *not* related to computing power. To wit: There are tens of thousands of possibilities in each turn in Arimaa. The 'brute force approach' to programming Arimaa fails miserably. Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down. This to me suggests that Arimaa does a good job of sniffing out the general area where top-down consciousness differs fundamentally from bottom up simulated intelligence. -- *Arimaa, the strategy
Re: Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down.
On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 2:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: From the Quora http://www.quora.com/Board-Games/What-are-some-fun-games-to-play-on-an-8x8-Checkerboard-besides-chess-checkers This is interesting because I think it shows the weakness of the one-dimensional view of intelligence as computation. Whether a program can be designed to win or not is beside the point, as it is the difference between this game and chess which hints at the differences between bottom-up mechanism and top-down intentionality. In Arimaa, the rules invite personal preference as a spontaneous initiative from the start - thus it does not make the reductionist assumption of intelligence as a statistical extraction or 'best choice'. Game play here begins intuitively and strategy is more proprietary-private than generic-public. In addition the interaction of the pieces and inclusion of the four trap squares suggests a game geography which is rooted more in space-time sensibilities than in pure arithmetic like chess. I'm not sure which aspects are the most relevant in the difference between how a computer performs, but it seems likely to me that the difference is specifically *not* related to computing power. To wit: There are tens of thousands of possibilities in each turn in Arimaa. The 'brute force approach' to programming Arimaa fails miserably. Any human who has played a bit of Arimaa can beat a computer hands down. This to me suggests that Arimaa does a good job of sniffing out the general area where top-down consciousness differs fundamentally from bottom up simulated intelligence. If this game shows where top-down consciousness differs fundamentally from bottom up simulated intelligence would you accept a computer beating a human at Arimaa as evidence that computers had the top-down consciousness? Would you accept an AI matching a human in any task whatsoever as evidence of the computer having consciousness? If not, why bother pointing out computers' failings if you believe they are a priori incapable of consciousness or even intelligence? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
