LizR wrote:
Your statement seems quite definitely to say that you do know that
computations must use energy and increase entropy. That assumes physicalism.
I must admit that I do not know what a computation that does not utilize
a computing machine (physical) is. Show me one, and indicate
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruce seems to ignore the (mind-body) problem, and to miss that the UDA
just helps to make that problem more precise, in the frame of
computationalism, and to make it more amenable to more rigorous
treatments, ... without mentioning that the arithmetical translation of
David Nyman wrote:
On 27 April 2015 at 07:43, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Mose people get on living in the world by means of heuristics, or
useful rules-of-thumb, that are good enough for most purposes. That
means, of course
meekerdb wrote:
Also yes doctor assumes that consciousness is retained when something
computationally equivalent is substituted; which is why Olympia and the
MG need to be counterfactually correct. But to realize the
counterfactual correctness would mean including within the static record
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 14:38, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes. I've mentioned occasionally that if the substitution level is quantum,
then no-cloning may be a problem, at least in principle. The usual answer is
that the subst level is WAY above quantum - that our
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 15:57, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 14:38, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes. I've mentioned occasionally that if the substitution level is
quantum,
then no-cloning may be a problem
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/3/2015 11:02 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
Also yes doctor assumes that consciousness is retained when
something computationally equivalent is substituted; which is why
Olympia and the MG need to be counterfactually correct. But to
realize
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 16:45, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 17:40, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 14:38, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes. I've mentioned occasionally that if the substitution level is
quantum,
then
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
What is the point of two identical quantum states if you don't know which
two are identical? It seems to me that copying at will is what is
required.
We are not talking about a copy by random chance
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 17:01, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 16:45, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 17:40, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 14:38, LizR lizj
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-04 8:28 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 5/3/2015 11:02 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
Also yes doctor assumes that consciousness is retained
when something computationally equivalent is substituted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 17:06, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
What is the point of two identical quantum states if you don't know which
two are identical? It seems
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 17:07, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 17:01, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 16:45, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 4 May 2015
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-04 9:10 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-04 8:28 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net On 5/3/2015 11:02 PM, Bruce
Kellett wrote
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
The initial point that we were making was that copying at the quantum level
of substitution is not possible, in principle. Accidental copies in another
universe are not deliberate
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
For each computation, there exist an infinity of valid
equivalent implementations, they're all computing the same
thing, that class of equivalent implementations is what
realize the conscious moment. For 1st POV, you only
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-04 9:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-04 9:31 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
For each computation, there exist an infinity of valid
equivalent implementations, they're all
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 17:19, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 17:07, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 17:01, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-04 9:51 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
The film is still physical, still running through a physical
projector, so the physical supervenience thesis is not affected by
the MGA. You have merely removed one physical substrate
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-04 10:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-04 9:51 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
The film is still physical, still running through
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-04 10:24 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
But then again... you reject step 0, so why bother saying
because of that step N is invalid... well ok, if step 0 is
invalid, any further deduction from
LizR wrote:
Yes, I read that some time ago (or however he would put that ... in a
distant capsule / pigeon hole?)
I can't remember now if he uses the Wheeler-DeWitt equation as a basis
for his views - could you remind me?
Yes, the WDW equation features prominently in Barbour's thinking.
LizR wrote:
On 30 April 2015 at 16:32, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
So where are the space and time dimensions of Platonia? Not to
mention the necessity of a Minkoskian metric. (Space and time are
interchangeable only within
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2015, at 02:12, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Given Platonia, they always exist timelessly, they never have to be
calculated because the are timelessly true.
But the view from the inside points of view is different.
You appeal sometimes to the block universe view
Kim Jones wrote:
On 30 Apr 2015, at 12:34 pm, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
If everything is to 'happen' in Platonia, you need to specify a temporal
variable. This is not trivial, and I have not seen any convincing explanation
of how you intend to do this.
Bruce
The way I
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2015, at 02:12, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Any two numbers might have an indefinitely large number of programs
mapping from one to the other, but all such programs reduce to
simple additions of two numbers.
Addition, + multiplication
LizR wrote:
On 30 April 2015 at 15:20, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Kim Jones wrote:
On 30 Apr 2015, at 12:34 pm, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote
John Clark wrote:
On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 8:53 PM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
We have no evidence that a quantum level of duplication is
necessary but, likewise, we have no evidence that it is not.
Nonsense, we have
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/4/2015 5:53 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
A classical computer can emulate a quantum computer, even if possibly
with a necessary slow down. So the UD, even if written in LISP, and
executed by a LISP interpreter, itself computed by some extendible
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
A quantum computer is not the issue here. I know that any UTM can
perform any calculation doable of a quantum computer, although the
quantum computer might make a rather poor desk calculator
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 May 2015, at 07:57, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 4 May 2015 at 14:38, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes. I've mentioned occasionally that if the substitution level is
quantum,
then no-cloning may be a problem, at least in principle. The usual
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/4/2015 8:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
We have evidence of the sort you mention that quantum superpositions
of the type need for a quantum computer decohere rapidly in the brain
environment. But decoherence affects only superpositions in non-robust
bases. You could have
LizR wrote:
On 5 May 2015 at 16:15, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
I agree. In fact, I think it is a weakness of Bruno's argument that
he starts from the yes doctor scenario rather than from a simple
assumption of strong AI. The problem might be that *we* cannot have
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/5/2015 1:40 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-05 9:42 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
Even if you do all that, it will not be strong evidence for
computationalism. It would, certainly, be evidence for strong AI,
but that just means
LizR wrote:
On 6 May 2015 at 11:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
It seems to be a continuing problem on this list that comp is used
for idea that parts of ones brain could be replaced with an
equivalent digital device and preserve ones consciousness. That's a
fairly widely
Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, May 06, 2015 at 10:45:29AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The main flaws in the logic, or at least weaknesses that I have
pointed out, are in the move of the UD into Platonia while claiming
that it still computes in exactly the same way as a physical
computer
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-06 1:24 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
It would be proof that your consciousness could be realized in a
digital computer
In the end it is just a program and the external world is only memory
location the program can access... What you call
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-06 8:47 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-06 1:24 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
It would
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-06 9:19 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-06 8:47 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 May 2015, at 04:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Counterfactual correctness has not been shown to be necessary -- it is
just an ad hoc move to save the argument.
Counterfactual correctness is the bone of what *is* a computation. To
have a computation, you need
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 May 2015, at 04:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:
For there to be a difference, the steps have to be performed in real
time, and that notion of real time is not available in Platonia.
Nor in any block universe.
That is just a lazy snipe, Bruno. I have explained how a time
Bruno Marchal wrote:
There are two things.
1) the mathematical facts, well known by the experts (who even asked me
to suppress any explanation on that as it is trivial for anybody having
grasp the ten first hours of course in that matter) that the notion of
computability is mathematical,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 May 2015, at 09:47, Bruce Kellett wrote
If a non-physicist shows that they do not really understand the
Standard Model of particle physics, or the Higgs mechanism, then I
attempt to explain it to the in simple terms.
Yes, but not on someone talking always like
I find that discussions around the comp thesis keep coming back to the
'Movie Graph Argument' (MGA). Each time I read one of the accounts in
Bruno's SANE04 or COMP(2013) papers, or Russell's 'MGA Revisited', I get
the feeling that something crucial to the argument is missing.
The account in
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, May 07, 2015 at 10:45:12PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
...
I am sorry, but this just does not follow. The original physical
functionality is admitted to be still intact -- provide, admittedly,
by the projected movie, but that is still a physical device
LizR wrote:
To summarise the summary...
Hypothetically, we have some computing machine that generates a
conscious experience. Since computation is deterministic, this will
create the /same/ conscious experience if we re-run it duplicating the
same initial state and inputs. (For example, each
meekerdb wrote:
Pretty good list.
On 5/6/2015 6:23 PM, LizR wrote:
With profound and sincere apologies to Bruno, some people distinguish
these two items, so I thought it might be worthwhile trying to
marshall the arguments in one place, and give them simple names as per
the objections to
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 May 2015, at 14:45, Bruce Kellett wrote:
..
Now, having read this many times, and looked at the other summaries of
the MGA, I still feel that something crucial is missing. We go from
the situation where we remove more and more of the original 'brain',
replacing
LizR wrote:
On Tuesday, May 5, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
Unknown (and unknowable) copies would not produce any first
person indeterminancy. FPI requires that you know there is a
duplicate that you could be.
This implies that pre-Everett quantum
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-05 9:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
It's not my theory.
It's not mine either... do we have
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2015-05-05 8:09 GMT+02:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
It's not my theory.
It's not mine either... do we have to have everything sort out before
discussing ? You can't have any theory, because one sure thing I can say
about any theory, it's that it is
LizR wrote:
On 11 May 2015 at 19:14, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
But if the notion of physical supervenience cannot be ruled out,
then the way is open for primitive physicality. The comp argument,
which claims that the appearance of the physical can be extracted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 12 May 2015, at 8:25 am, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
It won't be a specific electron that will switch consciousness off
regardless of the order in which you remove parts, as you seem to be
implying here, but rather, in a specific sequence of
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/11/2015 12:14 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 May 2015, at 14:45, Bruce Kellett wrote:
..
Now, having read this many times, and looked at the other summaries
of the MGA, I still feel that something crucial is missing. We go
from the situation
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/11/2015 6:54 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/11/2015 12:14 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 May 2015, at 14:45, Bruce Kellett wrote:
..
Now, having read this many times, and looked at the other
summaries of the MGA, I still feel
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 May 2015, at 09:14, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hmm... On the contrary: the brain is necessary. It is the primitive
physicalness of the brain which is not relevant.
That is not what you say in the paper. Hence, consciousness is not a
physical
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2015, at 06:28, Russell Standish wrote:
In which case their consciousness supervenes on their simulated
physics.
Simulated beings could be conscious with their simulated brains in
arithmetic.
This is still physical supervenience,
yes, even when the brains
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2015, at 08:20, Russell Standish wrote:
For a
robust ontology, counterfactuals are physically instantiated,
therefore the MGA is invalid.
I don't see this. The if A then B else C can be realized in a
newtonian universe, indeed in the game of life or c++.
And
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/12/2015 6:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Chalmer's fading quailia argument
http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html shows that if replacing a
biological neuron with a functionally equivalent silicon neuron
changed conscious perception, then it would lead to an absurdity, either:
Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 11:50 AM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 10:22 AM, Bruce Kellett
Are you seriously going to argue that homo sapiens did
Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 2:48 PM, Bruce Kellett
So you think that Darwinian evolution produced intelligent
zombies,
and then computationalism infused consciousness?
No. What I am saying is that consciousness is not a plausible
Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 10:33:42PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2015, at 08:20, Russell Standish wrote:
For a
robust ontology, counterfactuals are physically instantiated,
therefore the MGA is invalid.
I don't see this. The if A then B
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 01:04:09PM +1200, LizR wrote:
On 14 May 2015 at 12:32, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 11:26:17AM +1200, LizR wrote:
On 13 May 2015 at 18:20, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
For a robust
As an aside to recent discussions, it is interesting to point out that
physics has some of the problems associated with over-confidence in
ideas coming from pure intuition too.
http://aeon.co/magazine/science/has-cosmology-run-into-a-creative-crisis
This article by Ross Anderson in Aeon
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/11/2015 11:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
[BM] Why? Have you proven that consciousness supervenes on a record?
Have you proven that it does not?
No, but I have a lot of evidence it supervenes on brain /*processes*/.
Reducing that to /*states*/ is a further assumption
LizR wrote:
On 15 May 2015 at 06:34, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I'm trying to understand what counterfactual correctness means in
the physical thought experiments.
You and me both.
Yes. When you think about it, 'counterfactual' means that the
spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Photons can re-combine? So they are unlike electrons or positrons, which
like a magnet, repell like charges.
Electrons can recombine too. Just think of the two-slit experiment with
electron -- we see only one spot on the screen. It is all part of the
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/14/2015 7:24 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 15 May 2015 at 06:34, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I'm trying to understand what counterfactual correctness means in
the physical thought experiments.
You and me both
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/15/2015 4:40 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/14/2015 7:24 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 15 May 2015 at 06:34, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I'm trying to understand what counterfactual correctness
means
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/15/2015 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
But you could turn this around and pick some arbitrary
sequence/recording and say, Well it would be the right program to be
conscious in SOME circumstance, therefore it's conscious.
I think it goes without saying
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/15/2015 9:31 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/15/2015 7:37 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
But you could turn this around and pick some arbitrary
sequence/recording and say, Well it would be the right program to
be conscious in SOME circumstance
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/15/2015 6:18 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/15/2015 4:40 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/14/2015 7:24 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 15 May 2015 at 06:34, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I'm
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/15/2015 10:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The AI that I envisage will probably be based on a learning program of
some sort, that will have to learn in much the same way as an infant
human learns. I doubt that we will ever be able to create an AI that
is essentially
Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 10:22 AM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 8:14 AM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 8:14 AM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/15/2015 10:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The AI that I envisage will probably be based on a learning
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/15/2015 11:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/15/2015 10:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
The AI that I envisage will probably be based on a learning program
of some sort, that will have to learn in much the same way as an
infant human learns. I doubt that we
LizR wrote:
On 17 May 2015 at 11:44, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
I can see that computationalism might well have difficulties
accommodating a gradual evolutionary understanding of almost
anything -- after all, the dovetailer is there in Platonia
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 02:51:00PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
But we are always going to have difficulty assigning a truth value
to a counterfactual like: The present king of France has a beard.
I would expect that somewhere in the Multiverse, France still has a
king
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 May 2015, at 14:08, Bruce Kellett wrote:
So you claim that there is a contradiction between physical
supervenience and comp.
Yes. Between primitive-physical supervenience (as this what is at stake).
I cannot allow that this move is legitimate. The MGA does
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/13/2015 10:25 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/13/2015 5:32 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 11:26:17AM +1200, LizR wrote:
On 13 May 2015 at 18:20, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
For a robust ontology, counterfactuals
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/13/2015 5:32 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 11:26:17AM +1200, LizR wrote:
On 13 May 2015 at 18:20, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
For a robust ontology, counterfactuals are physically instantiated,
therefore the MGA is invalid.
Can
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/12/2015 4:26 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/11/2015 11:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
[BM] Why? Have you proven that consciousness supervenes on a record?
Have you proven that it does not?
No, but I have a lot of evidence it supervenes on brain
LizR wrote:
On 13 May 2015 at 15:03, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Bruno does make a prediction that can be empirically tested. He
predicts that consciousness does not supervene on physical brains
but on computations. The MGA
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/12/2015 8:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/12/2015 4:26 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 5/11/2015 11:14 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
[BM] Why? Have you proven that consciousness supervenes on a
record?
Have you proven that it does
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/15/2015 12:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But the question of the number of person is a different discussion. If
you agree that the W-guy, who stays in W and marries a girl in W, is
the same person as the guy in M, who marries a woman in M, are the
same person ... as the
LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by
philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific observation
by philosophy, but one can
LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl
LizR wrote:
In Bruno's COMP 2013 paper he says
The notion of the first person, or the conscious knower, admits the
simplest possible definition: it is provided by access to basic
memories. Consciousness, despite its non-definability, facilitates
the train of reasoning in
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/15/2015 4:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a person, my
consciousness changes from moment to moment with changing thoughts and
external stimuli, but I remain the same person. Can two spatially
distinct consciousnesses
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/15/2015 5:50 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/15/2015 4:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
That then leads to the questions of personal identity. As a person,
my consciousness changes from moment to moment with changing
thoughts and external stimuli, but I remain
LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 14:44, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 09:51, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 09:51, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical
sophistication.
A rigorous philosophical analysis usually starts with a definition,
I disagree. Philosophical discussion
LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing that Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of uncertainty
That's hardly what Bruno is claiming.
Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:53 AM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Apr 2015, at 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks philosophical
sophistication. Computationalism is based on the idea that human
consciousness is Turing emulable,
This is an acceptable terming for some argument
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Apr 2015, at 04:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
In Bruno's COMP 2013 paper he says
The notion of the first person, or the conscious knower, admits the
simplest possible definition: it is provided by access to basic
memories. Consciousness, despite its
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific finding by
philosophy. One cannot, of course
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics in the
brain is Turing emulable, and then if you follow
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