date:20131212

Having had a go at following the first paper, I will have to give in and
just accept that lack of dispersion indicates lack of quantum foam.

It seems ironic that quantum theory is supposed to explain what happens at
small scales compared to relativity, but now we have what looks like an
experiment showing that things go back to being relativistic (or at least a
continuum) well below the quantum scale. (Assuming I've understood this at
all...)

I must have a look at the second paper, but I'm not sure I will fare any
better...

On 13 December 2013 14:42, LizR  wrote:

> Thanks, I will have a go at understanding those.
>
>

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

Thanks, I will have a go at understanding those.

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 12/12/2013 5:12 PM, LizR wrote:
On 13 December 2013 14:04, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

The result was lack of frequency dispersion for gamma rays. So it was
assuming some
interaction between photons and the discrete units of spacetime. That
seems pretty
tight.

Assuming the interpretation is correct, at least. Do you know the theory of why that was
supposed to happen, and how the quantisation was reduced so far below the Planck length?
If so I'd be interested in an explanation, assuming I can understand it.

Bounds on Spectral Dispersion from Fermi-detected Gamma Ray Bursts
Robert J. Nemiroff,1 Ryan Connolly,1 Justin Holmes,1 and Alexander B. Kostinski1
1Dept. of Physics, Michigan Technological University, 1400 Townsend Dr., Houghton MI,
49931, USA

Data from four Fermi-detected gamma-ray bursts (GRBs) is used to set limits on
spectral dis-
persion of electromagnetic radiation across the universe. The analysis focuses on photons
recorded

above 1 GeV for Fermi detected GRB 080916C, GRB 090510A, GRB 090902B, and GRB
090926A
because these high-energy photons yield the tightest bounds on light dispersion. It is
shown that
significant photon bunches in GRB 090510A, possibly classic GRB pulses, are remarkably
brief, an
order of magnitude shorter in duration than any previously claimed temporal feature in
this energy
range. Although conceivably a > 3 fluctuation, when taken at face value, these pulses
lead to an
order of magnitude tightening of prior limits on photon dispersion. Bound of c/c < 6.94 x
10-21
is thus obtained. Given generic dispersion relations where the time delay is proportional
to the
photon energy to the first or second power, the most stringent limits on the dispersion
strengths

were k1 < 1.61 x 10-5 sec Gpc-1 GeV-1 and k2 < 3.57 x 10-7 sec Gpc-1 GeV-2
respectively. Such
limits constrain dispersive effects created, for example, by the spacetime foam of quantum
gravity.

In the context of quantum gravity, our bounds set M1c2 greater than 525 times
the Planck mass,
suggesting that spacetime is smooth at energies near and slightly above the
Planck mass.

arXiv:1109.5191v2

(Presumably if correct this result also screws up things like calculations of black hole
entropy, which seem to rely on the Planck length being a "unit" in some sense - at least
according to the "science for dummies" books I've read.)

Does quantum mechanics tell an atomistic spacetime?
Hans-Thomas Elze
Dipartimento di Fisica "Enrico Fermi", Largo Pontecorvo 3, I-56127 Pisa, Italia
E-mail: e...@df.unipi.it
Abstract. The canonical answer to the question posed is "Yes." -- tacitly
assuming that
quantum theory and the concept of spacetime are to be unified by 'quantizing' a
theory of
gravitation. Yet, instead, one may ponder: Could quantum mechanics arise as a
coarse-grained
reflection of the atomistic nature of spacetime? -- We speculate that this may
indeed be the
case. We recall the similarity between evolution of classical and quantum mechanical
ensembles,

according to Liouville and vonNeumann equation, respectively. The classical and
quantum
mechanical equations are indistinguishable for objects which are free or
subject to spatially
constant but possibly time dependent, or harmonic forces, if represented
appropriately. This
result suggests a way to incorporate anharmonic interactions, including
fluctuations which are
tentatively related to the underlying discreteness of spacetime. Being linear
and local at the
quantum mechanical level, the model offers a decoherence and natural
localization mechanism.
However, the relation to primordial deterministic degrees of freedom is
nonlocal.

arXiv:0906.1101v1

Brent

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 13 December 2013 14:04, meekerdb  wrote:

>
> The result was lack of frequency dispersion for gamma rays.  So it was
> assuming some interaction between photons and the discrete units of
> spacetime.  That seems pretty tight.
>
> Assuming the interpretation is correct, at least. Do you know the theory
of why that was supposed to happen, and how the quantisation was reduced so
far below the Planck length? If so I'd be interested in an explanation,
assuming I can understand it. (Presumably if correct this result also
screws up things like calculations of black hole entropy, which seem to
rely on the Planck length being a "unit" in some sense - at least according
to the "science for dummies" books I've read.)

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 12/12/2013 4:18 PM, LizR wrote:
On 13 December 2013 13:07, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

On 12/12/2013 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:

On 13 December 2013 06:00, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote:

On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist mailto:yann...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Liz,

In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends
on
various quantum states.
Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change
from your
previous state.
If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same
since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor.
Rich

Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital
consciousness
involves constant state changes, at the substitution level and below.
You end
up with something like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred Hoyle's pigeon
holes,
or someone, not sure who's "capsule" model of identity. It's all very
Heraclitean!

Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no "snapshots". The
computations that produce consciousness are distributed in space and
time and
one "thought" overlaps another.

Sorry, but I don't quite see what you mean here. How does being distributed
in
space and time avoid snapshots? You can still split space-time into
snapshots in
the MWI (or "foliate" space-time in relativity, I guess) in a manner that
usefully
explains extended processes - they just extend across sequential snapshots /
foliations. Digital consciousness would presumably have a clock at some
level, and
steps, but that might be far above the level of MWI snapshots, or it might
be far
below it - space-time itself might be digital, which would automatically
allow
higher level processes to be (in the sense required for comp).

Are you just saying that "observer moments" can't be identified with "MWI
snapshots" ?

Yes, but not JUST that. Foliation of spacetime is not unique. So no matter
how
slice it, a computational state that is extended in space and time can't be
captured
on a slice. It's on multiple slices and so it can overlap with other
computational
states and this implies an inherent order. Of course this wouldn't apply if
spacetime is itself discrete, but assuming that would be at a much finer
level than
computational states then the spacetime relations would supply continuity
to the
computational states.

That's all true, and QM and SR have been known to disagree on this for a long time, I
believe. I doubt that anyone would try to identify observer moments with snapshots or
foliations (especially if they're generated in arithmetic, of course)

And it seems experimentally that spacetime is not discrete even below the
Planck length.

I'd like to know how watertight that result is. IIRC they were looking for a particular
type of granularity - was it to do with the holographic principle?

The result was lack of frequency dispersion for gamma rays. So it was assuming some
interaction between photons and the discrete units of spacetime. That seems pretty tight.

Brent

I believe it rules out some theories (LQG?) which assume space-time is granular (in a
particular sense...) ? I would like to know more about this.

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 13 December 2013 13:07, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 12/12/2013 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 13 December 2013 06:00, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>   On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>>
>>>  Liz,
>>>
>>>  In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends on
>>> various quantum states.
>>> Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change from
>>> your previous state.
>>> If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same
>>> since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor.
>>> Rich
>>>
>>>  Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital
>> consciousness involves constant state changes, at the substitution level
>> and below. You end up with something like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred
>> Hoyle's pigeon holes, or someone, not sure who's "capsule" model of
>> identity. It's all very Heraclitean!
>>
>>
>>  Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no "snapshots".
>> The computations that produce consciousness are distributed in space and
>> time and one "thought" overlaps another.
>>
>>  Sorry, but I don't quite see what you mean here. How does being
> distributed in space and time avoid snapshots? You can still split
> space-time into snapshots in the MWI (or "foliate" space-time in
> relativity, I guess) in a manner that usefully explains extended processes
> - they just extend across sequential snapshots / foliations. Digital
> consciousness would presumably have a clock at some level, and steps, but
> that might be far above the level of MWI snapshots, or it might be far
> below it - space-time itself might be digital, which would automatically
> allow higher level processes to be (in the sense required for comp).
>
>  Are you just saying that "observer moments" can't be identified with
> "MWI snapshots" ?
>
>
> Yes, but not JUST that. Foliation of spacetime is not unique.  So no
> matter how slice it, a computational state that is extended in space and
> time can't be captured on a slice.  It's on multiple slices and so it can
> overlap with other computational states and this implies an inherent
> order.  Of course this wouldn't apply if spacetime is itself discrete, but
> assuming that would be at a much finer level than computational states then
> the spacetime relations would supply continuity to the computational states.
>

That's all true, and QM and SR have been known to disagree on this for a
long time, I believe. I doubt that anyone would try to identify observer
moments with snapshots or foliations (especially if they're generated in
arithmetic, of course)

>
> And it seems experimentally that spacetime is not discrete even below the
> Planck length.
>

I'd like to know how watertight that result is. IIRC they were looking for
a particular type of granularity - was it to do with the holographic
principle? I believe it rules out some theories (LQG?) which assume
space-time is granular (in a particular sense...) ? I would like to know
more about this.

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 12/12/2013 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 13 December 2013 06:00, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote:

On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist mailto:yann...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Liz,

In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends on
various
quantum states.
Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change from
your
previous state.
If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same
since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor.
Rich

Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital consciousness
involves
constant state changes, at the substitution level and below. You end up with
something like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred Hoyle's pigeon holes, or
someone,
not sure who's "capsule" model of identity. It's all very Heraclitean!

Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no "snapshots". The
computations that produce consciousness are distributed in space and time
and one
"thought" overlaps another.

Sorry, but I don't quite see what you mean here. How does being distributed in space and
time avoid snapshots? You can still split space-time into snapshots in the MWI (or
"foliate" space-time in relativity, I guess) in a manner that usefully explains extended
processes - they just extend across sequential snapshots / foliations. Digital
consciousness would presumably have a clock at some level, and steps, but that might be
far above the level of MWI snapshots, or it might be far below it - space-time itself
might be digital, which would automatically allow higher level processes to be (in the
sense required for comp).

Are you just saying that "observer moments" can't be identified with "MWI
snapshots" ?

Yes, but not JUST that. Foliation of spacetime is not unique. So no matter how slice it,
a computational state that is extended in space and time can't be captured on a slice.
It's on multiple slices and so it can overlap with other computational states and this
implies an inherent order. Of course this wouldn't apply if spacetime is itself discrete,
but assuming that would be at a much finer level than computational states then the
spacetime relations would supply continuity to the computational states.

And it seems experimentally that spacetime is not discrete even below the
Planck length.

Brent

Re: Uruguay

On 13 December 2013 07:04, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 12 Dec 2013, at 18:31, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  Is it true that you're transferring to the University of Uruguay, Bruno?
>
>
> Yes, but not exactly. Apparently I will be triplicated in Washington,
> Colorado, *and* Uruguay.
>

And Amsterdam?

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Re: Auguson Farms emergency food supplies at walmart

Good luck!


On 13 December 2013 00:34, Roger Clough  wrote:

>  Hi
>
> In preparation for the coming weimar-type economy collapse,
> where a loaf of bread will cost you $100 or more,
> I'm going up to Germantown to buy Auguson Farms
> emergency food pails at walmart. The 30 day pails of
> emergency food will keep for 25 years, run from $80 to
> $160 for 30 days. Maybe 6 months to begin with.
>
>
>  Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
> See my Leibniz site at
>  http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough
>
>
> --
> 
>
> This email is free from viruses and malware because avast! 
> Antivirusprotection is active.
>
>  --
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Re: Arctic sea ice increased by 51 % last year.

On 13 December 2013 11:11, Alberto G. Corona  wrote:

> You are a bunch of oil-paid  negationists!
> Your hands are stained with petrol!
>
> Why would posting a graph showing that Arctic sea ice has been in decline
since 1978, and that the current increase is insignificant compared to the
overall trend, imply that?

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 13 December 2013 10:27, John Clark  wrote:

>
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> > In Everett it's always obvious who I'm talking about when I use the
>>> personal pronoun "you", it's the only other fellow in the room with me; but
>>> in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing to the right of the
>>> duplicating machine and a identical looking man standing to the left of the
>>> duplicating machine and they both have a equal right to use the grand title
>>> "you".
>>>
>>
>>
> > But they know pretty well who they are in the first person way,
>>
>
> No they do not, not in a world with duplicating machines; and by insisting
> that they do you're assuming the most important part of the very thing
> you're trying to prove. Mr. You doesn't know if he's the copy or the
> original. Mr. You doesn't know if he's 40 years old or 40 seconds old. Mr.
> You does know that he's the guy who is having this thought right now, but
> in a worjd of duplicating machines that is insufficient information to make
> a differentiation because that fellow over there (or is it a mirror) could
> be having the exact same thought at the exact same time.
>

But I *do *know who I am in the first person, regardless of my personal
history, and regardless of the existence of duplicating machines. We could
make further extensions to the above scenario - say I'm really a digital
copy, stored in a computer in Daniel Dennett's secret laboratory, but
linked to the senses of an android which seems to be human - it appears
human when it looks at itself in the mirror, etc. As far as I can tell I am
that android, and unless it strays so far from my computer that there are
appreciable delays in communication, or its batteries run out or something,
I will never know otherwise. But even so, I am still correct about who I am.

I think you're mixing up my first person knowledge of who am I with the
third person knowledge required to know about the history of my body.

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 13 December 2013 06:00, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>
>>  Liz,
>>
>>  In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends on
>> various quantum states.
>> Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change from
>> your previous state.
>> If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same
>> since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor.
>> Rich
>>
>>  Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital
> consciousness involves constant state changes, at the substitution level
> and below. You end up with something like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred
> Hoyle's pigeon holes, or someone, not sure who's "capsule" model of
> identity. It's all very Heraclitean!
>
>
> Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no "snapshots".  The
> computations that produce consciousness are distributed in space and time
> and one "thought" overlaps another.
>
> Sorry, but I don't quite see what you mean here. How does being
distributed in space and time avoid snapshots? You can still split
space-time into snapshots in the MWI (or "foliate" space-time in
relativity, I guess) in a manner that usefully explains extended processes
- they just extend across sequential snapshots / foliations. Digital
consciousness would presumably have a clock at some level, and steps, but
that might be far above the level of MWI snapshots, or it might be far
below it - space-time itself might be digital, which would automatically
allow higher level processes to be (in the sense required for comp).

Are you just saying that "observer moments" can't be identified with "MWI
snapshots" ?

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Re: A definition of human consciousness

2013-12-12 Thread John Mikes

The present title is better:  *H U M A N  consciousness. *  I buy THAT as
"being conscious". Of what? first of myself. Then:
the world around ME. Then the development of HUMAN thinking over the past
millennia, including good old D. Hume, who -
IMO - was a wise person, but I feel since his time humanity might have
absorbed SOME info in addition to what he had at his time. I appreciate
Hume's wisdom, but would not like to go back and hold it as a measure for
my thinking. He did not text from a jet-flight about a TV show, or  ais DNA
aberrations. Etc.


On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:27 PM, John Mikes  wrote:

> Brent:   *W h a t*  consciousness? would you please describe your take
> (observing the caveat of Liz)?
> Whatever I could deduce from different peoples' (authors') mumblings (the
> contents?) boiled down in my 'generealization' to *"RESPONSE TO
> RELATIONS" *- no animal (human?) connotation, thinking, or feeling.
> They all fell out. With no  indication of   *H O W ? *
> *JM*
>
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 11:34 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 12/10/2013 7:42 PM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  On 11 December 2013 10:24, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>  On 12/10/2013 11:54 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 7:33 PM, LizR  wrote:
>>>
>>>   > One needs a rigorous definition of what consciousness is, to start
 with,

>>>
>>>  Examples are usually preferable to definitions.
>>>
>>>  > and then a theory that explains all its observed features, and makes
 testable predictions.

>>>
>>>  But that's the beauty of consciousness theories, we can detect
>>> consciousness only in ourselves so there are no observed features that a
>>> consciousness theory must explain,
>>>
>>>
>>>  Actually there are some observed features.  A sharp blow to the head
>>> can create a gap in ones consciousness.  Imbibing various substances that
>>> can cross the blood/brain barrier have somewhat predictable effects.
>>> Localized electrical stimulation of the brain produces repeatable effects,
>>> both in consciousness and somatic.
>>>
>>>  If you're assuming there is more to consciousness than the sum of our
>> thoughts, experiences, memories, etc - then this *may* be a description
>> of features of the contents of consciousness, rather than of the thing
>> itself.
>>
>>
>> ?? Are you speculating that there are parts of consciousness we're not
>> conscious of?
>>
>> Brent
>>
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>>
>
>

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Re: Arctic sea ice increased by 51 % last year.

2013-12-12 Thread Alberto G. Corona

You are a bunch of oil-paid  negationists!

Your hands are stained with petrol!


2013/12/12, LizR :
> *Or if you prefer it in tabular form...Table 1. * Previous minimum Arctic
> sea ice extents YEARMINIMUM ICE EXTENTDATEIN MILLIONS OF SQUARE
> KILOMETERSIN
> MILLIONS OF SQUARE MILES20074.171.61September 1820084.591.77September
> 202009
> 5.131.98September 1320104.631.79September 2120114.331.67September
> 1120123.41
> 1.32September 1620135.101.97September 131979 to 2000
> average6.702.59September
> 131981 to 2010 average6.222.40September 15
>
>
> On 13 December 2013 10:49, LizR  wrote:
>
>> From http://nsidc.org/
>>
>> (The National Snow and Ice Data Center at the University of Colorado)
>>
>> [image: Inline images 1]
>> Cue dismissal of the data based on the motives of the people putting it
>> forward.
>>
>>
>
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-- 
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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 12 December 2013 22:36, LizR  wrote:

> On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>
>> Liz,
>>
>> In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends on
>> various quantum states.
>> Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change from
>> your previous state.
>> If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same
>> since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor.
>> Rich
>>
>> Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital consciousness
> involves constant state changes, at the substitution level and below. You
> end up with something like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred Hoyle's pigeon
> holes, or someone, not sure who's "capsule" model of identity. It's all
> very Heraclitean!
>
> To reply slightly less poetically, I agree. The MWI postulates that each
"snapshot" is unique, and that only regions of the multiverse that had
differentiated can be considered as different snapshots - so at the micro
level we are made of superposed particles, and consciousness is riding
along on top of (supervening on, if it does) constantly differentiating
matter. Even if we consider snapshots of (say) me, each one is unique -
there is only a (constantly branching) thread of "closest" states which
give me a sense of identity along each thread. So one has identify the
process that gives me a sense of identity amidst all this fizzing chaos,
and see whether a digital brain could act as a "closest continuation" to
any given snapshot.

Having said all which, I'm persuaded that it would be very difficult /
impossible in practice to create a digital continuation. But obviously the
universe creates continuations, digital or otherwise.

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Re: Arctic sea ice increased by 51 % last year.

*Or if you prefer it in tabular form...Table 1. * Previous minimum Arctic
sea ice extents YEARMINIMUM ICE EXTENTDATEIN MILLIONS OF SQUARE KILOMETERSIN
MILLIONS OF SQUARE MILES20074.171.61September 1820084.591.77September 202009
5.131.98September 1320104.631.79September 2120114.331.67September 1120123.41
1.32September 1620135.101.97September 131979 to 2000 average6.702.59September
131981 to 2010 average6.222.40September 15

On 13 December 2013 10:49, LizR  wrote:

> From http://nsidc.org/
>
> (The National Snow and Ice Data Center at the University of Colorado)
>
> [image: Inline images 1]
> Cue dismissal of the data based on the motives of the people putting it
> forward.
>
>

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Re: Arctic sea ice increased by 51 % last year.

>From http://nsidc.org/

(The National Snow and Ice Data Center at the University of Colorado)

[image: Inline images 1]
Cue dismissal of the data based on the motives of the people putting it
forward.

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

2013-12-12 Thread Jason Resch

Any time John Clark pretends that he does not understand or believe in
first-person indeterminancy, refer him to his own post where he admitts to
understanding it and believing in it:

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/5PR1FXp_CSU/PnuTSn_82PwJ

John Clark: "So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of
knowing if A was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would
make no difference."

Note: In case A the inputs to the mind are controlled by a random number
generator and in case B, the mind is duplicated and shown different
results. So by accepting there is no subjective difference, John Clark
accepts that true randomness is subjectively indistinguishable from
duplication and bifurcation. In other words, John Clark knows that
duplication and bifurcation can yield the appearance of randomness.

Jason

On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 3:27 PM, John Clark  wrote:

>
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> > In Everett it's always obvious who I'm talking about when I use the
>>> personal pronoun "you", it's the only other fellow in the room with me; but
>>> in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing to the right of the
>>> duplicating machine and a identical looking man standing to the left of the
>>> duplicating machine and they both have a equal right to use the grand title
>>> "you".
>>>
>>
>>
> > But they know pretty well who they are in the first person way,
>>
>
> No they do not, not in a world with duplicating machines; and by insisting
> that they do you're assuming the most important part of the very thing
> you're trying to prove. Mr. You doesn't know if he's the copy or the
> original. Mr. You doesn't know if he's 40 years old or 40 seconds old. Mr.
> You does know that he's the guy who is having this thought right now, but
> in a worjd of duplicating machines that is insufficient information to make
> a differentiation because that fellow over there (or is it a mirror) could
> be having the exact same thought at the exact same time.
>
> > One told me: I see in my diary that I predicted (in Helsinki) that I
>> would be at both places, but I see now that this was wrong
>>
>
> I predicted? In such a situation that would only be a half truth, it would
> be much more accurate to say the Helsinki man predicted or Bruno Marchal
> predicted. A pronoun has raised its ugly head yet again.
>
>
>> >>> Then you can't say that you will survive anything. We die at each
 instant
>
>
>>> >> OK, but then you can't say that survival is important, or that the
>>> word means much of anything at all.
>>>
>>
>> > That was my point. Indeed. Comp would lost his meaning.
>>
>
> At last we agree on something, "comp" has lost it's meaning.
>
>
>>  >> 'Comp" is not trivial, "comp" is a gibberish word made up by you
>>> that is almost as meaningless as "free will".
>>>
>>
>> > Comp is the mechanist thesis. You confuse axioms and theorems.
>>
>
> It's the erroneous theorems that you claim to have derived from the sound
> axioms of computationalism that I object to. And that's the difference
> between "comp" and  "computationalism", and that is why you insist on using
> your homemade silly little word rather than the standard term.
>
> > your preceding argument was shown to confuse the 1-view and the 3-view
>>
>
> For several years now Bruno Marchal has accused John Clark of that, but
> John Clark would maintain that there is not a single person on the face of
> the earth who is confused by the difference between the first person and
> the third person.
>
> >> why do you keep emphasizing what the various copies will predict about
>>> their future and how accurate those predictions turn out to be?
>>>
>>
>> > The point is that we need only a notion of first person self
>>
>
> I think therefore I am.
>
> > and thrid person self
>>
>
> I know what a third person is, but what the hell is the "third person
> self"?
>
>
>> >> I honestly don't give a damn about "comp"
>>>
>>
>> > You said that you believe in comp.
>
>
> I NEVER said I believe in "comp", I don't even know what your homemade
> word means,  you claim it's just short for "computationalism" but that is
> clearly untrue. For years I've tried to infer its meaning from your usage
> but have been unsuccessful.
>
> > If you think there is no 1-indeterminacy
>>
>
> I don't think that either!  It's not exactly a earthshaking discovery to
> state that we often don't know what we will see next, I believe that was
> first found by Og the caveman.  So everything you say is true or original,
> the parts that are true are not original and the parts that are original
> are not true.
>
>   John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>  --
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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

2013-12-12 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 3:10 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 12/12/2013 12:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Dec 12, 2013, at 11:00 AM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>   On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
>
>>  Liz,
>>
>>  In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends on
>> various quantum states.
>> Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change from
>> your previous state.
>> If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same
>> since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor.
>> Rich
>>
>>  Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital
> consciousness involves constant state changes, at the substitution level
> and below. You end up with something like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred
> Hoyle's pigeon holes, or someone, not sure who's "capsule" model of
> identity. It's all very Heraclitean!
>
>
> Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no "snapshots".  The
> computations that produce consciousness are distributed in space and time
> and one "thought" overlaps another.
>
>
>  That isn't obvious to me. Are you saying the brain manufactures 10^43
> thoughts per second?  Would we know if the brain only made ~30 thoughts per
> second?
>
>
> No, I'm saying, roughly, the latter.  And those thoughts have extension in
> both space and time (in the brain) as physically realized, so they can
> overlap.  The overlapping times them together and provides an ordering,
> corresponding to the experience of consciousness and time.
>
>
Okay.  I agree with this.  It is particularly evident in the case of a
single-threaded CPU emulating a neural network, which is maximally spread
out in time (rather than space), but implements the same computation and
same consciousness.

Jason

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Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real

2013-12-12 Thread Richard Ruquist

Bruno: If our subst level is far above the quantum level, then QM can still
be derivable from arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical (and
thus variable in the whole of the physical reality).

Richard: Astronomical observations/measurements of the structure constant
across nearly the whole visible universe indicates that the constants are
to-first-order approximately monotonically variable as a function of space,
but not time. So the substitution level may be far above the quantum level
and that is a hypothesis in my model, to have the 6d particles of space, at
a density of 10^90/cc, emulate RA.and the comp ontology.


On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:17 PM, Richard Ruquist  wrote:

> Bruno: Please tell me if above helped.
>
> Richard: Yes. Very much so. We being "celestial, divine creatures, if you
> want. "We" (first person) are already in "heaven", or Platonia, "  is
> completely consistent with my thinking
>
> Bruno: To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which should
> be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable.
> If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she would
> provide evidence against digital mechanism.
>
> Richard: What I have to offer is a finite array of perhaps
> distinguishable,
> perhaps enumerable, 6d particles of string-theory spacetime
> sometimes called the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds.
>
> These may be computable and emulate the ontology of comp
> if Robinson Arithmetic can be manifested by them;
> amounting perhaps to a finite mod/comp.
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>> Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are,
>> qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis.
>> [if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is
>> empirically likely]
>>
>> Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is duplication
>> possible?
>>
>>
>>
>> It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simple
>> answer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we *bet* that
>> there is a level of description where we can be coded "into a number" and
>> emulated by a Turing universal machine, or equivalently, emulated in
>> arithmetic. (it turing universal part, or its sigma_1 complete part).
>>
>> Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, to illustrate
>> the "weakness" of the comp hypothesis I work with.
>>
>> 1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecular
>> level, with a classical average on elementary interaction between the
>> 'particles'.
>>
>> 2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of the
>> entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of galaxies,
>> (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the "right" fields,
>> or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and this with 10^(10^10)
>> decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you prefer. No collapse!
>>
>> Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler to use in
>> the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before "jumping" into
>> UD* at step 7.
>>
>> Indeed, at step seven, we see that the "precise" level, as far as it
>> exists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate "all "finite" levels, with all
>> oracles, infinitely often.
>>
>> Comp is a self-truncation hypothesis, even if it is at a very low level.
>> Molecular Biology illustrates plausibly a successful digital encoding of
>> our bodies (the DNA), and both the existence of the brain and of evolving
>> species, involves stability by redundancy of many slight variants, making
>> the theory working through some digital encodings.
>>
>> Non cloning concerns the apparent matter, which in comp should be defined
>> by an indeterminacy involving all computations, involving all universal
>> numbers, and their infinite works: something hardly clonable.
>>
>> But the point of comp is that we are not our bodies. We borrow bodies. We
>> borrow them with respect to our most probable histories (the 1p view in the
>> computations where you survive).
>>
>> We are celestial, divine creatures, if you want. "We" (first person) are
>> already in "heaven", or Platonia, or in the arithmetical true relations in
>> between possible universal numbers and other (arithmetical) entities.
>>
>> If you think that the brain or the body is a quantum object, you have
>> still the choice between a quantum brain (quantum computer, quantum mind)
>> or not.
>> The very weak comp I use remains valid in both case. This comes from the
>> fact that
>>
>> 1) classical Turing machine can emulate quantum computers (albeit very
>> slowly)
>> 2) the first person experience remains unchanged whatever big are the
>> delays of virtual reconstitution in the UD* (the run of the UD).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I read your paragraphs over and over and still come to the same question.
>>
>>
>> Please tell me if above helped.  In step 1

Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

2013-12-12 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> In Everett it's always obvious who I'm talking about when I use the
>> personal pronoun "you", it's the only other fellow in the room with me; but
>> in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man standing to the right of the
>> duplicating machine and a identical looking man standing to the left of the
>> duplicating machine and they both have a equal right to use the grand title
>> "you".
>>
>
>
> But they know pretty well who they are in the first person way,
>

No they do not, not in a world with duplicating machines; and by insisting
that they do you're assuming the most important part of the very thing
you're trying to prove. Mr. You doesn't know if he's the copy or the
original. Mr. You doesn't know if he's 40 years old or 40 seconds old. Mr.
You does know that he's the guy who is having this thought right now, but
in a worjd of duplicating machines that is insufficient information to make
a differentiation because that fellow over there (or is it a mirror) could
be having the exact same thought at the exact same time.

> One told me: I see in my diary that I predicted (in Helsinki) that I
> would be at both places, but I see now that this was wrong
>

I predicted? In such a situation that would only be a half truth, it would
be much more accurate to say the Helsinki man predicted or Bruno Marchal
predicted. A pronoun has raised its ugly head yet again.

> >>> Then you can't say that you will survive anything. We die at each
>>> instant

>> >> OK, but then you can't say that survival is important, or that the
>> word means much of anything at all.
>>
>
> > That was my point. Indeed. Comp would lost his meaning.
>

At last we agree on something, "comp" has lost it's meaning.

> >> 'Comp" is not trivial, "comp" is a gibberish word made up by you that
>> is almost as meaningless as "free will".
>>
>
> > Comp is the mechanist thesis. You confuse axioms and theorems.
>

It's the erroneous theorems that you claim to have derived from the sound
axioms of computationalism that I object to. And that's the difference
between "comp" and  "computationalism", and that is why you insist on using
your homemade silly little word rather than the standard term.

> your preceding argument was shown to confuse the 1-view and the 3-view
>

For several years now Bruno Marchal has accused John Clark of that, but
John Clark would maintain that there is not a single person on the face of
the earth who is confused by the difference between the first person and
the third person.

>> why do you keep emphasizing what the various copies will predict about
>> their future and how accurate those predictions turn out to be?
>>
>
> > The point is that we need only a notion of first person self
>

I think therefore I am.

> and thrid person self
>

I know what a third person is, but what the hell is the "third person
self"?

> >> I honestly don't give a damn about "comp"
>>
>
> > You said that you believe in comp.

I NEVER said I believe in "comp", I don't even know what your homemade word
means,  you claim it's just short for "computationalism" but that is
clearly untrue. For years I've tried to infer its meaning from your usage
but have been unsuccessful.

> If you think there is no 1-indeterminacy
>

I don't think that either!  It's not exactly a earthshaking discovery to
state that we often don't know what we will see next, I believe that was
first found by Og the caveman.  So everything you say is true or original,
the parts that are true are not original and the parts that are original
are not true.

  John K Clark

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Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real

2013-12-12 Thread Richard Ruquist

Bruno: Please tell me if above helped.

Richard: Yes. Very much so. We being "celestial, divine creatures, if you
want. "We" (first person) are already in "heaven", or Platonia, "  is
completely consistent with my thinking

Bruno: To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which should
be shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable.
If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she would
provide evidence against digital mechanism.

Richard: What I have to offer is a finite array of perhaps distinguishable,
perhaps enumerable, 6d particles of string-theory spacetime
sometimes called the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds.

These may be computable and emulate the ontology of comp
if Robinson Arithmetic can be manifested by them;
amounting perhaps to a finite mod/comp.


On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 12:21 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are,
> qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis.
> [if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is empirically
> likely]
>
> Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is duplication
> possible?
>
>
>
> It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simple
> answer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we *bet* that
> there is a level of description where we can be coded "into a number" and
> emulated by a Turing universal machine, or equivalently, emulated in
> arithmetic. (it turing universal part, or its sigma_1 complete part).
>
> Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, to illustrate the
> "weakness" of the comp hypothesis I work with.
>
> 1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecular level,
> with a classical average on elementary interaction between the 'particles'.
>
> 2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of the
> entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of galaxies,
> (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the "right" fields,
> or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and this with 10^(10^10)
> decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you prefer. No collapse!
>
> Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler to use in
> the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before "jumping" into
> UD* at step 7.
>
> Indeed, at step seven, we see that the "precise" level, as far as it
> exists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate "all "finite" levels, with all
> oracles, infinitely often.
>
> Comp is a self-truncation hypothesis, even if it is at a very low level.
> Molecular Biology illustrates plausibly a successful digital encoding of
> our bodies (the DNA), and both the existence of the brain and of evolving
> species, involves stability by redundancy of many slight variants, making
> the theory working through some digital encodings.
>
> Non cloning concerns the apparent matter, which in comp should be defined
> by an indeterminacy involving all computations, involving all universal
> numbers, and their infinite works: something hardly clonable.
>
> But the point of comp is that we are not our bodies. We borrow bodies. We
> borrow them with respect to our most probable histories (the 1p view in the
> computations where you survive).
>
> We are celestial, divine creatures, if you want. "We" (first person) are
> already in "heaven", or Platonia, or in the arithmetical true relations in
> between possible universal numbers and other (arithmetical) entities.
>
> If you think that the brain or the body is a quantum object, you have
> still the choice between a quantum brain (quantum computer, quantum mind)
> or not.
> The very weak comp I use remains valid in both case. This comes from the
> fact that
>
> 1) classical Turing machine can emulate quantum computers (albeit very
> slowly)
> 2) the first person experience remains unchanged whatever big are the
> delays of virtual reconstitution in the UD* (the run of the UD).
>
>
>
>
> I read your paragraphs over and over and still come to the same question.
>
>
> Please tell me if above helped.  In step 1-6 I imagine a high level, to
> simplify the reasoning, but I step 7, we are in front of a non stopping UD
> run, and this defined the indeterminacy whatever is your level.
>
> If you feel like you have a quantum brain, just consult a quantum doctor.
> Saying yes, might everything more complex, but does not change the
> consequences.
>
> To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which should be
> shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable.
> If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she would
> provide evidence against digital mechanism.
>
> Comp *is* very weird, and, when better and better understood, it appears
> more and more unbelievable.
> It has to be, for the self-referentially correct machine.
>
> Ask any question if something is unclear. I don't defend the

Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?


On 12/12/2013 12:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Dec 12, 2013, at 11:00 AM, meekerdb > wrote:



On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote:
On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist > wrote:


Liz,

In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends on 
various
quantum states.
Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change from your
previous state.
If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same
since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor.
Rich

Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital consciousness involves 
constant state changes, at the substitution level and below. You end up with something 
like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred Hoyle's pigeon holes, or someone, not sure 
who's "capsule" model of identity. It's all very Heraclitean!


Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no "snapshots".  The computations 
that produce consciousness are distributed in space and time and one "thought" overlaps 
another.




That isn't obvious to me. Are you saying the brain manufactures 10^43 thoughts per 
second?  Would we know if the brain only made ~30 thoughts per second?


No, I'm saying, roughly, the latter.  And those thoughts have extension in both space and 
time (in the brain) as physically realized, so they can overlap.  The overlapping times 
them together and provides an ordering, corresponding to the experience of consciousness 
and time.


Brent

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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

2013-12-12 Thread Jason Resch




On Dec 12, 2013, at 11:00 AM, meekerdb  wrote:


On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote:

On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist  wrote:
Liz,

In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends  
on various quantum states.
Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change  
from your previous state.

If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same
since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor.
Rich

Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital  
consciousness involves constant state changes, at the substitution  
level and below. You end up with something like David Deutsch's  
snapshots or Fred Hoyle's pigeon holes, or someone, not sure who's  
"capsule" model of identity. It's all very Heraclitean!


Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no "snapshots".   
The computations that produce consciousness are distributed in space  
and time and one "thought" overlaps another.




That isn't obvious to me. Are you saying the brain manufactures 10^43  
thoughts per second?  Would we know if the brain only made ~30  
thoughts per second?


Jason


Brent
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Re: Uruguay



On 12 Dec 2013, at 19:27, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:


As the great philosopher Tex Williams once wrote-

Now I'm a feller with a heart of gold
And the ways of a gentleman I've been told
The kind of guy that wouldn't even harm a flea
But if me and a certain character met
The guy that invented the cigarette
I'd murder that son-of-a-gun in the first degree

It ain't cuz I don't smoke myself
And I don't reckon that it'll harm your health
Smoked all my life and I ain't dead yet
But nicotine slaves are all the same
At a pettin' party or a poker game
Everything gotta stop while they have a cigarette

Smoke, smoke, smoke that cigarette
Puff, puff, puff and if you smoke yourself to death
Tell St. Peter at the Golden Gate
That you hate to make him wait
But you just gotta have another cigarette


On this planet, tobacco is the killer one, and is known to hook 75% of  
those who try it, in his combustion form.


Yes, the addiction is such that in those severe days, the tobacco  
consumers will be confronted with the cold winter when smoking outside.


Unless they use oral tobacco, of course.

But how can we, in this insane misinformation time, explain to the  
kids that what is really dangerous for their health, is the addition  
of tobacco, the hard drug, in the cannabis joint? Well, that will be  
more easy in Uruguay, now.


Then addiction can be cured,  ... once we stop making the cure  
illegal. Of course.


Well, thanks to the devil, if he is human enough to let someone burn a  
last cigarette, before burning he or she for eternity.


And St Peeter, in my humble opinion,  might just say: "- no problem,  
in Heaven, you can smoke all plants you want, and here is the nectar  
of the Gods, don't hesitate to serve yourselve. God is happy when you  
enjoy his many creations and discoveries, with self-moderation, of  
course".


The only plant you should never smoke in Heaven is Salvia.
That one irresistibly brings you back on Earth, and then  you think "I  
though I was dead".


Thanks for the poem, I like a guy saying that he wouldn't  not even  
harm a fly, and  promised two lines below to murder in the first  
degree a human ... for a discovery he made.


Take it easy, and

Happy Christmas to All (Believers, Disbelievers and Non Believers, in  
This or That)


Bruno





-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Thu, Dec 12, 2013 1:04 pm
Subject: Re: Uruguay


On 12 Dec 2013, at 18:31, meekerdb wrote:

Is it true that you're transferring to the University of Uruguay,  
Bruno?



Yes, but not exactly. Apparently I will be triplicated in  
Washington, Colorado, *and* Uruguay.


At the biochemical level, for sure!

:)

Bruno




Brent

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Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real



On 12 Dec 2013, at 19:06, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/12/2013 9:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state  
of the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local  
cluster of galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the  
level of the "right" fields, or at the level of elementary strings  
and branes, and this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger  
picture if you prefer. No collapse!


But in this case the doctor doing the substitution is included in  
the substitution.  I think this produces a contradiction.


That happens all the time with universal machines. They can simulate  
another machine simulating themselves, and the UD brought this in the  
picture. With the phi_i and the W_i,  many apparent contradictions are  
resolved through the fact that we are confronted with non stopping  
machines.


Of course, as I said, it would make the thought experience difficult,  
for no reason, in the first six steps.
In this list, the first presentation of the UD was a presentation in  
15 steps, where I made explicit the neuro-high level assumption used  
in "step 1-6" and show explicitly at "step 7" how the UD* (the  
complete running of the UD) discharge that assumption.


The mathematical reason why we escape the contradiction is related to  
the closure of diagonalization, and to Kleene's second recursion  
theorem, which allows machine to invoke machines invoking them. It is  
standard in theoretical computer science.


Judson Webb explains well how Gödel's theorem protect Church thesis,  
which protect mechanism. In fact Gödel's theorem and the whole of G*- 
G, create the points of view (by the machine distinction between Bp  
and Bp & p, etc.), and protect the whole machine's theology, by  
splitting the communicable part from the non communicable one.  
Mathematical logic distinguish also what is expressible by the  
machine, and what is not expressible, yet "known" or produces as  
"true" in many possible ways.


The UD even run dreams in dreams in dreams  in a completely  
circular way. We cannot impeach it to dig in the absurd, once it is  
computable. That would be like trying to eliminate the number 13 from  
the integers.


Obviously, if the level is so low you need to simulate the entire  
universal wave, in practice you will say NO to the doctor, but at step  
seven, even if the level is that low, the main consequences remain  
unchanged.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Uruguay

2013-12-12 Thread spudboy100


As the great philosopher Tex Williams once wrote-


Now I'm a feller with a heart of gold
 And the ways of a gentleman I've been told
 The kind of guy that wouldn't even harm a flea 
But if me and a certain character met
 The guy that invented the cigarette
 I'd murder that son-of-a-gun in the first degree

It ain't cuz I don't smoke myself
 And I don't reckon that it'll harm your health
 Smoked all my life and I ain't dead yet
But nicotine slaves are all the same
 At a pettin' party or a poker game
 Everything gotta stop while they have a cigarette

Smoke, smoke, smoke that cigarette
 Puff, puff, puff and if you smoke yourself to death
 Tell St. Peter at the Golden Gate
 That you hate to make him wait
 But you just gotta have another cigarette


-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Thu, Dec 12, 2013 1:04 pm
Subject: Re: Uruguay




On 12 Dec 2013, at 18:31, meekerdb wrote:


   
Is it true that you're  transferring to the University of Uruguay, 
Bruno?






Yes, but not exactly. Apparently I will be triplicated in Washington, Colorado, 
*and* Uruguay. 


At the biochemical level, for sure!


:)


Bruno




  
  Brent
  


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Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real


On 12/12/2013 9:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of the entire 
(quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of galaxies, (including dark 
matter!) and all this at the level of the "right" fields, or at the level of elementary 
strings and branes, and this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if 
you prefer. No collapse!


But in this case the doctor doing the substitution is included in the substitution.  I 
think this produces a contradiction.


Brent

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Re: Uruguay



On 12 Dec 2013, at 18:31, meekerdb wrote:

Is it true that you're transferring to the University of Uruguay,  
Bruno?



Yes, but not exactly. Apparently I will be triplicated in Washington,  
Colorado, *and* Uruguay.


At the biochemical level, for sure!

:)

Bruno




Brent

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Uruguay


Is it true that you're transferring to the University of Uruguay, Bruno?

Brent

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Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real



On 12 Dec 2013, at 12:00, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are,  
qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis.
[if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is  
empirically likely]


Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is  
duplication possible?



It is avery good and important question, which admits a very simple  
answer, which works because we use a very weak form of comp: we *bet*  
that there is a level of description where we can be coded "into a  
number" and emulated by a Turing universal machine, or equivalently,  
emulated in arithmetic. (it turing universal part, or its sigma_1  
complete part).


Let me give you two quite different substitution levels, to illustrate  
the "weakness" of the comp hypothesis I work with.


1) the higher level: the description of your brain at the molecular  
level, with a classical average on elementary interaction between the  
'particles'.


2) the lower level: the description of the Heisenberg matrix state of  
the entire (quantum observable) state of the entire local cluster of  
galaxies, (including dark matter!) and all this at the level of the  
"right" fields, or at the level of elementary strings and branes, and  
this with 10^(10^10) decimals. Use the Schroedinger picture if you  
prefer. No collapse!


Both are, by default, Turing emulable. The first one is simpler to use  
in the step 1-6 thought experiences. To get the training before  
"jumping" into UD* at step 7.


Indeed, at step seven, we see that the "precise" level, as far as it  
exists, is irrelevant: the UD will emulate "all "finite" levels, with  
all oracles, infinitely often.


Comp is a self-truncation hypothesis, even if it is at a very low  
level. Molecular Biology illustrates plausibly a successful digital  
encoding of our bodies (the DNA), and both the existence of the brain  
and of evolving species, involves stability by redundancy of many  
slight variants, making the theory working through some digital  
encodings.


Non cloning concerns the apparent matter, which in comp should be  
defined by an indeterminacy involving all computations, involving all  
universal numbers, and their infinite works: something hardly clonable.


But the point of comp is that we are not our bodies. We borrow bodies.  
We borrow them with respect to our most probable histories (the 1p  
view in the computations where you survive).


We are celestial, divine creatures, if you want. "We" (first person)  
are already in "heaven", or Platonia, or in the arithmetical true  
relations in between possible universal numbers and other  
(arithmetical) entities.


If you think that the brain or the body is a quantum object, you have  
still the choice between a quantum brain (quantum computer, quantum  
mind) or not.
The very weak comp I use remains valid in both case. This comes from  
the fact that


1) classical Turing machine can emulate quantum computers (albeit very  
slowly)
2) the first person experience remains unchanged whatever big are the  
delays of virtual reconstitution in the UD* (the run of the UD).





I read your paragraphs over and over and still come to the same  
question.


Please tell me if above helped.  In step 1-6 I imagine a high level,  
to simplify the reasoning, but I step 7, we are in front of a non  
stopping UD run, and this defined the indeterminacy whatever is your  
level.


If you feel like you have a quantum brain, just consult a quantum  
doctor. Saying yes, might everything more complex, but does not change  
the consequences.


To get non-comp, you need to "install" some function, which should be  
shown neither computable, nor FPI recoverable.
If someone can provide an evidence that such a thing exists, he/she  
would provide evidence against digital mechanism.


Comp *is* very weird, and, when better and better understood, it  
appears more and more unbelievable.

It has to be, for the self-referentially correct machine.

Ask any question if something is unclear. I don't defend the truth of  
comp, I just study the consequences.


Bruno









On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 11 Dec 2013, at 17:06, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: but the human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and  
without thinking to much

on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.

Richard: I would always say no to the doctor because of the "no- 
cloning" theorem.


The goal consists in explaining the no cloning theorem without  
assuming physics.





I read your recent paper where you discuss how comp circumvents  
that theorem.

But do not understand your argument.
It is equivalent IMO to comp circumventing the uncertainty principle.
Could you discuss this?


The problem is that to explain this to you, I need to know how far  
you go in the UD-Argument.
If you have gone through the 8 steps, you should know that all we  
need to assume is a (classical, q

Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?


On 12/12/2013 1:36 AM, LizR wrote:
On 12 December 2013 17:00, Richard Ruquist > wrote:


Liz,

In forking MWI worlds, your ID is constantly changing as it depends on 
various
quantum states.
Your detailed nature is never duplicated. Every fork is a change from your 
previous
state.
If comp supports MWI, why should your ID ever stay the same
since you are constantly forking with or without the doctor.
Rich

Yes, I wondered about that. However you look at it, digital consciousness involves 
constant state changes, at the substitution level and below. You end up with something 
like David Deutsch's snapshots or Fred Hoyle's pigeon holes, or someone, not sure who's 
"capsule" model of identity. It's all very Heraclitean!


Of course in a (gasp!) materialist model, there are no "snapshots". The computations that 
produce consciousness are distributed in space and time and one "thought" overlaps another.


Brent

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Arctic sea ice increased by 51 % last year.

2013-12-12 Thread Roger Clough

Hi - 

Global warming ? Liberals live in a universe of lies.
Arctic sea ice increased by 51 % last year.

http://stevengoddard.wordpress.com/2013/10/22/51-growth-in-thick-arctic-ice-over-last-year/



Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
See my Leibniz site at
http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough


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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 11 Dec 2013, at 17:19, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:49 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> Then you can't say that you will survive anything. We die at each  
instant

OK, but then you can't say that survival is important, or that the  
word means much of anything at all.

That was my point. Indeed. Comp would lost his meaning. We can say yes  
and no to the doctor, as we die anyway in the next second.

But of course this is non sense.

> and comp is made trivial,

'Comp" is not trivial, "comp" is a gibberish word made up by you  
that is almost as meaningless as "free will".

Comp is the mechanist thesis. You confuse axioms and theorems. You  
might disagree with the theorem, but then you need to start from comp,  
(step 0) and find a flaw.
I insist, your preceding argument was shown to confuse the 1-view and  
the 3-view on the 1-view, quite precisely. You have never answer that  
confusion.

>>  you can only trace identity from the past to the present. A  
feeling of self has nothing to do with predictions,

> That's the point.

If that's the point then why do you keep emphasizing what the  
various copies will predict about their future and how accurate  
those predictions turn out to be?

The point is that we need only a notion of first person self, and  
thrid person self, which in UDA are well defined through the diaries,  
and in the math part, the 3-self is given by the diagoal method (Dx =  
"xx"), and the 1-self by applying the Theatetus denition of the  
knower. But we don't need to solve the "personal identity" problem.  
Only local bodies (3-self) and personal memories (1-self) are used in  
the proof/argument.

>> If tomorrow somebody remembers being Telmo Menezes today then  
Telmo Menezes has a future, if not then Telmo Menezes has no future,  
and Quantum Mechanics or a understanding of Everett's Many Worlds is  
not needed for any of it. Period. However in a completely different  
unrelated matter, if you want to assign a probability that tomorrow  
a observer that can be interviewed by a third party will observe a  
electron move left or right then Quantum Mechanics will be needed.  
And some (including me) feel that Everett's interpretation is a  
convenient way to think about it, although there are other ways.

> Not in comp

Perhaps not but I honestly don't give a damn about "comp".

You said that you believe in comp. You disbelieve only in the  
consequence, but you don't have provided a correction to your  
refutation of the derivation of that consequence, which has shown to  
be flawed (not just by me).

If you don't give a damn about the consequence of comp, stay mute  
about them. If you think there is a flaw in a proof, it is up to you  
to find it, but without changing the definition, and by taking into  
account the 1/3 nuances, which are of course crucial to get the 1- 
indeterminacy provided by self-multiplication.

If you think there is no 1-indeterminacy, please give the algorithm of  
prediction, or an argument that such an algorithm could exist.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Auguson Farms emergency food supplies at walmart

2013-12-12 Thread Roger Clough

Hi 

In preparation for the coming weimar-type economy collapse,
where a loaf of bread will cost you $100 or more,
I'm going up to Germantown to buy Auguson Farms 
emergency food pails at walmart. The 30 day pails of 
emergency food will keep for 25 years, run from $80 to
$160 for 30 days. Maybe 6 months to begin with.


Dr. Roger B Clough NIST (ret.) [1/1/2000]
See my Leibniz site at
http://independent.academia.edu/RogerClough


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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?

On 11 Dec 2013, at 18:10, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 5:40 AM, Telmo Menezes  
 wrote:

> We always feel that we are a single person

Yes but the copy that walked out of the duplicating chamber with you  
(or perhaps you are the copy and he is the original, no way to tell  
and no reason to care) also feels like a single person, and the  
exact same single person that you do.

> We feel that we have a past;

Yes, and the copy of you that was made 5 seconds ago vividly  
remembers when he was in kindergarten 20 years ago.

> if you use Everett's interpretation to think about reality, then  
personal pronouns become ambiguous in the exact same way that you  
always point out.

No they do not. In Everett it's always obvious who I'm talking about  
when I use the personal pronoun "you", it's the only other fellow in  
the room with me; but in Bruno's thought experiment there is a man  
standing to the right of the duplicating machine and a identical  
looking man standing to the left of the duplicating machine and they  
both have a equal right to use the grand title "you".

But they know pretty well who they are in the first person way, so  
what you indicate justify the first person indeterminacy instead of  
eliminating it.

When I ask, after the duplication, I know very well what "1-you" mean  
in all circumstances: it means "the W" guy, when I address the  
question to the W-guy, and it means the M-guy when I address the  
question to the M guy.

One told me: I see in my diary that I predicted (in Helsinki) that I  
would be at both places, but I see now that this was wrong because I  
feel myself to be in only W, and I understand that the question what  
about that feeling.

The other told me: I see in my diary that I predicted (in Helsinki)  
that I would be at both places, but I see now that this was wrong  
because I feel myself to be in only M, and I understand that the  
question what about that feeling.

Both now grasped the 1-indeterminacy, and are aware they cannot  
predict the personal outcome of a self-duplication.

OK?

Bruno

> Under the MWI, observing the behaviour of an electron is  
equivalent to going through a duplicator,

No it is not because in MWI the entire universe is duplicated  
including the observer so he never sees more than one electron so he  
can safely use the pronoun "it"; but with Bruno's duplicating  
chamber the observer is not duplicated only the electron is, so he  
sees 2 electrons, so to avoid ambiguity that solo observer would  
have to say "it on the right" or "it on the left", just saying "it"  
won't do.

> Personal pronouns are part of language that evolved under a  
certain model of reality

Yes, and the environment personal pronouns evolved in did NOT  
include duplicating chambers, if it had the rules of grammar  
regarding them would be very different from what they are now.

  John K Clark

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Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment

On 11 Dec 2013, at 18:58, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 4:08 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

 Determinism is far from "well established".

>>> It's a basic assumption in almost every scientific theory.

>> In the most important theory in physics, Quantum Mechanics, no  
such assumption is made, and despite a century of trying no  
experiment has ever been performed that even hinted such a  
deterministic assumption should be added in.

> What? Everett = SWE. The wave evolves deterministically.

Yes the Schrodinger Wave Equation (SWE) is deterministic but that  
doesn't matter because it describes nothing observable in the  
universe.

In which theory?

To figure out if a electron will be at point X you've got to square  
the value of the SWE at point X , and then all you get is a  
probability not a certainty.

In Copenhangen. In Everett's theory, you get a self-duplication,  
similar to the comp one.

To make matters worse the SWE uses imaginary numbers so 2 very  
different complex numbers provided by Schrodinger can produce  
identical probabilities after squaring. If 2 different things can  
produce identical results then things are not deterministic,

?
It is the other way round. If two similar things can get different  
results, then things are not deterministic.
You would not say that arithmetic is indeterminate because both 8-5  
and 9-6 gives deterministically the same result.

Bruno

and if those results are probabilities not certainties then things  
are even less deterministic.

  John K Clark

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Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real



On 11 Dec 2013, at 21:10, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/11/2013 12:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote:


Hi List

I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you  
might be interested in this article from the Science Daily on line  
magazine


Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain Injury



Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best,
Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat.  
Even if the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but the  
human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking to  
much on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.


But this brings up a difficulty I see in "comp".  We know that if  
the level of substitution is quantal, then we can't clone the state  
of the part being replaced (and in the UD model this corresponds to  
not knowing all the threads of computation through the state).


If comp is true, we have to derive the quantal from that  
indeterminacy. In all case, we never know which computations are  
running us. If the brain is a quantum computer, physics should not be  
exactly quantum physics, as I said to richard today.





This wouldn't deter people from saying "yes" to the doctor.


If the doctor gives a quantum brain, in that case.


But it implies that there will the a qualitative difference in  
consciousness, a "jump", perhaps like a memory gap and temporary  
disorientation due to concussion or drugs.


yes, or worse. If my level is below the quantum level, I might just  
die if I am substituted above that level. May be it will look like I  
have surivived, but the doppelganger might, in this case, be really an  
usurper.




But then why doesn't some improbable quantum fluctuation prevent the  
part replacement and provide a more continuous path of  
consciousness, in analogy to quantum immortality?


It will. I will survive anyway, but perhaps not in the doppelganger  
actually done, but in some other part of the UD*.


Bruno






Brent



To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal  
long ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology confirms the  
use of comp by biological system all the time.



Bruno





George Levy


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Re: Atheism is wish fulfillment



On 11 Dec 2013, at 21:17, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/11/2013 1:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/10/2013 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 09 Dec 2013, at 23:28, meekerdb wrote:


On 12/9/2013 12:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




Bell's theorm proves that local hidden variables are impossible  
which leaves only two remaining explanations that explain the  
EPR paradox:


1. Non-local, faster-than-light, relativity violating effects


That's non-local hidden variable - which is exactly what a  
parallel universe is.


What is non local here?


A whole world is duplicated - including remote parts.


This will include only apparent distant associations. Splitting or  
differentiation occurs at the speed of the interaction, which is  
light speed, or slower. The same occurs in the UD.


But it is distant associations that make violation of Bell's  
inequality a non-local phenomenon.


In one world. A good exercise is to study the paper by Bennett & Al.  
on quantum teleportation, *in* the Everett (MWI) frame. You can  
convince yourself that everything is local, including the transfer of  
information. Then you can see that the residual classical bits that  
Alice needs to send to Bob, to complete the teleportation, only  
provides to Bob the information of iwhich branch of the multiverse he  
is situated in. Everything is completely local, but appears to be not  
so, "locally" (in each branch).



One may say decoherence propagates via interactions within the  
forward light cone, but the source can be a set of spacelike events  
(e.g. corresponding to different measurement choices at opposite  
ends of an EPR experiment).


This will not change the global locality.




Whether the same occurs in the UD is just a hope,


No, it is an easy justifiable proposition. What is a hope, is that the  
QM gives the right global measure on the FPI. And that hope is  
partially fulfilled by the self-reference logic.




unless you've been able to derive spacetime from the UD process.


Yes, that is the problem. The UD might be too rich, leading to non  
local space time, too much white rabbits, too much non computable  
phenomena in the neighborhood. A brain would no more be able to  
filtrate consciousness, and reality would be an incoherent dream. We  
should abandon comp at that stage. But taking into account the  
computer science self-referential constraints makes such refutation  
much harder, and there are promising result that such constraints is  
enough to get the right physics.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real



On 11 Dec 2013, at 21:35, John Mikes wrote:

Yes - to the doctor?  I was always kept aback from agreeing, because  
I still believe to have included  M O R E  in my mind  
(brainfunctions, as you say) then whatever that good doctor and his  
device may supply.


You have to assumed that there are some actual infinities playing a  
role in your ... brain. That would be assuming non-comp, and going out  
of the theory I am working in (false or true, we cannot really be sure).




So I consider a mechanical substitution to the 'living' (what is  
it?) capabilities a reduction in qualia and quanta.


OK. But again, that is like to say that you are open to non-comp. Me  
too, but "professionally "I work in comp.



Unless "the doctor" is an infinite universal machine...(still to  
have to meet one...)


All machine are finite. All universal machine are finite.

There are notions of universality for some non-machine notion, but  
they are not machine.


If something is actually infinite, it is not a machine. Church thesis  
allows us to identify machine with natural numbers, and reciprocally,   
if we want to do that (in some context, it eases the proofs without  
changing the generality).


Bruno






JM


On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:10 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 12/11/2013 12:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote:


Hi List

I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you  
might be interested in this article from the Science Daily on line  
magazine


Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain Injury



Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best,
Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat.  
Even if the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but the  
human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking to  
much on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.


But this brings up a difficulty I see in "comp".  We know that if  
the level of substitution is quantal, then we can't clone the  
stateof the part being replaced (and in the UD model this  
corresponds to not knowing all the threads of computation through  
the state).  This wouldn't deter people from saying "yes" to the  
doctor.  But it implies that there will the a qualitative difference  
in consciousness, a "jump", perhaps like a memory gap and temporary  
disorientation due to concussion or drugs.  But then why doesn't  
some improbable quantum fluctuation prevent the part replacement and  
provide a more continuous path of consciousness, in analogy to  
quantum immortality?


Brent



To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal  
long ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology   
confirms the use of comp by biological system all the time.



Bruno





George Levy


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Visit thi

Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real

2013-12-12 Thread Richard Ruquist

Bruno: So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are,
qualitatively, consequence of the comp hypothesis.
[if the sub level is above the quantum level, which you say is empirically
likely]

Richard: So if non-cloning is a consequence of comp, how is duplication
possible?
I read your paragraphs over and over and still come to the same question.



On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 11 Dec 2013, at 17:06, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Bruno: but the human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without
> thinking to much
> on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.
>
> Richard: I would always say no to the doctor because of the "no-cloning"
> theorem.
>
>
> The goal consists in explaining the no cloning theorem without assuming
> physics.
>
>
>
>
> I read your recent paper where you discuss how comp circumvents that
> theorem.
> But do not understand your argument.
> It is equivalent IMO to comp circumventing the uncertainty principle.
> Could you discuss this?
>
>
> The problem is that to explain this to you, I need to know how far you go
> in the UD-Argument.
> If you have gone through the 8 steps, you should know that all we need to
> assume is a (classical, quantum, whatever) universal formalism/theory, and
> I use the numbers+add+mult to fix the thing.
>
> Then you know that in that universal formalism, notably in the
> arithmetical reality, we can prove the existence of an infinity of
> computations (or of finite piece of computations: the first person will not
> see the difference) going through your state, defined by some substitution
> level. Below the level, and thus in the "apparent matter", there will be an
> infinity of computations needed to describe exactly that matter (the global
> FPI domain in arithmetic). This makes a priori the apparent primitive
> matter non-clonable. The primitive matter is literally a statistical sum on
> infinity of histories/computations, and you need the entire running of the
> UD to define it (to get the global FPI). It is not something a priori
> duplicable.
>
> So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively,
> consequence of the comp hypothesis. QM confirms this (which *proves*
> nothing, to be sure).
>
> If our (sharable) level of substitution is exactly the quantum level (that
> is for example the position and impulsion of our particles at the
> Heisenberg uncertainty level, or just above) then quantum mechanics will be
> exactly derivable from comp. If our substitution level is below the
> Heisenberg uncertainty level, (we would have a quantum brain/computer) then
> things are more complex. As the UD emulates also all quantum computations,
> the reversal physics/arithmetic is still obtained, but QM could no more be
> the fundamental theory in physics, and might appear as an approximation of
> an unknown theory (something like a non-linear QM). I doubt this from the
> evidences both from introspection, biology  and physics. If our subst level
> is far above the quantum level, then QM can still be derivable from
> arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical (and thus variable in
> the whole of the physical reality).
>
> We can come back on this. Better to be completely convinced by the UDA
> before, as it gives the frame in which address your difficult question.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Richard
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote:
>>
>>  Hi List
>>
>> I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you might be
>> interested in this article from the Science 
>> Dailyon line magazine
>>
>> Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain 
>> Injury
>>
>>
>> Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best,
>> Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat. Even if
>> the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but the human will say
>> "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking to much on the theoretical
>> consequences of the possible survival.
>>
>> To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal long
>> ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology confirms the use of comp
>> by biological system all the time.
>>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> George Levy
>>
>>
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>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
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Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real



On 11 Dec 2013, at 22:18, LizR wrote:

ISTM that "Yes Doctor" sums up comp. If a digital brain made below  
my substitution level can substitute for my organic one, then I  
literally have a 50% chance of waking up as the digital version.


However if the Subst Level is quantum, no cloning stops it being  
actually possible.


OK. But that does not prevent the UD to "prepare" infinitely often  
your unknown quantum states, and the reversal consequence will still  
apply. We still got step 7, and the six first steps can still be done,  
although they cill lost the pedagogical easiness.




Although in this case the universe itself is happy to do it all the  
time, "forking" everything continually; maybe one could use the MWI  
to design a suitable - if slightly less elegant - thought experiment  
(e.g. Helsinki man goes into a sealed room where hs is rendered  
unconscious, then according to a quantum result, he is taken to  
either Moscow or Washington...)


But then when we derive the QM from arithmetic, people will claims  
that we have used the quantum at the start.
you are logically correct, but using the quantum might confuse the  
people in the conclusions. I think. It is simpler to reason in the  
simple classical case, and to correct the conclusions with respect of  
the depth of the level after. IMO.


Bruno






On 12 December 2013 09:35, John Mikes  wrote:
Yes - to the doctor?  I was always kept aback from agreeing, because  
I still believe to have included  M O R E  in my mind  
(brainfunctions, as you say) then whatever that good doctor and his  
device may supply. So I consider a mechanical substitution to the  
'living' (what is it?) capabilities a reduction in qualia and  
quanta. Unless "the doctor" is an infinite universal machine... 
(still to have to meet one...)


JM


On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:10 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 12/11/2013 12:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote:


Hi List

I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you  
might be interested in this article from the Science Daily on line  
magazine


Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain Injury



Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best,
Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat.  
Even if the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but the  
human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking to  
much on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.


But this brings up a difficulty I see in "comp".  We know that if  
the level of substitution is quantal, then we can't clone the state  
of the part being replaced (and in the UD model this corresponds to  
not knowing all the threads of computation through the state).  This  
wouldn't deter people from saying "yes" to the doctor.  But it  
implies that there will the a qualitative difference in  
consciousness, a "jump", perhaps like a memory gap and temporary  
disorientation due to concussion or drugs.  But then why doesn't  
some improbable quantum fluctuation prevent the part replacement and  
provide a more continuous path of consciousness, in analogy to  
quantum immortality?


Brent



To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal  
long ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology confirms the  
use of comp by biological system all the time.



Bruno





George Levy


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Re: Santa Klaus does exist!



On 12 Dec 2013, at 06:30, Jesse Mazer wrote:

Thanks Bruno. As I understand it step 8's movie-graph argument is  
making a point similar to the "implementation problem" chalmers  
discusses in the paper at http://consc.net/papers/rock.html --  
basically the problem is that there seems to be no good way to  
decide whether a given physical system "implements" a given abstract  
computation (Chalmers proposes his own rules for deciding this, but  
they seem a bit ad hoc to me, depending on dividing a physical  
system into distinct spatial regions).


Hmm... I am not sure I agree with this. "rock" is a non well defined  
notion. I think we have already discuss this, when I told you it is  
more related with Maudlin than with the Chalmers-Putnam-Mallah  
implementation problem.
I guess we will soon or later come back to step 8. It only dimish the  
use of Occam to get the reversal physics/arithmetic (or physics/ 
theology).





Anyway, even though I tend to agree with you about rejecting the  
idea of what you call "real ontological primitive matter", it seems  
to me this argument goes too far, because it could easily be  
modified into an argument that there's no good way to decide whether  
one abstract computation (including the universal dovetailer)  
"implements" another computation as some sort of subroutine of the  
first one.


Consider your movie-graph experiment, where you have a lab with a  
computer made of optical gates. What if, instead of a real physical  
lab, we imagine a program A that is running an incredibly complex  
simulation of the same sort of lab, down to the level of individual  
atoms and photons and such? And within this simulated lab is the  
same type of computer made of simulated optical gates, which are  
supposed to run some simpler program B (we could imagine B is some  
very simple program, say a 1D cellular automaton consisting of a  
small number of cells, or we could imagine B as something  
complicated enough to include a conscious observer, like a large  
simulated neural network, but still much simpler than the atom-level  
simulation of the lab). If the notion of one program "implementing"  
another as a subroutine has any meaning, then shouldn't this be a  
case where program A implements program B?


Yes. As long as there is an (perhaps unknown) universal numbers  
relating logically the states, we can say that there is a computation.

A computation is really equivalent with the giving of
1) a universal number or system (that is: a number)
2) a data (a number for the program run by the universal number above)
3) two numbers (the beginning and end of the computation. The end does  
not need to be a stopping state).

This is a finite object, and can be codes by a number.



But if the simulated lab has a simulated movie projector of the type  
you describe, then simulated experimenters in the lab could run the  
experiment you describe of knocking out logic gates and replacing  
them with a movie of the same gates projected from above, which  
provide the needed triggers to the remaining light-sensitive gates.  
If more and more gates are knocked out until all that's left is a  
simulated movie being projected on an empty table, is there still  
any meaningful sense that program A is implementing program B?


There is no more sense. That would be a confusion between a  
description of a computation, and a computation. To have a  
computation, you need the exact logical relationhip between the state.  
The filmed movie abstracts from them. It only points to the fact that  
some computation exist, but is not a computation.





Personally, I lean towards the idea that since any running of a  
Turing machine can be represented as a set of logically  
interconnected propositions in an axiomatic system, to say that  
program A "implements" program B can mean that you can map some  
subset of the propositions about program A to all the propositions  
about program B, such that all the same logical relationships  
between the propositions still apply.


That seems correct, yes. The computation is in the logical  
relationship between the numbers, states, etc. Not in their local  
implementation, which change the measure, and not at all in the  
descriptions of computation, like the filmed graph, which will not  
change the measure, unless they are used for some further  
reimplementations (which would again change the measure).

I think we agree on this. OK?



And if the physical world follows universal physical laws, then the  
set of all physical truths about events in spacetime and the causal  
relationships between them should in principle be representable as a  
huge set of propositions about events, and propositions about  
universal laws, with logical relationships between them--in that  
case "physical implementation" could be defined in exactly the same  
way as I suggest defining program A's implementation of program B  
above. This is the idea I discussed w

Re: The Yes-Doctor Experiment for real



On 11 Dec 2013, at 17:06, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: but the human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and  
without thinking to much

on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.

Richard: I would always say no to the doctor because of the "no- 
cloning" theorem.


The goal consists in explaining the no cloning theorem without  
assuming physics.





I read your recent paper where you discuss how comp circumvents that  
theorem.

But do not understand your argument.
It is equivalent IMO to comp circumventing the uncertainty principle.
Could you discuss this?


The problem is that to explain this to you, I need to know how far you  
go in the UD-Argument.
If you have gone through the 8 steps, you should know that all we need  
to assume is a (classical, quantum, whatever) universal formalism/ 
theory, and I use the numbers+add+mult to fix the thing.


Then you know that in that universal formalism, notably in the  
arithmetical reality, we can prove the existence of an infinity of  
computations (or of finite piece of computations: the first person  
will not see the difference) going through your state, defined by some  
substitution level. Below the level, and thus in the "apparent  
matter", there will be an infinity of computations needed to describe  
exactly that matter (the global FPI domain in arithmetic). This makes  
a priori the apparent primitive matter non-clonable. The primitive  
matter is literally a statistical sum on infinity of histories/ 
computations, and you need the entire running of the UD to define it  
(to get the global FPI). It is not something a priori duplicable.


So, indeterminacy, non-locality, and non-cloning, are, qualitatively,  
consequence of the comp hypothesis. QM confirms this (which *proves*  
nothing, to be sure).


If our (sharable) level of substitution is exactly the quantum level  
(that is for example the position and impulsion of our particles at  
the Heisenberg uncertainty level, or just above) then quantum  
mechanics will be exactly derivable from comp. If our substitution  
level is below the Heisenberg uncertainty level, (we would have a  
quantum brain/computer) then things are more complex. As the UD  
emulates also all quantum computations, the reversal physics/ 
arithmetic is still obtained, but QM could no more be the fundamental  
theory in physics, and might appear as an approximation of an unknown  
theory (something like a non-linear QM). I doubt this from the  
evidences both from introspection, biology  and physics. If our subst  
level is far above the quantum level, then QM can still be derivable  
from arithmetic, but some constants can be geographical (and thus  
variable in the whole of the physical reality).


We can come back on this. Better to be completely convinced by the UDA  
before, as it gives the frame in which address your difficult question.


Bruno








Richard




On Wed, Dec 11, 2013 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 10 Dec 2013, at 20:20, George wrote:


Hi List

I haven't contributed to this list for a while but I thought you  
might be interested in this article from the Science Daily on  
linemagazine


Neural Prosthesis Restores Behavior After Brain Injury



Yes, things progress. Nice to hear of you George, best,
Of course, we cannot test the first person experience of the rat.  
Even if the rat can talk, that would prove almost nothing, but the  
human will say "yes" to the doctor anyway, and without thinking to  
much on the theoretical consequences of the possible survival.


To stop comp to be *applied*, we should have made glasses illegal  
long ago ... Then we can argue that molecular biology confirms the  
use of comp by biological system all the time.



Bruno





George Levy


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Re: How can a grown man be an atheist ?