On 10/6/2012 10:40 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Oct 6, 2012 at 12:14 AM, Stephen P. King
mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:
On 10/6/2012 1:02 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Sep 29, 2012 at 6:54 PM, Stephen P. King
mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:
On 9/29/201
On Sat, Oct 6, 2012 at 12:14 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
> On 10/6/2012 1:02 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 29, 2012 at 6:54 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>> On 9/29/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Indeed. I think 17 is intrinsically a prime number in all possible
>> realiti
ng content -
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-06, 01:14:01
Subject: Re: Epiphenomenalism
On 10/6/2012 1:02 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Sep 29, 2012 at 6:54 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/29/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Indeed. I think 17 is intri
On 10/6/2012 1:02 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Sep 29, 2012 at 6:54 PM, Stephen P. King
mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:
On 9/29/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Indeed. I think 17 is intrinsically a prime number in all
possible realities.
It is not a reality
On Sat, Sep 29, 2012 at 6:54 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
> On 9/29/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Indeed. I think 17 is intrinsically a prime number in all possible
> realities.
>
>
> It is not a reality in a world that only has 16 objects in it. I can
> come up with several other cou
On 9/30/2012 8:05 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
Leibniz would not go along with epiphenomena because
the matter that materialists base their beliefs in
is not real, so it can't emanate consciousness.
Leibniz did not believe in matter in the same way that
atheists today do not belie
On 30 Sep 2012, at 18:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/30/2012 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Sep 2012, at 21:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/29/2012 7:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, and the fact that we cannot know which one bears us "here
and now". The QM indeterminacy is made into a partic
On 9/30/2012 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Sep 2012, at 21:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/29/2012 7:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, and the fact that we cannot know which one bears us "here and now". The QM
indeterminacy is made into a particular first person comp indeterminacy.
Where
...@verizon.net
9/30/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-29, 19:54:56
Subject: Re: Epiphenomenalism
On 9/29/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Mar
On 30 Sep 2012, at 01:54, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/29/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Sep 2012, at 12:21, Stephen P. King wrote:
HEY!
It's nice to see other people noticing the same thing that I
have been complaining about. Thank you, Brent!
On 9/29/2012 3:49 AM, Brun
On 29 Sep 2012, at 21:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/29/2012 7:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, and the fact that we cannot know which one bears us "here
and now". The QM indeterminacy is made into a particular first
person comp indeterminacy.
Where is the "here and now" if not a localiza
On Saturday, September 29, 2012 2:14:34 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> > The spark plugs don't fire in response to the will of the driver, the
> brain
> > does. This isn't magic, this is the ordinary process by which we
> parti
On 9/29/2012 10:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Sep 2012, at 12:21, Stephen P. King wrote:
HEY!
It's nice to see other people noticing the same thing that I have
been complaining about. Thank you, Brent!
On 9/29/2012 3:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I *can* know the exact position of
On 9/29/2012 7:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, and the fact that we cannot know which one bears us "here and now". The QM
indeterminacy is made into a particular first person comp indeterminacy.
Where is the "here and now" if not a localization in a physical world.
Perhaps, but you need
On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> The spark plugs don't fire in response to the will of the driver, the brain
> does. This isn't magic, this is the ordinary process by which we participate
> in the world in every waking moment of our lives. It is not the same.
> Building a
On 29 Sep 2012, at 12:21, Stephen P. King wrote:
HEY!
It's nice to see other people noticing the same thing that I
have been complaining about. Thank you, Brent!
On 9/29/2012 3:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I *can* know the exact position of an electron in my brain, even
if this will
HEY!
It's nice to see other people noticing the same thing that I have
been complaining about. Thank you, Brent!
On 9/29/2012 3:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I *can* know the exact position of an electron in my brain, even if
this will make me totally ignorant on its impulsions. I can kno
On 28 Sep 2012, at 20:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/28/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Sep 2012, at 19:18, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/27/2012 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or
other
machine to behave in a way not predictable by pure
On 9/28/2012 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Sep 2012, at 19:18, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/27/2012 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.
But this cannot be entirel
On 27 Sep 2012, at 19:18, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/27/2012 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.
But this cannot be entirely correct. Consciousness will make your
bra
ger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/28/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-27, 12:52:30
Subject: Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
d knows everything
in the univefrse uniqueloy from its own point of view.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/28/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-l
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 11:29:12 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire
> >> then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics.
> >
> >
> > If t
On 9/27/2012 10:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 7:45:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg
> wrote:
>> I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or
other
>> machine to behave in a way not
On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire
>> then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics.
>
>
> If the neurons fire based on the participation of a personal identity in
> response to events in a p
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 7:45:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >
> wrote:
>
> >> I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
> >> machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.
> >> Some pe
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
>> machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.
>> Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is
>> possible but it is contrary to
On 9/27/2012 8:27 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Note that I think we agree (some forms of reasoning probably require consciousness),
which only provides another reason to doubt the consistency of the definition of
zombies. I don't think reasoning is normally assumed to require consciousness, which
On 9/27/2012 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.
But this cannot be entirely correct. Consciousness will make your brain, at the level
below the substitution level,
On 9/27/2012 5:49 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain
> scans what people are seeing:
>
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html
We still can't observe the experience. Adv
On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency".
This has
already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding
ability (by
Gödel "length of proof" theore
On 9/27/2012 10:22 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
I think the only difference in what you are saying and what I am
saying, is I say look the zombies can do these things (by their
definition), so they must be conscious and there is the inconsistency,
whereas you say zombies cannot do these things since
On 9/27/2012 10:22 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
This is to equate reasoning to automatically following an
algorithm. This implies perfect predictability at some level and
thus the absence of any 1p only aspects. Additionally, the recipe
is some thng that needs explanation. How was it f
On 9/27/2012 4:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Sep 2012, at 19:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:
in which case, how are they really arithmetic.
They are not. Arithmetical truth is already not arithmetical.
Arithmetic seen from inside is *vastly* bigger than arithmetic. This
needs a bit of "model th
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 7:49 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical
> events
> > or not? There are multiple levels involved here and you may be missing
> the
> > forest for t
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 9:09:12 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal
> >
> wrote:
>
> > You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency". This
> has
> > already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding ability
> (
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 1:01:12 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 11:09 PM, Stephen P. King
>
> > wrote:
>
>> On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>> > wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 a
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency". This has
> already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding ability (by
> Gödel "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self-consistency" is pure
> 3p, and is
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical events
> or not? There are multiple levels involved here and you may be missing the
> forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms. Saying the
> consciousness is irr
On 27 Sep 2012, at 04:24, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch
wrote:
If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the
pain
they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental?
There is a sequence of physical events from the application
On 26 Sep 2012, at 19:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, September 26, 2012 3:45:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou
On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 11:09 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
> On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch
>> wrote:
>>
>> > If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to tal
On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:
On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about
t
On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> > If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain
> > they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental?
>
> There is a sequence of physical events from the
On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain
> they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental?
There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
painful stimulus to the subject saying "that hurts",
On Wednesday, September 26, 2012 3:45:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> > On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 a
On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch
> wrote:
>
>> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someon
On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch
> > >
>
> > wrote:
> >
> >> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able
> >> to ta
On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch
wrote:
Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able
to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained
On Mon, Sep 24, 2012 at 10:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch
> wrote:
>
> > Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able to
> talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
>
> The behaviour - talking about the pain - could
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