Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality
On 04.11.2012 02:58 meekerdb said the following: On 11/3/2012 2:01 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... p. 210 We seem to be left with four equally unpalatable alternatives: o that either the point about isomorphism and mathematics is mistaken, or o that scientific representation is not at bottom mathematical representation alone, or o that science is necessarily incomplete in a way we can know it to be incomplete, or o that those apparent differences to us, cutting across isomorphism, are illusory. In his comment about immediate alive intuition, Weyl appears to opt for the second, or perhaps the third, alternative. But on the either of this, we face a perplexing epistemological question: Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory? It seems to me he left out the most likely case: that our science is incomplete in a way we know. Brent Could you please express this knowledge explicitly? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality
On 04.11.2012 00:47 Alberto G. Corona said the following: : Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory? Yes . I love my mother is some knowledge that I know , and is not part of a scientific theory. We know reality because we live in the reality, We do not approximate reality by theories. We directly know reality because we live within it. Our primary knowledge is intuitive, historic, direct.. It is _the_ reality. A theory is a second class of knowledge about a model that approximate reality, maybe upto a point of an isomorphism with some-part-of reality, but certainly, not an isomorphism that embraces the whole reality, because we could never know if we have modelized the entire reality, nether if this modelization is accurate. Let us imagine that we have a mathematical model that isomorphic with the whole reality. Let us say that this model is before you as some computer implementation. The problem of coordination still remains. To use this model, you need to find out its particular part and relate it with reality. The model of the whole reality does not do it by itself. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: [evol-psych] The problem of what exists*
Anna, I strongly suggest that any interested party read the paper http://arxiv.org/ftp/astro-ph/papers/0602/0602420.pdf as the copy below leaves out a most interesting discussion of emergence and entanglement. And besides the string landscape is not 10500 but rather the vastly larger number 10^500. To wet your appetite here is a key paragraph: It is of interest to determine just how complex a physical system has to be to encounter the Lloyd limit. For most purposes in physical science the limit is too weak to make a jot of difference. But in cases where the parameters of the system are combinatorically explosive, the limit can be significant. For example, proteins are made of strings of 20 different sorts of amino acids, and the combinatoric possibility space has more dimensions than the Lloyd limit of 10^120 when the number of amino acids is greater than about 60 (Davies, 2004). Curiously, 60 amino acids is about the size of the smallest functional protein, suggesting that the threshold for life might correspond to the threshold for strong emergence, supporting the contention that life is an emergent phenomenon (in the strong sense of emergence). Another example concerns quantum entanglement. An entangled state of about 400 particles also approaches the Landauer-Lloyd complexity limit (Davies, 2005a). That means the Hilbert space of such a state has more dimensions than the informational capacity of the universe; the state simply cannot be specified within the real universe. (There are not enough degrees of freedom in the entire cosmos to accommodate all the coefficients!) A direct implication of this result is the prediction that a quantum computer with more than about 400 entangled components will not function as advertised (and 400 is well within the target design specifications of the quantum computer industry). Richard On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 1:20 AM, Anna panth...@mail.com wrote: ** ** *The problem of what exists** ** *P.C.W. Davies* *Australian Centre for Astrobiology, Macquarie University, New South Wales, Australia 2109* *Abstract* ** ** *Popular multiverse models such as the one based on the string theory landscape require an underlying set of unexplained laws containing many specific features and highly restrictive prerequisites. I explore the consequences of relaxing some of these prerequisites with a view to discovering whether any of them might be justified anthropically. Examples considered include integer space dimensionality, the immutable, Platonic nature of the laws of physics and the no-go theorem for strong emergence. The problem of why some physical laws exist, but others which are seemingly possible do not, takes on a new complexion following this analysis, although it remains an unsolved problem in the absence of an additional criterion.* 1. Background The puzzle of why the universe consists of the things it does is one of the oldest problems of philosophy. Given the seemingly limitless possibilities available, why is it the case that atoms, stars, clouds, crystals, etc. are “chosen” to exist in profusion in preference to, say, pulsating green jelly or pentagonal chain mail? A related question is why the entities that do exist conform to the particular physical laws that they do as opposed to any other set of laws one might care to imagine. Physicists have mostly ignored this problem, content to accept the observed physical systems and their specific laws as “given,” and preferring to concentrate on the job of elucidating them. *Notable exceptions were Einstein, who famously remarked that he wanted to know whether “God had any choice” in the nature of his creation, and Wheeler, whose rhetorical question “How come existence?” provided the basis for a series of speculative papers (Wheeler, 1979, 1983, 1988, 1989, 1993).* Recently, however, theoretical physicists and cosmologists have been giving increasing attention to the problem of “what exists”. In part this stems from the growing interest in unification, especially string/M theory, and the concomitant sharp disagreements about uniqueness (see, for example, Danielsson, 2001). *Meanwhile, the popularity of multiverse cosmological models has prompted a dramatic reappraisal of the very concept physical existence.* ** The issues are clarified in Fig. 1. The picture shows three sets separated by two boundaries, A and B. The middle region is the set of all things that observers can in principle observe. *(At the moment, of course, humans have actually observed only a fraction of what is “out there”.)* The set delineated by A can be a subset of all that exists. Then there is a bigger set, containing the other two: the set of all that can exist. The principal question I shall address in this paper is how one might determine the location of the boundaries A and B. A common claim among string/M theorists is that A coincides with B; that is, the set of all that can be
Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality
On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 2:12 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: On 04.11.2012 02:58 meekerdb said the following: On 11/3/2012 2:01 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... p. 210 We seem to be left with four equally unpalatable alternatives: o that either the point about isomorphism and mathematics is mistaken, or o that scientific representation is not at bottom mathematical representation alone, or o that science is necessarily incomplete in a way we can know it to be incomplete, or o that those apparent differences to us, cutting across isomorphism, are illusory. In his comment about immediate alive intuition, Weyl appears to opt for the second, or perhaps the third, alternative. But on the either of this, we face a perplexing epistemological question: Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory? It seems to me he left out the most likely case: that our science is incomplete in a way we know. Brent Could you please express this knowledge explicitly? String theory is an example of knowledge of incomplete science as for the most part string theory has not been verified/falsified experimentally. Richard Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality
Hi Alberto G. Corona The only way to know reality is subjectively, just as Descartes found. He threw everything out until all he could know for sure was that he could think. Reality is what is happening now, which is what we can only know subjectively, from inside, by aquaintance. We cannot know now or reality descriptively from any theory, only by subjective acquaintance. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 18:47:00 Subject: Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality : Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory? Yes . I love my mother is some knowledge that I know , and is not part of a scientific theory.? We know reality because we live in the reality, We do not?pproximate?eality by theories. We directly know reality because we live within it. ?ur ?rimary knowledge is intuitive, historic, direct.. It is _the_ reality. ? A theory is a second class of knowledge about a model that?pproximate?eality, maybe upto a?oint?f an isomorphism with some-part-of reality, but certainly, not an isomorphism that embraces the whole reality,?ecause?e could never know if we have modelized the entire reality, nether if this modelization is accurate. The legitimate usage of the models is ?o refine this intuitive knowledge. But at the worst, a model can ?egate our direct knowledge and try to create an alternative reality. In this case the theorist reclaim the model as the reality. Thus the theorist .reclaim a complete knowledge of reality. In this case the theorist is outside of science, even if it is ?ithin the science industry, and becomes a sort of gnostic preacher -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
truth and reality cannot be expressed in words, only experienced
Hi Evgenii Rudnyi Weyl makes complicated what is ultimately simple-- reality, which is subjective, which is experiencing, which is now. Which is focussing your attention on your breath going out and coming in. This is what yoga teaches. Weyl does best we he touches on color. Reality is knowledge by acquaintance. The best that science can give us is knowledge by description. But that is just words, code, and words are not reality. The only reality is in experiencing, such as experiencing your breathing. Kierkegard said it much better than Weyl, when he stated that truth is subjective. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Evgenii Rudnyi Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 14:01:41 Subject: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality Some more quotes from Bas C Van Fraassen Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. This time on what Weyl has said on isomorphism between mathematics and reality. p. 208 Herman Weyl expressed the fundamental insight as follows in 1934: 'A science can never determine its subject-matter expect up to isomorphic representation. The idea of isomorphism indicates the self-understood, insurmountable barrier of knowledge. [...T]oward the nature of its objects science maintains complete indifference.' (Weyl 1934:19) The initial assertion is clearly based on two basic convictions: o that scientific representation is mathematical, and o that in mathematics no distinction cuts across structural sameness. p. 209 Weyl illustrates this with the example of a color space and an isomorphic geometric object. ... The color space is a region on the projective plane. If we can nevertheless distinguish the one from the other, or from other attribute spaces with that structure, doesn't that mean that we can know more that what science, so conceived, can deliver? Weyl accompanies his point about this limitation with an immediate characterization of the 'something else' which is then left un-represented. 'This - for example what distinguish the colors from the point of the projective plane - one can only know in immediate alive intuition.' (Ibid.) p. 210 We seem to be left with four equally unpalatable alternatives: o that either the point about isomorphism and mathematics is mistaken, or o that scientific representation is not at bottom mathematical representation alone, or o that science is necessarily incomplete in a way we can know it to be incomplete, or o that those apparent differences to us, cutting across isomorphism, are illusory. In his comment about immediate alive intuition, Weyl appears to opt for the second, or perhaps the third, alternative. But on the either of this, we face a perplexing epistemological question: Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory? Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Emergence of Properties
Hi Stephen P. King All that we can know of reality is in the experience of now. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:26:12 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:17, Stephen P. King wrote: ?? After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, I meant independent of us. Not innate in the sense of psychology. Dear Bruno, ?? Please elaborate on what this independence implies that has to do with the definiteness of properties. but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. I garee with what Leibiz said, and what Frege and the logicians have done with it. ?? Any elaboration or link on this? The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. You are too much unclear, for me. I can agree and disagree. As long as you don't present your theory it is hard to find out what you mean.? Bruno ?? Please understand that I am still developing my thesis, it is not yet born. It is like a jig-saw puzzle with most of the Big Picture on the box missing... ?? Even today I realized a new piece of the picture, but I don't know how to explain it... It has to do with the way that the duality permutes under exponentiation in Pratt's theory in a way that might be a better way to connect it with comp. ?? The canonical transformation of the duality, in Pratt's theory, is an exact or bijective chain of transformations ... - body - mind - body - mind - ... This makes the isomorphism between the Stone spaces and Boolean algebras into a bijective map equivalent to an automorphism. If we consider the transformation for the case there it is almost but not quite bijective, then we get orbits that tend to be near the automorphism, like the orbits of a strange attractor and not exactly periodic in space/time. This can be taken to something like an ergodic map where the orbits of the transformation are never periodic and every body and mind in the chain is different. ? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: truth and reality cannot be expressed in words, only experienced
Roger, Is God part of your reality and if so how do you experience God, or is god just a theory.? For me god is described by a theory. Richard On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 7:36 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Evgenii Rudnyi Weyl makes complicated what is ultimately simple-- reality, which is subjective, which is experiencing, which is now. Which is focussing your attention on your breath going out and coming in. This is what yoga teaches. Weyl does best we he touches on color. Reality is knowledge by acquaintance. The best that science can give us is knowledge by description. But that is just words, code, and words are not reality. The only reality is in experiencing, such as experiencing your breathing. Kierkegard said it much better than Weyl, when he stated that truth is subjective. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Evgenii Rudnyi Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 14:01:41 Subject: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality Some more quotes from Bas C Van Fraassen Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. This time on what Weyl has said on isomorphism between mathematics and reality. p. 208 Herman Weyl expressed the fundamental insight as follows in 1934: 'A science can never determine its subject-matter expect up to isomorphic representation. The idea of isomorphism indicates the self-understood, insurmountable barrier of knowledge. [...T]oward the nature of its objects science maintains complete indifference.' (Weyl 1934:19) The initial assertion is clearly based on two basic convictions: o that scientific representation is mathematical, and o that in mathematics no distinction cuts across structural sameness. p. 209 Weyl illustrates this with the example of a color space and an isomorphic geometric object. ... The color space is a region on the projective plane. If we can nevertheless distinguish the one from the other, or from other attribute spaces with that structure, doesn't that mean that we can know more that what science, so conceived, can deliver? Weyl accompanies his point about this limitation with an immediate characterization of the 'something else' which is then left un-represented. 'This - for example what distinguish the colors from the point of the projective plane - one can only know in immediate alive intuition.' (Ibid.) p. 210 We seem to be left with four equally unpalatable alternatives: o that either the point about isomorphism and mathematics is mistaken, or o that scientific representation is not at bottom mathematical representation alone, or o that science is necessarily incomplete in a way we can know it to be incomplete, or o that those apparent differences to us, cutting across isomorphism, are illusory. In his comment about immediate alive intuition, Weyl appears to opt for the second, or perhaps the third, alternative. But on the either of this, we face a perplexing epistemological question: Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory? Evgenii -- http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/bas-c-van-fraassen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
A higher truth than that of arithmetic
Hi Stephen P. King Necessary truths are never connected to facts, because facts, being specific, can change. I think there is a higher truth than the truth of arithmetic, which I would call reality, and this is simply the experience of now subjectively. Meditation teaches this. Prayer teaches this. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:29:09 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 11/3/2012 8:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King 1 + 1 =2 is a necessary truth, not a fact. It is always true. A priori. So there are necessary truths such as arithmetical truths which were here before the contingent world of facts was created. And will always be. Hi Roger, It seems to me that is there are necessary truths that have no connection to facts in any way, then they are unknowable. I am just reversing that thought to define the relations between a priori and a posteriori truths. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Does your monad (your 1p) survive artificial changes to the brain ?
On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:51, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think the issue of your survival of the doctor's operation or whatever is clouded by the solipsism issue. You might need to elaborate on this. It is ipso facto not solipsist as we have a notion of 3-view and 1-views attributed to relative machine. The 1p is de facto a solipsist experience, but the one who bet on comp bet ipso facto on other persons. It should work, for better or worse, as long as you can affirm you have survived by your subjective (1p) experience. The contrary. It works only as long as you don't affirm you have survived. The fact that you survived will be felt by the 1p as a strong confirmation of comp, but by attributing the comp 1p to the doppelganger, in the duplication experience, the 1p knows that such a personal confirmation does not constitute a public communication. Comp necessitates a recurrent act of faith, somehow. So you are right if you substitute you can affirm to yourself you are survived by 1p experience. But that's again *is* the comp hypothesis. The fact that you will survive if your brain/body/environment is Turing emulated at some correct substitution level. I do not pretend that comp is true, I make it a bit more precise that usual, through explicit and precise definition of 1p and 3p, to study the metaphysical/theological/fundamental consequences. In a nutshell, in soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. (I don't pretend it is the end of the match, either. The main point is that comp + classical theory of knowledge and belief is non trivial and empirically testable. More comments are below, but that is the bottom line. MORE COMMENTS: I started looking at your comments on sane04, recalling a comment made by Leibniz, namely the question about what happens to your monad if an arm is amputated ? Right after that, the arm is still alive, I think it can be rejoined. Leibniz said (and I wish I could remember exactly what he said) that your monad--which is actually called spirit for a man or monad with intellect-- will stay with your intellect (or 1p), for that it is what defines you, it is your identity. The arm will not share that monad or soul while detached and so will shortly die. Plotinus get in that question. My inspiration comes from the study of amoebas and planarias. It is an important problem, but I think the Dx = T(xx) method solves the solution in the computer science, along with other fixed point theorems. This raises serious problems with the head/mind transplant conjecture. According to L, I think I can say that it wouldn't work. I beg to differ on this. Your monad would stay with the amputated head, and remain attached to or associated with it. But the head or intellect will die for lack of fresh blood, etc., so the monad will remain attached to a rotting head. Nothing will be rotten. You are copied on the right level, under anesthesia if you prefer, at a very low temperature, and the information scanned is send on a disk. The original body/brain is then destroyed and assumed to be destroyed successfully (it is part of the protocol). From the information kept in the disk, you are reconstituted at the correct level (which exists by the comp hypothesis) and you go out of the hospital, having survived in the usual clinical sense. Your soul is your identity. Yes. It stays with you, even though you change through the years or while asleep during an operation. And even when you die. If your subjective 1p consciousness (your monad) survives, then you have survived the doctor's alterations (either with digital hardware or signals) to your brain. Good insight. Yes. The question is not if you will survive with an artificial brain as you will survive anyway. The question is in better keeping the normal probability of manifesting your 1p relatively to your fellow in this branch of the arithmetical emanation. It is a theorem for the universal machines. Once they have the cognitive ability to bet that they can survive a duplication, they can infer that they survive no matter what. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 12:44:33 Subject: Re: Against Mechanism On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:25, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 2:21 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: the you before the duplication or the you after the duplication? All the you after, are the you before, by definition of comp. OK, but the you before is not the you after. The Helsinki man knows nothing about Moscow or Washington, not even if he still exists after the duplication, He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp. but both the Moscow man and the Washington man know all about Helsinki
Re: arithmetic truth and 1p truth
On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:58, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think in computationalism you only have to be able to say that the result is arithmetically or algebraically true. Arithmetic truth is what you seek. However, I still have yet to know if a particular computation seems true to your 1p. That would be 1p truth. Does the arithmetic truth pass the 1p test ? Yes. Good question. That's the purpose of AUDA. The arithmetical UDA. It is in the second part of sane04. The interview of the universal machine. Up to now, thanks to the Everett/Feynman formulation of QM, comp succeeds the first tests. Arguably. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 13:23:36 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 01 Nov 2012, at 22:50, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 01:18, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/31/2012 12:45 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: can stop reading as you need to assume the numbers (or anything Turing equivalent) to get them. Dear Bruno, So it is OK to assume that which I seek to explain? You can't explain the numbers without assuming the numbers. This has been foreseen by Dedekind, and vert well justified by many theorem in mathematical logic. Below the number, you are lead to version of ultrafinitism, which is senseless in the comp theory. Dear Bruno, I disagree with ultrafinitists, they seem to be the mathematical equivalent of flat-earthers'. *and* having some particular set of values and meanings. I just assume x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x *0 = 0 x*s(y) = x*y + x And hope you understand. I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. So your thinking about them is not a physical act? Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer yes and no. Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events. No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by platonic arithmetical truth. Implementation and physical will be explained from them. A natural thing as they are much more complex than the laws above. Numbers are meaningless in the absence of a means to define them. Theories do not free-float. Truth is free floating, and theories lived through truth, they are truth floating, even when false. In the absence of some common media, even if it is generated by sheaves of computations, there simply is no way to understand anything. Why ? Because there is not way to know of them otherwise. Our knowing as nothing to do with truth. If an asteroid would have destroy Earth before the Oresme bishop dicovered that the harmonic series diverge, she would have still diverge, despite no humans would know it. Unless you can communicate with me, I have no way of knowing anything about your ideas. Similarly if there is no physical implementation of a mathematical statement, there is no meaning to claims to truth of such statements. To claim, no. To be true is independent of the claim of the apes. You must accept non-well foundedness for your result to work, but you seem fixated against that. 1004. Pfft. Nice custom made quip. You are often escaping answers by inappropriate mathematical precision, which meaning contradicts your mathematical super- relativism. It is really 1004+contradiction. A statement, such as 2 = 1+1 or two equals one plus one, are said truthfully to have the same meaning because there are multiple and separable entities that can have the agreement on the truth value. In the absence of the ability to judge a statement independently of any particular entity capable of understanding the statement, there is no meaning to the concept that the statement is true or false. To insist that a statement has a meaning and is true (or false) in an ontological condition where no entities capable of judging the meaning, begs the question of meaningfulness! You are taking for granted some things that your arguments disallow. Do you agree that during the five seconds just after the Big Bang (assuming that theory) there might not have been any possible observers. But then the Big Bang has no more sense. No, I don't. Why? Because that concept of the five seconds just after the Big Bang is an assumption of a special case or pleading. I might as well postulate the existence of Raindow Dash to act as the entity to whom the Truth of mathematical statements have absolute meaning. To be frank, I thing that the Big Bang theory, as usually explained is a steaming pile of rubbish, as it asks us to believe
Why religious truth is the highest truth
Hi Stephen P. King Necessary truths can't be contingent, because contingent truths by definition are contingent on circumstances and so may not always be true. Scientific truth, or any truth of this world, is such. Pierce taught that consensus or pragmatic truth is supreme. What people believe in their hearts, what they believe subjectively. What they experience now. Why is pragmatic truth supreme ? Even higher than a necessary truth? 1 + 1 = 2, a statement, is a necessary truith, but the higher truth is to know that 1 +1 =2, to personally accept and believe that. If many agree, that is even better. If many, such as the Christian church, accept a truth such as God created the world, you might want to consider it. But it is only true if you pragmatically accept it as true. Lutherans call that acceptance faith. There are many forms of truth-- necessary and contingent truths, subjective and objective truths, truths by correspondence, or through coherency, pragmatic truth, eye witness truth, and so forth. In the end, one accepts the truth he has the most faith in. So faith again rules. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:31:14 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds in agreement. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On uniqueness
On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:09, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Yes, and keep in mind that there may be more than one theory that gives the same results in the form of data. This plays the key role. That all data structuring admit infinities of theories, like each state of mind can be associate to infinities of machines. So in this world, the truth must lie in the data, which is unique, and not the theory, which may not be unique. The inner truth, yes. But the outer truth it is more complex, not to say on the fringe of the inconceivable. In this world, data is king. Hmm... It is a question of taste, but personally I would say that the interpreter of the data is more fundamental. Data are usually very contingent, and sometimes they can hide reality more than enlightening. Many data can put shadows and distort the view, and they can also be biased. Data are important, sure. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 13:34:22 Subject: Re: Self-ascription and Perfect Model Model On 02 Nov 2012, at 10:42, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno, Could it not be that there is nothing especially sacred about the natural numbers, that these are, as Hobbes put it regarding words, but counterfeit tokens ? Numbers, with + and * laws, is mainly the same things than digital machines, and the laws making them working. And the real controlling force which uses them is information theory ? That is to say, intelligence. Here you are far too quick. I can make sense, because I have some favorable imagination. As I said, information theory is a tiny part of computer science. It exploits the duality between immune/simple set, where the self-reference logic exploits the duality creative/ productive set. The two dualities plays some r?e, but the creative/ productive set duality (the theory of universal machine) is much more rich. The mathematical notion of information still disallows meaning and person. It is more used for communication of signals, treatment of noise, compression of data, etc. You will also have the problem between choosing classical information or quantum information, and how to relate them, etc. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Evgenii Rudnyi Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-01, 06:09:50 Subject: Re: Self-ascription and Perfect Model Model On 30.10.2012 16:25 Bruno Marchal said the following: On 30 Oct 2012, at 12:53, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... You talk for example about integers as a framework for everything. Fine. Yet, I would like to understand how mankind through it development has invented integers. How comp would help to answer this? Comp might not been able to answer that, in any better way than, say, evolution theory. Numbers are important in nature, as everything is born from them, and to survive with bigger chance, the universal numbers, us in particular, have to be able to recognize them, and manipulate them accordingly. Comp is not a theory aimed at explaining everything directly. It is just, at the start, an hypothesis in philosophy of mind, and then it appears that it reduces the mind- body problem to an explanation of quanta and qualia from arithmetic/computer science. Its main value in the human science, is, imo, that he forces us to be more modest, and more aware that we know about nothing, if only because we have wrongly separate the human science (including theology, afterlife, metaphysics) and the exact sciences. Comp provides a way to reunite them. Comp can be seen as an abstract corpus callosum making a bridge between the formal and the informal, before bridging mind and matter. Below there is a couple of quotes about German idealism. Please replace Absolute Spirit by Natural Numbers there. Then it may give one possible answer to my question. ?bsolute Spirit is the fundamental reality. But in order to create the world, the Absolute manifests itself, or goes out of itself in a sense, the Absolute forgets itself and empties itself into creation (although never really ceasing to be itself). Thus the world is created as a ?alling away? from Spirit, as a ?elf-alienation? of Spirit, although the Fall is never anything but a play of Spirit itself.? ?aving ?allen? into the manifest and material world, Spirit begins the process of returning to itself, and this process of the return of Spirit to Spirit is simply development or evolution itself. The original ?escent? (or involution) is a forgetting, a fall, a self-alienation of Spirit; and the reverse movement of ?scent? (or evolution) is thus the self-remembering and self-actualization of Spirit. And yet, the Idealists emphasized, all of
Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality
On 04.11.2012 08:37 Richard Ruquist said the following: On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 2:12 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: On 04.11.2012 02:58 meekerdb said the following: On 11/3/2012 2:01 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... p. 210 We seem to be left with four equally unpalatable alternatives: o that either the point about isomorphism and mathematics is mistaken, or o that scientific representation is not at bottom mathematical representation alone, or o that science is necessarily incomplete in a way we can know it to be incomplete, or o that those apparent differences to us, cutting across isomorphism, are illusory. In his comment about immediate alive intuition, Weyl appears to opt for the second, or perhaps the third, alternative. But on the either of this, we face a perplexing epistemological question: Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory? It seems to me he left out the most likely case: that our science is incomplete in a way we know. Brent Could you please express this knowledge explicitly? String theory is an example of knowledge of incomplete science as for the most part string theory has not been verified/falsified experimentally. Richard Let us imagine that the superstring theory is completed and even experimentally verified. So what's then? How the superstring theory would change engineering practice? Evgenii -- p. 278 ... the regularities must derive from not just natural but logical necessity. This sentiment is sometimes encountered still, not so much among philosophers but in physicists' dreams of a final theory so logically airtight as to admit of no conceivable alternative, one that would be grasped as true when understood at all. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The One is not a number but a metaphor
On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:13, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I misconstrued the river/man analogy. Heraclitus said instead that a man cannot stand in the same river twice (or even from moment to moment). It's just a statement of contingency. I don't believe that. In my childhood, every summer I did stand in the same river. Of course a river is a living being, it changes shapes, and moves in the panorama, and the quality of the water decreased, alas, for some time, also. But it was the same river, at least in the sense that I am the same guy who took pleasure standing in that river. Heraclitus commited the naturalist error (with respect to comp) to identify a river with the local constitution that he assumes the existence. But that is for me in contradiction with most use of the word river in geography. A river is already a high level natural entity. Le temps s'en va! Le temps s'en va! Non Madame, le temps ne s'en va pas. C'est nous qui nous nous s'en allons! (French poet: literally times go away! times go away! No Miss, times does't go away, but *we* go away). Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 13:39:24 Subject: Re: The One is not a number but a metaphor On 02 Nov 2012, at 11:50, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal When I refer to the One, I think of it not as a number 1 but as a metaphor. Well, the ONE is not the number 1. OK. The Soul is the identity of a monad, including the supreme monad. The soul does not change, even though the monad is constantly (rapidly) changing. The river keeps changing, but the man standing in it remains the same. Hmm why not. Too much fuzzy to be sure. Only the universal soul can be sais not changing. But once the soul has fallen, it forgets its universal origin, and undergone quite big changes. So in like manor, we can consider the One (as a metaphor, not as a number) as the Soul of the universe, the Universal Soul. I don't think so. the soul is the inner God, the one you can awake by different technic. The outer God, is beyond conceivability, even if comp can identify it with the very complex set of code of the arithmetical truth. At least in the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
3-view truth vs 1-view truth
Hi Bruno Marchal 3-view is descriptive truth, 1-view truth is truth by acquaintance. Descriptive truth is similar to your knowing about Bertrand Russell. Or to know that in principle 1+1 =2. Truth by acquaintance is that you have met Bertrand Russell. Or you accept that 1 +1 = 2. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 08:07:16 Subject: Re: Does your monad (your 1p) survive artificial changes to the brain ? On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:51, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think the issue of your survival of the doctor's operation or whatever is clouded by the solipsism issue. You might need to elaborate on this. It is ipso facto not solipsist as we have a notion of 3-view and 1-views attributed to relative machine. The 1p is de facto a solipsist experience, but the one who bet on comp bet ipso facto on other persons. It should work, for better or worse, as long as you can affirm you have survived by your subjective (1p) experience. The contrary. It works only as long as you don't affirm you have survived. The fact that you survived will be felt by the 1p as a strong confirmation of comp, but by attributing the comp 1p to the doppelganger, in the duplication experience, the 1p knows that such a personal confirmation does not constitute a public communication. Comp necessitates a recurrent act of faith, somehow. So you are right if you substitute you can affirm to yourself you are survived by 1p experience. But that's again *is* the comp hypothesis. The fact that you will survive if your brain/body/environment is Turing emulated at some correct substitution level. I do not pretend that comp is true, I make it a bit more precise that usual, through explicit and precise definition of 1p and 3p, to study the metaphysical/theological/fundamental consequences. In a nutshell, in soccer terms: Plato 1, Aristotle 0. (I don't pretend it is the end of the match, either. The main point is that comp + classical theory of knowledge and belief is non trivial and empirically testable. More comments are below, but that is the bottom line. MORE COMMENTS: I started looking at your comments on sane04, recalling a comment made by Leibniz, namely the question about what happens to your monad if an arm is amputated ? Right after that, the arm is still alive, I think it can be rejoined. Leibniz said (and I wish I could remember exactly what he said) that your monad--which is actually called spirit for a man or monad with intellect-- will stay with your intellect (or 1p), for that it is what defines you, it is your identity. The arm will not share that monad or soul while detached and so will shortly die. Plotinus get in that question. My inspiration comes from the study of amoebas and planarias. It is an important problem, but I think the Dx = T(xx) method solves the solution in the computer science, along with other fixed point theorems. This raises serious problems with the head/mind transplant conjecture. According to L, I think I can say that it wouldn't work. I beg to differ on this. Your monad would stay with the amputated head, and remain attached to or associated with it. But the head or intellect will die for lack of fresh blood, etc., so the monad will remain attached to a rotting head. Nothing will be rotten. You are copied on the right level, under anesthesia if you prefer, at a very low temperature, and the information scanned is send on a disk. The original body/brain is then destroyed and assumed to be destroyed successfully (it is part of the protocol). From the information kept in the disk, you are reconstituted at the correct level (which exists by the comp hypothesis) and you go out of the hospital, having survived in the usual clinical sense. Your soul is your identity. Yes. It stays with you, even though you change through the years or while asleep during an operation. And even when you die. If your subjective 1p consciousness (your monad) survives, then you have survived the doctor's alterations (either with digital hardware or signals) to your brain. Good insight. Yes. The question is not if you will survive with an artificial brain as you will survive anyway. The question is in better keeping the normal probability of manifesting your 1p relatively to your fellow in this branch of the arithmetical emanation. It is a theorem for the universal machines. Once they have the cognitive ability to bet that they can survive a duplication, they can infer that they survive no matter what. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content -
Re: heraclitus and leibniz on washington vs moscow
On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:29, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
As to washington vs moscow, the man remains the same.
Although a man cannot stand in the same river twice,
his 1p or monad, his identity, remains the same.
OK.
The monad itself belongs to the supreme monad or
platonia (same 1p, same identity), because
although its contents keep changing, it has
to remain a fixed identity-- or else the supreme
monad would not know where to place the
constantly adjusted perceptions.
More or less OK. It is a play with four actors: God, Man, the Soul. (=
4 as the Man is a bit schizo and has two personality: a terrestrial
and a divine one). Those can be played, in comp + classical theory of
knowledge) by Arithmetical Truth (God), The Loebian universal Turing
machine (Man, Bp), and Bp p (The theatetical definition of knowledge
applied to ideally correct machine's provability.
Note that in Leibniz's metaphysics, the perceptions
of each monad are not that of an individual soul such
as we understand perception. An individual soul
sees only the phenomenol world-- from his own
perspective. But a monad contains all of the perceptions
of all the other monads in the universe, so it sees
the universe truly, meaning from all perspectives.
The term holographic perception comes to mind.
Interesting. I think this or similar are still open problems.
In this sense we are God's local sensors, for the God
who knows all.
OK. This, for me, is more salvia than comp and logic, but so I
*guess* you are correct. Open problem with comp.
Bruno
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/3/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-03, 05:18:25
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to not assume a
concrete robust physical universe.
?
Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I
explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality.
In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum.
Dear Bruno,
I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you
still didn't understand... From: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf
...what if we don? grant a concrete robust physical universe?
Actually the 8th present step will explain
that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the
notion of concrete and
existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power.
It will follow that a much
weaker and usual form of Ockham? razor can be used to conclude that
not only physics has
been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ?
matter? has been
ontologically reduced to ?mind? where mind is defined as the
object study of fundamental
machine psychology.
My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any
other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically
primitive. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither
and has no particular properties.
How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic?
Dear Bruno,
No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be
complete and consistent simultaneously,
Why not? The One is not a theory.
thus it must stratify itself into Many. Each of the Many is claimed
to have aspects that when recombined cancel to neutrality.
[SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we
reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds
Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I
just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of
metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp).
Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable
aspects of multiple sheaves of computations?
This is what I have shown to be a consequence of comp.
I agree.
[SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or
derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive -
Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are operating somehow in an
atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run without
ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. In my
thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the
TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My
problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of
creation that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptah of
ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu or whatever other myth one might
like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and
formal language of modal logic any
Re: The contingency of theories
On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:34, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
All theories are based on the a priori but
can only give contingent results (this world
results).
Hmm OK.
However, arithmetic is not a theory,
Sorry, but it is. I mean there are even many theories. Two important
one in the comp setting is the very elementary theory. Basically
just the four equalities:
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
This is already Turing universal.
A richer theory (PA), which is Löbian (knows she is universal), is the
same four axioms +
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) - x = y
and with the infinities of induction axioms, for all arithmetical
formula F(x) :
( F(0) Ax(F(x) - F(s(x)) ) - AxF(x)
By Gödel 2, or by Löb, Arithmetical Truth is far beyond *all*
theories and machines. Arithmetical Truth cannot be defined by those
machines, although they can build transfinite of approximation, and
handles pointer on the notion.
it is
arithmetical (permanent, necessary, logical) truth.
Yes. But logically you have still to make your assumptions explicit
and clear, and then you see that arithmetical truth is bigger than
what we can conceive (provably so about the sound machines) and that
it will have many contingent internal aspects when seen from inside.
Still both the necessary and the contingent obeys to (meta) laws, in
the computer science setting.
Bruno
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
11/3/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-03, 05:59:33
Subject: Re: Against Mechanism
On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:02, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote:
He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp.
People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a
reason for doing so. And I no longer know what comp means.
Comp means that we can survive with a digital brain. Nothing else.
but it implies that Plato is correct and Aristotle is incorrect for
the global conception of reality.
Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the
brain.
I have no difficulty with that, but now you tell me that it means a
great many other things too,
Yes. It has concequences which contradict many point of Aristotle
metaphysics.
things that are clearly untrue; like consciousness was there before
Evolution produced brains or the owner [of a brain] itself must
attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic.
Let us go step by step.
you are stuck in step 3
And I will remain stuck there until you fix the blunders you made in
step 3;
Your blunder has been debunked by many people. Then you have
oscillate between contradictory statements. You are only confusing 1-
views with 3-views. Sometimes between 3-views on 1-views and the 1-
views on 1-views.
You are the one pretending being able to predict what happens after
pushing the button, but you have always given a list of what can
happen, which is not a prediction.
after that perhaps the additional steps that were built on that
fatally flawed foundation would be worth reading.
You did not show a flow, just a confusion between 1p and 3p.
the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy in H
Yes.
by definition of comp.
I don't know what that is.
See above.
This is enough to get the 1_indeterminacy.
You don't know what your environment will be, what's new and
mysterious about that?
OK. Good. So you accept it. Please go to step 4 now, and tell me if
you agree. We have all the time to see where the reasoning will
eventually lead us.
I have no duplicating machine but I still don't know if my
environment will include rain tomorrow, but I can't find anything of
philosophical interest in that fact .
This is not the same form of indeterminacy. The impossibility of
predicting the weather is due to the deterministic chaos. This is
not used in the first person indeterminacy.
And the guy in Helsinki, if he can reason like any L?ian machine,
Like your other invention comp I don't know what a L?ian
machine is.
A universal machine capable of proving all sentence with the shape p
- Bew('p'), with p being an arithmetical sentence with shape
ExP(x), and P decidable. Exemple: prover theorem for PA, ZF, etc.
What is the probability the Washington man will write in his
diary he sees Washington? 100%.
The question was asked to the Helsinki man.
But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got a
rather severe case of writers block and is writing very little in
his diary.
The body of the guy in Helsinki is destroyed, but by comp, we have
already accept that the guy itself survives.
So when you say The question was asked to the
Re: The two types of truth
On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:45, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal and Stephen, http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/leibniz.html Leibniz declares that there are two kinds of truth: truths of reason [which are non-contradictory, are always either true or false], We can only hope that they are non contradictory. And although true or false, they are aslo known or unknown, believed of not believed, disbelieved or not disbelieved, etc. and truths of fact [which are not always either true or false]. Why? They are contextual, but you can study the relation fact/context in the higher structure level. Truths of reason are a priori, while truths of fact are a posteriori. Truths of reason are necessary, permanent truths. Truths of fact are contingent, empirical truths. Both kinds of truth must have a sufficient reason. Truths of reason have their sufficient reason in being opposed to the contradictoriness and logical inconsistency of propositions which deny them. Truths of fact have their sufficient reason in being more perfect than propositions which deny them. Unfortunately, this is acceptable below Sigma_1 truth, but doubtable above, so even in the lower complexity part of arithmetic, things are not that simple. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 07:13:24 Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm On 02 Nov 2012, at 23:12, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 1:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I can understand these symbols because there is at least a way to physically implement them. Those notion have nothing to do with physical implementation. So your thinking about them is not a physical act? Too much ambiguous. Even staying in comp I can answer yes and no. Yes, because my human thinking is locally supported by physical events. No, because the whole couple mind/physical events is supported by platonic arithmetical truth. Dear Bruno, Where is the evidence of the existence of a Platonic realm? It is part of the assumption. We postulate arithmetic. I try to avoid the use of platonic there, as I used the term in Plato sense. In that sense Platonia = the greek No?, and it is derived from arithmetic and comp. All you need is the belief that 43 is prime independently of 43 is prime. The mere self-consistency of an idea is proof of existence Already in arithmetic we have the consistence of the existence of a prrof of the false, this certainly does not mean that there exist a proof of the false. So self-consistency is doubtfully identifiable with truth, and still less with existence. but the idea must be understood by a multiplicity of entities with the capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood to have any coherence as an idea! Not at all. 43 is prime might be true, even in absence of universe and observer. We cannot just assume that the mere existence of some undefined acts to determine the properties of the undefined. Truth and falsity are possible properties, they are not ontological aspects of existence. Truth is no more a property than existence. It makes no sense. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality
On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 8:18 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: On 04.11.2012 08:37 Richard Ruquist said the following: On Sun, Nov 4, 2012 at 2:12 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: On 04.11.2012 02:58 meekerdb said the following: On 11/3/2012 2:01 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... p. 210 We seem to be left with four equally unpalatable alternatives: o that either the point about isomorphism and mathematics is mistaken, or o that scientific representation is not at bottom mathematical representation alone, or o that science is necessarily incomplete in a way we can know it to be incomplete, or o that those apparent differences to us, cutting across isomorphism, are illusory. In his comment about immediate alive intuition, Weyl appears to opt for the second, or perhaps the third, alternative. But on the either of this, we face a perplexing epistemological question: Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory? It seems to me he left out the most likely case: that our science is incomplete in a way we know. Brent Could you please express this knowledge explicitly? String theory is an example of knowledge of incomplete science as for the most part string theory has not been verified/falsified experimentally. Richard Let us imagine that the superstring theory is completed and even experimentally verified. So what's then? How the superstring theory would change engineering practice? I am unable to predict any engineering advantage to any proposed high energy theory even if it were to explain dark energy. That includes comp. What I can predict is that such a valid theory may change our conception of reality. In particular it may determine if a god is possible and exists and/or if a Many World multiverse exists. My personal prediction is that it is one or the other, either MWI or a god and a supernatural realm. Richard Evgenii -- p. 278 ... the regularities must derive from not just natural but logical necessity. This sentiment is sometimes encountered still, not so much among philosophers but in physicists' dreams of a final theory so logically airtight as to admit of no conceivable alternative, one that would be grasped as true when understood at all. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: (mathematical) solipsism
On 03 Nov 2012, at 13:00, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] In the absence of a means to determine some property, it is incoherent and sometimes inconsistent to claim that the property has some particular value and the absence of all other possible values. In math this is called (mathematical) solipsism. Dear Bruno, How is it solipsism? Solipsism is: Solipsism is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist. The term comes from the Latin solus (alone) and ipse (self). Solipsism as an epistemological position holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure. The external world and other minds cannot be known, and might not exist outside the mind. As a metaphysical position, solipsism goes further to the conclusion that the world and other minds do not exist. My point is that numbers, by your notion of AR, are solipsistic as there is literally nothing other than the numbers. I reject AR because of this! Numbers alone cannot do what you propose. Comp entails Strong AI, which attributes consciousness to machines, and thus to others. You argument is not valid because it beg the question that number (related through the laws of + and *) emulated computation to which comp attribute consciousness. So comp is not solipsism. Bruno This post argues similar to my point: http://mathforum.org/kb/message.jspa?messageID=5944965 Conventional solipsism is a logical philosophy whose underlying views apply equally to mathematical philosophies of neopythagoreanism and neoplatonism as well as mathematical realism and empiricism generally. The well established philosophical principle of solipsism is that only the individual is or can be demonstrated to exist. But the problem is that if this principle were actually demonstrably true it would also make it false because the truth established would ipso facto make the principle beyond control of any individual. Nobody really thinks solipsism is true. But the difficulty is no one can prove or disprove the concept because no one can prove the foundations of truth in absolute, necessary, and universal terms. This article http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020context=philo argues against the claim that Intuitionism is solipsistic. I reject Intuitionism as a singular coherent theory of mathematics, but I do accept it as a member of the pantheon of interpretations of mathematics. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 03 Nov 2012, at 13:06, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Brent already debunked this. The truth of a statement does not need the existence of the statement. You confuse again the truth of 1+1=2, with a possible claim of that truth, like 1+1=2. Horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? Explain me how the truth of an arithmetical truth depends on its being claimed or not. What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? We can make claim about them, but we don't need to do that for them being true or false. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/4/2012 12:37 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/3/2012 11:06 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 10:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:11 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: Horsefeathers http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? You are causing confusion by asking how the truth of a statement is separable from any claim of that truth. But claims and statements are the same thing - so of course they are not seperable. Bruno is saying that the claim/statement is NOT the same as the fact that makes it true. 1+1=2 is a claim; it's the claim that 1+1=2. And that's a true claim; it's true that 1+1=2 whether you claim it or not. It is not about me or any other single individual, it is about the mutual agreement on the claim by many individuals, any one of which is irrelevant to the truth of a claim. Realism (arithmetical or other) is the position that the claim by EVERY one of which is irrelevant; the truth of the claim depends only whether it corresponds to a fact. Brent It your claim is true then truth is unknowable, I don't see how that follows. When everyone claimed the Earth was flat did that make it unknowable that it was round? If so how did anyone ever come know it? as facts become meaningless. Fact require independent verification to exist. That's directly contrary to the meaning of 'fact'. I think you want the word 'opinion'. Brent Dear Brent, Try reasoning about this in a way that is not limited to the assumption that observations are not just what humans do or think about. Reality is not just people populated. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Emergence of Properties
On 11/4/2012 7:40 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King All that we can know of reality is in the experience of now. Hi Roger, Yes, in our mutual consistency and individually, but we have to start with a 'now' at the 1p for each observer. Every observer perceived itself at the center of its own universe. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:26:12 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:17, Stephen P. King wrote: ?? After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of properties as being innate, I meant independent of us. Not innate in the sense of psychology. Dear Bruno, ?? Please elaborate on what this independence implies that has to do with the definiteness of properties. but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not think too deeply about the concept of property. I garee with what Leibiz said, and what Frege and the logicians have done with it. ?? Any elaboration or link on this? The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the internalization of the associations and relations within our thinking process. You are too much unclear, for me. I can agree and disagree. As long as you don't present your theory it is hard to find out what you mean.? Bruno ?? Please understand that I am still developing my thesis, it is not yet born. It is like a jig-saw puzzle with most of the Big Picture on the box missing... ?? Even today I realized a new piece of the picture, but I don't know how to explain it... It has to do with the way that the duality permutes under exponentiation in Pratt's theory in a way that might be a better way to connect it with comp. ?? The canonical transformation of the duality, in Pratt's theory, is an exact or bijective chain of transformations ... - body - mind - body - mind - ... This makes the isomorphism between the Stone spaces and Boolean algebras into a bijective map equivalent to an automorphism. If we consider the transformation for the case there it is almost but not quite bijective, then we get orbits that tend to be near the automorphism, like the orbits of a strange attractor and not exactly periodic in space/time. This can be taken to something like an ergodic map where the orbits of the transformation are never periodic and every body and mind in the chain is different. ? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: (mathematical) solipsism
On 11/4/2012 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp entails Strong AI, which attributes consciousness to machines, and thus to others. You argument is not valid because it beg the question that number (related through the laws of + and *) emulated computation to which comp attribute consciousness. So comp is not solipsism. Hi Bruno, No, comp is not solipsism, it is the construction of a solipsistic mind. All minds are inherently solipsistic until they escape from their prison of consistency. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/4/2012 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 13:06, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Brent already debunked this. The truth of a statement does not need the existence of the statement. You confuse again the truth of 1+1=2, with a possible claim of that truth, like 1+1=2. Horsefeathers http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? Explain me how the truth of an arithmetical truth depends on its being claimed or not. Hi Bruno, I am using the possibility of a claim to make my argument, not any actual instance of a claim. There is a difference. In comp there are claims that such and such know or believe or bet. I am trying to widen our thinking of how the potentials of acts is important. What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? We can make claim about them, but we don't need to do that for them being true or false. Who are the we that you refer to? Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 03 Nov 2012, at 16:18, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 11:46, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? Dear Bruno, No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be complete and consistent simultaneously, Why not? The One is not a theory. Why does it have to be a theory? The concept of the One is a fragment of a theory... You make the same coinfusion again and again. The One is not the same as the concept of the One. Does the One have a Concept of The One as its unique 1p? I think the inner God, alias the arithmetical 1p (not arithmetical in the logician sense, but still applying to the machine) , alias Bp p (Theaetetus on Bp) can be said to be a unique abstract person. But it is not the 1p of the one, it is the 1p of the Man. Open problem for me if Arithmetical truth can be seen as a person or not. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?
On 03 Nov 2012, at 16:39, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:24, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't consider truth as an object. The numbers can be considered as the (only) object. truth concerns only the propositions about those objects and the derivative notions. OK, then how is it that you seem to imply that truth is independent of 1p, i.e. that it is a valuation internal to experience? Explain me why how you think that the content of the primeness of 43 depends on experience, and of whom. Dear Bruno, The primacy of 17 or 43 or any other number is such that it can be apprehended, at least in principle, by at least one entity (please note that this is a lower bound concept!). This implies that in the absence of that possibility of apprehension (by at least one entity) that there is no such thing as primeness. This is totally ridiculous, Stephen. With comp, it is obvious that the primacy of 43 is conceptually far simpler than the (true) fact that the primacy of 43 can be apprehended by a type of machine/numbers. You are like a biologist telling Morgan that it is stupid to hope to understand the genetic of the fly before understanding the genetic of the zoologist. Bruno The dependency that I am claiming for the properties of numbers is no different from the dependency of properties (in the sense of being definite) for physical objects; there must exist some means to determine or otherwise measure or prove what those particular properties might be. Finitists fail because they assume that only a finite number of entities can in principle exist that can determine the properties of some arbitrary number. (See Normal J. Wildberger's ideas for an example of finitism in mathematics) I propose that there are an infinity of possible worlds, each with a potential infinity of entities that can, at least in principle, determine the properties of any arbitrary number. This is the same idea, I think, as Godel's infinite tower of theories, each of which can determine the truth value for any theory which is a subset of itor implied to exist by it. I am just inverting the idea of the Forcing axiom of Cohen. I start with an ambiguous notion of the One and reduce it down to where it is a fragment, a monad, a subset of the totality of all possible, and yet it reflects all of its ancestors as it is never not a proper part of the One. This is just an elaboration of Leibniz' idea of monads... The idea that a property has content is nonsensical, IMHO. Primeness (of numbers) is a property of numbers, and like any other object, they are nothing more than bounded bundles (clopen sets?) of properties defined in relation to other bounded bundles of properties. Only the One is isolated and independent of all things, as it *is* all things! It cannot be aware of anything other than itself, by definition. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum
On 11/4/2012 12:09 AM, John Mikes wrote: snip ## to 9 I have objections. I cannot imagine (maybe my mistake) evolution without a goal, a final aim which would require an intelligent design to approach it. (I may have one: the re-distribution into the Plenitude). My way (as of yesterday) is the ease-and-potential path of changes allowed by the available configurations (relations) when a change occurs. NO RANDOM, it would make a grits out of nature. Even authors with high preference on random treatises withdrew into a conditional random when I attacked the term. Conditionality kills random of course. So in my terms: NO random mutations, (especially not FOR survival) I call 'evolution' the HISTORY of our universe. The unsuccessful mutants die, the successful go on - science detects them in its snapshots taken and explains them religiously. (Survival of the fittest - the Dinosaur was fit when it got extinct by the change in circumstances). I accept ONE random (in mathematical puzzles): take ANY number... Your lower, but not upper bound is highly appreciable. Thanks. I apologize for my haphazard remarks upon prima vista reading. The list-discussion is not a well-founded scientific discourse upon new ideas. Most people tell what they formulated over years. A reply is many times instantaneous. snip [HR] 9) Now add in evolution which is a random walk with a lower but no upper bound. snip Dear John, I wanted to make a remark on just this part of your post as I need to ask a question. Why is the Selective aspect of evolution almost completely ignored? It is easy to talk about mutations and models of them, such as random walks - which I favor!, but what about the selection aspect? what about how the Tree of Life is almost constantly pruned by events that kill off or otherwise blunt growth in some directions as opposed to others? My question to you is specific. How do polymers mold themselves to local parameters that influence their molecules? What determines their shape? Is there a deterministic explanation of the shape of a polymer? Would this explanation work for, say, DNA or peptite molecules? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why religious truth is the highest truth
On 11/4/2012 8:10 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Necessary truths can't be contingent, because contingent truths by definition are contingent on circumstances and so may not always be true. Scientific truth, or any truth of this world, is such. Dear Roger, By contingent I mean dependent on the co-existence of others. Existence cannot be dependent on anything at all, thus is must be taken in our explanations to be ontologically fundamental. Pierce taught that consensus or pragmatic truth is supreme. What people believe in their hearts, what they believe subjectively. What they experience now. I love Peirce's cryptic sense of irony. ;--) Why is pragmatic truth supreme ? Even higher than a necessary truth? 1 + 1 = 2, a statement, is a necessary truith, but the higher truth is to know that 1 +1 =2, to personally accept and believe that. If many agree, that is even better. Can we reason outside of our explanations? Can we discuss the content of our discussions? Can we escape from the implications of regress? If many, such as the Christian church, accept a truth such as God created the world, you might want to consider it. But it is only true if you pragmatically accept it as true. Lutherans call that acceptance faith. So what about what the Hyperboreans call that acceptance? And what of the Ponies or the Mormons or the Blue People? Does it matter who it is? There are many forms of truth-- necessary and contingent truths, subjective and objective truths, truths by correspondence, or through coherency, pragmatic truth, eye witness truth, and so forth. In the end, one accepts the truth he has the most faith in. So faith again rules. Of course, because what is faith but the expectation of a future truth? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net mailto:%20rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:31:14 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds in agreement. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Against Mechanism
On 03 Nov 2012, at 18:28, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Nov 3, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You are the one pretending being able to predict what happens after pushing the button, but you have always given a list of what can happen, which is not a prediction. A list is necessary because there are 2 things, But you know in davance that whatever happen, you will live only one thing. There are two 1p, as seen from the 3p view, but you know in advance that you will live, only one 1p view, from your next 1p view. Again and again and again, you answer on the future 1views, as decribed by the 3p view, but the question is about the 1p views, from the 1p views. And here, both the 1p view will concede living only half of the list above, and can, I hope grasp that the question was about that, eventually. if I know they are going to have different fates then I cannot just give one answer. You must make the work of putting yourself at the place of each of them. And if the 2 are identical I can't single out one and say this one will have fate X while that one will have fate Y, and because they are identical it would be a useless prediction even if I could. Irelevant as they are not identical. You did not show a flow, just a confusion between 1p and 3p. Oh for heaven's sake Bruno, do you really believe I don't understand the difference between the first and third person point of view? No, I see that in some paragraph you get it, and accept that there is an indeterminacy, and then later pretend that there is no indeterminacy. You are just pretty irrational on this. You are the one that nobody understand here. I have no duplicating machine but I still don't know if my environment will include rain tomorrow, but I can't find anything of philosophical interest in that fact . This is not the same form of indeterminacy. The impossibility of predicting the weather is due to the deterministic chaos. In the first place pure deterministic chaos probably does not exist, and even if it did it would not be predictable because you'd have to know the initial conditions with infinite and not just astronomically good precision, and because if you wished to get a answer before the event happened the computation would generate so much heat it would create a new Big Bang. So when you say The question was asked to the Helsinki man you are asking a question to a man who's body has been destroyed. No, the question is asked before he pushes on the read/cut button. I'll bet you don't even remember the question, it was What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary he sees Washington? and I said the answer was 100%. For some reason you believed my prediction was wrong. I repeat the question is asked in Helsinki. Let us keep straight the protocol of sane04, as to not introduce any confusion. If you want John Clark to make other predictions about what the Helsinki man will write in the Helsinki man's diary under various circumstances John Clark will do so, but because this involves personal identity for clarity please don't use any pronouns in the question. The question is about your future 1p. Personal identity is another matter. so he cannot assert that he will *feel* with 100% chance to be the one in Washington. Again you confuse the 3-view and the 1-view. And again you are confused by pronouns. The use of the 1p is very simple with the definition given. from the first person view, as he knows that after pushing the button he will find himself being in only one city, not in two cities simultaneously. Yes but John Clark sees nothing paradoxical or contradictory about that, No one has ever pretend it is paradoxical or contradictory about that. But with the definition of 1p, it shows that something is indeterminate. its just odd; and the only reason its odd is that were not accustomed to that sort of thing and the reason for that is that duplicating machines, although they violate no laws of physics are, with current technology, hard to make. And that could change. You pretend that there is 100% chance that he will feel to see Washington, and 100% chance he will feel to see Moscow and yet you agree that there is 100% chance he will see only one city If Bruno Marchal sees a contradiction in that its because pronouns have gotten the better of Bruno Marchal yet again. No it your prediction which is refuted by the two copies. One will say I feel to be only in W and the other will say I feel to be only in M, so BOTH will that they (John Clark) was wrong in Helsinki , or that he did not understand the question. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 03 Nov 2012, at 19:27, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Bertrand Russell was a superb logician but he was not infallible with regard to metaphysics. He called Leibniz's metaphysics an enchanted land and confessed that he hadn't a clue to what the meaning of pragmatism is. Hi Roger, Yeah, his star fell today, for me. Why. because he was wrong? But all serious people are wrong. To be wrong is a chance, and to be shown wrong is an even bigger chance. Russell was not annoyed by that, because his platonist intuition was preserved. he just learned that reason needed to learn modesty with respect to truth seeking, even on arithmetic and machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum
Hi Stephen and John: I believe I absorbed the evolution is a random walk with a lower bound but no upper bound from my readings of Stephen Gould. I have no memory of where and when and the memory may be false. In any event I do not see that it excludes selection. I think there was an illustration something like: A staggering drunk is walking down a city street on a sidewalk bounded on one side by a solid row of locked buildings and on the other by the street. Given a long enough walk the drunk will always end up in the gutter - the gutter in this case representing either a new player on the field or a pruning. This discussion is important to where I want to take my posts. Thanks Hal -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Stephen P. King Sent: Sunday, November 04, 2012 12:09 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum On 11/4/2012 12:09 AM, John Mikes wrote: snip ## to 9 I have objections. I cannot imagine (maybe my mistake) evolution without a goal, a final aim which would require an intelligent design to approach it. (I may have one: the re-distribution into the Plenitude). My way (as of yesterday) is the ease-and-potential path of changes allowed by the available configurations (relations) when a change occurs. NO RANDOM, it would make a grits out of nature. Even authors with high preference on random treatises withdrew into a conditional random when I attacked the term. Conditionality kills random of course. So in my terms: NO random mutations, (especially not FOR survival) I call 'evolution' the HISTORY of our universe. The unsuccessful mutants die, the successful go on - science detects them in its snapshots taken and explains them religiously. (Survival of the fittest - the Dinosaur was fit when it got extinct by the change in circumstances). I accept ONE random (in mathematical puzzles): take ANY number... Your lower, but not upper bound is highly appreciable. Thanks. I apologize for my haphazard remarks upon prima vista reading. The list-discussion is not a well-founded scientific discourse upon new ideas. Most people tell what they formulated over years. A reply is many times instantaneous. snip [HR] 9) Now add in evolution which is a random walk with a lower but no upper bound. snip Dear John, I wanted to make a remark on just this part of your post as I need to ask a question. Why is the Selective aspect of evolution almost completely ignored? It is easy to talk about mutations and models of them, such as random walks - which I favor!, but what about the selection aspect? what about how the Tree of Life is almost constantly pruned by events that kill off or otherwise blunt growth in some directions as opposed to others? My question to you is specific. How do polymers mold themselves to local parameters that influence their molecules? What determines their shape? Is there a deterministic explanation of the shape of a polymer? Would this explanation work for, say, DNA or peptite molecules? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why religious truth is the highest truth
Rodger, why do you believe that religious truth is truth at all, much less the highest truth? It's because most small children are genetically hard wired to unquestionably believe most of what adults tell them and to carry that belief until the day they die; that's why religious belief has a very very strong geographical pattern. Infants in the Americas were told Christian Bullshit before they were able to reason properly and so they believed it, and when they become adults they taught the same Bullshit to their children; Middle Eastern infants were taught Islamic Bullshit and Indian children were taught Hindu Bullshit. And this self reinforcing cycle of idiocy that has cursed the Human Race for so many centuries causes most people in the Americas to believe in Christianity mythology, most in the Middle East to to believe in Islamic mythology and most in India to believe in Hindu mythology. John K Clark Hi Stephen P. King Necessary truths can't be contingent, because contingent truths by definition are contingent on circumstances and so may not always be true. Scientific truth, or any truth of this world, is such. Pierce taught that consensus or pragmatic truth is supreme. What people believe in their hearts, what they believe subjectively. What they experience now. Why is pragmatic truth supreme ? Even higher than a necessary truth? 1 + 1 = 2, a statement, is a necessary truith, but the higher truth is to know that 1 +1 =2, to personally accept and believe that. If many agree, that is even better. If many, such as the Christian church, accept a truth such as God created the world, you might want to consider it. But it is only true if you pragmatically accept it as true. Lutherans call that acceptance faith. There are many forms of truth-- necessary and contingent truths, subjective and objective truths, truths by correspondence, or through coherency, pragmatic truth, eye witness truth, and so forth. In the end, one accepts the truth he has the most faith in. So faith again rules. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net +rclo...@verizon.net 11/4/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:31:14 Subject: Re: Emergence of Properties On 11/3/2012 8:57 AM, Roger Clough wrote: The properties of spacetime things are what can be measured (ie facts). The properties of beyond spacetime things are propositions that can't be contradicted (necessary truths). Hi Roger, I do not assume that the can't be contradicted is an a priori fixed apartheid on truths. I define necessary truths to be contingent on many minds in agreement. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum
Hi Everyone: I would now like to expand the discussion re the two current conclusions in the slightly edited version of the first post [below] as follows: i) Consciousness: The origin and purpose of life herein leads me to believe that consciousness is distributed across life entities in accordance with their ability to act in accord with it. Even single celled entities would have a non zero degree of it to properly enable life's purpose. ii) Freewill: Life's purpose as given herein precludes it. iii) Species survival: Life on this planet is in the midst of a mass extinction [not a new idea] that can't be stopped because implementation of the purpose as given herein is the only priority for life. We can't exclude ourselves from the extinction. [There have been a number of mass extinctions but evolution has sometimes used these to produce new life entities with greater energy hang-up barrier busting ability than the extinguished ones - new life entities such as ourselves. Edited first post 1) Definition (1): Energy (E) is the ability to subject a mass to a force. 2) There are several types of energy currently known or proposed: a) Mass itself via the conversion: [M = E/(c*c)] b) Gravitational c) Electromagnetic d) Nuclear [Strong and Weak forces] e) Dark Energy 3) Definition (2): Work (W) is the flow of energy amongst the various types by means of a change in the spatial configuration, dynamics and/or amount of mass in a system brought about by an actual application of a force to a mass. 4) The exact original distribution of energy amongst the various types can't be reestablished and the new configuration can't do as much work as the prior configuration was capable of doing. [Second Law of Thermodynamics] 5) Time is not a factor: Once a flow of energy is possible it will take place immediately. 6) Conclusion (1): Since life is an energy flow conduit, wherever the possibility of life exists life will appear as rapidly as possible. This is the origin of life herein. [If we look at the usual attempts to define life, we find things such as grow, procreate,[Thanks John] etc. These require a flow of energy from an initial ability to do work to a lower ability to do work and through the life entity. Think of the life entity as a pipe or conduit for this flow.] 7) Some energy flows are prevented by what are known [in my memory] as Energy Flow Hang-up Barriers such as nuclear bonding coefficient issues, spatial configuration, spin, other spatial dynamics, ignition temperature requirements, electromagnetic repulsion, etc. [Energy Flow Hang-up Barriers is not my terminology - I think there was a twenty year or so old article in Scientific American I am looking for and a quick Internet search found a discussion of the repulsion hang-up in Cosmology The Science of the Universe by Edward Robert Harrison. [Therefore life herein is just an energy flow conduit drilling holes in energy flow hang-up barriers as rapidly as possible for the particular entity to enable even more such energy flow.] 8) Conclusion (2): Once life is present it will immediately punch as many holes in as many Energy Hang-up Barriers as the details of the particular life entity involved allows - this is how it realizes its energy flow conduit character. This is the purpose of life herein. In other words life's purpose is to hasten the heat death of its host universe. 9) Now add in evolution which is a random walk with a lower but no upper bound. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality
On 11/4/2012 1:12 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 04.11.2012 02:58 meekerdb said the following: On 11/3/2012 2:01 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: ... p. 210 We seem to be left with four equally unpalatable alternatives: o that either the point about isomorphism and mathematics is mistaken, or o that scientific representation is not at bottom mathematical representation alone, or o that science is necessarily incomplete in a way we can know it to be incomplete, or o that those apparent differences to us, cutting across isomorphism, are illusory. In his comment about immediate alive intuition, Weyl appears to opt for the second, or perhaps the third, alternative. But on the either of this, we face a perplexing epistemological question: Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory? It seems to me he left out the most likely case: that our science is incomplete in a way we know. Brent Could you please express this knowledge explicitly? We don't know what dark matter is, we don't know what dark energy is, we don't know how to make GR and QM compatible,... Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Weyl on mathematics vs. reality
On 11/4/2012 1:18 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 04.11.2012 00:47 Alberto G. Corona said the following: : Is there something that I could know to be the case, and which is not expressed by a proposition that could be part of some scientific theory? Yes . I love my mother is some knowledge that I know , and is not part of a scientific theory. We know reality because we live in the reality, We do not approximate reality by theories. We directly know reality because we live within it. Our primary knowledge is intuitive, historic, direct.. It is _the_ reality. A theory is a second class of knowledge about a model that approximate reality, maybe upto a point of an isomorphism with some-part-of reality, but certainly, not an isomorphism that embraces the whole reality, because we could never know if we have modelized the entire reality, nether if this modelization is accurate. Let us imagine that we have a mathematical model that isomorphic with the whole reality. Let us say that this model is before you as some computer implementation. The problem of coordination still remains. To use this model, you need to find out its particular part and relate it with reality. The model of the whole reality does not do it by itself. That seems like an impossible hypothesis. Usually when one talks about having a model it is a model that one created or someone else created and the correspondence with whatever is modeled is part of the creation of the model. If you were simply presented with a model of all reality and you didn't know who created this model so that you could ask them how it corresponded to the thing modeled then you would be just like a scientist faced with nature and you would proceed by creating a model of the model in terms you understood. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Communicability
On 11/4/2012 11:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But you are exactly missing the point that I have been repeating. Truth is independent of a particular mind but it is not independent of all minds. This is ambiguous, as Arithmetical Truth contains the existence of all mind, and even in the right relations, once we assume comp. In that sense Arithmetical truth depends on all minds, but it is more simple and primary that all minds (again with comp, which relate consciousness to the computations done by universal machines). Dear Bruno, You need to show the necessity of separability of the minds, not just the existence. This is because there does not exist a unique naming scheme of minds. We discussed this when we agreed that god has no name. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Communicability
On 11/4/2012 11:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The body problem *is* the result, and does constitute the conceptual explantion of why we believe in bodies, despite the lack of it in the ontology. Well, do you want this problem to be solvable? Sure. And AUDA is a beginning of the solution, in a manner which makes possible to distinguish precisely the difference between terrestrial/objective and divine/subjective, that the the many 1p and 3p views. Dear Bruno, But there is no an absolute 3p view! Such would be the 'view' of God and the Kolmogorov minimum algorithm that specified it would be God's name! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm
On 11/4/2012 12:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: [SPK] Does the One have a Concept of The One as its unique 1p? I think the inner God, alias the arithmetical 1p (not arithmetical in the logician sense, but still applying to the machine) , alias Bp p (Theaetetus on Bp) can be said to be a unique abstract person. But it is not the 1p of the one, it is the 1p of the Man. Open problem for me if Arithmetical truth can be seen as a person or not. Dear Bruno, I am making a conjecture that Arithmetical truth (AT) cannot be seen as a singular person and pursuing the consequences of that conjecture. I claim that, at best, AT is the mutual consistent set of predicates (?) within the individual 1p of at least 3 entities. This follows from my definitions of information and Reality. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?
On 11/4/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Bruno, The primacy of 17 or 43 or any other number is such that it can be apprehended, at least in principle, by /at least one entity/ (please note that this is a lower bound concept!). This implies that in the absence of that possibility of apprehension (by at least one entity) that there is no such thing as primeness. This is totally ridiculous, Stephen. With comp, it is obvious that the primacy of 43 is conceptually far simpler than the (true) fact that the primacy of 43 can be apprehended by a type of machine/numbers. You are like a biologist telling Morgan that it is stupid to hope to understand the genetic of the fly before understanding the genetic of the zoologist. Bruno Dear Bruno, NO! What I am doing is like demanding that Morgan exists before I will agree that Morgan knows about the genetics of a fly. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/4/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 19:27, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Bertrand Russell was a superb logician but he was not infallible with regard to metaphysics. He called Leibniz's metaphysics an enchanted land and confessed that he hadn't a clue to what the meaning of pragmatism is. Hi Roger, Yeah, his star fell today, for me. Why. because he was wrong? But all serious people are wrong. To be wrong is a chance, and to be shown wrong is an even bigger chance. Russell was not annoyed by that, because his platonist intuition was preserved. he just learned that reason needed to learn modesty with respect to truth seeking, even on arithmetic and machine. Dear Bruno, I had hoped that he would could not be saved posthumously from Platonism. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Life: origin, purpose, and qualia spectrum
Hi Everyone: I would now like to expand the discussion re the two current conclusions in the slightly edited version of the first post [below] as follows: i) Consciousness: The origin and purpose of life herein leads me to believe that consciousness is distributed across life entities in accordance with their ability to act in accord with it. Even single celled entities would have a non zero degree of it to properly enable life's purpose. ii) Freewill: Life's purpose as given herein precludes it. iii) Species survival: Life on this planet is in the midst of a mass extinction [not a new idea] that can't be stopped because implementation of the purpose as given herein is the only priority for life. We can't exclude ourselves from the extinction. [There have been a number of mass extinctions but evolution has sometimes used these to produce new life entities with greater energy hang-up barrier busting ability than the extinguished ones - new life entities such as ourselves. Edited first post 1) Definition (1): Energy (E) is the ability to subject a mass to a force. 2) There are several types of energy currently known or proposed: a) Mass itself via the conversion: [M = E/(c*c)] b) Gravitational c) Electromagnetic d) Nuclear [Strong and Weak forces] e) Dark Energy 3) Definition (2): Work (W) is the flow of energy amongst the various types by means of a change in the spatial configuration, dynamics and/or amount of mass in a system brought about by an actual application of a force to a mass. 4) The exact original distribution of energy amongst the various types can't be reestablished and the new configuration can't do as much work as the prior configuration was capable of doing. [Second Law of Thermodynamics] 5) Time is not a factor: Once a flow of energy is possible it will take place immediately. 6) Conclusion (1): Since life is an energy flow conduit, wherever the possibility of life exists life will appear as rapidly as possible. This is the origin of life herein. [If we look at the usual attempts to define life, we find things such as grow, procreate,[Thanks John] etc. These require a flow of energy from an initial ability to do work to a lower ability to do work and through the life entity. Think of the life entity as a pipe or conduit for this flow.] 7) Some energy flows are prevented by what are known [in my memory] as Energy Flow Hang-up Barriers such as nuclear bonding coefficient issues, spatial configuration, spin, other spatial dynamics, ignition temperature requirements, electromagnetic repulsion, etc. [Energy Flow Hang-up Barriers is not my terminology - I think there was a twenty year or so old article in Scientific American I am looking for and a quick Internet search found a discussion of the repulsion hang-up in Cosmology The Science of the Universe by Edward Robert Harrison. [Therefore life herein is just an energy flow conduit drilling holes in energy flow hang-up barriers as rapidly as possible for the particular entity to enable even more such energy flow.] 8) Conclusion (2): Once life is present it will immediately punch as many holes in as many Energy Hang-up Barriers as the details of the particular life entity involved allows - this is how it realizes its energy flow conduit character. This is the purpose of life herein. In other words life's purpose is to hasten the heat death of its host universe. 9) Now add in evolution which is a random walk with a lower but no upper bound. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Why Does Geometry Exist?
Through the Stone Duality we know that every topology can be expressed by a logical algebra...so... Doesn't that make all forms of geometry, topology, or just 'forms' in general completely redundant? What would be the mathematical purpose of having this visual-spatial representation of numbers? This says to me again that Comp is unsupportable and that sense is more primitive than arithmetic. With sense as the universal primitive, logical algebras and geometric topologies are free to exist specifically for their differentiation - to multiply significance rather than to express a monolithic ideal truth. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/1oqIBm2s5DkJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
