RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Jeff, list,

 

Thanks for the positive response, Jeff! As for where the discussion goes
from here, that's up to you and whoever else wants to follow up on specific
ideas in it. A closer look at determination and reference would certainly be
worthwhile. Another matter that seems to me closely connected is the
discussion we were having awhile back with Franklin Ransom about term,
proposition and argument. The very end of the 1906 "Prolegomena" has a lot
to say about that.

 

As far as NDTR is concerned, I was thinking of applying to it the idea of
taking the Argument as the one sign type in which the other 9 are involved,
instead of taking it as the one that the others build up to. I've put
together a spreadsheet reformatting much of the latter part of NDTR so that
it's easier to read it backwards, so to speak, working down from Argument to
Qualisign (reversing Peirce's order of presentation) while looking at how
specific parameters change along the way. But I won't have much time in the
next week or so to develop any of these threads in great detail myself, so
I'll just try to follow whatever threads you or others choose to spin off
from here and help out when I can.

 

One thing I did come across recently "about the role of the different
correlates in these genuine triadic relations" is this bit from the late
piece on "Some Amazing Mazes" (CP 6.318):

[[ I have, since 1870, written much about the logic of relations. In those
writings, I have usually restricted the terms "relations" and
"relationships" to existential relations and relationships. By a
relationship I understand the conception of a fact about a set of things
abstracted from the representation of the things themselves or, in other
words, a predicate which requires more than one subject to complete a
proposition, or conception of a fact. A "relation" only differs from a
"relationship" in that one of the subjects is regarded as being taken
account of first, and is usually called the subject nominative, while the
others are called the direct and indirect objects. In other words a relation
is a predicate requiring one subject nominative and one or more objects in a
definite sequence. In my earlier papers I use the conception of relation
chiefly; in my later ones that of relationship. The difference is little
more than trifling. ]]

 

But that's it for now.

 

Gary f.

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 30-Mar-16 14:03



Hi Gary F., List,

 

The detailed post you've made on "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic
Relations" is quite helpful in framing a number of issues.  Having been
through it a few times, I don't see any places where I would want to voice
disagreement.  In fact, I think you've sorted through a number of
interpretative questions and issues in a sensitive and thoughtful manner.

 

You've covered quite a lot, so where should we focus our attention?  I have
a particular interest in looking more closely at two relations that are
central in Peirce's account of signs: determination and reference. In both
cases, I am wondering if we might draw out what Peirce is saying about the
role of the different correlates in these genuine triadic relations when
they have the character of possibilities, actualities and general rules. 

 

Yours,

 

Jeff

 

Jeffrey Downard

Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy

Northern Arizona University

(o) 928 523-8354


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Gary F., List,

The detailed post you've made on “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic 
Relations” is quite helpful in framing a number of issues.  Having been through 
it a few times, I don't see any places where I would want to voice 
disagreement.  In fact, I think you've sorted through a number of 
interpretative questions and issues in a sensitive and thoughtful manner.

You've covered quite a lot, so where should we focus our attention?  I have a 
particular interest in looking more closely at two relations that are central 
in Peirce's account of signs: determination and reference. In both cases, I am 
wondering if we might draw out what Peirce is saying about the role of the 
different correlates in these genuine triadic relations when they have the 
character of possibilities, actualities and general rules. 

Yours,

Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2016 3:34 AM
To: 'PEIRCE-L'
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Peirceans,



It’s been months since I posted to this thread about the “Nomenclature and 
Divisions of Triadic Relations”, and it’s taken me awhile to decide how to 
continue, as I felt some recontextualizing was needed. Meanwhile I noticed many 
connections with what I’ve already said online in my book Turning Signs. The 
result is the rather long and dense essay below, which is now part of the book 
and perfused with links (mostly to other parts of it). Since I’m not sure how 
well this format or those links will work in the transfer to email, I’m 
providing this link to the website version of this post: 
http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/xtn.htm#ndtrm.

I’m not trying to say anything terribly original here, just trying to clarify 
(for myself at least) some of Peirce’s later thoughts about the triadic action 
of signs, and especially of Arguments — which Peirce in NDTR subdivides into 
deductions, inductions and abductions.



Gary f.



As explained in Chapter 
15,
 mental activities (such as walking and thinking) are both semiotic and 
systemic. ‘The system must be, to some degree, indeterminate in order to be 
sculpted by the dynamic movement context, which includes not only internal and 
external forces but changes in the goals and intentions of the mover’ (Thelen 
and Smith 1994, 77). Likewise the semiosic process or action of determination 
can only occur in a context of prior indeterminacy. Many of Peirce's late 
definitions of ‘sign’ emphasize that its triadic 
action
 is partly being determined (by its dynamic object) and partly determining (its 
interpretant):

a sign endeavours to represent, in part at least, an Object, which is therefore 
in a sense the cause, or determinant, of the sign even if the sign represents 
its object falsely. But to say that it represents its Object implies that it 
affects a mind, and so affects it as, in some respect, to determine in that 
mind something that is mediately due to the Object. That determination of which 
the immediate cause, or determinant, is the Sign, and of which the mediate 
cause is the Object may be termed the Interpretant. —CP 6.347 (c.1909)



It seems that the representation of the Object by the sign is inseparable from 
the determination (or causation) of the sign by the Object, and from the 
determination of the Interpretant by the sign. In the last sentence of the 
quote above, the ‘determination’ which ‘may be termed the Interpretant’ is the 
result, or effect, of the determining action – determination in that sense – by 
the sign which ‘affects a mind.’ In Peirce's usage, this term does not refer 
only to human minds, as every animal has a mind adapted to its requirements (CP 
5.603, 1903). For our purposes we may define a mind (or ‘quasi-mind,’ as Peirce 
sometimes calls it) as anything capable of being determined by a sign to an 
interpretant.

A similar Peircean definition says that a sign

is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and 
an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the 
interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in 
such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through 
the mediation of this “sign.”

The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; 
the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. —EP2:410 (MS 318, 
1907)



That which is antecedent to something is before it in time, place or logical 
order; the consequent of it follows ‘as an effect or result, or as a necessary 
inference’ (CD<http://www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm#Century>). Reasoning 
proceeds from antecedent to consequent, and normally attributes the same 
sequential order to cause and effect (RLT 201ff.). The object being antecedent 
and the interp

[PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Peirceans,

 

It’s been months since I posted to this thread about the “Nomenclature and 
Divisions of Triadic Relations”, and it’s taken me awhile to decide how to 
continue, as I felt some recontextualizing was needed. Meanwhile I noticed many 
connections with what I’ve already said online in my book Turning Signs. The 
result is the rather long and dense essay below, which is now part of the book 
and perfused with links (mostly to other parts of it). Since I’m not sure how 
well this format or those links will work in the transfer to email, I’m 
providing this link to the website version of this post: 
http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/xtn.htm#ndtrm.

I’m not trying to say anything terribly original here, just trying to clarify 
(for myself at least) some of Peirce’s later thoughts about the triadic action 
of signs, and especially of Arguments — which Peirce in NDTR subdivides into 
deductions, inductions and abductions.

 

Gary f.

 

As explained in Chapter 15 

 , mental activities (such as walking and thinking) are both semiotic and 
systemic. ‘The system must be, to some degree, indeterminate in order to be 
sculpted by the dynamic movement context, which includes not only internal and 
external forces but changes in the goals and intentions of the mover’ (Thelen 
and Smith 1994, 77). Likewise the semiosic process or action of determination 
can only occur in a context of prior indeterminacy. Many of Peirce's late 
definitions of ‘sign’ emphasize that its triadic action 
  
is partly being determined (by its dynamic object) and partly determining (its 
interpretant): 

a sign endeavours to represent, in part at least, an Object, which is therefore 
in a sense the cause, or determinant, of the sign even if the sign represents 
its object falsely. But to say that it represents its Object implies that it 
affects a mind, and so affects it as, in some respect, to determine in that 
mind something that is mediately due to the Object. That determination of which 
the immediate cause, or determinant, is the Sign, and of which the mediate 
cause is the Object may be termed the Interpretant. —CP 6.347 (c.1909)

 

It seems that the representation of the Object by the sign is inseparable from 
the determination (or causation) of the sign by the Object, and from the 
determination of the Interpretant by the sign. In the last sentence of the 
quote above, the ‘determination’ which ‘may be termed the Interpretant’ is the 
result, or effect, of the determining action – determination in that sense – by 
the sign which ‘affects a mind.’ In Peirce's usage, this term does not refer 
only to human minds, as every animal has a mind adapted to its requirements (CP 
5.603, 1903). For our purposes we may define a mind (or ‘quasi-mind,’ as Peirce 
sometimes calls it) as anything capable of being determined by a sign to an 
interpretant. 

A similar Peircean definition says that a sign 

is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and 
an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the 
interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in 
such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through 
the mediation of this “sign.” 

The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; 
the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. —EP2:410 (MS 318, 
1907)

 

That which is antecedent to something is before it in time, place or logical 
order; the consequent of it follows ‘as an effect or result, or as a necessary 
inference’ (CD  ). Reasoning 
proceeds from antecedent to consequent, and normally attributes the same 
sequential order to cause and effect (RLT 201ff.). The object being antecedent 
and the interpretant consequent of the sign attributes that same sequential 
order to the determination of the sign by its dynamic object and its 
interpretant by the sign, and to the mediate determination of the interpretant 
by the object. Thus determination as the essential sign-action takes time – yet 
the mediate determination must take place at the same time as the other two 
determinations involved in a moment of semiosis. 

 

When we represent this moment as a step in semiosis (analogous to a step in 
walking), we regard sign, object and interpretant as the three correlates of a 
triadic relation, as if the three were separate entities or subjects connected 
by the one relation. The transitive action of determining a subject causes it 
to become determinate in some respect in which it was indeterminate before. 
Peirce defines this in logical terms: 

A subject is determinate in respect to any character which inheres in it or is 
(universally and affirmatively) predicated of it, as well as in respect to the 
negative of such character, these being the very same respect. In all other 
respects it is indeterminate. —CP 5.447, EP2:350

 

[PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Continuing with "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations":

 

After introducing the three trichotomies of signs, Peirce embarks on a
digression (from his main task of classification) which is mainly about the
nature of propositions and arguments and the difference between them. But
this 'digression' is very important for bringing us back to the logical
context of the whole essay, and for grounding it in the pragmatic realm of
"mental acts," which when uttered become what we call "speech acts". Here
I'll present CP 2.252 in full, beginning with the definition of "argument"
which came at the end of my last post in this thread.

 

 

CP 2.252. An Argument is a Sign which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of
law. Or we may say that a Rheme is a sign which is understood to represent
its object in its characters merely; that a Dicisign is a sign which is
understood to represent its object in respect to actual existence; and that
an Argument is a Sign which is understood to represent its Object in its
character as Sign. Since these definitions touch upon points at this time
much in dispute, a word may be added in defence of them. A question often
put is: What is the essence of a Judgment? A judgment is the mental act by
which the judger seeks to impress upon himself the truth of a proposition.
It is much the same as an act of asserting the proposition, or going before
a notary and assuming formal responsibility for its truth, except that those
acts are intended to affect others, while the judgment is only intended to
affect oneself. However, the logician, as such, cares not what the
psychological nature of the act of judging may be. The question for him is:
What is the nature of the sort of sign of which a principal variety is
called a proposition, which is the matter upon which the act of judging is
exercised? The proposition need not be asserted or judged. It may be
contemplated as a sign capable of being asserted or denied. This sign itself
retains its full meaning whether it be actually asserted or not. The
peculiarity of it, therefore, lies in its mode of meaning; and to say this
is to say that its peculiarity lies in its relation to its interpretant. The
proposition professes to be really affected by the actual existent or real
law to which it refers. The argument makes the same pretension, but that is
not the principal pretension of the argument. The rheme makes no such
pretension.

 

 

A few years after the Syllabus, Peirce remarked in a letter to Welby that he
would like to "write a little book on 'The Conduct of Thoughts'" - that is,
on how thoughts, considered as signs, behave; and he would focus on "what we
may, from one point of view, regard as the principal kind of signs," namely
dicisigns (SS 195-7, EP2:477-8). In the Syllabus he had not yet coined the
term "semiosis" for the behavior of signs, but we can see at least the
beginnings of Peirce's concern with what signs (especially propositions) do
in this paragraph of NDTR. The claim that the proposition "professes to be
really affected by the actual existent or real law to which it refers" is a
version of the claim that the proposition (or its not-necessarily-symbolic
basis, the dicisign) represents itself as well as its object. As Peirce put
it in the aforementioned letter, in the dicisign "there is one distinct part
appropriated to representing the object, and another to representing how
this very sign itself represents that object.. In 'John is in love with
Helen' the object signified is the pair, John and Helen. But the 'is in love
with' signifies the form this sign represents itself to represent
John-and-Helen's Form to be." (That part is the rheme involved in the
dicisign.)

 

The next paragraph, and my next post, will consider how the argument also
"professes" or represents itself, but takes this recursive conduct to
another level.

 

Gary f.

 

} Everything which is present to us is a phenomenal manifestation of
ourselves. [Peirce] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Jeff, I’ll take a crack at it, inserting my answers after your questions.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 4-Jan-16 19:37



Hello,

 

I'd like to follow up on the post that Gary F. made some weeks back about the 
first two pages in NDTR.  Let me focus on two paragraph that are found on the 
second page of the essay in the EP:

 

Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as the 
First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere possibility, 
an actual existent, or a law. These three trichotomies, taken together, divide 
all triadic relations into ten classes. These ten classes will have certain 
subdivisions according as the existent correlates are individual subjects or 
individual facts, and according as the correlates that are laws are general 
subjects, general modes of fact, or general modes of law. (CP 2.238) 

 

There will be besides a second similar division of triadic relations into  ten 
classes, according as the dyadic relations which they constitute between either 
the First and Second Correlates, or the First and Third, or the Second and 
Third are of the nature of possibilities, facts, or laws; and these ten classes 
will be subdivided in different ways. (CP 2.239) 

 

How do these claims fit together?  For the time being, let's set aside the two 
systems of classification, and let's focus on the relations themselves.  In CP 
2.238, Peirce describes triadic relations between the first, second and third 
correlates.

 

GF: Well, that’s what he does in the entire essay, based on the principle that 
the correlates are numbered first, second and third in order from simplest to 
most complex. Specifically in 238, he first considers each of the correlates 
monadically. For instance, in the case of a sign, considering it monadically 
(i.e. regardless of its relations to object or interpretant) gives us one 
trichotomy (later designated as qualisign/sinsign/legisign). Considering the 
object (second correlate) monadically would give us another trichotomy, and 
considering the interpretant (third correlate) monadically would give us a 
third trichotomy. (I say “would” because Peirce does not, in his later focus on 
sign relations, actually consider either the object or the interpretant 
monadically.)

 

JD:  In 2.239, he describes three dyadic relations between the correlates.  How 
are the three dyadic relations connected to the triadic relation or relations?

 

GF: As Peirce says in 239, every triadic relation constitutes three dyadic 
relations. In the semiotic case these would be sign-object, object-interpretant 
and sign-interpretant. In other words, each of these can be considered 
dyadically, and that would give us another set of three trichotomies, since 
dyadic relations (like monads) can be of the nature of possibilities, facts, or 
laws. (Only one of those trichotomies, icon/index/symbol, is actually given in 
NDTR.)

 

JD: In the opening remarks in the discussion of triadic relations in "The Logic 
of Mathematics; an attempt to develop my categories from within," he says the 
following about the connections between the dyadic and the triadic relations:  

Each of the three subjects introduces a dyad into the triad, and so does each 
pair of subjects.  (CP 1.472)

How should we understand his claims about the manner in which the dyads are 
being introduced into the triad?

 

GF: It should be clear enough that each pair of subjects “introduces” a dyad 
into the triad (following the order of involution or analysis) because the 
triad includes three pairs, each of which can be considered dyadically (as per 
CP 2.239). I think the reason that each subject introduces a dyad into the 
triad is that each of its three subjects must have a dyadic relation to the 
dyad which is the other two considered as a “unit”. CP 1.471 gives some context 
to this, including a couple of examples which may be helpful:

 

471. We come now to the triad. What is a triad? It is a three. But three what? 
If we say it is three subjects, we take at the outset an incomplete view of it. 
Let us see where we are, remembering that logic is to be our guide in this 
inquiry. The monad has no features but its suchness, which in logic is embodied 
in the signification of the verb. As such it is developed in the lowest of the 
three chief forms of which logic treats, the term, the proposition, and the 
syllogism. The dyad introduced a radically new sort of element, the subject, 
which first shows itself in the proposition. The dyad is the metaphysical 
correlative of the proposition, as the monad is of the term. Propositions are 
not all strictly and merely dyadic, although dyadism is their prominent 
feature. But strictly dyadic propositions have two subjects. One of these is 
active, or existentially prior, in its relation to the dyad, while the other is 
passive, or existentially posterior. A 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello,

I'd like to follow up on the post that Gary F. made some weeks back about the 
first two pages in NDTR.  Let me focus on two paragraph that are found on the 
second page of the essay in the EP:

Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as the 
First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere possibility, 
an actual existent, or a law. These three trichotomies, taken together, divide 
all triadic relations into ten classes. These ten classes will have certain 
subdivisions according as the existent correlates are individual subjects or 
individual facts, and according as the correlates that are laws are general 
subjects, general modes of fact, or general modes of law. (CP 2.238) 

There will be besides a second similar division of triadic relations into ten 
classes, according as the dyadic relations which they constitute between either 
the First and Second Correlates, or the First and Third, or the Second and 
Third are of the nature of possibilities, facts, or laws; and these ten classes 
will be subdivided in different ways. (CP 2.239) 

How do these claims fit together?  For the time being, let's set aside the two 
systems of classification, and let's focus on the relations themselves.  In CP 
2.238, Peirce describes triadic relations between the first, second and third 
correlates.  In 2.239, he describes three dyadic relations between the 
correlates.  How are the three dyadic relations connected to the triadic 
relation or relations?  In the opening remarks in the discussion of triadic 
relations in "The Logic of Mathematics; an attempt to develop my categories 
from within," he says the following about the connections between the dyadic 
and the triadic relations:  

Each of the three subjects introduces a dyad into the triad, and so does each 
pair of subjects.  (CP 1.472)

How should we understand his claims about the manner in which the dyads are 
being introduced into the triad?

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Friday, November 27, 2015 8:21 AM
To: 'PEIRCE-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

List,

Recent discussions have made it clear to me that some readers of Peirce who 
focus on the famous diagram of ten sign types (EP2:296) tend to overlook its 
context, the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (NDTR), and 
especially the first page or so, where Peirce is discussing triadic relations 
generally before narrowing his focus to semiotic relations. So I thought it 
might be worthwhile to present some of it here, in Peirce’s own words, along 
with some comments of a corollarial and non-controversial nature. The text 
begins on EP2:289, but I’ve used the paragraph numbering in the CP text here to 
facilitate reference. From this point on, all words in this font are directly 
quoted from Peirce, and my comments are inserted in [brackets]. I have made 
bold those parts of Peirce’s text that I wish to highlight.

Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations

CP 2.233. The principles and analogies of Phenomenology enable us to describe, 
in a distant way, what the divisions of triadic relations must be. But until we 
have met with the different kinds a posteriori, and have in that way been led 
to recognize their importance, the a priori descriptions mean little; not 
nothing at all, but little. Even after we seem to identify the varieties called 
for a priori with varieties which the experience of reflexion leads us to think 
important, no slight labour is required to make sure that the divisions we have 
found a posteriori are precisely those that have been predicted a priori. In 
most cases, we find that they are not precisely identical, owing to the 
narrowness of our reflexional experience. It is only after much further arduous 
analysis that we are able finally to place in the system the conceptions to 
which experience has led us. In the case of triadic relations, no part of this 
work has, as yet, been satisfactorily performed, except in some measure for the 
most important class of triadic relations, those of signs, or representamens, 
to their objects and interpretants.
[Most of NDTR will be about this “most important class of triadic relations,” 
which Peirce defines here but does not name. I will refer to it simply as 
S-O-I, or R-O-I. But before he begins to divide this class into subclasses, 
Peirce presents some ‘leading principles’, drawn from Phenomenology, which will 
be applied a posteriori to the classification of signs as familiar phenomena. 
In my comments, I will add some corollaries which follow from these general 
principles and frame the classification which follows.]

234. Provisionally, we may make a rude division of triadic relations, which, we 
need not doubt, contains impor

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[John Collier]

OK, thanks, Jerry. I don’t disagree. It may well be worthwhile to look at 
metalanguage to understand further what is going on in the process of 
hypostatic abstraction. I would want to look at the difference in how something 
is represented and what it is, as I suggested in my response below. This itself 
involves semiotics, of course, giving the issue an involuted*, but  that makes 
it complex in Robert Rosen’s sense of involving irreducible impredicatiivity 
(Essays on Life Itself). It would follow that it can’t be dealt with fully in 
1st order logic. My suggestion (below) was to go to 2nd order logic (which 
quantifies over properties), following Ramsey’s method (used in structural 
realism and some other forms of structuralism), but this has known problems 
itself. Perhaps the basic problem is that 2nd order logic is incomplete, and 
thus impredicative. The bump in the rug doesn’t go away easily.

I suspect that there is no way to deal with it fully, but I think it is still 
helpful to think of the grammar of  semiotic properties in terms of relations 
by using Peirce’s hypostatic abstraction.  Switching back and forth can help to 
get past the issues of the particular language, which are not essential to the 
subject. As for any possible application to the logic of chemistry, that is 
outside of my areas of expertise, but I would guess that shifting back and 
forth between chemical properties and relations via hypostatic abstraction 
might be informative by eliminating some accidents of representation system. 
That is just a guess on my part, though.

*From the Free Dictionary:
1.
a. The act of involving.
b. The state of being involved.
2. Intricacy; complexity.
3. Something, such as a long grammatical construction, that is intricate or 
complex.


John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 05 January 2016 6:07 AM
To: John Collier; Peirce List
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

John, List:
My response follows the original message

- Original Message -
From: John Collier
To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Peirce List
Cc: Gary Richmond
Sent: Monday, December 28, 2015 5:41 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

All I can say, Jerry, is to read it more carefully. There are no 
contradictions, so you must be misreading what I said. I have no idea why you 
relate what I said to Tarski’s views, with which I am quite familiar. The move 
that I think lies behind the connection between the triadic relations of the 
sign and the relations that I think Edwina is talking about is hypostatic 
abstraction, which is a technical device for reinterpreting a property as a 
relation. Other than that, I was trying to get how the two implied relations to 
the representamen become three, and it seemed to me that that the third is on a 
more abstract level, a relation of relations, again, and perhaps even more 
obviously if I am right about that, though Edwina seems to differ than the 
relations it relates. The third relation I am referring to seems to me to be 
the relation between the object the interpretant. The object and interpretant 
are properties (despite the grammatical nominatives used to refer to them), 
which are turned into relations by the abstraction, which is a standard method 
for understanding things, especially for semiotic vehicles, in Peirce’s work. 
Taken this way there is a sense in which I am suggesting that it is “meta”, but 
so are the relations related, as they also are grasped through hypostatic 
abstraction. If there is an apparent inconsistency I am pretty sure that it 
arise from not understanding and being able to recognize hypostatic 
abstraction, and confusing the way in which something is picked out with its 
essential nature. The same thing can be both a property and a relation, 
depending on how we look at it. This is not possible to represent in the 
language of first order logic due to its formal limitations. Second order logic 
makes the possible, e.g., in the Ramsification of theories (which basically 
replaces properties with relational structures). Ramsey tried to get a logic 
grounded solely in relations, but he was unsuccessful. I have little hope of 
doing what Ramsey failed to do despite his being one of the most insightful 
logicians of the first half of the last century, so I did not try, and I won’t 
try now, either. But I will say that Peirce’s hypostatic abstraction is 
probably the key. Tarski’s satisfaction notion of truth, though it fits nicely 
with Ramsey’s work on the nature of theories and their reference, doesn’t need 
hypostatic abstraction to be stated. “Snow is white” is true if and only if 
snow is white involves only properties. Unless, like Frege, one thinks that to 
be true is a relation between

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, list,

As I said, I'll leave you the last (substantive) word in these two matters
in this thread. So, as your last word included questions, I'd suggest that
we move the discussion off-list. We seem to be talking past each other and,
again, that may be (1) because our purposes are different and/or (2) you
are still very focused on NDTR and I'm taking a more general view of both
(a) the 9 parameters and (b) the 6 vectors.

But, honestly, I'm surprised at the distance there is between us in both
these matters. Perhaps there's even a (3), that we're working at different
levels of abstraction. This 'surprise' of mine is especially so for the 9
parameters which seem to me to be a pretty standard arrangement--nothing
particularly novel there except an emphasis on the categoriality of all
s-o-i and the 3 x 3 parameters (and my diagramming that categoriality in
the way I do).

Similarly, I pointed to Parmetier as regards the mirror of determination
and representation, so at least I'm not alone in seeing it this way. That
you're not seeing my (his) kind of example as expressing this may also be
the result of (1), (2) or (3). But to be so far apart on what seem to me to
be rather fundamental issues is, I must admit, a bit unnerving.

So, let's take this off-list and, perhaps, onto the "mirror" thread (I'd
rather prefer to discuss all 6 vectors and 3 mirrors there rather than just
the 'determination'/'representation' one as I'll maintaing that one can
find vectors--and even mirrored vectors--throughout Peirce's science and
logic as semiotic (so the consideration of specific examples, that is, any
particular disagreement as to whether something is a 'mirror' or not may be
a not quite to the point--at least as I'm looking at it at the moment).
Perhaps the entirety of this discussion needs a bit 'cooling off'--it
certainly seems to me that I need to distance myself a bit from it, reread
your posts, and try to figure out why we seem to me to be talking past each
other.

I'm also working on a post to introduce an entirely new thread in the
consideration of Peirce's late thinking on pragmatism, and perhaps I'd
prefer to concentrate on that at the beginning of the new year. (My sense
in reading your latest post to the 'mirror' thread is that I'll need to
reflect on your comments there for a while as well before responding).

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Thu, Dec 31, 2015 at 10:11 AM,  wrote:

> Gary R,
>
>
>
> My responses interleaved.
>
>
>
> } All particulars become meaningless if we lose sight of the pattern which
> they jointly constitute. [M. Polanyi] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 30-Dec-15 17:27
>
> Gary F. list,
>
>
>
> As we discussed off-list, I'll try to answer the questions you posed in
> your post of 12/24, give you "the last word" in response if you'd like it,
> then move this facet of the discussion off-list and, hopefully, to the
> 'mirror' thread, hardly begun.
>
>
>
> I'm away from my NYC apartment until 1/4, so I'll just give brief answers
> with no textual support for now. As I noted earlier, trying to incorporate
> the connection to the longish Peirce quotes you provided has, perhaps,
> slowed down my response. However, since as you off-list suggested, those
> quotes may have more to do with your interests than with mine, I won't much
> refer to them. Also, this discussion seems to have moved on, and some of
> the comments by myself and others in this and associated threads may have
> already offered at least part of the answer to one of them. You wrote:
>
>
>
> GF: In the case of the three trichotomies which you refer to as “this
> particular trichotomy of trichotomies,” I’m not sure whether you meant
> “this *triad* of trichotomies,” or are claiming that the three
> ‘parametric’ trichotomies represent a division of something else into
> three. (Or maybe you’re just rhetorically elevating the status of this
> triad, as in the expression “King of Kings”?) If you do regard them as a
> trichotomy (in the way that icon/index/symbol is a trichotomy *of the
> possible relations of the sign to its object*), then I’d like to know
> what it is that this meta-trichotomy divides into three.
>
> GR: As I've remarked in several posts this year and, really, over the
> years, I use the term "trichotomy" *exclusively* in the sense of such
> tricategorial divisions that Peirce describes in 'Trichotomic', 'A Guess at
> the Riddle', and many other places. So, I do *not* mean simply "this
> triad of trichotomies," but, indeed, "this trichotomy of tirchotomies."
>
> GF: OK, so this trichotomy of trichotomies divides something into three,
> in the sense that Peirce divides signs according to their mode of being to
> 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Edwina, John, Jon, Gary R., List,

Edwina says that "A dyad operates within two existentialities." 

I will agree with her suggestion that a dyadic relation between two existing 
individuals is, for Peirce, a kind paradigm case of a genuinely dyadic relation 
that can be considered in abstraction from any law or general rule.  Having 
said that, Peirce classifies a number of other dyadic relations in "The Logic 
of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within," that are not 
relations between two existing individuals, including the following:  (1) 
essential dyads; (2) accidental, inherential dyads; (3) accidental, relational 
dyads of identity; and (4) accidental relational dyads of diversity that are 
qualitative.  In fact, the first dyadic relation that he classifies that 
involves two existing individuals are (5) accidental, relational dyads of 
diversity that are dynamical.

In "Nomenclature and Division of Dyadic Relations," he provides a brief 
discussion of dyadic relations of reference and dyadic relations proper.  The 
latter class is divided into as well as referential dyads and dyadic 
rerelations.  The latter are divided into modal relations and existential 
rerelations.  The rest of the article is largely focused on existential 
rerelations, but he provides a separate discussion of modal rerelations.  
Peirce points out that, up to this point in his work in logic, he has mainly 
focused on dyadic existential rerelations.  What isn't clear to me is how we 
should fit reference and referential relations, and modal dyadic relations into 
the classificatory scheme provided in "On the Logic of Mathematics."  The 
simple comparison between an essential dyad and an accidental inherential dyad 
gives us nice clear examples of two kinds of modal relations.  The more 
complicated cases are harder to sort out.

Based on what he says in these two essays about dyadic relations, I think it is 
reasonable to infer that existential rerelations are all classified as (5) 
accidental, relational dyads of diversity that are dynamical.  They may be 
materially or formally ordered, or not.  For those that are both materially and 
formally ordered, they may be productive or actional in character.

Stepping back, for a moment, from Peirce's systems for classifying dyadic 
relations in these two essays, I think it behooves us to consider the full 
range of the different sorts of dyadic and triadic relations that he considers 
as we try to interpret what Peirce is doing in discussions such as what is 
found in "Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations" or the later Letters 
to Lady Welby.

My hunch is that the relation of correspondence is an especially important sort 
of relation for the sake of understanding his work in both mathematical logic 
and the normative science of semiotic.  Peirce explores the character of this 
kind of relation in a number of places, including the Logic Notebook at 333r.  
On that page of the MS, he spends a fair amount of time crossing out ideas that 
don't appear to work.  What he does retain are the ideas that the relation 
between A and B corresponds to the relation between X and Y  involves two 
dyadic relations--perhaps twice over--as well as a relation of non-identity.  
As such, even a simply kind of correspondence turns out to involve a rather 
complicated set of dyadic relations. (see, for instance, CP 4.81)

Hope that helps,

Jeff



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Edwina,

I am afraid you may be inside your 'semiotic blackhole" now.  That is, you
may be
(mind you I am not saying you are) so attracted to your own system of
beautiful ideas
that you cannot get out of it to see the real, not always beautiful, world
out there.

All the beast.

Sung

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 8:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Sung, please don't tell me what I meant. You aren't The Teacher here, but
> just a debater among debaters - and one who hasn't read Peirce but chooses
> to consider that his views on Peirce are always correct.
>
> I repeat - the 9 Relations are not dyads; that means that they aren't
> dyadic relations because a dyad operates between two existential nodes -
> and the Object-Representamen-Interpretant do not exist 'per se' each in
> themselves. They exist within the interactions...Such semiosic interactions
> may not be  with a human agent; a cell can semiosically interact with
> another cell and needs no human involvement.
>
> As Peirce noted, the semiosic triad is NOT made up of a collection of
> dyadic relations. Your mechanical reductionism is not Peircean.
>
> Edwina.
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
> *To:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 8:02 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Edwina,
>
> You say: " . . .  the 9 Relations are not dyads . . ."
>(122915-1)
>
> I say: " The 9 Relations are dyadic relations, not triadic ones."
>(1229151-2)
>
> I think you also meant (122915-2).
>
> Sung
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Sung - as I have repeatedly said, and which you continue to ignore, the 9
>> Relations are not dyads. A dyad operates within two existentialities, and
>> the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are not each existentialities in
>> themselves.
>>
>> The icon doesn't need an *existential *object or interpretant but it
>> still functions within a triadic semiosis.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> ----- Original Message -
>> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
>> *To:* Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com>
>> *Cc:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 4:34 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>>
>> Hi Matt.
>>
>> I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it
>> refers to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether
>> here and now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types
>> of signs are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view
>> that they are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e.,
>> R-R, R-O and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes.
>>
>> But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as
>> a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce)
>> neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a
>> blackboard.  It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic
>> sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit
>> that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as
>> triadic as mentioned above.   This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the
>> sign":
>>
>> "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of
>> discourse."   (122915-1)
>>
>> Sung
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken
>>> of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that
>>> mathematics is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable)
>>> circle signifies the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these
>>> cases the signs are still only signs within their triad; it's just that the
>>> object or interpretant doesn't need to be existent.
>>>
>>> Matt
>>>
>>> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
>>>
>>> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>>
>>> Jon A, List,
>>>
>>> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
>>> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>>>
>>> "A si

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Edwina,

You say: " . . .  the 9 Relations are not dyads . . ."
 (122915-1)

I say: " The 9 Relations are dyadic relations, not triadic ones."
 (1229151-2)

I think you also meant (122915-2).

Sung

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Sung - as I have repeatedly said, and which you continue to ignore, the 9
> Relations are not dyads. A dyad operates within two existentialities, and
> the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are not each existentialities in
> themselves.
>
> The icon doesn't need an *existential *object or interpretant but it
> still functions within a triadic semiosis.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
> *To:* Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com>
> *Cc:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 4:34 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Hi Matt.
>
> I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it refers
> to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether here and
> now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types of signs
> are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view that they
> are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e., R-R, R-O
> and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes.
>
> But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as
> a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce)
> neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a
> blackboard.  It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic
> sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit
> that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as
> triadic as mentioned above.   This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the
> sign":
>
> "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of
> discourse."   (122915-1)
>
> Sung
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken of
>> the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics
>> is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies
>> the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are
>> still only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or
>> interpretant doesn't need to be existent.
>>
>> Matt
>>
>> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
>>
>> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>
>> Jon A, List,
>>
>> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
>> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>>
>> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
>> once,  (122915-1)
>> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
>> would
>> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>>
>> That's in CP 2.304
>>
>> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which
>> would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its
>> object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
>> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
>> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
>> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
>> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
>> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
>> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
>> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no
>> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does
>> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification."
>>
>>
>>
>> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
>> sign*.
>>
>> Therefore,
>>
>> "Not all signs are triadic."
>> (122915-2)
>>
>> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>>
>> All the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subsc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Sung, please don't tell me what I meant. You aren't The Teacher here, but just 
a debater among debaters - and one who hasn't read Peirce but chooses to 
consider that his views on Peirce are always correct. 

I repeat - the 9 Relations are not dyads; that means that they aren't dyadic 
relations because a dyad operates between two existential nodes - and the 
Object-Representamen-Interpretant do not exist 'per se' each in themselves. 
They exist within the interactions...Such semiosic interactions may not be  
with a human agent; a cell can semiosically interact with another cell and 
needs no human involvement. 

As Peirce noted, the semiosic triad is NOT made up of a collection of dyadic 
relations. Your mechanical reductionism is not Peircean.

Edwina.
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 8:02 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Edwina,


  You say: " . . .  the 9 Relations are not dyads . . ."
  (122915-1)


  I say: " The 9 Relations are dyadic relations, not triadic ones." 
   (1229151-2)


  I think you also meant (122915-2).


  Sung


  On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Sung - as I have repeatedly said, and which you continue to ignore, the 9 
Relations are not dyads. A dyad operates within two existentialities, and the 
Object-Representamen-Interpretant are not each existentialities in themselves. 

The icon doesn't need an existential object or interpretant but it still 
functions within a triadic semiosis.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: Matt Faunce 
  Cc: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 4:34 PM
      Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Hi Matt. 


  I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it 
refers to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether here 
and now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types of signs 
are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view that they are 
not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e., R-R, R-O and R-I 
relations in 3 categorical modes.


  But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as 
a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce) 
neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a blackboard.  It 
is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic sign, and index a 
dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit that, depending on the 
context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as triadic as mentioned above.   
This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the sign":  

  "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of 
discourse."   (122915-1)


  Sung


  On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce <mattfau...@gmail.com> wrote:

Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken 
of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics 
is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies the 
hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are still 
only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or interpretant 
doesn't need to be existent.

Matt

On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

  On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:

Jon A, List, 


Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at 
the Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):

"A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which 
would, at once,  (122915-1)
lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, 
but would 
not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
  That's in CP 2.304


"A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign 
which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its 
object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a 
geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the character 
which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that 
character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a piece of 
mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the shot there 
would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether anybody has the 
sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign which would lose the 
character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the Relations 
are not dyads, are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?

Also - your definition of 'nominal' seems to suggest that you think that it 
refers to a view focused around 'names'. No- that's not the definition of 
nominalism.

Furthermore, the difference in analysis of the 9 types of Relations, isn't 
simply due to their 'name' - where you call them 'elementary signs', and Gary 
R. calls them 'parameters' and I call them 'Relations'. These differences 
aren't simply terminological; they are conceptually substantive. I strongly 
reject your mechanical reductionism.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 6:47 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,



  You wrote:


  "So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely an 
index,  (122015-1)
  but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one 
  day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."


  (1)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".  


  It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square 
triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be 
explained below:


   f  g
  Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant (I)
   |
 ^
   |
  |
   |___|
h


  Figure 1.  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
  f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign 
interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).  
  Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness, 
Secondness or Thirdness. 




  The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e., 
"interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in Figure 1) 
in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is determined by 
TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the bullet.




   (2)  You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of signs are 
not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not triadic ?  
Rather you think the 9 types are the "parameters" needed to produce the 10 
classes of triadic signs ?  You may be right, but the way you are expressing 
your idea is not too convincing to me.  To repeat my humble opinion, both the 9 
the types of signs and the 10 classes of signs are all signs (simply because we 
are thinking about them right here and now and we can only think in signs) but 
are not all of the same kind, since the former are parts of the latter and not 
the other way around, in an analogous way that quarks (there are 6 different 
kinds) are parts of baryons (i.e., protons, and neutrons) and not the other way 
around.  This is why I think it is justified to differentiate the 9 types of 
signs and the 10 classes of signs by giving them different names, for example, 
my suggestion that the former be referred to as the "elementary signs" and the 
latter "composite signs", which is in principle in the same spirit as your 
naming the former as "parameters" and the latter as "triadic signs", the 
difference being only NOMINAL.


  (3) Frankly  I am really surprised that, after at least for 3 years of 
discussions on the relation between the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of 
signs on this list and the biosemiotics list, beginning with [biosemiotics:46] 
dated 122/26/2012,  we have not yet reached a consensus on the definition of 
the seemingly simple concept of the sign.  It is like physicists quibbling over 
the definition of energy, or chemists not agreeing on the definition of 
molecules endlessly, which is unthinkable.  In fact semioticians, beginning 
with Peirce himself, seem to have been writing and discussing about the concept 
of signs in unbelievably complicated ways for over 100 years ! This is probably 
not because semioticians are, relatively speaking, not too bright on average, 
but because semiotics may be a much more complex discipline -- incomparably 
more complex than physics, chemistry, or even biology. This may explain why 
semiotics has not yet been able to make any significant contributions to 
advancing human knowledge (as I can see; If I am wrong on this, I would like to 
be informed of any specific contributions that smiotics have made to science, 
linguistics, mathemat

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Sung:

Again, the bullet-hole is ONLY a (necessarily triadic) sign because it has
immediate (possible) and final (would-be) interpretants.  The absence of a
dynamical (actual) interpretant does not somehow render it dyadic.

The nine terms are certainly signs--rhematic symbols, I suppose--but no one
is disputing this.  The issue is whether calling them "TYPES of signs" is
helpful or misleading, given the wide agreement that there are ten CLASSES
of signs based on their valid combinations.  Why do we even need a name for
all nine, taken together?  They are three relations that manifest in three
modes; why not just leave it at that?

Regards,

Jon S. (again, NOT Jon A.)

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely
> an index,  (122015-1)
> but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one
> day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."
>
> (*1*)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".
>
> It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square
> triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be
> explained below:
>
>  f
>  g
> Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant
> (I)
>  |
> ^
>  |
>  |
>  |___|
>   h
>
> *Figure 1.*  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
> f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign
> interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).
> Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness,
> Secondness or Thirdness.
>
> The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e.,
> "interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in *Figure
> 1) *in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is
> determined by TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the
> bullet.
>
>  (*2*)  You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of
> signs are not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not
> triadic ?  Rather you think the 9 types are the "parameters" needed to
> produce the 10 classes of triadic signs ?  You may be right, but the way
> you are expressing your idea is not too convincing to me.  To repeat my
> humble opinion, both the 9 the types of signs and the 10 classes of signs
> are all signs (simply because we are thinking about them right here and now
> and we can only think in signs) but are not all of the same kind, since the
> former are parts of the latter and not the other way around, in an
> analogous way that quarks (there are 6 different kinds) are parts of
> baryons (i.e., protons, and neutrons) and not the other way around.  This
> is why I think it is justified to differentiate the 9 types of signs and
> the 10 classes of signs by giving them different names, for example, my
> suggestion that the former be referred to as the "elementary signs" and the
> latter "composite signs", which is in principle in the same spirit as your
> naming the former as "parameters" and the latter as "triadic signs", the
> difference being only NOMINAL.
>
> (*3*) Frankly  I am really surprised that, after at least for 3 years of
> discussions on the relation between the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of
> signs on this list and the biosemiotics list, beginning with
> [biosemiotics:46] dated 122/26/2012,  we have not yet reached a consensus
> on the definition of the seemingly simple concept of *the sign*.  It is
> like physicists quibbling over the definition of energy, or chemists not
> agreeing on the definition of molecules endlessly, which is unthinkable.
> In fact semioticians, beginning with Peirce himself, seem to have been
> writing and discussing about the concept of *signs* in unbelievably
> complicated ways for over 100 years ! This is probably not because
> semioticians are, relatively speaking, not too bright on average, but
> because semiotics may be a much more complex discipline -- incomparably
> more complex than physics, chemistry, or even biology. This may explain why
> semiotics has not yet been able to make any significant contributions to
> advancing human knowledge (as I can see; If I am wrong on this, I would
> like to be informed of any specific contributions that smiotics have made
> to science, linguistics, mathematics, philosophy, or to theology throughout
> human history).  And yet semiotics is such an intellectually attractive
> discipline that it may act as a powerful intellectual blackhole for many
> aspiring thinkers. As a possible warning against such a semiotic danger,  I
> am taking the risk of committing the crime of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Matt Faunce]

Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken 
of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that 
mathematics is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) 
circle signifies the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these 
cases the signs are still only signs within their triad; it's just that 
the object or interpretant doesn't need to be existent.


Matt

On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:

Jon A, List,

Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at 
the Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):


"A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, 
at once,  (122915-1)
lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, 
but would

not lose that character if there were no interpretant."

That's in CP 2.304

"A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a
sign which would possess the character which renders it
significant, even though its object had no existence; such as a
lead-pencil streak as representing a geometrical line. An index is
a sign which would, at once, lose the character which makes it a
sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that character
if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a piece of
mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there,
whether anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A
symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a
sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of
speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being
understood to have that signification."

calvert Frome calvert Frome


So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a 
*dyadic sign*.


Therefore,

"Not all signs are triadic." (122915-2)

as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.

All the best.

Sung

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Matt - I think it was written in 1895.
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 5:56 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  On 12/29/15 5:40 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:



What year was CP 1.303 written?


  I meant, CP 2.303 

  I remember hearing Richard J. Bernstein mention in an online lecture that one 
sad consequence of Peirce's ostracization from academia is that he sometimes 
contradicted himself when he probably otherwise wouldn't have. If there's a 
seeming contradiction, I, of course, first look to see if it's just my 
misinterpretation, but second, I look to see if the two items that contradict 
come from two different eras of Peirce's thought. Is that the case here, with 
CP 2.303 and CP 1.138?

  Matt



--



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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Edwina,

You wrote:

"Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the
Relations are not dyads,  (122915-1)
are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?"

You may repeat (122915-1) as many times as you wish, but, to me, the fact
remains that


"The 9 types of signs are *dyadic relations*, regardless of whether or not
they become incorporated   (122915-2)
into a triadic sign, just as quarks are quarks regardless of whether or not
they are incorporated into
a baryon."

Perhaps you will find the *quark-sign analogy *useful someday, even though
it may not seem so now, despite the fact that I have been discussing this
model on these lists since [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012.

All the best.

Sung






On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 8:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the
> Relations are not dyads, are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?
>
> Also - your definition of 'nominal' seems to suggest that you think that
> it refers to a view focused around 'names'. No- that's not the definition
> of nominalism.
>
> Furthermore, the difference in analysis of the 9 types of Relations, isn't
> simply due to their 'name' - where you call them 'elementary signs', and
> Gary R. calls them 'parameters' and I call them 'Relations'. These
> differences aren't simply terminological; they are conceptually
> substantive. I strongly reject your mechanical reductionism.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
> *To:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 6:47 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely
> an index,  (122015-1)
> but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one
> day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."
>
> (*1*)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".
>
> It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square
> triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be
> explained below:
>
>  f
>  g
> Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant
> (I)
>  |
> ^
>  |
>  |
>  |___|
>   h
>
> *Figure 1.*  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
> f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign
> interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).
> Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness,
> Secondness or Thirdness.
>
>
> The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e.,
> "interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in *Figure
> 1) *in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is
> determined by TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the
> bullet.
>
>
>  (*2*)  You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of
> signs are not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not
> triadic ?  Rather you think the 9 types are the "parameters" needed to
> produce the 10 classes of triadic signs ?  You may be right, but the way
> you are expressing your idea is not too convincing to me.  To repeat my
> humble opinion, both the 9 the types of signs and the 10 classes of signs
> are all signs (simply because we are thinking about them right here and now
> and we can only think in signs) but are not all of the same kind, since the
> former are parts of the latter and not the other way around, in an
> analogous way that quarks (there are 6 different kinds) are parts of
> baryons (i.e., protons, and neutrons) and not the other way around.  This
> is why I think it is justified to differentiate the 9 types of signs and
> the 10 classes of signs by giving them different names, for example, my
> suggestion that the former be referred to as the "elementary signs" and the
> latter "composite signs", which is in principle in the same spirit as your
> naming the former as "parameters" and the latter as "triadic signs", the
> difference being only NOMINAL.
>
> (*3*) Frankly  I am really surprised that, after at least for 3 years of
> discussions on the relation b

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Sung - you are missing my point. I'm not trying to convince YOU to accept my 
view that the Relations are not dyads. I frankly don't care about whether or 
not you agree with me. 

I'm asking you to stop informing this list (as well as your endless postings to 
the biosemiotics list) that I consider the Relations to be dyads! I'm asking 
you to speak for yourself - and not misinform the lists about what I think!  
READ what you wrote:

 "You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of signs are not 
signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not triadic"

The way this reads - is that Edwina considers '9 dyadic relations'. But I 
don't. So, don't misinform people.  And you wrote:

I say: " The 9 Relations are dyadic relations, not triadic ones." (1229151-2)


I think you also meant (122915-2).


No, Sung, I did NOT say that the 9 Relations are dyadic relations. So - don't 
go and write something, informing the list of 'what Edwina also meant'.

Stick to your own comments about yourself and don't dictate what others 'ought 
to think'.

Edwina 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 8:50 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Edwina,


  You wrote:


  "Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the Relations 
are not dyads,  (122915-1)
  are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?"

  You may repeat (122915-1) as many times as you wish, but, to me, the fact 
remains that




  "The 9 types of signs are dyadic relations, regardless of whether or not they 
become incorporated   (122915-2)
  into a triadic sign, just as quarks are quarks regardless of whether or not 
they are incorporated into 
  a baryon." 


  Perhaps you will find the quark-sign analogy useful someday, even though it 
may not seem so now, despite the fact that I have been discussing this model on 
these lists since [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012.  


  All the best.


  Sung










  On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 8:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the 
Relations are not dyads, are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?

Also - your definition of 'nominal' seems to suggest that you think that it 
refers to a view focused around 'names'. No- that's not the definition of 
nominalism.

Furthermore, the difference in analysis of the 9 types of Relations, isn't 
simply due to their 'name' - where you call them 'elementary signs', and Gary 
R. calls them 'parameters' and I call them 'Relations'. These differences 
aren't simply terminological; they are conceptually substantive. I strongly 
reject your mechanical reductionism.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 6:47 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,



  You wrote:


  "So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely 
an index,  (122015-1)
  but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one 
  day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."


  (1)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".  


  It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square 
triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be 
explained below:


   f
  g
  Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant 
(I)
   |
 ^
   |
  |
   |___|
h


  Figure 1.  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
  f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign 
interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).  
  Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness, 
Secondness or Thirdness. 




  The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e., 
"interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in Figure 1) 
in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is determined by 
TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the bullet.




   (2)  You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of signs 
are not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations tha

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Matt Faunce]

Jon S, this is similar to a problem I had in another thread where Clark 
Gobel said that the long-run is a regulative principle that doesn't need 
to be actualized. I still have a problem with it. I need to spend some 
time working on fleshing out a concise explanation of the problem I see.


Matt

On 12/29/15 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Matt, List:

The "annihilation" of a particular dynamical (actual) interpretant 
does not negate the reality of the corresponding final/normal 
(potential) interpretant, does it?  This reminds me of Peirce's 
example of whether a diamond that is never actually scratched can be 
properly predicated as hard--something on which he changed his mind 
over time, ultimately deciding that what matters is what WOULD 
happen IF it were scratched.  The interpretant idea WOULD be 
discoverable under different circumstances--namely, if the individual 
consciousness in which it was determined were NOT annihilated.


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
 - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 


On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 4:40 PM, Matt Faunce > wrote:


Edwina, List,

OK. I see that Peirce said it, but how can believing that an
interpretant can be annihilated not block the way of inquiry. See
CP. 1.138:

"The second bar which philosophers often set up across the
roadway of inquiry lies in maintaining that this, that, and
the other never can be known. When Auguste Comte was pressed
to specify any matter of positive fact to the knowledge of
which no man could by any possibility attain, he instanced the
knowledge of the chemical composition of the fixed stars; and
you may see his answer set down in the Philosophie positive.^1
But the ink was scarcely dry upon the printed page before the
spectroscope was discovered..."

With this: "the sign is thereby rendered imperfect, at least." I
wonder what "at least" means, i.e., what more might the sign be
rendered. An illusion? If the interpretant, as an object of
inquiry, is rendered "absolutely undiscoverable" then there can be
no potential final opinion of it, therefore it was never real.

What year was CP 1.303 written?

Matt

On 12/29/15 4:24 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Exactly, Matt. As Peirce said - the interpretant doesn't need to
be existent NOW, for it could be existent in the future - that
potential interpretant to which you refer. BUT - "if the series
of successive interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby
rendered imperfect, at least." 2.303. And he continues, "If, an
interpretant idea having been determined in an individual
consciousness, it determines no outward sign, but that
consciousness becomes annihilated, or otherwise loses all memory
or other significant effect of the sign, it becomes absolutely
undiscoverable that there ever was such an idea in that
consciousness..." 2.303.
The point is, that without the interpretant, now or in the
future, the semiosic triad is 'empty' and thus - is no longer a sign.
Edwina





--
Matt


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Jon,

You wrote:

" . . . the nine "types" (A) are really just nine TERMS that name specific
 (122915-1)
characteristics (B) . . ."  (letters added)

I agree.  I wrote about it in [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2015.  You can
check it out.


But what I am saying is in addition to what you are saying above. I am
saying that

"If A is the name of B, A is called the sign for B."
 (122915-2)


Do you not agree ?

Sung





On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Sung, List:
>
> Again, the nine "types" are really just nine TERMS that name specific
> characteristics within the ten CLASSES of signs.  For example, an icon is
> also a rheme, and either a qualisign, sinsign, or legisign; i.e., three of
> the ten classes correspond to icons.  But no sign is ONLY an icon; it also
> ALWAYS has the R-R and R-I relations, as well.
>
> Icon, index, and symbol are all irreducibly triadic signs.  In claiming
> otherwise, you seem to be conflating reality with existence, contrary to
> Peirce's own usage of those terms.  The lead-pencil streak still has an
> object--the geometrical line--even though it does not exist.  The
> bullet-hole still has an interpretant--immediate, as well as final--even
> though it does not exist.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:34 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
>> Hi Matt.
>>
>> I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it
>> refers to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether
>> here and now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types
>> of signs are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view
>> that they are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e.,
>> R-R, R-O and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes.
>>
>> But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as
>> a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce)
>> neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a
>> blackboard.  It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic
>> sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit
>> that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as
>> triadic as mentioned above.   This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the
>> sign":
>>
>> "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of
>> discourse."   (122915-1)
>>
>> Sung
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken
>>> of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that
>>> mathematics is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable)
>>> circle signifies the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these
>>> cases the signs are still only signs within their triad; it's just that the
>>> object or interpretant doesn't need to be existent.
>>>
>>> Matt
>>>
>>> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
>>>
>>> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>>
>>> Jon A, List,
>>>
>>> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
>>> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>>>
>>> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
>>> once,  (122915-1)
>>> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
>>> would
>>> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>>>
>>> That's in CP 2.304
>>>
>>> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign
>>> which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though
>>> its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
>>> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
>>> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
>>> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
>>> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
>>> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
>>> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
>>> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no
>>> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does
>>> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification."
>>>
>>> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
>>> sign*.
>>>
>>> Therefore,
>>>
>>> "Not all signs are triadic."
>>> (122915-2)
>>>
>>> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>>>
>>> All the best.
>>>
>>> Sung
>>>
>>>


-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

In Peirce's terms, would it not be right to say that the representamen,
object, and interpretant need not EXIST at all?  A qualisign or legisign
does not exist unless and until it is embodied, but we can still talk about
it as a REAL triadic sign apart from any such particular instantiation.
The lead-pencil streak exists as a triadic sign of a geometrical line, but
its object is purely hypothetical.  The bullet-hole exists as a triadic
sign of a gunshot, but its (immediate) interpretant is never actualized
unless someone attributes it as such.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 7:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Sung, please don't tell me what I meant. You aren't The Teacher here, but
> just a debater among debaters - and one who hasn't read Peirce but chooses
> to consider that his views on Peirce are always correct.
>
> I repeat - the 9 Relations are not dyads; that means that they aren't
> dyadic relations because a dyad operates between two existential nodes -
> and the Object-Representamen-Interpretant do not exist 'per se' each in
> themselves. They exist within the interactions...Such semiosic interactions
> may not be  with a human agent; a cell can semiosically interact with
> another cell and needs no human involvement.
>
> As Peirce noted, the semiosic triad is NOT made up of a collection of
> dyadic relations. Your mechanical reductionism is not Peircean.
>
> Edwina.
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

calvert FromeExactly, Matt. As Peirce said - the interpretant doesn't need to 
be existent NOW, for it could be existent in the future - that potential 
interpretant to which you refer. BUT - "if the series of successive 
interpretants comes to an end, the sign is thereby rendered imperfect, at 
least." 2.303. And he continues, "If, an interpretant idea having been 
determined in an individual consciousness, it determines no outward sign, but 
that consciousness becomes annihilated, or otherwise loses all memory or other 
significant effect of the sign, it becomes absolutely undiscoverable that there 
ever was such an idea in that consciousness..." 2.303.

The point is, that without the interpretant, now or in the future, the semiosic 
triad is 'empty' and thus - is no longer a sign.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 3:30 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken of the 
"potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics is, a 
pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies the 
hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are still 
only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or interpretant 
doesn't need to be existent.

  Matt

  On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:

  Jon A, List, 


  Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the 
Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):

  "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at 
once,  (122915-1)
  lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but 
would 
  not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
That's in CP 2.304


  "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which 
would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its 
object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a 
geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the character 
which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not lose that 
character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a piece of 
mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the shot there 
would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether anybody has the 
sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign which would lose the 
character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any 
utterance of speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being 
understood to have that signification." 




  So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a dyadic 
sign.


  Therefore,  



  "Not all signs are triadic."  
   (122915-2)


  as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.


  All the best.


  Sung



--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, list,

Well, and succinctly said!

I will, however, continue to employ the term 'parameters' rather than
'terms' for the nine 'characteristics' of signs since 'terms' in that
context seems far too general to get at their function: "The three
trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF
SIGNS" (CP 2.264).

Best,

Gary

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Sung, List:
>
> Again, the nine "types" are really just nine TERMS that name specific
> characteristics within the ten CLASSES of signs.  For example, an icon is
> also a rheme, and either a qualisign, sinsign, or legisign; i.e., three of
> the ten classes correspond to icons.  But no sign is ONLY an icon; it also
> ALWAYS has the R-R and R-I relations, as well.
>
> Icon, index, and symbol are all irreducibly triadic signs.  In claiming
> otherwise, you seem to be conflating reality with existence, contrary to
> Peirce's own usage of those terms.  The lead-pencil streak still has an
> object--the geometrical line--even though it does not exist.  The
> bullet-hole still has an interpretant--immediate, as well as final--even
> though it does not exist.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:34 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
>> Hi Matt.
>>
>> I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it
>> refers to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether
>> here and now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types
>> of signs are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view
>> that they are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e.,
>> R-R, R-O and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes.
>>
>> But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as
>> a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce)
>> neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a
>> blackboard.  It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic
>> sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit
>> that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as
>> triadic as mentioned above.   This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the
>> sign":
>>
>> "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of
>> discourse."   (122915-1)
>>
>> Sung
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken
>>> of the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that
>>> mathematics is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable)
>>> circle signifies the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these
>>> cases the signs are still only signs within their triad; it's just that the
>>> object or interpretant doesn't need to be existent.
>>>
>>> Matt
>>>
>>> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
>>>
>>> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>>
>>> Jon A, List,
>>>
>>> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
>>> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>>>
>>> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
>>> once,  (122915-1)
>>> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
>>> would
>>> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>>>
>>> That's in CP 2.304
>>>
>>> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign
>>> which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though
>>> its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
>>> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
>>> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
>>> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
>>> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
>>> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
>>> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
>>> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no
>>> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does
>>> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification."
>>>
>>> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
>>> sign*.
>>>
>>> Therefore,
>>>
>>> "Not all signs are triadic."
>>> (122915-2)
>>>
>>> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>>>
>>> All the best.
>>>
>>> Sung
>>>
>>>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Sung, List:

Please see my reply in the other thread.  An index is still always triadic;
it has immediate (possible) and final/normal (would-be) interpretants, even
if it never produces a dynamic (actual) interpretant.

Regards,

Jon S. (not Jon A., since that would be Jon Awbrey)

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 2:38 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> John, List,
>
> I just wrote to Jon A as below, reminding him that not all signs are
> triadic, according to Peirce:
>
> "Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
> Riddle (K. Sheriff,
> Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>
> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
> once,  (122915-1)
> lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
> would
> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>
> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
> sign*.
>
> Therefore,
>
> "Not all signs are triadic."
>   (122915-2)"
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi Matt.

I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it refers
to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether here and
now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types of signs
are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view that they
are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e., R-R, R-O
and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes.

But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as a
sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce)
neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a
blackboard.  It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic
sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit
that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as
triadic as mentioned above.   This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the
sign":

"Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of
discourse."   (122915-1)

Sung

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken of
> the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics
> is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies
> the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are
> still only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or
> interpretant doesn't need to be existent.
>
> Matt
>
> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
>
> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
> Jon A, List,
>
> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>
> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
> once,  (122915-1)
> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
> would
> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>
> That's in CP 2.304
>
> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which
> would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its
> object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no
> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does
> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification."
>
>
>
> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
> sign*.
>
> Therefore,
>
> "Not all signs are triadic."
>   (122915-2)
>
> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>


-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[Sungchul Ji]

John, List,

I just wrote to Jon A as below, reminding him that not all signs are
triadic, according to Peirce:


"Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
Riddle (K. Sheriff,
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):

"A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
once,  (122915-1)
lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
would
not lose that character if there were no interpretant."

So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic sign*
.

Therefore,

"Not all signs are triadic."
  (122915-2)"

All the best.

Sung



On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 1:42 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:

> The interpretant is a sign, so of course it is triadic.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *On
> Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji
> *Sent:* Tuesday, 29 December 2015 2:34 PM
> *To:* PEIRCE-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations -
> meta-languages and propositions of triadicity
>
>
>
> Jon A, List,
>
>
>
> Your excellent quote
>
>
>
> ". . . . the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic
> relation to the Object,(122915-1)
>
> but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does."
>
>
>
> indicates that the Interpretant is triadic as well, just like the
> Representamen is.  But in the following quote I cited yesterday, Peirce
> said:
>
>
>
> " . . . (A, or a sign; my addition) is also in a triadic relation to B
> for a purely   (122915-2)
> passive correlate, C, this triadic relation being such as to determine
> *C to be in a dyadic relation, µ, to B*," (emphasis added)
>
>
>
> *30 - 1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably
> July 1905 .*
>
> So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a
> priman element generally) and we might define a sign as follows:
>
> "A "sign" is anything, A, which,
>
> (1) in addition to other characters of its own,
>
> (2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, B,
>
> (3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate,
> C, this triadic relation being such as to determine C to be in a dyadic
> relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the
> relation Þ."
>
> Retrieved from http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM
>
>
> Statements (122915-1) and (122915-2) are clearly contradictory, just as
> the following two statements are with respect to the ambiguous picture, P,
> shown in Figure 1:
>
>
>
> "A is a lion and not a cat."
>(122915-3)
>
> "A is a cat and not a lion."
>(122915-4)
>
>
>
> [image: Inline image 1]
>
>
>
> Figure 1. An ambiguous picture. retrieved from the Internet.
>
>
>
> But in reality
>
>
>
> "A is both a lion and a cat."
>   (122915-5)
>
>
>
> It seems to me that there are two possible explanations for the seeming
> contradiction revealed in Peirce's writings, (122915-1) and (122915-2):
>
> (i)  Peirce contradicted himself.
> (122915-6)
>
>
>
> (ii) Peirce (most likely unknowingly or unconsciously) prescinded
>  (122915-7)
> the dyadic aspect of the triadic sign.
>
>
>
> Possibility (ii) is consistent with what I called yesterday the "Peirce
> uncertainty principle" (PUP) or "Semiotic uncertainty principle" (PUP) in
> analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.   I now suggest that a
> stronger version of PUP or SUP would be
>
>
>
> "*All signs are ambiguous to varying degrees*."
>   (122915-8)
>
>
>
> which may be referred to as the "Sign Uncertainty Principle" (SUP)
>
>
>
> where the letter S is ambiguous.
>
>
>
> All the best.
>
>
>
> Sung
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 10:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
>
>
> Is it not the case, at least according to Peirce, that the
> interpretant-object relation is necessarily the same as the
> representamen-object relation?  If so,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Sung, List:

Again, the nine "types" are really just nine TERMS that name specific
characteristics within the ten CLASSES of signs.  For example, an icon is
also a rheme, and either a qualisign, sinsign, or legisign; i.e., three of
the ten classes correspond to icons.  But no sign is ONLY an icon; it also
ALWAYS has the R-R and R-I relations, as well.

Icon, index, and symbol are all irreducibly triadic signs.  In claiming
otherwise, you seem to be conflating reality with existence, contrary to
Peirce's own usage of those terms.  The lead-pencil streak still has an
object--the geometrical line--even though it does not exist.  The
bullet-hole still has an interpretant--immediate, as well as final--even
though it does not exist.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:34 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Hi Matt.
>
> I agree that "icon" can be a triadic sign if there is the object it refers
> to and the intepretant it determines on its interpreter, whether here and
> now, or sometime in the future.  In this sense, all of the 9 types of signs
> are triadic signs as I have been advocating against Edwina's view that they
> are not signs because they only refer to dyadic relations, i.e., R-R, R-O
> and R-I relations in 3 categorical modes.
>
> But, icons are different from index or from symbols in that it can act as
> a sign even without its object and interpretant (as Pointed out by Peirce)
> neither now nor in the future, like the lead-pencil streak on a
> blackboard.  It is in this sense that I am referring to icon as a monadic
> sign, and index a dyadic sign and symbol as a triadic sign. Again, I admit
> that, depending on the context, icon, index and symbol can be viewed as
> triadic as mentioned above.   This is what I mean by the "ambiguity of the
> sign":
>
> "Icon can be viewed as triadic or dyadic, depending on the context of
> discourse."   (122915-1)
>
> Sung
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:30 PM, Matt Faunce  wrote:
>
>> Peirce's "there were" means 'existent'. In the past, here, I've spoken of
>> the "potential interpretant". In the hypothetical science that mathematics
>> is, a pencil-lead streak forming a (rough but acceptable) circle signifies
>> the hypothetical object of a perfect circle. In these cases the signs are
>> still only signs within their triad; it's just that the object or
>> interpretant doesn't need to be existent.
>>
>> Matt
>>
>> On 12/29/15 3:14 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
>>
>> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>>
>> Jon A, List,
>>
>> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
>> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>>
>> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
>> once,  (122915-1)
>> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
>> would
>> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>>
>> That's in CP 2.304
>>
>> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which
>> would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its
>> object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
>> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
>> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
>> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
>> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
>> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
>> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
>> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no
>> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does
>> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification."
>>
>> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
>> sign*.
>>
>> Therefore,
>>
>> "Not all signs are triadic."
>> (122915-2)
>>
>> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>>
>> All the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Jon A, List,

Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):

"A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
once,  (122915-1)
lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
would
not lose that character if there were no interpretant."

So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic sign*
.

Therefore,

"Not all signs are triadic."
  (122915-2)

as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.

All the best.

Sung









"

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 9:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Sung, List:
>
> Yes, I meant legisign not dicisign.  Thanks for the correction.
>
> You asserted that it is "non-Peircean" to think that something non-triadic
> CANNOT be a sign.  If this is true, then Peirce's writings must identify
> something non-triadic that CAN be a sign.  I asked you to provide such a
> citation.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 6:47 AM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
>> Hi Jon,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> "Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; . . . "
>> (122915-1)
>>
>> Did you mean to say "legisign: instead of "dicisign" ?  It is my
>> understanding that "dicisign" is the interpretan of a sinsign.
>>
>> "Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines
>> something  (122915-2)
>> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>>
>> Can you re-phrase (122915-2) ?
>>
>> All the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Sung, List:
>>>
>>> The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each
>>> one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign.  Every sign is either a
>>> qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an
>>> index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an
>>> argument.  However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description,
>>> with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument
>>> (which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we
>>> start taking additional trichotomies into account.
>>>
>>> Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines
>>> something that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>>>
>>> It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not
>>> GUARANTEE that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of
>>> Peirce," and I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this.  However,
>>> I suspect that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to
>>> come away with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only
>>> to a limited extent.  Just my opinion, of course.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 Edwina,

 You wrote:

 "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs."
   (122815-1)

 (*1*)  Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to
 the 9 relations:

 1) quali*sign,*
 2) sin*sign*,
 3) legi*sign*.
 4) icon,
 5) index,
 6) symbol,
 7) rheme,
 8) dici*sign*, and
 9) argument.

 If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made
 mistakes when he referred to 4  (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9
 relations as "signs " ?

 (*2*)  The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to
 be that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely
 triadic.  So if something is not triadic  (e.g., the 9 dyadic relations
 above), that something cannot be a sign.  I think such a mode of thinking
  is not only fallacious but also non-Peircean.

 (*3*) If my claim that your understanding of the 9 types of signs is
 fallacious turns out to be correct, this may provide , IMHO, an interesting
 lesson  and warning for all Peircean scholars:

 "Reading Peirce extensively does not guarantee that the
 (122815-2)
 reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce."

 If (122815-2) proves to be true, upon further critical scrutiny, we may
 be able to identify possible reasons for why this statement may be true.
 One possibility that occurs to me, in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty
 Principle in physics, is something like the following:

 "It is impossible to simultaneously determine the object
   

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Matt:  Thanks for the longer excerpt, which I was just finding myself.

Sung:  In Peirce's example, the bullet-hole is a sign of the shot that
caused it, even if no one ever attributes it as such.  Does this make it
dyadic, rather than triadic?  I do not believe so, at least not according
to my understanding of Peircean semeiotic.  Although there is no DYNAMIC
(actual) interpretant that attributes it to a shot, there is certainly an
IMMEDIATE (possible) interpretant that does so--i.e., this clearly falls
within the range of the sign's interpretability.  "The Immediate
Interpretant consists in the Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit
to produce, not to any actual reaction." (CP8.315)  Furthermore, the FINAL
or NORMAL interpretant definitely attributes the bullet-hole to a shot,
since that is the truth of the matter.  "It is likewise requisite to
distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e. the Interpretant represented
or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect actually
produced on the mind by the Sign; and both of these from the Normal
Interpretant, or effect that would be produced on the mind by the Sign
after sufficient development of thought." (CP8.343)  Therefore, even though
no interpretant EXISTS in this case, the sign is still triadic; it is "fit
to produce" an interpretant, and WOULD produce an interpretant under the
right circumstances.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 2:14 PM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

> On 12/29/15 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
> Jon A, List,
>
> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>
> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
> once,  (122915-1)
> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
> would
> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>
> That's in CP 2.304
>
> "A sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol. An icon is a sign which
> would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its
> object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a
> geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose the
> character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would not
> lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for instance, is a
> piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the
> shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether
> anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A symbol is a sign
> which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no
> interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does
> only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification."
>
>So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a 
> *dyadic
> sign*.
>
> Therefore,
>
> "Not all signs are triadic."
>   (122915-2)
>
> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
> --
> Matt
>
>
>
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi Jon,

You wrote:

"Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; . . . "
  (122915-1)

Did you mean to say "legisign: instead of "dicisign" ?  It is my
understanding that "dicisign" is the interpretan of a sinsign.


"Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something
 (122915-2)
that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."

Can you re-phrase (122915-2) ?

All the best.

Sung


On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Sung, List:
>
> The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each
> one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign.  Every sign is either a
> qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an
> index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an
> argument.  However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description,
> with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument
> (which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we
> start taking additional trichotomies into account.
>
> Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something
> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>
> It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not
> GUARANTEE that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of
> Peirce," and I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this.  However,
> I suspect that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to
> come away with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only
> to a limited extent.  Just my opinion, of course.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
>> Edwina,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs."
>> (122815-1)
>>
>> (*1*)  Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to
>> the 9 relations:
>>
>> 1) quali*sign,*
>> 2) sin*sign*,
>> 3) legi*sign*.
>> 4) icon,
>> 5) index,
>> 6) symbol,
>> 7) rheme,
>> 8) dici*sign*, and
>> 9) argument.
>>
>> If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made mistakes
>> when he referred to 4  (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9 relations as
>> "signs " ?
>>
>> (*2*)  The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to be
>> that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely
>> triadic.  So if something is not triadic  (e.g., the 9 dyadic relations
>> above), that something cannot be a sign.  I think such a mode of thinking
>>  is not only fallacious but also non-Peircean.
>>
>> (*3*) If my claim that your understanding of the 9 types of signs is
>> fallacious turns out to be correct, this may provide , IMHO, an interesting
>> lesson  and warning for all Peircean scholars:
>>
>> "Reading Peirce extensively does not guarantee that the
>>   (122815-2)
>> reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce."
>>
>> If (122815-2) proves to be true, upon further critical scrutiny, we may
>> be able to identify possible reasons for why this statement may be true.
>> One possibility that occurs to me, in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty
>> Principle in physics, is something like the following:
>>
>> "It is impossible to simultaneously determine the object
>> (122815-3)
>> and the interpretant of a sign with arbitrary precision."
>>
>> Or,
>>
>> "The more accurately one can define the object of a sign, the
>>   (122815-4)
>> less accurately can one define its interpretant, and *vice versa*."
>>
>> If (122815-3) and (122815-4) prove to be valid in the future, we may
>> refer to them as the "Peircean uncertainty Principle" (PUP) or the
>> "semiotic uncertainty principle" (SUP).
>>
>> Are there any Peircean experts on this list who knows whether or not
>> Peirce discussed any topic in his extensive writings that may be related to
>> what is here referred to as PUP or SUP?
>>
>> One indirect support for the PUP may be provided the by intense debates
>> we have witnessed in recent months on this list about the true nature of
>> the Peircean sign among the acknowledge leaders of the semiotic community,
>> including Gary R, Gary F, Edwina, Jeff, Jon, and others.
>>
>> All the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>


-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Sung, List:

Yes, I meant legisign not dicisign.  Thanks for the correction.

You asserted that it is "non-Peircean" to think that something non-triadic
CANNOT be a sign.  If this is true, then Peirce's writings must identify
something non-triadic that CAN be a sign.  I asked you to provide such a
citation.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 6:47 AM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Hi Jon,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; . . . "
> (122915-1)
>
> Did you mean to say "legisign: instead of "dicisign" ?  It is my
> understanding that "dicisign" is the interpretan of a sinsign.
>
> "Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines
> something  (122915-2)
> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>
> Can you re-phrase (122915-2) ?
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Sung, List:
>>
>> The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each
>> one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign.  Every sign is either a
>> qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an
>> index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an
>> argument.  However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description,
>> with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument
>> (which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we
>> start taking additional trichotomies into account.
>>
>> Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something
>> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>>
>> It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not
>> GUARANTEE that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of
>> Peirce," and I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this.  However,
>> I suspect that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to
>> come away with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only
>> to a limited extent.  Just my opinion, of course.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>>
>>> Edwina,
>>>
>>> You wrote:
>>>
>>> "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs."
>>> (122815-1)
>>>
>>> (*1*)  Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to
>>> the 9 relations:
>>>
>>> 1) quali*sign,*
>>> 2) sin*sign*,
>>> 3) legi*sign*.
>>> 4) icon,
>>> 5) index,
>>> 6) symbol,
>>> 7) rheme,
>>> 8) dici*sign*, and
>>> 9) argument.
>>>
>>> If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made mistakes
>>> when he referred to 4  (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9 relations as
>>> "signs " ?
>>>
>>> (*2*)  The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to be
>>> that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely
>>> triadic.  So if something is not triadic  (e.g., the 9 dyadic relations
>>> above), that something cannot be a sign.  I think such a mode of thinking
>>>  is not only fallacious but also non-Peircean.
>>>
>>> (*3*) If my claim that your understanding of the 9 types of signs is
>>> fallacious turns out to be correct, this may provide , IMHO, an interesting
>>> lesson  and warning for all Peircean scholars:
>>>
>>> "Reading Peirce extensively does not guarantee that the
>>> (122815-2)
>>> reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce."
>>>
>>> If (122815-2) proves to be true, upon further critical scrutiny, we may
>>> be able to identify possible reasons for why this statement may be true.
>>> One possibility that occurs to me, in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty
>>> Principle in physics, is something like the following:
>>>
>>> "It is impossible to simultaneously determine the object
>>> (122815-3)
>>> and the interpretant of a sign with arbitrary precision."
>>>
>>> Or,
>>>
>>> "The more accurately one can define the object of a sign, the
>>> (122815-4)
>>> less accurately can one define its interpretant, and *vice versa*."
>>>
>>> If (122815-3) and (122815-4) prove to be valid in the future, we may
>>> refer to them as the "Peircean uncertainty Principle" (PUP) or the
>>> "semiotic uncertainty principle" (SUP).
>>>
>>> Are there any Peircean experts on this list who knows whether or not
>>> Peirce discussed any topic in his extensive writings that may be related to
>>> what is here referred to as PUP or SUP?
>>>
>>> One indirect support for the PUP may be provided the by intense debates
>>> we have witnessed in recent months on this list about the true nature of
>>> the Peircean sign among the 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[kirstima]

first order logic
due to its formal limitations. Second order logic makes the possible,
e.g., in the Ramsification of theories (which basically replaces
properties with relational structures). Ramsey tried to get a logic
grounded solely in relations, but he was unsuccessful. I have little
hope of doing what Ramsey failed to do despite his being one of the
most insightful logicians of the first half of the last century, so I
did not try, and I won’t try now, either. But I will say that
Peirce’s hypostatic abstraction is probably the key. Tarski’s
satisfaction notion of truth, though it fits nicely with Ramsey’s
work on the nature of theories and their reference, doesn’t need
hypostatic abstraction to be stated. “Snow is white” is true if
and only if snow is white involves only properties. Unless, like
Frege, one thinks that to be true is a relation between a proposition
and the True, which goes a good deal further, and may involve
hypostatic abstraction. But it is late and I am not going to think
that through right now.

John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier

FROM: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com]
 SENT: Monday, 28 December 2015 9:51 PM
 TO: Peirce List
 CC: John Collier; Gary Richmond
 SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
- meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

John:

Whatever are you seeking to communicate in this post?

These numerous assertions can be interpreted as mutually
contradicting, so it would be nice if you could list the propositions
that are motivating the predications.

One possible interpretation of these sentences is that you are
intentionally denying Tarski’s view of the nature of a proposition
with respect to a meta-language and its material implications for
predications of terms, such as relations / illations / copula (as
“yoking”)

Is my wild guest off-base?

Cheers

Jerry


On Dec 28, 2015, at 6:45 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
wrote:

Edwina, List,

I worry a bit about the idea that there are three relations involved
might lead to exactly the mistake that Edwina is arguing against,
that the triadic relation is somehow composed of three more basic
relations. I suggested a while back that the triadic sign relation
is not reducible, and hence can’t be composed of more basic
relations. This is a common situation in emergent phenomena in
general. A decomposition would leave something out, basically the
nonreducibility of the triad, which requires further explanation in
terms of what the triad itself is. This is not to say that Edwina is
not right that there are three relations involved in the triad, and
that ignoring this obscures their role. It’s just that the
relation among them is not simple composition, but a more complexly
organized and irreducible relation (which is the triad itself).

Edwina talks of inputs and outputs. I have no problem with this,
since an irreducible triad can be related to other things via its
nodes. But this is not what Edwina means. She refers to the
relations between the other nodes and the representamen, which is
also OK as long as they are not merely composed to make the triadic
relation. I am a bit puzzled because I count only two relations
here, which are constrained by the two being related to the
representamen in the same way (this is a third relation, but is one
order higher – a relation of the other two relations) than the
other two in specific triad instances, it seems to me). However,
Peirce himself refers to the relation of each of the representamen
and the interpretant to the object (the relationship he calls
“depends on), each in the same way as the other (a third relation,
but as it is a type identity perhaps we can ignore this, since
identity doesn’t introduce anything new). Edwina has a dependency
on the representamen as a mediator. This involves another third,
higher order relation (a relation between relations) between the
object-representamen and interpretant-representamen relations. There
appear to e a plethora of relations contained in (or implied by –
same thing, I would say) the basic triadic sign.

My suggestion earlier was that there is the triadic relation (in
each instance of sign) and that other relations mentioned in the
last paragraph, including the three (two?) Edwina mentions are
arrived at by precision (in this case hypostatic abstraction). I did
not make this last point as clear as I might have in my previous
posts on this issue. Edwina is right that the relata to the
representamen can vary in kind (but across different triads), which
does suggest individuation, but I would argue that on my account of
how Edwina’s (and other) relations implied by the triad fir
together all we need to maintain this type difference is a
difference in types of triadic semiotic relations.

John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1]

FROM: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
SENT: Sunday, 27 December 2015 4:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon - I see the representamen as 'Being thus connected with three things, the 
ground, the object, and the interpretant" 2.229.  These, in my view, are the 
three relations. The representamen is the key agent, for ALL three of these 
'connections' or relations must involve the representamen. 

There is the representamen "as it is in itself' (and we have three terms for 
its nature as it is in itself: qualsign, sinsign, legisign) 8.334.  And, the R 
"in respect to their relations to their dynamic objects" 8.335 (icon, index, 
symbol); and the R 'in regard to its relation to its signified interpretant" 
8.337 (rheme, dicent, argument). 

I see the R-O and R-I relations as providing breadth, while the R-R relation 
provides depth. The Representamen is a key agent/function in the semiosic 
process; it is not a mechanical transference of object data to interpretation. 
It is the ground, the evolved set of habits, the knowledge base of the system 
in which semiosis is taking place. It transforms input data from the object via 
its knowledge-mediation...to result in an interpretation.  As Peirce writes, "a 
sign mediates between the interpretant sign and its object" 8.332 - 
understanding the first term of 'sign' here as the representamen. Without this 
key process that is the role of the Representamen - our world would have no 
habits of organization, it would be pure randomness. And as Peirce also pointed 
out, these habits evolve...

As Peirce wrote in the quote you provided, there are THREE nodes: 
representamen, object, interpretant.

Now, the interaction between the Interpretant and the Object is not, to my 
view, within the first basic triad. Note that it does NOT involve the 
Representamen - which I consider a necessary semiosic process. It provides a 
necessary inductive reference whereby the Interpretant does not stand alienated 
from objective reality but must - not necessarily now - but at some time in the 
future - reference that object truthfully. How does it do this? By generating 
more triadic signs; that is, the Interpretant generates more triadic signs.

As he points out, the I-O can't be a dyadic relation; and it can't mimic the 
R-O relationInstead, the Interpretant "must be capable of determining a 
Third (Interpretant) on its own, but besides that, it must have a second 
triadic relation in which the Representamen, or rather the relation thereof to 
its Object, shall be its own (the Third's) Object, and must be capable of 
determining a Third (Interpretant). All this must be equally be true of the 
Third's Thirds and so on endlessly..EPp 273. 

The way I read this, is that the Interpretant, a result of that first basic 
semiosic triad, then generates more triads - thus, involving the Representamen 
- and more Interpretants, to arrive at, in some future time, the truth of the 
Object.

Edwina

- Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Monday, December 28, 2015 10:28 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity


  Edwina, List:


  Is it not the case, at least according to Peirce, that the 
interpretant-object relation is necessarily the same as the 
representamen-object relation?  If so, then there is no need for a separate 
trichotomy to characterize it.


  "A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.  The triadic relation is 
genuine, that is, its three members are bound together by it in a way that does 
not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.  That is the reason that the 
Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, 
but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does." 
(EP2:272-273)


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

John, list:
That's an extremely interesting suggestion, that the 'third relation' is 
that between the interpretant and the object. I have trouble with that, as the 
9 relations (parameters according to Gary R) which are differentiated in terms 
of the modal category, do not refer to this interpretant-object relation. 

They refer to the representamen-in-itself, which I consider to be a 
relation-of-depth (providing an evolved over time generalization/set of 
habits); then, to the relation between the representamen-object; and the 
relation between the representamen-interpretant.
I consider the representamen, which mus

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

John, list - Agreed, there are no 'basic relations' that exist per se. A 
relation by definition exists only within an interaction. And certainly, the 
triad is not 'simple composition' - which would imply that those separate 
relations are each existential in themselves; the triad is a complex dynamic 
whole.

The two relations which we understand most commonly - " in respect to their 
relations to their dynamic objects" 8.335; and "in regard to its relation to 
its signified interpretant" 8.337. But the third, the representaman, [which 
Peirce often also calls 'the sign'] has a relation as well, namely "as it is in 
itself' 8.334. I judge that to be a relation of depth, 'in itself', for the 
representamen, being also a mediator, must have some ground to its nature, to 
function as that mediation. "A sign mediates between the interpretant sign and 
its object" 8.332. Or, referring to their ordinal nature, "Shall we say that a 
Sign brings a Second, its Object, into cognitive relation to a Third" 8.332.

The representamen isn't simply a passive mechanical door that moves the data 
from the object node to the interpretant node. Something happens at that 
representamen; it analyzes, thinks, 'minds' that data - and that requires a 
depth of information at that site. Again, "the essential function of a sign is 
to render inefficient relations efficient- not to set them into action but to 
establish a habit or general rule whereby they will act on occasion" 8.332.

I don't think that I would define the representamen relation as a 'higher 
order' of one order higher. I'm suggesting that the representamen relation, 
because it has depth of knowledge already in itself - that generalization of 
rules which exists longer than the particular experience - is a 'relation in 
itself'.

None of these relations exist 'per se' but are analyzed via, as John points 
out, precision. That includes the representamen relation, which cannot exist 
per se - unless one follows the Forms of Plato- and Peirce was an Aristotelian.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: John Collier 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, December 28, 2015 7:45 AM
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Edwina, List,

   

  I worry a bit about the idea that there are three relations involved might 
lead to exactly the mistake that Edwina is arguing against, that the triadic 
relation is somehow composed of three more basic relations. I suggested a while 
back that the triadic sign relation is not reducible, and hence can’t be 
composed of more basic relations. This is a common situation in emergent 
phenomena in general. A decomposition would leave something out, basically the 
nonreducibility of the triad, which requires further explanation in terms of 
what the triad itself is. This is not to say that Edwina is not right that 
there are three relations involved in the triad, and that ignoring this 
obscures their role. It’s just that the relation among them is not simple 
composition, but a more complexly organized and irreducible relation (which is 
the triad itself). 

   

  Edwina talks of inputs and outputs. I have no problem with this, since an 
irreducible triad can be related to other things via its nodes. But this is not 
what Edwina means. She refers to the relations between the other nodes and the 
representamen, which is also OK as long as they are not merely composed to make 
the triadic relation. I am a bit puzzled because I count only two relations 
here, which are constrained by the two being related to the representamen in 
the same way (this is a third relation, but is one order higher – a relation of 
the other two relations) than the other two in specific triad instances, it 
seems to me). However, Peirce himself refers to the relation of each of the 
representamen and the interpretant to the object (the relationship he calls 
“depends on), each in the same way as the other (a third relation, but as it is 
a type identity perhaps we can ignore this, since identity doesn’t introduce 
anything new). Edwina has a dependency on the representamen as a mediator. This 
involves another third, higher order relation (a relation between relations) 
between the object-representamen and interpretant-representamen relations. 
There appear to e a plethora of relations contained in (or implied by – same 
thing, I would say) the basic triadic sign.

   

  My suggestion earlier was that there is the triadic relation (in each 
instance of sign) and that other relations mentioned in the last paragraph, 
including the three (two?) Edwina mentions are arrived at by precision (in this 
case hypostatic abstraction). I did not make this last point as clear as I 
might have in my previous posts on this issue. Edwina is right that the relata 
to the representamen can vary in kind (but across different triads), which does 
sugg

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[Gary Richmond]

ou could list the propositions that are motivating
>> the predications.
>>
>> One possible interpretation of these sentences is that you are
>> intentionally denying Tarski’s view of the nature of a proposition with
>> respect to a meta-language and its material implications for predications
>> of terms, such as relations / illations / copula (as “yoking”)
>>
>> Is my wild guest off-base?
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>>
>>
>> On Dec 28, 2015, at 6:45 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
>>
>> Edwina, List,
>>
>> I worry a bit about the idea that there are three relations involved
>> might lead to exactly the mistake that Edwina is arguing against, that the
>> triadic relation is somehow composed of three more basic relations. I
>> suggested a while back that the triadic sign relation is not reducible, and
>> hence can’t be composed of more basic relations. This is a common situation
>> in emergent phenomena in general. A decomposition would leave something
>> out, basically the nonreducibility of the triad, which requires further
>> explanation in terms of what the triad itself is. This is not to say that
>> Edwina is not right that there are three relations involved in the triad,
>> and that ignoring this obscures their role. It’s just that the relation
>> among them is not simple composition, but a more complexly organized and
>> irreducible relation (which is the triad itself).
>>
>> Edwina talks of inputs and outputs. I have no problem with this, since an
>> irreducible triad can be related to other things via its nodes. But this is
>> not what Edwina means. She refers to the relations between the other nodes
>> and the representamen, which is also OK as long as they are not merely
>> composed to make the triadic relation. I am a bit puzzled because I count
>> only two relations here, which are constrained by the two being related to
>> the representamen in the same way (this is a third relation, but is one
>> order higher – a relation of the other two relations) than the other two in
>> specific triad instances, it seems to me). However, Peirce himself refers
>> to the relation of each of the representamen and the interpretant to the
>> object (the relationship he calls “depends on), each in the same way as the
>> other (a third relation, but as it is a type identity perhaps we can ignore
>> this, since identity doesn’t introduce anything new). Edwina has a
>> dependency on the representamen as a mediator. This involves another third,
>> higher order relation (a relation between relations) between the
>> object-representamen and interpretant-representamen relations. There appear
>> to e a plethora of relations contained in (or implied by – same thing, I
>> would say) the basic triadic sign.
>>
>> My suggestion earlier was that there is the triadic relation (in each
>> instance of sign) and that other relations mentioned in the last paragraph,
>> including the three (two?) Edwina mentions are arrived at by precision (in
>> this case hypostatic abstraction). I did not make this last point as clear
>> as I might have in my previous posts on this issue. Edwina is right that
>> the relata to the representamen can vary in kind (but across different
>> triads), which does suggest individuation, but I would argue that on my
>> account of how Edwina’s (and other) relations implied by the triad fir
>> together all we need to maintain this type difference is a difference in
>> types of triadic semiotic relations.
>>
>> John Collier
>> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
>> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>>
>> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca <tabor...@primus.ca>]
>> *Sent:* Sunday, 27 December 2015 4:24 PM
>> *To:* Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>>
>> I agree with Gary R's analysis here, and reject Gary F's and Sung's
>> insistence that the singular term is a sign. Agreed, the 9 parameters, as
>> Gary R, calls them (I call them the 9 Relations) can't be defined, in
>> themselves, as signs (Gary F), or as Sung terms them, elementary signs.
>>
>> Such an approach, in my view, rejects the basic dynamics of Peircean
>> semiosis and instead, reduces the system to a mechanical one, where
>> 'complex signs' are formed from simple signs. I think that loses the basic
>> dynamics of the Peircean semiosis.
>>
>> As for my sticking to my three relations rather than one relation in the
>> analysis of the triad, I referred to this, privately to John Dee

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[John Collier]

All I can say, Jerry, is to read it more carefully. There are no 
contradictions, so you must be misreading what I said. I have no idea why you 
relate what I said to Tarski’s views, with which I am quite familiar. The move 
that I think lies behind the connection between the triadic relations of the 
sign and the relations that I think Edwina is talking about is hypostatic 
abstraction, which is a technical device for reinterpreting a property as a 
relation. Other than that, I was trying to get how the two implied relations to 
the representamen become three, and it seemed to me that that the third is on a 
more abstract level, a relation of relations, again, and perhaps even more 
obviously if I am right about that, though Edwina seems to differ than the 
relations it relates. The third relation I am referring to seems to me to be 
the relation between the object the interpretant. The object and interpretant 
are properties (despite the grammatical nominatives used to refer to them), 
which are turned into relations by the abstraction, which is a standard method 
for understanding things, especially for semiotic vehicles, in Peirce’s work. 
Taken this way there is a sense in which I am suggesting that it is “meta”, but 
so are the relations related, as they also are grasped through hypostatic 
abstraction. If there is an apparent inconsistency I am pretty sure that it 
arise from not understanding and being able to recognize hypostatic 
abstraction, and confusing the way in which something is picked out with its 
essential nature. The same thing can be both a property and a relation, 
depending on how we look at it. This is not possible to represent in the 
language of first order logic due to its formal limitations. Second order logic 
makes the possible, e.g., in the Ramsification of theories (which basically 
replaces properties with relational structures). Ramsey tried to get a logic 
grounded solely in relations, but he was unsuccessful. I have little hope of 
doing what Ramsey failed to do despite his being one of the most insightful 
logicians of the first half of the last century, so I did not try, and I won’t 
try now, either. But I will say that Peirce’s hypostatic abstraction is 
probably the key. Tarski’s satisfaction notion of truth, though it fits nicely 
with Ramsey’s work on the nature of theories and their reference, doesn’t need 
hypostatic abstraction to be stated. “Snow is white” is true if and only if 
snow is white involves only properties. Unless, like Frege, one thinks that to 
be true is a relation between a proposition and the True, which goes a good 
deal further, and may involve hypostatic abstraction. But it is late and I am 
not going to think that through right now.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com]
Sent: Monday, 28 December 2015 9:51 PM
To: Peirce List
Cc: John Collier; Gary Richmond
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

John:

Whatever are you seeking to communicate in this post?

These numerous assertions can be interpreted as mutually contradicting, so it 
would be nice if you could list the propositions that are motivating the 
predications.

One possible interpretation of these sentences is that you are intentionally 
denying Tarski’s view of the nature of a proposition with respect to a 
meta-language and its material implications for predications of terms, such as 
relations / illations / copula (as “yoking”)

Is my wild guest off-base?

Cheers

Jerry



On Dec 28, 2015, at 6:45 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

Edwina, List,

I worry a bit about the idea that there are three relations involved might lead 
to exactly the mistake that Edwina is arguing against, that the triadic 
relation is somehow composed of three more basic relations. I suggested a while 
back that the triadic sign relation is not reducible, and hence can’t be 
composed of more basic relations. This is a common situation in emergent 
phenomena in general. A decomposition would leave something out, basically the 
nonreducibility of the triad, which requires further explanation in terms of 
what the triad itself is. This is not to say that Edwina is not right that 
there are three relations involved in the triad, and that ignoring this 
obscures their role. It’s just that the relation among them is not simple 
composition, but a more complexly organized and irreducible relation (which is 
the triad itself).

Edwina talks of inputs and outputs. I have no problem with this, since an 
irreducible triad can be related to other things via its nodes. But this is not 
what Edwina means. She refers to the relations between the other nodes and the 
representamen, which is also OK as long as they are not merely composed to make 
the triadic relation. I am a bit puzzled because I co

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[Gary Richmond]

llier
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca <tabor...@primus.ca>]
> *Sent:* Sunday, 27 December 2015 4:24 PM
> *To:* Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> I agree with Gary R's analysis here, and reject Gary F's and Sung's
> insistence that the singular term is a sign. Agreed, the 9 parameters, as
> Gary R, calls them (I call them the 9 Relations) can't be defined, in
> themselves, as signs (Gary F), or as Sung terms them, elementary signs.
>
> Such an approach, in my view, rejects the basic dynamics of Peircean
> semiosis and instead, reduces the system to a mechanical one, where
> 'complex signs' are formed from simple signs. I think that loses the basic
> dynamics of the Peircean semiosis.
>
> As for my sticking to my three relations rather than one relation in the
> analysis of the triad, I referred to this, privately to John Deely, as
> similar to the Christian argument between the Athanasian versus Arian
> analysis of the Trinity - with the former viewing the Trinity as One, and
> the latter, as three interactions.  I am not persuaded, so far, that my
> view of the semiosic triad, as a 'whole' of three relations is wrong, for
> in my view - to say that it is ONE relation, misses the fact that each of
> the three 'nodes' can be in a different categorical mode. The insistence on
> the triad as ONE relation doesn't capture this fact.
>
> Even saying it is One Triadic relation, doesn't, to me, capture that
> fact.  The Interpretant (output) and the Object (input) relations to the
> representamen (sign) can each be in a different categorical mode, so
> calling them the SAME relation obscures this fact. What IS a fact is their
> dependency on the Representamen as mediator - that dependency is, to me,
> the SAME.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Monday, December 21, 2015 9:02 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Gary F. list,
>
> Gary wrote:
>
> I think you may be glossing over some important terminological
> considerations here, Gary. They may not seem to you important or even
> relevant to your present inquiry here--which has come to feel like a kind
> of slow read of portions of NDTR--but I think that there are *crucial* 
> distinctions
> to be made here, as difficult as they are given the various ways Peirce
> expresses himself at particular phases and moments of his semiotic analyses
> in NDTR. You wrote:
>
>
> GF: Some of the arguments over terminology in this thread make no positive
> contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For instance, if Peirce says
> that “an *Icon* is a sign” and “a *Symbol* is a sign” (as he does here),
> I don’t see that we have anything to gain by asserting that an icon is
> *not* a sign, or that a symbol is *not* a sign. Peirce’s nomenclature is
> difficult enough without introducing claims that directly contradict what
> he actually says.
>
>
>
> However, within the context of the 10 classes of signs, it seems clear
> enough, at least to me, that when, for example, he writes "an*Icon* is a
> sign," that he can only mean that the Sign will relate to its Object in some
>  *iconic* way, and that he does *not* mean that the Sign taken as a whole
> is an Icon, since signs in themselves are either qualisigns, sinsigns, or
> legisigns.
>
> So, to say "an *Icon* is a sign" seems a kind of loose way of speaking
> which has the potential for conflating what I've been referring to as the 9
> parameters (3 x 3 x 3 in consideration of the categorial possibilities
> available in relation to the Object, the Interpretant, or the Sign as
> such). To confuse those parameters with the 10 classes--where *not one* of
> the 10 none is an 'Icon' as such, and where only three are 'iconic', viz.
> (1, 2, and 5), all
> ​three of these being,
>  btw, 'rhematic'
> ​. In
>  like manner, I would *not* characterize the 6 signs of the 10 which
> *are* rhematic as 'rhemes"
> ​since
>  one is a qualisign, two are sinsigns, and three are legisigns. Those six
> are not rhemes, but 'rhematic'.
> ​ Only one of the six should properly be termed 'rheme' (namely, the
> symbolic legisign).​
>
>
> So, again, what I'm suggesting is
> ​that ​
> there is a kind of unfortunate looseness in Peirce's terminology in the
> course of his analysis. While this most certain
> ​ly​
>  *is* problematic, we shouldn't allow that difficulty to lead us into
> discussing aspects
> ​ (expressed more 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[John Collier]

The way I understand this continuation is that mere similarity (a second) is 
not enough, but similarity is not the only way of being of the same sort.  I 
think that this actually supports the interpretation I was giving, that it is 
of the same kind (or sort), a triadic kind. I am not quite awake yet (still 
drinking my morning cuppa), so I am not thinking this through right now, just 
responding from habit. So I might change my mind about this, but I am pretty 
sure I have Peirce right here.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 29 December 2015 6:17 AM
To: John Collier
Cc: Edwina Taborsky; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

John, List:

Well, the passage that I quoted previously continues, "Nor can the triadic 
relation in which the Third stands be merely similar to that in which the First 
stands, for this would make the relation of the Third to the First a degenerate 
Secondness merely.  The Third must, indeed, stand in such a relation, and thus 
must be capable of determining a Third of its own; but besides that, it must 
have a second triadic relation in which the Representamen, or rather the 
relation thereof to its Object, shall be its own (the Third's) Object, and must 
be capable of determining a Third to this relation.  All this must equally be 
true of the Third's Thirds and so on endlessly ..." (EP2:273)  Not sure if this 
clarifies things, or just muddies the waters further, which is why I hesitated 
to include it initially.

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 9:58 PM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Jon, List,

The interpretant is itself a sign, so at least implicitly there is a separate 
triad (and on to infinity, given Peirce’s continuity of thought):
1902 | Carnegie Institution Correspondence | NEM 4:54
“A sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign, 
determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence (or a lower 
implied sort) with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to 
C.”

I think “same” in the quote you give has to be understood as the same kind, not 
the identical relation. The above quote makes this more clear.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: Tuesday, 29 December 2015 5:28 AM
To: Edwina Taborsky; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

Edwina, List:

Is it not the case, at least according to Peirce, that the interpretant-object 
relation is necessarily the same as the representamen-object relation?  If so, 
then there is no need for a separate trichotomy to characterize it.

"A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.  The triadic relation is 
genuine, that is, its three members are bound together by it in a way that does 
not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.  That is the reason that the 
Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, 
but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does." 
(EP2:272-273)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
John, list:
That's an extremely interesting suggestion, that the 'third relation' is that 
between the interpretant and the object. I have trouble with that, as the 9 
relations (parameters according to Gary R) which are differentiated in terms of 
the modal category, do not refer to this interpretant-object relation.

They refer to the representamen-in-itself, which I consider to be a 
relation-of-depth (providing an evolved over time generalization/set of 
habits); then, to the relation between the representamen-object; and the 
relation between the representamen-interpretant.
I consider the representamen, which must act as 'mind-mediator' a vital 
relation, bringing its informational depth to deal with the R-O and R-I 
transitions.

But the interpretant-object interaction - is it a relation? What mediates this 
interaction? I'm not denying its importance, for objective referentiality is 
v

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Is it not the case, at least according to Peirce, that the
interpretant-object relation is necessarily the same as the
representamen-object relation?  If so, then there is no need for a separate
trichotomy to characterize it.

"A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine
triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of
determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.  The
triadic relation is genuine, that is, its three members are bound together
by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.
That is the reason that the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere
dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as
the Representamen itself does." (EP2:272-273)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John, list:
> That's an extremely interesting suggestion, that the 'third relation' is
> that between the interpretant and the object. I have trouble with that, as
> the 9 relations (parameters according to Gary R) which are differentiated
> in terms of the modal category, do not refer to this interpretant-object
> relation.
>
> They refer to the representamen-in-itself, which I consider to be a
> relation-of-depth (providing an evolved over time generalization/set of
> habits); then, to the relation between the representamen-object; and the
> relation between the representamen-interpretant.
> I consider the representamen, which must act as 'mind-mediator' a vital
> relation, bringing its informational depth to deal with the R-O and R-I
> transitions.
>
> But the interpretant-object interaction - is it a relation? What mediates
> this interaction? I'm not denying its importance, for objective
> referentiality is vital to validate our experiences - otherwise we live
> within a purely rhetorical, fictional world detached from reality.
>
> Edwina
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[John Collier]

Jon, List,

The interpretant is itself a sign, so at least implicitly there is a separate 
triad (and on to infinity, given Peirce’s continuity of thought):
1902 | Carnegie Institution Correspondence | NEM 4:54
“A sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign, 
determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence (or a lower 
implied sort) with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to 
C.”

I think “same” in the quote you give has to be understood as the same kind, not 
the identical relation. The above quote makes this more clear.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 29 December 2015 5:28 AM
To: Edwina Taborsky; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

Edwina, List:

Is it not the case, at least according to Peirce, that the interpretant-object 
relation is necessarily the same as the representamen-object relation?  If so, 
then there is no need for a separate trichotomy to characterize it.

"A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.  The triadic relation is 
genuine, that is, its three members are bound together by it in a way that does 
not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.  That is the reason that the 
Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, 
but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does." 
(EP2:272-273)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
John, list:
That's an extremely interesting suggestion, that the 'third relation' is that 
between the interpretant and the object. I have trouble with that, as the 9 
relations (parameters according to Gary R) which are differentiated in terms of 
the modal category, do not refer to this interpretant-object relation.

They refer to the representamen-in-itself, which I consider to be a 
relation-of-depth (providing an evolved over time generalization/set of 
habits); then, to the relation between the representamen-object; and the 
relation between the representamen-interpretant.
I consider the representamen, which must act as 'mind-mediator' a vital 
relation, bringing its informational depth to deal with the R-O and R-I 
transitions.

But the interpretant-object interaction - is it a relation? What mediates this 
interaction? I'm not denying its importance, for objective referentiality is 
vital to validate our experiences - otherwise we live within a purely 
rhetorical, fictional world detached from reality.

Edwina

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Sung, List:

The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each
one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign.  Every sign is either a
qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an
index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an
argument.  However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description,
with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument
(which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we
start taking additional trichotomies into account.

Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something
that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."

It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not GUARANTEE
that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce," and
I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this.  However, I suspect
that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to come away
with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only to a
limited extent.  Just my opinion, of course.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Edwina,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs."
>   (122815-1)
>
> (*1*)  Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to the
> 9 relations:
>
> 1) quali*sign,*
> 2) sin*sign*,
> 3) legi*sign*.
> 4) icon,
> 5) index,
> 6) symbol,
> 7) rheme,
> 8) dici*sign*, and
> 9) argument.
>
> If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made mistakes
> when he referred to 4  (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9 relations as
> "signs " ?
>
> (*2*)  The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to be
> that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely
> triadic.  So if something is not triadic  (e.g., the 9 dyadic relations
> above), that something cannot be a sign.  I think such a mode of thinking
>  is not only fallacious but also non-Peircean.
>
> (*3*) If my claim that your understanding of the 9 types of signs is
> fallacious turns out to be correct, this may provide , IMHO, an interesting
> lesson  and warning for all Peircean scholars:
>
> "Reading Peirce extensively does not guarantee that the
>   (122815-2)
> reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce."
>
> If (122815-2) proves to be true, upon further critical scrutiny, we may be
> able to identify possible reasons for why this statement may be true.  One
> possibility that occurs to me, in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty
> Principle in physics, is something like the following:
>
> "It is impossible to simultaneously determine the object
>   (122815-3)
> and the interpretant of a sign with arbitrary precision."
>
> Or,
>
> "The more accurately one can define the object of a sign, the
>   (122815-4)
> less accurately can one define its interpretant, and *vice versa*."
>
> If (122815-3) and (122815-4) prove to be valid in the future, we may refer
> to them as the "Peircean uncertainty Principle" (PUP) or the "semiotic
> uncertainty principle" (SUP).
>
> Are there any Peircean experts on this list who knows whether or not
> Peirce discussed any topic in his extensive writings that may be related to
> what is here referred to as PUP or SUP?
>
> One indirect support for the PUP may be provided the by intense debates we
> have witnessed in recent months on this list about the true nature of the
> Peircean sign among the acknowledge leaders of the semiotic community,
> including Gary R, Gary F, Edwina, Jeff, Jon, and others.
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

Well, the passage that I quoted previously continues, "Nor can the triadic
relation in which the Third stands be merely similar to that in which the
First stands, for this would make the relation of the Third to the First a
degenerate Secondness merely.  The Third must, indeed, stand in such a
relation, and thus must be capable of determining a Third of its own; but
besides that, it must have a second triadic relation in which the
Representamen, or rather the relation thereof to its Object, shall be its
own (the Third's) Object, and must be capable of determining a Third to
this relation.  All this must equally be true of the Third's Thirds and so
on endlessly ..." (EP2:273)  Not sure if this clarifies things, or just
muddies the waters further, which is why I hesitated to include it
initially.

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 9:58 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
>
>
> The interpretant is itself a sign, so at least implicitly there is a
> separate triad (and on to infinity, given Peirce’s continuity of thought):
>
> 1902 | Carnegie Institution Correspondence | NEM 4:54
>
> “A sign is something, *A*, which brings something, *B*, its *interpretant* 
> sign,
> determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence (or a
> lower implied sort) with something, *C*, its *object*, as that in which
> itself stands to *C*.”
>
>
>
> I think “same” in the quote you give has to be understood as the same
> kind, not the identical relation. The above quote makes this more clear.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, 29 December 2015 5:28 AM
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations -
> meta-languages and propositions of triadicity
>
>
>
> Edwina, List:
>
>
>
> Is it not the case, at least according to Peirce, that the
> interpretant-object relation is necessarily the same as the
> representamen-object relation?  If so, then there is no need for a separate
> trichotomy to characterize it.
>
>
>
> "A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine
> triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of
> determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
> relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.  The
> triadic relation is genuine, that is, its three members are bound together
> by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.
> That is the reason that the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere
> dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as
> the Representamen itself does." (EP2:272-273)
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
> John, list:
>
> That's an extremely interesting suggestion, that the 'third relation' is
> that between the interpretant and the object. I have trouble with that, as
> the 9 relations (parameters according to Gary R) which are differentiated
> in terms of the modal category, do not refer to this interpretant-object
> relation.
>
>
>
> They refer to the representamen-in-itself, which I consider to be a
> relation-of-depth (providing an evolved over time generalization/set of
> habits); then, to the relation between the representamen-object; and the
> relation between the representamen-interpretant.
>
> I consider the representamen, which must act as 'mind-mediator' a vital
> relation, bringing its informational depth to deal with the R-O and R-I
> transitions.
>
>
>
> But the interpretant-object interaction - is it a relation? What mediates
> this interaction? I'm not denying its importance, for objective
> referentiality is vital to validate our experiences - otherwise we live
> within a purely rhetorical, fictional world detached from reality.
>
>
>
> Edwina
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Edwina,


You wrote:

"I agree with Gary R's analysis here, and reject Gary F's and Sung's
insistence that the singular term is a sign. " (122715-1)


If you still believe in this statement after reading my post just set off
to PEIRCE-L, please let me know.

Sung




On Sun, Dec 27, 2015 at 9:24 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> I agree with Gary R's analysis here, and reject Gary F's and Sung's
> insistence that the singular term is a sign. Agreed, the 9 parameters, as
> Gary R, calls them (I call them the 9 Relations) can't be defined, in
> themselves, as signs (Gary F), or as Sung terms them, elementary signs.
>
> Such an approach, in my view, rejects the basic dynamics of Peircean
> semiosis and instead, reduces the system to a mechanical one, where
> 'complex signs' are formed from simple signs. I think that loses the basic
> dynamics of the Peircean semiosis.
>
> As for my sticking to my three relations rather than one relation in the
> analysis of the triad, I referred to this, privately to John Deely, as
> similar to the Christian argument between the Athanasian versus Arian
> analysis of the Trinity - with the former viewing the Trinity as One, and
> the latter, as three interactions.  I am not persuaded, so far, that my
> view of the semiosic triad, as a 'whole' of three relations is wrong, for
> in my view - to say that it is ONE relation, misses the fact that each of
> the three 'nodes' can be in a different categorical mode. The insistence on
> the triad as ONE relation doesn't capture this fact.
>
> Even saying it is One Triadic relation, doesn't, to me, capture that
> fact.  The Interpretant (output) and the Object (input) relations to the
> representamen (sign) can each be in a different categorical mode, so
> calling them the SAME relation obscures this fact. What IS a fact is their
> dependency on the Representamen as mediator - that dependency is, to me,
> the SAME.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Monday, December 21, 2015 9:02 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Gary F. list,
>
> Gary wrote:
>
> I think you may be glossing over some important terminological
> considerations here, Gary. They may not seem to you important or even
> relevant to your present inquiry here--which has come to feel like a kind
> of slow read of portions of NDTR--but I think that there are *crucial*
> distinctions to be made here, as difficult as they are given the various
> ways Peirce expresses himself at particular phases and moments of his
> semiotic analyses in NDTR. You wrote:
>
> GF: Some of the arguments over terminology in this thread make no positive
> contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For instance, if Peirce says
> that “an *Icon* is a sign” and “a *Symbol* is a sign” (as he does here),
> I don’t see that we have anything to gain by asserting that an icon is
> *not* a sign, or that a symbol is *not* a sign. Peirce’s nomenclature is
> difficult enough without introducing claims that directly contradict what
> he actually says.
>
>
> However, within the context of the 10 classes of signs, it seems clear
> enough, at least to me, that when, for example, he writes "an *Icon* is a
> sign," that he can only mean that the Sign will relate to its Object in
> some *iconic* way, and that he does *not* mean that the Sign taken as a
> whole is an Icon, since signs in themselves are either qualisigns,
> sinsigns, or legisigns.
>
> So, to say "an *Icon* is a sign" seems a kind of loose way of speaking
> which has the potential for conflating what I've been referring to as the 9
> parameters (3 x 3 x 3 in consideration of the categorial possibilities
> available in relation to the Object, the Interpretant, or the Sign as
> such). To confuse those parameters with the 10 classes--where *not one*
> of the 10 none is an 'Icon' as such, and where only three are 'iconic',
> viz. (1, 2, and 5), all
> ​three of these being,
>  btw, 'rhematic'
> ​. In
>  like manner, I would *not* characterize the 6 signs of the 10 which
> *are* rhematic as 'rhemes"
> ​since
>  one is a qualisign, two are sinsigns, and three are legisigns. Those six
> are not rhemes, but 'rhematic'.
> ​ Only one of the six should properly be termed 'rheme' (namely, the
> symbolic legisign).​
>
>
> So, again, what I'm suggesting is
> ​that ​
> there is a kind of unfortunate looseness in Peirce's terminology in the
> course of his analysis. While this most certain
> ​ly​
>  *is* problematic, we shouldn't allow that difficulty to lead us into
> discussing as

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Gary R,

 

Having read your subsequent message, I’m looking forward in the new year to 
further explication of your schema of the ten classes of signs. So I think I’ll 
wrap up this thread with a few questions that I hope your new thread on the 
subject will answer. Mostly I’m just asking for definitions of the terms used 
in your analysis, in the hope of understanding it better. I do think 
definitions of these terms are needed, especially for terms that are also used 
by Peirce, because if you don’t supply them, folks like me will assume that you 
are using them in the same way that Peirce did, which (as we’ve seen) will only 
cause more confusion.

 

In the case of the three trichotomies which you refer to as “this particular 
trichotomy of trichotomies,” I’m not sure whether you meant “this triad of 
trichotomies,” or are claiming that the three ‘parametric’ trichotomies 
represent a division of something else into three. (Or maybe you’re just 
rhetorically elevating the status of this triad, as in the expression “King of 
Kings”?) If you do regard them as a trichotomy (in the way that 
icon/index/symbol is a trichotomy of the possible relations of the sign to its 
object), then I’d like to know what it is that this meta-trichotomy divides 
into three.

 

Another term you’ll need to define is “involution.” Where Peirce uses this term 
— notably in “The Logic of Mathematics” (c.1896) — it is implicitly defined by 
being paired with “evolution,” for instance in CP 1. 484: “The general law of 
quality, as distinct from the classificatory system of quality (of which we can 
have but a fragmentary knowledge), has three clauses, relating respectively to 
single qualities, to pairs of qualities, and to triads of qualities. The first 
clause is that every quality is perfect and in itself such as it is. The second 
more complex law is that two qualities have one or other of two sorts of 
relations to one another; namely, they may be, first, independent of one 
another, somewhat resembling and somewhat differing from one another, or 
secondly, one of them may be merely a further determination of the other, this 
latter being essentially the first of the pair in the order of evolution, or 
synthesis, while it is the second of the pair in the order of involution or 
analysis.”

 

In other words, if quality B is merely a further determination of quality A, 
then evolution, or synthesis, proceeds from A to B, while involution proceeds 
from B to A, reversing the process of determination. This is what we would 
expect considering that evolution is a noun formed from the verb evolve and 
involution a noun formed from involve. This usage is also consistent with 
Peirce’s use of “involve” in NDTR, where a sinsign “involves a qualisign,” an 
index involves “a sort of Icon,” a “Dicisign necessarily involves, as a part of 
it, a Rheme,” etc. The implication would be that the order of evolution 
proceeds from rheme to dicisign, and the order of involution from dicisign to 
rheme, which seems clear enough as applied to the semiotic process of 
determination.

 

Further on in the “Logic of Mathematics” Peirce writes (CP 1.485):

“The triadic clause of the law of logic recognizes three elements in truth, the 
idea, or predicate, the fact or subject, the thought which originally put them 
together and recognizes they are together; from whence many things result, 
especially a threefold inferential process which either first follows the order 
of involution from living thought or ruling law, and existential case under the 
condition of the law to the predication of the idea of the law in that case; or 
second, proceeds from the living law and the inherence of the idea of that law 
in an existential case, to the subsumption of that case and to the condition of 
the law; or third, proceeds from the subsumption of an existential case under 
the condition of a living law, and the inherence of the idea of that law in 
that case to the living law itself. Thus the law of logic governs the relations 
of different predicates of one subject.”

Here the “order of involution” is one of three orders according to which an 
inferential process can take place (the other two orders are not named as 
such); but the usage of the term is consistent with that above. And so is the 
usage at CP 1.490:

“To get at the idea of a monad, and especially to make it an accurate and clear 
conception, it is necessary to begin with the idea of a triad and find the 
monad-idea involved in it. But this is only a scaffolding necessary during the 
process of constructing the conception. When the conception has been 
constructed, the scaffolding may be removed, and the monad-idea will be there 
in all its abstract perfection. According to the path here pursued from monad 
to triad, from monadic triads to triadic triads, etc., we do not progress by 
logical involution — we do not say the monad involves a dyad — but we pursue a 
path of evolution. That is to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Gary R, Gary F, Edwina, Jeff, List,


You wrote:

*GF*: I don’t see why you prefer the term “parameters” to Peirce’s term
“trichotomies."

*GR*: For one thing, there are so many 'trichotomies' in Peirce's semiotic,
and very, very many more in his mathematics, science and philosophy (Peirce
even thought that an entire 'art', *Trichotomic*, might be developed around
these myriad trichotomies) that to  distinguish this particular trichotomy
from the other semiotic trichotomies I have found it helpful in my own
thinking to see what it is doing, its function, in relation to the 'bigger
semiotic picture' involving the other trichotomies. Finally, there's no
need for me to reiterate that *this particular trichotomy of
trichotomies *(i.e,
the 9 types of signs; my addition) *in my view merely prepares for the
classification into 10 signs and cannot stand on its own as representing
possible signs.*

(*A*)  I finally understand why Gary R refers to the 9 types of signs of
Peirce as the "parameters" that are necessary for constructing the 10
classes of signs, because the definition of the signs given by Peirce (see
below) is not a usual word-based definition but a *parameter*-based
definition (i.e., a parametric definition) since it depends on three free
parameters, *A*, *B* and* C, *whose *values* are constrained to be one of
the 9 types of signs.


*"30 - 1905 - SS. pp. 192-193 - Letter to Lady Welby (Draft) presumably
July 1905 .*

So then anything (generally in a mathematical sense) is a priman (not a
priman element generally) and we might define a sign as follows:

A "sign" is anything, *A*, which,

(1) in addition to other characters of its own,

(2) stands in a dyadic relation Þ, to a purely active correlate, *B,*

(3) and is also in a triadic relation to B for a purely passive correlate,
C, this triadic relation being such as to determine *C* to be in a dyadic
relation, µ, to B, the relation µ corresponding in a recognized way to the
relation"

Retrieved from http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/76DEFS/76defs.HTM on
12/23/2015.
(*B*)  One example of a *parametric definition* is shown below, which is
the definition of *complexity* given by M. Burgin in *Super-recursive
Algorithms*, Springer, 2005, New York/Heidelberg/Berlin, which encompasses
most if not all currently available definitions of complexity in the
literature.  The definition of complexity given by Burgin involves three three
parameters, *R*, *P* and '*resource*', which can assume various VALUES as
you can see below:


“…if we analyze what does it mean when we say that some system or process
is complex, we come to conclusion that it is complex to do something with
this system or process: to study it, to describe it, to build it, to
control it, and so on. Thus, complexity is always complexity of doing
something. Being related to activity and functioning, complexity allows one
to represent efficiency in a natural way: when a process has high
efficiency, it is simple and when a process has low efficiency, it is
complex. For example, we can take time as a measure of efficiency: what is
possible to do in one hour is efficient, while what is impossible to do
even in a year is inefficient. There is a corresponding measure of
computational complexity that estimates time of computation or any other
algorithmic process.

*Definition 5.1.5.* *Complexity* of a system *R* is the amount of resources
necessary for (used by) a process *P* involving *R*.

There are different kinds of involvement.

*P *may be a process in the system *R*. For example, *R* is a computer, *P*
is an electrical process in *R*, and the *resource* is energy.

*P *may be a process that is realized by the system *R*. For example, *R*
is a computer, *P* is a computational process in *R*, and the *resource* is
memory.

*P *may be a process controlled by the system *R*. For example, *R* is a
program, *P* is a computational process controlled by *R*, and the
*resource* is time.

*P *may be a process that builds the system *R*. For example, *R* is a
software system, *P* is the process of its design, and the *resource* is
programmers.

*P *may be a process that transforms, utilizes, models, and/or predicts
behavior of the system *R*.

In cognitive processes complexity is closely related to information,
representing specific kind of information measures.”

(*C*)   A simple combinatoric consideration leads to the conclusion that
there are 9^3 = 729 possible ways of assigning the 9 types of signs to 10
classes of signs, but, as we well know, Peirce selected only 10 out of 729
based on some rules he had in mind apparently rooted in the ordinal
relation among the three categories, i.e.,1ns, 2ns and 3ns.  So far so
good: Every Peircean would accept this characterization of mine.  But the
continuing debate is about the NAMING of the 9 types of signs -- to some
the 9 types are not signs but just short-hand notation of the 9 relations
among R-R, R-O and R-I in the 3 modes of being of Firstness (1ns),

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, list,

Yes, it appears that we continue to disagree on this matter of terminology,
and especially since I don't believe it is merely a matter of our possibly
different analytical purposes, although that is no doubt part of it and may
even be at the heart of it.

For now I'll just comment on one of your interleaved paragraphs which for
me at the moment suggests what I see as our most significant disagreement,
and I'll try to get to your other comments at a later date as we seem to
have some disagreements there as well. (I'm breaking your paragraph up a
bit.)

You wrote in the first part:

GF: This indicates to me that you are taking the difference between nominal
and adjectival forms as an ontological distinction which Peirce does not
make. For Peirce, an iconic sign is an icon, a rhematic sign a rheme, a
symbolic sign a symbol, etc., regardless of whatever other classifications
it may belong to.


GR: It may be that in the segment of NDTR that you are forcusing that "For
Peirce, an iconic sign is an icon, a rhematic sign a rheme, a symbolic sign
a symbol, etc., regardless of whatever other classifications it may belong
to." But it is precisely that way of speaking, which is another kind of
shorthand for the particular purposes of his analysis at that point and in
that context, again, it is that shorthand, stripped of its *specific
context* of illustrating the possible trichotomies of relations possible
for S/O/I that has caused confusion for a number of folk, the result, as
I'd earlier noted, of conflating the aspects of the three
trichotomies--which are *not*, as I will continue to argue--signs
themselves, but, in a kind of "mix and match" *will* together generate ten
sign classes (which, btw, are not themselves 'real' signs at all until they
are 'embodied' in some actual semiosis; which is also to say that, as with
the three trichotomies you've been considering, the 10 classes are a
mere *analytical
abstraction*, albeit at another level than the trichotomies).

If, as you wrote, "an iconic sign is an icon, a rhematic sign a rheme, a
symbolic sign a symbol" (although using 'sign' in these phrases already
begs the question), then we have such cases as these:

(a) Signs (in the classes 8,9, and 10 of the classification) are all both
symbols and legisigns. Now, while that is true in one sense, and we can
properly--and frequently do--refer to the argument, the dicisign, and the
rheme as 'symbols', considering for the moment just sign 8, the rheme, if
all "rhematic signs" (to use your terminology) are 'rhemes' "regardless of
whatever other classifications it may belong to," then the rheme which is a
symbolic legisign might appear to be merely one of six such signs, and it
loses the special position it *rightly* has in our thinking and speaking
about the relation of the three sign classes, rheme (term), dicisign
(proposition), and argument. You continued:

GF: Some of the names of signs (each of which is, logically speaking, a
hypostatic abstraction) do not seem to have adjectival forms — Qualisign,
Sinsign, Legisign, and Argument — but I don’t see any ontological
significance in that. . .


GR: Well, yes, and most certainly Qualisign, Sinsign, and Legisign not only
"do not seem to have adjectival forms," but they can't and shouldn't have
them in the classification as they are the three kinds of possibly
to-be-embodied Signs that might be uttered--they are the *final* term,
the *arrival
point* in the involution of Peirce's analysis of each class of signs
(again, beginning at the place in the triangle of each class which
represents the Interpretant, passing through the Object, arriving at the
Sign).

So, for example, Sign 8 in the classification is involutionally analyzed as
a rhematic indexical legisign. This is the result of the *application* of
the 3 trichotomies in my understanding. The use of the adjectival form in
the places of the Interpretant and Object, and the noun form for the Sign,
are Peirce's (it's true that in creating his diagram Peirce doesn't employ
the adjectival form for the Argument and Dicent (although he might have
written 'argumentative'--but that expression has a different connotation;
while dicentic is used by some commentators), but perhaps that may be
because he expected these particular classes to be refered to as Argument
and Dicent. Finally, and in similar manner, he surely expected the first of
the three symbolic classes to be termed Rheme  (which he himself often
enough does, although in the diagram of the 10 classes he calls it Rhematic
Symbol).

You concluded this paragraph by commenting:

GF. . . I don’t see why or how you distinguish between “a Sign taken as a
whole” and some other way of taking a Sign.


GR: While I think I've already suggested why above (namely, that only the
triads of the classification represent potentially embodied sign classes),
I'll try to continue an answer by referring to one other point you made,
and then call it quits for now. You 

Re: revised RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, list,

Gary, since I'm caught up in holiday activities, end of the year tasks and
errands, while at the same time preparing to vacate my Village apartment
and move up to Harlem for about a week, I will not be able to respond to
this revised post--my earlier response to your, then, not completely edited
post, will have to stand for now as it is.

Most likely we can take up some of these questions later in the year (or,
more likely, in 2016) as I think that you and I are really seeing matters
quite differently and that it might be valuable to thrash out those
differences at least, even if we can't completely resolve them.

Perhaps, as you've been suggesting, our disagreement may in part be because
our *purposes* are different. On the other hand, Peirce's--and
your--"arduous analysis" should, in my opinion, be contextualized within
his larger semiotic project, or one can miss seeing the proverbial forest
through the trees. And we all, I think, remain "backswoodsmen" in
semiotics, so that there remains much work yet to be done in many, perhaps
all, of the disciplines which Peirce opened up.

In addition, I very much hope that in the new year, and even as we continue
analyses of semiotic grammar, perhaps also logical critic, (and writing now
for just a brief moment as list moderator) that the list once again might
plunge into a consideration of questions related to semiotic methodeutic
(theoretical rhetoric), and especially that part of it which got many of us
interested in Peirce in the first place, namely, his pragmatism.

To that end, I've been reading Peirce's 1907 "Pragmatism" (the name given
to this late ms by the EP editors), and working on the draft of a post
which I hope may get us again thinking about what we yet might be able to
*do* with Peirce's philosophy in a world which, in my opinion, is very much
in need of his critical commonsensism, an alternative, informal name for
pragmatism.

But there are many rooms in Arisbe, and I have little doubt that we will
continue to make headway in this forum, and elsewhere in the growing
universe of Peircean studies, in many of them.

Again, I wish us all an excellent transition to the new year, and an
intellectually rich 2016!

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 1:39 PM,  wrote:

> Sorry, folks, I was called away to domestic duties before I finished
> proofreading that last post properly, but sent it anyway. Here’s a
> corrected version, which should replace the earlier one.   —gary f.
>
>
>
> Gary R,
>
>
>
> I guess we will have to disagree on these terminological issues. I have
> every reason to believe that Peirce’s choice of terms in his “Nomenclature
> and Divisions of Triadic Relations” is as careful and exact as it is in the
> rest of the 1903 Syllabus, and for that matter as exact as in any of his
> works written for publication. This judgment is based not only on my
> experience of closely reading Peirce, but also on my purpose in posting
> these remarks on NDTR: I feel it is incumbent on me to understand Peirce’s
> semiotic as exactly as I can before I proceed to disagree with or modify
> his analysis. I don’t believe a reader can do that while believing that
> Peirce is using loose terminology for his purposes.
>
>
>
> By the same token, I can’t say that your terminology or Edwina’s is
> “loose” for *your* purposes. What I can do, though, is point out to the
> differences between your terminology and Peirce’s; and I think this may be
> worth doing because those differences may be symptomatic of differences
> between your purpose and mine in interpreting Peirce (rather than mere
> differences in terminological taste). If we are indeed at cross-purposes, I
> think it’s better to be aware of that. So my insertions below will consist
> mostly of comparisons between Peirce’s terminology and yours, along with
> some questions about terms of yours that I don’t understand.
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com
> ]
> *Sent:* 21-Dec-15 21:03
>
> Gary F. list,
>
>
>
> GR: I think you may be glossing over some important terminological
> considerations here, Gary. They may not seem to you important or even
> relevant to your present inquiry here--which has come to feel like a kind
> of slow read of portions of NDTR--but I think that there are *crucial*
> distinctions to be made here, as difficult as they are given the various
> ways Peirce expresses himself at particular phases and moments of his
> semiotic analyses in NDTR. You wrote:
>
>
>
> GF: Some of the arguments over terminology in this thread make no positive
> contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For instance, if Peirce says
> that “an *Icon* is a sign” and “a *Symbol* is a sign” (as he does here),
> I don’t see that we 

revised RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Sorry, folks, I was called away to domestic duties before I finished 
proofreading that last post properly, but sent it anyway. Here’s a corrected 
version, which should replace the earlier one.   —gary f.

 

Gary R,

 

I guess we will have to disagree on these terminological issues. I have every 
reason to believe that Peirce’s choice of terms in his “Nomenclature and 
Divisions of Triadic Relations” is as careful and exact as it is in the rest of 
the 1903 Syllabus, and for that matter as exact as in any of his works written 
for publication. This judgment is based not only on my experience of closely 
reading Peirce, but also on my purpose in posting these remarks on NDTR: I feel 
it is incumbent on me to understand Peirce’s semiotic as exactly as I can 
before I proceed to disagree with or modify his analysis. I don’t believe a 
reader can do that while believing that Peirce is using loose terminology for 
his purposes. 

 

By the same token, I can’t say that your terminology or Edwina’s is “loose” for 
your purposes. What I can do, though, is point out to the differences between 
your terminology and Peirce’s; and I think this may be worth doing because 
those differences may be symptomatic of differences between your purpose and 
mine in interpreting Peirce (rather than mere differences in terminological 
taste). If we are indeed at cross-purposes, I think it’s better to be aware of 
that. So my insertions below will consist mostly of comparisons between 
Peirce’s terminology and yours, along with some questions about terms of yours 
that I don’t understand.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 21-Dec-15 21:03

Gary F. list,

 

GR: I think you may be glossing over some important terminological 
considerations here, Gary. They may not seem to you important or even relevant 
to your present inquiry here--which has come to feel like a kind of slow read 
of portions of NDTR--but I think that there are crucial distinctions to be made 
here, as difficult as they are given the various ways Peirce expresses himself 
at particular phases and moments of his semiotic analyses in NDTR. You wrote:

 

GF: Some of the arguments over terminology in this thread make no positive 
contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For instance, if Peirce says that 
“an Icon is a sign” and “a Symbol is a sign” (as he does here), I don’t see 
that we have anything to gain by asserting that an icon is not a sign, or that 
a symbol is not a sign. Peirce’s nomenclature is difficult enough without 
introducing claims that directly contradict what he actually says.

 

However, within the context of the 10 classes of signs, it seems clear enough, 
at least to me, that when, for example, he writes "an Icon is a sign," that he 
can only mean that the Sign will relate to its Object in some iconic way, and 
that he does not mean that the Sign taken as a whole is an Icon, since signs in 
themselves are either qualisigns, sinsigns, or legisigns. 

GF: This indicates to me that you are taking the difference between nominal and 
adjectival forms as an ontological distinction which Peirce does not make. For 
Peirce, an iconic sign is an icon, a rhematic sign a rheme, a symbolic sign a 
symbol, etc., regardless of whatever other classifications it may belong to. 
Some of the names of signs (each of which is, logically speaking, a hypostatic 
abstraction) do not seem to have adjectival forms — Qualisign, Sinsign, 
Legisign, and Argument — but I don’t see any ontological significance in that, 
and I don’t see why or how you distinguish between “a Sign taken as a whole” 
and some other way of taking a Sign.


GR: So, to say "an Icon is a sign" seems a kind of loose way of speaking which 
has the potential for conflating what I've been referring to as the 9 
parameters (3 x 3 x 3 in consideration of the categorial possibilities 
available in relation to the Object, the Interpretant, or the Sign as such). To 
confuse those parameters with the 10 classes--where not one of the 10 none is 
an 'Icon' as such, and where only three are 'iconic', viz. (1, 2, and 5), all 
​three of these being, btw, 'rhematic' In like manner, I would not characterize 
the 6 signs of the 10 which *are* rhematic as 'rhemes" ​since one is a 
qualisign, two are sinsigns, and three are legisigns. Those six are not rhemes, 
but 'rhematic'. Only one of the six should properly be termed 'rheme' (namely, 
the symbolic legisign).​

 

GF: Since I don’t see why you prefer the term “parameters” to Peirce’s term 
“trichotomies,” I’ll continue to use the latter. What you are saying is true 
(approximately) IF you only look at the triangle diagram of the ten classes and 
ignore the text of NDTR. But, as Peirce says, the Ten Classes result from “the 
three trichotomies of Signs” which he defines in the text. If Peirce had chosen 
to divide triadic relations into a different set of three trichotomies — which 
he could have, as he points out in the opening 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Gary R,

 

I guess we will have to disagree on these terminological issues. I have every 
reason to believe that Peirce’s choice of terms in his “Nomenclature and 
Divisions of Triadic Relations” is as careful and exact as it is in the rest of 
the 1903 Syllabus, and for that matter as exact as in any of his works written 
for publication. This judgment is based not only on my experience of closely 
reading Peirce, but also on my purpose in posting these remarks on NDTR: I feel 
it is incumbent on me to understand Peirce’s semiotic as exactly as I can 
before I proceed to disagree with or modify his analysis. I don’t believe a 
reader can do that while believing that Peirce is using loose terminology for 
his purposes. 

 

By the same token, I can’t say that your terminology or Edwina’s is “loose” for 
your purposes. What I can do, though, is point out to the differences between 
your terminology and Peirce’s; and I think this may be worth doing because 
those differences may be symptomatic of differences between your purpose and 
mine in interpreting Peirce (rather than mere differences in terminological 
taste). If we are indeed at cross-purposes, I think it’s better to be aware of 
that. So my insertions below will consist mostly of comparison’s between 
Peirce’s terminology and yours, along with some questions about terms of yours 
that I don’t understand.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 21-Dec-15 21:03



Gary F. list,

 

GR: I think you may be glossing over some important terminological 
considerations here, Gary. They may not seem to you important or even relevant 
to your present inquiry here--which has come to feel like a kind of slow read 
of portions of NDTR--but I think that there are crucial distinctions to be made 
here, as difficult as they are given the various ways Peirce expresses himself 
at particular phases and moments of his semiotic analyses in NDTR. You wrote:

 

GF: Some of the arguments over terminology in this thread make no positive 
contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For instance, if Peirce says that 
“an Icon is a sign” and “a Symbol is a sign” (as he does here), I don’t see 
that we have anything to gain by asserting that an icon is not a sign, or that 
a symbol is not a sign. Peirce’s nomenclature is difficult enough without 
introducing claims that directly contradict what he actually says.

 

However, within the context of the 10 classes of signs, it seems clear enough, 
at least to me, that when, for example, he writes "an Icon is a sign," that he 
can only mean that the Sign will relate to its Object in some iconic way, and 
that he does not mean that the Sign taken as a whole is an Icon, since signs in 
themselves are either qualisigns, sinsigns, or legisigns. 



GF: This indicates to me that you are taking the difference between nominal and 
adjectival forms as an ontological distinction which Peirce does not make. For 
Peirce, an iconic sign is an icon, a rhematic sign a rheme, a symbolic sign a 
symbol, etc., regardless of whatever other classifications it may belong to. 
Some of the names of signs (each of which is, logically speaking, a hypostatic 
abstraction) do not seem to have adjectival forms — Qualisign, Sinsign, 
Legisign, and Argument — but I don’t see any ontological significance in that, 
and I don’t see why or how you distinguish between “a Sign taken as a whole” 
and some other way of taking a Sign.


So, to say "an Icon is a sign" seems a kind of loose way of speaking which has 
the potential for conflating what I've been referring to as the 9 parameters (3 
x 3 x 3 in consideration of the categorial possibilities available in relation 
to the Object, the Interpretant, or the Sign as such). To confuse those 
parameters with the 10 classes--where not one of the 10 none is an 'Icon' as 
such, and where only three are 'iconic', viz. (1, 2, and 5), all ​three of 
these being, btw, 'rhematic' In like manner, I would not characterize the 6 
signs of the 10 which *are* rhematic as 'rhemes" ​since one is a qualisign, two 
are sinsigns, and three are legisigns. Those six are not rhemes, but 
'rhematic'. Only one of the six should properly be termed 'rheme' (namely, the 
symbolic legisign).​

 

Since I don’t see why you prefer the term “parameters” to Peirce’s term 
“trichotomies,” I’ll continue to use the latter. What you are saying is true 
(approximately) IF you only look at the triangle diagram of the ten classes and 
ignore the text of NDTR. But, as Peirce says, the Ten Classes result from “the 
three trichotomies of Signs” which he defines in the text. If Peirce had chosen 
to divide triadic relations into a different set of three trichotomies — which 
he could have, as he points out in the opening paragraphs of NDTR — he would 
have come up with a different set of ten classes. And of course, a few years 
later he did generate a new set of classes, 66 in all, by dividing signs 
according to ten trichotomies 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Resuming the close examination of Peirce’s “Nomenclature and Divisions of 
Triadic Relations”, we move on to the second trichotomy, which divides signs 
“according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign's 
having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that 
object, or in its relation to an interpretant” (CP 2.243).

 

My reason for including Peirce’s text in these posts is mostly to bring us back 
to his own terminology, since it is his analysis of semiosis that we are 
investigating here. Some of the arguments over terminology in this thread make 
no positive contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For instance, if 
Peirce says that “an Icon is a sign” and “a Symbol is a sign” (as he does 
here), I don’t see that we have anything to gain by asserting that an icon is 
not a sign, or that a symbol is not a sign. Peirce’s nomenclature is difficult 
enough without introducing claims that directly contradict what he actually 
says.

 

So here is the second trichotomy:

 

 

CP 2.247. According to the second trichotomy, a Sign may be termed an Icon, an 
Index, or a Symbol. 

An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue 
of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any 
such Object actually exists or not. It is true that unless there really is such 
an Object, the Icon does not act as a sign; but this has nothing to do with its 
character as a sign. Anything whatever, be it quality, existent individual, or 
law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and used as a 
sign of it. 

248. An Index is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of 
being really affected by that Object. It cannot, therefore, be a Qualisign, 
because qualities are whatever they are independently of anything else. In so 
far as the Index is affected by the Object, it necessarily has some Quality in 
common with the Object, and it is in respect to these that it refers to the 
Object. It does, therefore, involve a sort of Icon, although an Icon of a 
peculiar kind; and it is not the mere resemblance of its Object, even in these 
respects, which makes it a sign, but it is the actual modification of it by the 
Object. 

249. A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of 
a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the 
Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus itself a 
general type or law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts through a Replica. 
Not only is it general itself, but the Object to which it refers is of a 
general nature. Now that which is general has its being in the instances which 
it will determine. There must, therefore, be existent instances of what the 
Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by “existent,” existent in the 
possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will 
indirectly, through the association or other law, be affected by those 
instances; and thus the Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index 
of a peculiar kind. It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight 
effect upon the Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant 
character of the Symbol. 

 

 

Let’s compare what Peirce says about each sign type in this second trichotomy 
with his definition of the three types in the first trichotomy. Since the 
Qualisign and the Icon are each first in their respective trichotomies, each 
exemplifies Firstness, but in a different way. The Firstness of the Qualisign 
is its being a quality in itself. The Firstness of the Icon, on the other hand, 
is the Firstness of its relation to its Object, specifically the fact that it 
“refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its 
own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually 
exists or not.”

 

Now compare the Secondness of the Index in its trichotomy with the Secondness 
of the Sinsign, which is its being an actual existent thing or event. The Index 
“refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of being really affected by 
that Object.” Again, its Secondness is that of its relation to its Object — 
which, as a genuine Secondness, involves a Firstness (namely “a sort of Icon”). 
The peculiarity of that Firstness, I would guess, is that its genuine 
Secondness to the Object does have something to do with its character, which is 
not the case with the Icon as defined above.

 

Finally, we come to the Thirdness of the Symbol in its trichotomy. The 
Thirdness of a Legisign is that it is in itself a “law” and a “general type.” 
The Symbol, being also a Legisign, is general in its mode of being but also in 
its relation to its Object. This entails that it acts through a Replica, and 
that there must be existent instances of what the Symbol denotes, although we 
must here understand by “existent,” existent in the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F. list,

Gary wrote:

I think you may be glossing over some important terminological
considerations here, Gary. They may not seem to you important or even
relevant to your present inquiry here--which has come to feel like a kind
of slow read of portions of NDTR--but I think that there are *crucial*
distinctions to be made here, as difficult as they are given the various
ways Peirce expresses himself at particular phases and moments of his
semiotic analyses in NDTR. You wrote:

GF: Some of the arguments over terminology in this thread make no positive
contribution to this inquiry that I can see. For instance, if Peirce says
that “an *Icon* is a sign” and “a *Symbol* is a sign” (as he does here), I
don’t see that we have anything to gain by asserting that an icon is *not* a
sign, or that a symbol is *not* a sign. Peirce’s nomenclature is difficult
enough without introducing claims that directly contradict what he actually
says.


However, within the context of the 10 classes of signs, it seems clear
enough, at least to me, that when, for example, he writes "an *Icon* is a
sign," that he can only mean that the Sign will relate to its Object in
some *iconic* way, and that he does *not* mean that the Sign taken as a
whole is an Icon, since signs in themselves are either qualisigns,
sinsigns, or legisigns.

So, to say "an *Icon* is a sign" seems a kind of loose way of speaking
which has the potential for conflating what I've been referring to as the 9
parameters (3 x 3 x 3 in consideration of the categorial possibilities
available in relation to the Object, the Interpretant, or the Sign as
such). To confuse those parameters with the 10 classes--where *not one* of
the 10 none is an 'Icon' as such, and where only three are 'iconic', viz.
(1, 2, and 5), all
​three of these being,
 btw, 'rhematic'
​. In
 like manner, I would *not* characterize the 6 signs of the 10 which *are*
rhematic as 'rhemes"
​since
 one is a qualisign, two are sinsigns, and three are legisigns. Those six
are not rhemes, but 'rhematic'.
​ Only one of the six should properly be termed 'rheme' (namely, the
symbolic legisign).​


So, again, what I'm suggesting is
​that ​
there is a kind of unfortunate looseness in Peirce's terminology in the
course of his analysis. While this most certain
​ly​
 *is* problematic, we shouldn't allow that difficulty to lead us into
discussing aspects
​ (expressed more properly as adjectives)​
of the sign
​as if they ​
were the whole of the sign
​:
the sign *as* sign. I do not see this distinction as being, say,
​'​
fastidious
​'​
.

In short, one needs to recall that at 2.264 that Peirce writes: "The three
trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF
SIGNS," and I consider it a grave error in semiotic analysis not to clearly
distinguish the elements of the trichotomies from the classes. Or, in other
words,
​conflating
 those three trichotomies involving nine categorial parameters with the ten
classes themselves has, in my opinion, historically brought about a great
deal of confusion, so that it behooves us to clear up--and not gloss
over--the potential confusion
​s​
resulting from that conflation.

I should add that I agree with you (and what I took John Collier to be
saying recently) in opposing what Edwina has been arguing, namely,
​y​
our holding, contra Edwina, that the sign is *not* three relations, but one
genuine triadic relation. Peirce has been quoted here repeatedly as stating
that a sign should *not *be conceived as "a complexus of dyadic relations"
(although, admittedly, his terminology can get a little loose in this
matter as well). Finally, the *integrity* of the sign is further emphasized
by his insisting that the interpretant stands in *the same relation* to the
object as the sign itself stands (I don't see that Edwina deals with that
last principle in her three-relations analysis whatsoever).

You concluded:

GF: I’d like to return to the “mirror” idea that Gary R. picked up on
awhile back, by suggesting that the *involvement*described above is a sort
of mirror image of *degeneracy*, in the way that the two concepts are
applied to these sign types here and in Kaina Stoicheia.


I would very much like to take up this mirror image notion in terms of
involvement (categorial involution) *and* degeneracy (and the relation of
the two), although I don't think that this thread is the place to do it. I
began another thread on that 'mirror' theme, and perhaps after the first of
the year we can take up these issues there if you and others are interested.

Meanwhile, I wish you and all Peirce e-forum members a happy, healthy, and
intellectually productive new year!

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 1:12 PM,  wrote:

> Resuming the close examination of 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi Jon,

That is an excellent point.
Can we then say that

"All actual signs derive from potential signs but not all potential signs
need be actual signs."   (122115-1)

This statement may be related to the the fact that

"There can be no Thirdness without Secondness and Firstness;
 (122115-2)
there can be no Secondness without Firstness."

If (122115-2) is true, then why stop at Firstness?  Why can't we continue
and say

"There can be no Firstness without 'Zeroness'."
 (122115-3)

The concept of Zeroness was invoked in 2013 as a logical consequence of the
9 types of signs defined by Peirce as detailed in [biosemiotics:4440]
forwarded to you separately.

All the best.

Sung

On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 1:50 AM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:

> Sung,
>
> Having a character that makes it a sign is not yet being a sign to someone
> of something. The first is potential, the second is actualization.
>
> Regards,
> Jon
>
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
>
> On Dec 21, 2015, at 12:33 AM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>
> Edwina,
>
> You said
>
> "All signs are triads".
>
> I disagree.  Not all signs are triads.  Only symbols are.  There can be
> signs without interpretant (e.g., a piece of mould with a bullet hoe in it;
> see below) or without object (e.g., a lead-pencil streak as representing a
> geometric line), according to Peirce:
>
>
> "An icon is a sign which would possess the character which renders it
> significant, even though its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil
> streak as representing a geometrical line. An index is a sign which would,
> at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were
> removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant.
> Such, for instance, is a piece of mould with a bullet hole in it as a sign
> of a shot; for without the shot there would have been no hole; but there is
> a hole there, whether anyone has the sense to attribute it to a shot or
> not. A symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a
> sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which
> signifies what it does only by virtue of it being understood to have that
> signification."
>
> (Peirce, Philosophical Writings, 104, as cited in
> http://goldberg.berkeley.edu/pubs/Index-and-the-Interface-Kris-Paulsen-Article-Spring-2013.pdf).
>
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 9:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Sung - if you want to consider the term 'Icon' as the 'name ' for the
>> Relation between the Representamen and the Object--- AND as a 'sign' of
>> that Relation...then, the term, ICON, must be operating within a triad. It
>> is not in itself, as that word, as you insist, an 'elementary sign'.
>>
>> Again - that word ICON, to be considered a sign, must itself be
>> functioning within a triad. The term ICON, as a sign, is made up of those
>> three relations: R-R, R-O and R-I. There is no such thing as an 'elementary
>> sign'. All signs are triads. So, when I hear or read the word ICON, [R-O],
>> my Representamen in its memory [R-R], mediates that sight/hearing of ICON,
>> to result in an Interpretant [R-I] of the relation between the R and the O.
>> That's a full triad. Not an elementary sign.
>>
>> Again- your lion and cat are irrelevant felines.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 8:42 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic
>> relations
>>
>> Hi Edwina,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> "We are talking about the meaning of these terms.
>>   (122015-1)
>> The term of 'icon' refers to the relation between the
>> Representamen and the Object."
>>
>> I disagree.
>>
>> We are not talking about just the meaning of these terms but also their
>> names.
>>
>> We agree that the *meaning *of 'icon' is *the relation between
>> representamen and object in the mode of Firstness.*
>>
>> Where we do not agree is that I regard 'icon' as the *name* of (and
>> hence a sign for) *the relation between representamen and object in the
>> mode of Firstness.*
>>
>> Again you are seeing only the lion and not the cat.
>>
>> *Sung*
>>
>>
>>
>&g

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Edwina, Helmut, John, Gary R, List,

You wrote:

"Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of
representamen relations'. (122015-1)
Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, . . . "

These '9 types of representmane relations' are the *objects* of the 9 types
of *signs* that Peirce named 'qualisign', 'singsign, 'legisign',
 'dicisign', etc.  For example, icon, index , and symbol are the *signs*
referring to the* relation* between  representamen and its object in the
mode of being of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively.  It
seems to me that you are conflating *representmen *and *object.   *

The 3x3 table of the 9 types of signs  is an *ambiguous* diagram, since it
an be intepreted  in more than one ways with equal validity, like the
figure shown below.  Clearly the figure can be interpreted as depicting  a
*lion*, a *cat*, or *both*, not unlike our 9 types and 10 classes of
signs.  I see both a lion  (*relations, i.e., objects*) and a cat (name of
the relations, i.e., *signs*) in the picture, but, metaphorically speaking,
Edwina seems to see only a lion, and Helmut only a cat.



[image: Inline image 1]

Retrieved from
http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/humanities/research/philosophyresearch/cspe/illusions/
on 12/20/2015.


All the best.

Sung





On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of
> representamen relations'. Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, despite
> Sung's description of them as 'elementary signs'. A sign is, by definition,
> a triad - and therefore, in my view, even the representamen-in-itself,
> can't be a sign, because it is not in a triad. The triad is the sign.
>
> That is why I refer to the interactions between the Representamen and the
> Object; the Representamen and the Interpretant - as Relations. And of
> course, Peirce does this as well, I've provided the quotes previously. The
> Representamen-in-itself is also a Relation, a depth relation, with its
> history.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
> *To:* colli...@ukzn.ac.za
> *Cc:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> ; PEIRCE-L
> <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 5:40 PM
> *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> John, Sung, list,
> for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The
> difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is
> not, as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it
> is a type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs,
> and the 9 types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen
> relations, 3 object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not
> completely clear about, is, what the representamen, object, or
> interpretant, has a relation with: Is it the representamen, or the whole
> sign? I think it is the representamen, as Edwina often has said, because,
> if they were relations between the whole triadic sign and either element of
> its, this would be some circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already
> is a relation between (or composition of?) these three relations...A
> logical loop. So, my temporal understanding is to replace "9 types of
> signs" with "9 types of representamen relations". Is that correct?
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr
>  "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
>
> Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to me that you are only
> picking out different ways of classifying the same things, which is fine,
> but they are not different things, as you seem to be saying. There is no
> difference in the dynamical objects involved. If there is, you have not
> shown this. You need tof show how the different classifications are
> grounded in different expectations about possible experiences. You haven't
> done that yet. From your response here it seems that you are confusing
> different ways of talking about the same things with different objects. I
> don't know of anyone who makes the mistake of confusing the objects of the
> classifications. Perhaps you could give an example. Of course someone could
> be misled by the difference in the immediate objects, which depends on how
> we are thinking, if they are confused about what Peirce is talking about
> with these classifications, I don't think that there are Peirce scholars
> who make that mistake. So perhaps you could provide examples. There is a
> good reason why Peirce didn't use different names. There is no need to.
> This is quite d

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

No, Sung. Again, it would help if you would actually read Peirce before you 
jump in with your views. 
We are talking about the meaning of these terms. The term of 'icon' refers to 
the relation between the Representamen and the Object. So, no-one, including 
me, is 'conflating 'representamen' and 'object'. ALL nine terms refer to the 
Relations of the Representamen; in itself as R-R, between R-O, and R-I. 

These 9 terms are not, as you insist, 'elementary terms', nor are they 
ambiguous. They are very specifically outlined, repeatedly, as to their 
meaning, in numerous Peircean texts.

And as John Collier's post just explained, these relations are not stand-alone. 
COLLIER:" I take it that the contained (or implied) pairwise relations are 
abstractions, and cannot (do not) exist on their own. So talking about, say, 
the relation between the representamen and its object always has the 
interpretant in the background."

That is - the relations operate within the semiosic triad. THREE relations - 
but you can't 'decompose' them.

Your lion-cat picture is totally irrelevant to the discussion.
Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 7:41 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Edwina, Helmut, John, Gary R, List,


  You wrote:


  "Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of representamen 
relations'. (122015-1)
  Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, . . . "

  These '9 types of representmane relations' are the objects of the 9 types of 
signs that Peirce named 'qualisign', 'singsign, 'legisign',  'dicisign', etc.  
For example, icon, index , and symbol are the signs referring to the relation 
between  representamen and its object in the mode of being of Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively.  It seems to me that you are 
conflating representmen and object.   


  The 3x3 table of the 9 types of signs  is an ambiguous diagram, since it an 
be intepreted  in more than one ways with equal validity, like the figure shown 
below.  Clearly the figure can be interpreted as depicting  a lion, a cat, or 
both, not unlike our 9 types and 10 classes of signs.  I see both a lion  
(relations, i.e., objects) and a cat (name of the relations, i.e., signs) in 
the picture, but, metaphorically speaking, Edwina seems to see only a lion, and 
Helmut only a cat. 









  Retrieved from 
http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/humanities/research/philosophyresearch/cspe/illusions/
 on 12/20/2015.





  All the best.


  Sung










  On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of 
representamen relations'. Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, despite Sung's 
description of them as 'elementary signs'. A sign is, by definition, a triad - 
and therefore, in my view, even the representamen-in-itself, can't be a sign, 
because it is not in a triad. The triad is the sign.

That is why I refer to the interactions between the Representamen and the 
Object; the Representamen and the Interpretant - as Relations. And of course, 
Peirce does this as well, I've provided the quotes previously. The 
Representamen-in-itself is also a Relation, a depth relation, with its history. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Helmut Raulien 
  To: colli...@ukzn.ac.za 
  Cc: Sungchul Ji ; PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 5:40 PM
  Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  John, Sung, list,
  for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The 
difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is not, 
as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it is a 
type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs, and the 9 
types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen relations, 3 
object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not completely clear 
about, is, what the representamen, object, or interpretant, has a relation 
with: Is it the representamen, or the whole sign? I think it is the 
representamen, as Edwina often has said, because, if they were relations 
between the whole triadic sign and either element of its, this would be some 
circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already is a relation between (or 
composition of?) these three relations...A logical loop. So, my temporal 
understanding is to replace "9 types of signs" with "9 types of representamen 
relations". Is that correct?
  Best,
  Helmut

  20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr
   "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
   
  Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to m

[PEIRCE-L] Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Awbrey]

Sung,

Having a character that makes it a sign is not yet being a sign to someone of 
something. The first is potential, the second is actualization. 

Regards,
Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

> On Dec 21, 2015, at 12:33 AM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
> 
> Edwina,
> 
> You said
> 
> "All signs are triads".
> 
> I disagree.  Not all signs are triads.  Only symbols are.  There can be signs 
> without interpretant (e.g., a piece of mould with a bullet hoe in it; see 
> below) or without object (e.g., a lead-pencil streak as representing a 
> geometric line), according to Peirce: 
> 
> 
> "An icon is a sign which would possess the character which renders it 
> significant, even though its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil 
> streak as representing a geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at 
> once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, 
> but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for 
> instance, is a piece of mould with a bullet hole in it as a sign of a shot; 
> for without the shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole 
> there, whether anyone has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A 
> symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign if 
> there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies 
> what it does only by virtue of it being understood to have that 
> signification."  
> 
> (Peirce, Philosophical Writings, 104, as cited in 
> http://goldberg.berkeley.edu/pubs/Index-and-the-Interface-Kris-Paulsen-Article-Spring-2013.pdf).
>   
> 
> All the best.
> 
> Sung
> 
> 
> 
>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 9:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
>> Sung - if you want to consider the term 'Icon' as the 'name ' for the 
>> Relation between the Representamen and the Object--- AND as a 'sign' of that 
>> Relation...then, the term, ICON, must be operating within a triad. It is not 
>> in itself, as that word, as you insist, an 'elementary sign'.
>>  
>> Again - that word ICON, to be considered a sign, must itself be functioning 
>> within a triad. The term ICON, as a sign, is made up of those three 
>> relations: R-R, R-O and R-I. There is no such thing as an 'elementary sign'. 
>> All signs are triads. So, when I hear or read the word ICON, [R-O], my 
>> Representamen in its memory [R-R], mediates that sight/hearing of ICON, to 
>> result in an Interpretant [R-I] of the relation between the R and the O. 
>> That's a full triad. Not an elementary sign.
>>  
>> Again- your lion and cat are irrelevant felines.
>>  
>> Edwina
>> - Original Message -
>> From: Sungchul Ji
>> To: Edwina Taborsky
>> Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 8:42 PM
>> Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>> 
>> Hi Edwina,
>> 
>> You wrote:
>> 
>> "We are talking about the meaning of these terms.
>>  (122015-1)
>> The term of 'icon' refers to the relation between the 
>> Representamen and the Object."
>> 
>> I disagree.
>> 
>> We are not talking about just the meaning of these terms but also their 
>> names.
>> 
>> We agree that the meaning of 'icon' is the relation between representamen 
>> and object in the mode of Firstness.
>> 
>> Where we do not agree is that I regard 'icon' as the name of (and hence a 
>> sign for) the relation between representamen and object in the mode of 
>> Firstness.
>> 
>> Again you are seeing only the lion and not the cat. 
>> 
>> Sung
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 7:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
>>> No, Sung. Again, it would help if you would actually read Peirce before you 
>>> jump in with your views. 
>>> We are talking about the meaning of these terms. The term of 'icon' refers 
>>> to the relation between the Representamen and the Object. So, no-one, 
>>> including me, is 'conflating 'representamen' and 'object'. ALL nine terms 
>>> refer to the Relations of the Representamen; in itself as R-R, between R-O, 
>>> and R-I.
>>>  
>>> These 9 terms are not, as you insist, 'elementary terms', nor are they 
>>> ambiguous. They are very specifically outlined, repeatedly, as to their 
>>> meaning, in numerous Peircean texts.
>>>  
>>> And as John Collier's post just explain

FW: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

I had intended to send this to the list as well. But forgot. I see that Helmut 
has addressed my concern in a post to the list that crossed mine to him.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: John Collier
Sent: Monday, 21 December 2015 01:36
To: 'Helmut Raulien'
Subject: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Helmut,

That is pretty close to my understanding, but I definitely would not refer to 
the “whole triadic sign” as a composition of three relations. That would 
suggest that a decomposition is possible, but it is not, according to Peirce. I 
take it that the contained (or implied) pairwise relations are abstractions, 
and cannot (do not) exist on their own. So talking about, say, the relation 
between the representamen and its object always has the interpretant in the 
background. I think that this is especially clear when we consider the relation 
of each kind to itself, say, the representamen to the representamen. As has 
been noted a number of times on this thread, a qualisign has the same thing 
playing all three roles. It contains its own object and its own interpretant. 
But to say that it is some composition of the three would be misleading. I 
agree with Edwina when she says that it is best to think of these as relations: 
the interpretant determines the object of the sign. So we can think of this 
determination (the – abstract -- relation) as being the interpretant. The 
interpretant, in the same way, determines the object of the representamen. The 
inverse relations give the object relation and the representamen relation, 
which in the light of the interpretant are the determination of the (abstract) 
relation between the representamen and its object. But none of this makes sense 
two by two; the whole sign can’t be broken up that way. The closest you can 
come is to put the third into the background in each case of what appears to be 
a dyadic relation, on the surface at least. This is a Lockean partial 
consideration, a Peircean prescinding, or, as I have called it, abstracting.

I think that of the nine possible “types” some are not signs at all, or even 
abstractions from  signs. All of the ten are signs.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: Monday, 21 December 2015 00:41
To: John Collier
Cc: Sungchul Ji; PEIRCE-L
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

John, Sung, list,
for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The 
difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is not, 
as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it is a 
type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs, and the 9 
types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen relations, 3 
object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not completely clear 
about, is, what the representamen, object, or interpretant, has a relation 
with: Is it the representamen, or the whole sign? I think it is the 
representamen, as Edwina often has said, because, if they were relations 
between the whole triadic sign and either element of its, this would be some 
circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already is a relation between (or 
composition of?) these three relations...A logical loop. So, my temporal 
understanding is to replace "9 types of signs" with "9 types of representamen 
relations". Is that correct?
Best,
Helmut

20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr
 "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to me that you are only 
picking out different ways of classifying the same things, which is fine, but 
they are not different things, as you seem to be saying. There is no difference 
in the dynamical objects involved. If there is, you have not shown this. You 
need tof show how the different classifications are grounded in different 
expectations about possible experiences. You haven't done that yet. From your 
response here it seems that you are confusing different ways of talking about 
the same things with different objects. I don't know of anyone who makes the 
mistake of confusing the objects of the classifications. Perhaps you could give 
an example. Of course someone could be misled by the difference in the 
immediate objects, which depends on how we are thinking, if they are confused 
about what Peirce is talking about with these classifications, I don't think 
that there are Peirce scholars who make that mistake. So perhaps you could 
provide examples. There is a good reason why Peirce didn't use different names. 
There is no need to. This is quite different from the baryon-quark case, where 
the difference has experimental consequences.

John

Sent from m

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Helmut Raulien]

John, Sung, list,

for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is not, as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it is a type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs, and the 9 types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen relations, 3 object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not completely clear about, is, what the representamen, object, or interpretant, has a relation with: Is it the representamen, or the whole sign? I think it is the representamen, as Edwina often has said, because, if they were relations between the whole triadic sign and either element of its, this would be some circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already is a relation between (or composition of?) these three relations...A logical loop. So, my temporal understanding is to replace "9 types of signs" with "9 types of representamen relations". Is that correct?

Best,

Helmut

 

20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr
 "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
 


Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to me that you are only picking out different ways of classifying the same things, which is fine, but they are not different things, as you seem to be saying. There is no difference in the dynamical objects involved. If there is, you have not shown this. You need tof show how the different classifications are grounded in different expectations about possible experiences. You haven't done that yet. From your response here it seems that you are confusing different ways of talking about the same things with different objects. I don't know of anyone who makes the mistake of confusing the objects of the classifications. Perhaps you could give an example. Of course someone could be misled by the difference in the immediate objects, which depends on how we are thinking, if they are confused about what Peirce is talking about with these classifications, I don't think that there are Peirce scholars who make that mistake. So perhaps you could provide examples. There is a good reason why Peirce didn't use different names. There is no need to. This is quite different from the baryon-quark case, where the difference has experimental consequences. 

 

John

 


Sent from my Samsung device



 Original message 
From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Date: 20/12/2015 14:04 (GMT+02:00)
To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
 

John, List,
 

You wrote:


"So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special meaning for “measurable”
(or even “detectable”) in the case of signs that I cannot fathom without more clarity
than I have now by what you mean by distinction you are trying to make, the distinction
between elementary signs and composite signs have no basis in what exists; you would
be making a distinction without a difference, and thus containing no information."

 

The distinction between elementary signs and composite signs is the same as the distinction between the  9 types of signs and the 10 classes of sign that Peirce himself made. (If you do not like these terms, any one is entitled to come up with better replacements.) So the distinction must have been in Peirce's mind whenever Peirce wrote about the 9 types and 10 classes.  The only thing that I am trying to do here, since 2012, is to give "names" or "representamens" to these distinct objects, so that we can avoid conflating them, or so that we can have two different interpretants.  Right now, we have only one representamen, "sign", to refer to two different objects (9 types and 10 classes) making them appear the same and yet they are not as you can plainly see in the fact that Peirce distinguished between 9 types and 10 classes.  This is why many, if not all, students of Peirce, seem confused.

 

All the best.

 

Sung

 

 

 

 


 
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 4:02 AM, John Collier  <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:




Sung, Lists,

 

I am unclear what you mean by measurable. The reason why this is important is that if there is no difference to possible experience, by the Pragmatic Maxim there is no difference in meaning. No elementary particle properties are directly measurable.  The best we can do is to have evidence for them by way of properties that are directly measurable, together with the theory (the measurements of quark properties are what is called “theory-laden”). So the notion of measurement that you are using is void unless there is some measurable difference between “there are nine elementary signs” and “there are ten composite signs”). The same would, of course hold for quarks and baryons unless there is a detectable difference to expe

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement: I think: The 10 classes of (triadic) signs are 3 classes, that have 6 subclasses (modes), that have 10 subclasses. The 9 types of representamen relations are 3 classes with 9 modes. These three classes are: Relation of the representamen with itself, with the object, and with the interpretant. So the Peircean relation reduction of  the triadic sign "R-O-I"  is: "R-R", "R-O", "R-I". This Peircean relation reduction is different from that by Ogden / Richards, which is: R-O, O-I, I-R. "Reduction" is meant as one of two kinds of relation reduction of triadic relations, one of which sometimes works, and the other not, because of irreducibility, see Jon Awbry´s work.




John, Sung, list,

for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is not, as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it is a type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs, and the 9 types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen relations, 3 object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not completely clear about, is, what the representamen, object, or interpretant, has a relation with: Is it the representamen, or the whole sign? I think it is the representamen, as Edwina often has said, because, if they were relations between the whole triadic sign and either element of its, this would be some circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already is a relation between (or composition of?) these three relations...A logical loop. So, my temporal understanding is to replace "9 types of signs" with "9 types of representamen relations". Is that correct?

Best,

Helmut

 

20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr
 "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
 


Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to me that you are only picking out different ways of classifying the same things, which is fine, but they are not different things, as you seem to be saying. There is no difference in the dynamical objects involved. If there is, you have not shown this. You need tof show how the different classifications are grounded in different expectations about possible experiences. You haven't done that yet. From your response here it seems that you are confusing different ways of talking about the same things with different objects. I don't know of anyone who makes the mistake of confusing the objects of the classifications. Perhaps you could give an example. Of course someone could be misled by the difference in the immediate objects, which depends on how we are thinking, if they are confused about what Peirce is talking about with these classifications, I don't think that there are Peirce scholars who make that mistake. So perhaps you could provide examples. There is a good reason why Peirce didn't use different names. There is no need to. This is quite different from the baryon-quark case, where the difference has experimental consequences. 

 

John

 


Sent from my Samsung device



 Original message --------
From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Date: 20/12/2015 14:04 (GMT+02:00)
To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
 

John, List,
 

You wrote:


"So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special meaning for “measurable”
(or even “detectable”) in the case of signs that I cannot fathom without more clarity
than I have now by what you mean by distinction you are trying to make, the distinction
between elementary signs and composite signs have no basis in what exists; you would
be making a distinction without a difference, and thus containing no information."

 

The distinction between elementary signs and composite signs is the same as the distinction between the  9 types of signs and the 10 classes of sign that Peirce himself made. (If you do not like these terms, any one is entitled to come up with better replacements.) So the distinction must have been in Peirce's mind whenever Peirce wrote about the 9 types and 10 classes.  The only thing that I am trying to do here, since 2012, is to give "names" or "representamens" to these distinct objects, so that we can avoid conflating them, or so that we can have two different interpretants.  Right now, we have only one representamen, "sign", to refer to two different objects (9 types and 10 classes) making them appear the same and yet they are not as you can plainly see in the fact that Peirce distinguished between 9 types and 10 classes.  This is why many, if not all, students of Peirce, seem confused.

 

All the best.

 

Sung

 

 

 

 


 
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 4:02 AM, John Collier  <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:




Sung, Lists,

 

Aw: FW: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Helmut Raulien]

John, list,

ok, so I send my answer also to the list. Apart from this (below) mathematical approach by Jon, which I am not very able to deal with properly, I think, that your term abstraction, and also the Lockean partial consideration, and the Peircean prescinding (Ive got to read about them), are guiding towards a good understanding, like (quasi-?) analysis can be something, that does not take apart things or reduce them in reality, but only in the mind, as a thought-experiment. Interesting, what you suggested, that in this case the interpretant is present in the background- in the mind.


Hi John,

yes, I just had added a supplement about this problem: I remembered having talked with Jon Awbrey about relation reduction: On one hand there is this "irreducibility", on the other there are the three relations that make the triadic sign. But to make something, should mean, that it can be taken apart again ("decomposed", as you have called it, or, say, "reduced"). I cannot find his answer, but I remember, that he said, that mathematically there are two kinds of relation reduction. Applying the first of these two kinds to triadic relations shows, that it never works, as triadic relations are always irreducible by this kind of reduction attempt. The other kind of reduction sometimes works, and sometimes not. In the case of the sign it works. I remember, one kind of reduction is called "projective reduction", and the other "compositional reduction", or some other word with "C". Sorry, I cannot find this thread. Maybe we should ask Jon.

Best,

Helmut

 


 

 21. Dezember 2015 um 01:14 Uhr
"John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
 




I had intended to send this to the list as well. But forgot. I see that Helmut has addressed my concern in a post to the list that crossed mine to him.

 


John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier


 




From: John Collier
Sent: Monday, 21 December 2015 01:36
To: 'Helmut Raulien'
Subject: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations



 

Helmut,

 

That is pretty close to my understanding, but I definitely would not refer to the “whole triadic sign” as a composition of three relations. That would suggest that a decomposition is possible, but it is not, according to Peirce. I take it that the contained (or implied) pairwise relations are abstractions, and cannot (do not) exist on their own. So talking about, say, the relation between the representamen and its object always has the interpretant in the background. I think that this is especially clear when we consider the relation of each kind to itself, say, the representamen to the representamen. As has been noted a number of times on this thread, a qualisign has the same thing playing all three roles. It contains its own object and its own interpretant. But to say that it is some composition of the three would be misleading. I agree with Edwina when she says that it is best to think of these as relations: the interpretant determines the object of the sign. So we can think of this determination (the – abstract -- relation) as being the interpretant. The interpretant, in the same way, determines the object of the representamen. The inverse relations give the object relation and the representamen relation, which in the light of the interpretant are the determination of the (abstract) relation between the representamen and its object. But none of this makes sense two by two; the whole sign can’t be broken up that way. The closest you can come is to put the third into the background in each case of what appears to be a dyadic relation, on the surface at least. This is a Lockean partial consideration, a Peircean prescinding, or, as I have called it, abstracting.

 

I think that of the nine possible “types” some are not signs at all, or even abstractions from  signs. All of the ten are signs.

 


John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier


 




From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: Monday, 21 December 2015 00:41
To: John Collier
Cc: Sungchul Ji; PEIRCE-L
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations



 




John, Sung, list,



for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is not, as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it is a type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs, and the 9 types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen relations, 3 object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not completely clear about, is, what the representamen, object, or interpretant, has a relation with: Is it the representamen, or the whole sign? I think it is the representamen, as Edwina often has said, because, if the

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of representamen 
relations'. Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, despite Sung's description of 
them as 'elementary signs'. A sign is, by definition, a triad - and therefore, 
in my view, even the representamen-in-itself, can't be a sign, because it is 
not in a triad. The triad is the sign.

That is why I refer to the interactions between the Representamen and the 
Object; the Representamen and the Interpretant - as Relations. And of course, 
Peirce does this as well, I've provided the quotes previously. The 
Representamen-in-itself is also a Relation, a depth relation, with its history. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Helmut Raulien 
  To: colli...@ukzn.ac.za 
  Cc: Sungchul Ji ; PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 5:40 PM
  Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  John, Sung, list,
  for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The 
difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is not, 
as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it is a 
type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs, and the 9 
types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen relations, 3 
object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not completely clear 
about, is, what the representamen, object, or interpretant, has a relation 
with: Is it the representamen, or the whole sign? I think it is the 
representamen, as Edwina often has said, because, if they were relations 
between the whole triadic sign and either element of its, this would be some 
circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already is a relation between (or 
composition of?) these three relations...A logical loop. So, my temporal 
understanding is to replace "9 types of signs" with "9 types of representamen 
relations". Is that correct?
  Best,
  Helmut

  20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr
   "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
   
  Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to me that you are only 
picking out different ways of classifying the same things, which is fine, but 
they are not different things, as you seem to be saying. There is no difference 
in the dynamical objects involved. If there is, you have not shown this. You 
need tof show how the different classifications are grounded in different 
expectations about possible experiences. You haven't done that yet. From your 
response here it seems that you are confusing different ways of talking about 
the same things with different objects. I don't know of anyone who makes the 
mistake of confusing the objects of the classifications. Perhaps you could give 
an example. Of course someone could be misled by the difference in the 
immediate objects, which depends on how we are thinking, if they are confused 
about what Peirce is talking about with these classifications, I don't think 
that there are Peirce scholars who make that mistake. So perhaps you could 
provide examples. There is a good reason why Peirce didn't use different names. 
There is no need to. This is quite different from the baryon-quark case, where 
the difference has experimental consequences. 

  John

  Sent from my Samsung device


   Original message 
  From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
  Date: 20/12/2015 14:04 (GMT+02:00)
  To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

  John, List, 

  You wrote:

  "So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special meaning for 
“measurable”
  (or even “detectable”) in the case of signs that I cannot fathom without more 
clarity
  than I have now by what you mean by distinction you are trying to make, the 
distinction
  between elementary signs and composite signs have no basis in what exists; 
you would
  be making a distinction without a difference, and thus containing no 
information."

  The distinction between elementary signs and composite signs is the same as 
the distinction between the  9 types of signs and the 10 classes of sign that 
Peirce himself made. (If you do not like these terms, any one is entitled to 
come up with better replacements.) So the distinction must have been in 
Peirce's mind whenever Peirce wrote about the 9 types and 10 classes.  The only 
thing that I am trying to do here, since 2012, is to give "names" or 
"representamens" to these distinct objects, so that we can avoid conflating 
them, or so that we can have two different interpretants.  Right now, we have 
only one representamen, "sign", to refer to two different objects (9 types and 
10 classes) making them appear the same and yet they are not as you can plainly 
see in the fact that Peirce distinguished between 9 types an

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Jeff,

 

Well, the only good way I know of understanding one of Peirce’s distinctions is 
to observe exactly how he applies it, and hope that the object he’s applying it 
to is something like what we find in our collateral experience as objects for 
the interpretants that Peirce’s applications determine in our minds.

 

If MS 7 isn’t clear enough on what makes a “sufficiently complete” sign, I 
think we have to supplement it with some excerpts from Kaina Stoicheia:

 

EP2:303-4: “Every sign that is sufficiently complete refers to sundry real 
objects. All these objects, even if we are talking of Hamlet's madness, are 
parts of one and the same Universe of being, the “Truth.” But so far as the 
“Truth” is merely the object of a sign, it is merely the Aristotelian Matter of 
it that is so. In addition however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently 
complete signifies characters, or qualities.”

…

“The purpose of every sign is to express “fact,” and by being joined with other 
signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which 
would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may 
use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a 
conception of perfection, or entelechy, which he never succeeds in making 
clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign 
which should be quite perfect, and so identical,—in such identity as a sign may 
have,—with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it. 
The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, will be 
that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the “Truth” of being. The “Truth,” the 
fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every 
sign.”

 

EP2:305: “ … A pure icon is independent of any purpose. It serves as a sign 
solely and simply by exhibiting the quality it serves to signify. The relation 
to its object is a degenerate relation. It asserts nothing. If it conveys 
information, it is only in the sense in which the object that it is used to 
represent may be said to convey information. An icon can only be a fragment of 
a completer sign.”

 

EP2:307: “It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon nor a pure index can 
assert anything, an index which forces something to be an icon, as a 
weather-cock does, or which forces us to regard it as an icon, as the legend 
under a portrait does, does make an assertion, and forms a proposition. This 
suggests the true definition of a proposition, which is a question in much 
dispute at this moment. A proposition is a sign which separately, or 
independently, indicates its object. No index, however, can be an 
argumentation. It may be what many writers call an argument; that is, a basis 
of argumentation; but an argument in the sense of a sign which separately shows 
what interpretant it is intended to determine it cannot be.”

 

EP2:313: ”… I maintain that every sufficiently complete symbol governs things, 
and that symbols alone do this. I mean that though it is not a force, it is a 
law.”

 

The tentative conclusion I would draw from this is that a symbol can be 
“sufficiently complete” if it is a dicent symbol (proposition) or an argument, 
while an icon is necessarily fragmentary, and an index is somewhere in between 
those two, in terms of completeness. But what makes a symbol “complete” is 
precisely that it involves both an icon and an index (or involves an index 
involving an icon), and is thus able to convey information, which neither an 
index nor an icon can do by itself. I would also note that the degree of 
incompleteness of a sign corresponds directly to its degree of degeneracy 
(EP2:306).

 

Peirce doesn’t use this language of “sufficiently complete” outside of MS 7 and 
Kaina Stoicheia (as far as I know), and both of these are framed as essays on 
the logic/semeiotic of mathematics — but i’m not sure how those two facts are 
related. Anyway that’s about all I can say for now in response to your question.

 

Gary f.

 

} The eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility. [Einstein] {

http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

 

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 19-Dec-15 13:33
To: 'PEIRCE-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

 

Hello Gary F., List,

 

In MS 7, Peirce says:  "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a 
sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a 
more complete sign."  How should we understand this distinction between a 
sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign that are less complete?

 

--Jeff

 


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.e

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

 prescission. But hypostatic
> abstraction, the abstraction which transforms "it is light" into "there is
> light here," which is the sense which I shall commonly attach to the word
> abstraction (since prescission will do for precisive abstraction) is a
> very special mode of thought. It consists in taking a feature of a percept
> or percepts (after it has already been prescinded from the other elements
> of the percept), so as to take propositional form in a judgment (indeed, it
> may operate upon any judgment whatsoever), and in conceiving this fact to
> consist in the relation between the subject of that judgment and another
> subject, which has a mode of being that merely consists in the truth of
> propositions of which the corresponding concrete term is the predicate.
> Thus, we transform the proposition, "honey is sweet," into "honey possesses
> sweetness." CP 4.235
>
> Is Peirce suggesting in this passage that a visual impression of light or
> a taste impression of sweetness can function as a sign (e.g., a qualisign)
> because the feeling is abstracted--both prescissively and
> hypostatically--from the percept?  Another possibility is that the
> impressions of light and taste can function as qualisigns insofar as they
> are precissively abstracted from the object, and then something like a
> diagram (what he will later call a percipuum) comes in as the interpretant
> of the qualisign.  The remarks he makes about the conventional symbols
> expressed as part of a perceptual judgment (e.g., "it is light" "honey is
> sweet") are the data that we can analyze for the sake of sharpening our
> account of how signs that are mere feelings (i.e., qualisigns) might
> function in an uncontrolled inference to a perceptual judgment.
>
> --Jeff
> 
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> 
> From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
> Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 2:25 PM
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Jon A.S.,
>
> IF (I say If!) we can consider the percept as the subject of the
> perceptual judgment, then I think rhematic indexical sinsign is probably
> how I would classify it. However, I think we can just as well (maybe
> better) consider the percept as the object of the sign (the perceptual
> judgment). If we consider the percept as a sign, then it must have an
> object of its own, and it’s hard to say how any phenomenon could be the
> object of a percept.
>
> Remember we’re talking logic/semiotic here, not the psychology of
> perception, which would probably locate the percept in the brain/mind and
> its object in the external world. But that analysis makes all kinds of
> metaphysical assumptions that phenomenology eschews. If we stick to
> phenomenology, we can say that the percept appears, i.e. it is a
> phenomenon, but it does not appear to mediate between some other phenomenon
> and a perceiver, as a sign does. It certainly doesn’t mean anything.
>
> I think your questions are nice, in the sense used by Peirce when he wrote
> in NDTR (CP 2.265):
> “It is a nice problem to say to what class a given sign belongs; since all
> the circumstances of the case have to be considered. But it is seldom
> requisite to be very accurate; for if one does not locate the sign
> precisely, one will easily come near enough to its character for any
> ordinary purpose of logic.”
>
> Gary f.
>
> } Throughout the universe nothing has ever been concealed. [Dogen] {
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
>
> From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> Sent: 9-Dec-15 13:22
>
> Gary, List:
>
> Based on the excerpt below, would a perceptual judgment be properly
> classified as a dicent sinsign?  And would the percept itself be a rhematic
> indexical sinsign?  Or is the percept not yet a sign at all?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<
> http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<
> http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
>
> On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:39 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:
>
> GF: I can only assume that you are referring to CP 7.619, and observe that
> Peirce does not say explicitly that the percept serves as immediate object.
> That proposition seems at best dubious to me, because the percept is
> precisely the point where the dynamic/immediate object distinction does not
> ap

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

Sung, Lists,

I am unclear what you mean by measurable. The reason why this is important is 
that if there is no difference to possible experience, by the Pragmatic Maxim 
there is no difference in meaning. No elementary particle properties are 
directly measurable.  The best we can do is to have evidence for them by way of 
properties that are directly measurable, together with the theory (the 
measurements of quark properties are what is called “theory-laden”). So the 
notion of measurement that you are using is void unless there is some 
measurable difference between “there are nine elementary signs” and “there are 
ten composite signs”). The same would, of course hold for quarks and baryons 
unless there is a detectable difference to experience. In this case the 
difference is, of course, by your notion of a baryon as isolatable, that we can 
isolate baryons but not quarks (for a combination of theoretical and 
experimental reasons). So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special 
meaning for “measurable” (or even “detectable”) in the case of signs that I 
cannot fathom without more clarity than I have now by what you mean by 
distinction you are trying to make, the distinction between elementary signs 
and composite signs have no basis in what exists; you would be making a 
distinction without a difference, and thus containing no information.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of 
Sungchul Ji
Sent: Sunday, 20 December 2015 07:05
To: PEIRCE-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Hi Gary R,

You wrote :

"As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do not 
consider the 9 parameters  (121915-1)
as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs as possibly embodied signs, 
I am always referring to
the 10 classes."


I have two comments on (121915-1) and a suggestion:

(1) If 'qualisign' is not a sign, why do you think Peirce used the word "sign" 
in "qualisign" ?

(2)  The problem, as I see it, may stem from what seems to me to be an 
unjustifiably firm belief on the part of many semioticians that there is only 
one kind of sign in Peirce's writings, i.e., the triadic ones (or the 10 
classes of signs). But what if, in Peirce's mind, there were two kinds of 
signs, i.e., the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of signs, although he used 
the same word "sign" to refer to both of them, just as physicists use the same 
word "particles" for both quarks and baryons.  They are both particles but 
physicists discovered that protons and neutrons are not fundamental particles 
but are composed of triplets of more fundamental particles called quarks.

(3)  I think the confusions in semiotics that Peirce himself seemed to have 
contributed to creating by not naming the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of 
signs DIFFERENTLY may be removed by adopting two different names (belatedly) 
for these two kinds of signs, e.g., the "elementary signs" for the 9 types and 
the "composite signs" for the 10 classes of signs as I recommended in 
[biosemiotics:46]. The former is monadic and incomplete as a sign, while the 
latter is triadic and hence complete as a sign.  Again this situation seems 
similar to the relation between quarks and baryons: Quarks are incomplete 
particles in that they cannot be isolated outside baryons whereas baryons 
(which are composed of three quarks) are complete particles since they can be 
isolated and experimentally measured.

All the best.

Sung





On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Gary Richmond 
<gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Sung, list,

When I gave the example of the qualisign as a sign which " 'may not possess all 
the essential characters of a more complete sign', and yet be a part of that 
more complex sign,"  I was in fact referring to the rhematic iconic qualisign 
following Peirce's (shorthand) usage, since "To designate a qualisign as a 
rhematic iconic qualisign is redundant [. . .] because a qualisign can only be 
rhematic and iconic."
http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/peirce.html

As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do not 
consider the 9 parameters as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs 
as possibly embodied signs, I am always referring to the 10 classes.

What I intended to convey in my last message was that the qualisign (that is, 
the rhematic iconic qualisign) *must* be part of a more complete sign (clear 
enough, I think, is Peirce's discussions of the 10 classes), that it simply 
cannot exist independently of that fuller sign complex (e.g., a 'feeling of 
red' doesn't float around in some unembodied Platonic universe).

Now, I'm off to a holiday party, but I thought I'd best make this point clea

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Sung - it would help if you would read Peirce. You have, yourself, admitted 
that you are not a scholar of Peirce, and yet, you insist that you understand 
his works - which you have not read - better than those who have done so. 

Your claim that because Peirce used the term 'sign' in, eg, Qualisign, that it 
makes that singularity a full sign is a specious argument.

Again, there are no elementary or composite Signs. The Sign, in itself, is 
triadic. It is made up of three Relations. Your mechanical reductionism denies 
the very nature of semiosis as a dynamic networking process.

The first relation of the triad is 'in itself', the Representamen (see 8.334); 
it is 'that which represents' 2.273. It 'stands to somebody for something" 
2.228. The second one is between that Representamen and the dynamic object (see 
8.335 and 2.228). Here, this relation is defined as an icon, index or symbol. 
As such, it affects the nature of the Representamen. A symbolic interaction 
can't have a Representamen in a mode of Firstness! This Reprsentamen-Object 
relation therefore does not exist 'per se' and thus, is not in itself an 
'elementary sign'. Such reductionism denies the very nature of the sign - which 
is always a triad. The third relation is to the Interpretant - and equally, the 
Interpretant doesn't exist 'per se' - but is a relation, an interaction - and 
is a rheme, dicent or argument. 

Again, your mechanical reductionism has nothing to do with Peircean semiosis, 
and your insistence that his theory be changed to fit into your reductionist 
boxes and columns simply doesn't work.

And a 'representamen' is not a name. It IS true that Peirce used the term 
'sign' to refer to both the full semiosic process and the key Relation, the 
'Representamen' but if you would read Peirce, then you would be able to see how 
he divides this triadic PROCESS into, not 'elementary signs' but relations, eg, 
'signs may be divided as to their own material nature, as to their relations 
with their objects, and as to their relations to their interpretants" 8.333.

He certainly does NOT define these 3x3 triads as 'elementary signs' - but as a 
division into three relations. The three relations are: 'as it is in itself' 
(8.334); 'relation to their dynamic objects' (8.335) and relation to its 
signified interpretant' 8.337. Each is further divided by categorical mode of 
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness. That gets the nine relations. They are NOT 
'elementary signs' - since they are not, by definition, signs.

Edwina



Edwina

  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 7:04 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  John, List,


  You wrote:

  "So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special meaning for 
“measurable” 
  (or even “detectable”) in the case of signs that I cannot fathom without more 
clarity 
  than I have now by what you mean by distinction you are trying to make, the 
distinction 
  between elementary signs and composite signs have no basis in what exists; 
you would 
  be making a distinction without a difference, and thus containing no 
information."


  The distinction between elementary signs and composite signs is the same as 
the distinction between the  9 types of signs and the 10 classes of sign that 
Peirce himself made. (If you do not like these terms, any one is entitled to 
come up with better replacements.) So the distinction must have been in 
Peirce's mind whenever Peirce wrote about the 9 types and 10 classes.  The only 
thing that I am trying to do here, since 2012, is to give "names" or 
"representamens" to these distinct objects, so that we can avoid conflating 
them, or so that we can have two different interpretants.  Right now, we have 
only one representamen, "sign", to refer to two different objects (9 types and 
10 classes) making them appear the same and yet they are not as you can plainly 
see in the fact that Peirce distinguished between 9 types and 10 classes.  This 
is why many, if not all, students of Peirce, seem confused.


  All the best.


  Sung










  On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 4:02 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:

Sung, Lists,



I am unclear what you mean by measurable. The reason why this is important 
is that if there is no difference to possible experience, by the Pragmatic 
Maxim there is no difference in meaning. No elementary particle properties are 
directly measurable.  The best we can do is to have evidence for them by way of 
properties that are directly measurable, together with the theory (the 
measurements of quark properties are what is called “theory-laden”). So the 
notion of measurement that you are using is void unless there is some 
measurable difference between “there are nine elementary signs” and “there are 
ten composite signs”). The same would, of course hold for qua

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi Jeff, Gary R, List,

I agree that "qualisigin" is not a complete sign because it is one of the 9
sigh types and not one of the 10 sign classes. It seems to me that in order
for "qualisign" to be a complete sign, it has to be a part of one of the 10
classes of signs, e.g., a "rhematic iconic qualisign" such as "feeling of
red", i.e., the "redness" felt by someone or some agent.  However,

"Redness", as a qualisign, can be there even though no one is there to feel
it.(121915-1)
For example, red color was there before we invented artificial signs and
applied one of them to it."

Peirce said that legisign is "a sign which would lose the character which
renders it a sign if there were no interpretant", and sinsign can be index
or icon, but as index it is is "a sign which would, at once, lose the
character which makes it a sign if its object is removed , but would not
lose that character if there were no interpretant".

By extension, I wonder if we can say that

"Qualisign is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign
if there were no representamen."  (121915-2)


Statement (121915-2) seems to be supported by Statement (121915-1).


Again I think the quark model of the Peircean sign is helpful in avoiding
confusions resulting from not distinguishing the two kinds of signs, i.e.,
9 types of signs vs. 10 classes of signs:

"Both quarks and baryons are particles but only the latter are
experimentally measurable;  (121915-3)
Similarly 9 types of signs and 10 classes of signs are both signs but only
the latter can be
used as a means of communicating information."

In [biosemiotics:46] dated  12/26/2012, I referred to the 9 types of signs
as "elementary signs" and the 10 classes of signs
as "composite signs", in analogy to baryons (protons, neutrons) being
composed of elementary quarks.

A Happy Holiday Season and A Wonderful New Year  to you all !

Sung




On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Jeff, Gary F. list,
>
> I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good example
> of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a more
> complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 1:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Hello Gary F., List,
>>
>> In MS 7, Peirce says:  "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of
>> a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters
>> of a more complete sign."  How should we understand this distinction
>> between a sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign that are
>> less complete?
>>
>> --Jeff
>>
>>
>>
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>> 
>> From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
>> Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 3:54 PM
>> To: 'PEIRCE-L'
>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>>
>> NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,”
>> EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main text this
>> thread has been referring to, so far.
>>
>> Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed at
>> some length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of the
>> manuscript here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius
>> Romanini, I think). It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or
>> refigures?) many of the things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,”
>> which follows immediately after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is
>> Peirce’s.— gary f.
>>
>> On the Foundations of Mathematics
>> MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining
>> rendered as italics]
>> §1. Mathematics deals essentially with Signs. All that we know or think
>> is so known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The
>> word and idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor
>> to analyze it.
>> It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular
>> replica 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Gary F., List,

In MS 7, Peirce says:  "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a 
sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a 
more complete sign."  How should we understand this distinction between a 
sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign that are less complete?

--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 3:54 PM
To: 'PEIRCE-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,” 
EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main text this thread 
has been referring to, so far.

Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed at some 
length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of the manuscript 
here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius Romanini, I think). 
It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or refigures?) many of the 
things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,” which follows immediately 
after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is Peirce’s.— gary f.

On the Foundations of Mathematics
MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining rendered as 
italics]
§1. Mathematics deals essentially with Signs. All that we know or think is so 
known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The word and 
idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor to analyze it.
It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular replica of 
it. If one casts one's eye down a printed page, every ‘the’ is the same word, 
and every e the same letter. The exact identity is not clear. Secondly, a sign 
may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess 
all the essential characters of a more complete sign. Thirdly, a sign 
sufficiently complete must be capable of determining an interpretant sign, and 
must be capable of ultimately producing real results. For a proposition of 
metaphysics which could never contribute to the determination of conduct would 
be meaningless jargon. On the other hand, the cards which, slipped into a 
Jacquard loom, cause appropriate figures to be woven, may very properly be 
called signs although there is no conscious interpretation of them. If not, it 
can only be because they are not interpreted by signs. In fact, in the present 
condition of philosophy, consciousness seems to be a mere quality of feeling 
which a formal science will do best to leave out of account. But a sign only 
functions as a sign when it is interpreted. It is therefore essential that it 
should be capable of determining an interpretant sign. Fourthly, a sign 
sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to a real object. A sign 
cannot even be false unless, with some degree of definiteness, it specifies the 
real object of which it is false. That the sign itself is not a definite real 
object has been pointed out under “firstly”. It is only represented. Now either 
it must be that it is one thing to really be and another to be represented, or 
else it must be that there is no such thing [a]s falsity. This involves no 
denial that every real thing may be a representation, or sign, but merely that, 
if so, there must be something more in reality than mere representation. Since 
a sufficiently complete sign may be false, and also since it is not any replica 
or collection of replicas, it is not real. But it refers to a real object. 
Consequently, a sign cannot have a sign as its sole object; though it may refer 
to an object through a sign; as if one should say, “Whatever the Pope, as such, 
may declare will be true,” or as a map may be a map of itself. But supposing 
the Pope not to declare anything, does that proposition refer to any real 
object? Yes, to the Pope. But, fifthly, even if there were no pope, still, like 
all other signs sufficiently complete, there is a single definite object to 
which it must refer; namely, to the ‘Truth,’ or the Absolute, or the entire 
Universe of real being. Sixthly, a sign may refer, in addition, and specially, 
to any number of parts of that universe. Seventhly, every interpretant of a 
sign need not refer to all the real objects to which the sign itself refers, 
but must, at least, refer to the Truth. Eighthly, an interpretant may refer to 
an object of its sign in an indefinite manner. Thus, given the sign, ‘Enoch was 
a man, and Enoch was translated,’ an interpretant of it would be ‘Some man was 
translated.’ Ninethly, a sign may refer to its interpretant in such a way that, 
in case the former sign is incomplete, the interpretant, being an interpretant 
of the completer sign, may refer to a sign to which the first sign does not 
specially refer

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

Jeff, Gary F. list,

I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good example
of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a more
complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 1:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hello Gary F., List,
>
> In MS 7, Peirce says:  "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of
> a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters
> of a more complete sign."  How should we understand this distinction
> between a sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign that are
> less complete?
>
> --Jeff
>
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> 
> From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
> Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 3:54 PM
> To: 'PEIRCE-L'
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,”
> EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main text this
> thread has been referring to, so far.
>
> Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed at
> some length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of the
> manuscript here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius
> Romanini, I think). It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or
> refigures?) many of the things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,”
> which follows immediately after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is
> Peirce’s.— gary f.
>
> On the Foundations of Mathematics
> MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining rendered
> as italics]
> §1. Mathematics deals essentially with Signs. All that we know or think is
> so known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The word
> and idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor to
> analyze it.
> It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular
> replica of it. If one casts one's eye down a printed page, every ‘the’ is
> the same word, and every e the same letter. The exact identity is not
> clear. Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though
> they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more
> complete sign. Thirdly, a sign sufficiently complete must be capable of
> determining an interpretant sign, and must be capable of ultimately
> producing real results. For a proposition of metaphysics which could never
> contribute to the determination of conduct would be meaningless jargon. On
> the other hand, the cards which, slipped into a Jacquard loom, cause
> appropriate figures to be woven, may very properly be called signs although
> there is no conscious interpretation of them. If not, it can only be
> because they are not interpreted by signs. In fact, in the present
> condition of philosophy, consciousness seems to be a mere quality of
> feeling which a formal science will do best to leave out of account. But a
> sign only functions as a sign when it is interpreted. It is therefore
> essential that it should be capable of determining an interpretant sign.
> Fourthly, a sign sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to a
> real object. A sign cannot even be false unless, with some degree of
> definiteness, it specifies the real object of which it is false. That the
> sign itself is not a definite real object has been pointed out under
> “firstly”. It is only represented. Now either it must be that it is one
> thing to really be and another to be represented, or else it must be that
> there is no such thing [a]s falsity. This involves no denial that every
> real thing may be a representation, or sign, but merely that, if so, there
> must be something more in reality than mere representation. Since a
> sufficiently complete sign may be false, and also since it is not any
> replica or collection of replicas, it is not real. But it refers to a real
> object. Consequently, a sign cannot have a sign as its sole object; though
> it may refer to an object through a sign; as if one should say, “Whatever
> the Pope, as such, may declare will be true,” or as a map may be a map of
> itself. But supposing the Pope not to declare anything, does that
> proposition refer to any real object? Yes, to the Pope. But, fifthly, even
> if there were no pope, still, like all other signs sufficie

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Matt, list,

Can you give your source for this?


I cannot. I confess that my statement was not well-thought out. I did not
mean to imply anything about the possibility of developing scientific
terminology in any given human language. What I meant "about the
development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific
terminology" is thinking about the case of where we find ourselves today,
in the state in which scientific terminology has actually developed to the
point it has. Obviously not every human language in history has developed
to the point of having the terminology that the sciences today command. For
example, the use of Latin words for developing terms identifying species in
biology, and the whole host of such terms that have been developed. Or the
development of mathematical language to the point where physical theories
like the general and special theories of relativity can be articulated.

I take it for granted though that it is widely acknowledged that human
languages do differ with respect to the rules of construction and the
things that can be said. If there has not been a vocabulary established in
a given language for discussing projective geometry, people speaking only
that language won't be able to say things about it without going through
the work of developing a system of terminology in order to say things about
it, or by translating from another language.

My essential point though was just to point out that trying to look to
human language as a model for representing reasoning, or the subject matter
of logic, is an ill-considered and ill-advised venture, precisely because
there is so much difference between human languages. It's not as though a
universal human language has been discovered by linguists, so I raised
concerns about Sungchul's reliance on 'human language' as his model for
representing reasoning. If one is to accept Sunchul's approach, we would
have to admit that there are different kinds of reasoning, one for each
human language, and logic would cease to be a general science of reasoning,
and would become indistinguishable from linguistics.

-- Franklin


On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 5:08 AM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

> On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
>
> Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and the
> things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time; the
> development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific
> terminology is not a development shared by every human language.
>
> Can you give your source for this? I remember reading the opposite from
> two different linguists. Michael Shapiro is one. (I'd have to search for
> the exact statements, but the keyword I'd use is 'passkey'.) Edward Vajda
> writes
>
> " Human language is unlimited in its expressive capacity."
>
> "Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology
> speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most highly
> industrialized society.  *There are no primitive languages*.  Virtually
> no linguist today would disagree with this statement."
>
> --
> Matt
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Matt, list,

So, [the token of] smoke [in your mind], as understood as being a type,
e.g., relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.

This is still a poor way of stating the matter. The token is not a type;
but your statement, as worded, suggests that it is. There is smoke as a
token, and there is smoke as a type. The token and the type are not the
same thing. The token, in being related to other tokens, is not thereby a
type. The token is an instance of a type, and the type is what refers to
all the instances. A token, rightly, only refers to the 'here and now', and
not to other tokens like it, which are other 'here and now's'.

But your point is taken: "I meant that the token of a type 'smoke' is a
perceptual judgment."

-- Franklin

--

On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 3:17 AM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

> On 12/13/15 9:38 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
>
>
> Matt wrote:
>
> EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts
>> don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a
>> perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g.,
>> relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.
>
>
> Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment is
> not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate.
>
>
> I meant that the token of a type 'smoke' is a perceptual judgment. I hoped
> that would've been understood from the context, e.g., my clause "relating
> to *other instances* of smoke," as an instance is a token, not a
> generality. As usual, I could've written it better. Then I continued to
> give my argument for the fact that there can be no token in perception
> without that token being of a type, concluding with "If this is correct
> then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns." Let me add bracketed
> insertions to my first paragraph to clarify what I meant:
>
>  EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas
> percepts don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you
> have a perceptual judgment. So, [the token of] smoke [in your mind], as
> understood as being a type, e.g., relating to other instances of smoke, is
> a perceptual judgment.
>
> I continued...
>
> Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very
>> basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x
>> to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not y' is to
>> generalize x by thinking it belongs to the general class of not y.  For
>> example, let's say 'x is not y' is 'the dark part* of my percept is
>> different from the light part'; this is a way of typifying x, the dark
>> side, as 'not y', 'not of the same type as the light part.'
>>
>> In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the tone of
>> dark becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'. I can't imagine
>> there can be a token that's not also a type of this most basic kind. If
>> this is correct then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns.
>>
>> Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a good
>> one.
>>
>> * Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone
>> (qualisign), i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances of dark.
>> Similarly, 'x is not y' etc., need not be verbalized propositions. It seems
>> to me that this basic level of dicisign precedes the sinsign, in that 'x',
>> 'the dark tone' only comes as a result of the distinction (this basic level
>> generalization)
>>
> Matt
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

ose that character if there were no interpretant".
>>
>> By extension, I wonder if we can say that
>>
>> "Qualisign is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a
>> sign if there were no representamen."  (121915-2)
>>
>>
>> Statement (121915-2) seems to be supported by Statement (121915-1).
>>
>>
>> Again I think the quark model of the Peircean sign is helpful in avoiding
>> confusions resulting from not distinguishing the two kinds of signs, i.e.,
>> 9 types of signs vs. 10 classes of signs:
>>
>> "Both quarks and baryons are particles but only the latter are
>> experimentally measurable;  (121915-3)
>> Similarly 9 types of signs and 10 classes of signs are both signs but
>> only the latter can be
>> used as a means of communicating information."
>>
>> In [biosemiotics:46] dated  12/26/2012, I referred to the 9 types of
>> signs as "elementary signs" and the 10 classes of signs
>> as "composite signs", in analogy to baryons (protons, neutrons) being
>> composed of elementary quarks.
>>
>> A Happy Holiday Season and A Wonderful New Year  to you all !
>>
>> Sung
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jeff, Gary F. list,
>>>
>>> I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good
>>> example of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a
>>> more complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Gary R
>>>
>>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>>
>>> *Gary Richmond*
>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>>> *Communication Studies*
>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>> *C 745*
>>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>>
>>> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 1:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
>>> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hello Gary F., List,
>>>>
>>>> In MS 7, Peirce says:  "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts
>>>> of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential
>>>> characters of a more complete sign."  How should we understand this
>>>> distinction between a sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign
>>>> that are less complete?
>>>>
>>>> --Jeff
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Jeffrey Downard
>>>> Associate Professor
>>>> Department of Philosophy
>>>> Northern Arizona University
>>>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>>> 
>>>> From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
>>>> Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 3:54 PM
>>>> To: 'PEIRCE-L'
>>>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>>>>
>>>> NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic
>>>> Relations,” EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main
>>>> text this thread has been referring to, so far.
>>>>
>>>> Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed
>>>> at some length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of
>>>> the manuscript here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius
>>>> Romanini, I think). It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or
>>>> refigures?) many of the things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,”
>>>> which follows immediately after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is
>>>> Peirce’s.— gary f.
>>>>
>>>> On the Foundations of Mathematics
>>>> MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining
>>>> rendered as italics]
>>>> §1. Mathematics deals essentially with Signs. All that we know or think
>>>> is so known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The
>>>> word and idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor
>>>> to analyze it.
>>>> It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular
>>>> replica of it. If one casts one's eye down a printed page, every ‘the’ is
>>>> the same word, and every e the same letter. The exact identity is not
>>>> clear. Secondly,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

> fallibilism and also his view that all thought is in signs, he should avoid
> it.
>
>
>
> I would argue that the grounds for knowledge are the topological
> structures of the distinctions in our experience. This is a form of
> information theoretic structure that I think Dretske, for one, has shown to
> be much more productive than might seem at first. Nonetheless, it is a
> pretty radical idea in epistemology at this stage. What I have called the
> effability issue is the motivation for moving in this radical direction,
> since it seems to rule out other kinds of ground for knowledge.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Sunday, 13 December 2015 23:19
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
>
>
> John, list,
>
>
>
> I will become much less active for the next few months after today.
>
>
>
> I would agree that the pragmatist C.I. Lewis viewed appearances as
> ineffable, and the analytic philosopher Quine was probably the same way; of
> Sellars, I couldn't say. Peirce does not view appearances as ineffable
> though.
>
>
>
> It should be understood that C.I. Lewis has the idea of the 'given', which
> together with his 'pragmatic a priori' concepts, permits the possibility of
> empirical knowledge. The 'pragmatic a priori' concepts are not themselves
> empirical, but given freely by the mind to make sense of the given and
> thereby give one experience, of which empirical knowledge is then possible.
> If I understand Quine rightly, he was of the view that the division between
> these analytic, pragmatic a priori concepts and the concepts of empirical
> knowledge (i.e., synthetic concepts) is not a division that holds strictly.
> In any case, there is the attempt to describe the given for both.
>
>
>
> I don't think Peirce subscribes to the view of Lewis's 'conceptual
> pragmatism', and the need for the pragmatic a priori. The pragmatic a
> priori is really a sort of Kantian move that Peirce would have eschewed.
> The appearances, or phenomena, are indeed effable, or else perceptual
> judgments would be impossible as judgments about percepts. Note that
> perceptual judgments are not the result of applying a priori concepts to
> percepts, at least not in Lewis's sense. For Lewis, the pragmatic a priori
> can be held by the mind regardless of their truth; he insists that they are
> held by the mind as being useful for interpreting the given, but can never
> be false, because they make falsity possible in empirical knowledge; the a
> priori concepts can only be rejected because they cease to be useful. But
> for Peirce, perceptual judgments, like any other judgments, can be false,
> and we can learn that they were false later. It is simply the case that at
> the time of the perceptual judgment occurring, we are in no position to
> question its veracity or to control conduct with respect to it.
>
>
>
> I would like to point out though that every phenomenon has a quality
> unique to it which is, strictly speaking, ineffable, being sui generis.
> Only this does not make the phenomenon itself ineffable, and it does not
> mean the quality is not like other qualities experienced, but only that it
> is not precisely the same as those other qualities.
>
>
>
> -- Franklin
>
>
>
> -
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 1:20 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:
>
> Jon,
>
> It intends to mean saving the appearances, but appearances, according to
> many pragmatists (C.I. Lewis, Quine, Sellars, probably Peirce) are
> ineffable, to use Lewis's term. We (Konrad and I) went to distinctions
> because there is no need to eff them. In order to save them. The current
> discussion about the nature of percepts and their distinction from
> perceptual judgements is relevant here. There is nothing in appearances
> alone that makes the distinction, since any qualisign must be interpreted
> to be a sign, implying a judgement. We can separate the two abstractly,
> however, and with distinctions, their quality implies their existence
> directly. Even with the mentioned self/non-self distinction (basic to using
> the Pragmatic Maxim) there is a necessary abduction involved to the self
> and non-self classes. But in the case of distinctions alone we have
> experiences that imply both existence (secondness ) and interpretation
> (thirdness) as either "this" or "that".
>
> John
>
> John Collier
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
> http://web.ncf.ca/colli

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

Sung, list,

When I gave the example of the qualisign as a sign which " 'may not possess
all the essential characters of a more complete sign', and yet be a part of
that more complex sign,"  I was in fact referring to the rhematic iconic
qualisign following Peirce's (shorthand) usage, since "To designate a
qualisign as a rhematic iconic qualisign is redundant [. . .] because a
qualisign can only be rhematic and iconic."
http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/peirce.html

As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do
not consider the 9 parameters as signs at all, so that when I am discussing
signs as possibly embodied signs, I am *always* referring to the 10 classes.

What I intended to convey in my last message was that the qualisign (that
is, the rhematic iconic qualisign) *must* be part of a more complete sign
(clear enough, I think, is Peirce's discussions of the 10 classes), that it
simply cannot exist independently of that fuller sign complex (e.g., a
'feeling of red' doesn't float around in some unembodied Platonic universe).

Now, I'm off to a holiday party, but I thought I'd best make this point
clear before there was any further confusion.

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 5:30 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:

> Hi Jeff, Gary R, List,
>
> I agree that "qualisigin" is not a complete sign because it is one of the
> 9 sigh types and not one of the 10 sign classes. It seems to me that in
> order for "qualisign" to be a complete sign, it has to be a part of one of
> the 10 classes of signs, e.g., a "rhematic iconic qualisign" such as
> "feeling of red", i.e., the "redness" felt by someone or some agent.
> However,
>
> "Redness", as a qualisign, can be there even though no one is there to
> feel it.(121915-1)
> For example, red color was there before we invented artificial signs and
> applied one of them to it."
>
> Peirce said that legisign is "a sign which would lose the character which
> renders it a sign if there were no interpretant", and sinsign can be index
> or icon, but as index it is is "a sign which would, at once, lose the
> character which makes it a sign if its object is removed , but would not
> lose that character if there were no interpretant".
>
> By extension, I wonder if we can say that
>
> "Qualisign is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a
> sign if there were no representamen."  (121915-2)
>
>
> Statement (121915-2) seems to be supported by Statement (121915-1).
>
>
> Again I think the quark model of the Peircean sign is helpful in avoiding
> confusions resulting from not distinguishing the two kinds of signs, i.e.,
> 9 types of signs vs. 10 classes of signs:
>
> "Both quarks and baryons are particles but only the latter are
> experimentally measurable;  (121915-3)
> Similarly 9 types of signs and 10 classes of signs are both signs but only
> the latter can be
> used as a means of communicating information."
>
> In [biosemiotics:46] dated  12/26/2012, I referred to the 9 types of signs
> as "elementary signs" and the 10 classes of signs
> as "composite signs", in analogy to baryons (protons, neutrons) being
> composed of elementary quarks.
>
> A Happy Holiday Season and A Wonderful New Year  to you all !
>
> Sung
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Jeff, Gary F. list,
>>
>> I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good example
>> of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a more
>> complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 1:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
>> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>>
>>> Hello Gary F., List,
>>>
>>> In MS 7, Peirce says:  "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts
>>> of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential
>>> characters of a more complete sign." 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi Gary F,

Thank you very much.
I read it once, but I am afraid I will need more than one reading to really
understand what Peirce was trying to say.

All the best.

Sung

On Fri, Dec 18, 2015 at 5:54 PM,  wrote:

> NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,”
> EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main text this
> thread has been referring to, so far.
>
>
>
> Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed at
> some length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of the
> manuscript here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius
> Romanini, I think). It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or
> refigures?) many of the things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,”
> which follows immediately after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is
> Peirce’s.— gary f.
>
>
>
> *On the Foundations of Mathematics*
>
> *MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining
> rendered as italics] *
>
> §1. Mathematics deals essentially with *Signs*. All that we know or think
> is so known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The
> word and idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor
> to analyze it.
>
> It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular
> *replica* of it. If one casts one's eye down a printed page, every ‘the’
> is the same word, and every e the same letter. The exact identity is not
> clear. Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though
> they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more
> complete sign. Thirdly, a sign sufficiently complete must be capable of
> determining an *interpretant* sign, and must be capable of ultimately
> producing real results. For a proposition of metaphysics which could never
> contribute to the determination of conduct would be meaningless jargon. On
> the other hand, the cards which, slipped into a Jacquard loom, cause
> appropriate figures to be woven, may very properly be called signs although
> there is no conscious interpretation of them. If not, it can only be
> because they are not interpreted by signs. In fact, in the present
> condition of philosophy, consciousness seems to be a mere quality of
> feeling which a formal science will do best to leave out of account. But a
> sign only functions as a sign when it is interpreted. It is therefore
> essential that it should be capable of determining an interpretant sign.
> Fourthly, a sign sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to a
> real object. A sign cannot even be false unless, with some degree of
> definiteness, it specifies the real object of which it is false. That the
> sign itself is not a definite real object has been pointed out under
> “firstly”. It is only *represented*. Now either it must be that it is one
> thing to *really be* and another to *be represented*, or else it must be
> that there is no such thing [a]s *falsity*. This involves no denial that
> every real thing may be a representation, or sign, but merely that, if so,
> there must be something more in reality than mere representation. Since a
> sufficiently complete sign may be false, and also since it is not any
> replica or collection of replicas, it is not real. But it refers to a real
> *object*. Consequently, a sign cannot have a sign as its sole object;
> though it may refer to an object through a sign; as if one should say,
> “Whatever the Pope, as such, may declare will be true,” or as a map may be
> a map of itself. But supposing the Pope not to declare anything, does that
> proposition refer to any real object? Yes, to the Pope. But, *fifthly*,
> even if there were no pope, still, like all other signs sufficiently
> complete, there is a single definite object to which it must refer; namely,
> to the ‘Truth,’ or the Absolute, or the entire Universe of real being.
> *Sixthly*, a sign may refer, in addition, and specially, to any number of
> parts of that universe. *Seventhly*, every interpretant of a sign need
> not refer to all the real objects to which the sign itself refers, but
> must, at least, refer to the Truth. *Eighthly*, an interpretant may refer
> to an object of its sign in an *indefinite* manner. Thus, given the sign,
> ‘Enoch was a man, and Enoch was translated,’ an interpretant of it would be
> ‘Some man was translated.’ *Ninethly*, a sign may refer to its
> interpretant in such a way that, in case the former sign is incomplete, the
> interpretant, being an interpretant of the completer sign, may refer to a
> sign to which the first sign does not specially refer, but only
> *generally* refers. Thus, the sign ‘Any man there may be is mortal’ does
> not refer to any real man, unless it so happens that it is a part of a sign
> which otherwise refers to such a real thing. But if it be a part of a sign
> of which another part is ‘some man sings,’ the sign ‘some man is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Gary F, Jeff, List,

Please excuse my ignorance.

What is NDTR ?

Thanks in advance.

Sung

On Fri, Dec 18, 2015 at 3:46 PM,  wrote:

> Jeff, list,
>
>
>
> It does get tricky when we consider the percept as a sign — as the
> excerpts you quote in your first two paragraphs (below) demonstrate; and I
> think it gets equally tricky when we consider the qualisign as a percept.
> But my more specific responses here will be inserted below, starting with
> your third paragraph …
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
> Sent: 14-Dec-15 09:12
>
> List,
>
>
>
> GF:  There is no vagueness in a percept; it’s a singular. So I don’t see
> how the concept of qualisign can serve the purpose you suggest here. I
> think the qualisign is simply a necessary result of Peirce’s introduction
> of the trichotomy of signs based on the sign’s mode of being in itself. It
> has to be First in that trichotomy.
>
>
>
> Peirce does say that percepts are, in some respects, vague.  Here is one
> place in "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmatism:  "But not to interrupt
> our train of thought, let us go on to note that while the Immediate Object
> of a Percept is excessively vague, yet natural thought makes up for that
> lack (as it almost amounts to), as follows. A late Dynamical Interpretant
> of the whole complex of Percepts is the Seme of a Perceptual Universe that
> is represented in instinctive thought as determining the original Immediate
> Object of every Percept.†2 Of course, I must be understood as talking not
> psychology, but the logic of mental operations. Subsequent Interpretants
> furnish new Semes of Universes resulting from various adjunctions to the
> Perceptual Universe. They are, however, all of them, Interpretants of
> Percepts. CP 4.539  I.e., A complex of percepts yields a picture of a
> perceptual universe. Without reflection, that universe is taken to be the
> cause of such objects as are represented in a percept. Though each percept
> is vague, as it is recognized that its object is the result of the action
> of the universe on the perceiver, it is so far clear." CP 4.539 Fn 2 p 425
>
>
>
> Here is a place where he says that percepts have a singular character:
> "the reader questions, perhaps, the assertion that conclusions of
> reasoning  are always of the nature of expectations. "What!" he will
> exclaim, "can we not reason about the authorship of the Junius Letters or
> the identity of the Man in the Iron Mask?" In a sense we can, of course.
> Still, the conclusion will not be at all like remembering the historical
> event. In order to appreciate the difference, begin by going back to the
> percept to which the memory relates. This percept is a single event
> happening hic et nunc. It cannot be generalized without losing its
> essential character. For it is an actual passage at arms between the
> non-ego and the ego. A blow is passed, so to say. Generalize the fact that
> you get hit in the eye, and all that distinguishes the actual fact, the
> shock, the pain, the inflammation, is gone. It is anti-general. The memory
> preserves this character, only slightly modified. The actual shock, etc.,
> are no longer there, the quality of the event has associated itself in the
> mind with similar past experiences. It is a little generalized in the
> perceptual fact. Still, it is referred to a  special and unique occasion,
> and the flavor of anti-generality is the predominant one."  CP 2.146
>
>
>
> For the sake of understanding the division in NDTR between signs based on
> the mode in which they are apprehended (i.e., qualisign, sinsign,
> legislgn), I do think it would help to spell out the manner in which each
> of these types of signs is determined by its object.
>
>
>
> GF: Peirce does not say that his first trichotomy in NDTR is based on the
> mode in which they are apprehended; rather he says it is “according as the
> sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general
> law.” I’ve been accustomed to referring to this parameter as the “mode of
> being” of the sign in itself.
>
> Later, in his 1908 letter to Welby, Peirce’s first trichotomy of signs is
> “According to the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign itself.” Until now, I’ve
> been thinking that this was equivalent to the Sign’s “mode of being,” and
> that his first trichotomy in the Welby letter is equivalent to the first
> trichotomy in NDTR. Now I think there may be a difference significant
> enough to explain why the names of the first-trichotomy sign types in 1908
> are not *qualisign, sinsign*, and *legisign *as they are in NDTR. If we
> are looking at two different trichotomies here (rather than one trichotomy
> differently named), then Peirce’s 1908 list of “The Ten Main Trichotomies
> of Signs” completely dispenses with the first trichotomy in NDTR, so that
> it does not include a division according to the mode of being of the sign
> in 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Jeff, list,

 

It does get tricky when we consider the percept as a sign — as the excerpts you 
quote in your first two paragraphs (below) demonstrate; and I think it gets 
equally tricky when we consider the qualisign as a percept. But my more 
specific responses here will be inserted below, starting with your third 
paragraph …

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 14-Dec-15 09:12



List,

 

GF:  There is no vagueness in a percept; it’s a singular. So I don’t see how 
the concept of qualisign can serve the purpose you suggest here. I think the 
qualisign is simply a necessary result of Peirce’s introduction of the 
trichotomy of signs based on the sign’s mode of being in itself. It has to be 
First in that trichotomy.

 

Peirce does say that percepts are, in some respects, vague.  Here is one place 
in "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmatism:  "But not to interrupt our train 
of thought, let us go on to note that while the Immediate Object of a Percept 
is excessively vague, yet natural thought makes up for that lack (as it almost 
amounts to), as follows. A late Dynamical Interpretant of the whole complex of 
Percepts is the Seme of a Perceptual Universe that is represented in 
instinctive thought as determining the original Immediate Object of every 
Percept.†2 Of course, I must be understood as talking not psychology, but the 
logic of mental operations. Subsequent Interpretants furnish new Semes of 
Universes resulting from various adjunctions to the Perceptual Universe. They 
are, however, all of them, Interpretants of Percepts. CP 4.539  I.e., A complex 
of percepts yields a picture of a perceptual universe. Without reflection, that 
universe is taken to be the cause of such objects as are represented in a 
percept. Though each percept is vague, as it is recognized that its object is 
the result of the action of the universe on the perceiver, it is so far clear." 
CP 4.539 Fn 2 p 425

 

Here is a place where he says that percepts have a singular character:  "the 
reader questions, perhaps, the assertion that conclusions of reasoning  are 
always of the nature of expectations. "What!" he will exclaim, "can we not 
reason about the authorship of the Junius Letters or the identity of the Man in 
the Iron Mask?" In a sense we can, of course. Still, the conclusion will not be 
at all like remembering the historical event. In order to appreciate the 
difference, begin by going back to the percept to which the memory relates. 
This percept is a single event happening hic et nunc. It cannot be generalized 
without losing its essential character. For it is an actual passage at arms 
between the non-ego and the ego. A blow is passed, so to say. Generalize the 
fact that you get hit in the eye, and all that distinguishes the actual fact, 
the shock, the pain, the inflammation, is gone. It is anti-general. The memory 
preserves this character, only slightly modified. The actual shock, etc., are 
no longer there, the quality of the event has associated itself in the mind 
with similar past experiences. It is a little generalized in the perceptual 
fact. Still, it is referred to a  special and unique occasion, and the flavor 
of anti-generality is the predominant one."  CP 2.146

 

For the sake of understanding the division in NDTR between signs based on the 
mode in which they are apprehended (i.e., qualisign, sinsign, legislgn), I do 
think it would help to spell out the manner in which each of these types of 
signs is determined by its object.

 

GF: Peirce does not say that his first trichotomy in NDTR is based on the mode 
in which they are apprehended; rather he says it is “according as the sign in 
itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law.” I’ve 
been accustomed to referring to this parameter as the “mode of being” of the 
sign in itself. 

Later, in his 1908 letter to Welby, Peirce’s first trichotomy of signs is 
“According to the Mode of Apprehension of the Sign itself.” Until now, I’ve 
been thinking that this was equivalent to the Sign’s “mode of being,” and that 
his first trichotomy in the Welby letter is equivalent to the first trichotomy 
in NDTR. Now I think there may be a difference significant enough to explain 
why the names of the first-trichotomy sign types in 1908 are not qualisign, 
sinsign, and legisign as they are in NDTR. If we are looking at two different 
trichotomies here (rather than one trichotomy differently named), then Peirce’s 
1908 list of “The Ten Main Trichotomies of Signs” completely dispenses with the 
first trichotomy in NDTR, so that it does not include a division according to 
the mode of being of the sign in itself. I think this too is plausible, but 
before giving my reasons, I’d better quote the whole discussion of the first 
trichotomy in the 1908 letter so we can compare it with the 
qualisign/sinsign/legisign trichotomy. Here it is (EP2:483):

 

 

I. A 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,” 
EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main text this thread 
has been referring to, so far.

 

Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed at some 
length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of the manuscript 
here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius Romanini, I think). 
It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or refigures?) many of the 
things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,” which follows immediately 
after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is Peirce’s.— gary f.

 

On the Foundations of Mathematics

MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining rendered as 
italics] 

§1. Mathematics deals essentially with Signs. All that we know or think is so 
known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The word and 
idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor to analyze it. 

It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular replica of 
it. If one casts one's eye down a printed page, every ‘the’ is the same word, 
and every e the same letter. The exact identity is not clear. Secondly, a sign 
may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess 
all the essential characters of a more complete sign. Thirdly, a sign 
sufficiently complete must be capable of determining an interpretant sign, and 
must be capable of ultimately producing real results. For a proposition of 
metaphysics which could never contribute to the determination of conduct would 
be meaningless jargon. On the other hand, the cards which, slipped into a 
Jacquard loom, cause appropriate figures to be woven, may very properly be 
called signs although there is no conscious interpretation of them. If not, it 
can only be because they are not interpreted by signs. In fact, in the present 
condition of philosophy, consciousness seems to be a mere quality of feeling 
which a formal science will do best to leave out of account. But a sign only 
functions as a sign when it is interpreted. It is therefore essential that it 
should be capable of determining an interpretant sign. Fourthly, a sign 
sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to a real object. A sign 
cannot even be false unless, with some degree of definiteness, it specifies the 
real object of which it is false. That the sign itself is not a definite real 
object has been pointed out under “firstly”. It is only represented. Now either 
it must be that it is one thing to really be and another to be represented, or 
else it must be that there is no such thing [a]s falsity. This involves no 
denial that every real thing may be a representation, or sign, but merely that, 
if so, there must be something more in reality than mere representation. Since 
a sufficiently complete sign may be false, and also since it is not any replica 
or collection of replicas, it is not real. But it refers to a real object. 
Consequently, a sign cannot have a sign as its sole object; though it may refer 
to an object through a sign; as if one should say, “Whatever the Pope, as such, 
may declare will be true,” or as a map may be a map of itself. But supposing 
the Pope not to declare anything, does that proposition refer to any real 
object? Yes, to the Pope. But, fifthly, even if there were no pope, still, like 
all other signs sufficiently complete, there is a single definite object to 
which it must refer; namely, to the ‘Truth,’ or the Absolute, or the entire 
Universe of real being. Sixthly, a sign may refer, in addition, and specially, 
to any number of parts of that universe. Seventhly, every interpretant of a 
sign need not refer to all the real objects to which the sign itself refers, 
but must, at least, refer to the Truth. Eighthly, an interpretant may refer to 
an object of its sign in an indefinite manner. Thus, given the sign, ‘Enoch was 
a man, and Enoch was translated,’ an interpretant of it would be ‘Some man was 
translated.’ Ninethly, a sign may refer to its interpretant in such a way that, 
in case the former sign is incomplete, the interpretant, being an interpretant 
of the completer sign, may refer to a sign to which the first sign does not 
specially refer, but only generally refers. Thus, the sign ‘Any man there may 
be is mortal’ does not refer to any real man, unless it so happens that it is a 
part of a sign which otherwise refers to such a real thing. But if it be a part 
of a sign of which another part is ‘some man sings,’ the sign ‘some man is 
mortal’ becomes an interpretant of it. This may be more conveniently expressed 
by speaking of an ‘utterer’ and an ‘interpreter.’ Then the utterer says to the 
interpreter, “you are at liberty to understand me as referring to any man [of] 
whom you can get any indication, and of him, I say, ‘he is mortal.’” Tenthly, a 
sign sufficiently complete must 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Helmut Raulien]

Degenerateness, I think, is a relation too. So, something may be (regarded for) degenerate, if you look at it as a mode. Because degeneracy is a trait of modes. But if you look at the same thing regarding it for a sign (a triadic sign), then degeneracy is not something you can assign to it. And anything can be interpreted for a triadic sign. It is the point of view that makes it. Anyway, I think, that "degenerate" is merely a Peircean technical term, and has nothing to do with the opposite of  "to generate". Subsumption or classification has to do with generation and inheritance: This is a one-way-affair, in which there is only generation, but never a degeneration. In compositional hierarchy you may say, that something complex is made of less complex things, and ok, you may substitute "less complex" with "degenerate", but that also has nothing to do with the opposite of  "to generate". All in all, I merely wanted to say, that I do not like the term "degenerate", because it leads to nothing but astray.

Best,

Helmut

 

16. Dezember 2015 um 20:48 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
 

Jeff - please see my comments below:
- Original Message -
From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
To: "'Peirce-L'" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, December 16, 2015 2:19 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


Edwina, List,

There are a number of claims that you make about how we should read Peirce's
texts that call out for some digging in the texts to see whether they fit
with what Peirce says. Let me start with this one about the character of
relatively degenerate signs. ET: "Therefore, I reject your view that the
"Qualisign is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign ".
It's the Relations in their categorical modes that are genuine or
degenerate; i.e., the modes are genuine/degenerate. Not the Signs.

1) JEFF: It is clear that Peirce treats the classification of the relations
between sign and dynamical object as more or less degenerate. He says, for
instance, that: Of these three genera of representamens, the Icon is the
Qualitatively degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the
Symbol is the relatively genuine genus. CP 5.73

EDWINA: I view the above, as outlining that the Relations are degenerate or
genuine with regard to a Representamen in a mode of Thirdness. So, the
Relation with the Dynamic Object in a mode of Firstness would be 3-1
(Thirdness in a mode of Firstness) which produces an iconic relation. The
Relation with the DO in a mode of Secondness would be 3-2, an indexical
Relation. And the Relation with the DO in a mode of Thirdness is 3-3, or
'pure' [genuine] Thirdness.
Now - what if the Relation were instead, in a mode of Secondness? [2-2,
2-1].

2) JEFF: What textual evidence do we have for thinking that the distinction
between signs based on the mode in which they are apprehended (i.e.,
qualisign, sinsign, legislign) is or is not based on more and less
degenerate kinds? I think the question is pretty clearly answered in CP
2.265 where he applies the notions of degenerate and genuine to each of the
three main classifications that he considers in NDTR.

EDWINA: Again, I think we must be careful in what we mean by 'sign'. By
Sign, I refer to the full triad. Peirce sometimes refers to the full triad
as a sign, and often only to the Representamen. Again, I don't consider that
the 'nodes' in themselves are genuine or degenerate for they don't exist 'in
themselves'; they exist only within the triadic relation; therefore, only
the Relations are genuine/degenerate.
And I don't see where in the 2.265 outline, there is any discussion of
genuine or degenerate relations. There is one outline of a triad in a full
mode of Secondness; the rest are mixed.

3) JEFF: In a separate remark, you claim that all signs are embodied.
Having looked at what Peirce says about the embodiment of a sign, the basic
idea is that a sign is embodied when it is realized in an instance where the
sign is a token (i.e., a sinsign). Peirce makes it clear that a sign does
not need to be embodied in token instance in order for it to be a sign. A
qualisign, for instance, is an abstraction that represents possible
feelings.

EDWINA: Again, please clarify your terminology. When you use the term
'sign', do you mean a Representamen? Again, a Sign, to me, is a full triad.
The three 'nodes' of the triad do not exist per se in themselves. Therefore,
the Representamen, that site-of-mediation, cannot exist per se except within
the interaction of mediation. When it is in this interaction, it must be
embodied; it can't exist 'in thin air'! I reject Platonism.
When the Representamen is in a mode of Firstness [a qualisign] - it is NOT
an abstraction (which is an intellectual construct] but the pure unanaly

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations, - units of thought

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

As is becoming my habit, I will merely pose some questions directed toward 
furthering the inquiry.

1. How can one articulate the kinship of "degeneracy" and "percept"?   (I have 
struggled with CSP's usage of the term "degeneracy" for over a decade; his 
meaning remains unsettled in my mind.)

2. In the Commens dictionary, one finds two terms from the same root as 
"percept".  Both terms apparently come from the same paper, Telepathy, CP 
7.648. 
 http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/ponecept
1903 | Telepathy | CP 7.648
It is a difficult question whether the serial principle permits us to draw 
sharp lines of demarcation between the percept and the near anticipation, or 
say the antecept, and between the percept and the recent memory (may I be 
permitted to call this the ponecept, a distant and dubious memory being perhaps 
quite another thing?), or whether the percept is at once but an extreme case of 
an antecept and an extreme case of a ponecept.

Are these terms used elsewhere?

3. Do these terms tie the concept of "percept" to a dynamic interpretation of 
the continuing emergence of a percept or a family of percepts?   (Here, I am 
thinking of biological entailments of meanings of percepts.)

4. How does  the triad, ponecept, percept and antecept relate to the form of 
symbols?

5. How does this triad, ponecept, percept and antecept, relate to the emergence 
of fresh legisigns?

Cheers

Jerry



On Dec 16, 2015, at 1:19 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

> Edwina, List,
> 
> There are a number of claims that you make about how we should read Peirce's 
> texts that call out for some digging in the texts to see whether they fit 
> with what Peirce says.  Let me start with this one about the character of 
> relatively degenerate signs.  ET:  "Therefore, I reject your view that the 
> "Qualisign is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign ".  It's 
> the Relations in their categorical modes that are genuine or degenerate; 
> i.e., the modes are genuine/degenerate. Not the Signs.
> 
> It is clear that Peirce treats the classification of the relations between 
> sign and dynamical object as more or less degenerate.  He says, for instance, 
> that: Of these three genera of representamens, the Icon is the Qualitatively 
> degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the Symbol is the 
> relatively genuine genus. CP 5.73
> 
> What textual evidence do we have for thinking that the distinction between 
> signs based on the mode in which they are apprehended (i.e., qualisign, 
> sinsign, legislign) is or is not based on more and less degenerate kinds?  I 
> think the question is pretty clearly answered in CP 2.265 where he applies 
> the notions of degenerate and genuine to each of the three main 
> classifications that he considers in NDTR. 
> 
> In a separate remark, you claim that all signs are embodied.  Having looked 
> at what Peirce says about the embodiment of a sign, the basic idea is that a 
> sign is embodied when it is realized in an instance where the sign is a token 
> (i.e., a sinsign).  Peirce makes it clear that a sign does not need to be 
> embodied in token instance in order for it to be a sign.  A qualisign, for 
> instance, is an abstraction that represents possible feelings. 
> 
> --Jeff
> 
> 
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> ____________________
> From: Edwina Taborsky [tabor...@primus.ca]
> Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 2:13 PM
> To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L'
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
> 
> Gary F-  I'm aware that Peirce used the term 'sign' to refer to both the 
> Representamen and the full triadic semiosic process. As you know, your 
> confining the term to mean ONLY the Representamen, is a problem I have, not 
> with Peirce, but with your outlines. I doubt that you and I will agree on 
> this.
> 
> I don't think that the term 'peculiar' naturally leads to its being defined 
> as 'degenerate'. That's because I understand the terms 'genuine' and 
> 'degenerate' to refer only to the modal categories. So, if the Relations 
> between the three parts of the triad (Object-Representamen-Interpretant) are 
> operating within the degnerate modes of (2-1, 3-1, 3-2) rather than the 'pure 
> modes' (1-1, 2-2, 3-3)...then, we can see them as 'degenerate relations'.
> 
> I do not know what Peirce meant by 'these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind 
> and only form a sign through being actually embodied" 2.245.  He might be 
> saying that a Sinsign, which functions as a particularity, might have a 
> qualitative relation (as well as a direct relation) with its Obje

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jeff - please see my comments below:
- Original Message - 
From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>

To: "'Peirce-L'" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, December 16, 2015 2:19 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


Edwina, List,

There are a number of claims that you make about how we should read Peirce's 
texts that call out for some digging in the texts to see whether they fit 
with what Peirce says.  Let me start with this one about the character of 
relatively degenerate signs.  ET:  "Therefore, I reject your view that the 
"Qualisign is degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign ". 
It's the Relations in their categorical modes that are genuine or 
degenerate; i.e., the modes are genuine/degenerate. Not the Signs.


1) JEFF: It is clear that Peirce treats the classification of the relations 
between sign and dynamical object as more or less degenerate.  He says, for 
instance, that: Of these three genera of representamens, the Icon is the 
Qualitatively degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the 
Symbol is the relatively genuine genus. CP 5.73


EDWINA: I view the above, as outlining that the Relations are degenerate or 
genuine with regard to a Representamen in a mode of Thirdness. So, the 
Relation with the Dynamic Object in a mode of Firstness would be 3-1 
(Thirdness in a mode of Firstness) which produces an iconic relation. The 
Relation with the DO in a mode of Secondness would be 3-2, an indexical 
Relation. And the Relation with the DO in a mode of Thirdness is 3-3, or 
'pure' [genuine] Thirdness.
Now - what if the Relation were instead, in a mode of Secondness? [2-2, 
2-1].


2) JEFF: What textual evidence do we have for thinking that the distinction 
between signs based on the mode in which they are apprehended (i.e., 
qualisign, sinsign, legislign) is or is not based on more and less 
degenerate kinds?  I think the question is pretty clearly answered in CP 
2.265 where he applies the notions of degenerate and genuine to each of the 
three main classifications that he considers in NDTR.


EDWINA: Again, I think we must be careful in what we mean by 'sign'. By 
Sign, I refer to the full triad. Peirce sometimes refers to the full triad 
as a sign, and often only to the Representamen. Again, I don't consider that 
the 'nodes' in themselves are genuine or degenerate for they don't exist 'in 
themselves'; they exist only within the triadic relation; therefore, only 
the Relations are genuine/degenerate.
And I don't see where in the 2.265 outline, there is any discussion of 
genuine or degenerate relations. There is one outline of a triad in a full 
mode of Secondness; the rest are mixed.


3) JEFF: In a separate remark, you claim that all signs are embodied. 
Having looked at what Peirce says about the embodiment of a sign, the basic 
idea is that a sign is embodied when it is realized in an instance where the 
sign is a token (i.e., a sinsign).  Peirce makes it clear that a sign does 
not need to be embodied in token instance in order for it to be a sign.  A 
qualisign, for instance, is an abstraction that represents possible 
feelings.


EDWINA: Again, please clarify your terminology.  When you use the term 
'sign', do you mean a Representamen? Again, a Sign, to me, is a full triad. 
The three 'nodes' of the triad do not exist per se in themselves. Therefore, 
the Representamen, that site-of-mediation, cannot exist per se except within 
the interaction of mediation. When it is in this interaction, it must be 
embodied; it can't exist 'in thin air'! I reject Platonism.
When the Representamen is in a mode of Firstness [a qualisign] - it is NOT 
an abstraction (which is an intellectual construct] but the pure unanalyzed 
feeling - and that qualisign never exists, again, per se, but only within 
the full triad of a Rhematic Iconic Qualisign.




From: Edwina Taborsky [tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 2:13 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Gary F-  I'm aware that Peirce used the term 'sign' to refer to both the 
Representamen and the full triadic semiosic process. As you know, your 
confining the term to mean ONLY the Representamen, is a problem I have, not 
with Peirce, but with your outlines. I doubt that you and I will agree on 
this.


I don't think that the term 'peculiar' naturally leads to its being defined 
as 'degenerate'. That's because I understand the terms 'genuine' and 
'degenerate' to refer only to the modal categories. So, if the Relations 
between the three parts of the triad (Object-Representamen-Interpretant) are 
operating within the degnerate modes of (2-1, 3-1, 3-2) rather than the 
'pure modes' (1-1, 2-2, 3-3)...then, we can see them as 'degenerate 
relations'.


I do not know what Peirce meant by 'th

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Edwina, List,

There are a number of claims that you make about how we should read Peirce's 
texts that call out for some digging in the texts to see whether they fit with 
what Peirce says.  Let me start with this one about the character of relatively 
degenerate signs.  ET:  "Therefore, I reject your view that the "Qualisign is 
degenerate relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign ".  It's the Relations 
in their categorical modes that are genuine or degenerate; i.e., the modes are 
genuine/degenerate. Not the Signs.

It is clear that Peirce treats the classification of the relations between sign 
and dynamical object as more or less degenerate.  He says, for instance, that: 
Of these three genera of representamens, the Icon is the Qualitatively 
degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the Symbol is the 
relatively genuine genus. CP 5.73

What textual evidence do we have for thinking that the distinction between 
signs based on the mode in which they are apprehended (i.e., qualisign, 
sinsign, legislign) is or is not based on more and less degenerate kinds?  I 
think the question is pretty clearly answered in CP 2.265 where he applies the 
notions of degenerate and genuine to each of the three main classifications 
that he considers in NDTR. 

In a separate remark, you claim that all signs are embodied.  Having looked at 
what Peirce says about the embodiment of a sign, the basic idea is that a sign 
is embodied when it is realized in an instance where the sign is a token (i.e., 
a sinsign).  Peirce makes it clear that a sign does not need to be embodied in 
token instance in order for it to be a sign.  A qualisign, for instance, is an 
abstraction that represents possible feelings. 

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Edwina Taborsky [tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 2:13 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Gary F-  I'm aware that Peirce used the term 'sign' to refer to both the 
Representamen and the full triadic semiosic process. As you know, your 
confining the term to mean ONLY the Representamen, is a problem I have, not 
with Peirce, but with your outlines. I doubt that you and I will agree on this.

I don't think that the term 'peculiar' naturally leads to its being defined as 
'degenerate'. That's because I understand the terms 'genuine' and 'degenerate' 
to refer only to the modal categories. So, if the Relations between the three 
parts of the triad (Object-Representamen-Interpretant) are operating within the 
degnerate modes of (2-1, 3-1, 3-2) rather than the 'pure modes' (1-1, 2-2, 
3-3)...then, we can see them as 'degenerate relations'.

I do not know what Peirce meant by 'these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind and 
only form a sign through being actually embodied" 2.245.  He might be saying 
that a Sinsign, which functions as a particularity, might have a qualitative 
relation (as well as a direct relation) with its Object in the mode of 2-1, or 
Secondness-as-Firstness.

Therefore, I reject your view that the "Qualisign is degenerate relative to the 
Sinsign and to the Legisign ".  It's the Relations in their categorical modes 
that are genuine or degenerate; i.e., the modes are genuine/degenerate. Not the 
Signs.

Qualisigns in themselves do not actually form a Representamen, for a 
Representamen is not a collection of particular relations, but is a 
transformation of these relations into generalities, into laws.  Qualisigns are 
connected to the object by an 'embodiment' process that is descriptive rather 
than denotative. . But, since no qualisign exists 'per se' but functions within 
a relation to its object (which could be also be in a mode of Firstness)  then, 
it could be that the 'peculiar' mode of a qualisign as related to a Sinsign 
(which is in a mode of Secondness) is in a categorical mode of 2-1, or, 
Secondness as Firstness.

Peirce also, in 2.246, refers to the Legisign, as requiring Sinsigns, but 
again, 'these are not ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that 
are regarded as significant'. Same thing. In a Legisign Representamen, the 
Relations between the Representamen and the Object and Interpretant could be in 
a mode of 3-2, or Thirdness operating in Secondness.

Again - how can a 'normal Qualisign' be disembodied? What's your meaning of 
this statement?

Edwina


- Original Message -
From: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
To: 'Peirce-L'<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Thursday, December 03, 2015 3:20 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Edwina, in my study of NDTR, I am using Peirce’s definition of “Sign” exactly 
as given in that work; I quoted it (again) in the post you are responding to. 
If you have a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Matt Faunce]

On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and 
the things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over 
time; the development of a language to the point where it can 
articulate scientific terminology is not a development shared by every 
human language.


Can you give your source for this? I remember reading the opposite from 
two different linguists. Michael Shapiro is one. (I'd have to search for 
the exact statements, but the keyword I'd use is 'passkey'.) Edward 
Vajda writes


" Human language is unlimited in its expressive capacity."

"Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology 
speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most 
highly industrialized society. _There are no primitive languages_.  
Virtually no linguist today would disagree with this statement."


--
Matt


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Matt, Franklin, List,

""Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology
speak languages
as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most highly industrialized
society.
*There are no primitive languages*.  Virtually no linguist today would
disagree with this statement."

If living cells use a language as I believe (so much so that I was
motivated to coin the word, "cellese", to refer to it in 1999; NYAS *870*
:411-417) and since we, including our primitive ancestors, are organized
systems of cells, the language of Homo sapiens must be at least as complex
and versatile as cellese.  As our scientific knowledge increases in
biology, we are finding out that cellese is much more complex and versatile
than once thought.  In fact the more we know about cellese (e.g., signal
transduction) through scientific research, the more unknowns seem to be
revealed.

Sung

On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 5:08 AM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

> On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
>
> Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and the
> things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time; the
> development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific
> terminology is not a development shared by every human language.
>
> Can you give your source for this? I remember reading the opposite from
> two different linguists. Michael Shapiro is one. (I'd have to search for
> the exact statements, but the keyword I'd use is 'passkey'.) Edward Vajda
> writes
>
> " Human language is unlimited in its expressive capacity."
>
> "Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology
> speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most highly
> industrialized society.  *There are no primitive languages*.  Virtually
> no linguist today would disagree with this statement."
>
> --
> Matt
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>


-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

;it is 
light" "honey is sweet") are the data that we can analyze for the sake of 
sharpening our account of how signs that are mere feelings (i.e., qualisigns) 
might function in an uncontrolled inference to a perceptual judgment.

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Wednesday, December 09, 2015 2:25 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Jon A.S.,

IF (I say If!) we can consider the percept as the subject of the perceptual 
judgment, then I think rhematic indexical sinsign is probably how I would 
classify it. However, I think we can just as well (maybe better) consider the 
percept as the object of the sign (the perceptual judgment). If we consider the 
percept as a sign, then it must have an object of its own, and it’s hard to say 
how any phenomenon could be the object of a percept.

Remember we’re talking logic/semiotic here, not the psychology of perception, 
which would probably locate the percept in the brain/mind and its object in the 
external world. But that analysis makes all kinds of metaphysical assumptions 
that phenomenology eschews. If we stick to phenomenology, we can say that the 
percept appears, i.e. it is a phenomenon, but it does not appear to mediate 
between some other phenomenon and a perceiver, as a sign does. It certainly 
doesn’t mean anything.

I think your questions are nice, in the sense used by Peirce when he wrote in 
NDTR (CP 2.265):
“It is a nice problem to say to what class a given sign belongs; since all the 
circumstances of the case have to be considered. But it is seldom requisite to 
be very accurate; for if one does not locate the sign precisely, one will 
easily come near enough to its character for any ordinary purpose of logic.”

Gary f.

} Throughout the universe nothing has ever been concealed. [Dogen] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 9-Dec-15 13:22

Gary, List:

Based on the excerpt below, would a perceptual judgment be properly classified 
as a dicent sinsign?  And would the percept itself be a rhematic indexical 
sinsign?  Or is the percept not yet a sign at all?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 11:39 AM, 
<g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:

GF: I can only assume that you are referring to CP 7.619, and observe that 
Peirce does not say explicitly that the percept serves as immediate object. 
That proposition seems at best dubious to me, because the percept is precisely 
the point where the dynamic/immediate object distinction does not apply. In 
fact it’s difficult to apply the sign/object distinction to the percept. 
Moreover, Peirce has almost nothing to say about signs in that entire long 
essay, and the little he does say is in reference to the perceptual judgment 
considered as a kind of natural proposition:



633. The other mode of definiteness of the percept consists in its being 
perfectly explicit. The perceptual judgment carelessly pronounces the chair 
yellow. What the particular shade, hue, and purity of the yellow may be it does 
not consider. The percept, on the other hand, is so scrupulously specific that 
it makes this chair different from every other in the world; or rather, it 
would do so if it indulged in any comparisons.

634. It may be objected that the terms of the judgment resemble the percept. 
Let us consider, first, the predicate, 'yellow' in the judgment that 'this 
chair appears yellow.' This predicate is not the sensation involved in the 
percept, because it is general. It does not even refer particularly to this 
percept but to a sort of composite photograph of all the yellows that have been 
seen. If it resembles the sensational element of the percept, this resemblance 
consists only in the fact that a new judgment will predicate it of the percept, 
just as this judgment does. It also awakens in the mind an imagination 
involving a sensational element. But taking all these facts together, we find 
that there is no relation between the predicate of the perceptual judgment and 
the sensational element of the percept, except forceful connections.

635. As for the subject of the perceptual judgment, as subject it is a sign. 
But it belongs to a considerable class of mental signs of which introspection 
can give hardly any account. It ought not to be expected that it should do so, 
since the qualities of these signs as objects have no relevancy to their 
significative character; for these signs merely play the part of de

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Matt Faunce]

On 12/13/15 9:38 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote:


Matt wrote:

EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas
percepts don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind
then you have a perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as
being a type, e.g., relating to other instances of smoke, is a
perceptual judgment.


Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment 
is not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate.


I meant that the token of a type 'smoke' is a perceptual judgment. I 
hoped that would've been understood from the context, e.g., my clause 
"relating to /other instances/ of smoke," as an instance is a token, not 
a generality. As usual, I could've written it better. Then I continued 
to give my argument for the fact that there can be no token in 
perception without that token being of a type, concluding with "If this 
is correct then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns."Let me add 
bracketed insertions to my first paragraph to clarify what I meant:


 EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas 
percepts don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then 
you have a perceptual judgment. So, [the token of] smoke [in your mind], 
as understood as being a type, e.g., relating to other instances of 
smoke, is a perceptual judgment.


I continued...


Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One
very basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not
me' is judging x to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment
'x is not y' is to generalize x by thinking it belongs to the
general class of not y.  For example, let's say 'x is not y' is
'the dark part* of my percept is different from the light part';
this is a way of typifying x, the dark side, as 'not y', 'not of
the same type as the light part.'

In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the
tone of dark becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'.
I can't imagine there can be a token that's not also a type of
this most basic kind. If this is correct then all perceptual
judgments are dicisigns.

Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a
good one.

* Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone
(qualisign), i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances
of dark. Similarly, 'x is not y' etc., need not be verbalized
propositions. It seems to me that this basic level of dicisign
precedes the sinsign, in that 'x', 'the dark tone' only comes as a
result of the distinction (this basic level generalization)


Matt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Matt Faunce]

Franklin, Peircers,

Here a distinction that I find helpful: 

EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts 
don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a 
perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g., relating 
to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment. 

Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very basic 
dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x to be the 
general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not y' is to generalize x by 
thinking it belongs to the general class of not y.  For example, let's say 'x 
is not y' is 'the dark part* of my percept is different from the light part'; 
this is a way of typifying x, the dark side, as 'not y', 'not of the same type 
as the light part.'

In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the tone of dark 
becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'. I can't imagine there can 
be a token that's not also a type of this most basic kind. If this is correct 
then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns.  

Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a good one.

* Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone (qualisign), 
i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances of dark. Similarly, 'x is 
not y' etc., need not be verbalized propositions. It seems to me that this 
basic level of dicisign precedes the sinsign, in that 'x', 'the dark tone' only 
come as a result of the distinction (this basic level generalization).

Matt


On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:35 AM, Franklin Ransom  
wrote:

> Gary F,
> 
> Just to clarify, do the categories still apply to a percept when it is 
> considered as a singular phenomenon?
> 
> I noticed that you say the verbal expression of the perceptual judgment is a 
> dicisign, but you do not say that the perceptual judgment is a dicisign. Is 
> it your position that the perceptual judgment is not a dicisign?
> 
> -- Franklin
> 
> --
> 
>> On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 10:36 AM,  wrote:
>> Franklin, Jeff,
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To perceive 
>> X as smoke is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression of that judgment, 
>> “That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition), uniting its subject 
>> (that) with a predicate (__ is smoke), which like all predicates is a 
>> general term (rhematic symbol). If you infer the presence of fire from the 
>> smoke (i.e. perceive the smoke as a sign), then you have an argument 
>> (whether it is expressed verbally or not).
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> I’m going to be offline for about a week now, so you may have to continue 
>> the thread without me for awhile ...
>> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Matt, list,

Matt wrote:

EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts
> don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a
> perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g.,
> relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.


Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment is not
the general element, but includes the general as its predicate. So, as I
said, one must say something like "that there is smoke", introducing the
general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a
dicisign). Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a
type. But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate,
or type, to the subject, or percept.

Also, note what he says in "The Nature of Meaning", EP2 p.208:
"Consequently, it is now clear that if there be any perceptual judgment, or
proposition directly expressive of and resulting from the quality of a
present percept, or sense-image, that judgment must involve generality in
its predicate." This suggests that the type is a generalization inspired by
the quality of the percept itself, and not simply introduced by the
interpreting mind to make sense of the percept; the percept contributes
something to the judgment that is made of it, besides its singularity as
the subject of the judgment.

Consider in connection with this idea the following excerpt from "The Seven
Systems of Metaphysics", EP2, p.194: "Therefore, if you ask me what part
Qualities can play in the economy of the Universe, I shall reply that the
Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working
out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have,
organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of
Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an
argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that Universe being
precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this
huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses *for us* and
these perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which *icons*
Qualities are immediately presented."

In a perceptual judgment, it is the quality of the percept which inspires
the predicate of the judgment, and that predicate is the introduction of
the general element in perception.

As Peirce goes to great lengths to argue at the outcome of the series of
lectures culminating in "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction": "The
elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and
whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be
arrested as unauthorized by reason."

-- Franklin



On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 3:03 AM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

> Franklin, Peircers,
>
> Here a distinction that I find helpful:
>
> EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts
> don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a
> perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g.,
> relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.
>
> Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very
> basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x
> to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not y' is to
> generalize x by thinking it belongs to the general class of not y.  For
> example, let's say 'x is not y' is 'the dark part* of my percept is
> different from the light part'; this is a way of typifying x, the dark
> side, as 'not y', 'not of the same type as the light part.'
>
> In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the tone of
> dark becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'. I can't imagine
> there can be a token that's not also a type of this most basic kind. If
> this is correct then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns.
>
> Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a good
> one.
>
> * Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone
> (qualisign), i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances of dark.
> Similarly, 'x is not y' etc., need not be verbalized propositions. It seems
> to me that this basic level of dicisign precedes the sinsign, in that 'x',
> 'the dark tone' only come as a result of the distinction (this basic level
> generalization).
>
> Matt
>
>
> On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:35 AM, Franklin Ransom <
> pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Gary F,
>
> Just to clarify, do the categories still apply to a percept when it is
> considered as a singular phenomenon?
>
> I noticed that you say the verbal expression of the perceptual judgment is
> a dicisign, but you do not say that the perceptual judgment is a dicisign.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Franklin, List,

You wrote the following statements with quotation marks:


"Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment
 (121315-1)
is not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate."

"So, as I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke",
introducing   (1213`15-2)
the general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a
dicisign)."

"Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a type.
 (121315-3)
But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate, or
type, to the subject, or percept."

These fit with my understanding [1] that

 

Also the following statements nicely fit (12135-4):

"Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment."
 (121315-5)

Because "smoke" is a word, not a sentence.

"A perceptual judgment is not the general element, but includes
(121315-6)
the general as its predicate."

Again this fits (121315-4) well, since a perceptual judgement is a sentence
which includes a subject and a predicate, both could be words.


All the best.

Sung

Reference:
   [1] Hjelmslev, L. (1961).  *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*.  The
University of Wisconcin Press, Madison, pp. 4.

On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 9:38 AM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Matt, list,
>
> Matt wrote:
>
> EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts
>> don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a
>> perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g.,
>> relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.
>
>
> Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment is
> not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate. So, as
> I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke", introducing the
> general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a
> dicisign). Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a
> type. But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate,
> or type, to the subject, or percept.
>
> Also, note what he says in "The Nature of Meaning", EP2 p.208:
> "Consequently, it is now clear that if there be any perceptual judgment, or
> proposition directly expressive of and resulting from the quality of a
> present percept, or sense-image, that judgment must involve generality in
> its predicate." This suggests that the type is a generalization inspired by
> the quality of the percept itself, and not simply introduced by the
> interpreting mind to make sense of the percept; the percept contributes
> something to the judgment that is made of it, besides its singularity as
> the subject of the judgment.
>
> Consider in connection with this idea the following excerpt from "The
> Seven Systems of Metaphysics", EP2, p.194: "Therefore, if you ask me what
> part Qualities can play in the economy of the Universe, I shall reply that
> the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose,
> working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must
> have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of
> Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an
> argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that Universe being
> precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this
> huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses *for us*
> and these perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which
> *icons* Qualities are immediately presented."
>
> In a perceptual judgment, it is the quality of the percept which inspires
> the predicate of the judgment, and that predicate is the introduction of
> the general element in perception.
>
> As Peirce goes to great lengths to argue at the outcome of the series of
> lectures culminating in "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction": "The
> elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of
> perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and
> whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be
> arrested as unauthorized by reason."
>
> -- Franklin
>
> 
>
> On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 3:03 AM, Matt Faunce  wrote:
>
>> Franklin, Peircers,
>>
>> Here a distinction that I find helpful:
>>
>> EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas
>> percepts don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you
>> have a perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g.,
>> relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment.
>>
>> Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very
>> basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x
>> to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Awbrey]

John, List,

I have personally always understood “saving the phenomena” to
mean preserving the appearances, that is, whatever explanation
we come up with must leave the appearances invariant.

I remember reading somewhere that the Greek “sozein” could mean
either save or solve.  I thought it was Ian Hacking but not sure.
Poking around the web for it did turn up this historical comment:

https://thonyc.wordpress.com/2015/07/29/%CF%83%E1%BF%B4%CE%B6%CE%B5%CE%B9%CE%BD-%CF%84%E1%BD%B0-%CF%86%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%BD%CF%8C%CE%BC%CE%B5%CE%BD%CE%B1-sozein-ta-phainomena/

Regards,

Jon

On 12/13/2015 5:28 AM, John Collier wrote:

Peirce List,

Here is a link to a Peirce influenced paper that makes the basic point Matt has 
made here. It is based on work in my PhD dissertation that I am in the process 
of redoing 30-some years later to deal with problems of continuity of knowledge 
through radical theory change (and across different discourses and cultures, 
for that matter). There was some brief attention to that work at the time, but 
I was already working with biologists on an information dynamics approach to 
self-organization in evolution, and I set it aside. My co-author on the paper 
is a former student of mine who is one of the few to maintain and interest in 
the issues, though he is making his name more in the cognitive science of 
religion and superstition these days.

* Saving the distinctions: Distinctions as the epistemologically significant content 
of 
experience 
(2004, with Konrad Talmont-Kaminski)
The title is a sideways reference to “saving the phenomena” as used by Bas van 
Fraassen, who seems to have got it from Duhem.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier



--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
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[PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

Jon,

It intends to mean saving the appearances, but appearances, according to many 
pragmatists (C.I. Lewis, Quine, Sellars, probably Peirce) are ineffable, to use 
Lewis's term. We (Konrad and I) went to distinctions because there is no need 
to eff them. In order to save them. The current discussion about the nature of 
percepts and their distinction from perceptual judgements is relevant here. 
There is nothing in appearances alone that makes the distinction, since any 
qualisign must be interpreted to be a sign, implying a judgement. We can 
separate the two abstractly, however, and with distinctions, their quality 
implies their existence directly. Even with the mentioned self/non-self 
distinction (basic to using the Pragmatic Maxim) there is a necessary abduction 
involved to the self and non-self classes. But in the case of distinctions 
alone we have experiences that imply both existence (secondness ) and 
interpretation (thirdness) as either "this" or "that". 

John

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

> -Original Message-
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
> Sent: Sunday, 13 December 2015 19:21
> To: John Collier; Matt Faunce; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
> Subject: Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
> 
> John, List,
> 
> I have personally always understood “saving the phenomena” to mean
> preserving the appearances, that is, whatever explanation we come up with
> must leave the appearances invariant.
> 
> I remember reading somewhere that the Greek “sozein” could mean either
> save or solve.  I thought it was Ian Hacking but not sure.
> Poking around the web for it did turn up this historical comment:
> 
> https://thonyc.wordpress.com/2015/07/29/%CF%83%E1%BF%B4%CE%B6%C
> E%B5%CE%B9%CE%BD-%CF%84%E1%BD%B0-
> %CF%86%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%BD%CF%8C%CE%BC%CE%B5%CE%BD%CE%B
> 1-sozein-ta-phainomena/
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On 12/13/2015 5:28 AM, John Collier wrote:
> > Peirce List,
> >
> > Here is a link to a Peirce influenced paper that makes the basic point Matt
> has made here. It is based on work in my PhD dissertation that I am in the
> process of redoing 30-some years later to deal with problems of continuity of
> knowledge through radical theory change (and across different discourses
> and cultures, for that matter). There was some brief attention to that work at
> the time, but I was already working with biologists on an information
> dynamics approach to self-organization in evolution, and I set it aside. My 
> co-
> author on the paper is a former student of mine who is one of the few to
> maintain and interest in the issues, though he is making his name more in the
> cognitive science of religion and superstition these days.
> >
> > * Saving the distinctions: Distinctions as the epistemologically
> > significant content of
> experience .pdf> (2004, with Konrad Talmont-Kaminski) The title is a sideways reference
> to “saving the phenomena” as used by Bas van Fraassen, who seems to have
> got it from Duhem.
> >
> > John Collier
> > Professor Emeritus, UKZN
> > http://web.ncf.ca/collier
> >
> 
> --
> 
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list:
> http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Sung, list,

Well Sung, you didn't quote yourself at length, and it's on topic, so I'll
respond. Your penchant for numbering every claim is a bit curious, and
since I don't think anyone else is making use of the numbered claims, I
wonder why you do it. Is this habit related to some professional practice
in which you participate?

With respect to the comparison with language: It seems to me that it is not
necessary at all for a judgment to be expressed in a sentence. A
proposition can occur without being expressed verbally, and I think it
wrong to refer to the grammar of the English language in order to justify a
logical point. Perhaps some of the analytic philosophers would like to
agree with such an idea, but I am no analytic philosopher and do not think
the analysis of language is going to get us anywhere in philosophy.

So, while what I have said fits with your understanding, what you have said
does not fit with my understanding. A perceptual judgment is not a sentence
which includes a subject and a predicate; a perceptual judgment is a
proposition (or dicisign) which attributes a predicate to a subject, or an
icon to an index, as the result of an uncontrollable inference.

-- Franklin


On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 12:27 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Franklin, List,
>
> You wrote the following statements with quotation marks:
>
>
> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment
>(121315-1)
> is not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate."
>
> "So, as I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke",
> introducing   (1213`15-2)
> the general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a
> dicisign)."
>
> "Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a type.
>  (121315-3)
> But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate, or
> type, to the subject, or percept."
>
> These fit with my understanding [1] that
>
>  (121315-4)
>  In other words, to make a judgement, you need to use the
> vehicle of a sentence.>
>
> Also the following statements nicely fit (12135-4):
>
> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment."
>(121315-5)
>
> Because "smoke" is a word, not a sentence.
>
> "A perceptual judgment is not the general element, but includes
>   (121315-6)
> the general as its predicate."
>
> Again this fits (121315-4) well, since a perceptual judgement is a
> sentence which includes a subject and a predicate, both could be words.
>
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
> Reference:
>[1] Hjelmslev, L. (1961).  *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*.  The
> University of Wisconcin Press, Madison, pp. 4.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

John, list,

I will become much less active for the next few months after today.

I would agree that the pragmatist C.I. Lewis viewed appearances as
ineffable, and the analytic philosopher Quine was probably the same way; of
Sellars, I couldn't say. Peirce does not view appearances as ineffable
though.

It should be understood that C.I. Lewis has the idea of the 'given', which
together with his 'pragmatic a priori' concepts, permits the possibility of
empirical knowledge. The 'pragmatic a priori' concepts are not themselves
empirical, but given freely by the mind to make sense of the given and
thereby give one experience, of which empirical knowledge is then possible.
If I understand Quine rightly, he was of the view that the division between
these analytic, pragmatic a priori concepts and the concepts of empirical
knowledge (i.e., synthetic concepts) is not a division that holds strictly.
In any case, there is the attempt to describe the given for both.

I don't think Peirce subscribes to the view of Lewis's 'conceptual
pragmatism', and the need for the pragmatic a priori. The pragmatic a
priori is really a sort of Kantian move that Peirce would have eschewed.
The appearances, or phenomena, are indeed effable, or else perceptual
judgments would be impossible as judgments about percepts. Note that
perceptual judgments are not the result of applying a priori concepts to
percepts, at least not in Lewis's sense. For Lewis, the pragmatic a priori
can be held by the mind regardless of their truth; he insists that they are
held by the mind as being useful for interpreting the given, but can never
be false, because they make falsity possible in empirical knowledge; the a
priori concepts can only be rejected because they cease to be useful. But
for Peirce, perceptual judgments, like any other judgments, can be false,
and we can learn that they were false later. It is simply the case that at
the time of the perceptual judgment occurring, we are in no position to
question its veracity or to control conduct with respect to it.

I would like to point out though that every phenomenon has a quality unique
to it which is, strictly speaking, ineffable, being sui generis. Only this
does not make the phenomenon itself ineffable, and it does not mean the
quality is not like other qualities experienced, but only that it is not
precisely the same as those other qualities.

-- Franklin

-


On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 1:20 PM, John Collier  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> It intends to mean saving the appearances, but appearances, according to
> many pragmatists (C.I. Lewis, Quine, Sellars, probably Peirce) are
> ineffable, to use Lewis's term. We (Konrad and I) went to distinctions
> because there is no need to eff them. In order to save them. The current
> discussion about the nature of percepts and their distinction from
> perceptual judgements is relevant here. There is nothing in appearances
> alone that makes the distinction, since any qualisign must be interpreted
> to be a sign, implying a judgement. We can separate the two abstractly,
> however, and with distinctions, their quality implies their existence
> directly. Even with the mentioned self/non-self distinction (basic to using
> the Pragmatic Maxim) there is a necessary abduction involved to the self
> and non-self classes. But in the case of distinctions alone we have
> experiences that imply both existence (secondness ) and interpretation
> (thirdness) as either "this" or "that".
>
> John
>
> John Collier
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
> > -Original Message-
> > From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
> > Sent: Sunday, 13 December 2015 19:21
> > To: John Collier; Matt Faunce; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
> > Subject: Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
> >
> > John, List,
> >
> > I have personally always understood “saving the phenomena” to mean
> > preserving the appearances, that is, whatever explanation we come up with
> > must leave the appearances invariant.
> >
> > I remember reading somewhere that the Greek “sozein” could mean either
> > save or solve.  I thought it was Ian Hacking but not sure.
> > Poking around the web for it did turn up this historical comment:
> >
> > https://thonyc.wordpress.com/2015/07/29/%CF%83%E1%BF%B4%CE%B6%C
> > E%B5%CE%B9%CE%BD-%CF%84%E1%BD%B0-
> > %CF%86%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%BD%CF%8C%CE%BC%CE%B5%CE%BD%CE%B
> > 1-sozein-ta-phainomena/
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> > Jon
> >
> > On 12/13/2015 5:28 AM, John Collier wrote:
> > > Peirce List,
> > >
> > > Here is a link to a Peirce influenced paper that makes the basic point
> Matt
> > has made here. It is based on work in my PhD dissertation that I am in
> the
> > process of redoing 30-some years later to deal with problems of
> continuity of
> > knowledge through radical theory change (and across different discourses
> > and cultures, for that matter). There was some brief attention to that
> work at
> > 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Sung, list,

In fact I am now of the opinion that there may be two aspects to language
> -- (i) the language as a *type* (to be denoted with a bold capital, *L*),and
> (ii) the languages as *tokens* of *L* (to be denoted as L), leading to
> the following notations:
> *   L*(L1, L2, L3, . . . , Ln)
> (121315-2)
> where Li is the i^th language that are used (or operates) in the Universe,
> including humanese, cellese, and cosmese (or cosmic language, i.e.,
> mathematics, geometry, quantum mechanics, etc.).  It is possible that *L* can
> be identified with Peircean semiotics.  Do you know of any evidence to
> invalidate this possibility ?


I suppose it in part depends upon what is meant by the term 'language'. If
one wants to include non-verbal signs, while excluding cultural
idiosyncrasies, then perhaps it could be said that semiotic is concerned
with *L*. Usually, though, language is associated with a system of (mainly
verbal, whether oral or written) signs connected with a particular culture
and history. When logic, or semiotic, is referred to as the language of
thought, it is meant to be thought of as a language independent of a
particular culture and history. There is also the case of artificial
language, as we might suppose mathematics to be such a language, as well as
various programming languages. In this case, we have something of an
arbitrary system of signs designed for a specific purpose.

I'm not sure how to think of the case of a language we might imagine to be
that of the universe as a whole, i.e. a system of signs that is truly
universal, similarly to language considered as a type; but which also
involves the whole history of the universe, as we might imagine a token
language to have, as being a language with a history. I like to think that
a type has a history to it, but it is hard to see how semiotic is concerned
with the history of signs as such, since it seems that it would become more
of a descriptive science in that case rather than strictly normative.
Really, I'm not sure which field of study would be concerned with such a
history, if any. Who is supposed to come up with the dictionary explaining
the meaning of all of the universe's terms? Is there really only one
science that could be said to be doing this? I suppose for a reductive
physicalist, the answer is easy; for me, not so much.

Humans must have been making judgement long before verbal language evolved
> in the human society, and all organism must be making judgement although
> they do not have any sentences as we do.
> But I do not see anything wrong with using human language as a model of
> reasoning in both humans and non-human species.  For me, human language (or
> humanese for brevity) has been a useful model of reasoning in all organisms
> as well as the Universe itself.


Well, but which human language? The one that linguistics uncovers as
somehow the universal human language underlying every particular human
language? Where have you seen this produced, such that you are now using it
as a model of reasoning and applying it? I suspect you mean that you are
using the English language as a model of reasoning. Once you admit this, I
think you must see the problem. Human languages differ with respect to the
rules of construction and the things that can be said, and they also
develop and evolve over time; the development of a language to the point
where it can articulate scientific terminology is not a development shared
by every human language.

I admit that one can look to a language and analyze it to get at logical
points; as I recall, Plato does this in his dialogues from time to time.
But those logical points shouldn't depend upon the accidental grammar of a
language. Rather, the language should in some way reveal the effect of
logical form, which is itself really universal and not dependent upon the
accidental construction of a particular (human) language. Semiotic does
attempt to articulate the language of thought and of reasoning, not by
modeling it on the basis of some arbitrary human language such as English,
Latin, etc.; but rather on the basis of logical considerations. Peirce
would suggest these considerations must in part depend upon mathematical,
phenomenological, and normative considerations. Or so that is how I
understand his point of view.

-- Franklin

-

On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 5:17 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Franklin, List,
>
> (*1*) I like to number statements in my posts to keep track of them, and
> this is a common practice in physics and mathematics and some physicist
> writers even recommend this practice for non -technical writings. Also it
> makes it easier to refer to them when necessary.  In fact I would recommend
> that the PEIRCE-L managers consider numbering each and every post
> consecutively as the [biosemiotics] list has been doing. The first post
> that I wrote for the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Franklin, List,

(*1*) I like to number statements in my posts to keep track of them, and
this is a common practice in physics and mathematics and some physicist
writers even recommend this practice for non -technical writings. Also it
makes it easier to refer to them when necessary.  In fact I would recommend
that the PEIRCE-L managers consider numbering each and every post
consecutively as the [biosemiotics] list has been doing. The first post
that I wrote for the [biosemiotics] list is [biosemiotics:46] dated
December 26, 2012, I believe.

(*2*) You wrote:

"With respect to the comparison with language: It seems to me that it is
not   (121315-1)
necessary at all for a judgment to be expressed in a sentence. A
proposition
can occur without being expressed verbally, and I think it wrong to refer
to the
grammar of the English language in order to justify a logical point.
Perhaps
some of the analytic philosophers would like to agree with such an idea,
but I
am no analytic philosopher and do not think the analysis of language is
going
to get us anywhere in philosophy."

I agree.  Humans must have been making judgement long before verbal
language evolved in the human society, and all organism must be making
judgement although they do not have any sentences as we do.
But I do not see anything wrong with using human language as a model of
reasoning in both humans and non-human species.  For me, human language (or
humanese for brevity) has been a useful model of reasoning in all organisms
as well as the Universe itself. In fact I am now of the opinion that there
may be two aspects to language -- (i) the language as a *type* (to be
denoted with a bold capital, *L*),and (ii) the languages as *tokens* of *L* (to
be denoted as L), leading to the following notations:

*   L*(L1, L2, L3, . . . , Ln)
  (121315-2)

where Li is the i^th language that are used (or operates) in the Universe,
including humanese, cellese, and cosmese (or cosmic language, i.e.,
mathematics, geometry, quantum mechanics, etc.).  It is possible that *L* can
be identified with Peircean semiotics.  Do you know of any evidence to
invalidate this possibility ?

All the best.

Sung

On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Sung, list,
>
> Well Sung, you didn't quote yourself at length, and it's on topic, so I'll
> respond. Your penchant for numbering every claim is a bit curious, and
> since I don't think anyone else is making use of the numbered claims, I
> wonder why you do it. Is this habit related to some professional practice
> in which you participate?
>
> With respect to the comparison with language: It seems to me that it is
> not necessary at all for a judgment to be expressed in a sentence. A
> proposition can occur without being expressed verbally, and I think it
> wrong to refer to the grammar of the English language in order to justify a
> logical point. Perhaps some of the analytic philosophers would like to
> agree with such an idea, but I am no analytic philosopher and do not think
> the analysis of language is going to get us anywhere in philosophy.
>
> So, while what I have said fits with your understanding, what you have
> said does not fit with my understanding. A perceptual judgment is not a
> sentence which includes a subject and a predicate; a perceptual judgment is
> a proposition (or dicisign) which attributes a predicate to a subject, or
> an icon to an index, as the result of an uncontrollable inference.
>
> -- Franklin
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 12:27 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
>> Franklin, List,
>>
>> You wrote the following statements with quotation marks:
>>
>>
>> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment
>>  (121315-1)
>> is not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate."
>>
>> "So, as I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke",
>> introducing   (1213`15-2)
>> the general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a
>> dicisign)."
>>
>> "Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a type.
>>(121315-3)
>> But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate, or
>> type, to the subject, or percept."
>>
>> These fit with my understanding [1] that
>>
>>  >  (121315-4)
>>  In other words, to make a judgement, you need to use the
>> vehicle of a sentence.>
>>
>> Also the following statements nicely fit (12135-4):
>>
>> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment."
>>(121315-5)
>>
>> Because "smoke" is a word, not a sentence.
>>
>> "A perceptual judgment is not the general element, but includes
>>   (121315-6)
>> the general as its predicate."
>>
>> Again this fits (121315-4) well, since a perceptual judgement is a
>> sentence which includes a subject and a predicate, both could be words.
>>
>>
>> All 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

Franklin, List,

I agree about Peirce’s difference with Lewis wrt the a priori. I don’t see how 
that is related to the issue of the effability of percepts, though.

You are arguing below that each percept has its own individuality. I have no 
quarrel with that. My concern is that, since all thought is in signs, either 
percepts are thoughts and they have secondness and thirdness as well as 
firstness (I have called them existence and interpretation, respectively, 
recently here and argued that only distinction, among experiences, is 
self-contained in all of these respects, or else they are not thoughts. If they 
are not thoughts, then I question whether it makes sense to refer to them as 
determinate contents of experiences. It seems to me that Quine, Sellars and 
Lewis share my concerns. Though their arguments are somewhat different I think 
there is a convergence of their inferences towards what Lewis called 
ineffability. The main problem generated is for the grounds of empirical 
claims, which become very much more fluid than in most versions of empiricism 
and positivism. I don’t see that Peirce avoids this in any interesting way, nor 
does it seem to me that, given his fallibilism and also his view that all 
thought is in signs, he should avoid it.

I would argue that the grounds for knowledge are the topological structures of 
the distinctions in our experience. This is a form of information theoretic 
structure that I think Dretske, for one, has shown to be much more productive 
than might seem at first. Nonetheless, it is a pretty radical idea in 
epistemology at this stage. What I have called the effability issue is the 
motivation for moving in this radical direction, since it seems to rule out 
other kinds of ground for knowledge.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, 13 December 2015 23:19
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

John, list,

I will become much less active for the next few months after today.

I would agree that the pragmatist C.I. Lewis viewed appearances as ineffable, 
and the analytic philosopher Quine was probably the same way; of Sellars, I 
couldn't say. Peirce does not view appearances as ineffable though.

It should be understood that C.I. Lewis has the idea of the 'given', which 
together with his 'pragmatic a priori' concepts, permits the possibility of 
empirical knowledge. The 'pragmatic a priori' concepts are not themselves 
empirical, but given freely by the mind to make sense of the given and thereby 
give one experience, of which empirical knowledge is then possible. If I 
understand Quine rightly, he was of the view that the division between these 
analytic, pragmatic a priori concepts and the concepts of empirical knowledge 
(i.e., synthetic concepts) is not a division that holds strictly. In any case, 
there is the attempt to describe the given for both.

I don't think Peirce subscribes to the view of Lewis's 'conceptual pragmatism', 
and the need for the pragmatic a priori. The pragmatic a priori is really a 
sort of Kantian move that Peirce would have eschewed. The appearances, or 
phenomena, are indeed effable, or else perceptual judgments would be impossible 
as judgments about percepts. Note that perceptual judgments are not the result 
of applying a priori concepts to percepts, at least not in Lewis's sense. For 
Lewis, the pragmatic a priori can be held by the mind regardless of their 
truth; he insists that they are held by the mind as being useful for 
interpreting the given, but can never be false, because they make falsity 
possible in empirical knowledge; the a priori concepts can only be rejected 
because they cease to be useful. But for Peirce, perceptual judgments, like any 
other judgments, can be false, and we can learn that they were false later. It 
is simply the case that at the time of the perceptual judgment occurring, we 
are in no position to question its veracity or to control conduct with respect 
to it.

I would like to point out though that every phenomenon has a quality unique to 
it which is, strictly speaking, ineffable, being sui generis. Only this does 
not make the phenomenon itself ineffable, and it does not mean the quality is 
not like other qualities experienced, but only that it is not precisely the 
same as those other qualities.

-- Franklin

-


On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 1:20 PM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Jon,

It intends to mean saving the appearances, but appearances, according to many 
pragmatists (C.I. Lewis, Quine, Sellars, probably Peirce) are ineffable, to use 
Lewis's term. We (Konrad and I) went to distinctions because there is no need 
to eff them. In order to save them. The current discussion about the nature of 
percepts and their distinction fro

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Franklin, Jeff,

 

Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To perceive X 
as smoke is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression of that judgment, 
“That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition), uniting its subject (that) 
with a predicate (__ is smoke), which like all predicates is a general term 
(rhematic symbol). If you infer the presence of fire from the smoke (i.e. 
perceive the smoke as a sign), then you have an argument (whether it is 
expressed verbally or not).

 

I’m going to be offline for about a week now, so you may have to continue the 
thread without me for awhile ...

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 12-Dec-15 09:11
To: Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

 

Hello Franklin, Gary F., List,

 

If a person sees smoke billowing in the distance, is the percept the "smoke 
itself," or is the percept the visual impression of the smoke?  Peirce 
indicates that it is the latter when he provides the following explanation of a 
percept:  "A visual percept obtrudes itself upon me in its entirety. I am not 
therein conscious of any mental process by which the image has been 
constructed. The psychologists, however, are able to give some account of the 
matter. Since 1709, they have been in possession of sufficient proof (as most 
of them agree,) that, notwithstanding its apparent primitiveness, every percept 
is the product of mental processes, or at all events of processes for all 
intents and purposes mental, except that we are not directly aware of them;" CP 
7.624

 

This fits with the definitions he provides in the Century dictionary:

 

1.  Perceive:  1) in general, to become aware of; to gain knowledge of some 
object or fact. 2) specifically, to come to know by direct experience; in 
psychology, to come to know by a real action of the object on the mind 
(commonly upon the senses); though the knowledge may be inferential

 

2.  Perception:  1) cognition (originally, and down through the middle of the 
18th century); thought and sense in general, whether the faculty, the operation 
or the resulting idea. 2) the mental faculty, operation or resulting a 
construction of the imagination, of gaining knowledge by virtue of a real 
action of an object upon the mind.

 

3. Percept:  the immediate object in perception, in the sense in which the word 
is used by modern psychologists.

 

Insofar as the modern psychologists are engaged in a special science that is 
empirical in origin, then it would appear that Peirce is importing a technical 
term from the special science into his philosophical logic, and he is trying to 
articulate what is necessary for the percept to function in the (uncontrolled) 
process of drawing perceptual judgments as inferential conclusions.  One might 
think that these kinds of inferential processes are only of subsidiary concern 
if our aim is to understand the divisions Peirce is drawing between different 
kinds of signs in NDTR.  My assumption is that Peirce is generalizing from way 
in which terms and propositions function in self controlled arguments in order 
to account for these uncontrolled processes of mind.  

 

--Jeff

 

Jeffrey Downard

Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy

Northern Arizona University

(o) 928 523-8354



From: Franklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]

Sent: Saturday, December 12, 2015 6:41 AM

To:  <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

 

Gary F,

 

A perceptual judgment must take the form of a dicisign, so I would say the 
identification that "that right there is smoke" would be a perceptual judgment, 
but smoke itself is not a perceptual judgment, but would have to be the percept 
(supposing the percept has been rightly judged as smoke). Supposing that the 
percept has been rightly identified as smoke, then it would serve as a sign of 
fire, which would be another percept, that could be judged in a perceptual 
judgment as "that right there is fire". That's the way I think of how percept 
and perceptual judgment are related.

 

-- Franklin

 



 

On Fri, Dec 11, 2015 at 11:35 AM, < 
<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca%3cmailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:

Franklin,

 

Yes, this excerpt from Peirce’s “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” 
demonstrates that according to the purpose of the analysis, a percept can be 
considered either as an object or a sign. (And of course signs can be objects 
of other signs, otherwise we could say nothing about semiosis!) Your example 
does show that maybe it’

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary F,

Just to clarify, do the categories still apply to a percept when it is
considered as a singular phenomenon?

I noticed that you say the verbal expression of the perceptual judgment is
a dicisign, but you do not say that the perceptual judgment is a dicisign.
Is it your position that the perceptual judgment is not a dicisign?

-- Franklin

--

On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 10:36 AM,  wrote:

> Franklin, Jeff,
>
>
>
> Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To
> perceive X *as smoke* is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression of
> that judgment, “That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition), uniting
> its subject (*that*) with a predicate (*__ is smoke*), which like all
> predicates is a general term (rhematic symbol). If you infer the presence
> of fire from the smoke (i.e. perceive the smoke *as a sign*), then you
> have an argument (whether it is expressed verbally or not).
>
>
>
> I’m going to be offline for about a week now, so you may have to continue
> the thread without me for awhile ...
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Franklin Ransom]

Jeff, list,

Peirce does say, in paragraph 539 from Vol. 4 of CP, that "[t]he Immediate
Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last analysis, the
Percept". When you ask whether the percept is the smoke itself, or a visual
impression, I think this statement from Peirce implies you are right that
Peirce would lean toward the latter conclusion. However, I do not think
this is necessarily a fair way to put the matter. It seems to me that while
we can directly perceive the real, such perception does not mean that we
immediately understand it as a whole; for that understanding, we require a
concept of the real that is perceived, and perceptual judgment is an
instinctual attempt at applying a concept. The way I would state the matter
is that the percept, while not the whole of the real object, is at least in
some sense a part of that object, which we find ourselves immediately
related to by way of physiological processes, as the eye is affected by, in
the supposed example, the smoke (plus light, other percepts, etc.), and so
comes to visually perceive the smoke. That effect of the smoke is in some
sense part of what it is to be smoke. Going beyond the part of the real
that we perceive, and grasping it as a whole, requires the whole work of
understanding. But while the percept is not "smoke itself", i.e. is not the
whole of the object, it is nevertheless as much a part of smoke as it is a
part of the perceiver.

-- Franklin




On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 9:10 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hello Franklin, Gary F., List,
>
> If a person sees smoke billowing in the distance, is the percept the
> "smoke itself," or is the percept the visual impression of the smoke?
> Peirce indicates that it is the latter when he provides the following
> explanation of a percept:  "A visual percept obtrudes itself upon me in its
> entirety. I am not therein conscious of any mental process by which the
> image has been constructed. The psychologists, however, are able to give
> some account of the matter. Since 1709, they have been in possession of
> sufficient proof (as most of them agree,) that, notwithstanding its
> apparent primitiveness, every percept is the product of mental processes,
> or at all events of processes for all intents and purposes mental, except
> that we are not directly aware of them;" CP 7.624
>
> This fits with the definitions he provides in the Century dictionary:
>
> 1.  Perceive:  1) in general, to become aware of; to gain knowledge of
> some object or fact. 2) specifically, to come to know by direct experience;
> in psychology, to come to know by a real action of the object on the mind
> (commonly upon the senses); though the knowledge may be inferential
>
> 2.  Perception:  1) cognition (originally, and down through the middle of
> the 18th century); thought and sense in general, whether the faculty, the
> operation or the resulting idea. 2) the mental faculty, operation or
> resulting a construction of the imagination, of gaining knowledge by virtue
> of a real action of an object upon the mind.
>
> 3. Percept:  the immediate object in perception, in the sense in which the
> word is used by modern psychologists.
>
> Insofar as the modern psychologists are engaged in a special science that
> is empirical in origin, then it would appear that Peirce is importing a
> technical term from the special science into his philosophical logic, and
> he is trying to articulate what is necessary for the percept to function in
> the (uncontrolled) process of drawing perceptual judgments as inferential
> conclusions.  One might think that these kinds of inferential processes are
> only of subsidiary concern if our aim is to understand the divisions Peirce
> is drawing between different kinds of signs in NDTR.  My assumption is that
> Peirce is generalizing from way in which terms and propositions function in
> self controlled arguments in order to account for these uncontrolled
> processes of mind.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> 
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of the units unifies the unity

[Franklin Ransom]

Jerry, list,

Well, I'm glad that someone agrees with me, as far as the statement went.

Jerry, I think that you raise some good questions. Though, I must admit I'm
not entirely sure what a couple of your terms mean, such as 'coupling' and
'grammar'. As for 'unit', I'll guess you mean something like what the
original meaning of 'atom' meant, as something basic and indivisible from
which other, more complex things can be built up out of.

I've decided to answer the questions in the order reverse to the order in
which they were presented.

Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in
> character"?


I'm not sure what that means, but since it's a part-whole relation, and
mereology is a study concerned with such relations, it would seem almost
tautological that it is "mereological in character". But there are
different and competing theories in mereology, and I don't want to be taken
as supporting any one of them specifically.

Is smoke a unit?  Is a precept a unit?


I take it you meant "percept", not precept. I would say it depends on the
context; in one context, we could take percepts as our basic elements, or
units, while in another context of analysis we might try to break it down
more, as presumably someone in experimental psychology might try to break
down sense impressions to the physical operations of the body and the thing
experienced. Similarly with smoke, if we just wanted to talk about the
matter in terms of commonly understood objects and signs, then it could be
considered a unit; but obviously, the chemist could try to break it down
more into the specific analysis of gases, and down to the atoms, of which
the smoke is composed, and so on further to particles and such.

>
> If "whole work of understanding." implies a coupling of external events
> with internal processes, then what is the nature of the grammar the
> generates the coupling of the parts of the whole?


This is where the meaning of 'coupling' worries me, but I'll suppose it's
something like correspondence. Also not sure what grammar is supposed to be
in this context. By "whole work of understanding", I meant the introduction
of a concept, whether in perceptual judgment or in an abduction, for
explaining the phenomenon (percept); which concept, when analyzed into
possible further interactions with the object of the percept, and then put
to experimental test in practical conduct, proves helpful for interacting
with the object of the percept. So the whole process of semiosis, up to the
following out of a scientific inquiry into the object, may be required to
grasp the (whole) object. Put in terms of correspondence, I suppose that
the fact that the object responds to our interactions in the way we predict
is what reveals that there is a correspondence between our concept of the
object and the object as it is in itself.

I'm not sure how to relate that to "the nature of the grammar the generates
the coupling of the parts of the whole". Part and whole here were
originally about the object as immediate and the object as dynamical, but
relating what is going on between external events and internal processes
(i.e., perception?), is a different kind of relating. Perhaps (and this is
simply a suggestion), we might think of there being the real object, which
has a part of it involved in perception, and there being the mind, which
has a part of it involved in perception, and these two (the real object and
the mind) are themselves parts of a semiosis, and so the 'grammar' that
would ultimately be appropriate would be that offered by semiotic.

What is the nature of the coupling between the smoke and the "whole" of the
> experience?


Hmm, that's a good question. Partly it depends upon what is meant by
experience, and whether one subscribes to the doctrine of immediate
perception. If one includes perception and conception, and what is
perceived and conceived, then smoke would be a part of the experience; and
with respect to perception, it would be a part of smoke, but with respect
to conception it would be the whole of the smoke. But, it is good to
recognize that in such case, we can think of experience in a somewhat
flexible way, such that we could consider the initial experience as one of
perception only, then the experience of seeing the smoke and coming to
recognize it as smoke, and then the experience later of interacting with
the fire that is the source of the smoke; or we could lump these altogether
as one long experience, and include in it any other interactions we ever
have or could have of perceiving the smoke. Of course, even in the latter
case, the smoke and the experience of it will not be the same thing,
because there is always us, the ones experiencing the smoke, either as
individuals or as a community, that are also always involved in the
experience. So the smoke remains part of the experience, not the whole of
it; while whether we consider the smoke as experienced in part, or as a
whole, depends on how 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Franklin,

 

Yes, this excerpt from Peirce’s “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” 
demonstrates that according to the purpose of the analysis, a percept can be 
considered either as an object or a sign. (And of course signs can be objects 
of other signs, otherwise we could say nothing about semiosis!) Your example 
does show that maybe it’s not that “hard to say how any phenomenon could be the 
object of a percept” — although I could argue that smoke is not a percept but a 
perceptual judgment. But personally I’m going to leave for later (or for 
others) the consideration of perception in terms of triadic relations. At least 
until I have a better handle on NDTR and its classification of signs, and how 
that relates to the phenomenological categories. 

 

Gary f.

 

From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 9-Dec-15 18:00



 

Gary F, Jeff, Jon S,

 

Given Gary's comments in this last post, I think it would be worthwhile to 
quote the passage that is pertinent to some of what Jeff has been discussing, 
and which I discussed with Jeff in our previous discussion. From Vol. 4 of the 
Collected Papers:


539. The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last 
analysis, the Percept. This doctrine in no wise conflicts with Pragmaticism, 
which holds that the Immediate Interpretant of all thought proper is Conduct. 
Nothing is more indispensable to a sound epistemology than a crystal-clear 
discrimination between the Object and the Interpretant of knowledge; very much 
as nothing is more indispensable to sound notions of geography than a 
crystal-clear discrimination between north latitude and south latitude; and the 
one discrimination is not more rudimentary than the other. That we are 
conscious of our Percepts is a theory that seems to me to be beyond dispute; 
but it is not a fact of Immediate Perception. A fact of Immediate Perception is 
not a Percept, nor any part of a Percept; a Percept is a Seme, while a fact of 
Immediate Perception or rather the Perceptual Judgment of which such fact is 
the Immediate Interpretant, is a Pheme that is the direct Dynamical 
Interpretant of the Percept, and of which the Percept is the Dynamical Object, 
and is with some considerable difficulty (as the history of psychology shows), 
distinguished from the Immediate Object, though the distinction is highly 
significant.†1 But not to interrupt our train of thought, let us go on to note 
that while the Immediate Object of a Percept is excessively vague, yet natural 
thought makes up for that lack (as it almost amounts to), as follows. A late 
Dynamical Interpretant of the whole complex of Percepts is the Seme of a 
Perceptual Universe that is represented in instinctive thought as determining 
the original Immediate Object of every Percept.†2 Of course, I must be 
understood as talking not psychology, but the logic of mental operations. 
Subsequent Interpretants furnish new Semes of Universes resulting from various 
adjunctions to the Perceptual Universe. They are, however, all of them, 
Interpretants of Percepts.

 

Notice that the percept, in one case, is identified by Peirce as a Seme and 
that does in fact make it a sign. Of course, it is also discussed as immediate 
object, and dynamical object, so one needs to be careful as to how one 
interprets this passage when trying to figure out what is going on with the 
percept, and how it is understood differently depending upon what its role is 
in the triadic relation. In any case, it would appear that the percept, 
according to Peirce, can be a sign and classified as a seme (a.k.a., rheme), 
and can have its own immediate object, and have interpretants.

 

For my part, I would suppose that there can be phenomena which we directly 
experience (directly perceive), which can nevertheless serves as signs of other 
perceptual phenomena. I directly perceive smoke. The smoke, while perceived in 
itself, can also be a sign of fire, which can also be directly perceived. 
Perhaps I have failed to understand what Gary meant when he said that "it's 
hard to say how any phenomenon could be the object of a percept"?

 

-- Franklin

 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Jeff,

 

One comment inserted below, after your first paragraph. My response to your 
post as a whole is that most of it — and especially your attempt to situate 
Peirce in the history of Western philosophy — is “above my pay grade,” as Jon 
S. put it. To the extent that I follow your methodological argument, it doesn’t 
seem all that different from my approach; but your last sentence leaves me far 
behind, when you speak of trying “to explain things we haven't yet been able to 
explain in the speculative grammar with much success up to this point.” 

 

I can only ask: Who is “we”, and which of us is in a position to judge the 
“success” or non-success of “our” explanations? I think it often happens that 
one person’s explanation is another’s obfuscation, and vice versa. I don’t see 
that one scholar can make such a judgment on behalf of others. I simply think 
that the way to better understand text by a writer like Peirce is to pay close 
attention to it in its immediate context, allowing one’s acquaintance with the 
more mediate context to function implicitly in the background. What emerges 
from the inquiry may or may not be of use to anyone else, but in any case, 
anyone’s judgment of its “success” is superfluous to the inquiry.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 9-Dec-15 16:46
To: 'Peirce-L' 



Hi Gary F., List,

 

G.F:  Perhaps, but I think it’s better to take each essay in its own terms 
first before trying to map them onto each other. 

 

J.D.  I appreciate the approach of taking each essay on its own terms 
first--especially when it comes to helping those who are relatively new to 
Peirce learn how to work carefully with the texts themselves--rather than to 
run off to their own ideas thought about in their own terms.  If that is your 
goal, then it might make sense to pick an early published essay such as 
"Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" as the piece that will 
be used for such pedagogical purposes.  NDTR is a pretty tough essay to be 
reading in such a manner.

 

GF: No, I have no such pedagogical purpose. What I’m trying to do in this 
thread is to conduct an inquiry into the matter given in the subject line, 
starting with a close reading of Peirce’s main essay on that subject. I’m 
assuming some knowledge of Peirce’s other texts, but I do not believe that such 
knowledge is acquired by taking them in chronological order (nor do I think 
that Peirce’s early works are necessarily easier reading than his later ones). 
For me, the intellectual biography of Peirce, the narrative of how his thinking 
developed over time, is of secondary interest. My primary focus is on how 
Peirce’s analysis in this one seminal essay would apply to my collateral 
experience of signs and their triadic relations with their objects and 
interpretants. And part of my collateral experience is that the hermeneutic 
circle always applies to such an inquiry. (In Turning Signs, see

http://gnusystems.ca/TS/cls.htm#3thought .)

 

JD: For those of us who have read through this and related pieces a number of 
times, and who have read spent more hours fretting over the details of what 
Peirce says than we might care to admit, I do think there are good reasons to 
put some of the key pieces together in other essays--even if it is only a few 
at a time.  Let me offer an example:  when it comes to reading NDTR, I think it 
helps to frame the discussion in terms of the methods that were laid out in the 
run up to "On a New List of the Categories," and then to follow Peirce's lead 
in the way he develops those ideas in that early set of essays in the Cognition 
series.

 

First and foremost, we need to draw on Peirce's account of reasoning, which has 
three basic levels to the discussion:  self-controlled arguments, propositions, 
and terms.  Unlike many philosophers, such as Kant and Russell, who say that we 
should start with the question of what is necessary to assert that a 
proposition is true, Peirce is asking us to focus first and foremost on the 
level of valid arguments.  The question of what is necessary for the different 
forms of argument to be valid controls the kinds of explanations that can be 
given about the nature of propositions--and the same point holds when it comes 
to terms as parts of propositions.  There are many advantages to this more 
holistic method that Peirce is using for the sake of developing a philosophical 
logic.

 

So, in asking, "What are the basic kinds of signs when we consider them in 
their mode of apprehension?," we should arrive at the conclusion by seeing what 
role signs having the character of qualisigns, sinsigns and legisigns have in 
the various kinds of propositions that function as premisses or conclusions in 
abductive, inductive or deductive forms of argument.  Initially, we don't even 
need a theory of valid inference in order to work in such a