Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Oct 2013, at 09:24, freqflyer07281972 wrote:


And where you say:

Any way, I don't defend comp, I just show that comp makes physics
derivable in arithmetic, and that if you do it in some way, (using the
logic of self-reference) you can extract a general theory of qualia,
with its quanta part that you can compare with nature, and so test
comp. And up to now, it fits well with the facts.

What the hell are you talking about? I don't mean to be John Clark  
rude, but
honestly, I can't see at all how qualia can possibly emerge from  
your theory,



Clark has no problem with computationalism. He has even defend the  
idea that comp is the only possible theory, but he has a problem with  
the first person indeterminacy.




Cheers, and still looking for "the answer",


You have to made it more precise.
Are you saying that the qualia problem refutes computationalism (a bit  
like Craig says) ?
Are you saying that the qualia problem can be used to show that the  
UDA is not valid?


Craig assumes the qualia, so he does not try to explain them. I find  
this premature.


What would be an explanation of qualia which would satisfy you?

My opinion is that computationalism explains the most possible about  
qualia, including the machine's feeling (qualia) that no theories at  
all can explain them completely.


To be frank, I don't extend that explanation more than I need to  
debunk the argument against comp and based on qualia. To debunk that  
debunking, you have to provide a better explanation of qualia.


How does that comp-explanation of qualia work?

Hmm... I will avoid the math, and try to give you the gist of it.

Imagine you build a machine, and for some reason you want it being  
quite independent of you, like a robot that you would send on some  
Planet. On that planet there are many dangers, like acid rains, hole  
in the grounds, dangerous tempest, etc.


So you program it with a basic instruction, with the shape: "whatever  
happens to you, do anything you can do to avoid self-destruction, or  
self-injuries.


You can program "self" without problem (ask more if interested). You  
can provide to the robots many sensors, so that it can detect the  
possible dangers. For example, they have a sort of skin, and when too  
much acid attacks it, the brain get to cope with urgency warnings, and  
the "do anything you can to avoid a possible self-destruction and miss  
of the mission".


Now, in some "real" relatively to you, computational histories, that  
robot is actually send on that planet, and in that story, at some  
point, it get stuck in a crevasse and then it rains (acid rains!).


The robot has a complex software which is in some chaotic regime, with  
many conflicting procedure (raised by too much universal goal of doing  
whatever is possible to avoid self-destruction. It pull its leg to  
escape the crevasse and the rain, but he got new warning of self- 
destruction that he is programmed to avoid.


But eventually the rain ceases, and the robot succeed to escape the  
hole, and to complete the mission. On Earth, he got some medal and was  
interviewed by a philosopher.


The philosopher asks the robot if he/it:she enjoyed the mission, and  
would do it again. The philosopher asked the robot to tell its story  
when he was stuck under the acid rain, and if that was painful.


Now, the robot was able to behave like if some situation were  
unpleasant or pleasant. He was, by learning, imitation or simple  
inference inductive, using words like "pleasant" and "unpleasant" to  
describe its memories of episodes which were accordingly containing  
few slight warning (like "it is time to drink some oil"), or episodes  
with much severe warnings (unpleasant).


The memorized experience, which involves quite complex third person  
possible relations, is memorized as something experienced, true by  
default (the robot did not wake up saying that is was a dream), and  
which has a content, describable in a diary, for example. The qualia  
will be the way many aspect of the (self-referential) situation, coded  
in some way, is perceived by the person run by the robot's brain, and  
they have to contain some feature impossible to prove. The philosopher  
might try to convince the machine, that she has no qualia, but the  
argument will have no value for the machine, as it would put a doubt  
on not just its memories and their content, but on the existence of  
the experience of having those memories. At that moment, the machine  
will execute one loop more and conclude that the philosophers is  
"obviously" wrong, because that contradict the current experience.


The qualia has two components/ Some information (yes, no, Washington,  
Moscow, ...). It is a self-selection in some history, and the  
experience related to the overall self-perception, including the  
personal day-to-day history, the goal, the mission, etc.


This makes sense, as far as it has sense (which "we" believe in, when  
sending t

Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Oct 2013, at 07:33, freqflyer07281972 wrote:

Sorry to resurrect such an old thread, but I think I'd like to  
respond here:


On Saturday, November 10, 2012 4:32:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Nov 2012, at 10:11, freqflyer07281972 wrote:

> Hey all on the list,
>
> Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this
> teleportation business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's
> Razorish to simply conclude from the entire argument that the
> correct substitution level is, in principle, not only not knowable,
> but not achievable, which means:
>
> congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment
> proof that teleportation is impossible in any cases greater than,
> say, 12 atoms or so (give me a margin of error of about plus/minus
> 100) ...

No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality)

COMP   -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really MAT
means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a weirdness
close to quantum Everett.




> this is very reminiscent of the way that time travel theorists use
> some of godel's closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to einstein's
> relativity to argue that time travel to the past is possible. The
> problem is, the furthest back you can go is when you made the CTC,
> and yet in order to make the CTC, the formal and physical conditions
> require that you already have to have a time machine. This, of
> course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in the time
> machine in the first place, you have to have had a time machine to
> use as a kind of mechanism for the whole project.

But such loop can exist consistently in solution of the GR equation.
that's what Gödel showed. I don't think this was really a problem for
Einstein, as he said more than once, that time is an illusion. We
would say now that it is a machine mental construction, which obeys
the laws of machines.

But here we have the essence of the problem, I think. Simply because  
the mathematics or the logics of a given
problem happens to state that something CAN occur, this is  
absolutely no imposition upon nature that such things
MUST occur... we find certain things in mathematics that may or may  
not correspond to reality.


Which reality? What are your assumptions?

To give sense to the word "comp" (and Church thesis), we must agree  
that the artithmetical propositions are true or not independently of us.


In particular, the statement "freqflyer07281972 believes that he has  
sent a post to the everything list on the 12 october 2013" is  
(amazingly enough) provable in arithmetic (modulo acceptable  
definition, acceptable in the comp theory, to be sure).


(Now the real consciousness of freqflyer07281972 does not only depends  
on that proposition, but on all proofs (in the mathematical sense)  
which exist in arithmetic).


It is the very basic idea defended in the everything list that  
everything consistent exist. Comp forces us to extend Everett  
multiplication of worlds into a multiplication of dreams (and nothing  
else is real, in that theory).






It is truly uncanny in the
ways that mathematics does correspond, absolutely no doubt or  
argument. But what of all that stuff where

the math simply has nothing to say?


Some mathematical truth are beyond the saying of some machines.



How can you possibly derive qualia from math without a bunch of basic
handwaving -- which is really what you are doing when you cite such  
arguments as Bp & p etc etc it is
really a lot of handwaving nonsense that never gets close to the  
issue at all...


You are a bit quick here. Are you sure you grasp the math and the  
notion involved?

The Bp & p idea occurred to Theaetetus, and in many Indians analyses.
If you have some better definition, capable of formalizing the antic  
dream argument for doubting reality, I might appreciate.
If not, it looks like saying qualia are not mathematically  
representable (which is true) and thus cannot be mathematically  
explained (which does not follow, as the Bp & p can be proved to be  
non mathematically representable too by the machine to which it  
applies, and there are many examples of this, notably appearing when  
machines looks at themselves.
Note that even if comp is false, the hypostases describe real self- 
referential discourse by machines, existing in arithmetic. It makes  
your point being like saying, "oh, but those are only machine, and  
thus are zombies".





I really love the idea of your theory of everything Bruno, I really  
do, but when it comes to my next meal, or what I need to do with my

life, or what my next big decision is going to be, this is of no help.


All right. The idea is to contemplate possible truth. It is not  
necessarily practical.


Yet, I do think comp has a (meta) practical role: to remind us o

Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[freqflyer07281972]

And where you say:

Any way, I don't defend comp, I just show that comp makes physics   
derivable in arithmetic, and that if you do it in some way, (using the   
logic of self-reference) you can extract a general theory of qualia,   
with its quanta part that you can compare with nature, and so test   
comp. And up to now, it fits well with the facts. 

What the hell are you talking about? I don't mean to be John Clark rude, but
honestly, I can't see at all how qualia can possibly emerge from your 
theory, 

Cheers, and still looking for "the answer", 

Dan

On Saturday, October 12, 2013 1:33:10 AM UTC-4, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
>
> Sorry to resurrect such an old thread, but I think I'd like to respond 
> here: 
>
> On Saturday, November 10, 2012 4:32:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 10 Nov 2012, at 10:11, freqflyer07281972 wrote: 
>>
>> > Hey all on the list, 
>> > 
>> > Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this   
>> > teleportation business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's   
>> > Razorish to simply conclude from the entire argument that the   
>> > correct substitution level is, in principle, not only not knowable,   
>> > but not achievable, which means: 
>> > 
>> > congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment   
>> > proof that teleportation is impossible in any cases greater than,   
>> > say, 12 atoms or so (give me a margin of error of about plus/minus   
>> > 100) ... 
>>
>> No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak   
>> materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality) 
>>
>> COMP   -> NOT MAT 
>> MAT -> NOT COMP 
>> NOT MAT or NOT COMP 
>>
>> I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really MAT   
>> means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a weirdness   
>> close to quantum Everett. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > this is very reminiscent of the way that time travel theorists use   
>> > some of godel's closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to einstein's   
>> > relativity to argue that time travel to the past is possible. The   
>> > problem is, the furthest back you can go is when you made the CTC,   
>> > and yet in order to make the CTC, the formal and physical conditions   
>> > require that you already have to have a time machine. This, of   
>> > course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in the time   
>> > machine in the first place, you have to have had a time machine to   
>> > use as a kind of mechanism for the whole project. 
>>
>> But such loop can exist consistently in solution of the GR equation.   
>> that's what Gödel showed. I don't think this was really a problem for   
>> Einstein, as he said more than once, that time is an illusion. We   
>> would say now that it is a machine mental construction, which obeys   
>> the laws of machines. 
>>
>> But here we have the essence of the problem, I think. Simply because the 
> mathematics or the logics of a given 
> problem happens to state that something CAN occur, this is absolutely no 
> imposition upon nature that such things
> MUST occur... we find certain things in mathematics that may or may not 
> correspond to reality. It is truly uncanny in the 
> ways that mathematics does correspond, absolutely no doubt or argument. 
> But what of all that stuff where 
> the math simply has nothing to say? How can you possibly derive qualia 
> from math without a bunch of basic 
> handwaving -- which is really what you are doing when you cite such 
> arguments as Bp & p etc etc it is 
> really a lot of handwaving nonsense that never gets close to the issue at 
> all...
>
> I really love the idea of your theory of everything Bruno, I really do, 
> but when it comes to my next meal, or what I need to do with my 
> life, or what my next big decision is going to be, this is of no help. 
> BTW, if it's of any console, Craig's theory of everything doesn't help me 
> in the 
> same basic ways, so there... the thing is... all this stuff is about 
> abstraction, and yet life as lived is anything but abstraction...
> all particularities matter, at every level, shouldn't a theory of 
> everything really be a theory of particularities and contingencies, as they 
> have been produced?
> and not a theory of general particularities that no one is really 
> concerned about? 
>
> cheers,
>
> Dan 
>
>>
>>
>> > 
>> > In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the   
>> > conclusion you want it to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in   
>> > the computation of some infinite computer) but rather the less   
>> > appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the teleportation required in   
>> > your entire thought experiment is simply impossible, for much of the   
>> > same reasons as time travel is impossible. 
>>
>> But then we cannot be even quantum computer, because they can emulate   
>> by a classical machine, and they too exist in the arithmetical realm. 
>>
>> Any way, I don't defend 

Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[freqflyer07281972]

Sorry to resurrect such an old thread, but I think I'd like to respond 
here: 

On Saturday, November 10, 2012 4:32:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Nov 2012, at 10:11, freqflyer07281972 wrote: 
>
> > Hey all on the list, 
> > 
> > Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this   
> > teleportation business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's   
> > Razorish to simply conclude from the entire argument that the   
> > correct substitution level is, in principle, not only not knowable,   
> > but not achievable, which means: 
> > 
> > congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment   
> > proof that teleportation is impossible in any cases greater than,   
> > say, 12 atoms or so (give me a margin of error of about plus/minus   
> > 100) ... 
>
> No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak   
> materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality) 
>
> COMP   -> NOT MAT 
> MAT -> NOT COMP 
> NOT MAT or NOT COMP 
>
> I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really MAT   
> means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a weirdness   
> close to quantum Everett. 
>
>
>
>
> > this is very reminiscent of the way that time travel theorists use   
> > some of godel's closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to einstein's   
> > relativity to argue that time travel to the past is possible. The   
> > problem is, the furthest back you can go is when you made the CTC,   
> > and yet in order to make the CTC, the formal and physical conditions   
> > require that you already have to have a time machine. This, of   
> > course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in the time   
> > machine in the first place, you have to have had a time machine to   
> > use as a kind of mechanism for the whole project. 
>
> But such loop can exist consistently in solution of the GR equation.   
> that's what Gödel showed. I don't think this was really a problem for   
> Einstein, as he said more than once, that time is an illusion. We   
> would say now that it is a machine mental construction, which obeys   
> the laws of machines. 
>
> But here we have the essence of the problem, I think. Simply because the 
mathematics or the logics of a given 
problem happens to state that something CAN occur, this is absolutely no 
imposition upon nature that such things
MUST occur... we find certain things in mathematics that may or may not 
correspond to reality. It is truly uncanny in the 
ways that mathematics does correspond, absolutely no doubt or argument. But 
what of all that stuff where 
the math simply has nothing to say? How can you possibly derive qualia from 
math without a bunch of basic 
handwaving -- which is really what you are doing when you cite such 
arguments as Bp & p etc etc it is 
really a lot of handwaving nonsense that never gets close to the issue at 
all...

I really love the idea of your theory of everything Bruno, I really do, but 
when it comes to my next meal, or what I need to do with my 
life, or what my next big decision is going to be, this is of no help. BTW, 
if it's of any console, Craig's theory of everything doesn't help me in the 
same basic ways, so there... the thing is... all this stuff is about 
abstraction, and yet life as lived is anything but abstraction...
all particularities matter, at every level, shouldn't a theory of 
everything really be a theory of particularities and contingencies, as they 
have been produced?
and not a theory of general particularities that no one is really concerned 
about? 

cheers,

Dan 

>
>
> > 
> > In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the   
> > conclusion you want it to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in   
> > the computation of some infinite computer) but rather the less   
> > appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the teleportation required in   
> > your entire thought experiment is simply impossible, for much of the   
> > same reasons as time travel is impossible. 
>
> But then we cannot be even quantum computer, because they can emulate   
> by a classical machine, and they too exist in the arithmetical realm. 
>
> Any way, I don't defend comp, I just show that comp makes physics   
> derivable in arithmetic, and that if you do it in some way, (using the   
> logic of self-reference) you can extract a general theory of qualia,   
> with its quanta part that you can compare with nature, and so test   
> comp. And up to now, it fits well with the facts. 
>
>
>
> > 
> > It's still an important result, but perhaps not as profound as you   
> > think if we admit that the teleportation required in your thought   
> > experiment is simply not possibly for purely naturalistic (and   
> > therefore not computational, or mechanistic) reasons. 
>
> But the you need to assume non comp. The non clonability is also easy   
> to derive from comp, as the matter which constitutes us is eventually   
> defined 

Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Nov 2012, at 19:34, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/13/2012 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Nov 2012, at 00:48, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/12/2012 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:



This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp  
seems to only define a single conscious mind!


?

That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different  
conscious mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M.
Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite  
different conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and  
perhaps God.
You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian  
machine common to them.





Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality  
of numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto  
a plurality of minds.


It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with  
different experiences and minds.


Once I said that I am open to the idea that there is only one  
first person.


  If there is only one first person how is the content of such  
completely self-consistent?


There is only one person, in the sense of saying that if I  
duplicate you in the WM way, you can consider that the person in W  
and M are the same person (indeed you), but just put in different  
context.


No need to proceed if you disagree with this. It jusy makes sense:  
it is consistent with comp, but the contrary too, so no need to  
proceed on that identity question before understanding the whole  
UDA, as you might be confused. It is really another topic.


Dear Bruno,

   We need to better understand where you define "personal identity"  
such that this all follows.


I have already explain how UDA avoids the need of solving the personal  
identity problem.





What defines your notion of "same"?


There are as many notion of same that there are hypostases.







My problem is that I don't understand how all of the possible  
points of view implied by a plurality of minds can be combined  
together into a single narrative of a self.


One the same person might have different experiences in this case.


   What defines "sameness"?


At the ontological level, it is defined by the axiom of equality.
At the other level, by the hypostases modalities, and their  
arithmetical content, or their higher level contents. But we don't  
need that to get the "reversal".








Then, it an altogether different question to see if such lives can  
be recombined. I think so, but again, this is not used in the  
reasoning.
the reason I think so is that we can wake up and realize we were  
doing two dreams at once. It is not different than remembering two  
different hollidays, and not being able to remember which one occur  
first.








That might also be confused with solipsism.


  If there is only one mind that exists then that mind is  
solipsistic by definition;


Not with the usual definition of solipsism, which makes the others  
into zombie.






there are no other minds to consider.


The other mind still exists, even if they belong to the experiences  
of the same person. It is like with time travel. You go in the past  
and talk with yourself. That is locally two different minds, even  
if from a later pov, they can appear to belong to the same person.


Comp does not exclude *logically* that I might wake up and realize  
that dreamed both your life and mine.




"... the self is the only existing reality and that all other  
reality, including the external world and other persons, are  
representations of that self, and have no independent existence."  
It seems that minds cannot know of each other directly at all.




Again, this is truly even more at the opposite of solipsism. It  
is the case where not only you attribute consciousness to others,  
but you attribute to them your own identity,


  What does this mean: "you attribute to them your own identity?


Imagine you look at a video. You see children playing soccer, and  
then after 10 minutes, you realize that one of the kid there is  
you. You recognize yourself in that kid. Well, it is the same here.  
You recognize yourself in some other.


  I do not understand your definition of "same-ness". My notion of  
"same person" has to do with my memory of being in a succession of  
locations and states in a narratable sequence where each new  
experience is not inconsistent with the previous states and locations.


Don't mind this too much. I tend to think that there is only one 1p- 
person, but this is advanced speculation. It is not used for the  
reversal, and my opinion on this can still change a lot.











where solipsism denies them consciousness and subjective identity  
(and thus consider them as zombie).


  Yes, in the case of strong solipsism, but solipsism is not a bad  
thing if we are careful.


Solipsism is or the type fact, from the 1p view, but becomes a  

Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/13/2012 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Nov 2012, at 00:48, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/12/2012 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:



 This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp 
seems to only define a single conscious mind!


?

That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different 
conscious mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M.
Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite different 
conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and perhaps God.
You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian 
machine common to them.





Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality of 
numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto a 
plurality of minds.


It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with 
different experiences and minds.


Once I said that I am open to the idea that there is only one first 
person.


   If there is only one first person how is the content of such 
completely self-consistent?


There is only one person, in the sense of saying that if I duplicate 
you in the WM way, you can consider that the person in W and M are the 
same person (indeed you), but just put in different context.


No need to proceed if you disagree with this. It jusy makes sense: it 
is consistent with comp, but the contrary too, so no need to proceed 
on that identity question before understanding the whole UDA, as you 
might be confused. It is really another topic.


Dear Bruno,

We need to better understand where you define "personal identity" 
such that this all follows. What defines your notion of "same"?





My problem is that I don't understand how all of the possible points 
of view implied by a plurality of minds can be combined together into 
a single narrative of a self.


One the same person might have different experiences in this case.


What defines "sameness"?



Then, it an altogether different question to see if such lives can be 
recombined. I think so, but again, this is not used in the reasoning.
the reason I think so is that we can wake up and realize we were doing 
two dreams at once. It is not different than remembering two different 
hollidays, and not being able to remember which one occur first.








That might also be confused with solipsism.


   If there is only one mind that exists then that mind is 
solipsistic by definition;


Not with the usual definition of solipsism, which makes the others 
into zombie.






there are no other minds to consider.


The other mind still exists, even if they belong to the experiences of 
the same person. It is like with time travel. You go in the past and 
talk with yourself. That is locally two different minds, even if from 
a later pov, they can appear to belong to the same person.


Comp does not exclude *logically* that I might wake up and realize 
that dreamed both your life and mine.




"... the self is the only existing reality and that all other 
reality, including the external world and other persons, are 
representations of that self, and have no independent existence." It 
seems that minds cannot know of each other directly at all.




Again, this is truly even more at the opposite of solipsism. It is 
the case where not only you attribute consciousness to others, but 
you attribute to them your own identity,


   What does this mean: "you attribute to them your own identity?


Imagine you look at a video. You see children playing soccer, and then 
after 10 minutes, you realize that one of the kid there is you. You 
recognize yourself in that kid. Well, it is the same here. You 
recognize yourself in some other.


   I do not understand your definition of "same-ness". My notion of 
"same person" has to do with my memory of being in a succession of 
locations and states in a narratable sequence where each new experience 
is not inconsistent with the previous states and locations.







where solipsism denies them consciousness and subjective identity 
(and thus consider them as zombie).


   Yes, in the case of strong solipsism, but solipsism is not a bad 
thing if we are careful.


Solipsism is or the type fact, from the 1p view, but becomes a 
plausible dangerous falsity as a metaphysical assumption. It is an 
elimination of all the others. A zombification, we could say.


It depends on how you define solipsism as a property and what has it.






One mind cannot know the content of some other mind and thus minds 
'do not exist' to each other (unless you use my weird definition of 
existence).


Yes, that's the 1p fact.


We agree.






To say that there is only person is very natural in the context of 
the WM duplication experience, where from the 3-view,


   I do not understand how the 3-view obtains in your thinking. Is 
there an entity that has as its personal 1p the entire content of 
this '3-view"? In my 

Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 13 Nov 2012, at 00:48, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/12/2012 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:



 This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp  
seems to only define a single conscious mind!


?

That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different  
conscious mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M.
Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite different  
conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and perhaps God.
You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian  
machine common to them.





Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality of  
numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto a  
plurality of minds.


It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with  
different experiences and minds.


Once I said that I am open to the idea that there is only one first  
person.


   If there is only one first person how is the content of such  
completely self-consistent?


There is only one person, in the sense of saying that if I duplicate  
you in the WM way, you can consider that the person in W and M are the  
same person (indeed you), but just put in different context.


No need to proceed if you disagree with this. It jusy makes sense: it  
is consistent with comp, but the contrary too, so no need to proceed  
on that identity question before understanding the whole UDA, as you  
might be confused. It is really another topic.






My problem is that I don't understand how all of the possible points  
of view implied by a plurality of minds can be combined together  
into a single narrative of a self.


One the same person might have different experiences in this case.

Then, it an altogether different question to see if such lives can be  
recombined. I think so, but again, this is not used in the reasoning.
the reason I think so is that we can wake up and realize we were doing  
two dreams at once. It is not different than remembering two different  
hollidays, and not being able to remember which one occur first.








That might also be confused with solipsism.


   If there is only one mind that exists then that mind is  
solipsistic by definition;


Not with the usual definition of solipsism, which makes the others  
into zombie.






there are no other minds to consider.


The other mind still exists, even if they belong to the experiences of  
the same person. It is like with time travel. You go in the past and  
talk with yourself. That is locally two different minds, even if from  
a later pov, they can appear to belong to the same person.


Comp does not exclude *logically* that I might wake up and realize  
that dreamed both your life and mine.




"... the self is the only existing reality and that all other  
reality, including the external world and other persons, are  
representations of that self, and have no independent existence." It  
seems that minds cannot know of each other directly at all.




Again, this is truly even more at the opposite of solipsism. It is  
the case where not only you attribute consciousness to others, but  
you attribute to them your own identity,


   What does this mean: "you attribute to them your own identity?


Imagine you look at a video. You see children playing soccer, and then  
after 10 minutes, you realize that one of the kid there is you. You  
recognize yourself in that kid. Well, it is the same here. You  
recognize yourself in some other.







where solipsism denies them consciousness and subjective identity  
(and thus consider them as zombie).


   Yes, in the case of strong solipsism, but solipsism is not a bad  
thing if we are careful.


Solipsism is or the type fact, from the 1p view, but becomes a  
plausible dangerous falsity as a metaphysical assumption. It is an  
elimination of all the others. A zombification, we could say.





One mind cannot know the content of some other mind and thus minds  
'do not exist' to each other (unless you use my weird definition of  
existence).


Yes, that's the 1p fact.




To say that there is only person is very natural in the context of  
the WM duplication experience, where from the 3-view,


   I do not understand how the 3-view obtains in your thinking. Is  
there an entity that has as its personal 1p the entire content of  
this '3-view"? In my thinking the 3-view is an concept and is not  
real at all.


Eventually there is no physical 3p, but without any 3p, then we are  
back to the doctrinal ridiculous zombification of the other.
In comp we have arithmetic as a very good 3p base. Physics can be  
used, like in UDA, but eventually physics is itself only 1p plural.  
The 1p-plural can be very like a 3p, and can admit local 3p  
descriptions, well, like in physics.








you are in both cities,


   You are defining "you-ness" or "I-ness" in a strange way.


You must quote the whole p

Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Nov 2012, at 20:27, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/12/2012 11:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/10/2012 10:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)

COMP   ->  NOT MAT
MAT ->  NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what  
really

MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.

But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction. There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has  
not

made many definite predictions that could be contradicted. That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness. Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential  
point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP  
would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location  
and

not reason to be associated with a particular body.


I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.


But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from  
COMP?  Is it just an anthropic selection argument?

Hi Brent,

  This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp  
seems to only define a single conscious mind!


?

That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different  
conscious mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M.
Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite different  
conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and perhaps God.
You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian  
machine common to them.


Dear Bruno,

   I am trying to figure out how you differentiate "individual  
persons" (which seem to be distinguished by their relative locations  
- such as being in Moscow and being in Washington) from the abstract  
Löbian machine common to them.


It is the same difference as the difference between a program applied  
to some input, and the same program applied to another input. Here the  
location might be virtual like in step six. A localization is a mean  
to get an information. We could have used more abstract  
differentiation with just two bits 0 or 1.








Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality of  
numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto a  
plurality of minds.


It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with  
different experiences and minds.


   What distiguishes the different machines?


Either their codes, or their inputs, or both.




My question follows from the way that Godel numbering makes the  
natural ordering of the Integers vanish


That does not make sense.




unless there is a way to keep the native identity of the integers  
separated from the Godel numbers and from the universal numbers.


?  The identity of the numbers follows by the theory. Ax 0 ≠ s(x),  
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y, etc. A Gödel number is just a program or machine  
description written in arithmetic.
The Gödel numbering (programming) would not work, if it would change  
the elementary arithmetical truth. Gödel numbers are built on the top  
of it.








It seems to me that if we allow got Godel numbering schemes to  
code propositions then we cause the uniqueness of number identity  
to become degenerate. For example: 0123456789 can mean many  
things. It can be a particular number, it can be a Godel code for  
some other number, it can be a string of numbers...


A number support a person only relatively to a universal number.  
You have the same problem with any notion of states description in  
physics, or in any theory.


   How are the universal numbers distinguished from each other at  
the Platonic level?


Like 0 ≠ s(0).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/12/2012 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:



  This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp 
seems to only define a single conscious mind!


?

That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different 
conscious mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M.
Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite different 
conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and perhaps God.
You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian machine 
common to them.





Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality of 
numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto a 
plurality of minds.


It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with 
different experiences and minds.


Once I said that I am open to the idea that there is only one first 
person.


If there is only one first person how is the content of such 
completely self-consistent? My problem is that I don't understand how 
all of the possible points of view implied by a plurality of minds can 
be combined together into a single narrative of a self.




 That might also be confused with solipsism.


If there is only one mind that exists then that mind is solipsistic 
by definition; there are no other minds to consider. "... the self is 
the only existing reality and that all other reality, including the 
external world and other persons, are representations of that self, and 
have no independent existence." It seems that minds cannot know of each 
other directly at all.




Again, this is truly even more at the opposite of solipsism. It is the 
case where not only you attribute consciousness to others, but you 
attribute to them your own identity,


What does this mean: "you attribute to them your own identity?

where solipsism denies them consciousness and subjective identity (and 
thus consider them as zombie).


Yes, in the case of strong solipsism, but solipsism is not a bad 
thing if we are careful. One mind cannot know the content of some other 
mind and thus minds 'do not exist' to each other (unless you use my 
weird definition of existence).


To say that there is only person is very natural in the context of the 
WM duplication experience, where from the 3-view,


I do not understand how the 3-view obtains in your thinking. Is 
there an entity that has as its personal 1p the entire content of this 
'3-view"? In my thinking the 3-view is an concept and is not real at all.



you are in both cities,


You are defining "you-ness" or "I-ness" in a strange way. I only 
find myself in one location at any time. I join with John Clark in 
complaining about this strange idea that you are promoting.


and then you differentiate, but you can still consider or understand 
that the doppelganger is "you",


What maintains the identity? What is the invariant under the 
transformations of location?


put in a different context, and then you can generalize and get the 
idea that we are all the same original amoeba,


Ummm, you are thinking of consciousness as if it where a single 
continuous 'fluid" that is distributed over all forms of life?


but put in a quite big set of variate experiences and sensations, 
which deludes us about our identity and we fail to recognize ourselves 
in the others.


This is the greatest failing of humanity in my opinion, the lack of 
empathy.




Bruno





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Stephen


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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/12/2012 11:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/10/2012 10:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)

COMP   ->  NOT MAT
MAT ->  NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.

But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction. There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted. That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness. Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and
not reason to be associated with a particular body.


I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.


But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from 
COMP?  Is it just an anthropic selection argument?

Hi Brent,

   This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp 
seems to only define a single conscious mind!


?

That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different conscious 
mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M.
Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite different 
conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and perhaps God.
You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian machine 
common to them.


Dear Bruno,

I am trying to figure out how you differentiate "individual 
persons" (which seem to be distinguished by their relative locations - 
such as being in Moscow and being in Washington) from the abstract 
Löbian machine common to them.




Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality of 
numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto a 
plurality of minds.


It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with 
different experiences and minds.


What distiguishes the different machines? My question follows from 
the way that Godel numbering makes the natural ordering of the Integers 
vanish unless there is a way to keep the native identity of the integers 
separated from the Godel numbers and from the universal numbers.




It seems to me that if we allow got Godel numbering schemes to code 
propositions then we cause the uniqueness of number identity to 
become degenerate. For example: 0123456789 can mean many things. It 
can be a particular number, it can be a Godel code for some other 
number, it can be a string of numbers...


A number support a person only relatively to a universal number. You 
have the same problem with any notion of states description in 
physics, or in any theory.


How are the universal numbers distinguished from each other at the 
Platonic level?





--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/10/2012 10:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)

COMP   ->  NOT MAT
MAT ->  NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what  
really

MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.

But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction. There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has  
not

made many definite predictions that could be contradicted. That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness.  Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location  
and

not reason to be associated with a particular body.


I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.


But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from  
COMP?  Is it just an anthropic selection argument?

Hi Brent,

  This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp  
seems to only define a single conscious mind!


?

That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different  
conscious mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M.
Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite different  
conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and perhaps God.
You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian machine  
common to them.





Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality of  
numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto a  
plurality of minds.


It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with  
different experiences and minds.


Once I said that I am open to the idea that there is only one first  
person.

 That might also be confused with solipsism.

Again, this is truly even more at the opposite of solipsism. It is the  
case where not only you attribute consciousness to others, but you  
attribute to them your own identity, where solipsism denies them  
consciousness and subjective identity (and thus consider them as  
zombie). To say that there is only person is very natural in the  
context of the WM duplication experience, where from the 3-view, you  
are in both cities, and then you differentiate, but you can still  
consider or understand that the doppelganger is "you", put in a  
different context, and then you can generalize and get the idea that  
we are all the same original amoeba, but put in a quite big set of  
variate experiences and sensations, which deludes us about our  
identity and we fail to recognize ourselves in the others.


Bruno










It seems to me that if we allow got Godel numbering schemes to code  
propositions then we cause the uniqueness of number identity to  
become degenerate. For example: 0123456789 can mean many things. It  
can be a particular number, it can be a Godel code for some other  
number, it can be a string of numbers...


A number support a person only relatively to a universal number. You  
have the same problem with any notion of states description in  
physics, or in any theory.


Bruno








Brent



Personally, I think the association is required for self-awareness,
leading me to the conclusion that self-awareness (aka Loebianity)  
is
required for consciousness. I know that I disagree with Bruno on  
this
matter, who sees consciousness everywhere, but Loebianity more  
restricted.


Cheers






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Stephen


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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Nov 2012, at 01:13, freqflyer07281972 wrote:

So why the big fuss over teleportation when the UDA is really all  
about establishing that comp is consistent and implies computational/ 
machine metaphysics rather than materialism? Well, it would seem to  
me the entire argument stands or falls on this teleportation  
business, and if it's not possible, then the argument for the UD  
doesn't seem to get off the ground.


Neither comp nor QM makes it impossible to teleport classical  
informations. On the contrary comp explains why teleportation of  
unknown physical state are impossible. Up to now QM confirms comp,  
especially what seems weird (from an aristotelian perspective).


Anyway, comp does not suppose any physical theory at the start. It   
presupposes a physical reality (a priori primitive or not) and it  
presupposes that such a physical reality is enough rich to support  
relative universal machine, if only to give sense to brain and  
concrete computers.


Then we can reason from that, and eventually recognize that, like  
Darwin show life evolving from material inter-relations, comp shows  
the laws of physics are themselves born and developing in the first  
person apperception of the numbers relatively to the numbers and their  
inter-relations.


This makes arithmetic, or equivalent, into a testable TOE.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 12 Nov 2012, at 00:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/11/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Nov 2012, at 05:00, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.


But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from  
COMP?

Is it just an anthropic selection argument?

Brent



I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something
like:

1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness

2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich  
and
complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle),  
but

not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like
Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."

3) The simplest environment generating a given level of complexity  
is

one that has arisen as a result of evolution from a much simpler
initial state. This is the evolution in the multiverse observation,
that evolution is the only creative (or information generating)
process.

4) Evolutionary proccesses work with populations, so automatically,
you must have other self-aware entities in your world, and
consequently intersubjectivity.

Note that Bruno does not agree with 1). So I'm not quite sure how he
gets to the anti-solipsist veiwpoint.


By praying, mainly. (grin).
It is not excluded that comp leads to solipsism, especially after  
or near death, but even after death, it is not guarantied either.  
Solipsism is avoided by the first person plural, when the entire  
population of universal beings is multiplied into coherent  
continuation. There might be anthropic, or consciousness-tropic  
conditions justifying this. I do think that the adding of "Dt"  
makes the job (and the "1p", redemolish it for the qualia and  
sensations).


Everett QM illustrate very well the 'contagion of duplications',  
making us sharing "normal histories". Empirically, Everett saves  
comp from solipsism, but to be "sure", assuming comp, we have to  
derive Everett QM from all computations (a concept that Church  
Thesis makes utterly mathematically clear, as you can choose any  
Turing universal system to be define it mathematically).




Dear Bruno,

   Everett's MWI avoids solipsism by defining an observer in  
physical terms! Read his paper for yourself to see this.


Of course. He presumes a physical reality, although quite mathematical  
(the universal wave). But then comp this work only if that universal  
wave function is explained by the machine epistemology/theology, and  
the statistics on relative computations.
I love everett, but logically, it is not neede for UDA and AUDA, only  
for comparing the comp-physics with the physics extrapolated today by  
the physicists.











1) comes from the fact that applying 2), without something like 1)
being true, leads to the Occam catastrophe, namely we should  
expect to
find ourselves in a very simple boring world with nothing complex  
like

brains in it. Given that we can conceive of ourselves as being born
into a virtual reality (eg matrix style) where the virtual reality
generator renders nothing at all, the occams catastrophe situation  
is

certainly conceivable. Hence my interest at what happens in sensory
deprivation experiments. If you put a newborn baby in one of  
those, it
may never become conscious (not that that experiment is ethical  
though!).


It may hard for him/her to become self-conscious, but there are  
evidence that ape embryo already dream that they climb in trees, so  
I think the new born baby is conscious.


   To be conscious does not demand that the entity is conscious of  
its consciousness, IMHO.


I agree. This asks for one more reflexive loop. It is the difference  
between universal number and Löbian number.






But if you put it in a tank, his consciousness might quite similar  
to the disconnected consciousness of a Robinsonian arithmetic. This  
is not used in UDA.


   Could you elaborate on the disconnected consciousness of a  
Robinsonian arithmetic a bit?


It is consciousness without any idea of a self, nor even of a reality.  
It can be attained, with a lot of training, in the sleep states, or  
with some dissociative drugs, apparently.






The salvia reports, but also the reports of people having been  
victim of some trauma might suggest this.



   Salvia seems to work by suppressing memory,


It is a deeper disconnection, or dissociation. there is also a feeling  
or remembering something which seem obvious in that state, but seems  
quasi-contradictory in the normal state.





by making it so that the person under the influense only is aware of  
the present moment with no thoughts of previous moments of experience.


Even the awareness of the present moment, or anything related to time  
and sp

Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/10/2012 10:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)

COMP   ->  NOT MAT
MAT ->  NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.

But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction. There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted. That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness.  Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and
not reason to be associated with a particular body.


I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.


But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from  
COMP?  Is it just an anthropic selection argument?

Hi Brent,

   This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp  
seems to only define a single conscious mind!


?

That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different conscious  
mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M.
Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite different  
conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and perhaps God.
You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian machine  
common to them.





Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality of  
numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto a  
plurality of minds.


It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with  
different experiences and minds.





It seems to me that if we allow got Godel numbering schemes to code  
propositions then we cause the uniqueness of number identity to  
become degenerate. For example: 0123456789 can mean many things. It  
can be a particular number, it can be a Godel code for some other  
number, it can be a string of numbers...


A number support a person only relatively to a universal number. You  
have the same problem with any notion of states description in  
physics, or in any theory.


Bruno








Brent



Personally, I think the association is required for self-awareness,
leading me to the conclusion that self-awareness (aka Loebianity) is
required for consciousness. I know that I disagree with Bruno on  
this
matter, who sees consciousness everywhere, but Loebianity more  
restricted.


Cheers






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Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Nov 2012, at 20:46, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/10/2012 8:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)

COMP   -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.

But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction.  There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted.  That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness.  Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and
not reason to be associated with a particular body.


I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.

Dear Russell,

   This is the same idea that I have been trying to address with  
Bruno. He does not seem to notice that without a means to define a  
3p localizability that there is no way for minds to distinguish  
themselves from each other.



That's part of the body problem, which admits a precise mathematical  
formulation derivable from comp.





This leads, it seems to me, to a solipsism situation for a mind.


This cannot been excluded, but then comp is made very plausibly false,  
as it is a non solipsism at the start, given that it attributes  
different minds to an infinity of different relative numbers.









Personally, I think the association is required for self-awareness,
leading me to the conclusion that self-awareness (aka Loebianity) is
required for consciousness.


   But is Loebianity necessary for the ability of a consciousness to  
know that it is conscious


Possible.




or is it necesary just to be conscious w/o knowning that it is? I am  
ignoring considerations of reportability for now...


I tend to think that a planaria is conscious, but not self-conscious,  
contrary to jumping spiders, octopi and all vertebrates and other  
Löbian entities.








 I know that I disagree with Bruno on this
matter, who sees consciousness everywhere, but Loebianity more  
restricted.


   Does Bruno agree with panprotopsychism?


No. Only person, in a larger sense than human person of course, are  
conscious, and they all necessitate a computer or relative universal  
number.


Comp makes panprotopsychism even undefined, as "pan" is very  
ambiguous. Does it means all numbers, or all physical objects, or all  
mental objects?


With comp, only person supported by universal relations can think and  
can be conscious.


Bruno







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Stephen


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Re: Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Roger Clough]

Hi Russell Standish  

Consciousness and intelligence, not just consciousness. 
A cave man had to determine if a twig lying on the ground is a snake or a twig. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/12/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Russell Standish  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-10, 23:00:23 
Subject: Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible? 


On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: 
> On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote: 
> >I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain) 
> >is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an 
> >anti-solipsism requirement. 
>  
> But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from COMP? 
> Is it just an anthropic selection argument? 
>  
> Brent 
>  

I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something 
like: 

1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness  

2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and 
complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but 
not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like 
Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."  

3) The simplest environment generating a given level of complexity is 
one that has arisen as a result of evolution from a much simpler 
initial state. This is the evolution in the multiverse observation, 
that evolution is the only creative (or information generating) 
process. 

4) Evolutionary proccesses work with populations, so automatically, 
you must have other self-aware entities in your world, and 
consequently intersubjectivity. 

Note that Bruno does not agree with 1). So I'm not quite sure how he 
gets to the anti-solipsist veiwpoint. 

1) comes from the fact that applying 2), without something like 1) 
being true, leads to the Occam catastrophe, namely we should expect to 
find ourselves in a very simple boring world with nothing complex like 
brains in it. Given that we can conceive of ourselves as being born 
into a virtual reality (eg matrix style) where the virtual reality 
generator renders nothing at all, the occams catastrophe situation is 
certainly conceivable. Hence my interest at what happens in sensory 
deprivation experiments. If you put a newborn baby in one of those, it 
may never become conscious (not that that experiment is ethical though!). 

Cheers 

--  

 
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
Principal, High Performance Coders 
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au 
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
 

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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Nov 11, 2012 at 09:54:10PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
> On 11/11/2012 4:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >And many good reasons for thinking it is possible in a Multiverse, as
> >pointed out by David Deutsch. Time travel into the past is simply
> >equivalent to going somewhere else in the Multiverse, or to use the
> >Borge Library of Babel analogy, selecting a book from the Library of
> >Babel.
> >
> >It doesn't run into the grandfather paradox, because even when you go
> >back into the past, and kill your grandfather, because multiple
> >futures really do exist in the multiverse, you will just end up in a
> >history that never has the past you growing up in it, just the current
> >you living your life from where you reentered history. Meanwhile, your
> >childhood will still exist in a history where you failed to kill your
> >grandfather, or never even made the attempt.
> 
> Just because it doesn't produce a contradiction doesn't mean it's 
> nomologically possible.
> 
> Brent
> 

>From all of the above, a suitably high fidelity virtual reality
generator will suffice - bizarre as that seems. Whilst it may be
beyond current day technology, I don't see it as being nomologically so.

Cheers


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[meekerdb]

On 11/11/2012 4:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

And many good reasons for thinking it is possible in a Multiverse, as
pointed out by David Deutsch. Time travel into the past is simply
equivalent to going somewhere else in the Multiverse, or to use the
Borge Library of Babel analogy, selecting a book from the Library of
Babel.

It doesn't run into the grandfather paradox, because even when you go
back into the past, and kill your grandfather, because multiple
futures really do exist in the multiverse, you will just end up in a
history that never has the past you growing up in it, just the current
you living your life from where you reentered history. Meanwhile, your
childhood will still exist in a history where you failed to kill your
grandfather, or never even made the attempt.


Just because it doesn't produce a contradiction doesn't mean it's nomologically 
possible.

Brent

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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[meekerdb]

On 11/11/2012 4:13 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:



On Saturday, November 10, 2012 3:00:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 11/10/2012 1:11 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
> Hey all on the list,
>
> Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this 
teleportation
> business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's Razorish to simply 
conclude
from the
> entire argument that the correct substitution level is, in principle, not 
only not
> knowable, but not achievable, which means:
>
> congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment proof that
teleportation
> is impossible in any cases greater than, say, 12 atoms or so (give me a 
margin of
error
> of about plus/minus 100) ... this is very reminiscent of the way that 
time travel
> theorists use some of godel's closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to 
einstein's
> relativity to argue that time travel to the past is possible. The problem 
is, the
> furthest back you can go is when you made the CTC, and yet in order to 
make the
CTC, the
> formal and physical conditions require that you already have to have a 
time machine.
> This, of course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in the time 
machine
in the
> first place, you have to have had a time machine to use as a kind of 
mechanism for
the
> whole project.
>
> In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the 
conclusion you
want it
> to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in the computation of some 
infinite
computer)
> but rather the less appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the teleportation 
required in
> your entire thought experiment is simply impossible, for much of the same 
reasons as
> time travel is impossible.

I don't see the parallel.  Can you spell it out?

Brent

Sure, I'll try.

Regarding time travel, there are many reasons for thinking that this is simply 
impossible. This comes from Sean Carroll's excellent book 'From Eternity to Here' -- I'm 
just gonna quote it to save time and get on to the teleportation part:


"In 1967, theoretical physicist Robert Geroch investigated the question of wormhole 
construction, and he showed that you actually could create a wormhole by twisting 
spacetime in the appropriate way, but only if, as an intermediate step in the process, 
you created a closed time like curve. In other words, the first step to building a time 
machine by manipulating a wormhole is to build a time machine so you can make a 
wormhole." (p. 115)


Now, the analogy I see is this: A person wants to make a teleportation device. Well, in 
order to teleport object A to some location X, you need to specify the minimum amount of 
information that A must contain in order to continue having the experience of being A. 
This is what I take to be 'the substitution level,' (i.e. the level of fine-graining 
necessary to take a solid person, turn them into some kind of digital representation, 
send the digital representation at the speed of light across a vast distance, and then 
reconstitute them at the destination. My thinking is that, much like the wormhole, the 
substitution level, if known or achievable, would imply that we could build a 
teleportation device, but we'd need to confirm we had the right substitution level by 
building a working teleportation device -- in other words, it's a catch-22 - you need 
the teleportation device capable of dealing with the appropriate amount of information 
(I'm envisioning a super powerful computer combined with a beam splitter, and a super 
amazingly written piece of software - i.e. one must never crash!!! because if it does, 
there is the potential that the person you are teleporting could be lost in the ether!) 
and yet you need the substitution level to design and build the device properly.


First, you don't necessarily have to confirm it's function for it to function - if that 
were the case nothing functional could ever be built.  Second, you'd test it by 
teleporting something across a room, and then a hamster, and then a person, and then 
across the street, and...  Third, that someone might be destroyed is not an argument that 
it won't work.  It's easy to get killed trying to fly a rocket to the Moon, that doesn't 
mean there's some contradiction in rocketry.




In practice, from what I understand, they have been able to teleport systems of a couple 
or a few particles over 100 kilometres. Also, there's the no-teleportation theorem of 
quantum physics that would seem to suggest it's impossible, although I am aware that 
this doesn't strictly apply in the thought experiment, because the substitution level is 
something above the quantum level (am I right about this? I think it's implied by the 
condition that there is 'ambient organic material' in the container at the destination(s))


There's a no-cloning theorem, i.e. you can't make a copy of an unknown

Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Nov 11, 2012 at 04:13:38PM -0800, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, November 10, 2012 3:00:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> >
> > On 11/10/2012 1:11 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: 
> > > but rather the less appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the 
> > teleportation required in 
> > > your entire thought experiment is simply impossible, for much of the 
> > same reasons as 
> > > time travel is impossible. 
> >
> > I don't see the parallel.  Can you spell it out? 
> >
> > Brent 
> >
> > Sure, I'll try.
> 
> Regarding time travel, there are many reasons for thinking that this is 
> simply impossible. This comes from Sean Carroll's excellent book 'From 

And many good reasons for thinking it is possible in a Multiverse, as
pointed out by David Deutsch. Time travel into the past is simply
equivalent to going somewhere else in the Multiverse, or to use the
Borge Library of Babel analogy, selecting a book from the Library of
Babel.

It doesn't run into the grandfather paradox, because even when you go
back into the past, and kill your grandfather, because multiple
futures really do exist in the multiverse, you will just end up in a
history that never has the past you growing up in it, just the current
you living your life from where you reentered history. Meanwhile, your
childhood will still exist in a history where you failed to kill your
grandfather, or never even made the attempt.

Just as the grandfather paradox seems to show that past time travel is
impossible unless we live in a Multiverse, the UDA seems to show that
teleportation is impossible unless we live in a Multiverse.

So there may well be a connection between the two, as speculated by
the OP.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[freqflyer07281972]

On Saturday, November 10, 2012 3:00:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> On 11/10/2012 1:11 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: 
> > Hey all on the list, 
> > 
> > Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this 
> teleportation 
> > business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's Razorish to simply 
> conclude from the 
> > entire argument that the correct substitution level is, in principle, 
> not only not 
> > knowable, but not achievable, which means: 
> > 
> > congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment proof 
> that teleportation 
> > is impossible in any cases greater than, say, 12 atoms or so (give me a 
> margin of error 
> > of about plus/minus 100) ... this is very reminiscent of the way that 
> time travel 
> > theorists use some of godel's closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to 
> einstein's 
> > relativity to argue that time travel to the past is possible. The 
> problem is, the 
> > furthest back you can go is when you made the CTC, and yet in order to 
> make the CTC, the 
> > formal and physical conditions require that you already have to have a 
> time machine. 
> > This, of course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in the 
> time machine in the 
> > first place, you have to have had a time machine to use as a kind of 
> mechanism for the 
> > whole project. 
> > 
> > In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the 
> conclusion you want it 
> > to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in the computation of some 
> infinite computer) 
> > but rather the less appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the 
> teleportation required in 
> > your entire thought experiment is simply impossible, for much of the 
> same reasons as 
> > time travel is impossible. 
>
> I don't see the parallel.  Can you spell it out? 
>
> Brent 
>
> Sure, I'll try.

Regarding time travel, there are many reasons for thinking that this is 
simply impossible. This comes from Sean Carroll's excellent book 'From 
Eternity to Here' -- I'm just gonna quote it to save time and get on to the 
teleportation part: 

"In 1967, theoretical physicist Robert Geroch investigated the question of 
wormhole construction, and he showed that you actually could create a 
wormhole by twisting spacetime in the appropriate way, but only if, as an 
intermediate step in the process, you created a closed time like curve. In 
other words, the first step to building a time machine by manipulating a 
wormhole is to build a time machine so you can make a wormhole." (p. 115)

Now, the analogy I see is this: A person wants to make a teleportation 
device. Well, in order to teleport object A to some location X, you need to 
specify the minimum amount of information that A must contain in order to 
continue having the experience of being A. This is what I take to be 'the 
substitution level,' (i.e. the level of fine-graining necessary to take a 
solid person, turn them into some kind of digital representation, send the 
digital representation at the speed of light across a vast distance, and 
then reconstitute them at the destination. My thinking is that, much like 
the wormhole, the substitution level, if known or achievable, would imply 
that we could build a teleportation device, but we'd need to confirm we had 
the right substitution level by building a working teleportation device -- 
in other words, it's a catch-22 - you need the teleportation device capable 
of dealing with the appropriate amount of information (I'm envisioning a 
super powerful computer combined with a beam splitter, and a super 
amazingly written piece of software - i.e. one must never crash!!! because 
if it does, there is the potential that the person you are teleporting 
could be lost in the ether!) and yet you need the substitution level to 
design and build the device properly.

In practice, from what I understand, they have been able to teleport 
systems of a couple or a few particles over 100 kilometres. Also, there's 
the no-teleportation theorem of quantum physics that would seem to suggest 
it's impossible, although I am aware that this doesn't strictly apply in 
the thought experiment, because the substitution level is something above 
the quantum level (am I right about this? I think it's implied by the 
condition that there is 'ambient organic material' in the container at the 
destination(s))

So why the big fuss over teleportation when the UDA is really all about 
establishing that comp is consistent and implies computational/machine 
metaphysics rather than materialism? Well, it would seem to me the entire 
argument stands or falls on this teleportation business, and if it's not 
possible, then the argument for the UD doesn't seem to get off the ground. 

That's what I meant by the comparison, I hope I'm clear. 

Cheers,

Dan



 

> > 
> > It's still an important result, but perhaps not as profound as you think 
> if we admit 
> > that the teleportation required in your thought experiment is simply no

Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/11/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Nov 2012, at 05:00, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.


But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from COMP?
Is it just an anthropic selection argument?

Brent



I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something
like:

1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness

2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and
complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but
not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like
Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."

3) The simplest environment generating a given level of complexity is
one that has arisen as a result of evolution from a much simpler
initial state. This is the evolution in the multiverse observation,
that evolution is the only creative (or information generating)
process.

4) Evolutionary proccesses work with populations, so automatically,
you must have other self-aware entities in your world, and
consequently intersubjectivity.

Note that Bruno does not agree with 1). So I'm not quite sure how he
gets to the anti-solipsist veiwpoint.


By praying, mainly. (grin).
It is not excluded that comp leads to solipsism, especially after or 
near death, but even after death, it is not guarantied either. 
Solipsism is avoided by the first person plural, when the entire 
population of universal beings is multiplied into coherent 
continuation. There might be anthropic, or consciousness-tropic 
conditions justifying this. I do think that the adding of "Dt" makes 
the job (and the "1p", redemolish it for the qualia and sensations).


Everett QM illustrate very well the 'contagion of duplications', 
making us sharing "normal histories". Empirically, Everett saves comp 
from solipsism, but to be "sure", assuming comp, we have to derive 
Everett QM from all computations (a concept that Church Thesis makes 
utterly mathematically clear, as you can choose any Turing universal 
system to be define it mathematically).




Dear Bruno,

Everett's MWI avoids solipsism by defining an observer in physical 
terms! Read his paper for yourself to see this.







1) comes from the fact that applying 2), without something like 1)
being true, leads to the Occam catastrophe, namely we should expect to
find ourselves in a very simple boring world with nothing complex like
brains in it. Given that we can conceive of ourselves as being born
into a virtual reality (eg matrix style) where the virtual reality
generator renders nothing at all, the occams catastrophe situation is
certainly conceivable. Hence my interest at what happens in sensory
deprivation experiments. If you put a newborn baby in one of those, it
may never become conscious (not that that experiment is ethical 
though!).


It may hard for him/her to become self-conscious, but there are 
evidence that ape embryo already dream that they climb in trees, so I 
think the new born baby is conscious.


To be conscious does not demand that the entity is conscious of its 
consciousness, IMHO.


But if you put it in a tank, his consciousness might quite similar to 
the disconnected consciousness of a Robinsonian arithmetic. This is 
not used in UDA.


Could you elaborate on the disconnected consciousness of a 
Robinsonian arithmetic a bit?


The salvia reports, but also the reports of people having been victim 
of some trauma might suggest this.


Salvia seems to work by suppressing memory, by making it so that 
the person under the influense only is aware of the present moment with 
no thoughts of previous moments of experience.


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/11/2012 11:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Nov 2012, at 02:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak 
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality)


COMP   -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really 
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a 
weirdness close to quantum Everett. 


But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction.  There 
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not 
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted.


The modal logics Z1*, X1*, and S4Grz1 generates an infinity of 
experiences testing the logic of the observables. Those obtained have 
been tested, as they corrresponds to orthomodularity, existence of a 
quatization, etc. It is just an open problem if they can emulate a 
quatum computer, as they should.


Dear Bruno,

Of that collection of "an infinity of experiences", is there a 
single Boolean Algebra for all of the experiences?




That's why I brought up the location of consciousness.  Empirically 
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point of 
the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would 
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and 
not reason to be associated with a particular body.


Yes, there is. the fact that you are indeterminate on an infinity of 
computational histories, which can be relatively deep, making us 
relatively rare and computationally costly, and yet mutiplied into 
continuum of very simlar computations, given a notion of Gaussian 
normality.


For me it is important to look at how the infinity of computational 
histories can be partitioned up into mutually consistent histories. We 
may need consider multiple narratives, one for each observer. There are 
good arguments against the idea of a single history or narrative. 
http://phys.columbia.edu/~judes/qm/10_30_PhilQM.mov 





Of course it is only a beginning. But it has to work if comp + the 
classical theory of knoweldge are correct, and it is the only theory 
which separates naturally the quanta as particular qualia, and give an 
arithmetical interpretation for the mystical conception of reality 
(Plato, Plotinus).


Sure.



Bruno




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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/11/2012 12:24 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 08:43:29PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 8:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something
like:

1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness

2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and
complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but
not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like
Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."

But this is the step I questioned.  Why not be like the Borg, i.e.
one consciousness with many bodies?  I think we only 'expect' to

Quite possibly because Borgs have lower measure for the anthropic
selection to work on than single body minds, particularly with mortal
bodies, as I would assume a Borg mind is effectively immortal.


Yes, the Borg mind would be, literally, independent of the 
existence of any subset of its collective bodies.




I have always felt that one resolution of the Doomsday Argument is
that humanity mind melds (or uploads, Singularity-style) so that
effectively no new minds get born.


Is this a good thing?



I haven't quite figured out what happens if we invert the relationship
- many minds to a body. Why don't we all exhibit multiple personality
disorder?


yeah! We see in the cases of MPD that each personality does not 
know of the existence of the others until that fact is forced on them.



  It probably has to do with the embodiment of the mind, but
still I don't know how this connects to the Anthropic Principle.


How do you define the AP? My definition is: An observer cannot 
experience itself existing in a world whose rules contradict its 
existence in that world. Its just a self-consistency rule.



find ourselves as we are because we don't have good theory about how
we might be otherwise.  COMP proposes to explain how we are by the
UDA, but it needs to explain why we are associated with bodies - not
just assume it to avoid solipism.


Absolutely agree. In fact COMP exacerbates the situation, in that it
is a form of idealism, making the Anthropic Principle mysterious
rather than ordinary. Whilst this is definitely a strike in favour of
materialism, there are so many other disadvantages of materialism that
it is worth trying to nut out how COMP can support the Anthropic Principle.



I agree 100%

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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/10/2012 11:43 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 8:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.

But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from COMP?
Is it just an anthropic selection argument?

Brent


I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something
like:

1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness

2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and
complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but
not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like
Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."


But this is the step I questioned.  Why not be like the Borg, i.e. one 
consciousness with many bodies?


Don't forget the problem of "whose point of view is that of the 
consciousness" of the Borg! I guess we can think of each Borg cyberbody 
as a sense organ for the Collective, but how is all that data correlated 
into a single Boolean Satisfiable whole? Satisfiability requires that 
all of the propositions of the BA(lgebra) are mutually consistent, no?


  I think we only 'expect' to find ourselves as we are because we 
don't have good theory about how we might be otherwise.


LOL, yeah!


  COMP proposes to explain how we are by the UDA, but it needs to 
explain why we are associated with bodies - not just assume it to 
avoid solipism.


Absolutely! This is more than the arithmetic body problem; this is 
a book keeping problem - how do the bodies locate themselves such that 
even if they have identical minds they can use their differences in 
location to define a 'external' 3p'ish difference?




Brent



3) The simplest environment generating a given level of complexity is
one that has arisen as a result of evolution from a much simpler
initial state. This is the evolution in the multiverse observation,
that evolution is the only creative (or information generating)
process.

4) Evolutionary proccesses work with populations, so automatically,
you must have other self-aware entities in your world, and
consequently intersubjectivity.

Note that Bruno does not agree with 1). So I'm not quite sure how he
gets to the anti-solipsist veiwpoint.

1) comes from the fact that applying 2), without something like 1)
being true, leads to the Occam catastrophe, namely we should expect to
find ourselves in a very simple boring world with nothing complex like
brains in it. Given that we can conceive of ourselves as being born
into a virtual reality (eg matrix style) where the virtual reality
generator renders nothing at all, the occams catastrophe situation is
certainly conceivable. Hence my interest at what happens in sensory
deprivation experiments. If you put a newborn baby in one of those, it
may never become conscious (not that that experiment is ethical 
though!).


Cheers






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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/10/2012 10:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)

COMP   ->  NOT MAT
MAT ->  NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.

But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction. There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted. That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness.  Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and
not reason to be associated with a particular body.


I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.


But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from COMP?  
Is it just an anthropic selection argument?

Hi Brent,

This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp 
seems to only define a single conscious mind! Bruno talks about 
plurality but never shows how the plurality of numbers and their mutual 
exclusive identities transfers onto a plurality of minds. It seems to me 
that if we allow got Godel numbering schemes to code propositions then 
we cause the uniqueness of number identity to become degenerate. For 
example: 0123456789 can mean many things. It can be a particular number, 
it can be a Godel code for some other number, it can be a string of 
numbers...





Brent



Personally, I think the association is required for self-awareness,
leading me to the conclusion that self-awareness (aka Loebianity) is
required for consciousness. I know that I disagree with Bruno on this
matter, who sees consciousness everywhere, but Loebianity more 
restricted.


Cheers






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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/10/2012 8:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)

COMP   -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.

But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction.  There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted.  That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness.  Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and
not reason to be associated with a particular body.


I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.

Dear Russell,

This is the same idea that I have been trying to address with 
Bruno. He does not seem to notice that without a means to define a 3p 
localizability that there is no way for minds to distinguish themselves 
from each other. This leads, it seems to me, to a solipsism situation 
for a mind.





Personally, I think the association is required for self-awareness,
leading me to the conclusion that self-awareness (aka Loebianity) is
required for consciousness.


But is Loebianity necessary for the ability of a consciousness to 
know that it is conscious or is it necesary just to be conscious w/o 
knowning that it is? I am ignoring considerations of reportability for 
now...



  I know that I disagree with Bruno on this
matter, who sees consciousness everywhere, but Loebianity more restricted.


Does Bruno agree with panprotopsychism?



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Stephen


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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Nov 2012, at 06:24, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 08:43:29PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 8:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something
like:

1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness

2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich  
and
complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle),  
but

not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like
Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."


But this is the step I questioned.  Why not be like the Borg, i.e.
one consciousness with many bodies?  I think we only 'expect' to


Quite possibly because Borgs have lower measure for the anthropic
selection to work on than single body minds, particularly with mortal
bodies, as I would assume a Borg mind is effectively immortal.

I have always felt that one resolution of the Doomsday Argument is
that humanity mind melds (or uploads, Singularity-style) so that
effectively no new minds get born.

I haven't quite figured out what happens if we invert the relationship
- many minds to a body. Why don't we all exhibit multiple personality
disorder? It probably has to do with the embodiment of the mind, but
still I don't know how this connects to the Anthropic Principle.


find ourselves as we are because we don't have good theory about how
we might be otherwise.  COMP proposes to explain how we are by the
UDA, but it needs to explain why we are associated with bodies - not
just assume it to avoid solipism.



Absolutely agree. In fact COMP exacerbates the situation, in that it
is a form of idealism, making the Anthropic Principle mysterious
rather than ordinary. Whilst this is definitely a strike in favour of
materialism, there are so many other disadvantages of materialism that
it is worth trying to nut out how COMP can support the Anthropic  
Principle.



It supports it in this sense. Soon or later the UD emulates the SWE of  
the Milky way, but with a different "Planck constant". We might fail  
to develop in such computations, or with more sparse and rare  
incarnation, hard to access in any immediate way from the type of  
normal computations we are living through, and that might justified  
the choice of some constant. But this we cannot know in advance,  
perhaps the Planck constant is itself determined by a law, that is by  
some key number/machine relations. The risk with the anthropic  
principle would be in overusing it, hidding some deeper necessary  
constrained. from inside there is no device capable of being sure that  
this or that is physical or just geographical. If the material  
hypostases would have collapsed, comp would have entailed that there  
are no physical laws, and that our laws are just a local (in  
arithmetic) geography. The Multiverse would have been a continuum of  
parametrized laws, with many different physics, but this is unlikely,  
both with comp and empiry, except for that 10^500 physical panorama of  
string theory, perhaps. Open problem in comp, to say the least.


Bruno





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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Nov 2012, at 05:00, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.


But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from COMP?
Is it just an anthropic selection argument?

Brent



I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something
like:

1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness

2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and
complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but
not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like
Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."

3) The simplest environment generating a given level of complexity is
one that has arisen as a result of evolution from a much simpler
initial state. This is the evolution in the multiverse observation,
that evolution is the only creative (or information generating)
process.

4) Evolutionary proccesses work with populations, so automatically,
you must have other self-aware entities in your world, and
consequently intersubjectivity.

Note that Bruno does not agree with 1). So I'm not quite sure how he
gets to the anti-solipsist veiwpoint.


By praying, mainly. (grin).
It is not excluded that comp leads to solipsism, especially after or  
near death, but even after death, it is not guarantied either.  
Solipsism is avoided by the first person plural, when the entire  
population of universal beings is multiplied into coherent  
continuation. There might be anthropic, or consciousness-tropic  
conditions justifying this. I do think that the adding of "Dt" makes  
the job (and the "1p", redemolish it for the qualia and sensations).


Everett QM illustrate very well the 'contagion of duplications',  
making us sharing "normal histories". Empirically, Everett saves comp  
from solipsism, but to be "sure", assuming comp, we have to derive  
Everett QM from all computations (a concept that Church Thesis makes  
utterly mathematically clear, as you can choose any Turing universal  
system to be define it mathematically).






1) comes from the fact that applying 2), without something like 1)
being true, leads to the Occam catastrophe, namely we should expect to
find ourselves in a very simple boring world with nothing complex like
brains in it. Given that we can conceive of ourselves as being born
into a virtual reality (eg matrix style) where the virtual reality
generator renders nothing at all, the occams catastrophe situation is
certainly conceivable. Hence my interest at what happens in sensory
deprivation experiments. If you put a newborn baby in one of those, it
may never become conscious (not that that experiment is ethical  
though!).


It may hard for him/her to become self-conscious, but there are  
evidence that ape embryo already dream that they climb in trees, so I  
think the new born baby is conscious. But if you put it in a tank, his  
consciousness might quite similar to the disconnected consciousness of  
a Robinsonian arithmetic. This is not used in UDA. The salvia reports,  
but also the reports of people having been victim of some trauma might  
suggest this.


Bruno




Cheers

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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Nov 2012, at 02:44, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)

COMP   -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.


But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction.  There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted.  That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness.  Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and
not reason to be associated with a particular body.



I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.


The sharing of vast bunch of computations. The existence of first  
person plural realities. The entanglement (the contagion of the  
duplications) in the statistics on computations.






Personally, I think the association is required for self-awareness,
leading me to the conclusion that self-awareness (aka Loebianity) is
required for consciousness. I know that I disagree with Bruno on this
matter, who sees consciousness everywhere,


Not everywhere. I suggest only that a disconnected form of  
consciousness might exist already for the universal numbers.




but Loebianity more restricted.


Loebianity is needed for self-consciousness, the bet on reality,  
others, etc.


Bruno




Cheers

--


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Nov 2012, at 02:14, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak  
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality)


COMP   -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really  
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a  
weirdness close to quantum Everett.


But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction.  There  
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not  
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted.


The modal logics Z1*, X1*, and S4Grz1 generates an infinity of  
experiences testing the logic of the observables. Those obtained have  
been tested, as they corrresponds to orthomodularity, existence of a  
quatization, etc. It is just an open problem if they can emulate a  
quatum computer, as they should.






That's why I brought up the location of consciousness.  Empirically  
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point  
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would  
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and  
not reason to be associated with a particular body.


Yes, there is. the fact that you are indeterminate on an infinity of  
computational histories, which can be relatively deep, making us  
relatively rare and computationally costly, and yet mutiplied into  
continuum of very simlar computations, given a notion of Gaussian  
normality.


Of course it is only a beginning. But it has to work if comp + the  
classical theory of knoweldge are correct, and it is the only theory  
which separates naturally the quanta as particular qualia, and give an  
arithmetical interpretation for the mystical conception of reality  
(Plato, Plotinus).


Bruno






Brent

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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 08:43:29PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
> On 11/10/2012 8:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something
> >like:
> >
> >1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness
> >
> >2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and
> >complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but
> >not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like
> >Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."
> 
> But this is the step I questioned.  Why not be like the Borg, i.e.
> one consciousness with many bodies?  I think we only 'expect' to

Quite possibly because Borgs have lower measure for the anthropic
selection to work on than single body minds, particularly with mortal
bodies, as I would assume a Borg mind is effectively immortal.

I have always felt that one resolution of the Doomsday Argument is
that humanity mind melds (or uploads, Singularity-style) so that
effectively no new minds get born.

I haven't quite figured out what happens if we invert the relationship
- many minds to a body. Why don't we all exhibit multiple personality
disorder? It probably has to do with the embodiment of the mind, but
still I don't know how this connects to the Anthropic Principle.

> find ourselves as we are because we don't have good theory about how
> we might be otherwise.  COMP proposes to explain how we are by the
> UDA, but it needs to explain why we are associated with bodies - not
> just assume it to avoid solipism.
> 

Absolutely agree. In fact COMP exacerbates the situation, in that it
is a form of idealism, making the Anthropic Principle mysterious
rather than ordinary. Whilst this is definitely a strike in favour of
materialism, there are so many other disadvantages of materialism that
it is worth trying to nut out how COMP can support the Anthropic Principle.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[meekerdb]

On 11/10/2012 8:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.

But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from COMP?
Is it just an anthropic selection argument?

Brent


I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something
like:

1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness

2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and
complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but
not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like
Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."


But this is the step I questioned.  Why not be like the Borg, i.e. one consciousness with 
many bodies?  I think we only 'expect' to find ourselves as we are because we don't have 
good theory about how we might be otherwise.  COMP proposes to explain how we are by the 
UDA, but it needs to explain why we are associated with bodies - not just assume it to 
avoid solipism.


Brent



3) The simplest environment generating a given level of complexity is
one that has arisen as a result of evolution from a much simpler
initial state. This is the evolution in the multiverse observation,
that evolution is the only creative (or information generating)
process.

4) Evolutionary proccesses work with populations, so automatically,
you must have other self-aware entities in your world, and
consequently intersubjectivity.

Note that Bruno does not agree with 1). So I'm not quite sure how he
gets to the anti-solipsist veiwpoint.

1) comes from the fact that applying 2), without something like 1)
being true, leads to the Occam catastrophe, namely we should expect to
find ourselves in a very simple boring world with nothing complex like
brains in it. Given that we can conceive of ourselves as being born
into a virtual reality (eg matrix style) where the virtual reality
generator renders nothing at all, the occams catastrophe situation is
certainly conceivable. Hence my interest at what happens in sensory
deprivation experiments. If you put a newborn baby in one of those, it
may never become conscious (not that that experiment is ethical though!).

Cheers



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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
> On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
> >is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
> >anti-solipsism requirement.
> 
> But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from COMP?
> Is it just an anthropic selection argument?
> 
> Brent
> 

I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something
like:

1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness 

2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment sufficiently rich and
complex to support self-aware structures (by Anthropic Principle), but
not more complex than necessary (Occams Razor). Sort of like
Einstein's principle "As simple as possible, and no simpler."  

3) The simplest environment generating a given level of complexity is
one that has arisen as a result of evolution from a much simpler
initial state. This is the evolution in the multiverse observation,
that evolution is the only creative (or information generating)
process.

4) Evolutionary proccesses work with populations, so automatically,
you must have other self-aware entities in your world, and
consequently intersubjectivity.

Note that Bruno does not agree with 1). So I'm not quite sure how he
gets to the anti-solipsist veiwpoint.

1) comes from the fact that applying 2), without something like 1)
being true, leads to the Occam catastrophe, namely we should expect to
find ourselves in a very simple boring world with nothing complex like
brains in it. Given that we can conceive of ourselves as being born
into a virtual reality (eg matrix style) where the virtual reality
generator renders nothing at all, the occams catastrophe situation is
certainly conceivable. Hence my interest at what happens in sensory
deprivation experiments. If you put a newborn baby in one of those, it
may never become conscious (not that that experiment is ethical though!).

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[meekerdb]

On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)

COMP   ->  NOT MAT
MAT ->  NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.

But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction.  There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted.  That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness.  Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and
not reason to be associated with a particular body.


I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.


But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from COMP?  Is it just an 
anthropic selection argument?


Brent



Personally, I think the association is required for self-awareness,
leading me to the conclusion that self-awareness (aka Loebianity) is
required for consciousness. I know that I disagree with Bruno on this
matter, who sees consciousness everywhere, but Loebianity more restricted.

Cheers



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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
> On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak
> >materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
> >reality)
> >
> >COMP   -> NOT MAT
> >MAT -> NOT COMP
> >NOT MAT or NOT COMP
> >
> >I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really
> >MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
> >weirdness close to quantum Everett.
> 
> But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction.  There
> may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not
> made many definite predictions that could be contradicted.  That's
> why I brought up the location of consciousness.  Empirically
> consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
> of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
> predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and
> not reason to be associated with a particular body.
> 

I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.

Personally, I think the association is required for self-awareness,
leading me to the conclusion that self-awareness (aka Loebianity) is
required for consciousness. I know that I disagree with Bruno on this
matter, who sees consciousness everywhere, but Loebianity more restricted.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[meekerdb]

On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak materialism: the 
doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality)


COMP   -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really MAT means or 
explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a weirdness close to quantum Everett. 


But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction.  There may be a contradiction 
with empirical observation, but COMP has not made many definite predictions that could be 
contradicted.  That's why I brought up the location of consciousness.  Empirically 
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point of the duplication 
experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would predict that a consciousness should have 
no particular location and not reason to be associated with a particular body.


Brent

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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Nov 2012, at 10:11, freqflyer07281972 wrote:


Hey all on the list,

Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this  
teleportation business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's  
Razorish to simply conclude from the entire argument that the  
correct substitution level is, in principle, not only not knowable,  
but not achievable, which means:


congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment  
proof that teleportation is impossible in any cases greater than,  
say, 12 atoms or so (give me a margin of error of about plus/minus  
100) ...


No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:  (MAT is weak  
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality)


COMP   -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP

I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really MAT  
means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a weirdness  
close to quantum Everett.





this is very reminiscent of the way that time travel theorists use  
some of godel's closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to einstein's  
relativity to argue that time travel to the past is possible. The  
problem is, the furthest back you can go is when you made the CTC,  
and yet in order to make the CTC, the formal and physical conditions  
require that you already have to have a time machine. This, of  
course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in the time  
machine in the first place, you have to have had a time machine to  
use as a kind of mechanism for the whole project.


But such loop can exist consistently in solution of the GR equation.  
that's what Gödel showed. I don't think this was really a problem for  
Einstein, as he said more than once, that time is an illusion. We  
would say now that it is a machine mental construction, which obeys  
the laws of machines.






In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the  
conclusion you want it to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in  
the computation of some infinite computer) but rather the less  
appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the teleportation required in  
your entire thought experiment is simply impossible, for much of the  
same reasons as time travel is impossible.


But then we cannot be even quantum computer, because they can emulate  
by a classical machine, and they too exist in the arithmetical realm.


Any way, I don't defend comp, I just show that comp makes physics  
derivable in arithmetic, and that if you do it in some way, (using the  
logic of self-reference) you can extract a general theory of qualia,  
with its quanta part that you can compare with nature, and so test  
comp. And up to now, it fits well with the facts.






It's still an important result, but perhaps not as profound as you  
think if we admit that the teleportation required in your thought  
experiment is simply not possibly for purely naturalistic (and  
therefore not computational, or mechanistic) reasons.


But the you need to assume non comp. The non clonability is also easy  
to derive from comp, as the matter which constitutes us is eventually  
defined by the entire, non computable dovetaling.


But puuting the subst level so low that comp is false, force you to  
use a strong form of non comp, where matter is not just infinite, but  
have to be a very special infinite not recoverable in the limiting  
first person indeterminacy. What you do is a bit like introducing an a  
priori unintelligible notion of matter to just avoid the consequence  
of a theory. Bilogy and its extreme redundancy and metabolic exchange  
pleas for comp, as such redundancy and metabolisation would be  
miraculous if not comp emulable. In fact we don't know in nature any  
process not emulable by a computer, except for the consciousness  
selection, like in the WM duplication, or in quantum everett.


You are logically right, but abandoning comp is premature, before  
listening to the machine (AUDA).


I know that some aristotelians are ready for all means, to avoid the  
neoplatonist consequences, but that is normal given the 1500 years of  
authoritative arguments.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[meekerdb]

On 11/10/2012 1:11 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:

Hey all on the list,

Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this teleportation 
business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's Razorish to simply conclude from the 
entire argument that the correct substitution level is, in principle, not only not 
knowable, but not achievable, which means:


congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment proof that teleportation 
is impossible in any cases greater than, say, 12 atoms or so (give me a margin of error 
of about plus/minus 100) ... this is very reminiscent of the way that time travel 
theorists use some of godel's closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to einstein's 
relativity to argue that time travel to the past is possible. The problem is, the 
furthest back you can go is when you made the CTC, and yet in order to make the CTC, the 
formal and physical conditions require that you already have to have a time machine. 
This, of course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in the time machine in the 
first place, you have to have had a time machine to use as a kind of mechanism for the 
whole project.


In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the conclusion you want it 
to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in the computation of some infinite computer) 
but rather the less appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the teleportation required in 
your entire thought experiment is simply impossible, for much of the same reasons as 
time travel is impossible.


I don't see the parallel.  Can you spell it out?

Brent



It's still an important result, but perhaps not as profound as you think if we admit 
that the teleportation required in your thought experiment is simply not possibly for 
purely naturalistic (and therefore not computational, or mechanistic) reasons.


Looking forward to your response,

Dan
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Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?

[John Mikes]

Dear Dan,
you make a lot of sense. Not so surprizing, though: "thought experiments"
are created for handling impossible (and NOT knowable) circumstances in the
tenets of (possible? believed?) scientific figments. Like e.g. the EPR.
Or: teleportation (a decade-long bore for me - sorry, Fellows).
My argument is mainly time-less: you can 'teleportate' (funny word) any
PAST event, not the FUTURE so the Teleport (noun for the teleportated?)
 will experience a DIFFERENT lifeline from the continuation of the
Original.
Your reference to time-travel is appreciable (can I kill my grandmother
before she gave birth to my mother?).
This seems to be a good pastime-game for people who could do smarter.
Regards
John Mikes



On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 4:11 AM, freqflyer07281972 <
thismindisbud...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hey all on the list,
>
> Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this
> teleportation business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's Razorish
> to simply conclude from the entire argument that the correct substitution
> level is, in principle, not only not knowable, but not achievable, which
> means:
>
> congratulations, you have found a convincing thought experiment proof that
> teleportation is impossible in any cases greater than, say, 12 atoms or so
> (give me a margin of error of about plus/minus 100) ... this is very
> reminiscent of the way that time travel theorists use some of godel's
> closed timelike curve (CTC) solutions to einstein's relativity to argue
> that time travel to the past is possible. The problem is, the furthest back
> you can go is when you made the CTC, and yet in order to make the CTC, the
> formal and physical conditions require that you already have to have a time
> machine. This, of course, leads to paradox, because in order to travel in
> the time machine in the first place, you have to have had a time machine to
> use as a kind of mechanism for the whole project.
>
> In the same way, I think, does your ingenious UDA lead not to the
> conclusion you want it to, (i.e. we are eternal numbers contained in the
> computation of some infinite computer) but rather the less appealing
> conclusion that, perhaps, the teleportation required in your entire thought
> experiment is simply impossible, for much of the same reasons as time
> travel is impossible.
>
> It's still an important result, but perhaps not as profound as you think
> if we admit that the teleportation required in your thought experiment is
> simply not possibly for purely naturalistic (and therefore not
> computational, or mechanistic) reasons.
>
> Looking forward to your response,
>
> Dan
>
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