David Nyman wrote:
Third person perception comes about when several observers share the
same perception because they share the same environmental contingencies
on their existence. In effect these observers share the same "frame of
reference." I see many similarities with relativity theo
David Nyman wrote:
George Levy wrote:
Not at all. A bidirectional contingency is superfluous. The only
relevent contingency is: If the observed event will result in different
probabilities of survival for myself and for others observing me, then
our perceptions will be different
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Bruno, I spent some (!) time on speculating on 'timelessness' - Let me tell
up front: I did not solve it.
Hi John
For example, we can conceive of a consciousness generated by a computer
operating in a time share mode where the time share occur every
thousand years.
Brent Meeker wrote:
>That brings us back to Descartes "I think therefore I am"; which Russell
>pointed out was an unsupported inference.
>
>
IMHO everything hinges on "I think." "I think" MUST BE THE STARTING
POINT - for any conscious observer THERE IS NO OTHER OBSERVABLE STARTING
POINT!
Brent Meeker wrote:
George Levy wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
That brings us back to Descartes "I think therefore I am"; which Russell
pointed out was an unsupported inference.
IMHO everything hinges on "I think." "I th
Brent Meeker wrote:
George Levy wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
George Levy wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
That brings us back to Descartes "I think therefore I am"; which Russell
pointed out was an u
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 13-août-06, à 23:48, George Levy a écrit :
"I think" also implies the concept of sanity. Unless you assume the
first step "I think" and that you are sane, you can't take any rational
and conscious second step and have any ratio
that
"to chase one's brain".
I am also happy that you use "sane" instead of
"normal" because the "norm" is insane.
Please do not cut this line (style) of yours!
John Mikes
--- George Levy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Bruno Marchal wro
If you're not sure that you are sane, then you must be crazy to say
"Yes Doctor."..
...yet a man could say it but not a "sane" machine.
Bruno's quest based on machine psychology runs the risk of leaving
unanswered the really big quest based on human psychology.
George
B
Slight correction:
If you are sane then you're not sure that you are sane, then you would
have to be crazy to say
"Yes Doctor."..
...yet a man could say it but not a "sane" machine.
Bruno's quest based on machine psychology runs the risk of leaving
unanswered the really
The scientist could prove that he is not alone by invoking the
principle of sufficient reason: nothing is arbitrary and exist with no
reason. If something exists in a particular arbitrary way (himself)
with no reason for him to be in that particular way, then all
other alternatives of him must
Bruno Marchal wrote in explaining Maudlin's argument:
"For any given precise running computation associated to
some inner experience, you
can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical
activity involved is
arbitrarily low, and even null for dreaming experience which has no
inp
from convincing.
George
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 03-oct.-06, à 06:56, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote in explaining Maudlin's argument:
"For any given precise running computation associated
to some
inner experience, you
can modify the device in such
ct.-06, à 21:33, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno,
I looked on the web but could not find Maudlin's paper.
Mmh... for those working in an institution affiliated to JSTOR, it is
available here:
http://www.jstor.org/view/0022362x/di973301/97p04115/0
I will search if s
Oops. Read: IF (Input = 27098217872180483080234850309823740127)
George
George Levy wrote:
Bruno, Stathis,
Thank you Stathis for the summary. I do have the paper now and I will
read it carefully. Based on Sathis summary I still believe that Maudlin
is fallacious. A computer program
List members
I scanned Maudlin's paper. Thank you Russell. As I suspected I found a
few questionable passages:
Page417: line 14:
"So the spatial sequence of the troughs need not reflect their
'computational sequence'. We may so contrive that any sequence of
address lie next to each other spa
Bruno,
Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my
computer. (The original at the Iridia web site
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf
is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.)
In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of cons
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy a écrit :
Bruno,
Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my
computer. (The original at the Iridia web site
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf
is not accessible
David Nyman wrote:
On Oct 9, 8:54 pm, George Levy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer who is also
split, in sync with the split consciousness, across time, space,
substrate and level (a la Zelazny - Science Fiction writer). I
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-oct.-06, à 21:54, George Levy a écrit :
To observe a split consciousness, you need an observer
who
is also split,
?
This is simple. The time/space/substrate/level of the observer must
match the time/space/substrate/level of what he observes
Thanks guys for the information. Now I have work on my hands.
George
Brent Meeker wrote
>Do a search for "transactional quantum mechanics" and look at Vic Stenger's
>website.
>Brent Meeker
scerir wrote:
>
> > George Levy
> > This is interesting. Is i
Hi Saibal
Speculation about mirror matter is interesting. If invisible mirror
planets did exist they would have been detected through their
gravitational interaction with the visible planets. This fact seems to
argue against a galactic model in which ordinary matter and mirror
matter are mixed. I
ist, David Deutsh and and Tegmark's idea.
George Levy
Wei Dai wrote:
>
> I find that I often have trouble understanding posts on this mailing list,
> given the wide range of intellectual ground that it covers. It seems that
> people sometimes assume a background in an academi
from me today to me tomorrow, and from you today
to you tomorrow.
George Levy
[EMAIL PROTECTED]">
Hal Finney wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]">
I took the liberty of copying a few paragraphs from James Joyce'sbook describing the causalist argument in Newcomb's Paradox. This isthe best statement of the argument for taking both boxes that I haveseen. I also included a short response of my own, w
I have been following the latest very scholarly exchange involving different
logical models in relation to the MWI, however I fail to see how it relates
to my own perception of the world and my own consciousness unless I think
according to those formal systems which I think is unlikely.
Using
jamikes wrote:
007f01c24609$8a1cfa00$5e76d03f@default">
I was missing your input lately
Yes, I am very busy preparing for a patent bar. But I still read the list.
I don't have too much time to dig deep into the references so I can't comment
intelligently when the going gets too te
Tim
I agree with you. Scientific American did not do a good job covering the
issue of time. The days of Martin Gardner are over. Paul Davies' article
on time travel making use of worm holes is just a rehash of "old
science-fiction technology" of the fifties and sixties. Falling into a
worm
Beautiful post, Hal. I have read and reread Rudy Rucker's "Infinity and the
Mind" four or five times. This is such a rich book that I enjoy it everytime.
His explanation of the infinite always leaves me in awe.
I agree with you that our brains and our bit-based digital computers are
limited to
Hal Finney wrote:
>Quantum randomness does not exist in the MWI. It is an illusion caused by
>the same effect which Bruno Marchal describes in his thought experiments,
>where an observer who is about to enter a duplication device has multiple
>possible futures, which he treats as random.
>
Cou
Bruno Marchal wrote:
George Levy asks recently "Could somebody incorporate complementarity in
a thought experiment in the style of Bruno's duplication experiment?"
This is an interesting proposal and I would be glad if someone manage
to present one. Just that
, September 07, 2002 7:39PM
Subject: Re: Duplication ThoughtExperiment Involving Complementarity
Bruno Marchal wrote:
George Levy asks recently "Could somebody incorporate complementarity
in a thought experiment in the style of Bruno's duplication
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Umm, I suspect that there is a minimul distance possible between the
Kirk that is some function of the speed of light so that no arbitrary pair
of Kirk Copies could communicate with each other such to exchage classical
information regarding their experie
Russell Standish wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]">
George Levy wrote:...As it stand, the comp hypothesis is only a philosophical exercise because it does not reproduce the same phenomenon as QM in particular the phenomenon of complementarity. Therefore, to establish a meaningful relevance
jamikes wrote:
George Levy wrote a comprehensive thought
experiment with a major flaw:
6.6257 square miles arenot interchangeable
to 6.6257 sqare kilometers.
There was indeterminacy in the units. But the number is real and does correspond
to a natural constant
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> George Levy wrote:
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> George Levy asks recently "Could somebody incorporate
>>> complementarity in a thought experiment in the style of Bruno's
>>> duplication experiment?"
&g
scerir wrote:
002401c25780$ce1358c0$f0c7fea9@scerir">
George Levy:
5) Is complementarity anthropically necessary?
I may be wrong but it seems to me that complementarity
is nothing more, and nothing less than a consequence
of the finiteness of
Here is a thought experiment illustrating a paradox involving the first
and third person point of views.
Romeo and Juliet, being very unhappy with their families, the Montague
and the Capulet, decide to engage in QS. (By QS, I do not mean Quantum
Sex, even though such an activity has intrigui
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> At 23:53 -0700 27/09/2002, George Levy wrote:
>
>> Here is a thought experiment illustrating a paradox involving the
>> first and third person point of views.
>>
>>
>> Romeo and Juliet, being very unhappy with their families, the
&g
Wei Dai wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]">
On Fri, Sep 27, 2002 at 11:53:10PM -0700, George Levy wrote:
After discussing the idea of QS with their dear friend Mercutio, Romeo and Juliet decide to go ahead with the project. Mercutio design the machine and under his instruction, B
Jesse Mazer wrote:
> George Levy wrote:
>
>> Without our quantum laws, for example, if we lived in a mechanistic
>> universe, electrons, unfettered by their >quantum levels would fall
>> into their nucleii resulting in the almost immediate annihilation of
>>
Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
>Suppose you are a virtual person, programmed by me and living in a virtual
>environment. You do some experiments to find the laws of physics. You try to
>break up things and look what they are ``made of´´. Would you ever discover
>how the pentium processor works if you pr
When you look at the bottom of the well,
all the way
deep down,
you see yourself staring right back at you.
And right now you look like an algorithm.
Oh well, there was a time when you looked like clockwork
Maybe tomorrow you'll be a brain.
And the day after tomorrow maybe a quantum device.
The u
e.
3) The lobotomy was a way to shift the experimenter subjective "frame of
reference." How does the knowledge of the machine affect the frame of
reference? What is the essence of the frame of reference?
George Levy
Thanks Bruno, for your comments, I fully agree with you. Let me add a few
comments for Tim and Scerir
Tim May wrote:
Consider this thought experiment: Alice is facing her quantum mechanics exam
at Berkeley. She sees two main approaches to take. First, study hard and
try to answer all of th
Tim May wrote:
From: Tim May <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu Jan 9, 2003 1:22:32 PM US/Pacific
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Quantum suicide without suicide
On Thursday, January 9, 2003, at 12:32 PM, George Levy wrote:
As you can see, suicide is not necessary. One could be on
This
is a reply to Eric Hawthorne and Tim May.
Eric Hawthorne wrote:
>George Levy wrote:
Conclusions:
All this involves really basic probability theory.
The first person perspective probability is identical to the probability
conditional to the person staying alive.
&
Hi Brent.
Brent Meeker wrote:
I don't understand the point of this modification. The idea of QS was
to arrange that in all possible worlds in which I exist, I'm rich.
If it's just a matter of being rich in a few and not rich in the
rest, I don't need any QS.
Yes but you only want
Tim, Hal, Russell
Since we have several futures ( and several pasts), time travel is just a
particular case of many-world travel.
Here is a (white) hared brained idea on how to build a time machine. You
need a very good recording device and a Quantum Suicide (QS) machine.
1) You allow
Tim May wrote
If you mean that
"many presents" have "many pasts," yes. But the current present only has
a limited number of pasts, possibly just one. (The origin of this asymmetry
in the lattice of events is related to our being in one present.)
I mean one (many?) present has many past
I am sorry to see Tim leave. We certainly need a multi-sided discussion
and some of his latest post were interesting in his challenge of the
concept of Quantum Suicide. However he did not convince me he was right
- I remain an agnostic - and quitting in the middle of a good discussion
is poor s
Stephen,
Amazingly, I had kind-of the same thought. From the point of view of information
flow, there seems to be an analogy between
1) falling down into a black hole and
2) "dying."
Both events results in the cessation of information flow between two observers.
In both cases one of the ob
We exist in an infinite number of simulations. Any arbitrary number of simulations
less than infinity would require a reason. We are led to this conclusion
by assuming a TOE which by definition has no a-priori reason. (This is the
philosophical rationale for postulating the plenitude)
Discre
John Collins wrote:
George Levy
wrote:
>Everytime a "measurement" is made,
the set of worlds spanned >by this consciousness is defined more narrowly,
but the >number in the set remains infinite. In addition, each >simulation
in the
Sorry about the graphics... There were'nt any except some italics I think.
I'll send this one in plain text.. tell me how it goes.
Hal Finney wrote:
George Levy writes:
Oh, sorry, I'm supposed to ignore that, aren't I? I guess you had
some n
Hi Stephen,
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Friends,
Does computational complexity (such as NP-Completeness, etc.)
and computational "power" requirements factor into the idea of
simulated worlds?
It may. Also important is the issue that Tegmark raised in the
Scientific American artic
HI Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Does computational complexity (such as NP-Completeness, etc.)
and computational "power" requirements factor into the idea of
simulated worlds?
It may. Also important is the issue that Tegmark raised in the
Scientific American article about the orderin
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George,
Interleaving,
- Original Message -
From: "George Levy" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Everything List" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, June 13, 2003 4:21 PM
Subject: Re: are we in a simulation?
HI Stephe
Hi Doriano,
Welcome to the list.
You raise an interesting problem and. I don't know the answer to your
question. However, I just want to point out that an observer in relative
motion observes the rotation in the complex plane of space-time
geodesics. Could there be a connection between quantum
to be OFF what would you do with the lamp
ONF? This is something we should really worry about instead of
worrying about the lamp!
George Levy
Norman Samich wrote
Welcome,
I've been looking for an idiot savant
to answer this question: Perhaps you've heard of Thompson's Lamp.
T
Welcome to the list Ron.
Could someone please explain dark energy in simple terms : newtonian
terms + mass-energy equivalence for example using equations such as
F= Gm1m2/r^2, F=ma and E=mc^2 . Could such equations describe to a
first approximation the forces and accelerations involved whe
Russel,
If you view the "observer-moments" as transitions rather than states,
then there is no need for requiring a time dimension. Each
observer-moments carries with it its own subjective feeling of time.
Different observer-moments can form vast networks without any time
requirement.
Saib
Ron,
I am not a physicist, just a dabbling engineer philosoper, however, the
idea of dark energy is intriguing. I asked a question a few weeks ago,
whether dark (mass) energy is identical to negative (mass) energy and
what the implications would be in terms of Newton mechanics. The reason
for
John Collins wrote:
One interpretation of
the universe of constructible sets found in standard set theory textbooks is
that even if you start with nothing, you can say "that's a thing," and put
brackets around it and then you've got two things: nothing and {nothing}.
And then you also have {noth
is another layer besides many-worlds, and COMP. What in
the nature of consciousness makes such a layer important?
George Levy
Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
I think this discussion might have already took place
here, but I would like to take you opinions on this.
How do we define (de)coherence? What mak
evel.
At a deeper level, we could ask the question, why is the principle of
causality so important? This principle is intimately tied up with our
own rationality which is an essential ingredient of our consciousness.
Thus the world itself seems to be a product of ourselves.
George Levy
ly to display a macroscopic white rabbit.
Ergo: No observable macroscopic white rabbit.
But of course the biggest rabbit is taken for granted. It is right under
our nose and so close that we don't see it.
George Levy
es of the subroutine B is
meaningless. It is the number of calls to B from A{}that matters.
George Levy
Hal Finney wrote:
David Barrett-Lennard writes:
Why is it assumed that a multiple "runs" makes any difference to the
measure?
One reason I like this assump
ABSTRACT:
Suggestion for keeping up with the volume of posts is to provide an
abstract.
CONTENT
I share Sergio's problem. I just can't keep up. How about providing an
abstract summarizing the post. Either that or keep your content less
than half a page.
George
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I'm
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Eric Hawthorne
writes:
I'll grant you that the subjective experience of "red" etc cannot be
derived from a theory of physics.
However, by Occam's Razor we can say that the qualia that other people
experience are the same as those that we experience.
The
Jesse Mazer wrote:
George Levy wrote:
You assume that you could get your hands on the absolute probability
distribution. You must assume >when you observe a physical system is
that you are an observer. The existence of (objective) absolute
>reality is another assumption that may
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Put in another way, *either* the massive computer simulates the exact
laws of physics (exact with comp = the laws extractible from the
measure on all 1-computations) in which case we belong to it but
in that case we belong also to all its "copy" in Platonia, and our
predicti
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 15:51 10/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
BM: But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.
GL: No I don't agree. I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all
things.
But to say that there is no plenitude without an UD does not mean that
the UD
is the
n be conscious?
Cheers
On Tue, May 11, 2004 at 04:10:15PM -0700, George Levy wrote:
Russell wrote
However, the mind-body problem doesn't completely disappear - rather
it is transformed into "Why the Anthropic Principle?".
Once you have accept
lude a representation (ie a body) of the creature itself.
Would that creature deduce that it is in a virtual reality, and that
it has a body in another (unobservable to it) reality?
Or would it even be conscious?
Cheers
On Tue, May 11, 2004 at 04:10:15PM -0700, George Levy wrot
Hi Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George,
My take of Russell's post is:
Unless the creature had some experience that
was not dismissible as a hallucination (1st person) and/or was witness
by others (a proxy of 3rd person?) that lead him to the conclusi
Hi Bruno
Bruno Marchal wrote:
when you say that the first person is all there is I am not sure it
fits nicely with
the methodology I am following. I am not sure I understand why you
don't need the UD,
given that the UD is just a nice third person description of the comp
plenitude.
[That such
Hi Stephen
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George,
Interleaving.
-
Original Message -
From:
George
Levy
To:
Stephen
Paul King
Sent:
Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:00 PM
Subject:
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer
- make them into one single coherent whole: Einstein's
Relativity, Everett's Relative Many-World interpretation, and
(Relative?) Logic.
Have a good weekend. I will also be busy till Tuesday.
George
I am rather busy until tuesday.
See You,
Bruno
At 21:42 12/05/04 -0700, George Le
^2^64
as minimal bit-length is quite little in comparison of almost all number
in Plato Heaven.
Bruno
At 15:56 05/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
This has been an interesting thread. Unfortunately I was too busy to
contribute much. However, here is a thought regarding simulation
versus fi
Bruno,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
My view is that the "observer-experience" simply consists in the
(virtual) transitions from one "observer-moment" to another where the
transition is filtered by having to be consistent with the
"observer-state." Note how the observer bootstraps himself into
conscio
ew),
the "right measure" seems to self-correct by itself. It is that
self-measure I study with provability logic.
Another problem with the idea of "low" level, or of "simple program"
is that even a program with 2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^64
as minimal bit-length is quit
Bruno,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 16:13 07/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
Bruno,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
My view is that the "observer-experience" simply consists in the
(virtual) transitions from one "observer-moment" to another where
the transition is filtered by having t
This has been an interesting thread. Unfortunately I was too busy to
contribute much. However, here is a thought regarding simulation versus
first and third person points of view.
It does make sense to talk about a 3rd person point of view about
simulation of a conscious entity on a computer. H
:
George
Levy
To:
Stephen
Paul King
Sent:
Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:00 PM
Subject:
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
Stephen,
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear George,
How does indeterminacy and
multiple-world
of its lack of formalism.
How can the notion of "objective reality" be defined? In fact, is there
such a thing as a true psychological objective reality? However, the
fact that a "psychological objective reality" is an oxymoron
(contradiction in terms) does not invalidate the definition of the
observer at the psychological level. Au contraire.
George Levy
ical propositions like "1+1=2", "Prime(17)",
or "the machine number i
>> (in some enumeration) does not stop on
input number j", this + Church Thesis + the "yes doctor"
>> act of faith is what I mean by comp.
George Levy
Bruno Marchal wro
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 17:50
05/06/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
Let's me see if I can convince you to bridge
the gap and maybe take the relative formulation as a starting point.
Like Socrates, let me start with one question. How can you possibly
know to begin with this parti
k that our survival or death,
the trimming process, is ongoing, omnipresent, and inherently coupled
with the physical laws at the most fundamental level.
George Levy
Bruno Marchal wrote:
GL wrote:
A first person
perception is
a subjective or relative experience.
A third person perception is an objective or
absolute experience.
Of course I would say
A first person perception is a subjective experience,
and
then an absolute one (in the se
vival is that consciousness
is unaware of
1) any substitution of parts or the whole of its physical
implemetation (i.e. body)
2) its own measure (the size of the subset of worlds in the
manyworld that sustain his or her consciousness)
George Levy
Jeanne Houston wrote:
I am a q
Hi Bruno
As a variation of my last post, I would like to use your teleportation
experiment rather than Q-suicide to illustrate the First and Third
Person concept, in a manner that parallels Einstein's scenario in which
two observers in different inertial frames of reference observe that the
len
Hi Stephen
Let me add my grain of salt to Bruno's post. The No Cloning Theorem
applies to the physical duplication but not necessarily to the
duplication of information that is carried by a physical substrate. For
example, you could very well make a copy of a DVD that reproduces
exactly the in
CMR wrote:
>To the question "What is
mathematics" - Podiek's (after Dave Rusin) answer:
>Mathematics is the part of science you could continue to do if
you woke up tomorrow and discovered the universe was >gone.
Let me make an analogy by paraphrasing: Empty space is the part
Bruno, John, Russell
I am half-way through Smullyan's book. It is an entertaining book for
someone motivated enough to do all these puzzles, but I think that what
is missing is a metalevel discussion of what all this means.
Mathematical fireworks occur because we are dealing with
self-referenti
Hi Bruno
Bruno Marchal wrote:
You get a native, and asks her if Santa Claus exists.
The native answers this: "If I am a knight then Santa Claus exists"
What can you deduce about the native, and about Santa Claus?
First let's assume that the native is a knight. Since he tells
Hi Russel
I just came back from vacation and am catching up with the list.
Are you claiming that photon particles are redirected to the detectors
by diffraction around the wires? If so your objection to Afshar's
experiment is not valid because you presupposes that the photons are
waves obeying d
Bruno
I am trying to visualize Lob formula as a block diagram to be
implemented either in neural net, as computer program or as a digital
cicuit. Digital circuits have the advantage of being very simple
(binary) so let's try to express Lob's formula as a truth table that
could be implemented w
I am still working to express Lob's formula using the simplest possible
electronic circuit. I am trying to use the well known three-state
concept in electronic as a vehicle for expressing belief .
Let's first define the operator B as a binary operator that uses two
arguments and has one re
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi
George, [out-of-line message]
perhaps you could try to motivate your "qBp == If q then p".
I don't see the relation with "if q is 1 then p is known, and and if q
is 0
then p is unknown". How do you manage the "known" notion.
Imagine a three port dev
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