time in which it
> came into being.
>
> And your claim that the creation of the entire universe from beginning to
> end is no more improbable than simply starting with a fine tuning of 20
> some constants is also frankly ludicrous.
>
So you think the universe starting at ap particula
exist and are actually
> a particular age.
>
>
> There's no special present moment. As an analogy, I feel that I am me, but
> there are many other people in the world who feel that they are themselves.
> I'm no more special than they are, and their sense of being themselves d
On Monday, February 24, 2014, David Nyman wrote:
> On 22 February 2014 05:59, Stathis Papaioannou
>
> > wrote:
>
> If we make a bet we can never settle, since the idea is that if the
>> replacement is technically perfect the subject's behaviour will be
>
mechanisms whereby the body
>> recognises foreign protein markers on the transplanted tissue. That's the
>> only thing you have said above which is close to an observational
>> consequence of your theory, and it doesn't support it.
>>
>
> The body's recogn
On Sunday, February 23, 2014, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
> Jesse,
>
> 1. Do you agree you are actually a particular age right now today as you
> read this?
>
Not Jesse, but yes.
2. Do you agree that I am actually a particular age right now today as I
> write this, whether or not you know what that i
ld be easily created from primordial soup. Your theory
> misses the whole other half of the universe which coheres from the top down.
>
> We can take out small words or skip letters of a sentence and still be
> understood, but we can't understand a sentence as a whole if we don
ot;
If we make a bet we can never settle, since the idea is that if the
replacement is technically perfect the subject's behaviour will be
normal, and behaviour includes displays of emotion and verbal
descriptions of internal states.
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On 20 February 2014 20:43, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 19 Feb 2014, at 22:50, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 19 Feb 2014, at 17:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>&
at's your theory, but the theory should have some straightforward
observational consequences. For example, if some of the matter in a
cell is replaced in a laboratory, then the cell would stop
functioning. This would confound the scientists because according to
current theories it ought to func
ll, get rounded up
> to 1 in MWI scenarios.
>
> All the best
Since in the world we live in probabilities for everything don't seem
to be 1, is this evidence that the MWI is false? Is it even logically
possible to be an observer in a multiverse where everything happens
with probab
hanks for telling me, so
> that I avoid any paranoia, like "did I say something impolite or what ...".
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Bruno
>
You're one of the most patient and polite people on the Internet, Bruno.
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On Thursday, February 20, 2014, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 19 Feb 2014, at 17:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 18/02/2014, David Nyman wrote:
>
> >> I think if I say consciousness is an epiphenomenon of biochemistry I
> >> should also say that
evidence that biologists
>> have been wrong and something new and mysterious is at play.
>>
>
> You're assuming that precise molecular assembly will necessarily yield a
> coherent dynamic process, but that may not be the case at all. If you put
> random people in the proper p
there but no life (which Craig can apparently
do).
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he body was lacking. Perhaps this would be
because the body does not supervene on the larger context of
awareness, but whatever it is, it would be evidence that biologists
have been wrong and something new and mysterious is at play.
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biochemistry being
there but consciousness absent (though further reasoning may show that
that to be impossible). But maybe that is just a failure of
imagination.
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he has the answer to the question of what is
needed to give rise to meaning/feeling/consciousness etc. His position
is quite attractive and consistent, but I am not sure how to convince
myself that it is true.
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On Sunday, February 16, 2014, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
> On Sunday, February 16, 2014 4:45:13 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, February 16, 2014, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, February 15, 2014 10:49:56 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On 16 February 2014
s deluded, how do you know that you are not a copy?
>> >
>> >
>> > You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just
>> because
>> > awareness is special, but because it is ontologically perpendicular to
>> the
>> > possi
ause it is ontologically perpendicular to the
> possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy awareness result in a doll.
A doll as in dead, or some other kind of doll?
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y answer to David, the movie has meaning only to a conscious
entity. If a computer is a conscious entity it will create meaning for
itself, as humans do. You don't think a computer could do this but
that's just prejudice.
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On 15 February 2014 20:14, David Nyman wrote:
> On 15 February 2014 02:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> If that is so (and I agree that it is, since I am not a physical
>> eliminativist) it is still consistent with the physical processes still
>> being *sufficient*
On 15 February 2014 20:14, David Nyman wrote:
> On 15 February 2014 02:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> If that is so (and I agree that it is, since I am not a physical
>> eliminativist) it is still consistent with the physical processes still
>> being *sufficient*
nsciousness can occur in different substrates. These
>> processes are meaningful to external observers and they are also
>> meaningful to the internal observer, the conscious self, to whom they
>> give rise.
>>
>> >> >> There are drugs
>> >> >> whic
in theory, since as
with the question "what is the meaning of life?" if the answer given
is X then one can always ask "and what is the meaning of X?". This
process can only stop by telling the inquisitor that enough
explanation has been provided and to stop asking more questions
physical processes are *necessary* for consciousness, and I
believe that consciousness can occur in different substrates. These
processes are meaningful to external observers and they are also
meaningful to the internal observer, the conscious self, to whom they
give rise.
>> >> There
t;> which have the same effect on species as far apart as humans and
>> bacteria.
>
>
> Which is why I say that it should be the same case for language if it was a
> product of brain change. There should be words with mean the same thing on
> species as far apart as humans and b
enes" on arithmetic).
>
> But the capital point (indeed captured in AUDA by the difference between p
> and []p), is that the explanation by physics or arithmetics, although
> sufficient for god, or from the 0-person points of view, or truth, it cannot
> be sufficient for *you*, and you can
sian better, you might drink a lot of vodka to condition
>> > your
>> > brain into a more conducive brain difference.
>>
>> None of this reasoning is plausible.
>
>
> Why not?
Why should different languages be comprehensible to different
cultures? Different compute
o-one can consistently tell them
>> apart?
>
>
> Then you would be begging the question. I am saying that in my
> understanding, there will never be computer programs that no-one can tell
> apart (though at some point they may find it easier if they have other
> computer program
express your
> point, but the content of your post is explained by your awareness of the
> questions, your taste for the field, your pleasure to argue rationally, your
> personality, etc. It is not explained by QM, as this explains all posts on
> all lists in all forums in an empty way.
ian better, you might drink a lot of vodka to condition your
> brain into a more conducive brain difference.
None of this reasoning is plausible.
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ould be so whether thought was generated by the brain or
not, so is not a reason.
> Another good reason is that matter in general has no plausible potential to
> generate intentions or illusions of itself.
That's begging the question, and not a reason.
--
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now I am
>> conscious if I am conscious, then it's perfectly logical.
>
>
> I meant to say "I might know it intuitively, but not be able to justify it
> logically".
>
> i.e., maybe part of the definition of being conscious is to know who else is
> consc
On 9 February 2014 21:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 09 Feb 2014, at 02:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 7 February 2014 07:47, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>> Well, I *could* be a zombie and still say that, unless you consider
>>>> the ide
>>> is due to the brain.
>>>
>>
>> I don't think science is supposed to make assumptions.
>>
>> Assumption was the wrong word. He meant hypothesis.
>
Strictly speaking everything is tentative and subject to revision in the
light of new evidenc
ave a very good reason
to challenge these assumptions.
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at is a step toward the elimination of the person.
>>
>> I know I'm not a zombie, but you don't know that.
>
>
> You might know it intuitively, but not be able to justify it logically.
If part of the defiinition of consciousness is that I know I am
conscious if I am c
difference is due to
brain difference. That's not to say that our techniques are at present
refined enough to see a difference, but there must be one if language
is due to the brain.
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treated indexically to, and with comp, in a way related to the
> many computations in arithmetic.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> for if there were we
>> would observe magical events. If you accept that then I agree with
>> you, any apparent disagreement is really just semantics.
> through which argument itself is defined. The argument may be able to
>> > silence objections, but that doesn't mean the argument is correct.
>>
>> Again, that's like the Pythagoreans deciding to suppress the evidence
>> for irrational numbers because they believed
On 5 February 2014 23:32, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 05 Feb 2014, at 07:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> To be clear, what I find problematic is the question of whether
>> consciousness can cause someone to refer to it.
>
>
> That is a good question. (
e which exists outside of all argument,
> through which argument itself is defined. The argument may be able to
> silence objections, but that doesn't mean the argument is correct.
Again, that's like the Pythagoreans deciding to suppress the evidence
for irrational numbers
ging on
> something non physical (which comp allows to limit on arithmetical truth or
> combinators truth, ...).
I don't believe that mind can act on anything except in a manner of
speaking, but again maybe this is nitpicking. The important thing is
that if mind had separate causal effica
On 5 February 2014 01:34, David Nyman wrote:
> On 4 February 2014 13:57, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> We can refer to our conscious states because the base phenomena on which
>> our conscious states supervene cause our vocal cords to move in a particular
>> way. But it
ational numbers offend their sense of aesthetics. You have not
shown that the argument is invalid.
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On Tuesday, February 4, 2014, David Nyman wrote:
> On 4 February 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou
>
> > wrote:
>
> > Why? You agree that there is still one way causal link. That is
>> > consciousness is a necessary side, and real, effect of the brain
>> ac
epiphenomenon?
We don't have to explain why it apparently has no effect on matter yet
we can still refer to it.
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gt; qualities of consciousness depend on functions to persist. Functions are an
> appearance within consciousness. Every function can have a level beneath
> them which is sensory-motive rather than mechanical.
Again, for the purpose of this discussion functions are purely third
person obs
ally begin to itch or turn orange, if the potential to itch or turn
> orange did not already exist?
As per my answer to David: if you could show that a physical
phenomenon of a particular type necessarily leads to consciousness,
then anything further you have to say, such as remarks about how weird
> recent comment) that the prize at the end of this road is a completed theory
> of the physical correlates of self-reported conscious phenomena. But many
> people take the view that after this prize is attained, there is still a
> "remainder problem" that doesn't seem
On 4 February 2014 02:26, David Nyman wrote:
> On 3 February 2014 12:06, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> If consciousness is epiphenomenal I don't see how that diminishes its
>> importance in any way, let alone eliminates it. It is consistent with
>> evolution sinc
s
the paradox that David Nyman sees. What's not to like?
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menal, even if the brain might have arbitrary
> choices in some of the way to sum up big chunks of informations available
> for the person in act.
>
> Consciousness might better be seen as phenomenal, 1p. It depends on truth,
> self, and relative consistency.
If the dolls l
On 1 February 2014 16:48, meekerdb wrote:
> On 1/31/2014 9:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> We are potentially immortal in the same way as a car can potentially
> survive indefinitely provided parts can be repaired or replaced
> indefinitely. At present, we can repair or rep
red or replaced
indefinitely. At present, we can repair or replace some parts in the
human body, but not enough to prolong life for more than a few years.
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uth, beauty, and universal values (mostly unknown) will be
> more "real" than their local terrestrial approximations through primitively
> physical brains and other interacting molecules like galaxies foam.
>
> Bruno
>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaio
on you *could* resurrect a dead person
with fairly simple techniques which "fix the machine". In the future,
this may be possible with what is currently defined as brain death.
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&qu
gt; > still, in the UD computation, be a closed account of the physical
>> > processes.
>> > No doubt it will be computationally linked with some provable sentences,
>> > which Bruno wants to then identify with beliefs. But this still leaves
>> > beliefs as epiph
eems there will
> still, in the UD computation, be a closed account of the physical processes.
> No doubt it will be computationally linked with some provable sentences,
> which Bruno wants to then identify with beliefs. But this still leaves
> beliefs as epiphenomena of the physical p
7;s a case of the definition of death changing
with technology. In future, there will probably be patients who would
currently considered brain dead who will be able to be revived.
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;> Et voila!
>> >
>> >
>> > Voila, a cadaver.
>>
>> Unless it's all set up to function properly.
>
>
> What's wrong with the way a cadaver functions?
Many changes occur after death, the end result of which is that in a
cadaver, the parts are in the
nted by the
>>> spirits of system-hood.
>>
>>
>> Imagine a small, roughly spherical room made out of a fairly hard material
>> something like limestone. Make a few holes in it, fill it with some goop
>> with the consistency of blancmange, decorate with sense
quot;Her" could not be
>> conscious.
>
>
> Because she doesn't need to be conscious. She could just as easily be
> programmed as a chameleon, which analyzes the profile of each user and
> builds an ad hoc identity to reflect some Bayesian extraction of their
&
hods
> can ever dream of. Intuition, serendipity, and imagination are required to
> generate the perpetual denationalization of creators ahead of the created.
> This doesn't mean that some people cannot be fooled all of the time or that
> all of the people can't be fooled some of t
e collection of John Wayne quotes, and how
> great a job the book does at imitating what John Wayne would say, the
> room/computer/simulation cannot ever become John Wayne.
It could not become John Wayne physically, and it could not become John
Wayne mentally if the actual matter in John
ween understanding and
processing is a difference in kind, so no matter how clever the
computer or how convincing its behaviour it will never have
understanding.
I don't think your example with the typing is as good as the Chinese
Room, because by changing the keys around a bit it would be o
rts, as the entire coherence of the body is
> as a character within relativistically scoped perceptual experiences.
>
> I don't think that I believe, I think that I understand. I think that you do
> not understand what I mean, but are projecting that onto me, and therefore
>
e of what is to be communicated
> in general, from the top down, and the inside out.
I think you have a problem with the idea that a system could display
properties that are not obvious from examining its parts. There's no
way to argue around this, you just believe it and that's that
mblance to multiverse
theories. At its simplest, a multiverse theory says that there are
multiple copies of you having your current thought, and if one of
these copies suddenly stops, you live on in the others. This does not
require the existence of a soul that flies from one body to the other,
as L
On Friday, 17 January 2014, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 16 Jan 2014, at 19:00, meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 1/16/2014 12:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>> On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>> The computational metaphor in
On 17 January 2014 12:07, LizR wrote:
> On 17 January 2014 14:00, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> At least *weak* AI would be possible. Weak AI means computers could do
>> everything we do but without necessarily being conscious. Strong AI
>> means they would also b
On 17 January 2014 11:43, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 6:42 PM, LizR wrote:
>>
>> On 17 January 2014 13:34, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> I meant that if the physics of the brain is computable it follows as a
&
our satisfaction, but which part of the claim I made do you
actually disagree with?
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On 13 January 2014 02:23, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 12 Jan 2014, at 06:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> I'm a lump of dumb matter arranged in a special way and I am
>> conscious,
>
>
> I think this is misleading. Are you really a dumb of matter? I think that
&
lorine into water by rearranging the subatomic
particles. You have argued that it is not possible to create a living
cell by arranging atoms.
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On 17 January 2014 01:17, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
> On Jan 16, 2014, at 2:11 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the Intel
>>&g
On 16 January 2014 23:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 16 Jan 2014, at 09:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the Intel
>>> CPU inside
n the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.
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atter arranged in a special way and I am
conscious, so I don't see why another lump of dumb matter arranged in
a special way might not also be conscious. What is it about that idea
that you see as not only wrong, but ridiculous?
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l, but comes at the cost
> of generally poor abilities to perform context-free computations. If human
> algorithms cannot be trusted to produce unfuzzy representations of odd
> numbers, triangles, and grandmothers, the idea that they can be trusted to
> do the heavy lifting of moment-
On 19 December 2013 08:32, LizR wrote:
> If this is a proof of the falsity of mechanism, is there any chance of a
> precis? :-)
The argument has been restated with elaboration by Penrose, and has
been extensively criticised.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/lp-argue/
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-
ent financial system, which some proponents claim
cryptocurrencies may eventually partly supplant.
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gt; would be created. (Or then again, that might be happening all the time
> anyway.)
>
> These are the sort of consideration that make me think that if you say "yes"
> to the Doctor, you've already effectively swallowed all the implcations of
> comp.
The req
ge Levy
The rat has the same behaviour, but does it have the same experience?
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On 25 November 2013 23:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>
>
>
> 2013/11/25 Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 25 November 2013 12:35:50 am AEDT, Samiya Illias wrote:
>>
>> Bruno asks: "Should we search, or not, for a reason behind t
On 25 November 2013 12:35:50 am AEDT, Samiya Illias wrote:Bruno asks: "Should
we search, or not, for a reason behind the physical reality?" We must,
otherwise this life itself doesn't make any sense. There has to be a purpose,
and there has to be some sort of an outcome.
series of mechanistic events,
but these mechanistic events follow from my decision, not the other
way around."
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be having these discussions: instead, we would wave the Consciousness
Detector over the computer and read out the result. So if
consciousness has top-down causal efficacy, that would mean an
undetectable force caused matter to move. In experiments, that would
look like a magical or supernatural effect. I
s adjusted to and within our limited capabilities of mind
>> > (consciousness???)
>>
>> Physics is what happens in the natural world due to natural processes.
>
>
> That sentence should win some kind of prize for containing the most logical
> fallacies.
I suppose y
gt; It all is adjusted to and within our limited capabilities of mind
> (consciousness???)
Physics is what happens in the natural world due to natural processes.
> On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 12:43 AM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 28 Oct
level of such explanatory thinking. It changed from time-period to
> time-period and is likely to change further in the future.
> Agnostically yours
> John Mikes
>
It would be supernatural not if it were inconsistent with known physics,
but with any physics.
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a change in
>> the brain, or a change in the brain not explained by the physics, would be
>> evidence of supernatural processes.
>>
>
> This study alone should convince you that this iron law you have adopted
> is obsolete. The fact that it does not only shows that you
actually trying to make sense
> *on purpose* ;) Could it be that consciousness is actually *conscious???*
>
If consciousness supervenes on neurochemistry then the brain will be
different if the conscious state is different. Demonstrating that there is
a change in consciousness without a c
consuming only inorganic atoms or
> mathematics.
There is no logical reason why something that is inorganic or did not
arise spontaneously or eats inoragnic matter cannot be conscious. It's
just something you have made up.
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visual data,
process it in a series of biological relays, then send electrical
signals to muscles that move the pieces around. This is what an alien
scientist would observe. That's not thinking! That's not
understanding!
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e is wrong then
>>>> the scientist would look at the physical processes B and declare that
>>>> there must be some supernatural influence,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Not supernatural, just transmeasurable. How would the scientist presume
>>> t
lly thinks the Earth is flat mean the Earth is
in fact flat, on the grounds that there would otherwise be no reason
for such a belief to be so widespread? Does the fact that every
culture has come up with religious beliefs mean God exists?
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omness or determinism.
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To post to this g
jective appreciation of what
> it does. No fMRI machine has the faintest idea what a brain is or why is has
> to generate images of it. From the perspective of non-humans, the brain is
> food, or a source of energy, or just a blob of decaying ooze.
The scientist might be wrong about what exactl
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