On 21 March 2010 19:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Bruno, I've been continuing to pummel my brain, on and off, about the
issues in this thread, and also reading and thinking about different
perspectives on the knowledge paradox (such as Gregg Rosenberg's).
If I may, let me put some
On 20 Mar 2010, at 21:34, David Nyman wrote:
On 20 March 2010 18:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Well, if by 3-p Chalmers you mean some 'body', such a body *is* a
zombie.
The 1-p Chalmers is Chalmers, the person. Its body does not think,
but makes
higher the probability that
On 24 February 2010 17:57, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Please, keep in mind I may miss your point, even if I prefer to say that you
are missing something, for being shorter and keeping to the point. You
really put your finger right on the hardest part of the mind-body problem.
On 20 Mar 2010, at 16:56, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2010 17:57, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Please, keep in mind I may miss your point, even if I prefer to say
that you
are missing something, for being shorter and keeping to the point.
You
really put your finger right
On 20 March 2010 18:22, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Well, if by 3-p Chalmers you mean some 'body', such a body *is* a zombie.
The 1-p Chalmers is Chalmers, the person. Its body does not think, but makes
higher the probability that the 1-p thoughts refers to the most probable
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, February 24, 2010 1:59 PM
Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness
On 24 Feb 2010, at 08:22, Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote
On 23 Feb 2010, at 15:38, Diego Caleiro wrote:
I'm not reading the whole discussion here, but the reason I
recommended those readings is that I sensed a mix between accounting
for phenomenal consciousness and access conciousness in the
discussion.Both were used as 1p and 3p, depending
Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness
Hi Marty,
On 25 Feb 2010, at 15:03, m.a. wrote:
Bruno:
Does the following relate at all to your theory of Comp?
I am not so sure, or I don't see how. I don't address the question of
individual life. What I show is true for all
and important. These people feel
fulfilled no matter which group they come from.
marty a.
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, February 24, 2010 1:59 PM
Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 7:17 AM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 24 February 2010 07:03, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
With this in mind, I'm not sure what you mean by two undeniably
manifest perpectives. Only ONE seems undeniable to me, and that's
1-p.
My proposal is
Hi,
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Rex Allen
Sent: Thursday, February 25, 2010 10:31 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 7:17
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 7:28 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
Hi Rex and Members,
There is a very compelling body of work in logic that allows for
circularity. Please take a look at:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/m06t7w0163945350/
and
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 12:08 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
Is hard determinism as bad an outcome as solipsism? If not, why not?
I don't know about good or bad - but since you post on the internet I infer
that you are not a solipist.
Since posting on the
On 24 February 2010 07:03, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
With this in mind, I'm not sure what you mean by two undeniably
manifest perpectives. Only ONE seems undeniable to me, and that's
1-p.
My proposal is that seeming is all there is to reality. It's all
surface, no depth.
24, 2010 2:48 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 1:52 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused
while giving rise
David,
please, do not put me down as a Schopenhauerist. My mini-solipsist views
stem from Colin Hayes' earlier Everything-list posts about perceived
reality as we MAY know it.
I condone the existence (?!) of the world I am part of, just restrict
whatever I CAN know to the content (and function,
2010/2/23 Diego Caleiro diegocale...@gmail.com:
Thanks for this. I have to say, though, that Yablo's approach strikes
me again as waving-away, or defining-out-of-existence, a real issue
that doesn't deserve such treatment. The motive for this seems to be
that academic philosophy has become
Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 1:52 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused
while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the
idea that conscious experience
On 24 Feb 2010, at 08:22, Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote:
It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard
problem.
1) Get rid of 1-p. (A la Dennettian eliminative
On 24 Feb, 16:09, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
We would seek unambiguous evidence
that, in the absence of specific subjective 1-p qualitative states,
certain subsequent 3-p events would be unaccountable without the
hypothesis of 1-p -- 3-p causal influence.
In the unlikely event
On 23 February 2010 05:45, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
For the reasons I've touched on above I don't see that introducing the
idea of a material world explains anything at all. Therefore, I vote
for getting rid of 3-p, except as a calculational device.
The idea of a material
I'm not reading the whole discussion here, but the reason I recommended
those readings is that I sensed a mix between accounting for phenomenal
consciousness and access conciousness in the discussion.Both were used
as 1p and 3p, depending on what was being talked about.
This is the reason for
On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote:
It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard
problem.
1) Get rid of 1-p. (A la Dennettian eliminative materialism)
OR
2) Get rid of 3-p. (subjective idealism)
For the reasons I've touched on above I don't see that
David,
First of all, as I have already said, you seem to be well aware of the
hardest part of the hard problem of consciousness. And this gives me
the opportunity to try to explain what you are missing. Indeed, in
this post, I will try to explain how comp does solve completely the
Bruno, I want to thank you for such a complete commentary on my recent
posts - I will need to spend quite a bit of time thinking carefully
about everything you have said before I respond at length. I'm sure
that I'm quite capable of becoming confused between a theory and its
subject, though I am
On 22 February 2010 21:03, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
I think the hard problem is not just 'hard to solve': it requires knowledge
of necessary ingredients (steps in the 'process') still unknown - but
cleverly spoken about in the sciences, within the framework of those
portions we
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 7:18 AM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 23 February 2010 05:45, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused
while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the
idea that
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote:
It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard
problem.
1) Get rid of 1-p. (A la Dennettian eliminative materialism)
OR
2) Get rid of 3-p.
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 1:52 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused
while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the
idea that conscious experience exists fundamentally and
On 22 February 2010 07:37, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
What do you mean by implicit here? What is implicit is that the
subjectivity (1-p), to make sense, has to be referentially correct
relatively to the most probable histories/consistent extensions.
What I mean by implicit is
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:50 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p.
However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the
weaker subordinate
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 9:52 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com
wrote:
The only rationale for adducing the additional
existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
Rex Allen wrote:
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:50 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p.
However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in
Rex Allen wrote:
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 9:52 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com
wrote:
The only rationale for adducing the additional
existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p
On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are
related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously
computable, not even partially).
Yes, I do understand that. What I'm particularly
On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
The only rationale for adducing the additional
existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
possess it (or seem to, according to some). We can't compute the
existence of any 1-p experiential
On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p.
However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the
weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained in terms of
3-p, while 3-p is
Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
The only rationale for adducing the additional
existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
possess it (or seem to, according to some). We can't compute the
existence of any
On 21 Feb 2010, at 17:31, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are
related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously
computable, not even partially).
Yes, I do
On 17 February 2010 02:08, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
I'm not sure in what sense you mean gratuitous. In a sense it is
gratuitous to describe anything - hence the new catch-phrase, It is what it
is. If one is just a different description of the other then they have the
same
On 17 February 2010 07:28, Diego Caleiro diegocale...@gmail.com wrote:
You guys should Read Chalmers: Philosophy of Mind, Classical and
contemporary Readings
and
Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Richard Rorty
In particular The Concepts of Counsciousness By Ned Block and Mental
On 17 February 2010 02:39, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
My intuition is that once we have a really good 3-p theory, 1-p will seem
like a kind of shorthand way of speaking about brain processes. That
doesn't mean you questions will be answered. It will be like Bertrand
On 16 Feb 2010, at 19:07, David Nyman wrote:
Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first-
person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third-
person perspective?
There is an ambiguity in you phrasing. I will proceed like I always
do, by interpreting your term favorably,
Hi,
Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?
Onward!
Stephen
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
David Nyman wrote:
This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every
morning for the last week. Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first-
person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third-
person perspective? The only rationale for adducing the additional
On 17 February 2010 05:07, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every
morning for the last week. Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first-
person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third-
person perspective?
Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?
I suspect there's a problem either way. AFAICS the issue is that, in
3-p and 1-p, there exist two irreducibly different
On 16 February 2010 22:21, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the
computation, you have the experience.
Yes, but that's precisely not the sense I was referring to. Rather
the sense I'm picking out is that neither the
David Nyman wrote:
Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?
I suspect there's a problem either way. AFAICS the issue is that, in
3-p and 1-p, there exist two
David Nyman wrote:
On 16 February 2010 22:21, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the
computation, you have the experience.
Yes, but that's precisely not the sense I was referring to. Rather
the sense I'm
On 17 February 2010 00:06, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
I don't see that my 1-p experience is at all causally closed. In fact,
thoughts pop into my head all the time with no provenance and no hint of
what caused them.
The problem is that if one believes that the 3-p narrative
On 17 February 2010 00:16, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
But suppose we had a really good theory and understanding of the brain so
that we could watch yours in operation on some kind of scope (like an fMRI,
except in great detail) and from our theory we could infer that David's
David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2010 00:06, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
I don't see that my 1-p experience is at all causally closed. In fact,
thoughts pop into my head all the time with no provenance and no hint of
what caused them.
The problem is that if one
David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2010 00:16, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
But suppose we had a really good theory and understanding of the brain so
that we could watch yours in operation on some kind of scope (like an fMRI,
except in great detail) and from our theory we
You guys should Read Chalmers: Philosophy of Mind, Classical and
contemporary Readings
and
Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Richard Rorty
In particular The Concepts of Counsciousness By Ned Block and Mental
Causation by stephen Yablo will get you nearer to where you are trying to
get.
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