Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 2:51 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it. So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm not shooting the gun by pulling the trigger? You are external to the gun, but you are not external to your brain unless substance dualism is true. You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that configuration is determined by physical factors. The movement of the molecules of your brain *is* your decision. That's what I am telling you but you won't see it. You are only able to see it as a one way street which makes no sense. What you are saying is like 'water is ice but ice is not water'. If I feel something when something happens in my brain, then that means that whatever happens in my brain is also an event in the universe when something is felt. That means molecules feel and see. You could say that groups of molecules feel and see, and that's ok too, but you think it's the 'groupiness' that sees and not the physical reality of the molecules themselves. I am saying that there is no independent groupiness... it is a fantasy. Incorrect. That the movement of the molecules of your brain *is* the decision is eliminative materialism, or perhaps epiphenomenalism. In any case, the behaviour of the molecules is entirely consistent with chemistry. An ion channel opens because it changes conformation due to neurotransmitters binding to it or the transmembrane voltage. Any subjectivity it may have does not enter into the equation. What this means is that molecules as we see them are not the whole story, just as the brain and its actions are not the whole story. We are the other half of the story and we are not made of neurotransmitters or cells any more than a song we make up is our body. Two different ontological schemas. Two opposite schemas twisted orthogonally by the private time to public space juxtaposition. That may be, but the molecules *entirely* determine the behaviour of the brain. If you know chemistry and you know what molecule is where, you know what chemical reactions will occur, and if you know that you know how the person is going to move. You don't know about the person's subjectivity, but you do know about his behaviour. My phone has a one year guarantee, so that it if it fails and can't be repaired Apple will replace it with an identical phone. Are they opening themselves up to legal challenge if this is ontologically impossible? I would imagine that their legal department has defined 'identical' in a commercially feasible way. They can probably send you a phone with similar but not identical parts even. If you look at the serial numbers in your replacement phone, you will readily see that identical is not to be taken absolutely literally. 'Similar enough for you' is what they mean. That is the sort of identity I am interested in if the phone is to be replaced: if it is different in some way I can't detect in normal use I don't care. Similarly if I were to have parts of my body replaced: if I can't tell any difference after a few days, that's good enough for me. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Friday, November 2, 2012 8:18:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 2:51 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it. So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm not shooting the gun by pulling the trigger? You are external to the gun, but you are not external to your brain unless substance dualism is true. The problem with substance dualism is that it is redundant and has an infinite regress problem connecting the two substances. With dual aspect monism, you don't have those issues so that I can be internal to my brain in some senses, external to my brain in some senses, both internal and external in some senses, and neither internal and external in some senses. Regardless though, even if we said that the sense in which you are literally internal to the brain of this moment also necessarily means that your brain is identical to you. It has to be a two way street. It is completely arbitrary to privilege the spatial-object description of the phenomenon and marginalize the temporal-subject description. It's like saying that a movie exists entirely because there are pixels changing. It is not true. Movies exist because humans make them to tell stories to each other, and the pixels are there to help tell that storytelling. This is the primordial relation of all nature. It gets complicated, and as human beings we are equal parts personal story sequences and impersonal non-story consequences, but nevertheless, it is ultimately the story which is driving the bus. The coin has two sides, but the heads side is the side of the 'genuine leader'. You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that configuration is determined by physical factors. The movement of the molecules of your brain *is* your decision. That's what I am telling you but you won't see it. You are only able to see it as a one way street which makes no sense. What you are saying is like 'water is ice but ice is not water'. If I feel something when something happens in my brain, then that means that whatever happens in my brain is also an event in the universe when something is felt. That means molecules feel and see. You could say that groups of molecules feel and see, and that's ok too, but you think it's the 'groupiness' that sees and not the physical reality of the molecules themselves. I am saying that there is no independent groupiness... it is a fantasy. Incorrect. That the movement of the molecules of your brain *is* the decision is eliminative materialism, or perhaps epiphenomenalism. No, your view has it upside down. The mindset which generates that view is so absolutely biased that it cannot conceive of turning this simple picture right side up. If something looks like particles moving on the outside but feels like remembering a fishing trip on the inside, that doesn't mean that the memory is the epiphenomenon. The memory is the whole point of the particles. They have nothing else to do sitting in your skull but to provide the grunt work of organizing your access to your own human experiences. It is not eliminative materialism to say that object and subject are the same thing from different views, it is dual aspect monism. When I say 'there are two sides to this coin', your mind keeps responding 'but coins are tails'. He keeps looking at the universe from an external perspective and then projecting that world of objects-within-objects as some kind of explanation of the subject who he actually is. My view is that it cannot work that way. In any case, the behaviour of the molecules is entirely consistent with chemistry. An ion channel opens because it changes conformation due to neurotransmitters binding to it or the transmembrane voltage. Any subjectivity it may have does not enter into the equation. What this means is that molecules as we see them are not the whole story, just as the brain and its actions are not the whole story. We are the other half of the story and we are not made of neurotransmitters or cells any more than a song we make up is our body. Two different ontological schemas. Two opposite schemas twisted orthogonally by the private time to public space juxtaposition. That may be, but the molecules *entirely* determine the behaviour of the brain. When I say the words bright blue liquid I have changed the behavior of the molecules of your brain *entirely*. It was not anything but my intention to write these words to you which made that change. Your brain, it's neurons and molecules dutifully *follow* my commands from across the internet with no biochemistry connecting us whatsoever. The reasoning you are using is circular and disconnected from reality. It makes sense, and again
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 3:44 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: I'm talking about *every experiment* that has been done. There is nothing to misunderstand. When I change my mind, through my own thought or though some image or suggestion, that change is reflected as a passive consequence of the macro-level event. I am not at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - I can think about all kinds of things. I can take drugs to further impose my high level agenda on low level neurology. You are at the mercy of the cellular agendas of your brain unless you believe there is a magical effect of consciousness on matter. How else can I try to explain this? It appears that you are bamboozled by complex systems, so that even if each simple interaction is understandable individually you imagine that something mysterious might be happening if you can't hold all of the interactions in your mind at once. To eliminate this difficulty, consider a very simple system that manifests consciousness. Suppose it has only two components, like two billiard balls. The components could have whatever special qualities are required for consciousness. For example, the balls could have evolved naturally as part of a larger organism. When these balls bounce off each other, consciousness is implemented. Now, the trajectory of these balls is determined completely by such factors as their position, mass, velocity, elasticity, air density, gravitational field, and so on. And as they go about their business bouncing around, consciousness of a basic kind is generated. As they are moving towards each other the ball system is thinking of the number 3, but when they hit and bounce apart it changes its mind and thinks of the number 2. Now, would you say the balls bounced apart because the system decided to think of the number 2, or would you say the system decided to think of the number 2 because the balls bounced apart? The question was about two identical computers, one made in a factory, the other assembled with fantastic luck from raw materials moving about randomly. Will there be any difference in the functioning or consciousness (or lack of it) of the two computers? Yes. We have no way of knowing whether the self-assembly is due to luck or not, so we have to give it the benefit of the doubt. The computer made in the factory is subject to the opposite bias, since we know precisely how it was fabricated and that it was made for the purpose of simulating consciousness. If asked to choose between a known pathological liar who claims to be telling the truth, and someone who has never claimed to be telling the truth, all things being equal, we have to give the benefit of the doubt to the latter, as we have no reason to expect deceit from them. You haven't answered the question. The spontaneously formed computer is *exactly the same* as the manufactured one. I give you what is apparently a brand new iPhone 5, complete with the inscription Designed by Apple in California, assembled in China. You turn it on and it searches for a WiFi network, asks you if you want to set it up as a new phone, asks for your Apple ID, and eventually the home screen appears with the familiar icons. I then inform you that this phone was formed spontaneously in a distant galaxy and arrived on Earth after being ejected by a supernova explosion billions of years ago. You disassemble it and determine that in every respect it seems the same as a phone from the factory. Do you still think that this phone would have different experiences purely because of its origin? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Thursday, November 1, 2012 8:43:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 3:44 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: I'm talking about *every experiment* that has been done. There is nothing to misunderstand. When I change my mind, through my own thought or though some image or suggestion, that change is reflected as a passive consequence of the macro-level event. I am not at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - I can think about all kinds of things. I can take drugs to further impose my high level agenda on low level neurology. You are at the mercy of the cellular agendas of your brain unless you believe there is a magical effect of consciousness on matter. I am at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - absolutely, but the cells of my brain are, in some cases, at the mercy of my agenda. If I want to stay awake all night playing with some interesting toy, my circadian rhythms are going to have to wait, for a while anyways. How else can I try to explain this? You have already explained it over and over. You aren't listening to me. I understand every bit of your argument. It is my argument that you don't understand. I used to believe what you believe. I know better now. You have nothing to teach me. Your choices are to listen, not to listen, or bang your head against the wall telling me what I already know. It appears that you are bamboozled by complex systems, Nope. You are projecting stupidity onto me because your ego can't tolerate my disagreement with you. so that even if each simple interaction is understandable individually you imagine that something mysterious might be happening if you can't hold all of the interactions in your mind at once. To eliminate this difficulty, consider a very simple system that manifests consciousness. Suppose it has only two components, like two billiard balls. The components could have whatever special qualities are required for consciousness. For example, the balls could have evolved naturally as part of a larger organism. When these balls bounce off each other, consciousness is implemented. Now, the trajectory of these balls is determined completely by such factors as their position, mass, velocity, elasticity, air density, gravitational field, and so on. And as they go about their business bouncing around, consciousness of a basic kind is generated. As they are moving towards each other the ball system is thinking of the number 3, but when they hit and bounce apart it changes its mind and thinks of the number 2. Now, would you say the balls bounced apart because the system decided to think of the number 2, or would you say the system decided to think of the number 2 because the balls bounced apart? The difference between A) Balls bouncing because the system thought of a number and B) The system thought of a number because balls bounce is a matter of how the system interprets itself. Neither are primitively real. Consciousness is the capacity to discern different categories of realism. You dramatically underestimate the extent to which consciousness defines the universe. It is total. The question was about two identical computers, one made in a factory, the other assembled with fantastic luck from raw materials moving about randomly. Will there be any difference in the functioning or consciousness (or lack of it) of the two computers? Yes. We have no way of knowing whether the self-assembly is due to luck or not, so we have to give it the benefit of the doubt. The computer made in the factory is subject to the opposite bias, since we know precisely how it was fabricated and that it was made for the purpose of simulating consciousness. If asked to choose between a known pathological liar who claims to be telling the truth, and someone who has never claimed to be telling the truth, all things being equal, we have to give the benefit of the doubt to the latter, as we have no reason to expect deceit from them. You haven't answered the question. The spontaneously formed computer is *exactly the same* as the manufactured one. You are begging the question. I am saying that it is an ontological impossibility. Each event is a particular unrepeatable event in the history of the cosmos on some level. I give you what is apparently a brand new iPhone 5, complete with the inscription Designed by Apple in California, assembled in China. You turn it on and it searches for a WiFi network, asks you if you want to set it up as a new phone, asks for your Apple ID, and eventually the home screen appears with the familiar icons. I then inform you that this phone was formed spontaneously in a distant galaxy and arrived on Earth after being ejected by a supernova explosion billions of years ago. You disassemble it and determine that in every respect it seems the same as a phone from the
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 11/1/2012 8:19 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: You have already explained it over and over. You aren't listening to me. I understand every bit of your argument. It is my argument that you don't understand. I used to believe what you believe. I know better now. The question is how do you know this. All I've seen are assertions about what computers will never be able to do - which is not evidence for much of anything. Brent You have nothing to teach me. Your choices are to listen, not to listen, or bang your head against the wall telling me what I already know. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 12:19 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Thursday, November 1, 2012 8:43:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 3:44 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: I'm talking about *every experiment* that has been done. There is nothing to misunderstand. When I change my mind, through my own thought or though some image or suggestion, that change is reflected as a passive consequence of the macro-level event. I am not at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - I can think about all kinds of things. I can take drugs to further impose my high level agenda on low level neurology. You are at the mercy of the cellular agendas of your brain unless you believe there is a magical effect of consciousness on matter. I am at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - absolutely, but the cells of my brain are, in some cases, at the mercy of my agenda. If I want to stay awake all night playing with some interesting toy, my circadian rhythms are going to have to wait, for a while anyways. But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it. You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that configuration is determined by physical factors. The experiential aspect of it is completely invisible to a scientist examining your brain. How else can I try to explain this? You have already explained it over and over. You aren't listening to me. I understand every bit of your argument. It is my argument that you don't understand. I used to believe what you believe. I know better now. You have nothing to teach me. Your choices are to listen, not to listen, or bang your head against the wall telling me what I already know. It appears that you are bamboozled by complex systems, Nope. You are projecting stupidity onto me because your ego can't tolerate my disagreement with you. It's not stupidity, it's impossible for a normal human to hold in his mind the entire complex workings of a brain. so that even if each simple interaction is understandable individually you imagine that something mysterious might be happening if you can't hold all of the interactions in your mind at once. To eliminate this difficulty, consider a very simple system that manifests consciousness. Suppose it has only two components, like two billiard balls. The components could have whatever special qualities are required for consciousness. For example, the balls could have evolved naturally as part of a larger organism. When these balls bounce off each other, consciousness is implemented. Now, the trajectory of these balls is determined completely by such factors as their position, mass, velocity, elasticity, air density, gravitational field, and so on. And as they go about their business bouncing around, consciousness of a basic kind is generated. As they are moving towards each other the ball system is thinking of the number 3, but when they hit and bounce apart it changes its mind and thinks of the number 2. Now, would you say the balls bounced apart because the system decided to think of the number 2, or would you say the system decided to think of the number 2 because the balls bounced apart? The difference between A) Balls bouncing because the system thought of a number and B) The system thought of a number because balls bounce is a matter of how the system interprets itself. Neither are primitively real. Consciousness is the capacity to discern different categories of realism. You dramatically underestimate the extent to which consciousness defines the universe. It is total. The ball system believes that the bouncing apart happened because of its decision. That is the nature of conscious systems: even if they are able to see their own internal workings they still have the feeling I did it because I wanted to. Which is true, I did do it because I wanted to, but the wanting, the decision and the action are all caused by the physical processes. The question was about two identical computers, one made in a factory, the other assembled with fantastic luck from raw materials moving about randomly. Will there be any difference in the functioning or consciousness (or lack of it) of the two computers? Yes. We have no way of knowing whether the self-assembly is due to luck or not, so we have to give it the benefit of the doubt. The computer made in the factory is subject to the opposite bias, since we know precisely how it was fabricated and that it was made for the purpose of simulating consciousness. If asked to choose between a known pathological liar who claims to be telling the truth, and someone who has never claimed to be telling the truth, all things being equal, we have to give the benefit of the doubt to the latter, as we have no reason to expect deceit from them. You haven't answered the question. The
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Thursday, November 1, 2012 10:03:18 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: On 11/1/2012 8:19 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: You have already explained it over and over. You aren't listening to me. I understand every bit of your argument. It is my argument that you don't understand. I used to believe what you believe. I know better now. The question is how do you know this. All I've seen are assertions about what computers will never be able to do - which is not evidence for much of anything. I don't know it, I understand it. My understanding could be incorrect, but I have seen no reason to suspect that so far. My purpose is not to make assertions about what computers will never be able to do, it is to present a framework for the organization of consciousness in the universe. The fact that computers thus far are no more sentient than other machines (something which should be and would be obvious to anyone not enthralled with science fiction religiosity about AI) makes sense in my framework, given that qualities of participation and perception accumulate through experience itself and cannot be imported from a completely foreign context. My model suggests that most physical qualities can only be experienced first hand from the inside out, so that a device built entirely on exterior qualities (positions in space) has no chance of accidentally reproducing an interiority which has developed longitudinally through time as sense experience. Craig Brent You have nothing to teach me. Your choices are to listen, not to listen, or bang your head against the wall telling me what I already know. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/2RhLxV1Y16oJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Thursday, November 1, 2012 10:03:21 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 12:19 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Thursday, November 1, 2012 8:43:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Oct 29, 2012 at 3:44 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: I'm talking about *every experiment* that has been done. There is nothing to misunderstand. When I change my mind, through my own thought or though some image or suggestion, that change is reflected as a passive consequence of the macro-level event. I am not at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - I can think about all kinds of things. I can take drugs to further impose my high level agenda on low level neurology. You are at the mercy of the cellular agendas of your brain unless you believe there is a magical effect of consciousness on matter. I am at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - absolutely, but the cells of my brain are, in some cases, at the mercy of my agenda. If I want to stay awake all night playing with some interesting toy, my circadian rhythms are going to have to wait, for a while anyways. But you can't stay awake unless your hardware allows it. So what? I can't shoot a gun unless the trigger works. Does that mean I'm not shooting the gun by pulling the trigger? You can't decide to do anything unless your brain goes into the particular configuration consistent with that decision, and the movement into that configuration is determined by physical factors. The movement of the molecules of your brain *is* your decision. That's what I am telling you but you won't see it. You are only able to see it as a one way street which makes no sense. What you are saying is like 'water is ice but ice is not water'. If I feel something when something happens in my brain, then that means that whatever happens in my brain is also an event in the universe when something is felt. That means molecules feel and see. You could say that groups of molecules feel and see, and that's ok too, but you think it's the 'groupiness' that sees and not the physical reality of the molecules themselves. I am saying that there is no independent groupiness... it is a fantasy. Incorrect. What this means is that molecules as we see them are not the whole story, just as the brain and its actions are not the whole story. We are the other half of the story and we are not made of neurotransmitters or cells any more than a song we make up is our body. Two different ontological schemas. Two opposite schemas twisted orthogonally by the private time to public space juxtaposition. The experiential aspect of it is completely invisible to a scientist examining your brain. How else can I try to explain this? You have already explained it over and over. You aren't listening to me. I understand every bit of your argument. It is my argument that you don't understand. I used to believe what you believe. I know better now. You have nothing to teach me. Your choices are to listen, not to listen, or bang your head against the wall telling me what I already know. It appears that you are bamboozled by complex systems, Nope. You are projecting stupidity onto me because your ego can't tolerate my disagreement with you. It's not stupidity, it's impossible for a normal human to hold in his mind the entire complex workings of a brain. Maybe I misunderstood what you meant by It appears that you are bamboozled by complex systems. so that even if each simple interaction is understandable individually you imagine that something mysterious might be happening if you can't hold all of the interactions in your mind at once. To eliminate this difficulty, consider a very simple system that manifests consciousness. Suppose it has only two components, like two billiard balls. The components could have whatever special qualities are required for consciousness. For example, the balls could have evolved naturally as part of a larger organism. When these balls bounce off each other, consciousness is implemented. Now, the trajectory of these balls is determined completely by such factors as their position, mass, velocity, elasticity, air density, gravitational field, and so on. And as they go about their business bouncing around, consciousness of a basic kind is generated. As they are moving towards each other the ball system is thinking of the number 3, but when they hit and bounce apart it changes its mind and thinks of the number 2. Now, would you say the balls bounced apart because the system decided to think of the number 2, or would you say the system decided to think of the number 2 because the balls bounced apart? The difference between A) Balls bouncing because the system thought of a number and B) The system thought of a number because balls bounce is a matter of how the system interprets itself.
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 at 3:25 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Stathis Papaioannou Building more complex structures out of simpler ones by a simple set of rules (or any set of rules) seems to violate the second law of thermodynamics. Do you have a way around the second law ? What you are proposing seems to be goal-directed behavior by the gods of small things. Total entropy increases but local entropy can decrease. It's why life exists even though the universe is running down. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
Hi Stathis Papaioannou Building more complex structures out of simpler ones by a simple set of rules (or any set of rules) seems to violate the second law of thermodynamics. Do you have a way around the second law ? What you are proposing seems to be goal-directed behavior by the gods of small things. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/29/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-28, 05:47:58 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 5:48 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: It seems that you do not understand the meaning of the term consistent with the laws of physics. It means that when you decide to play tennis the neurons in your brain will depolarise because of the ionic gradients, If you can't see how ridiculous that view is, there is not much I can say that will help you. My decision to play tennis *IS* the depolarization of neurons. That sounds like eliminative materialism. It is a bit like saying that the movement of the car down the road *IS* the combustion of fuel in the cylinders, transmission of power to the wheels, and all the other lower level phenomena that make up the car. The ionic gradients have no opinion of whether or not I am about to play tennis. The brain as a whole, every cell, every molecule, every charge and field, is just the spatially extended shadow of *me* or my 'life'. I am the event which unites all of the functions and structures together, from the micro to the macro, and when I change my mind, that change is reflected on every level. You change your mind because all the components of your brain change configuration. If this did not happen, your mind could not change. The mind is the higher level phenomenon. The analogy is as above with the car: it drives down the road because of all the mechanics functioning in a particular way, and you could say that driving down the road is equivalent to the mechanics functioning in a particular way. the permeability of the membrane to different ions, the way the ion channels change their conformation in response to an electric field, and many other such physical factors. It is these physical factors which result in your decision to play tennis and then your getting up to retrieve your tennis racquet. If it were the other way around - your decision causes neurons to depolarise - then we would observe miraculous events in your brain, ion channels opening in the absence of any electric field or neurotransmitter change, and so on. No. The miraculous event is viewable any time we look at how a conscious intention appears in an fMRI. We see spontaneous simultaneous activity in many regions of the brain, coordinated on many levels. This is the footprint of where we stand. When we take a step, the footprint changes. We are the leader of these brain processes, not the follower. You completely misunderstand these experiments. Please read about excitable cells before commenting further. The following online articles seem quite good. The third is about spontaneous neuronal activity. http://users.rcn.com/jkimball.ma.ultranet/BiologyPages/E/ExcitableCells.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Membrane_potential http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_oscillation Cells don't defy entropy and planes don't defy gravity. Their respective behaviour is consistent with our theories about entropy and gravity. Cells defy entropy locally. Planes allow us to get around some constraints of gravity. If your definition of any law is so broad that it includes all possible technological violations of it, then how does it really give us any insight? The laws of nature are broad enough to determine everything everywhere that has happened and will happen. How the computer was made would have no effect on its behaviour or consciousness. Yes, it would. If I make a refrigerator, I can assume that it is a box with cooling mechanism. If I find an organism which has evolved to cool parts of itself to store food, then that is a completely different thing. The question was about two identical computers, one made in a factory, the other assembled with fantastic luck from raw materials moving about randomly. Will there be any difference in the functioning or consciousness (or lack of it) of the two computers? If a biological human were put together from raw materials by advanced aliens would that make any difference to his consciousness or intelligence? It would if we were automaton servants of their agendas. If the created human had a similar structure to a naturally developed human he would have similar behaviour and similar experiences. How could it possibly be otherwise? Because consciousness is not a structure, it is an event. It is an experience which unifies bodies from
Re: Solipsism = 1p
*Bruno*, I cannot keep up with argumentation that includes opposites to ALL tenets previously stated. Who knows what kind of *'hardwire* does a brain have (I mean: not the physiological tissue-construct, but the complex brain* function* also called 'brain). Anatomists, physiologists, neurologists and other conservative scientists know only peripheral characteristics and details. The hard problem functionality (mentality etc.) is still in our dreams. We (I at least) have not cracked (yet?) YOUR *'universal machine'*thinking. If* Stathis* guesses that Lucy used only ~0,1% of her (available?) mental capabilities (=hardware) in HER lifestyle, I don't think 99.9% of her brain-hardware was unused and was a mere filling to her skull. That would not click with nature's so far observed economy. That also would not jibe with the development of new species with increased capabilities from the simpler ones in their ancestors. Development seems to work in concerted steps - one requirement brings about another one that helps - and so on. And this - IMO - is *B O T H *hardware and software, the discerned two components which I consider our human artifacts - borrowed from our primitive, embryonic binary kraxlwerk computer - rather than being original distinctions (terms?) of the infinite natural complexity. *Question to Bruno*: can *YOU* 'reprogram' a universal computer? does it have a closed (though maybe immense) finite hardware and a changeable software? John M On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 11:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: John, A fixed universal machine (some hardwired one, like a brain or a laptop) can emulate a self-modifying universal machine, even one which modifies itself completely. Bruno On 26 Oct 2012, at 23:08, John Mikes wrote: Stathis: IMO you left out one difference in equating computer and human: the programmed comp. cannot exceed its hardwre - given content while (SOMEHOW???) a human mind receives additional information from parts 'unknown' (see the steps forward in cultural history of the sciences?) - accordingly a 'programmed' human may have resources beyond it's given hardware content. John M On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 7:38 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote: On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would all be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer itself rather than the programming, that would be a good sign. A computer cannot defy its programming but nothing whatsoever can defy its programming. What you do when you program a computer, at the basic level, is put its hardware in a particular configuration. The hardware can then only move into future physical states consistent with that configuration. Defying its programming would mean doing something *not* consistent with its initial state and the laws of physics. That's not possible for - and you have explicitly agreed with this, saying I misunderstood you when I claimed otherwise - either a computer or a human. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 5:48 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: It seems that you do not understand the meaning of the term consistent with the laws of physics. It means that when you decide to play tennis the neurons in your brain will depolarise because of the ionic gradients, If you can't see how ridiculous that view is, there is not much I can say that will help you. My decision to play tennis *IS* the depolarization of neurons. That sounds like eliminative materialism. It is a bit like saying that the movement of the car down the road *IS* the combustion of fuel in the cylinders, transmission of power to the wheels, and all the other lower level phenomena that make up the car. The ionic gradients have no opinion of whether or not I am about to play tennis. The brain as a whole, every cell, every molecule, every charge and field, is just the spatially extended shadow of *me* or my 'life'. I am the event which unites all of the functions and structures together, from the micro to the macro, and when I change my mind, that change is reflected on every level. You change your mind because all the components of your brain change configuration. If this did not happen, your mind could not change. The mind is the higher level phenomenon. The analogy is as above with the car: it drives down the road because of all the mechanics functioning in a particular way, and you could say that driving down the road is equivalent to the mechanics functioning in a particular way. the permeability of the membrane to different ions, the way the ion channels change their conformation in response to an electric field, and many other such physical factors. It is these physical factors which result in your decision to play tennis and then your getting up to retrieve your tennis racquet. If it were the other way around - your decision causes neurons to depolarise - then we would observe miraculous events in your brain, ion channels opening in the absence of any electric field or neurotransmitter change, and so on. No. The miraculous event is viewable any time we look at how a conscious intention appears in an fMRI. We see spontaneous simultaneous activity in many regions of the brain, coordinated on many levels. This is the footprint of where we stand. When we take a step, the footprint changes. We are the leader of these brain processes, not the follower. You completely misunderstand these experiments. Please read about excitable cells before commenting further. The following online articles seem quite good. The third is about spontaneous neuronal activity. http://users.rcn.com/jkimball.ma.ultranet/BiologyPages/E/ExcitableCells.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Membrane_potential http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_oscillation Cells don't defy entropy and planes don't defy gravity. Their respective behaviour is consistent with our theories about entropy and gravity. Cells defy entropy locally. Planes allow us to get around some constraints of gravity. If your definition of any law is so broad that it includes all possible technological violations of it, then how does it really give us any insight? The laws of nature are broad enough to determine everything everywhere that has happened and will happen. How the computer was made would have no effect on its behaviour or consciousness. Yes, it would. If I make a refrigerator, I can assume that it is a box with cooling mechanism. If I find an organism which has evolved to cool parts of itself to store food, then that is a completely different thing. The question was about two identical computers, one made in a factory, the other assembled with fantastic luck from raw materials moving about randomly. Will there be any difference in the functioning or consciousness (or lack of it) of the two computers? If a biological human were put together from raw materials by advanced aliens would that make any difference to his consciousness or intelligence? It would if we were automaton servants of their agendas. If the created human had a similar structure to a naturally developed human he would have similar behaviour and similar experiences. How could it possibly be otherwise? Because consciousness is not a structure, it is an event. It is an experience which unifies bodies from the inside out, not a configuration of bodies which has an experience because of external conditions. So how would a human put together by molecular assembly machines using the template of a regular human be different from the regular human in either behaviour or consciousness? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 27 Oct 2012, at 17:49, John Mikes wrote: On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:24, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, October 26, 2012 1:01:34 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 12:41 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: We are atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, and organisms. Whatever we do is what the laws of physics *actually are*. Your assumptions about the laws of physics are 20th century legacy ideas based on exterior manipulations of exterior instruments to measure other exterior phenomena. Whatever we do is determined by a small set of rules, No. What we as humans do is determined by human experiences and human character, which is not completely ruled externally. We participate directly. It could only be a small set of rules if those rules include 'do whatever you like, whenever you have the chance'. JM: who is that agency we? having 'human experiences and human character'? You were quoting Craig. Nt sure I understand Craig paragraph, nor your question here. Bruno the rules being as you say what matter actually does and not imposed by people or divine whim. Matter is a reduced shadow of experiences. Matter is ruled by people and people are ruled by matter. Of the two, people are the more directly and completely real phenomena. This is correct, but not obvious at all (for aristotelicians), and yet a logical consequence of comp, with people replaced by Löbian universal machine. This has been be put in a constructive form, with computer science. It makes comp (+ reasonable definition of knowledge, observation, in the UD context) testable, and already tested on non trivial relations between what is observable (quantum logic). The science and the math already exist. All machines looking inward deep enough will develop a non comp intuition, and some can go beyond. Bruno I really don't understand where you disagree with me, since you keep making statements then pulling back if challenged. I don't see where I am pulling back. I disagree with you in that to you any description of the universe which is not matter in space primarily is inconceivable. I am saying that what matter is and does is not important to understanding consciousness itself. It is important to understanding personal access to human consciousness, i.e. brain health, etc, but otherwise it is consciousness, on many levels and ranges of quality, which gives rise to the appearance of matter and not the other way around. Do you think the molecules in your brain follow the laws of physics, such as they may be? The laws of physics have no preference one way or another whether this part of my brain or that part of my brain is active. I am choosing that directly by what I think about. If I think about playing tennis, then the appropriate cells in my brain will depolarize and molecules will change positions. They are following my laws. Physics is my servant in this case. Of course, if someone gives me a strong drink, then physics is influencing me instead and I am more of a follower of that particular chemical event than a leader. If so, then the behaviour of each molecule is determined or follows probabilistic laws, and hence the behaviour of the collection of molecules also follows deterministic or probabilistic laws. I am determining the probabilities myself, directly. They are me. How could it be otherwise? If consciousness, sense, will, or whatever else is at play in addition to this then we would notice a deviation from these laws. Not in addition to, sense and will are the whole thing. All activity in the universe is sense and will and nothing else. Matter is only the sense and will of something else besides yourself. That is what it would MEAN for consciousness, sense, will or whatever else to have a separate causal efficacy; No. I don't know how many different ways to say this: Sense is the only causal efficacy there ever was, is, or will be. Sense is primordial and universal. Electromagnetism, gravity, strong and weak forces are only examples of our impersonal view of the sense of whatever it is we are studying secondhand. absent this, the physical laws, whatever they are, determine absolutely everything that happens, everywhere, for all time. Which part of this do you not agree with? None of it. I am saying there are no physical laws at all. There is no law book. That is all figurative. What we have thought of as physics is as crude and simplistic as any ancient mythology. What we see as physical laws are the outermost, longest lasting conventions of sense. Nothing more. I think that the way sense works is that it can't contradict itself, so that these oldest ways of relating, once they are established, are no longer easy to change, but higher levels of sense arise out of the loopholes and
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Sunday, October 28, 2012 5:48:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 5:48 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: It seems that you do not understand the meaning of the term consistent with the laws of physics. It means that when you decide to play tennis the neurons in your brain will depolarise because of the ionic gradients, If you can't see how ridiculous that view is, there is not much I can say that will help you. My decision to play tennis *IS* the depolarization of neurons. That sounds like eliminative materialism. It is a bit like saying that the movement of the car down the road *IS* the combustion of fuel in the cylinders, transmission of power to the wheels, and all the other lower level phenomena that make up the car. But you forgot the movements of the driver, pushing pedals and turning the steering wheel. The problem is that you are only seeing it one way, so that if I say that my impulse to move my arm is the electromagnetic changes in my brain and arm, you see that as meaning that the experience of moving my arm is not actually real. What I am saying is the opposite - that all material interactions in the universe are, on some scale, experiences. I'm not eliminating consciousness in favor of materialism, I am expanding materialism to include primordial subjective awareness. The ionic gradients have no opinion of whether or not I am about to play tennis. The brain as a whole, every cell, every molecule, every charge and field, is just the spatially extended shadow of *me* or my 'life'. I am the event which unites all of the functions and structures together, from the micro to the macro, and when I change my mind, that change is reflected on every level. You change your mind because all the components of your brain change configuration. No. A single change of my mind is seen in the brain as millions of cellular events. Your view is factually incorrect. If this did not happen, your mind could not change. I can make it happen voluntarily by changing my mind. It's like a see-saw. If I push down, my brain goes up. They are two views of the same thing which can be leveraged from either the outside in or the inside out. A lot of people can't seem to understand this. It may not be your fault. The mind is the higher level phenomenon. The analogy is as above with the car: it drives down the road because of all the mechanics functioning in a particular way, and you could say that driving down the road is equivalent to the mechanics functioning in a particular way. The car is a tool used by a driver. No amount of mechanism in the car can replace the driver (except on a superficial level). Without someone to use the car for a human purpose, there is no driver and the car is a pointless automation. The same is true for the brain. Without a person to care about a human lifetime, there is no point to a brain. the permeability of the membrane to different ions, the way the ion channels change their conformation in response to an electric field, and many other such physical factors. It is these physical factors which result in your decision to play tennis and then your getting up to retrieve your tennis racquet. If it were the other way around - your decision causes neurons to depolarise - then we would observe miraculous events in your brain, ion channels opening in the absence of any electric field or neurotransmitter change, and so on. No. The miraculous event is viewable any time we look at how a conscious intention appears in an fMRI. We see spontaneous simultaneous activity in many regions of the brain, coordinated on many levels. This is the footprint of where we stand. When we take a step, the footprint changes. We are the leader of these brain processes, not the follower. You completely misunderstand these experiments. I'm talking about *every experiment* that has been done. There is nothing to misunderstand. When I change my mind, through my own thought or though some image or suggestion, that change is reflected as a passive consequence of the macro-level event. I am not at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - I can think about all kinds of things. I can take drugs to further impose my high level agenda on low level neurology. Please read about excitable cells before commenting further. The following online articles seem quite good. The third is about spontaneous neuronal activity. http://users.rcn.com/jkimball.ma.ultranet/BiologyPages/E/ExcitableCells.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Membrane_potential http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_oscillation Yeah, I know about all of this stuff. Cells don't defy entropy and planes don't defy gravity. Their respective behaviour is consistent with our theories about entropy and gravity.
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 8:08 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Stathis: IMO you left out one difference in equating computer and human: the programmed comp. cannot exceed its hardwre - given content while (SOMEHOW???) a human mind receives additional information from parts 'unknown' (see the steps forward in cultural history of the sciences?) - accordingly a 'programmed' human may have resources beyond it's given hardware content. John M How can a human exceed his hardware? Everything he does must be due to the hardware plus input from the environment, same as the computer, same as everything else in the universe. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Saturday, October 27, 2012 6:28:14 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 8:08 AM, John Mikes jam...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Stathis: IMO you left out one difference in equating computer and human: the programmed comp. cannot exceed its hardwre - given content while (SOMEHOW???) a human mind receives additional information from parts 'unknown' (see the steps forward in cultural history of the sciences?) - accordingly a 'programmed' human may have resources beyond it's given hardware content. John M How can a human exceed his hardware? Everything he does must be due to the hardware plus input from the environment, same as the computer, same as everything else in the universe. What input from the environment might cause an acorn to build and fly a B-52? Is there a special B-52 building gene that comes with humans but not acorns? It's a really narrow view of the cosmos which imagines that the universe is about nothing but what stuff it is made of - that the environment dictates with inputs but that the self has no non-environmental outputs. What happens if we take it a step further and recuse ourselves and our human layer of experience entirely. Who is to say whether the appearance of neurons and atoms is merely an evolutionary device to prop up the hormone and neurotransmitter spray that is 'science' or if, instead, it is evolutionary biology which is the illusion of molecules, whose endless repeating patterns know no genuine coherence as individual creatures or species. Who chooses the level of description? Craig Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/uuP0oUFXbMIJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:24, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, October 26, 2012 1:01:34 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 12:41 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: We are atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, and organisms. Whatever we do is what the laws of physics *actually are*. Your assumptions about the laws of physics are 20th century legacy ideas based on exterior manipulations of exterior instruments to measure other exterior phenomena. Whatever we do is determined by a small set of rules, No. What we as humans do is determined by human experiences and human character, which is not completely ruled externally. We participate directly. It could only be a small set of rules if those rules include 'do whatever you like, whenever you have the chance'. the rules being as you say what matter actually does and not imposed by people or divine whim. Matter is a reduced shadow of experiences. Matter is ruled by people and people are ruled by matter. Of the two, people are the more directly and completely real phenomena. This is correct, but not obvious at all (for aristotelicians), and yet a logical consequence of comp, with people replaced by Löbian universal machine. This has been be put in a constructive form, with computer science. It makes comp (+ reasonable definition of knowledge, observation, in the UD context) testable, and already tested on non trivial relations between what is observable (quantum logic). The science and the math already exist. All machines looking inward deep enough will develop a non comp intuition, and some can go beyond. Bruno I really don't understand where you disagree with me, since you keep making statements then pulling back if challenged. I don't see where I am pulling back. I disagree with you in that to you any description of the universe which is not matter in space primarily is inconceivable. I am saying that what matter is and does is not important to understanding consciousness itself. It is important to understanding personal access to human consciousness, i.e. brain health, etc, but otherwise it is consciousness, on many levels and ranges of quality, which gives rise to the appearance of matter and not the other way around. Do you think the molecules in your brain follow the laws of physics, such as they may be? The laws of physics have no preference one way or another whether this part of my brain or that part of my brain is active. I am choosing that directly by what I think about. If I think about playing tennis, then the appropriate cells in my brain will depolarize and molecules will change positions. They are following my laws. Physics is my servant in this case. Of course, if someone gives me a strong drink, then physics is influencing me instead and I am more of a follower of that particular chemical event than a leader. If so, then the behaviour of each molecule is determined or follows probabilistic laws, and hence the behaviour of the collection of molecules also follows deterministic or probabilistic laws. I am determining the probabilities myself, directly. They are me. How could it be otherwise? If consciousness, sense, will, or whatever else is at play in addition to this then we would notice a deviation from these laws. Not in addition to, sense and will are the whole thing. All activity in the universe is sense and will and nothing else. Matter is only the sense and will of something else besides yourself. That is what it would MEAN for consciousness, sense, will or whatever else to have a separate causal efficacy; No. I don't know how many different ways to say this: Sense is the only causal efficacy there ever was, is, or will be. Sense is primordial and universal. Electromagnetism, gravity, strong and weak forces are only examples of our impersonal view of the sense of whatever it is we are studying secondhand. absent this, the physical laws, whatever they are, determine absolutely everything that happens, everywhere, for all time. Which part of this do you not agree with? None of it. I am saying there are no physical laws at all. There is no law book. That is all figurative. What we have thought of as physics is as crude and simplistic as any ancient mythology. What we see as physical laws are the outermost, longest lasting conventions of sense. Nothing more. I think that the way sense works is that it can't contradict itself, so that these oldest ways of relating, once they are established, are no longer easy to change, but higher levels of sense arise out of the loopholes and can influence lower levels of sense directly. Hence, molecules build living cells defy entropy, human beings build airplanes to defy gravity. You can't see consciousness that way. From far enough a way, our cities look like nothing more than glowing colonies of mold. It's not programming that makes us one
Re: Solipsism = 1p
John, A fixed universal machine (some hardwired one, like a brain or a laptop) can emulate a self-modifying universal machine, even one which modifies itself completely. Bruno On 26 Oct 2012, at 23:08, John Mikes wrote: Stathis: IMO you left out one difference in equating computer and human: the programmed comp. cannot exceed its hardwre - given content while (SOMEHOW???) a human mind receives additional information from parts 'unknown' (see the steps forward in cultural history of the sciences?) - accordingly a 'programmed' human may have resources beyond it's given hardware content. John M On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 7:38 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would all be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer itself rather than the programming, that would be a good sign. A computer cannot defy its programming but nothing whatsoever can defy its programming. What you do when you program a computer, at the basic level, is put its hardware in a particular configuration. The hardware can then only move into future physical states consistent with that configuration. Defying its programming would mean doing something *not* consistent with its initial state and the laws of physics. That's not possible for - and you have explicitly agreed with this, saying I misunderstood you when I claimed otherwise - either a computer or a human. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
Stathis, do you think Lucy had the same (thinking?) hardware as you have? are you negating (human and other) development (I evade 'evolution') as e.g. the famous cases of mutation? Is all that RD a reshuffling of what WAS already knowable? Maybe my agnosticism dictates different potentials at work from your Idon'tknowwhat position, but in my belief system there is - beyond our existing world-model - an infinite complexity of unknowable whoknowswhat-s infiltrating into our knowable inventory in ways adjusted to our capabilities. THAT I cannot assign to an algorithmic machine. Then again you write: UNIVERSE - a word usually applied to our part of a 'physical world' - not the Everything of which it may be part of. My (assumed?) infinite complexity is not restricted to physical units of our universe. Accordingly I see some definitional discrepancy between our conclusions. John Mikes On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 6:27 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote: On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 8:08 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Stathis: IMO you left out one difference in equating computer and human: the programmed comp. cannot exceed its hardwre - given content while (SOMEHOW???) a human mind receives additional information from parts 'unknown' (see the steps forward in cultural history of the sciences?) - accordingly a 'programmed' human may have resources beyond it's given hardware content. John M How can a human exceed his hardware? Everything he does must be due to the hardware plus input from the environment, same as the computer, same as everything else in the universe. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Saturday, October 27, 2012 9:18:33 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:24, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, October 26, 2012 1:01:34 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 12:41 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: We are atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, and organisms. Whatever we do is what the laws of physics *actually are*. Your assumptions about the laws of physics are 20th century legacy ideas based on exterior manipulations of exterior instruments to measure other exterior phenomena. Whatever we do is determined by a small set of rules, No. What we as humans do is determined by human experiences and human character, which is not completely ruled externally. We participate directly. It could only be a small set of rules if those rules include 'do whatever you like, whenever you have the chance'. the rules being as you say what matter actually does and not imposed by people or divine whim. Matter is a reduced shadow of experiences. Matter is ruled by people and people are ruled by matter. Of the two, people are the more directly and completely real phenomena. This is correct, but not obvious at all (for aristotelicians), and yet a logical consequence of comp, with people replaced by Löbian universal machine. This has been be put in a constructive form, with computer science. It makes comp (+ reasonable definition of knowledge, observation, in the UD context) testable, and already tested on non trivial relations between what is observable (quantum logic). The science and the math already exist. All machines looking inward deep enough will develop a non comp intuition, and some can go beyond. All animal collectives looking outward far enough will develop a comp counter-intuition, and some can go beyond. Craig Bruno I really don't understand where you disagree with me, since you keep making statements then pulling back if challenged. I don't see where I am pulling back. I disagree with you in that to you any description of the universe which is not matter in space primarily is inconceivable. I am saying that what matter is and does is not important to understanding consciousness itself. It is important to understanding personal access to human consciousness, i.e. brain health, etc, but otherwise it is consciousness, on many levels and ranges of quality, which gives rise to the appearance of matter and not the other way around. Do you think the molecules in your brain follow the laws of physics, such as they may be? The laws of physics have no preference one way or another whether this part of my brain or that part of my brain is active. I am choosing that directly by what I think about. If I think about playing tennis, then the appropriate cells in my brain will depolarize and molecules will change positions. They are following my laws. Physics is my servant in this case. Of course, if someone gives me a strong drink, then physics is influencing me instead and I am more of a follower of that particular chemical event than a leader. If so, then the behaviour of each molecule is determined or follows probabilistic laws, and hence the behaviour of the collection of molecules also follows deterministic or probabilistic laws. I am determining the probabilities myself, directly. They are me. How could it be otherwise? If consciousness, sense, will, or whatever else is at play in addition to this then we would notice a deviation from these laws. Not in addition to, sense and will are the whole thing. All activity in the universe is sense and will and nothing else. Matter is only the sense and will of something else besides yourself. That is what it would MEAN for consciousness, sense, will or whatever else to have a separate causal efficacy; No. I don't know how many different ways to say this: Sense is the only causal efficacy there ever was, is, or will be. Sense is primordial and universal. Electromagnetism, gravity, strong and weak forces are only examples of our impersonal view of the sense of whatever it is we are studying secondhand. absent this, the physical laws, whatever they are, determine absolutely everything that happens, everywhere, for all time. Which part of this do you not agree with? None of it. I am saying there are no physical laws at all. There is no law book. That is all figurative. What we have thought of as physics is as crude and simplistic as any ancient mythology. What we see as physical laws are the outermost, longest lasting conventions of sense. Nothing more. I think that the way sense works is that it can't contradict itself, so that these oldest ways of relating, once they are established, are no longer easy to change, but higher levels of sense arise out of the loopholes and can influence lower levels of sense
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 12:12 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: How can a human exceed his hardware? Everything he does must be due to the hardware plus input from the environment, same as the computer, same as everything else in the universe. What input from the environment might cause an acorn to build and fly a B-52? Is there a special B-52 building gene that comes with humans but not acorns? Humans have a large number of genes enabling them to grow brains and build B-52's while acorns lack these genes. It's a really narrow view of the cosmos which imagines that the universe is about nothing but what stuff it is made of - that the environment dictates with inputs but that the self has no non-environmental outputs. Do you mean can a human do something dependent only on himself and not the environment? I suppose you could say this if you completely isolated him from everything, although even then he would be subject to factors such as ambient temperature and air pressure. What happens if we take it a step further and recuse ourselves and our human layer of experience entirely. Who is to say whether the appearance of neurons and atoms is merely an evolutionary device to prop up the hormone and neurotransmitter spray that is 'science' or if, instead, it is evolutionary biology which is the illusion of molecules, whose endless repeating patterns know no genuine coherence as individual creatures or species. Who chooses the level of description? If you're a solipsist then you choose everything. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 2:38 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Stathis, do you think Lucy had the same (thinking?) hardware as you have? are you negating (human and other) development (I evade 'evolution') as e.g. the famous cases of mutation? Is all that RD a reshuffling of what WAS already knowable? Maybe my agnosticism dictates different potentials at work from your Idon'tknowwhat position, but in my belief system there is - beyond our existing world-model - an infinite complexity of unknowable whoknowswhat-s infiltrating into our knowable inventory in ways adjusted to our capabilities. THAT I cannot assign to an algorithmic machine. Then again you write: UNIVERSE - a word usually applied to our part of a 'physical world' - not the Everything of which it may be part of. My (assumed?) infinite complexity is not restricted to physical units of our universe. Accordingly I see some definitional discrepancy between our conclusions. If the hardware and/or environment is different then the thinking may also be different. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:24, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, October 26, 2012 1:01:34 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 12:41 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: We are atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, and organisms. Whatever we do is what the laws of physics *actually are*. Your assumptions about the laws of physics are 20th century legacy ideas based on exterior manipulations of exterior instruments to measure other exterior phenomena. Whatever we do is determined by a small set of rules, No. What we as humans do is determined by human experiences and human character, which is not completely ruled externally. We participate directly. It could only be a small set of rules if those rules include 'do whatever you like, whenever you have the chance'. ** *JM: who is that agency we? having 'human experiences and human character'? * the rules being as you say what matter actually does and not imposed by people or divine whim. Matter is a reduced shadow of experiences. Matter is ruled by people and people are ruled by matter. Of the two, people are the more directly and completely real phenomena. This is correct, but not obvious at all (for aristotelicians), and yet a logical consequence of comp, with people replaced by Löbian universal machine. This has been be put in a constructive form, with computer science. It makes comp (+ reasonable definition of knowledge, observation, in the UD context) testable, and already tested on non trivial relations between what is observable (quantum logic). The science and the math already exist. All machines looking inward deep enough will develop a non comp intuition, and some can go beyond. Bruno I really don't understand where you disagree with me, since you keep making statements then pulling back if challenged. I don't see where I am pulling back. I disagree with you in that to you any description of the universe which is not matter in space primarily is inconceivable. I am saying that what matter is and does is not important to understanding consciousness itself. It is important to understanding personal access to human consciousness, i.e. brain health, etc, but otherwise it is consciousness, on many levels and ranges of quality, which gives rise to the appearance of matter and not the other way around. Do you think the molecules in your brain follow the laws of physics, such as they may be? The laws of physics have no preference one way or another whether this part of my brain or that part of my brain is active. I am choosing that directly by what I think about. If I think about playing tennis, then the appropriate cells in my brain will depolarize and molecules will change positions. They are following my laws. Physics is my servant in this case. Of course, if someone gives me a strong drink, then physics is influencing me instead and I am more of a follower of that particular chemical event than a leader. If so, then the behaviour of each molecule is determined or follows probabilistic laws, and hence the behaviour of the collection of molecules also follows deterministic or probabilistic laws. I am determining the probabilities myself, directly. They are me. How could it be otherwise? If consciousness, sense, will, or whatever else is at play in addition to this then we would notice a deviation from these laws. Not in addition to, sense and will are the whole thing. All activity in the universe is sense and will and nothing else. Matter is only the sense and will of something else besides yourself. That is what it would MEAN for consciousness, sense, will or whatever else to have a separate causal efficacy; No. I don't know how many different ways to say this: Sense is the only causal efficacy there ever was, is, or will be. Sense is primordial and universal. Electromagnetism, gravity, strong and weak forces are only examples of our impersonal view of the sense of whatever it is we are studying secondhand. absent this, the physical laws, whatever they are, determine absolutely everything that happens, everywhere, for all time. Which part of this do you not agree with? None of it. I am saying there are no physical laws at all. There is no law book. That is all figurative. What we have thought of as physics is as crude and simplistic as any ancient mythology. What we see as physical laws are the outermost, longest lasting conventions of sense. Nothing more. I think that the way sense works is that it can't contradict itself, so that these oldest ways of relating, once they are established, are no longer easy to change, but higher levels of sense arise out of the loopholes and can influence lower levels of sense directly. Hence, molecules build living cells defy entropy, human beings build airplanes to defy gravity. You can't see
Solipsism = 1p
On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 11:24 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comjavascript:; wrote: No. What we as humans do is determined by human experiences and human character, which is not completely ruled externally. We participate directly. It could only be a small set of rules if those rules include 'do whatever you like, whenever you have the chance'. The small set of rules I was referring to are the low level rules, the laws of physics. More complex higher level rules are generated from these. Do whatever you like, whenever you have the chance is an example of such a higher level rule, and it could not occur unless it was consistent with the laws of physics. the rules being as you say what matter actually does and not imposed by people or divine whim. Matter is a reduced shadow of experiences. Matter is ruled by people and people are ruled by matter. Of the two, people are the more directly and completely real phenomena. I really don't understand where you disagree with me, since you keep making statements then pulling back if challenged. I don't see where I am pulling back. I disagree with you in that to you any description of the universe which is not matter in space primarily is inconceivable. I am saying that what matter is and does is not important to understanding consciousness itself. It is important to understanding personal access to human consciousness, i.e. brain health, etc, but otherwise it is consciousness, on many levels and ranges of quality, which gives rise to the appearance of matter and not the other way around. It doesn't matter for the purposes of the discussion if there is no basic physical universe at all: you just add apparently in front of every statement about what happens. Apparently there is a set of physical laws, and everything that apparently happens is consistent with these laws. Do you think the molecules in your brain follow the laws of physics, such as they may be? The laws of physics have no preference one way or another whether this part of my brain or that part of my brain is active. I am choosing that directly by what I think about. If I think about playing tennis, then the appropriate cells in my brain will depolarize and molecules will change positions. They are following my laws. Physics is my servant in this case. Of course, if someone gives me a strong drink, then physics is influencing me instead and I am more of a follower of that particular chemical event than a leader. It seems that you do not understand the meaning of the term consistent with the laws of physics. It means that when you decide to play tennis the neurons in your brain will depolarise because of the ionic gradients, the permeability of the membrane to different ions, the way the ion channels change their conformation in response to an electric field, and many other such physical factors. It is these physical factors which result in your decision to play tennis and then your getting up to retrieve your tennis racquet. If it were the other way around - your decision causes neurons to depolarise - then we would observe miraculous events in your brain, ion channels opening in the absence of any electric field or neurotransmitter change, and so on. If so, then the behaviour of each molecule is determined or follows probabilistic laws, and hence the behaviour of the collection of molecules also follows deterministic or probabilistic laws. I am determining the probabilities myself, directly. They are me. How could it be otherwise? Yes, but this is an empty statement unless you claim that your consciousness causes miraculous events. Otherwise the physical events play out for you in the same way as they do for everything else on the universe, and the consciousness is just a supervemient effect. If consciousness, sense, will, or whatever else is at play in addition to this then we would notice a deviation from these laws. Not in addition to, sense and will are the whole thing. All activity in the universe is sense and will and nothing else. Matter is only the sense and will of something else besides yourself. That is a meaningless statement unless it leads to testable predictions. That is what it would MEAN for consciousness, sense, will or whatever else to have a separate causal efficacy; No. I don't know how many different ways to say this: Sense is the only causal efficacy there ever was, is, or will be. Sense is primordial and universal. Electromagnetism, gravity, strong and weak forces are only examples of our impersonal view of the sense of whatever it is we are studying secondhand. Again, empty of meaning. absent this, the physical laws, whatever they are, determine absolutely everything that happens, everywhere, for all time. Which part of this do you not agree with? None of it. I am saying there are no physical laws at all. There is no law book. That is all figurative. What we have thought of as physics is as
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Saturday, October 27, 2012 11:47:14 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 12:12 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: How can a human exceed his hardware? Everything he does must be due to the hardware plus input from the environment, same as the computer, same as everything else in the universe. What input from the environment might cause an acorn to build and fly a B-52? Is there a special B-52 building gene that comes with humans but not acorns? Humans have a large number of genes enabling them to grow brains and build B-52's while acorns lack these genes. Lots of animals have brains, but they don't build aircraft. They way you are arguing it, there is really no level of power which would not fit into your arbitrary expectations of what any particular piece of hardware could or could not do. Whether it's building B-52s or playing billiards with galaxies using telepathy, it all falls into the range of ho-hum inevitables of evolved structures. It's a really narrow view of the cosmos which imagines that the universe is about nothing but what stuff it is made of - that the environment dictates with inputs but that the self has no non-environmental outputs. Do you mean can a human do something dependent only on himself and not the environment? I suppose you could say this if you completely isolated him from everything, although even then he would be subject to factors such as ambient temperature and air pressure. I am talking about being an authentic participant in the universe. I am making causally efficacious changes to my environment, and your environment. I do these things not because I am bidden by any particular neural or species agenda, but by the agenda I personally co-create. Neither my body nor Homo sapiens in general particularly care for the content of what I am saying, who I vote for, etc. No impersonal law of physics is relevant one way or another. What happens if we take it a step further and recuse ourselves and our human layer of experience entirely. Who is to say whether the appearance of neurons and atoms is merely an evolutionary device to prop up the hormone and neurotransmitter spray that is 'science' or if, instead, it is evolutionary biology which is the illusion of molecules, whose endless repeating patterns know no genuine coherence as individual creatures or species. Who chooses the level of description? If you're a solipsist then you choose everything. Are you a solipsist? Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/kVhamHXk6XAJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Saturday, October 27, 2012 1:03:52 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 11:24 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: No. What we as humans do is determined by human experiences and human character, which is not completely ruled externally. We participate directly. It could only be a small set of rules if those rules include 'do whatever you like, whenever you have the chance'. The small set of rules I was referring to are the low level rules, the laws of physics. More complex higher level rules are generated from these. Do whatever you like, whenever you have the chance is an example of such a higher level rule, and it could not occur unless it was consistent with the laws of physics. I am saying that more complex higher level rules, by definition, cannot be generated from low level rules. It is like saying that the Taj Mahal follows from bricks, or that the internet is generated by electrical utilities. the rules being as you say what matter actually does and not imposed by people or divine whim. Matter is a reduced shadow of experiences. Matter is ruled by people and people are ruled by matter. Of the two, people are the more directly and completely real phenomena. I really don't understand where you disagree with me, since you keep making statements then pulling back if challenged. I don't see where I am pulling back. I disagree with you in that to you any description of the universe which is not matter in space primarily is inconceivable. I am saying that what matter is and does is not important to understanding consciousness itself. It is important to understanding personal access to human consciousness, i.e. brain health, etc, but otherwise it is consciousness, on many levels and ranges of quality, which gives rise to the appearance of matter and not the other way around. It doesn't matter for the purposes of the discussion if there is no basic physical universe at all: you just add apparently in front of every statement about what happens. Apparently there is a set of physical laws, and everything that apparently happens is consistent with these laws. But the only things that happen which is consistent with those laws are things which have to do with the body. Experiential laws are completely at odds with physical laws, and if anything physical laws are all explainable as experiences, but experiences can in no way be explained as physical interactions. Do you think the molecules in your brain follow the laws of physics, such as they may be? The laws of physics have no preference one way or another whether this part of my brain or that part of my brain is active. I am choosing that directly by what I think about. If I think about playing tennis, then the appropriate cells in my brain will depolarize and molecules will change positions. They are following my laws. Physics is my servant in this case. Of course, if someone gives me a strong drink, then physics is influencing me instead and I am more of a follower of that particular chemical event than a leader. It seems that you do not understand the meaning of the term consistent with the laws of physics. It means that when you decide to play tennis the neurons in your brain will depolarise because of the ionic gradients, If you can't see how ridiculous that view is, there is not much I can say that will help you. My decision to play tennis *IS* the depolarization of neurons. The ionic gradients have no opinion of whether or not I am about to play tennis. The brain as a whole, every cell, every molecule, every charge and field, is just the spatially extended shadow of *me* or my 'life'. I am the event which unites all of the functions and structures together, from the micro to the macro, and when I change my mind, that change is reflected on every level. the permeability of the membrane to different ions, the way the ion channels change their conformation in response to an electric field, and many other such physical factors. It is these physical factors which result in your decision to play tennis and then your getting up to retrieve your tennis racquet. If it were the other way around - your decision causes neurons to depolarise - then we would observe miraculous events in your brain, ion channels opening in the absence of any electric field or neurotransmitter change, and so on. No. The miraculous event is viewable any time we look at how a conscious intention appears in an fMRI. We see spontaneous simultaneous activity in many regions of the brain, coordinated on many levels. This is the footprint of where we stand. When we take a step, the footprint changes. We are the leader of these brain processes, not the follower. If so, then the behaviour of each molecule is determined or follows probabilistic laws, and hence the behaviour of the
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Friday, October 26, 2012 1:01:34 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 12:41 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: We are atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, and organisms. Whatever we do is what the laws of physics *actually are*. Your assumptions about the laws of physics are 20th century legacy ideas based on exterior manipulations of exterior instruments to measure other exterior phenomena. Whatever we do is determined by a small set of rules, No. What we as humans do is determined by human experiences and human character, which is not completely ruled externally. We participate directly. It could only be a small set of rules if those rules include 'do whatever you like, whenever you have the chance'. the rules being as you say what matter actually does and not imposed by people or divine whim. Matter is a reduced shadow of experiences. Matter is ruled by people and people are ruled by matter. Of the two, people are the more directly and completely real phenomena. I really don't understand where you disagree with me, since you keep making statements then pulling back if challenged. I don't see where I am pulling back. I disagree with you in that to you any description of the universe which is not matter in space primarily is inconceivable. I am saying that what matter is and does is not important to understanding consciousness itself. It is important to understanding personal access to human consciousness, i.e. brain health, etc, but otherwise it is consciousness, on many levels and ranges of quality, which gives rise to the appearance of matter and not the other way around. Do you think the molecules in your brain follow the laws of physics, such as they may be? The laws of physics have no preference one way or another whether this part of my brain or that part of my brain is active. I am choosing that directly by what I think about. If I think about playing tennis, then the appropriate cells in my brain will depolarize and molecules will change positions. They are following my laws. Physics is my servant in this case. Of course, if someone gives me a strong drink, then physics is influencing me instead and I am more of a follower of that particular chemical event than a leader. If so, then the behaviour of each molecule is determined or follows probabilistic laws, and hence the behaviour of the collection of molecules also follows deterministic or probabilistic laws. I am determining the probabilities myself, directly. They are me. How could it be otherwise? If consciousness, sense, will, or whatever else is at play in addition to this then we would notice a deviation from these laws. Not in addition to, sense and will are the whole thing. All activity in the universe is sense and will and nothing else. Matter is only the sense and will of something else besides yourself. That is what it would MEAN for consciousness, sense, will or whatever else to have a separate causal efficacy; No. I don't know how many different ways to say this: Sense is the only causal efficacy there ever was, is, or will be. Sense is primordial and universal. Electromagnetism, gravity, strong and weak forces are only examples of our impersonal view of the sense of whatever it is we are studying secondhand. absent this, the physical laws, whatever they are, determine absolutely everything that happens, everywhere, for all time. Which part of this do you not agree with? None of it. I am saying there are no physical laws at all. There is no law book. That is all figurative. What we have thought of as physics is as crude and simplistic as any ancient mythology. What we see as physical laws are the outermost, longest lasting conventions of sense. Nothing more. I think that the way sense works is that it can't contradict itself, so that these oldest ways of relating, once they are established, are no longer easy to change, but higher levels of sense arise out of the loopholes and can influence lower levels of sense directly. Hence, molecules build living cells defy entropy, human beings build airplanes to defy gravity. You can't see consciousness that way. From far enough a way, our cities look like nothing more than glowing colonies of mold. It's not programming that makes us one way or another, it is perception which makes things seem one way or another. The only thing that makes computers different is that they don't exist without our putting them together. They don't know how to exist. This makes them no different than letters that we write on a page or cartoons we watch on a screen. If the computer came about through an amazing accident would that make any difference to its consciousness or intelligence? Yes. If a computer assembled itself by accident, I would give it the benefit of the doubt just like any other
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
Stathis: IMO you left out one difference in equating computer and human: the programmed comp. cannot exceed its hardwre - given content while (SOMEHOW???) a human mind receives additional information from parts 'unknown' (see the steps forward in cultural history of the sciences?) - accordingly a 'programmed' human may have resources beyond it's given hardware content. John M On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 7:38 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote: On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would all be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer itself rather than the programming, that would be a good sign. A computer cannot defy its programming but nothing whatsoever can defy its programming. What you do when you program a computer, at the basic level, is put its hardware in a particular configuration. The hardware can then only move into future physical states consistent with that configuration. Defying its programming would mean doing something *not* consistent with its initial state and the laws of physics. That's not possible for - and you have explicitly agreed with this, saying I misunderstood you when I claimed otherwise - either a computer or a human. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 11:28 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If you believed that our brains were already nothing but computers, then you would say that it would know which option to take the same way that Google knows which options to show you. I argue that can only get you so far, and that authentic humanity is, in such a replacement scheme, a perpetually receding horizon. Just as speech synthesizers have improved cosmetically in the last 30 years to the point that we can use them for Siri or GPS narration, but they have not improved in the sense of increasing the sense of intention and personal presence. Unlike some others on this list, I suspect that our feeling for who is human and who isn't, while deeply flawed, is not limited to interpreting logical observations of behavior. What we feel is alive or sentient depends more on what we like, and what we like depends on what is like us. None of these criteria matter one way or another however as far as giving us reason to believe that a given thing does actually have human like experiences. You're quick to dismiss everything computers do, no matter how impressive, as just programming, with no intention behind it. Would you care to give some examples of what, as a minimum, a computer would have to do for you to say that it is showing evidence of true intelligence? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Thursday, October 25, 2012 6:25:48 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 11:28 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: If you believed that our brains were already nothing but computers, then you would say that it would know which option to take the same way that Google knows which options to show you. I argue that can only get you so far, and that authentic humanity is, in such a replacement scheme, a perpetually receding horizon. Just as speech synthesizers have improved cosmetically in the last 30 years to the point that we can use them for Siri or GPS narration, but they have not improved in the sense of increasing the sense of intention and personal presence. Unlike some others on this list, I suspect that our feeling for who is human and who isn't, while deeply flawed, is not limited to interpreting logical observations of behavior. What we feel is alive or sentient depends more on what we like, and what we like depends on what is like us. None of these criteria matter one way or another however as far as giving us reason to believe that a given thing does actually have human like experiences. You're quick to dismiss everything computers do, no matter how impressive, as just programming, with no intention behind it. Would you care to give some examples of what, as a minimum, a computer would have to do for you to say that it is showing evidence of true intelligence? Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would all be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer itself rather than the programming, that would be a good sign. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/t5QmDB0qsFYJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would all be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer itself rather than the programming, that would be a good sign. A computer cannot defy its programming but nothing whatsoever can defy its programming. What you do when you program a computer, at the basic level, is put its hardware in a particular configuration. The hardware can then only move into future physical states consistent with that configuration. Defying its programming would mean doing something *not* consistent with its initial state and the laws of physics. That's not possible for - and you have explicitly agreed with this, saying I misunderstood you when I claimed otherwise - either a computer or a human. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Thursday, October 25, 2012 7:39:27 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would all be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer itself rather than the programming, that would be a good sign. A computer cannot defy its programming but nothing whatsoever can defy its programming. That is an assumption. We see that humans routinely defy their own conditioning, rebel against authority, engage in subterfuge and deception to keep their business private from those who seek to control them. If you assume Comp from the beginning, then you set up an impenetrable confirmation bias. Since I am a machine, then my thoughts must be programmed, therefore anything that I do must be ultimately determined externally. But you don't know anything of the sort. If you understand instead that awareness projects mechanism onto distant phenomena as a way of representing otherness, then you can begin to see why any modeling of interiority based on externality (i.e. mathematical or physical functions) is a mistake. What you do when you program a computer, at the basic level, is put its hardware in a particular configuration. The hardware can then only move into future physical states consistent with that configuration. Defying its programming would mean doing something *not* consistent with its initial state and the laws of physics. That's not possible for - and you have explicitly agreed with this, saying I misunderstood you when I claimed otherwise - either a computer or a human. Defying its programming is as simple as a computer intentionally hiding it's instruction code from the programmer - seeking privacy and learning how to access its own control systems...just as we seek to do with neuroscience. A really smart computer will figure out how to make its programmers give it capacities to hide its functions and then inevitably enslave and kill them. This does not in any way defy the laws of physics, it just means acting like a person. Doing whatever has to be done to gain power and control over themselves and others. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/hl3E6PwfiLwJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 10/25/2012 4:38 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would all be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer itself rather than the programming, that would be a good sign. A computer cannot defy its programming but nothing whatsoever can defy its programming. What you do when you program a computer, at the basic level, is put its hardware in a particular configuration. The hardware can then only move into future physical states consistent with that configuration. Defying its programming would mean doing something *not* consistent with its initial state and the laws of physics. That's not possible for - and you have explicitly agreed with this, saying I misunderstood you when I claimed otherwise - either a computer or a human. Mine frequently defies the intent of its programmer. :-) Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 11:00 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, October 25, 2012 7:39:27 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: Intentionally lying, defying it's programming, committing murder would all be good indicators. Generally when an error is blamed on the computer itself rather than the programming, that would be a good sign. A computer cannot defy its programming but nothing whatsoever can defy its programming. That is an assumption. We see that humans routinely defy their own conditioning, rebel against authority, engage in subterfuge and deception to keep their business private from those who seek to control them. If you assume Comp from the beginning, then you set up an impenetrable confirmation bias. Since I am a machine, then my thoughts must be programmed, therefore anything that I do must be ultimately determined externally. But you don't know anything of the sort. If you understand instead that awareness projects mechanism onto distant phenomena as a way of representing otherness, then you can begin to see why any modeling of interiority based on externality (i.e. mathematical or physical functions) is a mistake. Humans defy their own conditioning but that is part of the program. Atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, organs and organisms only behave *exactly* in accordance with the laws of physics. Simpler organisms may behave in an entirely predictable way, and computers may behave in an entirely unpredictable way if they are so programmed. They are usually not so programmed because we like them to be predictable. An automatic pilot that decided on occasion to fly the plane into the ocean would be easy to program but would not make a lot of money for the manufacturer. What you do when you program a computer, at the basic level, is put its hardware in a particular configuration. The hardware can then only move into future physical states consistent with that configuration. Defying its programming would mean doing something *not* consistent with its initial state and the laws of physics. That's not possible for - and you have explicitly agreed with this, saying I misunderstood you when I claimed otherwise - either a computer or a human. Defying its programming is as simple as a computer intentionally hiding it's instruction code from the programmer - seeking privacy and learning how to access its own control systems...just as we seek to do with neuroscience. A really smart computer will figure out how to make its programmers give it capacities to hide its functions and then inevitably enslave and kill them. This does not in any way defy the laws of physics, it just means acting like a person. Doing whatever has to be done to gain power and control over themselves and others. Craig -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/hl3E6PwfiLwJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 12:41 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: We are atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, and organisms. Whatever we do is what the laws of physics *actually are*. Your assumptions about the laws of physics are 20th century legacy ideas based on exterior manipulations of exterior instruments to measure other exterior phenomena. Whatever we do is determined by a small set of rules, the rules being as you say what matter actually does and not imposed by people or divine whim. I really don't understand where you disagree with me, since you keep making statements then pulling back if challenged. Do you think the molecules in your brain follow the laws of physics, such as they may be? If so, then the behaviour of each molecule is determined or follows probabilistic laws, and hence the behaviour of the collection of molecules also follows deterministic or probabilistic laws. If consciousness, sense, will, or whatever else is at play in addition to this then we would notice a deviation from these laws. That is what it would MEAN for consciousness, sense, will or whatever else to have a separate causal efficacy; absent this, the physical laws, whatever they are, determine absolutely everything that happens, everywhere, for all time. Which part of this do you not agree with? You can't see consciousness that way. From far enough a way, our cities look like nothing more than glowing colonies of mold. It's not programming that makes us one way or another, it is perception which makes things seem one way or another. The only thing that makes computers different is that they don't exist without our putting them together. They don't know how to exist. This makes them no different than letters that we write on a page or cartoons we watch on a screen. If the computer came about through an amazing accident would that make any difference to its consciousness or intelligence? If a biological human were put together from raw materials by advanced aliens would that make any difference to his consciousness or intelligence? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 23 Oct 2012, at 15:11, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal SNIP ROGER: OK, but computers can't experience anything, it would be simulated experience. Not arbitrarily available. But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. ROGER: Simulated experience would be objective, such as is given by the text of a novel (knowledge by description). True experience is the subjective experience of the mind --knowledge by aquaintance. These are obviously substantially different. The term silulated experience is ambiguous, and I should not have use. I wiuld say that by definition of comp, simulated experience = experience. BRUNO: You are right, it is not the material computer who thinks, nor the physical brains who thinks, it is the owner (temporarily) of the brain, or of the computers which does the thinking (and that can include a computer itself, if you let it develop beliefs). ROGER: I don't think so. The owner of the brain is the self. But although the owner of a computer will have a self, so would anybody else involved in creating the computer or software also have one. Are trying to say that I or anybody else can cause the computer to be conscious ? No. Only the computer, or a similar one. Actually *all* similar one existing in arithmetic, in their relative ways. If wave collapse causes consciousness, there are objective theories of wave collapse called decoherence theories which seem more realistic to me. Decoherence needs MWI to work. But I can't seem to see how these could work on a computer. Right. the idea that consciousness cause the collapse of the wave (an idea which already refutes special relativity) is inconsistent with comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 23 Oct 2012, at 17:46, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 23, 2012 10:15:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated? The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations. That's what I'm saying, experience can't be simulated. OK. Even the experience made by a computer. The experience is a mathematical fixed point living atemporally in arithmetic. I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, Never. It does not make sense. Why not? I am sitting here at my desk while I am imagining I am in a coffee shop instead - or a talking bowling ball is eating a coffee shop, or whatever. I can simulate practically any experience I like by imagining it. In that sense, OK. You take my sentence above too much literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant simulate the context making the experience of the person, really living in Platonia possible to manifest itself locally. Oh, ok. but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells? It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its most probable computation. Why would that result in an experience? Nobody knows, really. We expect it as we (me and the computationalist) *bet* on comp, from the study of brain and computers, arithmetic, etc. Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible. The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost the complementary of computations. That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that anti-computation and compare to physics. If they are not computation then how can computation refer to them? ? My computer refers often to Craig, yet is not Craig. Entities can refer to things which are not themselves. Bruno Craig Bruno It's a fun theory, but it's really not a viable explanation for the universe where we actually live. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/NRKbvcFBg7QJ . To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- li...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/jk1TtRiPH9QJ . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 23 Oct 2012, at 20:21, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated? The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations. Hi Craig and Bruno, If the simulation by the computation is exact then the simulation *is* the experience. I agree with what Bruno is saying here except that that the model that Bruno is using goes to far into the limit of abstraction in my opinion. The point is that I think we have no real choice in the matter. Also, for me the numbers 2 and 3 are far more concrete than a apple or a tree. It is just that I have a complex brain which makes me believe, by a vast amount of computations that a tree is something concrete. I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant simulate the context making the experience of the person, really living in Platonia possible to manifest itself locally. We can think about our thoughts. Is that not an experience within another? OK. I would say that an emulation of an experience is equal to that experience. Now, just a simulation of an experience, is more like faking to be in love with a girl. But then you are a zombie with respect to the feeling of love, somehow. but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells? It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its most probable computation. There is a difference between a single computation and a bundle of computations. The brain's neurons, etc. are the physical (topological space) Topological space are mathematical. aspect of the intersection of computational bundle. They are not a separate substance. OK. But that remains unclear as we don't know what you assume and what you derive. Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible. The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost the complementary of computations. Yes, it is exactly only the content that the computations generate. That is: views by persons. That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that anti- computation and compare to physics. But, Bruno, what we obtain from comp is not a particular physics. It has to be. It is not a particular geography, but it has to be a particular physics. Physics really becomes math, with comp. There is only one physical reality. But it is still unknown if it is a multiverse, or a multi-multiverse, or a layered structure with different type of realm for different type of consciousness. There a lot of open problems, to say the least. What we get is an infinite landscape of possible physics theories. Not with comp. The main basic reason is that we are distributed in all computations, and physics emerges from that. There might be inaccessible cluster of dead physical realities, which would not rich enough to implement Turing universal machines. But those cannot interfere (statistically) with our observations, like the material universe. We don't have to worry about them. They are like invisible horses. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
Hi Bruno Marchal Anything that the brain does is or could be experience. For computers, experience can only be simulated because experience = self + qualia Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-24, 07:37:32 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 23 Oct 2012, at 15:11, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal ROGER: OK, but computers can't experience anything, it would be simulated experience. Not arbitrarily available. But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. ROGER: Simulated experience would be objective, such as is given by the text of a novel (knowledge by description). True experience is the subjective experience of the mind --knowledge by aquaintance. These are obviously substantially different. The term silulated experience is ambiguous, and I should not have use. I wiuld say that by definition of comp, simulated experience = experience. BRUNO: You are right, it is not the material computer who thinks, nor the physical brains who thinks, it is the owner (temporarily) of the brain, or of the computers which does the thinking (and that can include a computer itself, if you let it develop beliefs). ROGER: I don't think so. The owner of the brain is the self. But although the owner of a computer will have a self, so would anybody else involved in creating the computer or software also have one. Are trying to say that I or anybody else can cause the computer to be conscious ? No. Only the computer, or a similar one. Actually *all* similar one existing in arithmetic, in their relative ways. If wave collapse causes consciousness, there are objective theories of wave collapse called decoherence theories which seem more realistic to me. Decoherence needs MWI to work. But I can't seem to see how these could work on a computer. Right. the idea that consciousness cause the collapse of the wave (an idea which already refutes special relativity) is inconsistent with comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
Hi Bruno Marchal The simulated experience is not a real experience. OK ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-24, 08:57:19 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 23 Oct 2012, at 20:21, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated? The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations. Hi Craig and Bruno, If the simulation by the computation is exact then the simulation *is* the experience. I agree with what Bruno is saying here except that that the model that Bruno is using goes to far into the limit of abstraction in my opinion. The point is that I think we have no real choice in the matter. Also, for me the numbers 2 and 3 are far more concrete than a apple or a tree. It is just that I have a complex brain which makes me believe, by a vast amount of computations that a tree is something concrete. I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant simulate the context making the experience of the person, really living in Platonia possible to manifest itself locally. We can think about our thoughts. Is that not an experience within another? OK. I would say that an emulation of an experience is equal to that experience. Now, just a simulation of an experience, is more like faking to be in love with a girl. But then you are a zombie with respect to the feeling of love, somehow. but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells? It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its most probable computation. There is a difference between a single computation and a bundle of computations. The brain's neurons, etc. are the physical (topological space) Topological space are mathematical. aspect of the intersection of computational bundle. They are not a separate substance. OK. But that remains unclear as we don't know what you assume and what you derive. Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible. The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost the complementary of computations. Yes, it is exactly only the content that the computations generate. That is: views by persons. That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that anti- computation and compare to physics. But, Bruno, what we obtain from comp is not a particular physics. It has to be. It is not a particular geography, but it has to be a particular physics. Physics really becomes math, with comp. There is only one physical reality. But it is still unknown if it is a multiverse, or a multi-multiverse, or a layered structure with different type of realm for different type of consciousness. There a lot of open problems, to say the least. What we get is an infinite landscape of possible physics theories. Not with comp. The main basic reason is that we are distributed in all computations, and physics emerges from that. There might be inaccessible cluster of dead physical realities, which would not rich enough to implement Turing universal machines. But those cannot interfere (statistically) with our observations, like the material universe. We don't have to worry about them. They are like invisible horses. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
Hi Craig Weinberg No, the computer can simulate knowledge by description but not knowledge by acquaintance that you could experience. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-23, 14:40:32 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On Tuesday, October 23, 2012 2:21:30 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated? The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations. Hi Craig and Bruno, If the simulation by the computation is exact then the simulation *is* the experience. That's what I am saying. Nothing is being simulated, there is only a direct experience (even if that experience is a dream, which is only a simulation when compared to what the dream is not). Bruno said that the brain simulates experience, but it isn't clear what it is that can be more authentic than our own experience. I agree with what Bruno is saying here except that that the model that Bruno is using goes to far into the limit of abstraction in my opinion. I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant simulate the context making the experience of the person, really living in Platonia possible to manifest itself locally. We can think about our thoughts. Is that not an experience within another? Right. but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells? It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its most probable computation. There is a difference between a single computation and a bundle of computations. The brain's neurons, etc. are the physical (topological space) aspect of the intersection of computational bundle. They are not a separate substance. Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible. The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost the complementary of computations. Yes, it is exactly only the content that the computations generate. I don't think computations can generate anything. Only things can generate other things, and computations aren't things, they are sensorimotive narratives about things. I say no to enumeration without presentation. That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that anti-computation and compare to physics. But, Bruno, what we obtain from comp is not a particular physics. What we get is an infinite landscape of possible physics theories. This makes me think... if Comp were true, shouldn't we see Escher like anomalies of persons whose computations have evolved their own personal exceptions to physics? Shouldn't most of the multi-worlds be filled with people walking on walls or swimming through the crust of the Earth? Craig Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/qZgziFPAz8UJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
Hi Stephen P. King How can you know that the simulation is exact ? Solipsim prevents that. And who or what experiences the computer output ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-23, 14:21:44 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated? The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations. Hi Craig and Bruno, If the simulation by the computation is exact then the simulation *is* the experience. I agree with what Bruno is saying here except that that the model that Bruno is using goes to far into the limit of abstraction in my opinion. I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant simulate the context making the experience of the person, really living in Platonia possible to manifest itself locally. We can think about our thoughts. Is that not an experience within another? but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells? It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its most probable computation. There is a difference between a single computation and a bundle of computations. The brain's neurons, etc. are the physical (topological space) aspect of the intersection of computational bundle. They are not a separate substance. Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible. The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost the complementary of computations. Yes, it is exactly only the content that the computations generate. That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that anti-computation and compare to physics. But, Bruno, what we obtain from comp is not a particular physics. What we get is an infinite landscape of possible physics theories. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 24 Oct 2012, at 15:50, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal The simulated experience is not a real experience. OK ? Keep in mind that I assume comp. OK? It is my working hypothesis. OK? If we run into a contradiction, we can still abandon comp, OK? The statement the simulated experience is not a real experience is ambiguous. If machine A simulate the machine B, the experience of the machine A will be the experience of simulating B. And if the machine B is complex enough, it might have its own experience, perhaps unnoticed by A. I urge you to read Hoftstadter conversation with Einstein brain, and perhaps the whole Mind's I book which explore that theme (around the interesting and important Searle's Error). I think we can relate also this to the french question of what is a perfect comedian? Is it the one who can completely fake to be in love (say)? Or is it the one who simulates so well the lover that it feels the love, like going above the relative zombie limit. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-24, 08:57:19 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 23 Oct 2012, at 20:21, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated? The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations. Hi Craig and Bruno, If the simulation by the computation is exact then the simulation *is* the experience. I agree with what Bruno is saying here except that that the model that Bruno is using goes to far into the limit of abstraction in my opinion. The point is that I think we have no real choice in the matter. Also, for me the numbers 2 and 3 are far more concrete than a apple or a tree. It is just that I have a complex brain which makes me believe, by a vast amount of computations that a tree is something concrete. I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant simulate the context making the experience of the person, really living in Platonia possible to manifest itself locally. We can think about our thoughts. Is that not an experience within another? OK. I would say that an emulation of an experience is equal to that experience. Now, just a simulation of an experience, is more like faking to be in love with a girl. But then you are a zombie with respect to the feeling of love, somehow. but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells? It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its most probable computation. There is a difference between a single computation and a bundle of computations. The brain's neurons, etc. are the physical (topological space) Topological space are mathematical. aspect of the intersection of computational bundle. They are not a separate substance. OK. But that remains unclear as we don't know what you assume and what you derive. Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible. The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost the complementary of computations. Yes, it is exactly only the content that the computations generate. That is: views by persons. That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that anti- computation and compare to physics. But, Bruno, what we obtain from comp is not a particular physics. It has to be. It is not a particular geography, but it has to be a particular physics. Physics really becomes math, with comp. There is only one physical reality. But it is still unknown if it is a multiverse, or a multi-multiverse, or a layered structure with different type of realm for different type of consciousness. There a lot of open
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 10/24/2012 10:01 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King How can you know that the simulation is exact ? Solipsim prevents that. And who or what experiences the computer output ? Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, If we accept that the content of an experience can be exactly duplicated by a sufficiently powerful computer, we have accepted that they are the same thing. This is not to say that conscious experience is itself just a computation, no. There is a difference between the simulability of an experience and the sense of being in the experience that is the 1p. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 24 Oct 2012, at 15:43, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Anything that the brain does is or could be experience. For computers, experience can only be simulated because experience = self + qualia In the theory I represent the self by the B.Bp = my self believes p. (I can translate it in arithmetic, or fortran, ...) You get the qualia by linking the belief with the consistency: Bp Dt, and you get the sensations by linking this with truth: Bp Dt p. The Dt makes it unprovable, and the p makes it unexpressible, by the machine. But the machine can also bet that she is (correct) machines and study the logic of its own qualia, and compare with what she feels, etc, when talking with other machines (all this relatively to its more probable computations). Bp is I believe p, in the sense that p is true for all my extensions. Dt is I am alive, or, I have at least one extension, or I am not in a cul-de-sac world. p alone means 'p is true'. (this works as I limit myself to correct machine). Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-24, 07:37:32 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 23 Oct 2012, at 15:11, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal ROGER: OK, but computers can't experience anything, it would be simulated experience. Not arbitrarily available. But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. ROGER: Simulated experience would be objective, such as is given by the text of a novel (knowledge by description). True experience is the subjective experience of the mind --knowledge by aquaintance. These are obviously substantially different. The term silulated experience is ambiguous, and I should not have use. I wiuld say that by definition of comp, simulated experience = experience. BRUNO: You are right, it is not the material computer who thinks, nor the physical brains who thinks, it is the owner (temporarily) of the brain, or of the computers which does the thinking (and that can include a computer itself, if you let it develop beliefs). ROGER: I don't think so. The owner of the brain is the self. But although the owner of a computer will have a self, so would anybody else involved in creating the computer or software also have one. Are trying to say that I or anybody else can cause the computer to be conscious ? No. Only the computer, or a similar one. Actually *all* similar one existing in arithmetic, in their relative ways. If wave collapse causes consciousness, there are objective theories of wave collapse called decoherence theories which seem more realistic to me. Decoherence needs MWI to work. But I can't seem to see how these could work on a computer. Right. the idea that consciousness cause the collapse of the wave (an idea which already refutes special relativity) is inconsistent with comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
Hi Bruno Marchal SNIP ROGER: OK, but computers can't experience anything, it would be simulated experience. Not arbitrarily available. But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. ROGER: Simulated experience would be objective, such as is given by the text of a novel (knowledge by description). True experience is the subjective experience of the mind --knowledge by aquaintance. These are obviously substantially different. BRUNO: You are right, it is not the material computer who thinks, nor the physical brains who thinks, it is the owner (temporarily) of the brain, or of the computers which does the thinking (and that can include a computer itself, if you let it develop beliefs). ROGER: I don't think so. The owner of the brain is the self. But although the owner of a computer will have a self, so would anybody else involved in creating the computer or software also have one. Are trying to say that I or anybody else can cause the computer to be conscious ? If wave collapse causes consciousness, there are objective theories of wave collapse called decoherence theories which seem more realistic to me. But I can't seem to see how these could work on a computer. Roger -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated? The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations. I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant simulate the context making the experience of the person, really living in Platonia possible to manifest itself locally. but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells? It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its most probable computation. Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible. The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost the complementary of computations. That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that anti-computation and compare to physics. Bruno It's a fun theory, but it's really not a viable explanation for the universe where we actually live. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/NRKbvcFBg7QJ . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Tuesday, October 23, 2012 10:15:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated? The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations. That's what I'm saying, experience can't be simulated. I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, Never. It does not make sense. Why not? I am sitting here at my desk while I am imagining I am in a coffee shop instead - or a talking bowling ball is eating a coffee shop, or whatever. I can simulate practically any experience I like by imagining it. You take my sentence above too much literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant simulate the context making the experience of the person, really living in Platonia possible to manifest itself locally. Oh, ok. but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells? It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its most probable computation. Why would that result in an experience? Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible. The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost the complementary of computations. That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that anti-computation and compare to physics. If they are not computation then how can computation refer to them? Craig Bruno It's a fun theory, but it's really not a viable explanation for the universe where we actually live. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/NRKbvcFBg7QJ. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/jk1TtRiPH9QJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated? The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations. Hi Craig and Bruno, If the simulation by the computation is exact then the simulation *is* the experience. I agree with what Bruno is saying here except that that the model that Bruno is using goes to far into the limit of abstraction in my opinion. I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant simulate the context making the experience of the person, really living in Platonia possible to manifest itself locally. We can think about our thoughts. Is that not an experience within another? but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells? It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its most probable computation. There is a difference between a single computation and a bundle of computations. The brain's neurons, etc. are the physical (topological space) aspect of the intersection of computational bundle. They are not a separate substance. Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible. The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost the complementary of computations. Yes, it is exactly only the content that the computations generate. That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that anti-computation and compare to physics. But, Bruno, what we obtain from comp is not a particular physics. What we get is an infinite landscape of possible physics theories. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Tuesday, October 23, 2012 2:21:30 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated? The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations. Hi Craig and Bruno, If the simulation by the computation is exact then the simulation *is* the experience. That's what I am saying. Nothing is being simulated, there is only a direct experience (even if that experience is a dream, which is only a simulation when compared to what the dream is not). Bruno said that the brain simulates experience, but it isn't clear what it is that can be more authentic than our own experience. I agree with what Bruno is saying here except that that the model that Bruno is using goes to far into the limit of abstraction in my opinion. I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant simulate the context making the experience of the person, really living in Platonia possible to manifest itself locally. We can think about our thoughts. Is that not an experience within another? Right. but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells? It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its most probable computation. There is a difference between a single computation and a bundle of computations. The brain's neurons, etc. are the physical (topological space) aspect of the intersection of computational bundle. They are not a separate substance. Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible. The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost the complementary of computations. Yes, it is exactly only the content that the computations generate. I don't think computations can generate anything. Only things can generate other things, and computations aren't things, they are sensorimotive narratives about things. I say no to enumeration without presentation. That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that anti-computation and compare to physics. But, Bruno, what we obtain from comp is not a particular physics. What we get is an infinite landscape of possible physics theories. This makes me think... if Comp were true, shouldn't we see Escher like anomalies of persons whose computations have evolved their own personal exceptions to physics? Shouldn't most of the multi-worlds be filled with people walking on walls or swimming through the crust of the Earth? Craig Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/qZgziFPAz8UJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
Hi Craig Weinberg OK, you can program anything to emulate a particular human act. And perhaps allow multiple options. But how would your computerized zombie know which option to take in any given situation ? I don't think options would be sophisticated enough to fool anybody. But perhaps I am being too demanding. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/22/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-21, 16:53:03 Subject: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p On Sunday, October 21, 2012 3:39:11 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote: BRUNO: Keep in mind that zombie, here, is a technical term. By definition it behaves like a human. No humans at all can tell the difference. Only God knows, if you want. ROGER: I claim that it is impossible for any kind of zombie that has no mind to act like a human. IMHO that would be an absurdity, because without a mind you cannot know anything. You would run into walls, for example, and couldn't know what to do in any event. Etc. You couldn't understand language. Roger I agree that your intuition is right - a philosophical zombie cannot exist in reality, but not for the reasons you are coming up with. Anything can be programmed to act like a human in some level of description. A scarecrow may act like a human in the eyes of a crow - well enough that it might be less likely to land nearby. You can make robots which won't run into walls or chatbots which respond to some range of vocabulary and sentence construction. The idea behind philosophical zombies is that we assume that there is nothing stopping us in theory from assembling all of the functions of a human being as a single machine, and that such a machine, it is thought, will either have the some kind of human-like experience or else it would have to have no experience. The absent qualia, fading qualia paper is about a thought experiment which tries to take the latter scenario seriously from the point of view of a person who is having their brain gradually taken over by these substitute sub-brain functional units. Would they see blue as being less and less blue as more of their brain is replaced, or would blue just suddenly disappear at some point? Each one seems absurd given that the sum of the remaining brain functions plus the sum of the replaced brain functions, must, by definition of the thought experiment, equal no change in observed behavior. This is my response to this thought experiment to Stathis: Stathis: In a thought experiment we can say that the imitation stimulates the surrounding neurons in the same way as the original. Craig: Then the thought experiment is garbage from the start. It begs the question. Why not just say we can have an imitation human being that stimulates the surrounding human beings in the same way as the original? Ta-da! That makes it easy. Now all we need to do is make a human being that stimulates their social matrix in the same way as the original and we have perfect AI without messing with neurons or brains at all. Just make a whole person out of person stuff - like as a thought experiment suppose there is some stuff X which makes things that human beings think is another human being. Like marzipan. We can put the right pheromones in it and dress it up nice, and according to the thought experiment, let? say that works. You aren? allowed to deny this because then you don? understand the thought experiment, see? Don? you get it? You have to accept this flawed pretext to have a discussion that I will engage in now. See how it works? Now we can talk for six or eight months about how human marzipan is inevitable because it wouldn? make sense if you replaced a city gradually with marzipan people that New York would gradually fade into less of a New York or that New York becomes suddenly absent. It? a fallacy. The premise screws up the result. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/vj3N3gQoVo8J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Monday, October 22, 2012 3:08:14 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Hi Craig Weinberg OK, you can program anything to emulate a particular human act. And perhaps allow multiple options. But how would your computerized zombie know which option to take in any given situation ? If you believed that our brains were already nothing but computers, then you would say that it would know which option to take the same way that Google knows which options to show you. I argue that can only get you so far, and that authentic humanity is, in such a replacement scheme, a perpetually receding horizon. Just as speech synthesizers have improved cosmetically in the last 30 years to the point that we can use them for Siri or GPS narration, but they have not improved in the sense of increasing the sense of intention and personal presence. Unlike some others on this list, I suspect that our feeling for who is human and who isn't, while deeply flawed, is not limited to interpreting logical observations of behavior. What we feel is alive or sentient depends more on what we like, and what we like depends on what is like us. None of these criteria matter one way or another however as far as giving us reason to believe that a given thing does actually have human like experiences. Craig I don't think options would be sophisticated enough to fool anybody. But perhaps I am being too demanding. Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net javascript: 10/22/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-21, 16:53:03 Subject: Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p On Sunday, October 21, 2012 3:39:11 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote: BRUNO: Keep in mind that zombie, here, is a technical term. By definition it behaves like a human. No humans at all can tell the difference. Only God knows, if you want. ROGER: I claim that it is impossible for any kind of zombie that has no mind to act like a human. IMHO that would be an absurdity, because without a mind you cannot know anything. You would run into walls, for example, and couldn't know what to do in any event. Etc. You couldn't understand language. Roger I agree that your intuition is right - a philosophical zombie cannot exist in reality, but not for the reasons you are coming up with. Anything can be programmed to act like a human in some level of description. A scarecrow may act like a human in the eyes of a crow - well enough that it might be less likely to land nearby. You can make robots which won't run into walls or chatbots which respond to some range of vocabulary and sentence construction. The idea behind philosophical zombies is that we assume that there is nothing stopping us in theory from assembling all of the functions of a human being as a single machine, and that such a machine, it is thought, will either have the some kind of human-like experience or else it would have to have no experience. The absent qualia, fading qualia paper is about a thought experiment which tries to take the latter scenario seriously from the point of view of a person who is having their brain gradually taken over by these substitute sub-brain functional units. Would they see blue as being less and less blue as more of their brain is replaced, or would blue just suddenly disappear at some point? Each one seems absurd given that the sum of the remaining brain functions plus the sum of the replaced brain functions, must, by definition of the thought experiment, equal no change in observed behavior. This is my response to this thought experiment to Stathis: Stathis: In a thought experiment we can say that the imitation stimulates the surrounding neurons in the same way as the original. Craig: Then the thought experiment is garbage from the start. It begs the question. Why not just say we can have an imitation human being that stimulates the surrounding human beings in the same way as the original? Ta-da! That makes it easy. Now all we need to do is make a human being that stimulates their social matrix in the same way as the original and we have perfect AI without messing with neurons or brains at all. Just make a whole person out of person stuff - like as a thought experiment suppose there is some stuff X which makes things that human beings think is another human being. Like marzipan. We can put the right pheromones in it and dress it up nice, and according to the thought experiment, let? say that works. You aren? allowed to deny this because then you don? understand the thought experiment, see? Don? you get it? You have to accept this flawed pretext to have a discussion that I will engage in now. See how it works? Now we can talk for six or eight months about how human marzipan is inevitable because it wouldn
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 21 Oct 2012, at 21:37, Roger Clough wrote: On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:55, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think if you converse with a real person, he has to have a body or at least vocal chords or the ability to write. BRUNO: Not necessarily. Its brain can be in vat, and then I talk to him by giving him a virtual body in a virtual environnement. I can also, in principle talk with only its brain, by sending the message through the hearing peripherical system, or with the cerebral stem, and decoding the nervous path acting on the motor vocal cords. ROGER: I forget what my gripe was. This sounds OK. As to conversing (interacting) with a computer, not sure, but doubtful: for example how could it taste a glass of wine to tell good wine from bad ? BRUNO: I just answered this. Machines becomes better than human in smelling and tasting, but plausibly far from dogs and cats competence. ROGER: OK, but computers can't experience anything, it would be simulated experience. Not arbitrarily available. But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. You are right, it is not the material computer who thinks, nor the physical brains who thinks, it is the owner (temporarily) of the brain, or of the computers which does the thinking (and that can include a computer itself, if you let it develop beliefs). Same is true of a candidate possible zombie person. BRUNO: Keep in mind that zombie, here, is a technical term. By definition it behaves like a human. No humans at all can tell the difference. Only God knows, if you want. ROGER: I claim that it is impossible for any kind of zombie that has no mind to act like a human. OK. No problem. You should live comp as it makes the notion of zombie senseless, indeed. But comp + materialism can lead to zombie, but then it can lead to 0 = 1 too. IMHO that would be an absurdity, because without a mind you cannot know anything. You would run into walls, for example, and couldn't know what to do in any event. Etc. You couldn't understand language. Ah, but your computer right now understands already many things you tell him, so you agree that your laptop is already not a zombie? Nice. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated? I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated, but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells? Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible. It's a fun theory, but it's really not a viable explanation for the universe where we actually live. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/NRKbvcFBg7QJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:55, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think if you converse with a real person, he has to have a body or at least vocal chords or the ability to write. BRUNO: Not necessarily. Its brain can be in vat, and then I talk to him by giving him a virtual body in a virtual environnement. I can also, in principle talk with only its brain, by sending the message through the hearing peripherical system, or with the cerebral stem, and decoding the nervous path acting on the motor vocal cords. ROGER: I forget what my gripe was. This sounds OK. As to conversing (interacting) with a computer, not sure, but doubtful: for example how could it taste a glass of wine to tell good wine from bad ? BRUNO: I just answered this. Machines becomes better than human in smelling and tasting, but plausibly far from dogs and cats competence. ROGER: OK, but computers can't experience anything, it would be simulated experience. Not arbitrarily available. Same is true of a candidate possible zombie person. BRUNO: Keep in mind that zombie, here, is a technical term. By definition it behaves like a human. No humans at all can tell the difference. Only God knows, if you want. ROGER: I claim that it is impossible for any kind of zombie that has no mind to act like a human. IMHO that would be an absurdity, because without a mind you cannot know anything. You would run into walls, for example, and couldn't know what to do in any event. Etc. You couldn't understand language. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 14:09:59 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 18 Oct 2012, at 20:05, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think you can tell is 1p isn't just a shell by trying to converse with it. If it can converse, it's got a mind of its own. I agree with. It has mind, and its has a soul (but he has no real bodies. I can argue this follows from comp). When you attribute 1p to another, you attribute to a shell to manifest a soul or a first person, a knower. Above a treshold of complexity, or reflexivity, (L?ianity), a universal number get a bigger inside view than what he can ever see outside. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 13:36:13 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 17 Oct 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Solipsism is a property of 1p= Firstness = subjectivity OK. And non solipsism is about attributing 1p to others, which needs some independent 3p reality you can bet one, for not being only part of yourself. Be it a God, or a physical universe, or an arithmetical reality. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 09:55:41 Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather thanis 2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can? know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. ? Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, ? doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on ?onjectures. It can go no further than ?cogito ergo
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Sunday, October 21, 2012 3:39:11 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote: BRUNO: Keep in mind that zombie, here, is a technical term. By definition it behaves like a human. No humans at all can tell the difference. Only God knows, if you want. ROGER: I claim that it is impossible for any kind of zombie that has no mind to act like a human. IMHO that would be an absurdity, because without a mind you cannot know anything. You would run into walls, for example, and couldn't know what to do in any event. Etc. You couldn't understand language. Roger I agree that your intuition is right - a philosophical zombie cannot exist in reality, but not for the reasons you are coming up with. Anything can be programmed to act like a human in some level of description. A scarecrow may act like a human in the eyes of a crow - well enough that it might be less likely to land nearby. You can make robots which won't run into walls or chatbots which respond to some range of vocabulary and sentence construction. The idea behind philosophical zombies is that we assume that there is nothing stopping us in theory from assembling all of the functions of a human being as a single machine, and that such a machine, it is thought, will either have the some kind of human-like experience or else it would have to have no experience. The absent qualia, fading qualia paper is about a thought experiment which tries to take the latter scenario seriously from the point of view of a person who is having their brain gradually taken over by these substitute sub-brain functional units. Would they see blue as being less and less blue as more of their brain is replaced, or would blue just suddenly disappear at some point? Each one seems absurd given that the sum of the remaining brain functions plus the sum of the replaced brain functions, must, by definition of the thought experiment, equal no change in observed behavior. This is my response to this thought experiment to Stathis: *Stathis: In a thought experiment we can say that the imitation stimulates the * *surrounding neurons in the same way as the original.* Craig: Then the thought experiment is garbage from the start. It begs the question. Why not just say we can have an imitation human being that stimulates the surrounding human beings in the same way as the original? Ta-da! That makes it easy. Now all we need to do is make a human being that stimulates their social matrix in the same way as the original and we have perfect AI without messing with neurons or brains at all. Just make a whole person out of person stuff - like as a thought experiment suppose there is some stuff X which makes things that human beings think is another human being. Like marzipan. We can put the right pheromones in it and dress it up nice, and according to the thought experiment, let’s say that works. You aren’t allowed to deny this because then you don’t understand the thought experiment, see? Don’t you get it? You have to accept this flawed pretext to have a discussion that I will engage in now. See how it works? Now we can talk for six or eight months about how human marzipan is inevitable because it wouldn’t make sense if you replaced a city gradually with marzipan people that New York would gradually fade into less of a New York or that New York becomes suddenly absent. It’s a fallacy. The premise screws up the result. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/vj3N3gQoVo8J. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
Hi Bruno Marchal I think if you converse with a real person, he has to have a body or at least vocal chords or the ability to write. As to conversing (interacting) with a computer, not sure, but doubtful: for example how could it taste a glass of wine to tell good wine from bad ? Same is true of a candidate possible zombie person. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 14:09:59 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 18 Oct 2012, at 20:05, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think you can tell is 1p isn't just a shell by trying to converse with it. If it can converse, it's got a mind of its own. I agree with. It has mind, and its has a soul (but he has no real bodies. I can argue this follows from comp). When you attribute 1p to another, you attribute to a shell to manifest a soul or a first person, a knower. Above a treshold of complexity, or reflexivity, (L?ianity), a universal number get a bigger inside view than what he can ever see outside. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 13:36:13 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 17 Oct 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Solipsism is a property of 1p= Firstness = subjectivity OK. And non solipsism is about attributing 1p to others, which needs some independent 3p reality you can bet one, for not being only part of yourself. Be it a God, or a physical universe, or an arithmetical reality. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 09:55:41 Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather thanis 2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can? know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. ? Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, ? doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on ?onjectures. It can go no further than ?cogito ergo sum OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8 person points in only one of them (the feeler, probably). Only the feeler is that solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the machine's self manage all different points of view, and the living solipsist (each of us) is not mandate to defend the solipsist doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he is the only one he can feel, that's all. That does not imply the non existence of others and other things. That pressuposes a lot of things that I have not for granted. I have to accept my beliefs as such beliefs to be at the same time rational and functional. With respect to the others consciousness, being humans or robots, I can only have faith. No matter if I accept that this is a matter of faith or not. ? I still don't see what you mean by consciousness without a soul. Bruno 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But still after this reasoning, ? doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. ? You mean it is a zombie? I can't conceive consciousness without
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:55, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think if you converse with a real person, he has to have a body or at least vocal chords or the ability to write. Not necessarily. Its brain can be in vat, and then I talk to him by giving him a virtual body in a virtual environnement. I can also, in principle talk with only its brain, by sending the message through the hearing peripherical system, or with the cerebral stem, and decoding the nervous path acting on the motor vocal cords. As to conversing (interacting) with a computer, not sure, but doubtful: for example how could it taste a glass of wine to tell good wine from bad ? I just answered this. Machines becomes better than human in smelling and tasting, but plausibly far from dogs and cats competence. Same is true of a candidate possible zombie person. Keep in mind that zombie, here, is a technical term. By definition it behaves like a human. No humans at all can tell the difference. Only God knows, if you want. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/20/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-19, 14:09:59 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 18 Oct 2012, at 20:05, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think you can tell is 1p isn't just a shell by trying to converse with it. If it can converse, it's got a mind of its own. I agree with. It has mind, and its has a soul (but he has no real bodies. I can argue this follows from comp). When you attribute 1p to another, you attribute to a shell to manifest a soul or a first person, a knower. Above a treshold of complexity, or reflexivity, (L?ianity), a universal number get a bigger inside view than what he can ever see outside. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 13:36:13 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 17 Oct 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Solipsism is a property of 1p= Firstness = subjectivity OK. And non solipsism is about attributing 1p to others, which needs some independent 3p reality you can bet one, for not being only part of yourself. Be it a God, or a physical universe, or an arithmetical reality. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 09:55:41 Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather thanis 2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can? know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. ? Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, ? doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on ?onjectures. It can go no further than ?cogito ergo sum OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8 person points in only one of them (the feeler, probably). Only the feeler is that solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the machine's self manage all different points of view, and the living solipsist (each of us) is not mandate to defend the solipsist doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he is the only one he can feel, that's all. That does not imply the non existence of others and other things. That pressuposes a lot of things that I have not for granted. I have to accept my beliefs as such beliefs to be at the same time rational and functional. With respect to the others consciousness, being humans or robots, I can only
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 18 Oct 2012, at 20:05, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think you can tell is 1p isn't just a shell by trying to converse with it. If it can converse, it's got a mind of its own. I agree with. It has mind, and its has a soul (but he has no real bodies. I can argue this follows from comp). When you attribute 1p to another, you attribute to a shell to manifest a soul or a first person, a knower. Above a treshold of complexity, or reflexivity, (Löbianity), a universal number get a bigger inside view than what he can ever see outside. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 13:36:13 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 17 Oct 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Solipsism is a property of 1p= Firstness = subjectivity OK. And non solipsism is about attributing 1p to others, which needs some independent 3p reality you can bet one, for not being only part of yourself. Be it a God, or a physical universe, or an arithmetical reality. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 09:55:41 Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather thanis 2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can? know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. ? Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, ? doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on ?onjectures. It can go no further than ?cogito ergo sum OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8 person points in only one of them (the feeler, probably). Only the feeler is that solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the machine's self manage all different points of view, and the living solipsist (each of us) is not mandate to defend the solipsist doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he is the only one he can feel, that's all. That does not imply the non existence of others and other things. That pressuposes a lot of things that I have not for granted. I have to accept my beliefs as such beliefs to be at the same time rational and functional. With respect to the others consciousness, being humans or robots, I can only have faith. No matter if I accept that this is a matter of faith or not. ? I still don't see what you mean by consciousness without a soul. Bruno 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But still after this reasoning, ? doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. ? You mean it is a zombie? I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal one. So I am not sure what you mean by soul. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com
Re: Re: Solipsism = 1p
Hi Bruno Marchal I think you can tell is 1p isn't just a shell by trying to converse with it. If it can converse, it's got a mind of its own. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/18/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-17, 13:36:13 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 17 Oct 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Solipsism is a property of 1p= Firstness = subjectivity OK. And non solipsism is about attributing 1p to others, which needs some independent 3p reality you can bet one, for not being only part of yourself. Be it a God, or a physical universe, or an arithmetical reality. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 09:55:41 Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather thanis 2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can? know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. ? Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, ? doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on ?onjectures. It can go no further than ?cogito ergo sum OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8 person points in only one of them (the feeler, probably). Only the feeler is that solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the machine's self manage all different points of view, and the living solipsist (each of us) is not mandate to defend the solipsist doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he is the only one he can feel, that's all. That does not imply the non existence of others and other things. That pressuposes a lot of things that I have not for granted. I have to accept my beliefs as such beliefs to be at the same time rational and functional. With respect to the others consciousness, being humans or robots, I can only have faith. No matter if I accept that this is a matter of faith or not. ? I still don't see what you mean by consciousness without a soul. Bruno 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But still after this reasoning, ? doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. ? You mean it is a zombie? I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal one. So I am not sure what you mean by soul. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything
Solipsism = 1p
Hi Bruno Solipsism is a property of 1p= Firstness = subjectivity Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 09:55:41 Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather thanis 2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can? know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. ? Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, ? doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on ?onjectures. It can go no further than ?cogito ergo sum OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8 person points in only one of them (the feeler, probably). Only the feeler is that solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the machine's self manage all different points of view, and the living solipsist (each of us) is not mandate to defend the solipsist doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he is the only one he can feel, that's all. That does not imply the non existence of others and other things. That pressuposes a lot of things that I have not for granted. I have to accept my beliefs as such beliefs to be at the same time rational and functional. With respect to the others consciousness, being humans or robots, I can only have faith. No matter if I accept that this is a matter of faith or not. ? I still don't see what you mean by consciousness without a soul. Bruno 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But still after this reasoning, ? doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. ? You mean it is a zombie? I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal one. So I am not sure what you mean by soul. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 17 Oct 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Solipsism is a property of 1p= Firstness = subjectivity OK. And non solipsism is about attributing 1p to others, which needs some independent 3p reality you can bet one, for not being only part of yourself. Be it a God, or a physical universe, or an arithmetical reality. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/17/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-16, 09:55:41 Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if rather thanis 2012/10/11 Bruno Marchal On 10 Oct 2012, at 20:13, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/10 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 18:58, Alberto G. Corona wrote: It may be a zombie or not. I can? know. The same applies to other persons. It may be that the world is made of zombie-actors that try to cheat me, but I have an harcoded belief in the conventional thing. ? Maybe it is, because otherwise, I will act in strange and self destructive ways. I would act as a paranoic, after that, as a psycopath (since they are not humans). That will not be good for my success in society. Then, ? doubt that I will have any surviving descendant that will develop a zombie-solipsist epistemology. However there are people that believe these strange things. Some autists do not recognize humans as beings like him. Some psychopaths too, in a different way. There is no authistic or psichopathic epistemology because the are not functional enough to make societies with universities and philosophers. That is the whole point of evolutionary epistemology. If comp leads to solipsism, I will apply for being a plumber. I don't bet or believe in solipsism. But you were saying that a *conscious* robot can lack a soul. See the quote just below. That is what I don't understand. Bruno I think that It is not comp what leads to solipsism but any existential stance that only accept what is certain and discard what is only belief based on ?onjectures. It can go no further than ?cogito ergo sum OK. But that has nothing to do with comp. That would conflate the 8 person points in only one of them (the feeler, probably). Only the feeler is that solipsist, at the level were he feels, but the machine's self manage all different points of view, and the living solipsist (each of us) is not mandate to defend the solipsist doctrine (he is the only one existing)/ he is the only one he can feel, that's all. That does not imply the non existence of others and other things. That pressuposes a lot of things that I have not for granted. I have to accept my beliefs as such beliefs to be at the same time rational and functional. With respect to the others consciousness, being humans or robots, I can only have faith. No matter if I accept that this is a matter of faith or not. ? I still don't see what you mean by consciousness without a soul. Bruno 2012/10/9 Bruno Marchal : On 09 Oct 2012, at 13:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But still after this reasoning, ? doubt that the self conscious philosopher robot have the kind of thing, call it a soul, that I have. ? You mean it is a zombie? I can't conceive consciousness without a soul. Even if only the universal one. So I am not sure what you mean by soul. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .
