Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Kim Jones]

On 24/01/2009, at 4:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> Have you find the time to take a look on UN-16 UN-24 in
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume1CC/4z1_1sansp.pdf
>
> After all, you know some french, isn't it? Take it easy, I will  
> explain all this to you, beginning from zero. Put the document above  
> in a easily accessible place (virtual or real) so that I can point  
> on the little drawings there.
>





Je suis en traîne de lire et de digester entièrement cette thèse.  
Comme Johnny Mikes, j'apprécie beaucoup l'occasion de te lire en  
langue native! Peut-être demain je te poserai quelques questions sur  
la construction de l'ordinateur


En attendant, je te conseille d'eviter le plus possible les cinglés à  
couteau qui menaçent

amitiés,

K
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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[John Mikes]

Bruno,

thanks for 4z1, I find it an exciting (although not in all details for me
followable text) in beautiful French (your language!) which I have to
pronounce (silently) to understand (mostly) and did not study all along so
far. Also the supporting lit is remarkable - it was decades ago when I wrote
a publication with such 'umfangreich' lit-background.
I store both the pdf (drawings) and a compacted text-only version - easier
to read.

I still feel that the position(s) in it (mostly lit.) represent some
oriented (partial) views vs. my prefered totality-view (which however is
more than what I can presently express in a fully 'scientific' requirement.
I only 'think' and 'feel' in it).  As we talked about it (pro and con) on
this list many times, a 'quantized' view is an extract of the total that
contains the non-quantizable aspects as well. I assign the 'number-base' to
the former and the 'hazy' remark that "many" integers express them all does
not convince me to the opposite. Of course I could not read (and study) ALL
your posts...

I don't want to argue against your position, I "live" the scientific freedom
to differ. We all start from belief and assumption -  our personal mindset
(Colin's mini-solipsism, the 1st person 'perceived reality' of each of us).

Have a good weekend

John M




On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 12:02 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
>  On 22 Jan 2009, at 13:21, Kim Jones wrote:
>
>  Bruno,
> Have a wonderful day, sensei!
>
> You too, other sensei. Have you find the time to take a look on UN-16
> UN-24 in
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume1CC/4z1_1sansp.pdf
>
> After all, you know some french, isn't it? Take it easy, I will explain all
> this to you, beginning from zero. Put the document above in a easily
> accessible place (virtual or real) so that I can point on the little
> drawings there.
>
> Have a good week-end,
>
>
> Bruno
>
>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Jan 2009, at 13:21, Kim Jones wrote:

> Bruno,
>
> I found this an incredibly moving reply. I also see clearly your  
> points. I am glad to have given you an opportunity to state so  
> clearly some profoundly important ideas. Thank you, and let's  
> continue the voyage.

OK, thanks. ASAP (I am a bit busy).


>
>
> I am glad that Penrose was wrong.

I guess you mean you are glad that the "Godelian" argument against  
mechanism is wrong. Keep in mind science try to avoid wishful  
thinking, and be open to the idea that UDA could still lead to a  
refutation of comp.



> But then, without somebody as perceptive as Penrose being wrong  
> about things as important as this, your own light of understanding  
> could perhaps not shine so brightly.


I appreciate very much Penrose. At least he belongs to the very few  
aware of the "scientitic" mind-body problem, and he is very courageous  
to tackle it.

It helped also to make people realise how much logicians are living in  
a Ivory Tower, not knowing their (even old) work are not yet  
assimilated by the scientific community.

My understanding shining brightly?  (Don't abuse of illegal drugs too!).



>
>
> If we were in Japan, I would now bow very low to you.


Take care of your back.





>
> Have a wonderful day, sensei!


You too, other sensei. Have you find the time to take a look on  
UN-16 UN-24 in

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume1CC/4z1_1sansp.pdf

After all, you know some french, isn't it? Take it easy, I will  
explain all this to you, beginning from zero. Put the document above  
in a easily accessible place (virtual or real) so that I can point on  
the little drawings there.

Have a good week-end,


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Kim Jones]

Bruno,

I found this an incredibly moving reply. I also see clearly your  
points. I am glad to have given you an opportunity to state so clearly  
some profoundly important ideas. Thank you, and let's continue the  
voyage.


I am glad that Penrose was wrong. But then, without somebody as  
perceptive as Penrose being wrong about things as important as this,  
your own light of understanding could perhaps not shine so brightly.


If we were in Japan, I would now bow very low to you.

Have a wonderful day, sensei!

cheers,


K





On 22/01/2009, at 9:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
> On 21 Jan 2009, at 05:46, Kim Jones wrote:
>
>
>>>
>>> OK. But keep in mind that consciousness is unique in the sense of  
>>> knowing that it cannot know its Turing emulability level (yet can  
>>> bet).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>  Footnote  - (parenthetical digression): I know the above thought  
>> is native to your schema, and up to here Penrose appears to agree  
>> with you.
>
> Penrose has been wrong on this issue in its first book (The Emperor  
> New clothes), and corrected it formally in the second book "The  
> Shadows of the Mind". But, he is still incorrect on his general  
> conclusion drawn from Gödel.
>
>
>
>
>> But, this very singular quality of consciousness (to not know its  
>> emulability level but to be able to bet on it - via the Bayesian  
>> probabilities detector that is the mind) is precisely the reason  
>> Penrose and Hammeroff have decided that the mind is NOT  
>> computation; because of the uncomputability of this issue.
>
> The fact that we cannot known which machine we are does not prevent  
> us to be a machine, on the contrary. Note that Penrose and Hammeroff  
> have split their mind on this issue. Indeed Penrose argues that we  
> are not machine at all, where Hammeroff can conceive that we are  
> quantum machine (and in that case comp is satisfied).
> In general the non computability argument is wrong because  
> computationalism explains why many things ABOUT machines are not  
> computable. The universal machine "lives" on the frontier between  
> the computable and the non computable.
>
> Note that Penrose, Maudlin and me, do agree that mind and matter  
> cannot be both computable. But for different reasons, and Penrose's  
> one are not correct.
>
>
>> Why should the mind be limited to the computable?
>
> This sentence is ambiguous. In a sense, the comp hyp. makes the mind  
> "computable" (Turing-emulable), yet it does not necessarily limit  
> the mind to the computable (angels can think!), nor does it prevents  
> many manifestation of the mind to be completely not computable. We  
> will have the opportunity to dig a bit more on this.
> By "angel" I mean a self-referential entity not emulable by a  
> machine (this exists mathematically).
>
>
>
>> Clearly it is not. Could an AI conceive of Platonia?
>
>
> ?
> Could *you* conceive of Platonia? If yes, then at least one AI can  
> conceive of Platonia: you (assuming comp of course).
>
>
>
>
>> Now that would perhaps be to go one better than any Blade Runner- 
>> style Turing Test!
>
>
> This address the question: "could a machine convinces another that  
> it conceives of Platonia". This asks for an infinite Turing test  
> indeed.
> Well ... even a *big* infinity ... (depending on the precise sense  
> you can give to "conceive").
>
>
>
>> For Penrose, Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem is enough to lock the  
>> door against the thought that the mind is limited to the algorithms  
>> of the computable.
>
> It is worse than that. Penrose believes that the mind needs an  
> actual  non computable components. His argument is just wrong. Many  
> logicians have pinpoint on the mistakes made by Penrose. They are  
> analog of the errors made by Lucas an half century before. Judson  
> Webb wrote a formidable book on that issue (ref in the biblio of my  
> Lille thesis).
>
>
>
>> The mind, apparently, can understand things outside the realm of  
>> the computable. I guess it all depends on what you mean by  
>> "understand". I would cite musical understanding as an example of  
>> something that cannot be computed. There is information that  
>> appears in the (listening) mind that cannot be deduced from the  
>> notes, the melodies, the harmonies, the rhythms etc. All of the  
>> mechanics of music are of course computable, but my subjective  
>> interaction with a particular musical discourse is (probably) not.
>
>
> Universal machines can grasp that there are many things that they  
> cannot grasp. Penrose, like Lucas and the few people who still  
> believe that Gödel incompleteness theorem does limit the power of  
> machine, always forget that some machines can understand and prove  
> that theorem, even about themselves. Godel's (incompleteness  
> theorem) really shows how far a machine, betting on its own  
> consistency, can study its own limitations.
> Soon or later, any correct universal machine discover that "its  
> physical world" 

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Jan 2009, at 22:15, Kim Jones wrote:

>
>
> On 22/01/2009, at 3:50 AM, Günther Greindl wrote:
>
>>
>> Kim,
>>
>>> the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited
>>> to the
>>> computable? Clearly it is not.
>>
>> So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor?
>
>
> In fact I have 'multiple personality disorder' - from Thursday to
> Monday I say 'Yes' to the doctor, on Tuesday and Wednesday I am no
> longer the same personality because my medications have run out ;-)
>
> Well, it's Thursday here now and I have a fresh supply of anxiety-
> suppression pills,


Beware the legal drugs. They are in general more dangerous and  
addictive than some illegal one, I think.
And more expensive too.




> so I'm off to see the Doctor again!! He's talking
> about this scary Step 7 and I am starting to get sweaty palms, so in a
> fit of madness I reached into the bookshelf and drew out a Penrose
> volume which seemed to suggest I might do better to have a cup of tea
> and a little sleep...


"Road to Reality"? It is my favorite book by Penrose, but frankly it  
is more math demanding than the step seven.
A little sleep is always good.




>>
>>> Could an AI conceive of Platonia?
>
>
>>>
>>
>> Why not?
>
>
>
> Well, this particular AI which calls itself Kim can conceive of it, so
> I guess all other AIs couldunless there is a special class of AI
> that can only conceive of computables?


Once you conceive the computable, you conceive the uncomputable. Some  
intuitionist could argue differently, but they are talking on  
something else. Once you develop enough intuition of the finite, you  
grasp the infinite.




> Perhaps I should put "Road to
> Reality" back on the bookshelf for now!
>
>
> Bring on the advanced Theology


Kim, do you understand how a computer work?
Do you have a complete understanding of that? I mean, could you build  
a computer by yourself in case you are lost and isolated in a jungle  
with a lot plants, but without animals, nor electricity? I am not  
asking you to build an efficient computer 
I will bring you to that understanding.
Unfortunately I am used to explain that kind of things by doing a lot  
of drawings, which I cannot do in mail. So I suggest you put Penrose's  
"Road to reality" in the shelves indeed, and that you print instead  
the following 31 pages pdf:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume1CC/4z1_1sansp.pdf

It is the first chapter of my belgium thesis. It is written in french,  
but we will need only the drawings from page UN-16 to un-24. (You can  
try to print only those pages).

I will soon create a new thread for that purpose. You don't need math  
to understand how a computer works. On the contrary, that  
understanding will lead you to the math in some natural way. All  
right? This is needed to understand the "advanced theology of the  
machine" :)

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Jan 2009, at 05:46, Kim Jones wrote:


>>
>> OK. But keep in mind that consciousness is unique in the sense of  
>> knowing that it cannot know its Turing emulability level (yet can  
>> bet).
>>
>>
>>
>
>  Footnote  - (parenthetical digression): I know the above thought is  
> native to your schema, and up to here Penrose appears to agree with  
> you.

Penrose has been wrong on this issue in its first book (The Emperor  
New clothes), and corrected it formally in the second book "The  
Shadows of the Mind". But, he is still incorrect on his general  
conclusion drawn from Gödel.




> But, this very singular quality of consciousness (to not know its  
> emulability level but to be able to bet on it - via the Bayesian  
> probabilities detector that is the mind) is precisely the reason  
> Penrose and Hammeroff have decided that the mind is NOT computation;  
> because of the uncomputability of this issue.

The fact that we cannot known which machine we are does not prevent us  
to be a machine, on the contrary. Note that Penrose and Hammeroff have  
split their mind on this issue. Indeed Penrose argues that we are not  
machine at all, where Hammeroff can conceive that we are quantum  
machine (and in that case comp is satisfied).
In general the non computability argument is wrong because  
computationalism explains why many things ABOUT machines are not  
computable. The universal machine "lives" on the frontier between the  
computable and the non computable.

Note that Penrose, Maudlin and me, do agree that mind and matter  
cannot be both computable. But for different reasons, and Penrose's  
one are not correct.


> Why should the mind be limited to the computable?

This sentence is ambiguous. In a sense, the comp hyp. makes the mind  
"computable" (Turing-emulable), yet it does not necessarily limit the  
mind to the computable (angels can think!), nor does it prevents many  
manifestation of the mind to be completely not computable. We will  
have the opportunity to dig a bit more on this.
By "angel" I mean a self-referential entity not emulable by a machine  
(this exists mathematically).



> Clearly it is not. Could an AI conceive of Platonia?


?
Could *you* conceive of Platonia? If yes, then at least one AI can  
conceive of Platonia: you (assuming comp of course).




> Now that would perhaps be to go one better than any Blade Runner- 
> style Turing Test!


This address the question: "could a machine convinces another that it  
conceives of Platonia". This asks for an infinite Turing test indeed.
Well ... even a *big* infinity ... (depending on the precise sense you  
can give to "conceive").



> For Penrose, Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem is enough to lock the  
> door against the thought that the mind is limited to the algorithms  
> of the computable.

It is worse than that. Penrose believes that the mind needs an actual   
non computable components. His argument is just wrong. Many logicians  
have pinpoint on the mistakes made by Penrose. They are analog of the  
errors made by Lucas an half century before. Judson Webb wrote a  
formidable book on that issue (ref in the biblio of my Lille thesis).



> The mind, apparently, can understand things outside the realm of the  
> computable. I guess it all depends on what you mean by "understand".  
> I would cite musical understanding as an example of something that  
> cannot be computed. There is information that appears in the  
> (listening) mind that cannot be deduced from the notes, the  
> melodies, the harmonies, the rhythms etc. All of the mechanics of  
> music are of course computable, but my subjective interaction with a  
> particular musical discourse is (probably) not.


Universal machines can grasp that there are many things that they  
cannot grasp. Penrose, like Lucas and the few people who still believe  
that Gödel incompleteness theorem does limit the power of machine,  
always forget that some machines can understand and prove that  
theorem, even about themselves. Godel's (incompleteness theorem)  
really shows how far a machine, betting on its own consistency, can  
study its own limitations.
Soon or later, any correct universal machine discover that "its  
physical world" is a product of that productive ignorance, and this  
without going into solipsism.





>>>
>>> Our world may be a giant hologram - space - 15 January 2009 - New  
>>> Scientist
>>
>>
>> Very interesting! Thanks.
>> If consciousness is gravity (the wave selector), as Penrose find  
>> plausible, the blurriness of the hologram could necessarily  
>> (asuming comp) prevent the observation of the gravitational waves,  
>> making them definitely undetectable. Just thinking aloud.
>
>
>
> Isn't this like the Turing lock-out with respect to truth and  
> provability?


This is what I was alluding too, from Penrose's curious intuition that  
consciousness has something to do with gravity.



> We "know" the gravitational waves are there, but we 

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Kim Jones]

On 22/01/2009, at 3:50 AM, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Kim,
>
>> the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited  
>> to the
>> computable? Clearly it is not.
>
> So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor?


In fact I have 'multiple personality disorder' - from Thursday to  
Monday I say 'Yes' to the doctor, on Tuesday and Wednesday I am no  
longer the same personality because my medications have run out ;-)

Well, it's Thursday here now and I have a fresh supply of anxiety- 
suppression pills, so I'm off to see the Doctor again!! He's talking  
about this scary Step 7 and I am starting to get sweaty palms, so in a  
fit of madness I reached into the bookshelf and drew out a Penrose  
volume which seemed to suggest I might do better to have a cup of tea  
and a little sleep...
>
>
>
>> Could an AI conceive of Platonia?


>>
>
> Why not?



Well, this particular AI which calls itself Kim can conceive of it, so  
I guess all other AIs couldunless there is a special class of AI  
that can only conceive of computables?  Perhaps I should put "Road to  
Reality" back on the bookshelf for now!


Bring on the advanced Theology


loving it

K

>
>
> Cheers,
> Günther
>
> >


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Günther Greindl]

Kim,

> the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited to the 
> computable? Clearly it is not. 

So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor?


>Could an AI conceive of Platonia? 

Why not?

Cheers,
Günther

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Kim Jones]

On 21/01/2009, at 6:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
>
> On 19 Jan 2009, at 13:56, Kim Jones wrote:
>
>
>> But Brent was momentarily speaking of materialism - materialism  
>> doesn't acknowledge any form of comp "immateriality" except  
>> according to the (probably) false mind/body dualism, where the mind  
>> is allowed to be an ethereal emanation of the brain. But that's not  
>> even immateriality in your specific sense - that's popular  
>> superstition. You've cured me of that. Mind is computation; matter  
>> is computation -
>
> Actually this is an open problem. The point is that if mind is  
> computation then matter is not necessarily computation, and a priori  
> it is not computation. (Step 7 !)
> With comp we can take a very little ontology: just 0, 1, 2, 3, ...  
> with their usual additive and multiplicative relations.
> This, then give rise "automatically" to a literally un-computably  
> big "first person" an "other-person epistemology.
>
>
>
>> consciousness is not unique in the sense of some special pleading  
>> that allows it to avoid Turing emulability.
>
>
> OK. But keep in mind that consciousness is unique in the sense of  
> knowing that it cannot know its Turing emulability level (yet can  
> bet).
>
>
>

  Footnote  - (parenthetical digression): I know the above thought is  
native to your schema, and up to here Penrose appears to agree with  
you. But, this very singular quality of consciousness (to not know its  
emulability level but to be able to bet on it - via the Bayesian  
probabilities detector that is the mind) is precisely the reason  
Penrose and Hammeroff have decided that the mind is NOT computation;  
because of the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be  
limited to the computable? Clearly it is not. Could an AI conceive of  
Platonia? Now that would perhaps be to go one better than any Blade  
Runner-style Turing Test! For Penrose, Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem  
is enough to lock the door against the thought that the mind is  
limited to the algorithms of the computable. The mind, apparently, can  
understand things outside the realm of the computable. I guess it all  
depends on what you mean by "understand". I would cite musical  
understanding as an example of something that cannot be computed.  
There is information that appears in the (listening) mind that cannot  
be deduced from the notes, the melodies, the harmonies, the rhythms  
etc. All of the mechanics of music are of course computable, but my  
subjective interaction with a particular musical discourse is  
(probably) not.

I doubt that I am telling you anything you didn't already know...


(snip)

>>
>>
>> Our world may be a giant hologram - space - 15 January 2009 - New  
>> Scientist
>
>
> Very interesting! Thanks.
> If consciousness is gravity (the wave selector), as Penrose find  
> plausible, the blurriness of the hologram could necessarily (asuming  
> comp) prevent the observation of the gravitational waves, making  
> them definitely undetectable. Just thinking aloud.



Isn't this like the Turing lock-out with respect to truth and  
provability? We "know" the gravitational waves are there, but we can  
never directly detect them. Perhaps our "knowing" such a thing is non- 
computable?

regards,

Kim


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 19 Jan 2009, at 13:56, Kim Jones wrote:


> But Brent was momentarily speaking of materialism - materialism  
> doesn't acknowledge any form of comp "immateriality" except  
> according to the (probably) false mind/body dualism, where the mind  
> is allowed to be an ethereal emanation of the brain. But that's not  
> even immateriality in your specific sense - that's popular  
> superstition. You've cured me of that. Mind is computation; matter  
> is computation -

Actually this is an open problem. The point is that if mind is  
computation then matter is not necessarily computation, and a priori  
it is not computation. (Step 7 !)
With comp we can take a very little ontology: just 0, 1, 2, 3, ...  
with their usual additive and multiplicative relations.
This, then give rise "automatically" to a literally un-computably big  
"first person" an "other-person epistemology.



> consciousness is not unique in the sense of some special pleading  
> that allows it to avoid Turing emulability.


OK. But keep in mind that consciousness is unique in the sense of  
knowing that it cannot know its Turing emulability level (yet can bet).





>
>>
>>
>> That "natural supernatural" is really "super" in the sense that, as a
>> machine or number, we cannot prove or known all the relations from
>> which physics and nature emerge or supervene on.
>
>
> Once comp is assumed this follows, yes.


OK, but that is why, when we assume comp, physics can no more be  
fundamental but cannot be entirely computable.





>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> Kim, (and others) are you OK with the first person indeterminacy  
>> issue?
>
>
> I am happy to move on from this now. I cannot see how there can be a  
> way of distinguishing any of my copies.
>
>
>
>>
>> Are you ok that, from a first person point of view, throwing a coin  
>> and
>> self-duplication are identical or isomorphic experience?
>
>
> The two appear fundamentally the same process apart from the numbers  
> of atoms involved
>
>
>
>>
>> And, do you agree that introducing delays does not change the
>> expectations (the probabilities, or the credibilities) used for the
>> first person indeterminacy?
>
>
> Discussion over the last few days points has circled around this;  
> personally, I now accept that "I" only exist when my conscious mind  
> is up and running. During delays in teleportation my conscious mind  
> cannot run on any hardware so I have no way of experiencing the  
> delay. In fact the delay makes no difference to the outcome from my  
> perspective.
>
> In step 6 every consistent extension is now virtual but this makes  
> no difference to my belief that I am the same person I was before  
> teleportation since I anticipate a consistent extension and that is  
> what I experience. All that the experiment has to do is match my  
> expectations with a consistently logical and convincing reality and  
> I am prepared every time to say "This is real and this is happening  
> to me" despite delays, annihilated originals, virtual renderings  
> etc. As long as I am convinced by the environment I find myself in,  
> I am prepared to bet that it is causally connected to the one (I  
> experienced) before it - which I guess it would be even if it were  
> an unconvincing low-res simulation.


Whaouh good work!



>
>>
>>
>> Take all you time, but if you can ask some question, it will help  
>> me to
>> prepare the answer. If UDA1..6 is well understood, meaning that there
>> is no more question, I will try to imagine a way to explain step 7,  
>> and
>> this without getting in the mathematical details (if that is  
>> possible).
>
>
> This is the hard part! Still, I feel that I can intuit it. This is  
> where you show how physics arises from number. Also how the  
> Multiverse and MWI find their place in comp.


Yes, exactly. comp has its own multiverse so you can compare with the  
multiverse inferred from observation.



>
>
>>
>>
>> I know that sometimes, things can seems so incomprehensible that  
>> people
>> cannot even ask any question.
>
>
> Not incomprehensible - just counter-intuitive. It's a mind-boggling  
> exercise and up to here I do not feel you are losing any explanatory  
> power by cutting back on the maths.



I am not sure I completely understand what you mean by "cutting back  
on the maths".

But I am sure you understand that if, at the end of the argument  
"reality" is arithmetical, it will be hard to keep the math under the  
rug. Theoretical computer science is a branch of math. Forgetting  
Babbage for one second, the discovery of the universal machine is a  
discovery made by mathematicians (Post, Turing, Church, ...).

The path here is easy, but long. I have to introduce you to the  
universal machine, and this can seem as very abstract without some  
acquaintance with *many* universal machines (note the "s").







>
>
>
>
>> In that case, tell me know that it is too
>> much incomprehensible, and it will be my duty to make things even  
>> more

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Kim Jones]

On 19/01/2009, at 9:58 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
>
> Le 18-janv.-09, à 11:32, Kim Jones a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 18/01/2009, at 4:38 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>

 I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are
 incompatible,
 though.
>>>
>>> Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal
>>> links?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> supernatural causal links
>
>
>
> All right, if you define "supernatural causal links" by the "natural"
> relation existing among "natural" numbers (or other finite things).
> Assuming comp, of course.



But Brent was momentarily speaking of materialism - materialism  
doesn't acknowledge any form of comp "immateriality" except according  
to the (probably) false mind/body dualism, where the mind is allowed  
to be an ethereal emanation of the brain. But that's not even  
immateriality in your specific sense - that's popular superstition.  
You've cured me of that. Mind is computation; matter is computation -  
consciousness is not unique in the sense of some special pleading that  
allows it to avoid Turing emulability.

>
>
> That "natural supernatural" is really "super" in the sense that, as a
> machine or number, we cannot prove or known all the relations from
> which physics and nature emerge or supervene on.


Once comp is assumed this follows, yes.



>
>
> Kim, (and others) are you OK with the first person indeterminacy  
> issue?


I am happy to move on from this now. I cannot see how there can be a  
way of distinguishing any of my copies.



>
> Are you ok that, from a first person point of view, throwing a coin  
> and
> self-duplication are identical or isomorphic experience?


The two appear fundamentally the same process apart from the numbers  
of atoms involved



>
> And, do you agree that introducing delays does not change the
> expectations (the probabilities, or the credibilities) used for the
> first person indeterminacy?


Discussion over the last few days points has circled around this;  
personally, I now accept that "I" only exist when my conscious mind is  
up and running. During delays in teleportation my conscious mind  
cannot run on any hardware so I have no way of experiencing the delay.  
In fact the delay makes no difference to the outcome from my  
perspective.

In step 6 every consistent extension is now virtual but this makes no  
difference to my belief that I am the same person I was before  
teleportation since I anticipate a consistent extension and that is  
what I experience. All that the experiment has to do is match my  
expectations with a consistently logical and convincing reality and I  
am prepared every time to say "This is real and this is happening to  
me" despite delays, annihilated originals, virtual renderings etc. As  
long as I am convinced by the environment I find myself in, I am  
prepared to bet that it is causally connected to the one (I  
experienced) before it - which I guess it would be even if it were an  
unconvincing low-res simulation.

>
>
> Take all you time, but if you can ask some question, it will help me  
> to
> prepare the answer. If UDA1..6 is well understood, meaning that there
> is no more question, I will try to imagine a way to explain step 7,  
> and
> this without getting in the mathematical details (if that is  
> possible).


This is the hard part! Still, I feel that I can intuit it. This is  
where you show how physics arises from number. Also how the Multiverse  
and MWI find their place in comp.


>
>
> I know that sometimes, things can seems so incomprehensible that  
> people
> cannot even ask any question.


Not incomprehensible - just counter-intuitive. It's a mind-boggling  
exercise and up to here I do not feel you are losing any explanatory  
power by cutting back on the maths.




> In that case, tell me know that it is too
> much incomprehensible, and it will be my duty to make things even more
> clearer  until the "ah ah" (meaning "I understand or I have find  
> an
> error".
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno


- I did get a brief case of the "Ah Ah" (meaning I understand) when I  
read this article recently:


Our world may be a giant hologram - space - 15 January 2009 - New  
Scientist


Surely the discovery of the graininess of spacetime adds weight to the  
physics/psychology reversal of comp?

regards,

Kim








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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 18-janv.-09, à 11:32, Kim Jones a écrit :

>
>
> On 18/01/2009, at 4:38 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>>
>>> I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are
>>> incompatible,
>>> though.
>>
>> Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal
>> links?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>
>
> supernatural causal links



All right, if you define "supernatural causal links" by the "natural" 
relation existing among "natural" numbers (or other finite things). 
Assuming comp, of course.

That "natural supernatural" is really "super" in the sense that, as a 
machine or number, we cannot prove or known all the relations from 
which physics and nature emerge or supervene on.

Kim, (and others) are you OK with the first person indeterminacy issue? 
Are you ok that, from a first person point of view, throwing a coin and 
self-duplication are identical or isomorphic experience?
And, do you agree that introducing delays does not change the 
expectations (the probabilities, or the credibilities) used for the 
first person indeterminacy?

Take all you time, but if you can ask some question, it will help me to 
prepare the answer. If UDA1..6 is well understood, meaning that there 
is no more question, I will try to imagine a way to explain step 7, and 
this without getting in the mathematical details (if that is possible).

I know that sometimes, things can seems so incomprehensible that people 
cannot even ask any question. In that case, tell me know that it is too 
much incomprehensible, and it will be my duty to make things even more 
clearer  until the "ah ah" (meaning "I understand or I have find an 
error".

Best,

Bruno


>
> enter the hand wavers
>
> Kim
>
> >
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 18 Jan 2009, at 06:38, Brent Meeker wrote:


>>
>> Are you stopping at UDA step 1?
>
> No.  There's a difference between your idea of running a world and  
> making a copy
> of me within this world.  I think the latter will necessarily incur  
> a gap in my
> consciousness because of the need to gather the information about my  
> state (plus
> some environment), but not the former.


I could agree, but then are you OK with UDA 7, where this difference  
is not relevant.



>
>
>> With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed  
>> in
>> making you say directly "no" to the doctor.
>
> Do I have to say "no" just because I suppose I'd incur a gap in  
> consciousness? :-)


To be honest, I have still not understand where that gap of  
consciousness comes from, nor am I sure the notion of gap of  
consciousness makes sense. I think those could be amnesia or  
distraction.

I don't think we can loose consciousness, we can only forget, this  
asks for work.


>>
>>
>> I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are  
>> incompatible,
>> though.
>
> Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal  
> links?


No, it is because of UDA. And yes consciousness depends on causal  
links. As being first person, consciousness depends on infinitely many  
causal links, due to the fact that comp truncates the histories at  
some level, below that level material or observable reality sums on  
all alternate computations. Of course I identify here "causal link"  
and computation.
The advantage is that "causality" and its many higher level versions  
are explained through number and classical logic, in that case. The  
modalities emerge through the correct self-reflexion. We get for free  
mind, and matter (and other hypostases).

Also, materialist have hard time to define the notion of causality,  
like "matter" or "energy", it is hard to interpret the physical facts  
and the theories we make from observation already. The UDA approach  
consists in taking seriously a "theological" hypothesis: the yes  
doctor *qua computatio*, and to follow the consequences.

If you say "yes" to the doctor, you can understand that your next  
instant of consciousness is determined by all computations going  
through your actual state (described at the lowest level). Here:  
2^aleph_0 histories, a priori.

No universal machine, like us (this by assumption),  can distinguish  
"real reality", from "virtual (emulated) reality", from "arithmetical  
reality", from analytical reality, from set theoretical reality, etc.   
(and this by theorem). The base ontology is not important to be  
named.  When Turing emulable and universal, it generates all (internal  
and relatively external) notions of causalities, even ladders of  
higher and higher order notion of causality.

And to explain the observable universe by its mere "existence" is a  
bit creationist for me. I like comp showing us that the inquiry game  
just begin: the laws of physics have a reason, a beginning of  
explanation. Numbers reflect Numbers.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Kim Jones]

On 18/01/2009, at 4:38 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:

>>
>> I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are  
>> incompatible,
>> though.
>
> Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal  
> links?
>
> Brent
>
>


supernatural causal links

enter the hand wavers

Kim

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Quentin Anciaux]

I should add that in the case of the digital version, as I said earlier, the
causal link is in no way the physical computer, but the program and its
state.

2009/1/18 Quentin Anciaux 

>
>
> 2009/1/18 Brent Meeker 
>
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >
>> > On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> >>>
>>  Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> > 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker > > > wrote:
>> > 
>> >>
>> >> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer
>>  to run
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a
>> >>> mathematical run.
>> >>
>> >> But isn't that the crux of the question?  Mathematics is a set of
>> logical
>> >> relations - which have no temporal component.  So a "mathematical run"
>> >> can only
>> >> be analogous to a physical run.  So what is it in a mathematical run
>> >> that makes
>> >> it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object?
>> >
>> >
>> > The notion of step, and successor of a step.  For a mathematical run you
>> > have a notion of first step, second step, etc.
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>> It is digital some we can use the natural numbers
>> >>> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run.
>> >>
>> >> But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not
>> >> implemented.  When it is run on a computer, the physics of the
>> >> computer provides
>> >> the succession.
>> >
>> >
>> > That is based on your theory according to which there is a physical
>> > reality. I have no problem with that, but the UDA has shown that you
>> > have to say no to the doctor,
>>
>> Why?  The doctor proposes a physical implementation.
>
>
> Yes and I thought I did show you that which physical implementation is used
> doesn't matter ? or would you say you would accept a digital copy of
> yourself on ARM but not on Core 2 DUO ?
>
>>
>>
>> >or to point on the point that you don't
>> > understand in the UDA.
>> > You told us you have a problem with the UDA 6, I have provided an
>> > explanation, but then I am not sure if this satisfies you or not.
>> > Rfefrerring to the environment does not change the reasoning, unless you
>> > put non-turing emulable feature in your brain/ environment (but then you
>> > say no to the doctor).
>> >
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> 
>>  In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that
>>  there would be
>>  a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one
>>  would probably
>>  hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are
>> >>> gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you
>> >>> will extract from the numbers.
>> >>
>> >> In order to teleport me, my state must be determined.  That means the
>> >> values of
>> >> physical variables at disparate spacetime points (in my head or my
>> galaxy
>> >> or...), but relativity makes it impossible to determine the state over
>> an
>> >> extended region until some later time on the order of d/c where d is
>> >> the size of
>> >> the region.  So in reproducing me in the teleporter this increment of
>> >> time will
>> >> not be reproduced - I will experience a gap in consciousness, or a
>> >> failure to
>> >> remember a certain interval just before the teleportation.  It's
>> >> comparable to
>> >> the time it would take a computer to store an image of it's state.
>> >
>> >
>> > Are you stopping at UDA step 1?
>>
>> No.  There's a difference between your idea of running a world and making
>> a copy
>> of me within this world.  I think the latter will necessarily incur a gap
>> in my
>> consciousness because of the need to gather the information about my state
>> (plus
>> some environment), but not the former.
>>
>
> Ok let's accept that for your first copy (biological brain copied into
> digital form) you did occur a conscionsness gap because of that... but then
> I have a digital copy of you, and if you still believe it is you, I can put
> your digital copy running on my bananas computer, agreed ? and no more gap
> occurs copying you because I'm external to your simulated brain/environnment
> running in my bananas computer.
>
>
>>
>> >  With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed in
>> > making you say directly "no" to the doctor.
>>
>> Do I have to say "no" just because I suppose I'd incur a gap in
>> consciousness? :-)
>>
>
> No, just because you don't believe that the digital version is still you.
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
>
>
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> >In that case you just say no
>> > to UDA step 0, that is to comp. I have no problem with that.
>> >
>> >  I am personally not interested in discussing if comp is true or false
>> > (except for debunking invalid reasoning which are ffrequent there).
>> > My

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2009/1/18 Brent Meeker 

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>>
>  Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  > > wrote:
> > 
> >>
> >> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer
>  to run
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a
> >>> mathematical run.
> >>
> >> But isn't that the crux of the question?  Mathematics is a set of
> logical
> >> relations - which have no temporal component.  So a "mathematical run"
> >> can only
> >> be analogous to a physical run.  So what is it in a mathematical run
> >> that makes
> >> it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object?
> >
> >
> > The notion of step, and successor of a step.  For a mathematical run you
> > have a notion of first step, second step, etc.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>> It is digital some we can use the natural numbers
> >>> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run.
> >>
> >> But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not
> >> implemented.  When it is run on a computer, the physics of the
> >> computer provides
> >> the succession.
> >
> >
> > That is based on your theory according to which there is a physical
> > reality. I have no problem with that, but the UDA has shown that you
> > have to say no to the doctor,
>
> Why?  The doctor proposes a physical implementation.


Yes and I thought I did show you that which physical implementation is used
doesn't matter ? or would you say you would accept a digital copy of
yourself on ARM but not on Core 2 DUO ?

>
>
> >or to point on the point that you don't
> > understand in the UDA.
> > You told us you have a problem with the UDA 6, I have provided an
> > explanation, but then I am not sure if this satisfies you or not.
> > Rfefrerring to the environment does not change the reasoning, unless you
> > put non-turing emulable feature in your brain/ environment (but then you
> > say no to the doctor).
> >
> >>>
> >>>
> 
>  In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that
>  there would be
>  a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one
>  would probably
>  hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are
> >>> gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you
> >>> will extract from the numbers.
> >>
> >> In order to teleport me, my state must be determined.  That means the
> >> values of
> >> physical variables at disparate spacetime points (in my head or my
> galaxy
> >> or...), but relativity makes it impossible to determine the state over
> an
> >> extended region until some later time on the order of d/c where d is
> >> the size of
> >> the region.  So in reproducing me in the teleporter this increment of
> >> time will
> >> not be reproduced - I will experience a gap in consciousness, or a
> >> failure to
> >> remember a certain interval just before the teleportation.  It's
> >> comparable to
> >> the time it would take a computer to store an image of it's state.
> >
> >
> > Are you stopping at UDA step 1?
>
> No.  There's a difference between your idea of running a world and making a
> copy
> of me within this world.  I think the latter will necessarily incur a gap
> in my
> consciousness because of the need to gather the information about my state
> (plus
> some environment), but not the former.
>

Ok let's accept that for your first copy (biological brain copied into
digital form) you did occur a conscionsness gap because of that... but then
I have a digital copy of you, and if you still believe it is you, I can put
your digital copy running on my bananas computer, agreed ? and no more gap
occurs copying you because I'm external to your simulated brain/environnment
running in my bananas computer.


>
> >  With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed in
> > making you say directly "no" to the doctor.
>
> Do I have to say "no" just because I suppose I'd incur a gap in
> consciousness? :-)
>

No, just because you don't believe that the digital version is still you.

Regards,
Quentin


>
> Brent
>
> >In that case you just say no
> > to UDA step 0, that is to comp. I have no problem with that.
> >
> >  I am personally not interested in discussing if comp is true or false
> > (except for debunking invalid reasoning which are ffrequent there).
> > My point is just that IF comp is true, THEN physics is a branch of
> > number theory, and I propose a constructive prove which shows how to
> > drive physics from numbers making the comp hyp. empirically refutable,
> > making comp a scientific theory, in the Popper sense of "scientific".
> >
> > I have no doubt that digital mechanism and material

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
> 
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
>>
>> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer  
 to run
>>>
>>>
>>> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a  
>>> mathematical run.
>>
>> But isn't that the crux of the question?  Mathematics is a set of logical
>> relations - which have no temporal component.  So a "mathematical run" 
>> can only
>> be analogous to a physical run.  So what is it in a mathematical run 
>> that makes
>> it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object?
> 
> 
> The notion of step, and successor of a step.  For a mathematical run you 
> have a notion of first step, second step, etc.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>
>>
>>> It is digital some we can use the natural numbers  
>>> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run.  
>>
>> But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not
>> implemented.  When it is run on a computer, the physics of the 
>> computer provides
>> the succession.
> 
> 
> That is based on your theory according to which there is a physical 
> reality. I have no problem with that, but the UDA has shown that you 
> have to say no to the doctor, 

Why?  The doctor proposes a physical implementation.

>or to point on the point that you don't 
> understand in the UDA.
> You told us you have a problem with the UDA 6, I have provided an 
> explanation, but then I am not sure if this satisfies you or not.
> Rfefrerring to the environment does not change the reasoning, unless you 
> put non-turing emulable feature in your brain/ environment (but then you 
> say no to the doctor).
> 
>>>
>>>

 In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that  
 there would be
 a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one  
 would probably
 hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
>>>
>>>
>>> From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are  
>>> gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you  
>>> will extract from the numbers.
>>
>> In order to teleport me, my state must be determined.  That means the 
>> values of
>> physical variables at disparate spacetime points (in my head or my galaxy
>> or...), but relativity makes it impossible to determine the state over an
>> extended region until some later time on the order of d/c where d is 
>> the size of
>> the region.  So in reproducing me in the teleporter this increment of 
>> time will
>> not be reproduced - I will experience a gap in consciousness, or a 
>> failure to
>> remember a certain interval just before the teleportation.  It's 
>> comparable to
>> the time it would take a computer to store an image of it's state.
> 
> 
> Are you stopping at UDA step 1? 

No.  There's a difference between your idea of running a world and making a 
copy 
of me within this world.  I think the latter will necessarily incur a gap in my 
consciousness because of the need to gather the information about my state 
(plus 
some environment), but not the former.

>  With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed in 
> making you say directly "no" to the doctor. 

Do I have to say "no" just because I suppose I'd incur a gap in consciousness? 
:-)

Brent

>In that case you just say no 
> to UDA step 0, that is to comp. I have no problem with that.
> 
>  I am personally not interested in discussing if comp is true or false 
> (except for debunking invalid reasoning which are ffrequent there). 
> My point is just that IF comp is true, THEN physics is a branch of 
> number theory, and I propose a constructive prove which shows how to 
> drive physics from numbers making the comp hyp. empirically refutable, 
> making comp a scientific theory, in the Popper sense of "scientific".
> 
> I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are incompatible, 
> though.

Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal links?

Brent

> 
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/17 Brent Meeker :

> But I think you are assuming something about states that is false - i.e.
> that they are discrete non-overlapping things. According to our current
> understanding of physics this is not the case for brain states or
> computer states.  Because they are distributed in space, relativity
> implies they are also distributed in time.  Whether  the causal
> connections can be sufficiently simulated in Bruno's UD is a separate
> question, but I don't think it's valid to argue that the spatiotemporal
> relations can be ignored in brains, which is what talk about "states"
> implies, therefore they can be ignored in representation consisting only
> of static states.

As Quentin pointed out, a computer state can be saved to disk and the
program continued at a later time or on another machine. This process
doesn't involve saving the actual instantaneous physical state of the
machine, but the point is that what is saved is the minimal
information for the program to continue. Are you suggesting that a
conscious program that goes through such a stop/save/restart process
would somehow be aware of this, even though the program post the
interruption appears to proceed the same way as it would have without
the interruption?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/17 Bruno Marchal :
>
>
> On 16 Jan 2009, at 14:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>
>> 2009/1/16 Brent Meeker :
>>
>>> But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are
>>> implementing a process
>>> that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections.
>>
>> Yes, and my claim is that the causal connections are important only
>> because they give rise to the sequence of states.
>
>
> I agree with you. Now, with the computational supervenience thesis: "
> a causal connection" is the same as a "universal machine".
>  From third person point of view, one causal connection (one UM) is
> enough (and I take the numbers+addition+multiplication) for the ease.
>  From a first person point of view the physics emerge from all
> possible "causal connection" below my substitution level. Comp
> predicts that if I observe myself below the substitution level, I will
> find a sheaf of "local connections".

To clarify my position, I do agree with you that if we accept comp,
ultimately we have to drop physicalism. However, most
computationalists are physicalists. Also, most computationalists are
disturbed by ideas such as those explored in Egan's "Permutation
City", which leads them to invoke rules such as "no consciousness
without the causal links" to prevent such absurdities. But I maintain
that these rules don't work.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2009/1/16 Brent Meeker 

>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > 2009/1/16 Brent Meeker :
> >
> >
> >> But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are implementing a
> process
> >> that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections.
> >>
> >
> > Yes, and my claim is that the causal connections are important only
> > because they give rise to the sequence of states. If the same state
> > changes occurred accidentally, I don't see where there is room for the
> > resulting consciousness to be any different.
> But I think you are assuming something about states that is false - i.e.
> that they are discrete non-overlapping things. According to our current
> understanding of physics this is not the case for brain states or
> computer states.


The state of a program is discrete, the fact that the electrical states of
the physical computer that runs the program is not (or is) doesn't change
that... this feature is "below" the program knowledge... the program is a
number, the whole program+data is also a number, and a program is composed
of a finite set of instruction which are executed at each step (which is of
"no-time" duration from its pov). The physicality of the computer inner
working doesn't change the program which is implemented at a higher level if
not the physical machine is broken. For example, openoffice works the same
on every kind of physical computers it runs on... even if on different
computers the number of step a computer can handle each physical second is
different, even if one computer represent a binary one by +3.5V or +0.5V or
whatever or even bananas.



> Because they are distributed in space, relativity
> implies they are also distributed in time.  Whether  the causal
> connections can be sufficiently simulated in Bruno's UD is a separate
> question, but I don't think it's valid to argue that the spatiotemporal
> relations can be ignored in brains, which is what talk about "states"
> implies, therefore they can be ignored in representation consisting only
> of static states.
>

If spatiotemporal relation is needed and is turing emulable, then there's no
problem, in fact if whatever makes the brain and is needed to make "it work"
is turing emulable then no problem... nobody argues here I think that the
only thing you need to simulate a real actual brain is the electric firing
pattern of the brain. But if all of this is turing emulable then all of this
is composed of a finite or infinite number of finite step with each step
comprising of a state containing a finite number of informations.

Regards,
Quentin


> > For if the consciousness
> > were to be different it would be able to send different signals to the
> > vocal cords or loudspeaker reporting that difference, but this is
> > impossible if the output states are the same as they would have been
> > had they been causally linked.
> >
> >
>  In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that there
> would be
>  a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one
> would probably
>  hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
> 
> >>> Assuming the gap did not result in accumulation of errors, a technical
> >>> problem, and assuming the environment is held constant to eliminate
> >>> 100Hz flicker, I don't see how teleportation every 10ms could alter
> >>> consciousness.
> >>>
> >> I could if you lost 10ms of consciousness everytime you were teleported.
> >>
> >
> > How can you be sure that your consciousness was not suspended for the
> > past minute, assuming that care was taken to leave the environment
> > unchanged during this period?
> >
> How do you know it's possible to suspend consciousness without
> noticeable change?


If all informations needed to notice is change is not available to the
consciousness then it cannot notice by definition. For example, I "copy" you
and recreate you in a virtual reality at the same state that you were copied
in the outer real, then your copy in the VR will not notice anything because
nothing is different, you can notice what is available unless magics or non
turing emulability of the mind in this case. If you could notice then the
chosen digital level is not correct and too "high". You did not simulate
enough.


> That seems to me to be assuming what I argue against
> about "states".  It's an idealization which can certainly be
> approximated because the brain is fairly small and operates slowly  (in
> relativistic terms) - but  I don't think the ideal can be realized and
> cannot be the basis of fundamental metaphysics.
>
> Brent
>
> >
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
>>
>> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer  
 to run
>>>
>>>
>>> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a  
>>> mathematical run.
>>
>> But isn't that the crux of the question?  Mathematics is a set of 
>> logical
>> relations - which have no temporal component.  So a "mathematical 
>> run" can only
>> be analogous to a physical run.  So what is it in a mathematical run 
>> that makes
>> it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object?
>
>
> The notion of step, and successor of a step.  For a mathematical run 
> you have a notion of first step, second step, etc.
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>> It is digital some we can use the natural numbers  
>>> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run.  
>>
>> But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not
>> implemented.  When it is run on a computer, the physics of the 
>> computer provides
>> the succession.
>
>
> That is based on your theory according to which there is a physical 
> reality. I have no problem with that, but the UDA has shown that you 
> have to say no to the doctor, or to point on the point that you don't 
> understand in the UDA.
> You told us you have a problem with the UDA 6, I have provided an 
> explanation, but then I am not sure if this satisfies you or not.
> Rfefrerring to the environment does not change the reasoning, unless 
> you put non-turing emulable feature in your brain/ environment (but 
> then you say no to the doctor).
>
>>>
>>>

 In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that  
 there would be
 a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one  
 would probably
 hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
>>>
>>>
>>> From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are  
>>> gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you  
>>> will extract from the numbers.
>>
>> In order to teleport me, my state must be determined.  That means the 
>> values of
>> physical variables at disparate spacetime points (in my head or my 
>> galaxy
>> or...), but relativity makes it impossible to determine the state 
>> over an
>> extended region until some later time on the order of d/c where d is 
>> the size of
>> the region.  So in reproducing me in the teleporter this increment of 
>> time will
>> not be reproduced - I will experience a gap in consciousness, or a 
>> failure to
>> remember a certain interval just before the teleportation.  It's 
>> comparable to
>> the time it would take a computer to store an image of it's state.
>
>
> Are you stopping at UDA step 1? 
>  With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed 
> in making you say directly "no" to the doctor. In that case you just 
> say no to UDA step 0, that is to comp. I have no problem with that.

I might say "yes", accepting that there will necessarily be a small gap 
in my consciousness (in fact I've already said "yes" to much longer gaps 
during surgery).

>
>  I am personally not interested in discussing if comp is true or false 
> (except for debunking invalid reasoning which are ffrequent there).

I think  teleportation requires a gap in consciousness; the gap comes 
from the requirement to gather the information necessary to define a 
"state" so that it can be transmitted and reproduced.  This doesn't 
imply that there must be a gap in a digital simulation once it is running.

Brent

> My point is just that IF comp is true, THEN physics is a branch of 
> number theory, and I propose a constructive prove which shows how to 
> drive physics from numbers making the comp hyp. empirically refutable, 
> making comp a scientific theory, in the Popper sense of "scientific".
>
> I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are 
> incompatible, though.
>
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>
> >


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/16 Brent Meeker :
>
>   
>> But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are implementing a 
>> process
>> that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections.
>> 
>
> Yes, and my claim is that the causal connections are important only
> because they give rise to the sequence of states. If the same state
> changes occurred accidentally, I don't see where there is room for the
> resulting consciousness to be any different. 
But I think you are assuming something about states that is false - i.e. 
that they are discrete non-overlapping things. According to our current 
understanding of physics this is not the case for brain states or 
computer states.  Because they are distributed in space, relativity 
implies they are also distributed in time.  Whether  the causal 
connections can be sufficiently simulated in Bruno's UD is a separate 
question, but I don't think it's valid to argue that the spatiotemporal 
relations can be ignored in brains, which is what talk about "states" 
implies, therefore they can be ignored in representation consisting only 
of static states.

> For if the consciousness
> were to be different it would be able to send different signals to the
> vocal cords or loudspeaker reporting that difference, but this is
> impossible if the output states are the same as they would have been
> had they been causally linked.
>
>   
 In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that there 
 would be
 a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one would 
 probably
 hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
 
>>> Assuming the gap did not result in accumulation of errors, a technical
>>> problem, and assuming the environment is held constant to eliminate
>>> 100Hz flicker, I don't see how teleportation every 10ms could alter
>>> consciousness.
>>>   
>> I could if you lost 10ms of consciousness everytime you were teleported.
>> 
>
> How can you be sure that your consciousness was not suspended for the
> past minute, assuming that care was taken to leave the environment
> unchanged during this period?
>   
How do you know it's possible to suspend consciousness without 
noticeable change?  That seems to me to be assuming what I argue against 
about "states".  It's an idealization which can certainly be 
approximated because the brain is fairly small and operates slowly  (in 
relativistic terms) - but  I don't think the ideal can be realized and 
cannot be the basis of fundamental metaphysics.

Brent

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 16 Jan 2009, at 14:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/1/16 Brent Meeker :
>
>> But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are  
>> implementing a process
>> that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections.
>
> Yes, and my claim is that the causal connections are important only
> because they give rise to the sequence of states.


I agree with you. Now, with the computational supervenience thesis: "  
a causal connection" is the same as a "universal machine".
 From third person point of view, one causal connection (one UM) is  
enough (and I take the numbers+addition+multiplication) for the ease.
 From a first person point of view the physics emerge from all  
possible "causal connection" below my substitution level. Comp  
predicts that if I observe myself below the substitution level, I will  
find a sheaf of "local connections".




> If the same state
> changes occurred accidentally, I don't see where there is room for the
> resulting consciousness to be any different. For if the consciousness
> were to be different it would be able to send different signals to the
> vocal cords or loudspeaker reporting that difference, but this is
> impossible if the output states are the same as they would have been
> had they been causally linked.


I can be OK, but there is place for ambiguity. We will have to come  
back about the movie-graph, to make this clear.


>
>
 In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that  
 there would be
 a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one  
 would probably
 hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
>>>
>>> Assuming the gap did not result in accumulation of errors, a  
>>> technical
>>> problem, and assuming the environment is held constant to eliminate
>>> 100Hz flicker, I don't see how teleportation every 10ms could alter
>>> consciousness.
>>
>> I could if you lost 10ms of consciousness everytime you were  
>> teleported.
>
> How can you be sure that your consciousness was not suspended for the
> past minute, assuming that care was taken to leave the environment
> unchanged during this period?

OK.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  wrote:
 
>
> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer
>>> to run
>>
>>
>> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a
>> mathematical run.
>
> But isn't that the crux of the question?  Mathematics is a set of  
> logical
> relations - which have no temporal component.  So a "mathematical  
> run" can only
> be analogous to a physical run.  So what is it in a mathematical run  
> that makes
> it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object?


The notion of step, and successor of a step.  For a mathematical run  
you have a notion of first step, second step, etc.





>
>
>> It is digital some we can use the natural numbers
>> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run.
>
> But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not
> implemented.  When it is run on a computer, the physics of the  
> computer provides
> the succession.


That is based on your theory according to which there is a physical  
reality. I have no problem with that, but the UDA has shown that you  
have to say no to the doctor, or to point on the point that you don't  
understand in the UDA.
You told us you have a problem with the UDA 6, I have provided an  
explanation, but then I am not sure if this satisfies you or not.
Rfefrerring to the environment does not change the reasoning, unless  
you put non-turing emulable feature in your brain/ environment (but  
then you say no to the doctor).

>>
>>
>>>
>>> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that
>>> there would be
>>> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one
>>> would probably
>>> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
>>
>>
>> From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are
>> gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you
>> will extract from the numbers.
>
> In order to teleport me, my state must be determined.  That means  
> the values of
> physical variables at disparate spacetime points (in my head or my  
> galaxy
> or...), but relativity makes it impossible to determine the state  
> over an
> extended region until some later time on the order of d/c where d is  
> the size of
> the region.  So in reproducing me in the teleporter this increment  
> of time will
> not be reproduced - I will experience a gap in consciousness, or a  
> failure to
> remember a certain interval just before the teleportation.  It's  
> comparable to
> the time it would take a computer to store an image of it's state.


Are you stopping at UDA step 1?
  With some effort Stathis, Quentin or me, or some other will succeed  
in making you say directly "no" to the doctor. In that case you just  
say no to UDA step 0, that is to comp. I have no problem with that.

  I am personally not interested in discussing if comp is true or  
false (except for debunking invalid reasoning which are ffrequent  
there).
My point is just that IF comp is true, THEN physics is a branch of  
number theory, and I propose a constructive prove which shows how to  
drive physics from numbers making the comp hyp. empirically refutable,  
making comp a scientific theory, in the Popper sense of "scientific".

I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are  
incompatible, though.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/16 Brent Meeker :

> But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are implementing a process
> that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections.

Yes, and my claim is that the causal connections are important only
because they give rise to the sequence of states. If the same state
changes occurred accidentally, I don't see where there is room for the
resulting consciousness to be any different. For if the consciousness
were to be different it would be able to send different signals to the
vocal cords or loudspeaker reporting that difference, but this is
impossible if the output states are the same as they would have been
had they been causally linked.

>>> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that there 
>>> would be
>>> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one would 
>>> probably
>>> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
>>
>> Assuming the gap did not result in accumulation of errors, a technical
>> problem, and assuming the environment is held constant to eliminate
>> 100Hz flicker, I don't see how teleportation every 10ms could alter
>> consciousness.
>
> I could if you lost 10ms of consciousness everytime you were teleported.

How can you be sure that your consciousness was not suspended for the
past minute, assuming that care was taken to leave the environment
unchanged during this period?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 15-janv.-09, à 20:55, Brent Meeker a écrit :



>> Stathis is not wrong but seems unclear on what a computation
>> mathematically is perhaps.
>>
>> Many miss Church thesis. The fact that there is a purely mathematical
>> notion of computation at all.
>
> I thought the Church's thesis was that all effectively computable 
> functions were
> in the lambda-calculus, but the "effectively" referred to intuitive 
> ideas of
> what is physically realizable.

In the foundation of mathematics, including theoretical computer 
science, the word "effectivity" refers to either to Turing or Church or 
equivalent notion of mathematical computability, or just, with Church 
Thesis, to computability.
For intuitionist it can refer to even more abstract (unphysical) 
notions of constructivity




> Later it was shown that the recursive functions
> and the Turing functions also defined the same set of effectively 
> computable
> functions.

Yes. All formalism which has been invented to describe the computable 
functions by finite vmeans have led to the same class of functions. It 
is the "empirical" argument for the thesis by Church, Post, Turing. 
Emil Post is the first to give a name to that thesis.


> Turing was plainly motivated by considering physically implemented
> computations.

Give me a reference. Turing did have a large spectrum of interest, 
including biology, chemistry and quantum physics. For example, the 
quantum Zeno effect has been discovered by Turing, but he did not 
publish it. But in his seminal 1936 paper on computability (which can 
be found in Davis 1964 book, reedited by Dover one year ago), there is 
no references to physics at all. On the contrary, the definition is 
inspired directly by what a human mathematician can compute using paper 
and a pencil, with refrence only to his mental state.

I must go. I will probably comment your other post tomorrow, because 
I'm rather busy today.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
> 
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>
 However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also  
 requires a
 set of transition rules.  So in the same abstract way that the  
 integers
 are ordered by "succession" the computational states of a Turing  
 machine
 are ordered.  Whether just abstract rules, without implementation,  
 are
 sufficient isn't clear to me.
>>> In an actual physical computer the transition rules are represented  
>>> by
>>> the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will
>>> reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my  
>>> question
>>> about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a sequence  
>>> of
>>> states, so that s1 to s10 on m1 are causally linked, s11 to s20 on m2
>>> are causally linked, but there is no link between m1 and m2, i.e. m2
>>> just happens to start in s11 accidentally. Assuming that s1 to s20
>>> occurring in a single machine results is a few moments of
>>> consciousness (which is to say, assuming that computationalism is
>>> true), what would happen if the sequence is broken in the way just
>>> described?
>> I suspect something is lost.  You are thinking of the states as  
>> abstract steps
>> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer  
>> to run
> 
> 
> This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a  
> mathematical run. 

But isn't that the crux of the question?  Mathematics is a set of logical 
relations - which have no temporal component.  So a "mathematical run" can only 
be analogous to a physical run.  So what is it in a mathematical run that makes 
it a "run" instead of just a timeless Platonic object?

>It is digital some we can use the natural numbers  
> and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run.  

But if we look at the program for a UD the successor relation is not 
implemented.  When it is run on a computer, the physics of the computer 
provides 
the succession.

> Independent subcomputations manage their own "time". Physical time is  
> something else: it emerges in the plural first person perspective.
> 
>  From the point of view of the machine it makes no difference (it is  
> the MGA point).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> and
>> the computer implements distributed spatiotemporal links.
> 
> 
> This of course is not proved, but admittedly required for a materialist.

It is empirically verified.  Of course nothing is ever "proved" outside a 
formal 
axiomatic system.

> (I guess you were saying: "the computer is implemented by  
> spatiotemporal links")

That's looking at the computer as an abstract "machine" which gets implemented 
in physics. I was looking at the computation as an abstract process which gets 
implemented by the (physical) computer.

> 
> 
> 
> 
>>  In general you cannot
>> take even a digitial computer and freeze it in a instant of time,  
>> call that a
>> state, and restart it without any effects.
> 
> 
> Apparently, homeotherm animals can be frozen and heated back and still  
> keep even their short term memory, if I remember correctly (!).  
> Experiences with rats suggest this is the case, according to Michel  
> Jouvert (the discoverer of REM sleep).
> 
> But what I really want to say is this. Even if you were true, or  
> Jouvet false, actually even if our relevant brain state was a quantum  
> state, which when unknown are not duplicable, it would change nothing.  
> I suppose some high level in UDA(1...6) only for making the reasoning  
> more easy. At step seven, all what matters is that there is a level  
> were you are in principle digitally describable, be it the galaxy .  
> The reason is that if such a level exist then the UD will access that  
> state, infinitely often, in many subcomputations, and  
> subsubcomputations.
> And this gives the fundamental first person (plural) indeterminacy:  
> the fact that each computation, from the 1-pov, more exactly from the  
> obligatory (by UDA('1...6)) 3-pov on the 1-pov, bifurcate or  
> differentiate into 2^aleph_zero histories in the universal deployment.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Switches are in intermediate states,
>> EM waves are propagating, electrons are diffusing - it is not a  
>> static thing
>> like a step in a program.
> 
> 
> I think comp explains the appearance of continua, and the relative  
> correctness of that view. But that "thing", the concrete computer, is  
> a local approximation of the true thing (with the comp assumption). If  
> its representation abilities are locally enough stable relatively to  
> you, it will make possible for the "true thing" to manifest itself  
> relatively to your histories. The "true" thing being the person, not  
> its relative (to you) envelop or  description.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>
>> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that  
>> there would be
>> a one-time gap in

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:52, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 
>> Hi,
>>
>> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker > >
>>
>>
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> > 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> >
>> >> However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also
>> requires a
>> >> set of transition rules.  So in the same abstract way that the
>> integers
>> >> are ordered by "succession" the computational states of a
>> Turing machine
>> >> are ordered.  Whether just abstract rules, without
>> implementation, are
>> >> sufficient isn't clear to me.
>> >
>> > In an actual physical computer the transition rules are
>> represented by
>> > the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will
>> > reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my
>> question
>> > about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a
>> sequence of
>> > states, so that s1 to s10 on m1 are causally linked, s11 to s20
>> on m2
>> > are causally linked, but there is no link between m1 and m2, i.e. m2
>> > just happens to start in s11 accidentally. Assuming that s1 to s20
>> > occurring in a single machine results is a few moments of
>> > consciousness (which is to say, assuming that computationalism is
>> > true), what would happen if the sequence is broken in the way just
>> > described?
>>
>> I suspect something is lost.  You are thinking of the states as
>> abstract steps
>> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer
>> to run and
>> the computer implements distributed spatiotemporal links.  In
>> general you cannot
>> take even a digitial computer and freeze it in a instant of time,
>> call that a
>> state, and restart it without any effects. 
>>
>>
>> I do not see a problem with that... a program can be freezed any 
>> time... dump the memory to a file, on restart, load the dump file to 
>> memory, put the instruction pointer at the correct place and you're 
>> done. (well in practice it is a little more difficult, but you could 
>> do it for *any* program). In the situation that Stathis describe, 
>> causality is not broken in any way. S1->S10 run in computer 1, dump, 
>> reload on computer 2 S11->S20 run in computer 2, the causal link is 
>> given by the program that compute S1-S20 irrelevant on what physical 
>> device it is running on... the causal link is the program and a 
>> program is relative to a machine (abstract one). So a computation is 
>> the set of a program and the machine that runs it. A state doesn't 
>> exists by itself (state of what ?), and this is where Stathis is wrong 
>> I think.
> 
> Stathis is not wrong but seems unclear on what a computation 
> mathematically is perhaps.
> 
> Many miss Church thesis. The fact that there is a purely mathematical 
> notion of computation at all. 

I thought the Church's thesis was that all effectively computable functions 
were 
in the lambda-calculus, but the "effectively" referred to intuitive ideas of 
what is physically realizable.  Later it was shown that the recursive functions 
and the Turing functions also defined the same set of effectively computable 
functions.  Turing was plainly motivated by considering physically implemented 
computations.

Brent

> 
> Best,
> Bruno
> 
> 
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>> Quentin
>>  
>>
>>  Switches are in intermediate states,
>> EM waves are propagating, electrons are diffusing - it is not a
>> static thing
>> like a step in a program.
>>
>> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that
>> there would be
>> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one
>> would probably
>> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -- 
>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>>
>>
>>
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:52, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

> Hi,
>
> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker 
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  wrote:
> >
> >> However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also  
> requires a
> >> set of transition rules.  So in the same abstract way that the  
> integers
> >> are ordered by "succession" the computational states of a Turing  
> machine
> >> are ordered.  Whether just abstract rules, without  
> implementation, are
> >> sufficient isn't clear to me.
> >
> > In an actual physical computer the transition rules are  
> represented by
> > the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will
> > reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my  
> question
> > about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a  
> sequence of
> > states, so that s1 to s10 on m1 are causally linked, s11 to s20 on  
> m2
> > are causally linked, but there is no link between m1 and m2, i.e. m2
> > just happens to start in s11 accidentally. Assuming that s1 to s20
> > occurring in a single machine results is a few moments of
> > consciousness (which is to say, assuming that computationalism is
> > true), what would happen if the sequence is broken in the way just
> > described?
>
> I suspect something is lost.  You are thinking of the states as  
> abstract steps
> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer  
> to run and
> the computer implements distributed spatiotemporal links.  In  
> general you cannot
> take even a digitial computer and freeze it in a instant of time,  
> call that a
> state, and restart it without any effects.
>
> I do not see a problem with that... a program can be freezed any  
> time... dump the memory to a file, on restart, load the dump file to  
> memory, put the instruction pointer at the correct place and you're  
> done. (well in practice it is a little more difficult, but you could  
> do it for *any* program). In the situation that Stathis describe,  
> causality is not broken in any way. S1->S10 run in computer 1, dump,  
> reload on computer 2 S11->S20 run in computer 2, the causal link is  
> given by the program that compute S1-S20 irrelevant on what physical  
> device it is running on... the causal link is the program and a  
> program is relative to a machine (abstract one). So a computation is  
> the set of a program and the machine that runs it. A state doesn't  
> exists by itself (state of what ?), and this is where Stathis is  
> wrong I think.

Stathis is not wrong but seems unclear on what a computation  
mathematically is perhaps.

Many miss Church thesis. The fact that there is a purely mathematical  
notion of computation at all.

Best,
Bruno


>
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
>
>  Switches are in intermediate states,
> EM waves are propagating, electrons are diffusing - it is not a  
> static thing
> like a step in a program.
>
> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that  
> there would be
> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one  
> would probably
> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>
>
> -- 
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>> However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also  
>>> requires a
>>> set of transition rules.  So in the same abstract way that the  
>>> integers
>>> are ordered by "succession" the computational states of a Turing  
>>> machine
>>> are ordered.  Whether just abstract rules, without implementation,  
>>> are
>>> sufficient isn't clear to me.
>>
>> In an actual physical computer the transition rules are represented  
>> by
>> the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will
>> reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my  
>> question
>> about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a sequence  
>> of
>> states, so that s1 to s10 on m1 are causally linked, s11 to s20 on m2
>> are causally linked, but there is no link between m1 and m2, i.e. m2
>> just happens to start in s11 accidentally. Assuming that s1 to s20
>> occurring in a single machine results is a few moments of
>> consciousness (which is to say, assuming that computationalism is
>> true), what would happen if the sequence is broken in the way just
>> described?
>
> I suspect something is lost.  You are thinking of the states as  
> abstract steps
> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer  
> to run


This is true, but the word "run" is ambiguous. It could be a  
mathematical run. It is digital some we can use the natural numbers  
and the successor relation for the first order time of the UD run.  
Independent subcomputations manage their own "time". Physical time is  
something else: it emerges in the plural first person perspective.

 From the point of view of the machine it makes no difference (it is  
the MGA point).




> and
> the computer implements distributed spatiotemporal links.


This of course is not proved, but admittedly required for a materialist.
(I guess you were saying: "the computer is implemented by  
spatiotemporal links")




>  In general you cannot
> take even a digitial computer and freeze it in a instant of time,  
> call that a
> state, and restart it without any effects.


Apparently, homeotherm animals can be frozen and heated back and still  
keep even their short term memory, if I remember correctly (!).  
Experiences with rats suggest this is the case, according to Michel  
Jouvert (the discoverer of REM sleep).

But what I really want to say is this. Even if you were true, or  
Jouvet false, actually even if our relevant brain state was a quantum  
state, which when unknown are not duplicable, it would change nothing.  
I suppose some high level in UDA(1...6) only for making the reasoning  
more easy. At step seven, all what matters is that there is a level  
were you are in principle digitally describable, be it the galaxy .  
The reason is that if such a level exist then the UD will access that  
state, infinitely often, in many subcomputations, and  
subsubcomputations.
And this gives the fundamental first person (plural) indeterminacy:  
the fact that each computation, from the 1-pov, more exactly from the  
obligatory (by UDA('1...6)) 3-pov on the 1-pov, bifurcate or  
differentiate into 2^aleph_zero histories in the universal deployment.




> Switches are in intermediate states,
> EM waves are propagating, electrons are diffusing - it is not a  
> static thing
> like a step in a program.


I think comp explains the appearance of continua, and the relative  
correctness of that view. But that "thing", the concrete computer, is  
a local approximation of the true thing (with the comp assumption). If  
its representation abilities are locally enough stable relatively to  
you, it will make possible for the "true thing" to manifest itself  
relatively to your histories. The "true" thing being the person, not  
its relative (to you) envelop or  description.




>
>
> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that  
> there would be
> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one  
> would probably
> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.


 From the ultimate third point of view, there are no gap, or there are  
gaps everywhere, that could depend on the topology or topologies you  
will extract from the numbers. Strictly speaking there are only the  
natural numbers and their many arithmetical relations. Now some  
arithmetical relation define or represent universal computation(s),  
including all finite portions of the universal deployment.

 From the first point of view, there is no gap. For the same reason  
that the Everett observer, when measuring, with an {UP,DOWN}-measuring  
apparatus a particle in the state UP+DOWN, will not feel the split or  
feel self-superposed. The first person experience is determined by the  
possible relations you have with your most probable universal history,  
among already 2^aleph_zero very similar universal histories. 

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/15 Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
>>> In an actual physical computer the transition rules are represented by
>>> the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will
>>> reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my question
>>> about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a sequence of
>>> states, so that s1 to s10 on m1 are causally linked, s11 to s20 on m2
>>> are causally linked, but there is no link between m1 and m2, i.e. m2
>>> just happens to start in s11 accidentally. Assuming that s1 to s20
>>> occurring in a single machine results is a few moments of
>>> consciousness (which is to say, assuming that computationalism is
>>> true), what would happen if the sequence is broken in the way just
>>> described?
>> I suspect something is lost.  You are thinking of the states as abstract 
>> steps
>> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer to run and
>> the computer implements distributed spatiotemporal links.  In general you 
>> cannot
>> take even a digitial computer and freeze it in a instant of time, call that a
>> state, and restart it without any effects.  Switches are in intermediate 
>> states,
>> EM waves are propagating, electrons are diffusing - it is not a static thing
>> like a step in a program.
> 
> But the idea behind functionalism is that an equivalent program
> running on completely different hardware would give rise to the same
> mental states. It is hard to see how that could be possible if, for
> example, the EM radiation caused by electrical switching 

I'm not talking about the incidental EM radiation; I'm talking about the 
conduction of EM energy from one gate to another, from one part of the computer 
to another or in a brain the transfer of electrochemical potential down an axon.

>somehow
> coloured or altered the resulting mental states, for what should we
> then expect from the equivalent program running on a purely mechanical
> computer?

But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are implementing a process 
that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections.

> 
>> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that there would 
>> be
>> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one would 
>> probably
>> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
> 
> Assuming the gap did not result in accumulation of errors, a technical
> problem, and assuming the environment is held constant to eliminate
> 100Hz flicker, I don't see how teleportation every 10ms could alter
> consciousness.

I could if you lost 10ms of consciousness everytime you were teleported.

Brent

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/15 Brent Meeker  wrote:

>> In an actual physical computer the transition rules are represented by
>> the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will
>> reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my question
>> about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a sequence of
>> states, so that s1 to s10 on m1 are causally linked, s11 to s20 on m2
>> are causally linked, but there is no link between m1 and m2, i.e. m2
>> just happens to start in s11 accidentally. Assuming that s1 to s20
>> occurring in a single machine results is a few moments of
>> consciousness (which is to say, assuming that computationalism is
>> true), what would happen if the sequence is broken in the way just
>> described?
>
> I suspect something is lost.  You are thinking of the states as abstract steps
> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer to run and
> the computer implements distributed spatiotemporal links.  In general you 
> cannot
> take even a digitial computer and freeze it in a instant of time, call that a
> state, and restart it without any effects.  Switches are in intermediate 
> states,
> EM waves are propagating, electrons are diffusing - it is not a static thing
> like a step in a program.

But the idea behind functionalism is that an equivalent program
running on completely different hardware would give rise to the same
mental states. It is hard to see how that could be possible if, for
example, the EM radiation caused by electrical switching somehow
coloured or altered the resulting mental states, for what should we
then expect from the equivalent program running on a purely mechanical
computer?

> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that there would 
> be
> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one would 
> probably
> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.

Assuming the gap did not result in accumulation of errors, a technical
problem, and assuming the environment is held constant to eliminate
100Hz flicker, I don't see how teleportation every 10ms could alter
consciousness.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/15 John Mikes  wrote:
> Stathis: (from reply to Brent):
> "I return to my question about what would happen if there were a
> discontinuity in a sequence of states,..."
> There IS discontinuity if the state "transits'(?) from s1 to s2.
> Do you have any idea how one can observe a changed state by only continuous
> transitions? Where do you pick the limit to call it the 'next' state? Isn't
> such 'arbitrary'?

This also involves answering the question of whether time and the
universe is fundamentally discrete or continuous.

> In your reply to me:
> I find the rat-related IBM publication wanting:
> "...Each of its microchips has been programmed to act just like a real
> neuron in a real brain"
> How much we know about a 'real neuron' and its function is a matter of the
> present level of R&D. We know more than a decade ago and less than a decade
> hence. And the 'rat' discloses only its movements - evaluated and
> understood(?) at the complexity of the human brain. Would you draw valid
> conclusions on - say - personality by a silent film of only the movements of
> a person - even at matching complexity?
> I may write some distracting stories to follow 'movements'.
> A rat doesn't communicate with researcher. Rat-shrink?

What they ultimately aim to do is simulate a whole rat brain and then
see if exhibits ratlike behaviour. If it does, using this bottom up
approach, then I would say this is very good evidence that the
researchers have figured out what is important about how a neuron
works. It's straightforward experimental science.

> I wouldn't use Terry Seynowski's critical word that the brain is too
> 'mystrerious': it is too complex and poorly followable by our present level
> of our 2009 cognitive inventory. We can know just 'that' much and most
> likely there is much 'more' to it. (my 'enrichment' remark of past and
> future knowledge).
> Markram's work is glorious. That's the way we can proceed in widening our
> knowledge 10,000 'neurons' is a good start.
> But their fundamental tenet:
> "Every brain is made of the same basic parts" -
> means a restriction to our ongoing physical/physiological observational
> capabilities which have shown incredible enlargement in the past (still
> within the 'physical world' figment). Frequencies, methods, evaluations are
> all limited.
> I keep it open that penetrating the Hard Problem we may find new phenomena
> unassignable to our present knowledge of the known tissue and physics.
> Nobody has diversified amp or MRI data to distinguish whether a blood-surge
> refers to a political opinion, love, boredom, financial expectation, or
> whatever, in a mentally-topical distinction.

I guess you don't expect this will happen, but what would you say if a
computer model of a brain based on relatively simple reductionist
assumptions, as Markram's team are attempting, did result in complex
emergent behaviour similar to that of a biological brain?



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi John,


On 14 Jan 2009, at 14:53, John Mikes wrote:

> Stathis: (from reply to Brent):
> "I return to my question about what would happen if there were a  
> discontinuity in a sequence of states,..."
> There IS discontinuity if the state "transits'(?) from s1 to s2.
> Do you have any idea how one can observe a changed state by only  
> continuous transitions? Where do you pick the limit to call it the  
> 'next' state? Isn't such 'arbitrary'? (I have similar questions with  
> astronomy - what I never studied - how do they calculate the  
> planatary movement markers (year?) into (fractional?) seconds? but  
> they do).
> Same question to Bruno's 'integers: there is no transition between 2  
> and 3.

But I can offer you a machine transforming 2 to 3, and so on, and one  
is enough for usual standard third person point of view on numbers.
Now, oversimplifying myself for reason of shortness: when you take  
into account the personal interview of 2 and 3; what they infer  
normally or generally is that there have to take into account an  
infinity of computations going from 2 to 3. There are many transitions  
possible, perhaps too many.




> Even putting fractals in between only extends the question to  
> smaller scale.


Right.




> "Infinite small" I would not consider at our present level of  
> cognition.


Me too. But, concerning the substitution level, which non constructive  
existence is assumed as working hypothesis, we have to conceive the  
idea of arbitrary small. The Mandelbrot set offers a vivid  
illustration. Any plane compact representation of the universal  
deployment will look like that:
People can take a look http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8cX6Ghis6ts




> 
> In your reply to me:
> I find the rat-related IBM publication wanting:
> "...Each of its microchips has been programmed to act just like a  
> real neuron in a real brain"
> How much we know about a 'real neuron' and its function is a matter  
> of the present level of R&D. We know more than a decade ago and less  
> than a decade hence. And the 'rat' discloses only its movements -  
> evaluated and understood(?) at the complexity of the human brain.  
> Would you draw valid conclusions on - say - personality by a silent  
> film of only the movements of a person - even at matching complexity?
> I may write some distracting stories to follow 'movements'.
> A rat doesn't communicate with researcher.



How can know that?  And are you sure that the researcher you have in  
mind is listening to the rat?

If you have the time look at those youtube videos, they provide a  
counterexample.
Here a rat communicates something to a cat:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ikm3o5hDks&feature=channel_page
Here a cat communicates something to a human:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TZ860P4iTaM&feature=related
:)






> Rat-shrink?
> I wouldn't use Terry Seynowski's critical word that the brain is too  
> 'mystrerious': it is too complex and poorly followable by our  
> present level of our 2009 cognitive inventory.


Agreed. But Lobian  Machines can prove theorems on Machines: they can  
prove that all Lobian machines are too complex to "understood" itself.  
All lobian machine are too complex from its own point of view.
Yet some Lobian machine A can prove first  that all correct machine  
have about the same abstract theology, and second that they can study  
the complete theology of some simpler correct Lobian machine. This  
include the physics of the machine (physics is one of the  
"theological" hypostases) so they can compare the structure of their  
apparent neighborhoods with the machine's physics, and eventually even  
measure some possible degree of non-computationalism.




> We can know just 'that' much and most likely there is much 'more' to  
> it. (my 'enrichment' remark of past and future knowledge).
> Markram's work is glorious. That's the way we can proceed in  
> widening our knowledge 10,000 'neurons' is a good start.
> But their fundamental tenet:
> "Every brain is made of the same basic parts" -
> means a restriction to our ongoing physical/physiological  
> observational capabilities which have shown incredible enlargement  
> in the past (still within the 'physical world' figment).  
> Frequencies, methods, evaluations are all limited.
> I keep it open that penetrating the Hard Problem we may find new  
> phenomena unassignable to our present knowledge of the known tissue  
> and physics. Nobody has diversified amp or MRI data to distinguish  
> whether a blood-surge refers to a political opinion, love, boredom,  
> financial expectation, or whatever, in a mentally-topical distinction.
> *
> Thanks for that brilliant article. It says honestly:
> "When listening to Markram speculate, it's easy to forget that the  
> Blue Brain simulation is still just a single circuit, confined  
> within a silent supercomputer. The machine is not yet alive. "
> Exactly.
> Neuroscience is heroic an

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Quentin Anciaux]

2009/1/14 Brent Meeker 

>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  > >
> >
> >
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >  > 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  > > wrote:
> >  >
> >  >> However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also
> > requires a
> >  >> set of transition rules.  So in the same abstract way that the
> > integers
> >  >> are ordered by "succession" the computational states of a Turing
> > machine
> >  >> are ordered.  Whether just abstract rules, without
> > implementation, are
> >  >> sufficient isn't clear to me.
> >  >
> >  > In an actual physical computer the transition rules are
> > represented by
> >  > the causal links between the states, so that a particular input
> will
> >  > reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my
> > question
> >  > about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a
> > sequence of
> >  > states, so that s1 to s10 on m1 are causally linked, s11 to s20 on
> m2
> >  > are causally linked, but there is no link between m1 and m2, i.e.
> m2
> >  > just happens to start in s11 accidentally. Assuming that s1 to s20
> >  > occurring in a single machine results is a few moments of
> >  > consciousness (which is to say, assuming that computationalism is
> >  > true), what would happen if the sequence is broken in the way just
> >  > described?
> >
> > I suspect something is lost.  You are thinking of the states as
> > abstract steps
> > in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer
> > to run and
> > the computer implements distributed spatiotemporal links.  In
> > general you cannot
> > take even a digitial computer and freeze it in a instant of time,
> > call that a
> > state, and restart it without any effects.
> >
> >
> > I do not see a problem with that... a program can be freezed any time...
> > dump the memory to a file
>
> The abstract program, consisting of a set of steps can be stopped at any
> "time"
> (i.e. at a step), but a computer running a program cannot just be stopped.
>  What
> your are contemplating is having the operating system copy the values of
> various
> registers to a some memory file and then stop.
>

Well the operating system or the program itself or whatever... If I run a vm
and dump the state of the vm and restart it, it's the same thing... who did
tell to your program on what it is running anyway and of what relevance it
was for it ?


> >, on restart, load the dump file to memory, put
> > the instruction pointer at the correct place and you're done. (well in
> > practice it is a little more difficult, but you could do it for *any*
> > program).
>
> But have you ever cut the power to your computer while it was running? ;-)
>
> Brent
>

Well you are talking about physicalities here... For what it's worth I would
in this case (to stay in the material realm) implement it on a cluster with
failover (which is what ? dumping the state and distributing it accross the
cluster)

And when I close my notebook, the system goes to "hibernation" which is ?
saving the memory state.

Regards,
Quentin


> >In the situation that Stathis describe, causality is not
> > broken in any way. S1->S10 run in computer 1, dump, reload on computer 2
> > S11->S20 run in computer 2, the causal link is given by the program that
> > compute S1-S20 irrelevant on what physical device it is running on...
> > the causal link is the program and a program is relative to a machine
> > (abstract one). So a computation is the set of a program and the machine
> > that runs it. A state doesn't exists by itself (state of what ?), and
> > this is where Stathis is wrong I think.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Quentin
> >
> >
> >  Switches are in intermediate states,
> > EM waves are propagating, electrons are diffusing - it is not a
> > static thing
> > like a step in a program.
> >
> > In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that
> > there would be
> > a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one
> > would probably
> > hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
> >
> > Brent
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
> >
> > >
>
>
> >
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  >
> 
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>  > 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  > wrote:
>  >
>  >> However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also
> requires a
>  >> set of transition rules.  So in the same abstract way that the
> integers
>  >> are ordered by "succession" the computational states of a Turing
> machine
>  >> are ordered.  Whether just abstract rules, without
> implementation, are
>  >> sufficient isn't clear to me.
>  >
>  > In an actual physical computer the transition rules are
> represented by
>  > the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will
>  > reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my
> question
>  > about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a
> sequence of
>  > states, so that s1 to s10 on m1 are causally linked, s11 to s20 on m2
>  > are causally linked, but there is no link between m1 and m2, i.e. m2
>  > just happens to start in s11 accidentally. Assuming that s1 to s20
>  > occurring in a single machine results is a few moments of
>  > consciousness (which is to say, assuming that computationalism is
>  > true), what would happen if the sequence is broken in the way just
>  > described?
> 
> I suspect something is lost.  You are thinking of the states as
> abstract steps
> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer
> to run and
> the computer implements distributed spatiotemporal links.  In
> general you cannot
> take even a digitial computer and freeze it in a instant of time,
> call that a
> state, and restart it without any effects. 
> 
> 
> I do not see a problem with that... a program can be freezed any time... 
> dump the memory to a file

The abstract program, consisting of a set of steps can be stopped at any "time" 
(i.e. at a step), but a computer running a program cannot just be stopped.  
What 
your are contemplating is having the operating system copy the values of 
various 
registers to a some memory file and then stop.

>, on restart, load the dump file to memory, put 
> the instruction pointer at the correct place and you're done. (well in 
> practice it is a little more difficult, but you could do it for *any* 
> program). 

But have you ever cut the power to your computer while it was running? ;-)

Brent

>In the situation that Stathis describe, causality is not 
> broken in any way. S1->S10 run in computer 1, dump, reload on computer 2 
> S11->S20 run in computer 2, the causal link is given by the program that 
> compute S1-S20 irrelevant on what physical device it is running on... 
> the causal link is the program and a program is relative to a machine 
> (abstract one). So a computation is the set of a program and the machine 
> that runs it. A state doesn't exists by itself (state of what ?), and 
> this is where Stathis is wrong I think.
> 
> Regards,
> Quentin
>  
> 
>  Switches are in intermediate states,
> EM waves are propagating, electrons are diffusing - it is not a
> static thing
> like a step in a program.
> 
> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that
> there would be
> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one
> would probably
> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
> 
> > 


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi,

2009/1/14 Brent Meeker 

>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  wrote:
> >
> >> However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a
> >> set of transition rules.  So in the same abstract way that the integers
> >> are ordered by "succession" the computational states of a Turing machine
> >> are ordered.  Whether just abstract rules, without implementation, are
> >> sufficient isn't clear to me.
> >
> > In an actual physical computer the transition rules are represented by
> > the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will
> > reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my question
> > about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a sequence of
> > states, so that s1 to s10 on m1 are causally linked, s11 to s20 on m2
> > are causally linked, but there is no link between m1 and m2, i.e. m2
> > just happens to start in s11 accidentally. Assuming that s1 to s20
> > occurring in a single machine results is a few moments of
> > consciousness (which is to say, assuming that computationalism is
> > true), what would happen if the sequence is broken in the way just
> > described?
>
> I suspect something is lost.  You are thinking of the states as abstract
> steps
> in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer to run
> and
> the computer implements distributed spatiotemporal links.  In general you
> cannot
> take even a digitial computer and freeze it in a instant of time, call that
> a
> state, and restart it without any effects.


I do not see a problem with that... a program can be freezed any time...
dump the memory to a file, on restart, load the dump file to memory, put the
instruction pointer at the correct place and you're done. (well in practice
it is a little more difficult, but you could do it for *any* program). In
the situation that Stathis describe, causality is not broken in any way.
S1->S10 run in computer 1, dump, reload on computer 2 S11->S20 run in
computer 2, the causal link is given by the program that compute S1-S20
irrelevant on what physical device it is running on... the causal link is
the program and a program is relative to a machine (abstract one). So a
computation is the set of a program and the machine that runs it. A state
doesn't exists by itself (state of what ?), and this is where Stathis is
wrong I think.

Regards,
Quentin


>  Switches are in intermediate states,
> EM waves are propagating, electrons are diffusing - it is not a static
> thing
> like a step in a program.
>
> In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that there
> would be
> a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one would
> probably
> hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.
>
> Brent
>
> >
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
>> However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a
>> set of transition rules.  So in the same abstract way that the integers
>> are ordered by "succession" the computational states of a Turing machine
>> are ordered.  Whether just abstract rules, without implementation, are
>> sufficient isn't clear to me.
> 
> In an actual physical computer the transition rules are represented by
> the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will
> reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my question
> about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a sequence of
> states, so that s1 to s10 on m1 are causally linked, s11 to s20 on m2
> are causally linked, but there is no link between m1 and m2, i.e. m2
> just happens to start in s11 accidentally. Assuming that s1 to s20
> occurring in a single machine results is a few moments of
> consciousness (which is to say, assuming that computationalism is
> true), what would happen if the sequence is broken in the way just
> described?

I suspect something is lost.  You are thinking of the states as abstract steps 
in a computer program.  But a computer program requires a computer to run and 
the computer implements distributed spatiotemporal links.  In general you 
cannot 
take even a digitial computer and freeze it in a instant of time, call that a 
state, and restart it without any effects.  Switches are in intermediate 
states, 
EM waves are propagating, electrons are diffusing - it is not a static thing 
like a step in a program.

In terms of Bruno's teleporter, one might say yes accepting that there would be 
a one-time gap in consciousness (ever had a concussion?), but one would 
probably 
hesitate if the there was to be a gap every 10ms.

Brent

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[John Mikes]

Stathis: (from reply to Brent):
"I return to my question about what would happen if there were a
discontinuity in a sequence of states,..."
There IS discontinuity if the state "transits'(?) from s1 to s2.
Do you have any idea how one can observe a changed state by only continuous
transitions? Where do you pick the limit to call it the 'next' state? Isn't
such 'arbitrary'? (I have similar questions with astronomy - what I never
studied - how do they calculate the planatary movement markers (year?) into
(fractional?) seconds? but they do).
Same question to Bruno's 'integers: there is no transition between 2 and 3.
Even putting fractals in between only extends the question to smaller scale.
"Infinite small" I would not consider at our present level of cognition.

In your reply to me:
I find the rat-related IBM publication wanting:
"...Each of its microchips has been programmed to act just like a real
neuron in a real brain"
How much we know about a 'real neuron' and its function is a matter of the
present level of R&D. We know more than a decade ago and less than a decade
hence. And the 'rat' discloses only its movements - evaluated and
understood(?) at the complexity of the human brain. Would you draw valid
conclusions on - say - personality by a silent film of only the movements of
a person - even at matching complexity?
I may write some distracting stories to follow 'movements'.
A rat doesn't communicate with researcher. Rat-shrink?
I wouldn't use Terry Seynowski's critical word that the brain is too
'mystrerious': it is too *complex* and poorly followable by our present
level of our 2009 cognitive inventory. We can know just 'that' much and most
likely there is much 'more' to it. (my 'enrichment' remark of past and
future knowledge).
Markram's work is glorious. That's the way we can proceed in widening our
knowledge 10,000 'neurons' is a good start.
But their fundamental tenet:
"*Every brain is made* of the same basic parts" -
means a restriction to our ongoing physical/physiological observational
capabilities which have shown incredible enlargement in the past (still
within the 'physical world' figment). Frequencies, methods, evaluations are
all limited.
I keep it open that penetrating the Hard Problem we may find new phenomena
unassignable to our present knowledge of the known tissue and physics.
Nobody has diversified amp or MRI data to distinguish whether a blood-surge
refers to a political opinion, love, boredom, financial expectation, or
whatever, in a mentally-topical distinction.
*
Thanks for that brilliant article. It says honestly:
"When listening to Markram speculate, it's easy to forget that the Blue
Brain simulation is still just a single circuit, confined within a silent
supercomputer. The machine is not yet alive. "
Exactly.
Neuroscience is heroic and 'explains' lots of tenets into open "somehow'-s.
Their assumptions are within our conventional sciences. Digitally computed.
Computing analogue ideational meanings?

I wish to look further - especially on this list.
John


On Wed, Jan 14, 2009 at 4:40 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/1/14 John Mikes :
> > Stathis,
> >
> > common sense, not always applicable to math-related topics
> > is startled before a task on a REGULAR contraption-type Turing machine
> > (binary, electrically driven finite hardware etc.) can emulate ALL the
> > potentials of 11+billion neurons in unrestricted groupings and unlimited
> > connectivities as to the complexity of all the codes/details
> > (un!)imaginable.
> > (Maybe if you change to Bruno's infinite Loebian vs. Turing machine...??
> I
> > doubt if you can do that, since there are different brains (eg for
> genetical
> > etc. reasons) and I cannot figure so many (although limited number)
> > variables in the 'unrestricted' (all encompassing?) Loebian machines.)
>
It is possible to calculate how much computing power it would take to
> simulate a brain at a particular level. For simulations at the
> cellular level, there is for example this work by IBM researchers
> simulating a rat neocortical column:
>
> http://www.seedmagazine.com/news/2008/03/out_of_the_blue.php?page=all&p=y
> http://www.research.ibm.com/journal/rd/521/djurfeldt.pdf
>
> It's still a long way from simulating an entire brain and observing
> ratlike behaviour, but it does show that computational neuroscience is
> now beyond the philosopher's thought experiment stage.
>
>
>
> --
>  Stathis Papaioannou
>
> >
>

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/14 John Mikes :
> Stathis,
>
> common sense, not always applicable to math-related topics
> is startled before a task on a REGULAR contraption-type Turing machine
> (binary, electrically driven finite hardware etc.) can emulate ALL the
> potentials of 11+billion neurons in unrestricted groupings and unlimited
> connectivities as to the complexity of all the codes/details
> (un!)imaginable.
> (Maybe if you change to Bruno's infinite Loebian vs. Turing machine...?? I
> doubt if you can do that, since there are different brains (eg for genetical
> etc. reasons) and I cannot figure so many (although limited number)
> variables in the 'unrestricted' (all encompassing?) Loebian machines.)

It is possible to calculate how much computing power it would take to
simulate a brain at a particular level. For simulations at the
cellular level, there is for example this work by IBM researchers
simulating a rat neocortical column:

http://www.seedmagazine.com/news/2008/03/out_of_the_blue.php?page=all&p=y
http://www.research.ibm.com/journal/rd/521/djurfeldt.pdf

It's still a long way from simulating an entire brain and observing
ratlike behaviour, but it does show that computational neuroscience is
now beyond the philosopher's thought experiment stage.



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/14 Brent Meeker  wrote:

> However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a
> set of transition rules.  So in the same abstract way that the integers
> are ordered by "succession" the computational states of a Turing machine
> are ordered.  Whether just abstract rules, without implementation, are
> sufficient isn't clear to me.

In an actual physical computer the transition rules are represented by
the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will
reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my question
about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a sequence of
states, so that s1 to s10 on m1 are causally linked, s11 to s20 on m2
are causally linked, but there is no link between m1 and m2, i.e. m2
just happens to start in s11 accidentally. Assuming that s1 to s20
occurring in a single machine results is a few moments of
consciousness (which is to say, assuming that computationalism is
true), what would happen if the sequence is broken in the way just
described?



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Jan 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 2009/1/13 Brent Meeker :
>>
>>
>>> In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a  
>>> process in which
>>> signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime  
>>> and is connected
>>> causally which means, per relativity, that you cannot make any  
>>> unique spacelike
>>> snapshot and label it "the state".  I don't go so far as to claim  
>>> that
>>> consciousness *must be* instantiated in this way, but I think  
>>> there must be
>>> something that makes the "states" part of a process - not just  
>>> snapshots.  Bruno
>>> gets around the problem of defining states by assuming a digital  
>>> Turing like
>>> process, but then he has to provide something besides spacetime to  
>>> make the set
>>> of states a sequence; which is he does by invoking the requirement  
>>> that they be
>>> a computation.  I have some doubts as to whether this is enough,  
>>> but at least it
>>> is something.
>>>
>>
>> It comes down to whether the brain is Turing emulable. If it is, then
>> I see no problem describing it in terms of a sequence of discrete
>> states. The question then arises whether the causal links between the
>> states in an intact digital computer are necessary to give rise to
>> consciousness, which is what I thought you were claiming, or whether
>> the same states in disconnected fashion would achieve the same thing.
>> Opponents of computationalism such as John Searle have argued that if
>> a Turing machine can give rise to consciousness then the disconnected
>> states would also have to give rise to consciousness, which is then
>> taken as a reductio against computationalism.
> However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also  
> requires a
> set of transition rules.  So in the same abstract way that the  
> integers
> are ordered by "succession" the computational states of a Turing  
> machine
> are ordered.  Whether just abstract rules, without implementation, are
> sufficient isn't clear to me.


OK, but then the UDA is supposed to explain that.
When we abandon the physical supervenience principle, and still keep  
digital mechanism, comp, we have to make clearer the comp  
surpevenience thesis. When you say in a previous post, to Stathis:



> Bruno gets around the problem of defining states by assuming a  
> digital Turing like
> process, but then he has to provide something besides spacetime to  
> make the set
> of states a sequence; which is he does by invoking the requirement  
> that they be
> a computation.  I have some doubts as to whether this is enough,





I only bet that there is a universal machine with respect to which  
that sequence of states is a computation.
UDA makes it *necessarily* enough, once you say "yes" to the  
digitalist surgeon. I think.
(then from the first person point of view it will be an infinity of  
computations-universal machines)


> but at least it is something.


Thanks. But what a thing! It is no my thing, it is what clearly  
"nature" has not stopped to show us with life, brains (amoebas getting  
cabled), and computers: apparition and re-apparition of *the* (by  
Church thesis) Universal "Machine".

You get a point on Stathis: a sequence of states, or a sequence of  
description of states, or a description of a sequence of states, none  
of those things can "implement" consciousness ... per se. Sequences of  
states ,or description of sequences of states, implement consciousness  
only relatively to universal machine, either in the third person way  
(get accessed by the UD), or from the first person points of view the  
most probable (or credible, or bettable) universal machine(s)  
relatively to its indexicaly current state.

I think Stathis can conceive that a stone could implement all  
computations. In a sense, this is true (assuming comp), given that a  
stone, from *your* point of view should already be described by the  
collection of *all* computational history going through the state of  
"the stone" (if that exists) or the state of "you + the stone". This  
is advanced stuff and could perhaps be resolved by hands, but it is  
more funny, deeper, and modest, and then this is what I have done  
after all, to directly interview the universal machine itself.
Which leads to AUDA.

Assuming comp, specifying just one universal machine will do,  
ontologically. And elementary arithmetic, taught in high school, and  
captured by Robinson Arithmetic is enough. It defines implicitly a  
universal deployment. If f(x) = z, f computable, then Robinson  
Arithmetic will prove that fact (and also that if f(x) = z & f(x) = y  
then y = z).

But it is epistemology which counts, in particular Physics is first  
person (plural), and to be described, we need a universal machine  
which is little bit more introspective. Here there is a theorem (not  
mine!): if you had, to Robinson Arithmetic, the infinity of  
"induction" formula (Ax means 

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[John Mikes]

Stathis,

common sense, not always applicable to math-related topics
is startled before a task on a REGULAR contraption-type Turing machine
(binary, electrically driven finite hardware etc.) can emulate ALL the
potentials of 11+billion neurons in unrestricted groupings and unlimited
connectivities as to the complexity of all the codes/details
(un!)imaginable.
(Maybe if you change to Bruno's infinite Loebian vs. Turing machine...?? I
doubt if you can do that, since there are different brains (eg for genetical
etc. reasons) and I cannot figure so many (although limited number)
variables in the 'unrestricted' (all encompassing?) Loebian machines.)
*
To Brent's remark:
The 'sequence vs. time' is not trivial, it has its intricacies: considering
an 'open' time-scale your 'sequence' may follow up some sequencing steps in
nanosecs, others in lightyears. Principally it is all 'time', yet no
time-systemic temporality.
*
Spacetime is harder: the hard-problem (thought) part works easily in
a_temporal - a_spatial conditions where sequence IS yet included,
however spatial restrictions much less. E.g. plunging into the
inter-universe teleporting it is hard to figure out spatial conditions
'between' universes. How far is U3 from U145? Does Multiverse have a
space-system?
*
Ccness? what type? I find even Bruno's version restricted, although my
version (response to infirmation) is applicable in computing, I just figure
more planes than just Platonic (i.e. numerical? math?) objects.

John

On Tue, Jan 13, 2009 at 6:49 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/1/13 Brent Meeker :
>
> > In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a process in
> which
> > signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime and is
> connected
> > causally which means, per relativity, that you cannot make any unique
> spacelike
> > snapshot and label it "the state".  I don't go so far as to claim that
> > consciousness *must be* instantiated in this way, but I think there must
> be
> > something that makes the "states" part of a process - not just snapshots.
>  Bruno
> > gets around the problem of defining states by assuming a digital Turing
> like
> > process, but then he has to provide something besides spacetime to make
> the set
> > of states a sequence; which is he does by invoking the requirement that
> they be
> > a computation.  I have some doubts as to whether this is enough, but at
> least it
> > is something.
>
> It comes down to whether the brain is Turing emulable. If it is, then
> I see no problem describing it in terms of a sequence of discrete
> states. The question then arises whether the causal links between the
> states in an intact digital computer are necessary to give rise to
> consciousness, which is what I thought you were claiming, or whether
> the same states in disconnected fashion would achieve the same thing.
> Opponents of computationalism such as John Searle have argued that if
> a Turing machine can give rise to consciousness then the disconnected
> states would also have to give rise to consciousness, which is then
> taken as a reductio against computationalism. The alternative way,
> saving computationalism, is, I think, Bruno's: it isn't the physical
> states giving rise to consciousness, but the computation as Platonic
> object.
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> >
>

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/13 Brent Meeker :
>
>   
>> In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a process in 
>> which
>> signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime and is 
>> connected
>> causally which means, per relativity, that you cannot make any unique 
>> spacelike
>> snapshot and label it "the state".  I don't go so far as to claim that
>> consciousness *must be* instantiated in this way, but I think there must be
>> something that makes the "states" part of a process - not just snapshots.  
>> Bruno
>> gets around the problem of defining states by assuming a digital Turing like
>> process, but then he has to provide something besides spacetime to make the 
>> set
>> of states a sequence; which is he does by invoking the requirement that they 
>> be
>> a computation.  I have some doubts as to whether this is enough, but at 
>> least it
>> is something.
>> 
>
> It comes down to whether the brain is Turing emulable. If it is, then
> I see no problem describing it in terms of a sequence of discrete
> states. The question then arises whether the causal links between the
> states in an intact digital computer are necessary to give rise to
> consciousness, which is what I thought you were claiming, or whether
> the same states in disconnected fashion would achieve the same thing.
> Opponents of computationalism such as John Searle have argued that if
> a Turing machine can give rise to consciousness then the disconnected
> states would also have to give rise to consciousness, which is then
> taken as a reductio against computationalism. 
However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a 
set of transition rules.  So in the same abstract way that the integers 
are ordered by "succession" the computational states of a Turing machine 
are ordered.  Whether just abstract rules, without implementation, are 
sufficient isn't clear to me.

Brent

> The alternative way,
> saving computationalism, is, I think, Bruno's: it isn't the physical
> states giving rise to consciousness, but the computation as Platonic
> object.
>
>
>   


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/13 Günther Greindl :
>
> Stathis,
>
> thinking about this way (which I did when reading Egan's Permutation
> City) is indeed problematic - because then you would also have to let
> consciousness supervene on Lucky Alice (the one from MGA), right down to
> Super Lucky Alice (Alice which is "made" anew for every state through
> random events).
>
> In a materialist view, you can associate consciousness with states
> directly (which leads to strange consequences, see MGA for instance); or
> some part of the running is responsible - in which case you can't leave
> out the causal dynamics or maybe the material substrate - but that isn't
> computationalism anymore, because you must assume that the substrate is
> not turing-emulable (otherwise you would just have to choose a
> different, correct, substitution level).
>
> That is why I agree with Bruno - IF you assume COMP - and you are
> assuming it, I gather - then forget matter, and forget "running", and
> forget "isolated" states - you will find your OMs in UD* - and as such,
> the states s1 through s20 etc will only contribute to the measure of
> histories for an OM, but will not constitute the OM _by themselves_.
>
> In one sentence: The states s1 through s20 (or any others) will
> contribute to the measure of a certain OM and the ingoing/outgoing
> histories, independent of order, if they can be attributed to a
> computation of an UD.

Yes, I agree, and I see "dust" type arguments as equivalent to
arguments in favour of Marchalian Idealism (to coin a phrase). It's
either that or drop computationalism.



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/13 Brent Meeker :

> In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a process in which
> signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime and is 
> connected
> causally which means, per relativity, that you cannot make any unique 
> spacelike
> snapshot and label it "the state".  I don't go so far as to claim that
> consciousness *must be* instantiated in this way, but I think there must be
> something that makes the "states" part of a process - not just snapshots.  
> Bruno
> gets around the problem of defining states by assuming a digital Turing like
> process, but then he has to provide something besides spacetime to make the 
> set
> of states a sequence; which is he does by invoking the requirement that they 
> be
> a computation.  I have some doubts as to whether this is enough, but at least 
> it
> is something.

It comes down to whether the brain is Turing emulable. If it is, then
I see no problem describing it in terms of a sequence of discrete
states. The question then arises whether the causal links between the
states in an intact digital computer are necessary to give rise to
consciousness, which is what I thought you were claiming, or whether
the same states in disconnected fashion would achieve the same thing.
Opponents of computationalism such as John Searle have argued that if
a Turing machine can give rise to consciousness then the disconnected
states would also have to give rise to consciousness, which is then
taken as a reductio against computationalism. The alternative way,
saving computationalism, is, I think, Bruno's: it isn't the physical
states giving rise to consciousness, but the computation as Platonic
object.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/12 Brent Meeker :
> 
>>> A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
>>> Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several
>>> moments of consciousness. Would you say that running the sequence s1
>>> to s20 on a single machine m1 will give a different conscious
>>> experience to running s1 to s10 on m1 and separately s11 to s20 on m2?
>>>
>>>
>> I'm suggesting that there has to be something that makes the states a
>> sequence instead of just a set or an aggregate.
> 
> In that case, there would be a difference between the two cases I
> described above, perhaps a gap in consciousness when the sequence is
> separated into two parts on two machines. But this presents conceptual
> problems. For a start, the observer notices no gap, 

You are assuming the set of states is a sufficient simulation to instantiate an 
observer, which is what I doubt.

>and his external
> behaviour is also unchanged. If there is nevertheless a gap, would it
> be of infinitesimal duration or would its duration perhaps be that of
> the period of consciousness s10 and s11 would have given rise to had
> they occurred in the usual causally connected way in the one machine?

In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a process in which 
signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime and is 
connected 
causally which means, per relativity, that you cannot make any unique spacelike 
snapshot and label it "the state".  I don't go so far as to claim that 
consciousness *must be* instantiated in this way, but I think there must be 
something that makes the "states" part of a process - not just snapshots.  
Bruno 
gets around the problem of defining states by assuming a digital Turing like 
process, but then he has to provide something besides spacetime to make the set 
of states a sequence; which is he does by invoking the requirement that they be 
a computation.  I have some doubts as to whether this is enough, but at least 
it 
is something.

Brent

> What would happen to the gap if there were communication between the
> two machines, say by sneakernet? And what if the information transfer
> between the two machines was unreliable, so that the right state was
> transferred only half the time?
> 
> 
> 


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Günther Greindl]

Stathis,

thinking about this way (which I did when reading Egan's Permutation 
City) is indeed problematic - because then you would also have to let 
consciousness supervene on Lucky Alice (the one from MGA), right down to 
Super Lucky Alice (Alice which is "made" anew for every state through 
random events).

In a materialist view, you can associate consciousness with states 
directly (which leads to strange consequences, see MGA for instance); or 
some part of the running is responsible - in which case you can't leave 
out the causal dynamics or maybe the material substrate - but that isn't 
computationalism anymore, because you must assume that the substrate is 
not turing-emulable (otherwise you would just have to choose a 
different, correct, substitution level).

That is why I agree with Bruno - IF you assume COMP - and you are
assuming it, I gather - then forget matter, and forget "running", and 
forget "isolated" states - you will find your OMs in UD* - and as such, 
the states s1 through s20 etc will only contribute to the measure of 
histories for an OM, but will not constitute the OM _by themselves_.

In one sentence: The states s1 through s20 (or any others) will 
contribute to the measure of a certain OM and the ingoing/outgoing 
histories, independent of order, if they can be attributed to a 
computation of an UD.

Cheers,
Günther

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/11 Brent Meeker :
> 
>> I'm suggesting that "running a state" is incoherent.
> 
> A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
> Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several
> moments of consciousness. Would you say that running the sequence s1
> to s20 on a single machine m1 will give a different conscious
> experience to running s1 to s10 on m1 and separately s11 to s20 on m2?
> 

-- 
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
guenther.grei...@univie.ac.at

Blog: http://www.complexitystudies.org/
Thesis: http://www.complexitystudies.org/proposal/



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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/12 Brent Meeker :

>> A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
>> Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several
>> moments of consciousness. Would you say that running the sequence s1
>> to s20 on a single machine m1 will give a different conscious
>> experience to running s1 to s10 on m1 and separately s11 to s20 on m2?
>>
>>
> I'm suggesting that there has to be something that makes the states a
> sequence instead of just a set or an aggregate.

In that case, there would be a difference between the two cases I
described above, perhaps a gap in consciousness when the sequence is
separated into two parts on two machines. But this presents conceptual
problems. For a start, the observer notices no gap, and his external
behaviour is also unchanged. If there is nevertheless a gap, would it
be of infinitesimal duration or would its duration perhaps be that of
the period of consciousness s10 and s11 would have given rise to had
they occurred in the usual causally connected way in the one machine?
What would happen to the gap if there were communication between the
two machines, say by sneakernet? And what if the information transfer
between the two machines was unreliable, so that the right state was
transferred only half the time?



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

Le 11-janv.-09, à 17:55, Brent Meeker a écrit :

>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 2009/1/11 Brent Meeker :
>>
>>
>>> I'm suggesting that "running a state" is incoherent.
>>>
>>
>> A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
>> Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several
>> moments of consciousness. Would you say that running the sequence s1
>> to s20 on a single machine m1 will give a different conscious
>> experience to running s1 to s10 on m1 and separately s11 to s20 on m2?
>>
>>
> I'm suggesting that there has to be something that makes the states a
> sequence instead of just a set or an aggregate.

I agree.
What you need is a Universal system/machine/language/whatever. To say 
that something is a state in a computation, or that something is a 
computation, you need a universal machine capable of producing that 
computation.
Now, assuming the "yes doctor" entails that the universal system does 
not need to be physical, and that the very term "physical" will have to 
be explained in term of purely combinatorial or arithmetical universal 
system. The explanatory gain is fabulous, then.

Bruno



>
> Brent
>
> >
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/11 Brent Meeker :
>
>   
>> I'm suggesting that "running a state" is incoherent.
>> 
>
> A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
> Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several
> moments of consciousness. Would you say that running the sequence s1
> to s20 on a single machine m1 will give a different conscious
> experience to running s1 to s10 on m1 and separately s11 to s20 on m2?
>
>   
I'm suggesting that there has to be something that makes the states a 
sequence instead of just a set or an aggregate.

Brent

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/11 Brent Meeker :

> I'm suggesting that "running a state" is incoherent.

A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several
moments of consciousness. Would you say that running the sequence s1
to s20 on a single machine m1 will give a different conscious
experience to running s1 to s10 on m1 and separately s11 to s20 on m2?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/10 Brent Meeker :
>
>   
>> The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the passage 
>> of
>> (simulated) time.  If you just look a momentary machine states, ignoring 
>> their
>> causal/temporal relations, how will they create the consciousness of time in 
>> the
>> simulated observer?
>> 
>
> Are you suggesting that the observer would be conscious of the passage
> of time through two consecutive machine states, s1 and s2, running on
> the one machine m1, but not if s1 is run on m1 (which is then stopped)
> and s2 run on a separate machine m2?
>
>
>   
I'm suggesting that "running a state" is incoherent.

Brent

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/10 Brent Meeker :

> The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the passage of
> (simulated) time.  If you just look a momentary machine states, ignoring their
> causal/temporal relations, how will they create the consciousness of time in 
> the
> simulated observer?

Are you suggesting that the observer would be conscious of the passage
of time through two consecutive machine states, s1 and s2, running on
the one machine m1, but not if s1 is run on m1 (which is then stopped)
and s2 run on a separate machine m2?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Kim Jones wrote:
> 
> On 10/01/2009, at 6:37 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> 
>> The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the  
>> passage of
>> (simulated) time.  If you just look a momentary machine states,  
>> ignoring their
>> causal/temporal relations, how will they create the consciousness of  
>> time in the
>> simulated observer?
>>
>> Brent
> 
> 
> But does it make any difference whether the observer is simulated or  
> not? 

But the question is what constitutes an adequate simulation.  Can it be the 
existence of disjoint states or must there be a causal connection between the 
states or is some implicit order enough?  How does the "time" get simulated?

Brent

>I've been assuming all along that my "reality" might be a  
> "simulated" one from your POV. You could (without me knowing for sure  
> but perhaps suspecting it) be projecting my entire reality for my (and  
> almost certainly, your) benefit. Without you fiddling the knobs and  
> faders behind the scenes I don't even exist.
> 
> Time exists where the conscious mind attributes or senses "meaning".  
> Because everything can ultimately be derived from everything else, it  
> makes sense that time is like a kind of "white noise of meaning" of  
> all perceived OMs.
> 
> 
> If that isn't too Shirley McLaine
> 
> 
> 
> regards,
> 
> 
> Kim
> 
> > 
> 


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Kim Jones]

On 10/01/2009, at 6:37 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:

> The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the  
> passage of
> (simulated) time.  If you just look a momentary machine states,  
> ignoring their
> causal/temporal relations, how will they create the consciousness of  
> time in the
> simulated observer?
>
> Brent


But does it make any difference whether the observer is simulated or  
not? I've been assuming all along that my "reality" might be a  
"simulated" one from your POV. You could (without me knowing for sure  
but perhaps suspecting it) be projecting my entire reality for my (and  
almost certainly, your) benefit. Without you fiddling the knobs and  
faders behind the scenes I don't even exist.

Time exists where the conscious mind attributes or senses "meaning".  
Because everything can ultimately be derived from everything else, it  
makes sense that time is like a kind of "white noise of meaning" of  
all perceived OMs.


If that isn't too Shirley McLaine



regards,


Kim

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/10 Brent Meeker :
> 
>>> Consider a simulation of an observer watching a falling stone, running
>>> on a digital computer. Does the observer have any way of knowing
>>> whether the simulation is being run serially, in parallel, on how many
>>> and what kinds of physical machines, at what speed, or in what order?
>>>
>>>
>> Is the observer conscious of a passage to time?
> 
> Yes,but of course it won't be real or external time of which he will
> be conscious. In a block universe, there isn't necessarily any real or
> external time. Whether you call the internal time of the simulation or
> block universe "real" is a matter of taste.
> 

The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the passage of 
(simulated) time.  If you just look a momentary machine states, ignoring their 
causal/temporal relations, how will they create the consciousness of time in 
the 
simulated observer?

Brent

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/10 Brent Meeker :

>> Consider a simulation of an observer watching a falling stone, running
>> on a digital computer. Does the observer have any way of knowing
>> whether the simulation is being run serially, in parallel, on how many
>> and what kinds of physical machines, at what speed, or in what order?
>>
>>
>
> Is the observer conscious of a passage to time?

Yes,but of course it won't be real or external time of which he will
be conscious. In a block universe, there isn't necessarily any real or
external time. Whether you call the internal time of the simulation or
block universe "real" is a matter of taste.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/9 Brent Meeker :
> 
>>> But in a block universe, where each frame contains all of the
>>> information for a particular time, the order is implicit.
>> What makes it implicit?... increasing entropy? ...conformance to dynamical 
>> laws?
>>   These are things outside the frames.  If you assume there is enough inside
>> the frames to order them (as a continuum model does by implicit overlap) then
>> that is a time order and it's meaningless to talk about shuffling or 
>> separating
>> them (in what spacetime could such operations be carried out?).
> 
> Consider a simulation of an observer watching a falling stone, running
> on a digital computer. Does the observer have any way of knowing
> whether the simulation is being run serially, in parallel, on how many
> and what kinds of physical machines, at what speed, or in what order?
> 
> 

Is the observer conscious of a passage to time?

Brent

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/9 Brent Meeker :

>> But in a block universe, where each frame contains all of the
>> information for a particular time, the order is implicit.
>
> What makes it implicit?... increasing entropy? ...conformance to dynamical 
> laws?
>   These are things outside the frames.  If you assume there is enough inside
> the frames to order them (as a continuum model does by implicit overlap) then
> that is a time order and it's meaningless to talk about shuffling or 
> separating
> them (in what spacetime could such operations be carried out?).

Consider a simulation of an observer watching a falling stone, running
on a digital computer. Does the observer have any way of knowing
whether the simulation is being run serially, in parallel, on how many
and what kinds of physical machines, at what speed, or in what order?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Günther Greindl]

Thomas,

>> (Apropos Günther Greindl's remark: "space as the self moving in
>> relation to everything else, time as everything outside the self moving in 
>> relation to oneself."

> it's funny that already in 1895, in his novel The Time Machine, H.G.
> Wells wrote, "There is no difference between time and any of the three

thanks for that notice, I wasn't aware of it!

Best Wishes,
Günther

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/8 Brent Meeker :
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>> 2009/1/7 Abram Demski  wrote:
>>>
 I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical
 structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the
 stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else...
 which is true by supposition in the block world).

 Perhaps that still counts as a magical requirement for you, though.
>>> So if the boards were shuffled, or separated by arbitrary distances,
>>> the causality would go and the computation (perhaps a conscious
>>> computation) would no longer be implemented? What justification is
>>> there for adding this requirement?
>>>
>>>
>>
>>2 + 2 = 4 is true
>>4 + 2 = 2 is false
>>
>> Order counts.
> 
> But in a block universe, where each frame contains all of the
> information for a particular time, the order is implicit. 

What makes it implicit?... increasing entropy? ...conformance to dynamical 
laws? 
   These are things outside the frames.  If you assume there is enough inside 
the frames to order them (as a continuum model does by implicit overlap) then 
that is a time order and it's meaningless to talk about shuffling or separating 
them (in what spacetime could such operations be carried out?).

Brent

>Arranging
> the frames a particular way is only important for an observer outside
> of the ensemble, like someone watching a film. Some argue that such a
> block universe would lack the special quality that gives rise to
> computation, consciousness and all other good things.
> 
> 


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/8 Brent Meeker :
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 2009/1/7 Abram Demski  wrote:
>>
>>> I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical
>>> structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the
>>> stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else...
>>> which is true by supposition in the block world).
>>>
>>> Perhaps that still counts as a magical requirement for you, though.
>>
>> So if the boards were shuffled, or separated by arbitrary distances,
>> the causality would go and the computation (perhaps a conscious
>> computation) would no longer be implemented? What justification is
>> there for adding this requirement?
>>
>>
>
>
>2 + 2 = 4 is true
>4 + 2 = 2 is false
>
> Order counts.

But in a block universe, where each frame contains all of the
information for a particular time, the order is implicit. Arranging
the frames a particular way is only important for an observer outside
of the ensemble, like someone watching a film. Some argue that such a
block universe would lack the special quality that gives rise to
computation, consciousness and all other good things.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Thomas Laursen]

PS. If the two-dimensional cartoon man has something to say about
mathematics or logic, I would certainly listen, but his intuition,
"common sense" and and experienses I would rather smile at :)

Maybe somebody is smiling at me right now? or laughing? I hope not ;-)
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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Thomas Laursen]

OK, and thanks Bruno. I thought MW more or less presumed a block
universe without time, but apparently this is yet uncertain.

Abram,

> If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
> "moving" in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
> the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
> dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing so treat
> time more like we treat space? Et cetera.

Probably because our sense apparatus and brain are fine-tuned (by
evolution) to a limited part of reallity. We don't experience reallity
directly in its wholeness. Think of a cartoon man. He lives his entire
life in what to him looks like two spatial dimensions and probably
still makes claims about reallity! His life begins at page 1 and ends
at say page 50. At page 40 he remembers what happend at page 20, but
not visa versa. The reader could tell him, because the reader can go
back and forth in the book like he wants, but the cartoon man can't
see, hear, or touch the reader, though he probably senses the third
dimension in some strange way, similar to the strange way the reader
senses the fourth dimension, time. And the same relation a little
being living on a thin thread would have to the cartoon man. And the
reader to a being outside the universe, if such being exists.

If time is something different from space, this analogy doesn't hold
totally, though :)

> To my knowledge, modern physics treats many things as "dimensions":
> not just time and space, but also forces such as electromagnetism.
> This does not imply that such things are spatial in nature. A
> dimension is just a variable. Unless you think there is something
> particularly spatial about time?

"Dimension" is a flexible word meaning many different things, also non-
spatial, depending on the context. About the spatial nature of time
the others answered much better than I can :)

See also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacetime

(Apropos Günther Greindl's remark: "space as the self moving in
relation to everything else,
time as everything outside the self moving in relation to oneself."
it's funny that already in 1895, in his novel The Time Machine, H.G.
Wells wrote, "There is no difference between time and any of the three
dimensions of space except that our consciousness moves along it." I
guess it's the same that is meant. Consciousness IS a funny thing in a
block universe, I admit :-)
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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Jan 2009, at 20:18, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> 2009/1/6 Abram Demski :
>>> Thomas,
>>>
>>> If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we  
>>> experience
>>> "moving" in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
>>> the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
>>> dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing so  
>>> treat
>>> time more like we treat space? Et cetera.
>>
>> You could model a block universe as a big stack of Life boards, where
>> the time dimension is represented by the spatial displacement between
>> the boards. There's no way the observers in such an arrangement can
>> step out of one board onto another, backwards or out of sequence.  
>> Some
>> would say that the stack of boards does not count as a computation,
>> and others that even if it counts as a computation it doesn't count  
>> as
>> a conscious computation; that to reach such states you need causality
>> and for causality you need fundamentally real time, not block
>> pseudo-time. I don't see any justification for such claims beyond a
>> desire to preserve the magic in the world.
>
> If you don't require causality or something else that provides a  
> continuum
> topology then the boards can be infinitesimally thin and without any  
> intrinsic
> order.  That would mean that a single "board", by itself (a "state"  
> in machine
> terminology) would have to count as a computation.  That's why Bruno  
> insists on
> a digital structure, but even in his model there is the UD running  
> in the
> background and providing an order.


OK.

What remains to be (re)explained, to grasp completely the steps 7 and  
8 of the UDA,  is that the background for a "running UD" does not need  
more than a tiny part of arithmetic (or combinator, ...).

The computation steps of the UD can be defined entirely in arithmetic,  
and this determines the topology and the measure on the "boards" in a  
way where it makes no sense to "change" anything, like you cannot  
change the property of the numbers at will, once you have accepted the  
(usual) definitions.

This is not easy to explain. It is implicit in the proof that the  
recursive or computable functions are representable in (Robinson)  
Arithmetic, or that the recursively enumerable sets are representable  
in (Robinson) Arithmetic, or combinators(*).

Actually the AUDA shows that there will be as many topologies and  
measures than there are types of points of view. Starting from the  
usual, and best known, Gödelian, notion of effective self-reference  
for defining the third point of view, and accepting the Theaetetus'  
definitions of knowledge for defining the other person's point's of  
view, we can extract the logics corresponding to those views, (they  
correspond to the arithmetical "hypostases" in the plotinus paper).  
They determine the corresponding topology and the corresponding  
measure. Then it should be "just" math. I see indeed this as mainly an  
attempt to formulate the mind body problem in math, as it can be done  
when assuming digital mechanism.

AUDA protects explicitly machines against any reductionist conception  
of what a machine, or number (or combinator, ...) can be. This is due  
to the fact that correct universal machines can prove their own  
incompleteness and can distinguish "truth" from their own provability  
predicate. They can known they cannot define or give a name to an  
ultimate notion of "truth", yet they can be guided by it and to it, in  
a non enumerable varieties of ways.


Bruno

(*)This is rather well done in the two following (quite good) books:

George S Boolos, John P. Burgess,  and Richard C. Jeffrey.  
Computability and Logic, fourth edition, 2002, Cambridge University  
Press.

Richard L. Epstein and Walter A. Carnielli. Computability, Computable  
Functions, Logic, and the Foundations of Mathematics.  1989, Wadswoth  
& Brooks/Cole Mathematics Series, Pacific Grove, California.

Those who appreciates the combinators, (or those who dislikes the  
numbers),  can read "How to Mock a Mocking Bird" by Raymond Smullyan,  
who gives a big part of the ideas and technics for representing the  
recursive functions with the combinators S and K.




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/7 Abram Demski  wrote:
> 
>> I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical
>> structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the
>> stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else...
>> which is true by supposition in the block world).
>>
>> Perhaps that still counts as a magical requirement for you, though.
> 
> So if the boards were shuffled, or separated by arbitrary distances,
> the causality would go and the computation (perhaps a conscious
> computation) would no longer be implemented? What justification is
> there for adding this requirement?
> 
> 


2 + 2 = 4 is true
4 + 2 = 2 is false

Order counts.

Brent

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/7 Abram Demski  wrote:

> I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical
> structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the
> stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else...
> which is true by supposition in the block world).
>
> Perhaps that still counts as a magical requirement for you, though.

So if the boards were shuffled, or separated by arbitrary distances,
the causality would go and the computation (perhaps a conscious
computation) would no longer be implemented? What justification is
there for adding this requirement?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Lewis Carroll Epstein says the reason we can't go faster than light is that we 
can't go slower than light, c is our speed along the time axis.

Brent

Günther Greindl wrote:
> Abram,
> 
> an intuition I have come to concerning time is the following (it is only 
> qualitative and may or may not be helpful in thinking about time):
> 
>  From relativity theory we know that there is no universal now, and that 
> the invariant between two "points" in the physical universe is spacetime 
> distance, where time or space are interchangeable relative to different 
> (moving) observers.
> 
> Now let us for the moment go into the position of an observer 
> (ourselves, for instance).
> 
> space: is the dimensions over which I have control as a thinking 
> subject. I can move left, right, up, down, front, back - three 
> dimensions. I can consciously change my relation to other objects (which 
> continue on their trajectories through spacetime).
> 
> time: is the motion of all other objects in the universe in relation to
> myself - even some objects of which I am made of, say, the cells in my
> body (which divide etc), bloodstream etc.
> 
> So we see a first person/third person divide:
> 
> space as the self moving in relation to everything else,
> time as everything outside the self moving in relation to
> oneself.
> 
> So, in this sense, time and space are indeed very much alike - they just 
> represent different points of view (self vs otherness)
> 
> Just a few thoughts :-)
> 
> Best Wishes,
> Günther
> 
> > 
> 


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Günther Greindl]

Abram,

an intuition I have come to concerning time is the following (it is only 
qualitative and may or may not be helpful in thinking about time):

 From relativity theory we know that there is no universal now, and that 
the invariant between two "points" in the physical universe is spacetime 
distance, where time or space are interchangeable relative to different 
(moving) observers.

Now let us for the moment go into the position of an observer 
(ourselves, for instance).

space: is the dimensions over which I have control as a thinking 
subject. I can move left, right, up, down, front, back - three 
dimensions. I can consciously change my relation to other objects (which 
continue on their trajectories through spacetime).

time: is the motion of all other objects in the universe in relation to
myself - even some objects of which I am made of, say, the cells in my
body (which divide etc), bloodstream etc.

So we see a first person/third person divide:

space as the self moving in relation to everything else,
time as everything outside the self moving in relation to
oneself.

So, in this sense, time and space are indeed very much alike - they just 
represent different points of view (self vs otherness)

Just a few thoughts :-)

Best Wishes,
Günther

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/1/6 Abram Demski :
>> Thomas,
>>
>> If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
>> "moving" in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
>> the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
>> dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing so treat
>> time more like we treat space? Et cetera.
> 
> You could model a block universe as a big stack of Life boards, where
> the time dimension is represented by the spatial displacement between
> the boards. There's no way the observers in such an arrangement can
> step out of one board onto another, backwards or out of sequence. Some
> would say that the stack of boards does not count as a computation,
> and others that even if it counts as a computation it doesn't count as
> a conscious computation; that to reach such states you need causality
> and for causality you need fundamentally real time, not block
> pseudo-time. I don't see any justification for such claims beyond a
> desire to preserve the magic in the world.

If you don't require causality or something else that provides a continuum 
topology then the boards can be infinitesimally thin and without any intrinsic 
order.  That would mean that a single "board", by itself (a "state" in machine 
terminology) would have to count as a computation.  That's why Bruno insists on 
a digital structure, but even in his model there is the UD running in the 
background and providing an order.

Brent

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Abram Demski]

Bruno,

This I know... yet I want to say that it doesn't necessarily make time
*spatial*. But, I can't say exactly what that would mean. It seems to
me that the word "spatial" becomes less meaningful if time is said to
be spatial...

--Abram

On Tue, Jan 6, 2009 at 1:57 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> Abram,
>
> With General Relativity, time is so geometrical that you can make it
> circular.
> (Cf the Gödel's solutions to Einstein's GR Equation, which gives hope
> to some to build a time machine, and even infinite computers!).
>
> Give me just a sufficiently massive cylinder ...
>
> Bruno
>
>
> On 06 Jan 2009, at 12:51, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> Abram,
>>
>> I agree with Brent. In relativity theory space and time are
>> intermingled in a geometrical way to give the Minkowski structure.
>> Actually you can make it into an Euclidian space by introducing an
>> imaginary time t' = sqr(-1)*t = it. The metrics becomes dx^2 + dy^2 +
>> dz^2 + dt'^2.
>> In quantum mechanics the possible position of an object on a line
>> gives
>> rise to an hermitian space: it is infinite dimensional, but there is
>> still a geometrical structure, with notions akin to angles and
>> distances. Of course mathematician have far more general notion of
>> dimensional spaces, some of which have nothing to do with geometry. In
>> physics metrics play always some role somewhere though.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>> Le 06-janv.-09, à 02:59, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>> Abram Demski wrote:
 Thomas,

 If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we
 experience
 "moving" in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
 the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
 dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing so
 treat
 time more like we treat space? Et cetera.

 To my knowledge, modern physics treats many things as "dimensions":
 not just time and space, but also forces such as electromagnetism.
 This does not imply that such things are spatial in nature. A
 dimension is just a variable. Unless you think there is something
 particularly spatial about time?
>>>
>>> There is something spatial about time, duration is measured along
>>> paths in
>>> space.  Coordinate time is mixed with space by Lorentz symmetries.
>>> But it's
>>> still different from space.  Lee Smolin and Fotini Markopolo have
>>> argued that
>>> time must be considered fundamental (no block universe).
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>

>>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>> >
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>



-- 
Abram Demski
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Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski
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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Abram Demski]

Stathis,

I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical
structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the
stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else...
which is true by supposition in the block world).

Perhaps that still counts as a magical requirement for you, though.

--Abram

On Tue, Jan 6, 2009 at 8:07 AM, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
> 2009/1/6 Abram Demski :
>>
>> Thomas,
>>
>> If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
>> "moving" in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
>> the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
>> dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing so treat
>> time more like we treat space? Et cetera.
>
> You could model a block universe as a big stack of Life boards, where
> the time dimension is represented by the spatial displacement between
> the boards. There's no way the observers in such an arrangement can
> step out of one board onto another, backwards or out of sequence. Some
> would say that the stack of boards does not count as a computation,
> and others that even if it counts as a computation it doesn't count as
> a conscious computation; that to reach such states you need causality
> and for causality you need fundamentally real time, not block
> pseudo-time. I don't see any justification for such claims beyond a
> desire to preserve the magic in the world.
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> >
>



-- 
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com
Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski
Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

Abram,

With General Relativity, time is so geometrical that you can make it  
circular.
(Cf the Gödel's solutions to Einstein's GR Equation, which gives hope  
to some to build a time machine, and even infinite computers!).

Give me just a sufficiently massive cylinder ...

Bruno


On 06 Jan 2009, at 12:51, Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
> Abram,
>
> I agree with Brent. In relativity theory space and time are
> intermingled in a geometrical way to give the Minkowski structure.
> Actually you can make it into an Euclidian space by introducing an
> imaginary time t' = sqr(-1)*t = it. The metrics becomes dx^2 + dy^2 +
> dz^2 + dt'^2.
> In quantum mechanics the possible position of an object on a line  
> gives
> rise to an hermitian space: it is infinite dimensional, but there is
> still a geometrical structure, with notions akin to angles and
> distances. Of course mathematician have far more general notion of
> dimensional spaces, some of which have nothing to do with geometry. In
> physics metrics play always some role somewhere though.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> Le 06-janv.-09, à 02:59, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
>>
>> Abram Demski wrote:
>>> Thomas,
>>>
>>> If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we  
>>> experience
>>> "moving" in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
>>> the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
>>> dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing so  
>>> treat
>>> time more like we treat space? Et cetera.
>>>
>>> To my knowledge, modern physics treats many things as "dimensions":
>>> not just time and space, but also forces such as electromagnetism.
>>> This does not imply that such things are spatial in nature. A
>>> dimension is just a variable. Unless you think there is something
>>> particularly spatial about time?
>>
>> There is something spatial about time, duration is measured along
>> paths in
>> space.  Coordinate time is mixed with space by Lorentz symmetries.
>> But it's
>> still different from space.  Lee Smolin and Fotini Markopolo have
>> argued that
>> time must be considered fundamental (no block universe).
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>>
>>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Jan 2009, at 14:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>
> 2009/1/6 Abram Demski :
>>
>> Thomas,
>>
>> If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
>> "moving" in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
>> the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
>> dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing so treat
>> time more like we treat space? Et cetera.
>
> You could model a block universe as a big stack of Life boards, where
> the time dimension is represented by the spatial displacement between
> the boards. There's no way the observers in such an arrangement can
> step out of one board onto another, backwards or out of sequence. Some
> would say that the stack of boards does not count as a computation,


To *count* as a computation, you have to make precise the "base" in  
which you count, that is the choice of a universal machine, language  
or system. The initial choice does not really matter, for the  
theoretical purpose.



>
> and others that even if it counts as a computation it doesn't count as
> a conscious computation; that to reach such states you need causality
> and for causality you need fundamentally real time, not block
> pseudo-time. I don't see any justification for such claims beyond a
> desire to preserve the magic in the world.


I'm afraid you are either pushing the thing to much, or that you could  
give that impression. But thanks for giving me an opportunity to  
clarify. We do need a "universal notion" of  causality, if only to be  
able to define the "displacement" between the boards, and discuss  
"science about them" between us. I agree with you, to invoke  
"physical" causality is *magic*, or *dogmatic* (and useless, by UDA).

But, well, at least assuming comp, we still need a notion of  
"computationalist causality", if only to get the comp supervenience  
"theorem", and then it is just a bit of work to get that such notion,  
with the Church Turing Thesis,  needs "only" 0, succession, addition  
and multiplication.

We could instead use any first order description of any universal  
programming language, or systems (Combinators, Lambda, Cellular  
automata, Gaussian Integers, ...).
  I use mainly 0, succession, addition and multiplication, because it  
is taught in school, but combinators can be very useful too for  
addressing the fundamental questions (like c++ or Java are useful for  
implementing concrete software and uploading them on the net).

Don't forget the universal machine. it is really a bomb. A creative  
bomb, for a change. It obeys the approximable but non unifiable laws  
emerging from the mess brought by addition and multiplication in the  
(positive) integers.

Why is the observable reality so smooth and symmetrical?  Now we can  
ask the universal machine(s).

Surprise! The machine not only can explain the trajectories of the  
snow balls (making comp testable eventually), but the machine can  
explain why it feels cold. The machine can justify also the non- 
eliminability of the person, somehow.

To be sure, I don't interview a machine who believes *only* in 0,  
succession, addition and multiplication. The machine believes also in  
the induction axioms (I will say more on this later). This makes the  
Löbian nuance.

That's enough for making the machine "knowing" its universality and  
capable of discussing about what could be provable or "true" or  
"probable" for itself and its consistent extensions.

If you weaken too much the notion of causality, you take the risk of  
being lead to a trivial theory which would explains nothing and see  
computations everywhere. I am not saying that you do that, but I know  
that some people, near this "stage",  can be tempted to conclude too  
quickly . Some even affronts (for a lapse of time) the ultimate white  
rabbit 0 = 1.

Arithmetics kicks back. Since Gödel we know (assuming comp and betting  
on self-consistency) that Arithmetic necessarily kicks back.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/1/6 Abram Demski :
>
> Thomas,
>
> If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
> "moving" in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
> the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
> dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing so treat
> time more like we treat space? Et cetera.

You could model a block universe as a big stack of Life boards, where
the time dimension is represented by the spatial displacement between
the boards. There's no way the observers in such an arrangement can
step out of one board onto another, backwards or out of sequence. Some
would say that the stack of boards does not count as a computation,
and others that even if it counts as a computation it doesn't count as
a conscious computation; that to reach such states you need causality
and for causality you need fundamentally real time, not block
pseudo-time. I don't see any justification for such claims beyond a
desire to preserve the magic in the world.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

Abram,

I agree with Brent. In relativity theory space and time are 
intermingled in a geometrical way to give the Minkowski structure. 
Actually you can make it into an Euclidian space by introducing an 
imaginary time t' = sqr(-1)*t = it. The metrics becomes dx^2 + dy^2 + 
dz^2 + dt'^2.
In quantum mechanics the possible position of an object on a line gives 
rise to an hermitian space: it is infinite dimensional, but there is 
still a geometrical structure, with notions akin to angles and 
distances. Of course mathematician have far more general notion of 
dimensional spaces, some of which have nothing to do with geometry. In 
physics metrics play always some role somewhere though.

Bruno


Le 06-janv.-09, à 02:59, Brent Meeker a écrit :

>
> Abram Demski wrote:
>> Thomas,
>>
>> If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
>> "moving" in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
>> the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
>> dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing so treat
>> time more like we treat space? Et cetera.
>>
>> To my knowledge, modern physics treats many things as "dimensions":
>> not just time and space, but also forces such as electromagnetism.
>> This does not imply that such things are spatial in nature. A
>> dimension is just a variable. Unless you think there is something
>> particularly spatial about time?
>
> There is something spatial about time, duration is measured along 
> paths in
> space.  Coordinate time is mixed with space by Lorentz symmetries.  
> But it's
> still different from space.  Lee Smolin and Fotini Markopolo have 
> argued that
> time must be considered fundamental (no block universe).
>
> Brent
>
>
> >
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Brent Meeker]

Abram Demski wrote:
> Thomas,
> 
> If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
> "moving" in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
> the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
> dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing so treat
> time more like we treat space? Et cetera.
> 
> To my knowledge, modern physics treats many things as "dimensions":
> not just time and space, but also forces such as electromagnetism.
> This does not imply that such things are spatial in nature. A
> dimension is just a variable. Unless you think there is something
> particularly spatial about time?

There is something spatial about time, duration is measured along paths in 
space.  Coordinate time is mixed with space by Lorentz symmetries.  But it's 
still different from space.  Lee Smolin and Fotini Markopolo have argued that 
time must be considered fundamental (no block universe).

Brent


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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 05 Jan 2009, at 01:10, Thomas Laursen wrote:

>
> I admit that consciousness is a bit special but what about time as
> (nothing but) a space dimension? Do you agree on this?

The physicist in me don't know. But he likes the universal equation of  
the multiverse E = 0, in which physical time disappear globally.
The computationalist does not even know if there is space  I got  
just the shadow of the shadows of braids and perhaps knots. I dream  
about a rich quantum universal topology.



> (put aside
> whether time/space is only in the mind, as you think, or really exist)

Some things which are only in the mind could really exist, once you  
accept that mind exists.

All I say is that if MEC is true (in the coginitive science, or in  
theology ...) then those things (space, time, energy) emerge from what  
numbers can tell about numbers. I will be able to say more if I get to  
the AUDA (the Arithmetical version of the UDA) where things are more  
precise.

I am not suggesting a new physics, I just make a point in "theology":  
if we are machine, the theory of matter will be a modality on  
arithmetic. A numbers' view of numbers, and numbers' sequences, well  
everything representable in Robinson arithmetic, or by a universal (in  
the sense of Church Turing) immaterial (number-theoretical) machine.

Bruno



>
>
>
> On Jan 3, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> I disagree, and your remark singles out the problem with the bird's
>> eye/frog view of Tegmark. Those two views remains "third person point
>> of views". Consciousness is intrinsically a first person view. You
>> cannot describe it in any third person point of view. This explains
>> why the Aristotelians want so much eliminate consciousness.
>> But you are right for memories and the the possible discourse *about*
>> consciousness, this can be compared to marks on some block-structure.
>> Consciousness itself will be more a "distributed" logical feature in
>> the whole of the block reality. Consciousness, even consciousness of
>> time and space, is not something you can effectively relate to time
>> and space. Assuming comp you can relate it to fixed point of self-
>> observation and other "logical" (but non geometrical) things. Then
>> discourses made by conscious entities have themselves invariant
>> pattern, like "we cannot define it", "we cannot explain it " that you
>> can (with luck) recognize in the (more geometrical) marks.
>>
>> Bruno Marchal
>>
>> On 03 Jan 2009, at 06:46, Thomas Laursen wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> If I understand the "standard" MWI right (with my layman brain)  
>>> Abram
>>> Demski's view of time is very much in accordance with it, except  
>>> that
>>> time should be looked at simply as a fourth space dimension. A  
>>> bird's
>>> eye view on the whole universe (= all it's "actualized" worlds)  
>>> would
>>> be like a static picture where, lets say, the beginning (big bang)  
>>> is
>>> at the left side (or right if you're Chinese), the present in the
>>> middle, and the future at the right. Of course this (2-dimensional)
>>> picture is extremely simplified but the idea behind is true (if I
>>> understand Everett and others, mainly Deutsch and Tegmark in their
>>> popular papers, right). Memory is then nothing but "marks" in the
>>> brain, and consciousness just like other moving things in nature  
>>> with
>>> a (relatively) stable structure (a body, river, plant, etc), only  
>>> more
>>> complex.
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Abram Demski]

Thomas,

If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
"moving" in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing so treat
time more like we treat space? Et cetera.

To my knowledge, modern physics treats many things as "dimensions":
not just time and space, but also forces such as electromagnetism.
This does not imply that such things are spatial in nature. A
dimension is just a variable. Unless you think there is something
particularly spatial about time?

--Abram

On Sun, Jan 4, 2009 at 7:10 PM, Thomas Laursen  wrote:
>
> I admit that consciousness is a bit special but what about time as
> (nothing but) a space dimension? Do you agree on this? (put aside
> whether time/space is only in the mind, as you think, or really exist)
>
>
> On Jan 3, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> I disagree, and your remark singles out the problem with the bird's
>> eye/frog view of Tegmark. Those two views remains "third person point
>> of views". Consciousness is intrinsically a first person view. You
>> cannot describe it in any third person point of view. This explains
>> why the Aristotelians want so much eliminate consciousness.
>> But you are right for memories and the the possible discourse *about*
>> consciousness, this can be compared to marks on some block-structure.
>> Consciousness itself will be more a "distributed" logical feature in
>> the whole of the block reality. Consciousness, even consciousness of
>> time and space, is not something you can effectively relate to time
>> and space. Assuming comp you can relate it to fixed point of self-
>> observation and other "logical" (but non geometrical) things. Then
>> discourses made by conscious entities have themselves invariant
>> pattern, like "we cannot define it", "we cannot explain it " that you
>> can (with luck) recognize in the (more geometrical) marks.
>>
>> Bruno Marchal
>>
>> On 03 Jan 2009, at 06:46, Thomas Laursen wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> > If I understand the "standard" MWI right (with my layman brain) Abram
>> > Demski's view of time is very much in accordance with it, except that
>> > time should be looked at simply as a fourth space dimension. A bird's
>> > eye view on the whole universe (= all it's "actualized" worlds) would
>> > be like a static picture where, lets say, the beginning (big bang) is
>> > at the left side (or right if you're Chinese), the present in the
>> > middle, and the future at the right. Of course this (2-dimensional)
>> > picture is extremely simplified but the idea behind is true (if I
>> > understand Everett and others, mainly Deutsch and Tegmark in their
>> > popular papers, right). Memory is then nothing but "marks" in the
>> > brain, and consciousness just like other moving things in nature with
>> > a (relatively) stable structure (a body, river, plant, etc), only more
>> > complex.
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >
>



-- 
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com
Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski
Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Thomas Laursen]

PS. Of course space and time exist, even if only in consciousness, but
I guess you know what I mean :)

On Jan 5, 1:10 am, Thomas Laursen  wrote:
> I admit that consciousness is a bit special but what about time as
> (nothing but) a space dimension? Do you agree on this? (put aside
> whether time/space is only in the mind, as you think, or really exist)
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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Thomas Laursen]

I admit that consciousness is a bit special but what about time as
(nothing but) a space dimension? Do you agree on this? (put aside
whether time/space is only in the mind, as you think, or really exist)


On Jan 3, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> I disagree, and your remark singles out the problem with the bird's  
> eye/frog view of Tegmark. Those two views remains "third person point  
> of views". Consciousness is intrinsically a first person view. You  
> cannot describe it in any third person point of view. This explains  
> why the Aristotelians want so much eliminate consciousness.
> But you are right for memories and the the possible discourse *about*  
> consciousness, this can be compared to marks on some block-structure.  
> Consciousness itself will be more a "distributed" logical feature in  
> the whole of the block reality. Consciousness, even consciousness of  
> time and space, is not something you can effectively relate to time  
> and space. Assuming comp you can relate it to fixed point of self-
> observation and other "logical" (but non geometrical) things. Then  
> discourses made by conscious entities have themselves invariant  
> pattern, like "we cannot define it", "we cannot explain it " that you  
> can (with luck) recognize in the (more geometrical) marks.
>
> Bruno Marchal
>
> On 03 Jan 2009, at 06:46, Thomas Laursen wrote:
>
>
>
> > If I understand the "standard" MWI right (with my layman brain) Abram
> > Demski's view of time is very much in accordance with it, except that
> > time should be looked at simply as a fourth space dimension. A bird's
> > eye view on the whole universe (= all it's "actualized" worlds) would
> > be like a static picture where, lets say, the beginning (big bang) is
> > at the left side (or right if you're Chinese), the present in the
> > middle, and the future at the right. Of course this (2-dimensional)
> > picture is extremely simplified but the idea behind is true (if I
> > understand Everett and others, mainly Deutsch and Tegmark in their
> > popular papers, right). Memory is then nothing but "marks" in the
> > brain, and consciousness just like other moving things in nature with
> > a (relatively) stable structure (a body, river, plant, etc), only more
> > complex.
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

I disagree, and your remark singles out the problem with the bird's  
eye/frog view of Tegmark. Those two views remains "third person point  
of views". Consciousness is intrinsically a first person view. You  
cannot describe it in any third person point of view. This explains  
why the Aristotelians want so much eliminate consciousness.
But you are right for memories and the the possible discourse *about*  
consciousness, this can be compared to marks on some block-structure.  
Consciousness itself will be more a "distributed" logical feature in  
the whole of the block reality. Consciousness, even consciousness of  
time and space, is not something you can effectively relate to time  
and space. Assuming comp you can relate it to fixed point of self- 
observation and other "logical" (but non geometrical) things. Then  
discourses made by conscious entities have themselves invariant  
pattern, like "we cannot define it", "we cannot explain it " that you  
can (with luck) recognize in the (more geometrical) marks.

Bruno Marchal


On 03 Jan 2009, at 06:46, Thomas Laursen wrote:

>
> If I understand the "standard" MWI right (with my layman brain) Abram
> Demski's view of time is very much in accordance with it, except that
> time should be looked at simply as a fourth space dimension. A bird's
> eye view on the whole universe (= all it's "actualized" worlds) would
> be like a static picture where, lets say, the beginning (big bang) is
> at the left side (or right if you're Chinese), the present in the
> middle, and the future at the right. Of course this (2-dimensional)
> picture is extremely simplified but the idea behind is true (if I
> understand Everett and others, mainly Deutsch and Tegmark in their
> popular papers, right). Memory is then nothing but "marks" in the
> brain, and consciousness just like other moving things in nature with
> a (relatively) stable structure (a body, river, plant, etc), only more
> complex.
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Thomas Laursen]

If I understand the "standard" MWI right (with my layman brain) Abram
Demski's view of time is very much in accordance with it, except that
time should be looked at simply as a fourth space dimension. A bird's
eye view on the whole universe (= all it's "actualized" worlds) would
be like a static picture where, lets say, the beginning (big bang) is
at the left side (or right if you're Chinese), the present in the
middle, and the future at the right. Of course this (2-dimensional)
picture is extremely simplified but the idea behind is true (if I
understand Everett and others, mainly Deutsch and Tegmark in their
popular papers, right). Memory is then nothing but "marks" in the
brain, and consciousness just like other moving things in nature with
a (relatively) stable structure (a body, river, plant, etc), only more
complex.
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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Kim,


On 25 Dec 2008, at 06:21, Kim Jones wrote:

>
> A bit of an end-of-year ramble. For the multi-lingual, illogically-
> minded, lateral thinkers:


My last post was a bit self-destructive ramble as I am able to do once  
a time. But that's ok. (I hope I am not shocking).
It is rather kind of you to pursue the destructive task. I guess it is  
a tradition in december. I continue the ramble.


>
> Love bread - having lived and worked in France for 3 years


France is good for bread, wine and cheese. that's true!




> - love rice; my partner is Japanese and she has all of that wonderful
> imagination for rice cooking the Japanese have - drink water
> constantly in coffee, tea, beer, wine, gin, whisky, vodka, sake,
> shōchū - you name it

A very long time ago a doctor told me "your liver are bad; you must  
quit alcohol". I said "NO, doctor". And I quit doctors.

I stopped alcohol, eventually. It does not make me feel good. I have  
used cannabis as a very efficacious harm reduction technic in that  
setting.
Occasionally I can still take some wine (don't panic when you will  
borrow my body!).



>
>
> I also drink plenty of H2O neat as well - I am not of the mindset of
> W.C. Fields who famously said "I never drink water. Fish fuck in it" -
> although the taste of chlorine in the Sydney water supply adds little
> to the experience I must say...
>
> I wonder whether Boltzmann Brains need anything to keep them going?
> Have never read anything about the "energy needs" of Boltzmann  
> Brains...


By definition, I would say that they use unreasonable statistical  
events that you can interpret as providing unreasonable energy. A bit  
like water boiling in the fridge. A rare event! A classical white  
rabbits.



>
>
>
>
>
>> - in the morning: drink as much coffee or tea up until you remember
>> your 1 times table multiplication. It is enough.
>
>
>
>
> Yes, I am a caffeine lover too and do precisely this. Doesn't appear
> to help with mathematical understanding though. Merely allows me to
> feel real enough to confront "the world". Nobody should even dare to
> say "hello" to me before I have raised the caffeine levels to where
> they must be.


OK. We are the same person with respect to coffee.




>
>
> Hmm - might need something more artificial here, like a  
> surgically-
> embedded nano-chip with Newton's "Principia" imprinted in it or at the
> very least "Mathematics for Dummies". Your response to this thought in
> the "Kim 2.1" thread was:
>
> "The pleasure is in the (long) path (I'm afraid). Note that a math
> book, a course or a conversation is already a good approximation of
> this."
>
>
>
> Bien sûr - It was, after all, moi who was saying recently that we all
> need to learn Chinese or Medieval Mongolian in our dotage to keep our
> brains healthy! I agree - it's the journey (of learning) that is more
> important than the arrival. Where do we arrive at, anyway? I imagine
> you would probably expect to continue to learn new things about
> numbers until you expire, so there is *no* arrival, no endpoint to
> learning.  Nevertheless, the monsters of time and entropy are starting
> to bear down on me and my brain cells at age 51 (the digi-brain you
> supplied unfortunately needs to be replaced every three years or at
> the very least requires an exorbitantly costly hardware upgrade. In
> this respect, wet, messy biological brains are still the better option
> for the foreseeable future if you can only be satisfied with their
> puny processing power).


The pleasure is in the walk, but perhaps even more in the pause, when  
looking at the panorama.
Like the pleasure in research is given by the pause coffee :)


>
>
> Although a devotee of "life-long learning" I need to optimise my
> efforts toward practical ends as death approaches and processing power
> wanes. Is not the long path the path for the young learner? Even COMP/
> MEC plus quantum immortality doesn't help here; there appears to be no
> carry-over of knowledge between instantiations.



Well a priori there is. Which a priori is rather unpleasant,  
especially in "bad" form of death, like violent accident, or  
Alzheimer. Fortunately, looking at the (more technical alas) details,  
things are ... far more complex.
When you arrive at the panorama, you have the time to wonder how big  
the mountain is. Science points on a mountain which appears bigger and  
bigger as we climb on it. Assuming comp this is necessary. (As you  
will perhaps see one day).





> If I die of natural
> causes, I have to start the learning all over again in my neophite
> self. If I go to Gaza and get a bullet in my head during a firefight I
> will default to a parallel self or instantiation elsewhere in the MV,
> but, once again - there is no carry-over.
>
> Also, by the time I have mastered récherché math by age 81, the
> technology of instantaneous learning will almost certainly have
> arrived by then which means I could have devoted the intervening time
> t

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Kim and all,

On 23 Dec 2008, at 11:50, Kim Jones wrote:

>
> Bruno,
>
>
> things are starting to hang together in my new digital brain (bright
> yellow)


Good.


>
>
>
> you wrote the plan:
>
>
> ---
>
> A) UDA  (Universal Dovetailer Argument)
>
> 1) I explain that if you are a machine, you are already immaterial.
>
> ---
>
> Fine. This thought is merely surprising and somewhat (strangely)
> satisfying. It doesn't affect the way I live my life, but it sure as
> hell gets me some funny looks from people when I try to explain it to
> them! Most people think I am identifying the "self" with the "soul" or
> the "spirit" or some other metaphysical conjecture that they have
> heard of from religion or from their grandmother. They simply do not
> buy it when I tell them that all of reality is like this - that the
> assumption of a primitive, primary material reality is probably a
> gross "error of perception" albeit quite an understandable one.
>
> People are so hoodwinked by appearances, by their senses. Somehow I
> still think we are *meant* to be fooled by appearances - although this
> thought may well be self-contradictory.


You are pointing on a difficult point which we will have to address  
soon or later.




> It's a good thing I find most
> things quite unconvincing - including appearances and reality
> generally!


Good to be skeptical. But mind the relativist trap.




> I am always asking myself "What is really going on here?
> Why are things THIS way, in particular? Why not some other way? I have
> always been like this. Some people find me quite annoying in this
> regard...


Don't mind this, though. Except during the feast perhaps ...



>
>
>
> -
>
> 2) Mechanism entails the existence of a subjective or first person
> indeterminacy or uncertainty.
>
> -
>
> In the sense that I cannot know who or what I am, BEING who or what I
> am. Correct?



Perhaps you are a little too quick here.





> I would necessarily have to step outside my existence to
> do so - manifestly impossible, given the laws of physics (or simply
> given MEC/COMP). I would have to reboot from a different system; be a
> different entity in fact.


This will be possible, in some sense. You are definitely too quick here.



>
>
> Paradox Alert: Without a first person perspective there could be no
> third person perspectives anyway, isn't that correct?



Just by assuming MEC there will be third person realities conceivable  
without first person.






> Why then doesn't
> some part of the first person uncertainty (ie "my" uncertainty about
> "me") translate into 3rd person perspectives?


Ah Ah! Good question.
You know, the first person knows always very well who she is, despite  
she cannot tell. In the frame of the UDA, the first person  
indeterminacy does not concern who you are (you know that even if you  
cannot translate that in any third person description), but it  
concerns the more practical (even "physical") question of predicting  
who you will be in the next instant, like before and after a sequance  
of self-polyplication.





> Anything I might say or
> merely perceive about something or someone else is surely contaminated
> by my uncertainties...so, in the quest to "know myself" how can I
> trust the veracity of any knowledge that comes to me from outside? All
> knowledge comes via brains (wet, messy ones) and all of these brains
> are suffering the same uncertainties about their identity as I.


That is why we assume comp, and then use logic and computer science.  
We need a theory to provide light.



> Note,
> I am not a solipsist.


Very good. Let us decide to abandon the comp hypothesis if it leads us  
toward solipsism. That may still be possible.




>
>
> Also, you cannot experience the experience that I experience and vice
> versa. Which is why I think art and music in particular are important
> revelations of the first person perspective.


Yes.




> Music is an ATTEMPT to
> overcome first person indeterminacy by "universalising" certain
> qualia. Tchaikowsky expects you to BECOME Tchaikowsky when you listen
> to the first movement of his 6th Symphony. You suffer and agonise and
> die with him. It's a VR experience. Madonna just doesn't do this for  
> me.


Not a chance for Madonna, but apparently she succeeds with some  
others, and that is fine.
I am ok with you here.



>
>
> However,
>
> new research has shown that reading the mind is literally possible. We
> can now assemble an image seen via an optical system transmitted only
> via the electrical impulses read in a brain system (NewScientist last
> ed.)
>
> Perhaps it is not too far from here to the thought that you and I
> might "swap instantiations" for a short time? Maybe it would be fun to
> think, walk, talk and act like Bruno Marchal, if only for 5 minutes.
> In fact, I would pay a princely sum to have that experience. In an age
> when some people will spend gazi

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Kim Jones]

Bruno,


things are starting to hang together in my new digital brain (bright  
yellow)


you wrote the plan:


---

A) UDA  (Universal Dovetailer Argument)

1) I explain that if you are a machine, you are already immaterial.

---

Fine. This thought is merely surprising and somewhat (strangely)  
satisfying. It doesn't affect the way I live my life, but it sure as  
hell gets me some funny looks from people when I try to explain it to  
them! Most people think I am identifying the "self" with the "soul" or  
the "spirit" or some other metaphysical conjecture that they have  
heard of from religion or from their grandmother. They simply do not  
buy it when I tell them that all of reality is like this - that the  
assumption of a primitive, primary material reality is probably a  
gross "error of perception" albeit quite an understandable one.

People are so hoodwinked by appearances, by their senses. Somehow I  
still think we are *meant* to be fooled by appearances - although this  
thought may well be self-contradictory. It's a good thing I find most  
things quite unconvincing - including appearances and reality  
generally! I am always asking myself "What is really going on here?  
Why are things THIS way, in particular? Why not some other way? I have  
always been like this. Some people find me quite annoying in this  
regard...


-

2) Mechanism entails the existence of a subjective or first person
indeterminacy or uncertainty.

-

In the sense that I cannot know who or what I am, BEING who or what I  
am. Correct? I would necessarily have to step outside my existence to  
do so - manifestly impossible, given the laws of physics (or simply  
given MEC/COMP). I would have to reboot from a different system; be a  
different entity in fact.

Paradox Alert: Without a first person perspective there could be no  
third person perspectives anyway, isn't that correct? Why then doesn't  
some part of the first person uncertainty (ie "my" uncertainty about  
"me") translate into 3rd person perspectives? Anything I might say or  
merely perceive about something or someone else is surely contaminated  
by my uncertainties...so, in the quest to "know myself" how can I  
trust the veracity of any knowledge that comes to me from outside? All  
knowledge comes via brains (wet, messy ones) and all of these brains  
are suffering the same uncertainties about their identity as I. Note,  
I am not a solipsist.

Also, you cannot experience the experience that I experience and vice  
versa. Which is why I think art and music in particular are important  
revelations of the first person perspective. Music is an ATTEMPT to  
overcome first person indeterminacy by "universalising" certain  
qualia. Tchaikowsky expects you to BECOME Tchaikowsky when you listen  
to the first movement of his 6th Symphony. You suffer and agonise and  
die with him. It's a VR experience. Madonna just doesn't do this for me.

However,

new research has shown that reading the mind is literally possible. We  
can now assemble an image seen via an optical system transmitted only  
via the electrical impulses read in a brain system (NewScientist last  
ed.)

Perhaps it is not too far from here to the thought that you and I  
might "swap instantiations" for a short time? Maybe it would be fun to  
think, walk, talk and act like Bruno Marchal, if only for 5 minutes.  
In fact, I would pay a princely sum to have that experience. In an age  
when some people will spend gazillions on a "space tourist" (virtual)  
reality experience, I would go for the "Be Bruno for Five Minutes"  
option long before I would want to see the globe from orbit

-

3) The Universal Machine, the Universal Dovetailer and the reversal
physics/bio-psycho-theo-whatever-logy.


--


OK - so Abram has been impatient on this point but I guess I am ready  
too:


On 23/12/2008, at 8:11 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

>
> Abram,
>
>
> On 23 Dec 2008, at 00:23, Abram Demski wrote:
>
>> I think you are right in calling this view eliminative materialism. I
>> am saying that the "I" is a convenient fiction.
>
>
> All right. It is a normal tendency for scientist. It is like wanting
> to see Platonia from outside.


I always think of the Sydney Opera House as Platonia. You cannot  
predict how it looks on the outside if you are teleported into the  
foyer!

Also, the Tardis of Doctor Who has a similar asymmetry between outside  
and inside view.

Are you saying Platonia has no outside? The true inside of all  
outsides - just like the 1st person perspective, in fact.




> It is like deciding to believe only in
> the third person description view, abstracting away our experiences
> and subjectivity. Then the "I", free-will, decisions, and eventually
> "consciousness" are explained  ... away.


Yes - and then, to make matters worse, we turn the whole morass of  
uncertainty o

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

Abram,


On 23 Dec 2008, at 00:23, Abram Demski wrote:

> I think you are right in calling this view eliminative materialism. I
> am saying that the "I" is a convenient fiction.


All right. It is a normal tendency for scientist. It is like wanting  
to see Platonia from outside. It is like deciding to believe only in  
the third person description view, abstracting away our experiences  
and subjectivity. Then the "I", free-will, decisions, and eventually  
"consciousness" are explained  ... away.


>
>
>> Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when
>> you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink
>> coffee.
>
> Maybe "We love coffee, so we will drink coffee" (with "we" referring
> to many moment-selves).

Does your "we" includes my "we" ?



> Or, perhaps, "Abram loves coffee, so Abram
> will drink coffee" (no identification of a self, only of an identity).

Almost like a regression. To hide the first person data, you have to  
change the language. You are very coherent (as "time-skeptic"). OK.


>
>
>> It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this
>> sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you
>> did'nt, you are the copy.
>
> Since all possible moments exist, that old self did not die.

Again, you talk like if you are seeing the whole platonia. But I think  
that none of you are an observer-moment. You are inextricably linked  
to time. You are an observer moment embedded in a set of observer  
moments with a proximity relation among them.



> My
> after-reading consciousness can observe that it is not the
> before-reading consciousness, and  the before-reading consciousness
> could observe that it is not the after-reading consciousness, but that
> is all. There is no switching from one to the other, since that would
> require time (which does not exist). :)

Nice. You give me the opportunity to (re)define time: it is the  
switching from one to the other. The switching can be defined  
eventually by the relation among numbers which captures the universal  
computational dependency. Time is a creation of the first person. Look  
at the occidental Brouwer or the oriental Dogen for analysis of  
consciousness in term of time creation.


>
>
> Of course, that is where I-as-time-skeptic have trouble knowing what
> it means to choose.

Not a good thing before Christmas !



> I can understand being-in-a-state-of-choosing, but
> I refuse to accept the cause/effect reasoning that gos along with that
> state. (In other words, I can understand choosing from the 3rd person
> perspective, but cannot understand it from the 1st person
> perspective.)


No machine can. No bodies can know from inside who the chooser really  
is. That is perhaps why the meditation on the question "who am I" (cf  
Ramana Maharshi) can lead to the "enlightenment". That is probably why  
in the eastern "art of the war", people learns to not-decide, yet act.

Bruno




>
>
> --Abram
>
> On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal   
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> I wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> Abram wrote

 --When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not
 minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing  
 the
 number of my copies that will be so carried.
>>>
>>> ?
>>
>>
>> OK. I was distracted. To do this by altruism?  And  *you* (in your
>> sense) you die.
>> Is this what you mean?
>>
>> And you say "yes" to the doctor because you die at each instant.
>>
>> And you still care about the quality and seriousness of the doctor
>> because you care by altruism for the copy.
>>
>> With MEC we have indeed this at each instant ( through QM or not).
>>
>> But then, you will have to think about anything you do in the future
>> as an act of altruism. You take a cigarette because you care about  
>> the
>> satisfaction feeling of the "copy" who will smoke it, and you abandon
>> the cigarette because you care of the lungs of the copies of the  
>> future.
>>
>> Egoism as pure self-altruisme, why not? But then, assuming MEC, any
>> statement of any laws (physical, arithmetical, juridic, etc.)  
>> concerns
>> our copies, and this means that taking this point of view or not is
>> not relevant in the reasoning, we have still to derive the laws, be  
>> it
>> by altruism or egoism according to the interpretation of identity.
>>
>> Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when
>> you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink
>> coffee.
>>
>> I think that if you put yourself in the place of the polycopies, none
>> will feel like that except a few exception. I mean the quasi- 
>> tautology
>> that none *feels* dying at each instant.  You have to meditate eight
>> hours per day during eight years or to eat or smoke something
>> (legal!), or to die, or perhaps to dream for PERHAPS get a feeling of
>> what dying could be, according to some.
>>
>> But your view is coherent and rather cool to

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Abram Demski]

Bruno,

I think you are right in calling this view eliminative materialism. I
am saying that the "I" is a convenient fiction.

> Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when
> you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink
> coffee.

Maybe "We love coffee, so we will drink coffee" (with "we" referring
to many moment-selves). Or, perhaps, "Abram loves coffee, so Abram
will drink coffee" (no identification of a self, only of an identity).

> It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this
> sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you
> did'nt, you are the copy.

Since all possible moments exist, that old self did not die. My
after-reading consciousness can observe that it is not the
before-reading consciousness, and  the before-reading consciousness
could observe that it is not the after-reading consciousness, but that
is all. There is no switching from one to the other, since that would
require time (which does not exist). :)

Of course, that is where I-as-time-skeptic have trouble knowing what
it means to choose. I can understand being-in-a-state-of-choosing, but
I refuse to accept the cause/effect reasoning that gos along with that
state. (In other words, I can understand choosing from the 3rd person
perspective, but cannot understand it from the 1st person
perspective.)

--Abram

On Mon, Dec 22, 2008 at 3:16 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>
> I wrote:
>
>
>
>> Abram wrote
>>>
>>> --When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not
>>> minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing the
>>> number of my copies that will be so carried.
>>
>> ?
>
>
> OK. I was distracted. To do this by altruism?  And  *you* (in your
> sense) you die.
> Is this what you mean?
>
> And you say "yes" to the doctor because you die at each instant.
>
> And you still care about the quality and seriousness of the doctor
> because you care by altruism for the copy.
>
> With MEC we have indeed this at each instant ( through QM or not).
>
> But then, you will have to think about anything you do in the future
> as an act of altruism. You take a cigarette because you care about the
> satisfaction feeling of the "copy" who will smoke it, and you abandon
> the cigarette because you care of the lungs of the copies of the future.
>
> Egoism as pure self-altruisme, why not? But then, assuming MEC, any
> statement of any laws (physical, arithmetical, juridic, etc.) concerns
> our copies, and this means that taking this point of view or not is
> not relevant in the reasoning, we have still to derive the laws, be it
> by altruism or egoism according to the interpretation of identity.
>
> Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when
> you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink
> coffee.
>
> I think that if you put yourself in the place of the polycopies, none
> will feel like that except a few exception. I mean the quasi-tautology
> that none *feels* dying at each instant.  You have to meditate eight
> hours per day during eight years or to eat or smoke something
> (legal!), or to die, or perhaps to dream for PERHAPS get a feeling of
> what dying could be, according to some.
>
> But your view is coherent and rather cool too, so let us continue the
> UDA reasoning, by altruism for *all* our descendants and why not the
> many others descendant to:)
>
> It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this
> sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you
> did'nt, you are the copy.
>
> Computability can be thought as a topological notion. MEC is the
> assumption that I, and my continuous life, is preserved in
> teleportation, and polyplication (duplication and other self-
> multiplication).
>
> (I know you are playing the role of the "time person skeptic").
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>



-- 
Abram Demski
Public address: abram-dem...@googlegroups.com
Public archive: http://groups.google.com/group/abram-demski
Private address: abramdem...@gmail.com

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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

I wrote:



> Abram wrote
>>
>> --When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not
>> minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing the
>> number of my copies that will be so carried.
>
> ?


OK. I was distracted. To do this by altruism?  And  *you* (in your  
sense) you die.
Is this what you mean?

And you say "yes" to the doctor because you die at each instant.

And you still care about the quality and seriousness of the doctor  
because you care by altruism for the copy.

With MEC we have indeed this at each instant ( through QM or not).

But then, you will have to think about anything you do in the future  
as an act of altruism. You take a cigarette because you care about the  
satisfaction feeling of the "copy" who will smoke it, and you abandon  
the cigarette because you care of the lungs of the copies of the future.

Egoism as pure self-altruisme, why not? But then, assuming MEC, any  
statement of any laws (physical, arithmetical, juridic, etc.) concerns  
our copies, and this means that taking this point of view or not is  
not relevant in the reasoning, we have still to derive the laws, be it  
by altruism or egoism according to the interpretation of identity.

Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say "he" when  
you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink  
coffee.

I think that if you put yourself in the place of the polycopies, none  
will feel like that except a few exception. I mean the quasi-tautology  
that none *feels* dying at each instant.  You have to meditate eight  
hours per day during eight years or to eat or smoke something  
(legal!), or to die, or perhaps to dream for PERHAPS get a feeling of  
what dying could be, according to some.

But your view is coherent and rather cool too, so let us continue the  
UDA reasoning, by altruism for *all* our descendants and why not the  
many others descendant to:)

It is also a pity to think that you will die the time I finish this  
sentence. You think now you have survived that reading, but you  
did'nt, you are the copy.

Computability can be thought as a topological notion. MEC is the  
assumption that I, and my continuous life, is preserved in  
teleportation, and polyplication (duplication and other self- 
multiplication).

(I know you are playing the role of the "time person skeptic").

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Abram,


> Interesting thought experiment. My initial reaction (from my "time
> skeptic" position):
>
> --Since my consciousness is relative to a single moment,


I take this as a motivation for doing MGA before UDA(1...7), because  
this does not make sense for me.
Consciousness is better attached to a computation or computational  
history as see from a *point* (or "interval") of view.



> I can't talk
> about that same consciousness being carried over to the next moment:
> the consciousness in the next moment is a different consciousness that
> remembers the previous one.


I would say that it is the consciousness itself which is invariant, it  
is the *content* of that consciousness which vary. So the person  
itself remains the same person but with enriched experiences, more or  
less defined by the many content of its accessible consciousness  
(under the form of memories, hope, wishes, ...




> To suppose otherwise is to invent an
> imaginary entity that is carried along through time, which effects the
> world (to the extent that my consciousness alters the world) but does
> not itself change.


Its life changes, but continuously, or computationally, preserving its  
personhood.
Are you saying that the person is imaginary? Then you will be lead to  
eliminative materialism.
I have no clue why person are imaginary. They are immaterial, but they  
are no less real than a soccer game, or a nation, or a tree, or  
whatever stable relatively to an environment.



>
> --To then ask which copy of me I will have the experience of is to ask
> which location that imaginary entity will be carried to; in other
> words, it is a meaningless question.


I don't see how you will convince any of your polycopies. Some rare  
will say "I have seen the Space Odyssey movie", much more but still  
very rare will say "I have seen a good movie"/ Most will say "I have  
seen white noise". All will accept that the question was  
retrospectively meaningful.



>
> --When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not
> minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing the
> number of my copies that will be so carried.

?



> I can and should take
> this into account; for example, if I am OK with only a few copies
> surviving so long as those copies get to see the original Dracula
> movie, then I could "bet" that I will see the original Dracula movie.


I agree. MEC makes choice and decision a suicide with respect to the  
future we don't want. If I decide to go to Washington, somehow I am  
killing the "myself" who could have gone to Moscow. Choice is always a  
form of partial suicide. I am OK with that. It is the base of quantum  
and comp suicide.



>
> --This perspective does not prevent me from entering the teleporter or
> saying yes to the doctor, because I already believe that "I" am a
> different consciousness each moment.


You say yes to the doctor because you think you will die anyway. This  
is not MEC!
You could say yes to the doctor who proposes to you an empty brain,  
then. It is the cheaper one.



>
>
> In fairness, the time skeptic cannot really give so complete an
> answer, since the time skeptic doesn't quite know what it means to
> make decisions, particularly decisions that choose between potential
> futures...


Right. And decisions in general concern potential futures I think.




> but let us say that the time skeptic is for now "playing
> along" with the experiment.


It seems to me that the "time skeptic" is a "person skeptic" only.

>
>
> Oh, and just to be clear... the time skeptic is asserting that the
> above solution is the only possible solution, not merely that it is a
> working one. :)


I don't understand. I guess that I miss something here.


Bruno




> On Sun, Dec 21, 2008 at 1:44 PM, Bruno Marchal   
> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Abram, Him Kim,
>>
>> Kim, while answering Abram, I realised I was doing the KIM 2.3, you
>> can read it before KIM 2.2 without problem I think, in any case tell
>> me if you have follow the argument. I don't answer the questions, so
>> you or Abram, or anyone else can answer.
>>
>> Abram, The answer to your post is really the step 3 of the UDA
>> reasoning. It is the justification of the first person indeterminacy,
>> and the definition of (relatively) normal machine.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 20 Dec 2008, at 04:46, Abram Demski wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Bruno,
>>>
>>> From what assumptions could a probability ultimately be derived?
>>
>>
>> From the assumption that when I do an experience or an experiment, I
>> will observe a result.
>>
>> And from the hope I will be able to interpret that result in my or  
>> our
>> favorite current theory from which I can *deduce* the probability  
>> laws.
>>
>> This is akin to a self-consistency assumption.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> It
>>> seems that a coherent theory of the probability of future events is
>>> needed (otherwise the passing of time could be white noise), but I  
>>> do
>>> not see where such probabilities 

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Abram Demski]

Bruno,

Interesting thought experiment. My initial reaction (from my "time
skeptic" position):

--Since my consciousness is relative to a single moment, I can't talk
about that same consciousness being carried over to the next moment:
the consciousness in the next moment is a different consciousness that
remembers the previous one. To suppose otherwise is to invent an
imaginary entity that is carried along through time, which effects the
world (to the extent that my consciousness alters the world) but does
not itself change.
--To then ask which copy of me I will have the experience of is to ask
which location that imaginary entity will be carried to; in other
words, it is a meaningless question.
--When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not
minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing the
number of my copies that will be so carried. I can and should take
this into account; for example, if I am OK with only a few copies
surviving so long as those copies get to see the original Dracula
movie, then I could "bet" that I will see the original Dracula movie.
--This perspective does not prevent me from entering the teleporter or
saying yes to the doctor, because I already believe that "I" am a
different consciousness each moment.

In fairness, the time skeptic cannot really give so complete an
answer, since the time skeptic doesn't quite know what it means to
make decisions, particularly decisions that choose between potential
futures... but let us say that the time skeptic is for now "playing
along" with the experiment.

Oh, and just to be clear... the time skeptic is asserting that the
above solution is the only possible solution, not merely that it is a
working one. :)

--Abram

On Sun, Dec 21, 2008 at 1:44 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> Hi Abram, Him Kim,
>
> Kim, while answering Abram, I realised I was doing the KIM 2.3, you
> can read it before KIM 2.2 without problem I think, in any case tell
> me if you have follow the argument. I don't answer the questions, so
> you or Abram, or anyone else can answer.
>
> Abram, The answer to your post is really the step 3 of the UDA
> reasoning. It is the justification of the first person indeterminacy,
> and the definition of (relatively) normal machine.
>
>
>
>
> On 20 Dec 2008, at 04:46, Abram Demski wrote:
>
>>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> From what assumptions could a probability ultimately be derived?
>
>
>  From the assumption that when I do an experience or an experiment, I
> will observe a result.
>
> And from the hope I will be able to interpret that result in my or our
> favorite current theory from which I can *deduce* the probability laws.
>
> This is akin to a self-consistency assumption.
>
>
>
>
>
>> It
>> seems that a coherent theory of the probability of future events is
>> needed (otherwise the passing of time could be white noise), but I do
>> not see where such probabilities could come out of more basic
>> assumptions.
>
> UDA is a non constructive proof that in the MEC theory, we have to
> derive the probabilities from the discourse of the "normal machine",
> which I will define below (anticipating on the KIM 2 thread).
>
> AUDA is a path toward a constructive derivation of the probability
> laws. The basic idea is simple: let us ask the question directly to
> the universal machine.
>
> In QM, without collapse, Everett (+ Gleason theorem)  has convinced me
> that
>  1. There is no probabilities in the theory.
>  2. Quantum and classical probabilities are justified in the "normal"
> self-observing machines by the SWE only.
>
>
> But there is a "hic". A "little" problem.
>
> That derivation assumes MEC (or weakenings). And MEC forces the
> probabilities to be derived from all type of computations, no way to
> chose a particular universal machine at the start, any must do. This
> is really what UDA shows. The good news is that such an extraction can
> then justify both the quanta and the qualia. Quanta are (should be
> here) particular case of (sharable) qualia.
>
>
>
>
>> To reason about the future, we assume that we are in a
>> randomly chosen computation--
>
>
> Right now I don't feel like being on a randomly chosen computation.
> "I"  "belong(s)" on all computations which have reached my actual
> state(s) (singular for the 1-state, and plural for the 3-states, or
> the 1-plural states, see below).
> My next state will be chosen partially randomly among many consistent
> continuations.
>
>
>
>> but then we are already using some
>> probability distribution.
>
>
> At some level it is the Gaussian distribution. See the definition of
> the "normal machine" below.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> Evolution is at the root of our ability to predict probabilistically.
>> We use one probability distribution over another because it helps us
>> survive. However, this is not good enough of an answer in the
>> multiverse: every possible form survives anyway.
>
> Once you bet on everything you have to accept also, among many
> realities, those who does 

KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Abram, Him Kim,

Kim, while answering Abram, I realised I was doing the KIM 2.3, you  
can read it before KIM 2.2 without problem I think, in any case tell  
me if you have follow the argument. I don't answer the questions, so  
you or Abram, or anyone else can answer.

Abram, The answer to your post is really the step 3 of the UDA  
reasoning. It is the justification of the first person indeterminacy,  
and the definition of (relatively) normal machine.




On 20 Dec 2008, at 04:46, Abram Demski wrote:

>
> Bruno,
>
> From what assumptions could a probability ultimately be derived?


 From the assumption that when I do an experience or an experiment, I  
will observe a result.

And from the hope I will be able to interpret that result in my or our  
favorite current theory from which I can *deduce* the probability laws.

This is akin to a self-consistency assumption.





> It
> seems that a coherent theory of the probability of future events is
> needed (otherwise the passing of time could be white noise), but I do
> not see where such probabilities could come out of more basic
> assumptions.

UDA is a non constructive proof that in the MEC theory, we have to  
derive the probabilities from the discourse of the "normal machine",  
which I will define below (anticipating on the KIM 2 thread).

AUDA is a path toward a constructive derivation of the probability  
laws. The basic idea is simple: let us ask the question directly to  
the universal machine.

In QM, without collapse, Everett (+ Gleason theorem)  has convinced me  
that
  1. There is no probabilities in the theory.
  2. Quantum and classical probabilities are justified in the "normal"  
self-observing machines by the SWE only.


But there is a "hic". A "little" problem.

That derivation assumes MEC (or weakenings). And MEC forces the  
probabilities to be derived from all type of computations, no way to  
chose a particular universal machine at the start, any must do. This  
is really what UDA shows. The good news is that such an extraction can  
then justify both the quanta and the qualia. Quanta are (should be  
here) particular case of (sharable) qualia.




> To reason about the future, we assume that we are in a
> randomly chosen computation--


Right now I don't feel like being on a randomly chosen computation.  
"I"  "belong(s)" on all computations which have reached my actual  
state(s) (singular for the 1-state, and plural for the 3-states, or  
the 1-plural states, see below).
My next state will be chosen partially randomly among many consistent  
continuations.



> but then we are already using some
> probability distribution.


At some level it is the Gaussian distribution. See the definition of  
the "normal machine" below.



>
>
> Evolution is at the root of our ability to predict probabilistically.
> We use one probability distribution over another because it helps us
> survive. However, this is not good enough of an answer in the
> multiverse: every possible form survives anyway.

Once you bet on everything you have to accept also, among many  
realities, those who does not "survive", the cul-de-sac.
At the level of reasoning in comp this is equivalent with a "self- 
consistency" assumption, which is implicit in teleportation experiment.
The multiverse idea is not so different from the Darwinian idea of  
"all the species", of course restricted to the relatively consistent  
one.
Relatively to what? Relatively to their most probable histories/ 
computation.

Below, to define the notion of "normal machine", I will construct a  
case where in a sense "every possible form survives". despite this  
fact, the probabilities will emerge clearly once we distinguish the  
third person discourses from the first person discourses.





> To keep talking about
> evolution, we would need to talk about which forms are more common in
> the multiverse. But to count how common forms are, we would need some
> measure over the multiverse, which could give us a probability
> distribution in the first place. So every possible argument seems
> circular.

I don't think so. See below.

>
>
> So, I don't need all the details of your derivation of a probability
> (though I'm interested); but what assumptions can you get a
> probability distribution from?


 From the assumption of mechanism. Digital mechanism. The assumption  
that you survive with a relative probability 1 in case of scanning,  
annihilation and reconstitution done at some level.

Then you are duplicable. I can "cut" you and "paste" you in two  
identical rooms, except that I have put a "one" in a closed box in one  
room, and I have put a "zero" in a similar and similarly disposed box,  
in the other room. Ah! To help for some probable cutting the air  
argument, I put a cup of delicious coffee near the boxes in the two  
rooms. All right?

(If you don't mind I will of course assume you really want a cup of  
coffee, at the moment of the experience).

Now the third person discourses