Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-12-23 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 28 Nov 2012, at 17:42, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/28/2012 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



The question though is how does that happen?


Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know  
why and how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of  
math in physics. With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from  
this we can explain why numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically  
defined) and why they obey apparent laws


So you say.  But where is the explanation and the explanation of why  
this electron instead of that electron?


Comp provides two type of explanation. Programs (that is number), and  
programs 1p expectation when distributed in the UD. Apparently if you  
look where an electron is, in some orbital (you know its excitation  
level of energy), there will be no explanation of why it is here or  
there, by first person indeterminacy on the branches relative to your  
knowledge of its energy. Like we can explain why nobody can explain to  
the W-man why he is the W-man and not the M-man, in the WM- 
duplication. But we can explain the "W and M and not Vienna", by the  
program and its local history.





It seems your arguments are all of the form, "If comp is true, then  
everything true is explained by comp."


OK, but this in the same sense that if physicalism is true, then  
everything true is explained by physicalism.


Yet, when physicalism fails on consciousness, people tend to say, "- 
Ah! but this means probably that consciousness is not true", and I  
feel like I have better to run away. It is really like changing the  
data when the theory is wrong, or changing the people when the tyrant  
is tired.


Comp start from consciousness admittance, and then explain matter by  
the relation than numbers have with possible truth including  
consciousness.


And comp is made very precise by Church thesis, and computer science,  
when physicalism still seem unaware of its "assumption" aspect, based  
on a rough speculation extrapolated by our animal conception of  
reality. Progress has begun when the Greeks depart from that habit, to  
take matter for granted, but the bad habit get back through a  
simplification of Aristotle imposed by tradition of authorities.


If comp is true everything HAS TO BE explained in arithmetic and  
arithmetic only, and with reasonable definitions.

That would be more correct to say.

Bruno





Brent

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-12-02 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 30 Nov 2012, at 20:08, Jesse Mazer wrote:




On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Craig Weinberg > wrote:



On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:
On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> Richard,
>
>
> On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>> Bruno,
>> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?
>
>
>
> Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come  
from

> arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.
>
> Bruno
>

Since energy is what makes things happen
then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
Richard



If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum  
production in a program and solve the world's energy problem.  
Instead, we find that in all real implementations of computing, comp  
invariably consumes net energy. Why would that be? Does comp allow  
anti-comp? Maybe we could run our computers backwards and get some  
kilowatt hours back.


Craig


Seems like this argument is confusing levels of simulations. If you  
have one simulated world on a computer which is complex enough to  
have its own simulated oil production, as well as simulated physical  
computers, then those computers could be used to simulate another  
world, a simulation-within-the-simulation. But obviously having  
petroleum production in the simulation-within-the-simulation is not  
going to provide any energy to the original simulated world, despite  
the fact that they are both computer simulations. So, the fact that  
we cannot get energy from simulations of oil production, and don't  
get wet from simulations of rainstorms and such, is no argument  
against the idea that our own universe might just be a computational  
system.


I agree with your point, as a valid rebuttal of Craig, but with comp  
we definitely know that the universe is not a computational system a  
priori, as the physical reality supervene on the first person plural  
indeterminacy which is a sum on all computations, and this is not a  
priori computable. Indeed that is why we have to hunt the white rabbit  
away.


Digital physics implies comp, and comp implies the negation (a priori)  
of digital physics, and this makes digital physics inconsistent (with  
or without comp).


Bruno




Jesse


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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-12-01 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 30 Nov 2012, at 16:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:
On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> Richard,
>
>
> On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>> Bruno,
>> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?
>
>
>
> Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come  
from

> arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.
>
> Bruno
>

Since energy is what makes things happen
then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
Richard



If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum  
production in a program and solve the world's energy problem.  
Instead, we find that in all real implementations of computing, comp  
invariably consumes net energy. Why would that be? Does comp allow  
anti-comp?


Well, not really. But comp allows the consistency of non comp (but  
consistency is very cheap, so this does not say too much).





Maybe we could run our computers backwards and get some kilowatt  
hours back.


Lol

Of course (of course ?), to go backward needs reversibility, and  
reversibility needs no loss of energy. It is ironical.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-12-01 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 30 Nov 2012, at 16:32, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

Richard,


On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,
Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?




Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.

Bruno



Since energy is what makes things happen


Wow, you are quick here. What you say assume a priori Energy, some  
physical laws relating energy and happening, etc.





then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.


There is a sense to say that arithmetic makes everything happen, from  
the 1pov view of the arithmetical creature, and that this follows from  
the comp supposition, OK, but it is still an open problem if this  
gives a quantum multiverse, or Everett precise relative state. But  
there are sign that it might be the case indeed. It is testable.


Bruno







On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:




On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:




On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:




On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:




  How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from  
observation

(the
quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear  
positive
operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical  
quantization,

which
exists already.





UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if  
we are

machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be
justified by
the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to  
it.




Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a  
piece of

iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface
between
pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have  
to be
matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic  
alone. Can

we
use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what  
we feel?




Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.




The question though is how does that happen?


Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't  
know why

and
how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in  
physics.
With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can  
explain

why
numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey
apparent
laws



How do tangible things interface with logic -


I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask  
for some

amount of consistency.



how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and  
through

what
capacity can they express that obedience?


With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities
(actually
0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.

The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to  
divide

6,
for example.















Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the  
presumption

of
logic?


At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in  
logic

quite
a lot.




I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes  
it even
worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very  
limited
logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then  
what is

it
that you are reducing it from?


?




If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,


It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded  
by a

universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.



then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need  
the pork

loin?


Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological  
sense, bu
assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal  
numbers about

it.



Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or  
shapes or

anything other than what they actually are)?


By the decoding process, like 10001100 can be decoded into  
add 0 to

the
content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the  
"real

case"
of the "roasted pork smelly experiences".













Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level,  
only simple

substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.




Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It  
sounds like

this:

C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"


We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic.
(We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).




We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but  
not

everything that makes s

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-30 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Friday, November 30, 2012 2:08:34 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Craig Weinberg 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal  
>>> wrote: 
>>> > Richard, 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> >> Bruno, 
>>> >> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic? 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from 
>>> > arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct. 
>>> > 
>>> > Bruno 
>>> > 
>>>
>>> Since energy is what makes things happen 
>>> then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe. 
>>> Richard 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum production in 
>> a program and solve the world's energy problem. Instead, we find that in 
>> all real implementations of computing, comp invariably consumes net energy. 
>> Why would that be? Does comp allow anti-comp? Maybe we could run our 
>> computers backwards and get some kilowatt hours back.
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>
> Seems like this argument is confusing levels of simulations. If you have 
> one simulated world on a computer which is complex enough to have its own 
> simulated oil production, as well as simulated physical computers, then 
> those computers could be used to simulate another world, a 
> simulation-within-the-simulation. But obviously having petroleum production 
> in the simulation-within-the-simulation is not going to provide any energy 
> to the original simulated world, despite the fact that they are both 
> computer simulations. So, the fact that we cannot get energy from 
> simulations of oil production, and don't get wet from simulations of 
> rainstorms and such, is no argument against the idea that our own universe 
> might just be a computational system.
>

I'm using this argument precisely to show that comp has no sensible way of 
handling levels of simulation. There is no simulation of energy, because 
energy is intrinsically tied to *the sole cosmos of realized mass and 
spacetime*. A simulation of motion is still motion. A simulation of color 
is still color. I only need one layer of hardware to simulate endless 
levels of cartoon universes, but none of these cartoon universes can 
simulate anything 'outside' of the ground floor hardware. Within the 
simulations, there is no problem. I can have a set of containers running 
virtual Windows servers, and they can have virtual Web browsers on them, 
which can run another virtual Windows server nested in that, etc... None of 
them have any problem simulating whatever worldly conditions I want to 
create. Whatever level confusion could arise is easily solved. I can change 
one byte on a virtual gear of a virtual engine and have it go from 
representing grinding torque and acceleration of mass to a ghostly image of 
gear shaped shadows spinning merrily through each other. 

Nothing like this happens in the bottom level of hardware. If anything 
realism is defined explicitly in opposition to this arbitrary 
materialization. There is strict thermodynamic conservation and concretely 
irreversible events. From any level within any of the simulations, there is 
no problem making radical changes to the physics on any other level, except 
the level that actually touches matter-energy-space-time. Comp is based on 
the reckless and unfounded assumption that there is no sole cosmos of 
realized function, and it uses that error to lock us in a tautological 
multiverse of Platonic phantoms. To me, it's great fiction, but it fails to 
locate reality.

Craig


> Jesse
>
>

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-30 Thread Jesse Mazer 
On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>> > Richard,
>> >
>> >
>> > On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>> >
>> >> Bruno,
>> >> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
>> > arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.
>> >
>> > Bruno
>> >
>>
>> Since energy is what makes things happen
>> then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
>> Richard
>>
>>
>>
> If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum production in
> a program and solve the world's energy problem. Instead, we find that in
> all real implementations of computing, comp invariably consumes net energy.
> Why would that be? Does comp allow anti-comp? Maybe we could run our
> computers backwards and get some kilowatt hours back.
>
> Craig
>
>
Seems like this argument is confusing levels of simulations. If you have
one simulated world on a computer which is complex enough to have its own
simulated oil production, as well as simulated physical computers, then
those computers could be used to simulate another world, a
simulation-within-the-simulation. But obviously having petroleum production
in the simulation-within-the-simulation is not going to provide any energy
to the original simulated world, despite the fact that they are both
computer simulations. So, the fact that we cannot get energy from
simulations of oil production, and don't get wet from simulations of
rainstorms and such, is no argument against the idea that our own universe
might just be a computational system.

Jesse

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-30 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:
>
> On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal 
> > 
> wrote: 
> > Richard, 
> > 
> > 
> > On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: 
> > 
> >> Bruno, 
> >> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic? 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from 
> > arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct. 
> > 
> > Bruno 
> > 
>
> Since energy is what makes things happen 
> then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe. 
> Richard 
>
>
>
If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum production in a 
program and solve the world's energy problem. Instead, we find that in all 
real implementations of computing, comp invariably consumes net energy. Why 
would that be? Does comp allow anti-comp? Maybe we could run our computers 
backwards and get some kilowatt hours back.

Craig
 

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-30 Thread Richard Ruquist 
On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> Richard,
>
>
> On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>> Bruno,
>> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?
>
>
>
> Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
> arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.
>
> Bruno
>

Since energy is what makes things happen
then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
Richard

>
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



 On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:



 On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>How exactly does the comparison occur?
>>
>>
>> By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation
>> (the
>> quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive
>> operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization,
>> which
>> exists already.
>> 
>
>
>
> UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are
> machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be
> justified by
> the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.



 Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of
 iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface
 between
 pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be
 matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can
 we
 use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel?



 Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
 On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The question though is how does that happen?
>>>
>>>
>>> Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why
>>> and
>>> how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics.
>>> With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain
>>> why
>>> numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey
>>> apparent
>>> laws
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> How do tangible things interface with logic -
>>>
>>>
>>> I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for some
>>> amount of consistency.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through
>>> what
>>> capacity can they express that obedience?
>>>
>>>
>>> With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities
>>> (actually
>>> 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.
>>>
>>> The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to divide
>>> 6,
>>> for example.
>>>
>>>
>>>






>
>
>
>
> Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption
> of
> logic?
>
>
> At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic
> quite
> a lot.



 I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even
 worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited
 logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is
 it
 that you are reducing it from?


 ?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,
>>>
>>>
>>> It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a
>>> universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork
>>> loin?
>>>
>>>
>>> Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological sense, bu
>>> assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers about
>>> it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or
>>> anything other than what they actually are)?
>>>
>>>
>>> By the decoding process, like 10001100 can be decoded into add 0 to
>>> the
>>> content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the "real
>>> case"
>>> of the "roasted pork smelly experiences".
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>






>
> Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple
> substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.



 Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like
 this:

 C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"


 We can't. But we can

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-30 Thread Bruno Marchal 

Richard,


On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Bruno,
Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?



Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from  
arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.


Bruno




On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:



On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:




   How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from  
observation (the
quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear  
positive
operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical  
quantization, which

exists already.




UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we  
are
machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be  
justified by

the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.



Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a  
piece of
iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface  
between
pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have  
to be
matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone.  
Can we
use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we  
feel?



Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.



The question though is how does that happen?


Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know  
why and
how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in  
physics.
With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can  
explain why
numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey  
apparent

laws



How do tangible things interface with logic -


I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for  
some

amount of consistency.



how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and  
through what

capacity can they express that obedience?


With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities  
(actually

0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.

The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to  
divide 6,

for example.















Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the  
presumption of

logic?


At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in  
logic quite

a lot.



I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it  
even
worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very  
limited
logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then  
what is it

that you are reducing it from?


?



If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,


It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a
universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.



then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need  
the pork

loin?


Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological  
sense, bu
assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers  
about

it.



Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or  
shapes or

anything other than what they actually are)?


By the decoding process, like 10001100 can be decoded into add  
0 to the
content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the  
"real case"

of the "roasted pork smelly experiences".













Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only  
simple

substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.



Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It  
sounds like

this:

C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"


We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic.
(We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).



We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not
everything that makes sense is logical.


You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least,  
and with

UDA: at most.











B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any  
logic. All

you really need is logic."



You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that  
you don't
need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The  
arithmetic (or

equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.



What does logic and arithmetic need?


?
Nothing, I would say.












Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a
machine/number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the  
existence of
such machine does not require the belief or assumpt

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-28 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 28 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 7:29:42 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 11/27/2012 10:52 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:


The question though is how does that happen? How do tangible things  
interface with logic - how do they know the logic is there, how do  
they 'obey' it, and through what capacity can they express that  
obedience?


It's the other way around.  Language was invented to describe things  
and logic is just some rules about making inferences in a way such  
that you don't end up inadvertently contradicting yourself.


Right. That's what I'm getting at. Logic didn't invent consciousness.


OK.




Even if logic could invent something, it wouldn't be able to tell  
that it had.


Not really.
PA can discover and prove the existence of prime numbers, and can also  
prove that PA can prove the existence of the prime numbers. In at  
least a sense, she can know the prime numbers exist, and she can know  
that she can know that prime numbers exist.



Before arithmetic truths or physical laws can exist, there must  
first exist the capacity to detect, discern, and participate in  
sensory experience of some kind.


OK.
And the comp hypothesis suggest to explain or defined the capacity to  
detect, discern, and participate in sensory experience of some kind by  
mechanical, or arithmetical (it is equivalent, with CT), relation.
The riddle of consciousness is explained by the existence of truth  
about numbers, that numbers can develop many beliefs about, sometimes  
true, yet unjustifiable, and in some case knowingly unjustifiable by  
them.


At the propositional level we inherit for the ideal sound machines two  
logics of self-reference, one give the provable part of self-reference  
(G) and the other (G*) give the true, including the non provable, part  
of self-reference.





That is the only conceivable universal primitive: sense.


Which sense? Mine? Yours? The jumping spider's sense? The computer's  
sense?


Sorry but it is easier for me to make sense of numbers making sense,  
than making sense of sense making numbers not making sense.


There is a theory of self-reference for the relative numbers, relative  
to *probable* universal numbers.
Physics origin is explained by that probability calculus on the  
universal number histories competing for your continuation (from your  
1p view).


Comp extends "Darwin and Everett" on arithmetic, somehow. And I don't  
say the result is the true physics,  I say that it is testable.



Bruno






Craig


Brent

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-28 Thread meekerdb 

On 11/28/2012 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The question though is how does that happen?


Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why and how electron 
obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics. With comp there is only math 
(arithmetic) and from this we can explain why numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically 
defined) and why they obey apparent laws


So you say.  But where is the explanation and the explanation of why this electron instead 
of that electron?  It seems your arguments are all of the form, "If comp is true, then 
everything true is explained by comp."


Brent

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-28 Thread Richard Ruquist 
Bruno,
Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?

On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:




 How exactly does the comparison occur?


 By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the
 quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive
 operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which
 exists already.
 
>>>
>>>
>>> UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are
>>> machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be justified by
>>> the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.
>>
>>
>> Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of
>> iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface between
>> pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be
>> matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can we
>> use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel?
>>
>>
>> Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
>> On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.
>
>
> The question though is how does that happen?
>
>
> Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why and
> how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics.
> With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain why
> numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey apparent
> laws
>
>
>
> How do tangible things interface with logic -
>
>
> I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for some
> amount of consistency.
>
>
>
> how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through what
> capacity can they express that obedience?
>
>
> With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities (actually
> 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.
>
> The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to divide 6,
> for example.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of
>>> logic?
>>>
>>>
>>> At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite
>>> a lot.
>>
>>
>> I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even
>> worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited
>> logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is it
>> that you are reducing it from?
>>
>>
>> ?
>
>
> If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,
>
>
> It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a
> universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.
>
>
>
> then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork
> loin?
>
>
> Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological sense, bu
> assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers about
> it.
>
>
>
> Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or
> anything other than what they actually are)?
>
>
> By the decoding process, like 10001100 can be decoded into add 0 to the
> content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the "real case"
> of the "roasted pork smelly experiences".
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple
>>> substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.
>>
>>
>> Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like
>> this:
>>
>> C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"
>>
>>
>> We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic.
>> (We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).
>
>
> We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not
> everything that makes sense is logical.
>
>
> You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least, and with
> UDA: at most.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. All
>> you really need is logic."
>>
>>
>>
>> You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you don't
>> need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The arithmetic (or
>> equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.
>
>
> What does logic and arithmetic need?
>
>
> ?
> Nothing, I would say.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontolog

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-27 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 7:29:42 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 11/27/2012 10:52 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>
> The question though is how does that happen? How do tangible things 
> interface with logic - how do they know the logic is there, how do they 
> 'obey' it, and through what capacity can they express that obedience?
>
>
> It's the other way around.  Language was invented to describe things and 
> logic is just some rules about making inferences in a way such that you 
> don't end up inadvertently contradicting yourself. 
>

Right. That's what I'm getting at. Logic didn't invent consciousness. Even 
if logic could invent something, it wouldn't be able to tell that it had. 
Before arithmetic truths or physical laws can exist, there must first exist 
the capacity to detect, discern, and participate in sensory experience of 
some kind. That is the only conceivable universal primitive: sense.

Craig
 

>
> Brent
>  

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-27 Thread meekerdb 

On 11/27/2012 10:52 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
The question though is how does that happen? How do tangible things interface with logic 
- how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through what capacity 
can they express that obedience?


It's the other way around.  Language was invented to describe things and logic is just 
some rules about making inferences in a way such that you don't end up inadvertently 
contradicting yourself.


Brent

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-27 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 26 Nov 2012, at 17:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 11/23/2012 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is  
involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a  
pair of logics?



The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic,  
makes a relative physical certainty into a trueSigma_1  
sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. So the  
observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with  
p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical  
reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is  
given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and  
this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of  
quantum logic into arithmetic.
Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the  
quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.


The question is why is the sentence about anything.


Well, we are supposed to choose them accordingly.




It's easy to write down axioms and prove theorems from them, but  
that doesn't make them true of anything.


No. That is why we ask politely at the start if you agree with them,  
if only temporarily for the sake of the argument.



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-27 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:





How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from  
observation (the quantum logic based on the algebra of the  
observable/linear positive operators) and the logic obtained from  
the arithmetical quantization, which exists already.





How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is  
involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a  
pair of logics?



The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic,  
makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence,  
which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with  
measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical  
sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to  
be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the  
quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes  
possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum  
logic into arithmetic.
Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the  
quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.



The question is straightforward to me - what makes logical  
comparison happen? Let me try to tease out what you answer is here,  
because it is not obvious.


The logic exists, because,
so far so good.
by UDA,
Isn't UDA a logical construct already?


UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are  
machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be  
justified by the arithmetical relations, and some internal views  
related to it.


Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece  
of iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface  
between pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't  
have to be matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by  
logic alone. Can we use logic to alone to deny that we see what we  
see or feel what we feel?


Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.










Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the  
presumption of logic?


At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic  
quite a lot.


I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it  
even worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very  
limited logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that,  
then what is it that you are reducing it from?


?






Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only  
simple substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.


Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds  
like this:


C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"


We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic.
(We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).






B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any  
logic. All you really need is logic."



You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you  
don't need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The  
arithmetic (or equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical  
detail.






Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/ 
number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of  
such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.


I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about  
awareness of participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the  
possibility of logic at all.


Logic is defined by the minimum we assume like

we will say that "p & q" is true, when p is true and q is true, and  
only then.
We will accept that if we assume p and if we assume (p->q), then we  
cab derive q from those assumption.

etc.
Logicians and computer scientist studies those kind of relations  
between proposition. It is a branch of math, and it is not necessarily  
related to foundations.









That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after  
that, you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha  
and omega answer to all possible questions.


On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize  
that we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make  
the questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some  
shape of the answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's  
conception of reality (even Pythagorus).
This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between  
Plato and Aristotle in theology.


How do we know that we aren't making the questions c

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-26 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>>  
>>
>>
>> How exactly does the comparison occur? 
>>
>>
>>  By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the 
>> quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive 
>> operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which 
>> exists already. 
>>
>>   
>>
>> How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is 
>> involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of 
>> logics?
>>
>>
>>
>> The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a 
>> relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be 
>> provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by 
>> []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the 
>> way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum 
>> logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and 
>> this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum 
>> logic into arithmetic. 
>> Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum 
>> propositions, new one, different one, etc.
>>
>
>
> The question is straightforward to me - what makes logical comparison 
> happen? Let me try to tease out what you answer is here, because it is not 
> obvious. 
>
> The logic exists, because, 
>
> so far so good. 
>
> by UDA, 
>
> Isn't UDA a logical construct already? 
>
>
> UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are 
> machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be justified by 
> the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.
>

Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of iron 
into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface between pure 
logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be matter, 
even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can we use logic 
to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel?


>
>
>
> Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption of 
> logic? 
>
>
> At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic quite 
> a lot. 
>

I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even 
worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited 
logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is it 
that you are reducing it from? 
 

> Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple 
> substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms. 
>

Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like 
this:

C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"

B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. All 
you really need is logic."
 

> Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/number 
>  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of such machine 
> does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.
>

I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about awareness of 
participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the possibility of logic 
at all.


>
>
> That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, you 
> are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega answer 
> to all possible questions. 
>
>
> On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize that 
> we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make the 
> questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape of the 
> answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception of reality 
> (even Pythagorus).
> This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between Plato 
> and Aristotle in theology.
>

How do we know that we aren't making the questions clearer by amputating 
everything that doesn't fit our axioms?


>
>
>
> when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a 
> true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. 
>
> Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes 
> things true? How does it actually happen?
>
>
> We assume some notion of arithmetical truth. I hope you can agree with 
> proposition like "44 is a prime number or 44 is not a prime number". 
>

What are the mechanics of that assumption though? The details of the 
propositions are not interesting to me, rather it is the ontology of 
proposition itself. What is it? Who proposes? How do they do it exactly? 
That is the only magic that consciousness contains. Beyond that, it's just 
mind-nu

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-26 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:




On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:





How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation  
(the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear  
positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical  
quantization, which exists already.





How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is  
involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a  
pair of logics?



The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic,  
makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence,  
which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with  
measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical  
sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to  
be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the  
quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes  
possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic  
into arithmetic.
Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the  
quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.



The question is straightforward to me - what makes logical  
comparison happen? Let me try to tease out what you answer is here,  
because it is not obvious.


The logic exists, because,
so far so good.
by UDA,
Isn't UDA a logical construct already?


UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are  
machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be  
justified by the arithmetical relations, and some internal views  
related to it.





Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the  
presumption of logic?


At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic  
quite a lot. Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological  
level, only simple substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.  
Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a machine/ 
number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence of  
such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.




That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after  
that, you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha  
and omega answer to all possible questions.


On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize  
that we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make  
the questions clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape  
of the answer, like seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception  
of reality (even Pythagorus).
This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between  
Plato and Aristotle in theology.





when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty  
into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and  
consistent.
Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What  
makes things true? How does it actually happen?


We assume some notion of arithmetical truth. I hope you can agree with  
proposition like "44 is a prime number or 44 is not a prime number".  
Not much is assumed, except for UDA, where you are asked if you are  
willing to accept a computer in place of your brain. The computer is  
supposed to be reconfigured at some level of course. We assume also  
Church thesis, although it is easy to avoid it, technically (but not  
so much "philosophically").




So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p,  
with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the  
physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum  
logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p ->  
[]<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal  
translation of quantum logic into arithmetic.


Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again.


It is not your fault. Nobody knows logic, except the professional  
logicians, who are not really aware of this.


I talk about logic, the branch of math, not logic the adjective for  
all simple rational behavior that we all know. UDA does not use logic- 
branch-math, but of course it use the logic that you are necessarily  
using when sending a post to a list (implicitly).
AUDA needs logic-the branch of math, due to the link between computer  
science and mathematical logic.





Comparison is used in the everyday sense.
Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense'  
being the reality


That would cut all the funding in fundamental sciences, as this answer  
everything. It is a bit like "why do you waste your time trying to  
understanding the thermo-kinetics of car motor and how car moves? Why  
not just accept that car moves when we press on the pedal?"


The everyday sense is a part of reality, an

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-26 Thread meekerdb 

On 11/23/2012 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, only how. 
What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?



The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative 
physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and 
consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p 
arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be 
redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the quantization []<>p, 
thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal 
translation of quantum logic into arithmetic.
Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum propositions, 
new one, different one, etc.


The question is why is the sentence about anything.  It's easy to write down axioms and 
prove theorems from them, but that doesn't make them true of anything.


Brent

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-26 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>  
>
>
> How exactly does the comparison occur? 
>
>
>  By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation (the 
> quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive 
> operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, which 
> exists already. 
>
>   
>
> How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is involved, 
> only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of logics?
>
>
>
> The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic, makes a 
> relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be 
> provable, and consistent. So the observability with measure one is given by 
> []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the 
> way the physical reality has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum 
> logic is given by the quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and 
> this makes possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum 
> logic into arithmetic. 
> Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the quantum 
> propositions, new one, different one, etc.
>


The question is straightforward to me - what makes logical comparison 
happen? Let me try to tease out what you answer is here, because it is not 
obvious. 

The logic exists, because, 

so far so good. 

by UDA, 

Isn't UDA a logical construct already? Is your answer to 'what makes logic 
happen?' rooted in the presumption of logic? That's ok with me, but you 
don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, you are pretty much committed 
to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega answer to all possible questions. 

when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into a 
true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. 

Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes 
things true? How does it actually happen?

So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p 
arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality 
has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the 
quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes possible 
to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into 
arithmetic. 


Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again. 

Comparison is used in the everyday sense.

Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense' being 
the reality and the specialized logic being one category of specialized 
mechanisms within that?
 
Craig

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-26 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:





How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation  
(the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear  
positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical  
quantization, which exists already.





How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is  
involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair  
of logics?



The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic,  
makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence,  
which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability with  
measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmetical sigma_1  
(this is coherent with the way the physical reality has to be  
redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by the  
quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes  
possible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic  
into arithmetic.
Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get the  
quantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.









Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an  
equiprobable way.


?


Does not comp require all possible 1p to exist?


Comp makes all possible 1p existing in arithmetic, from the possible  
arithmetical pov.








There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we  
cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the  
(so-called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily  
find itself in a world what has laws compatible with its  
existence. It seems to me that the observational act itself is a  
breaking of the perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible  
worlds.


?





But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.
I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between  
Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:


"Russell Standish: The predictions can easily depend of the  
'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a  
simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the  
spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B  
decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction.  
Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis,  
and Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both  
observations are correct in the first person picture of that  
observer. A "person" with the third person perspective, sees  
observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse,  
each with appropriate measure that can be computed from Quantum  
Mechanics.
Jacques Mallah: On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the  
way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution  
of observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn  
from that distribution. There are no different sets of predictions  
for different pictures, just the measure distribution and the  
sample from it.
Russell Standish: It sounds to me like you don't think the  
prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to  
observe? An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis  
and the y axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen  
which direction to measure the spin, the history of that  
particular is observer is constrained by that fact, and the  
predictions of QM altered accordingly. This is true both in MWI  
and the Copenhagen interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of  
QM. I used to think that QM gave predictions in terms of  
distributions, and that because one didn't see isolated particles,  
rather ensembles of such particles, I didn't see a problem. The  
properties of an ensemble are well defined. However, the ability  
of experimenters to isolate a single particle, such as a photon,  
or an atom, means we have to take this "spookiness" seriously."


The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion  
of a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of  
observers in separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for  
example, A and B have observables that mutually commute and thus  
have some chance of being mutually consistent and capable of being  
integrated into a single narrative. I think that this problem is  
being overlooked because the problem of Satisfiability is being  
ignored.



?









I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a  
physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell,  can  
consider... Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?


? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the  
physical reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how  
it emerges from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a  
first person plural product, with the persons being all Löbian  
machines, etc.


I am coming at the idea of a 'physical reali

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-22 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/22/2012 9:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 22 Nov 2012, at 00:20, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

  I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that 
then

gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.



I doubt that very much, ...


Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict 
comp, which is assumed also.

Dear Bruno,

   Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p 
that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with 
each other as a 'physical reality"?


There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from 
observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.

And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.


Dear Bruno,

How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation 
(the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear 
positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical 
quantization, which exists already.




Dear Bruno,

How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is 
involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of 
logics?




Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an 
equiprobable way.


?


Does not comp require all possible 1p to exist?



There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we 
cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the 
(so-called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find 
itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It 
seems to me that /the observational act itself is a breaking of the 
perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds/.


?





But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.
I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between 
Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:


*"**Russell Standish: *The predictions can easily depend of the 
'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a 
simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the 
spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B 
decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction. 
Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis, and 
Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both observations are 
correct in the first person picture of that observer. /A "person" 
with the third person perspective, sees observers A and B as 
inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse, each with appropriate 
measure that can be computed from Quantum Mechanics./


*Jacques Mallah: *On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the 
way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution of 
observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from that 
distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for 
different pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample from it.


*Russell Standish: *It sounds to me like you don't think the 
prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to observe? 
An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis and the y 
axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen which 
direction to measure the spin, the history of that particular is 
observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QM 
altered accordingly. This is true both in MWI and the Copenhagen 
interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of QM. I used to think 
that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, and that because 
one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of such 
particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble are 
well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a 
single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take 
this "spookiness" seriously."


The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of 
a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in 
separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have 
observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being 
mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single 
narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the 
problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.



?









I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a 
physical

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-22 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 22 Nov 2012, at 00:20, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

  I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that  
then

gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how  
'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even  
particles

could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.



I doubt that very much, ...


Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus  
contradict comp, which is assumed also.

Dear Bruno,

   Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of  
1p that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating  
with each other as a 'physical reality"?


There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from  
observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.

And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.


Dear Bruno,

How exactly does the comparison occur?


By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation  
(the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear  
positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical  
quantization, which exists already.






Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an  
equiprobable way.


?




There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we  
cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so- 
called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find  
itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It  
seems to me that the observational act itself is a breaking of the  
perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds.


?





But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.
I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between  
Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:


"Russell Standish: The predictions can easily depend of the  
'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a  
simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the  
spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B  
decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction.  
Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis,  
and Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both  
observations are correct in the first person picture of that  
observer. A "person" with the third person perspective, sees  
observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse,  
each with appropriate measure that can be computed from Quantum  
Mechanics.
Jacques Mallah: On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the  
way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution  
of observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from  
that distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for  
different pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample  
from it.
Russell Standish: It sounds to me like you don't think the  
prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to  
observe? An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis  
and the y axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen  
which direction to measure the spin, the history of that particular  
is observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QM  
altered accordingly. This is true both in MWI and the Copenhagen  
interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of QM. I used to think  
that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, and that because  
one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of such  
particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble are  
well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a  
single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take  
this "spookiness" seriously."


The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of  
a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in  
separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have  
observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being  
mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single  
narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the  
problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.



?









I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a  
physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell,  can consider...  
Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?


? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the  
physical reality is unavoidable for the dream

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-21 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

  I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.



I doubt that very much, ...


Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict 
comp, which is assumed also.

Dear Bruno,

   Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p 
that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with 
each other as a 'physical reality"?


There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from 
observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.

And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.


Dear Bruno,

How exactly does the comparison occur? Comp seems to necessitate 
all possible physical worlds in an equiprobable way. There is a deep 
problem with notions of priors as it seems that we cannot escape from 
the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so-called) anthropic 
principle: each observer will necessarily find itself in a world what 
has laws compatible with its existence. It seems to me that /the 
observational act itself is a breaking of the perfect symmetry of 
equiprobability of possible worlds/. But this claim implies violence to 
the idea of a 3p.
I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between 
Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:


*"**Russell Standish: *The predictions can easily depend of the 
'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a simple 
example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the spin of an 
electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B decides to measure 
the spin of the electron in the y direction. Observer A will see the 
spin of the electron aligned with x axis, and Observer B will see it 
aligned with the y axis. Both observations are correct in the first 
person picture of that observer. /A "person" with the third person 
perspective, sees observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a 
multiverse, each with appropriate measure that can be computed from 
Quantum Mechanics./


*Jacques Mallah: *On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the way 
I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution of 
observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from that 
distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for different 
pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample from it.


*Russell Standish: *It sounds to me like you don't think the prediction 
changes according to what the observer chooses to observe? An electron 
cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis and the y axis at the same 
time. Once the experimenter has chosen which direction to measure the 
spin, the history of that particular is observer is constrained by that 
fact, and the predictions of QM altered accordingly. This is true both 
in MWI and the Copenhagen interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of 
QM. I used to think that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, 
and that because one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of 
such particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble 
are well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a 
single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take 
this "spookiness" seriously."


The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of a 
'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in 
separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have 
observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being 
mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single 
narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the 
problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.





I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a 
physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell,  can consider... Is 
it necessarily inconsistent with comp?


? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical 
reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges 
from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a first person 
plural product, with the persons being all Löbian machines, etc.


I am coming at the idea of a 'physical reality' as an emergent 
structure and not some pre-defined ordering.




Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical laws, 
making comp

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-21 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 21 Nov 2012, at 14:10, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Isn't the Godel problem similar or related to saying that the
subject cannot be part of the predicate ?


Yes. the subject (1p) can't. But the machine can still refer to itself.




Then in any system
there will always be at least one subject, and that subject
cannot be part of the rest of the system ?


Eve,ntually the "system" belongs only to the imagination of the subject.




Which is the same as saying, along with Leibniz, that
in any system (of monads ) there must be at least one
supreme monad, whose subject or identity or soul
cannot be part of anything below it, because it is supreme.


Possible. the universal knower in ourself might then be the "supreme  
monad". But it is not the outer God, it more the universal soul, the  
third greek god.


Bruno








[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/21/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-20, 11:56:31
Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett  
Interpretation



On 20 Nov 2012, at 03:52, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that  
then

gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how  
'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even  
particles

could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I  
point

out in my book.


Hi Russell,

And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that  
we are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a  
particular basis that some set of "observers with compatible  
bases can sharing their realities". Is a reality something that  
is 1p in your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that  
aside for now.
That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered  
about the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's  
catastrophe. It seems to me that there is something that is being  
assumed about consciousness in those reasonings, something that  
is being taken for granted. (For one thing, the  
Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a universal ensemble that  
is very much like Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus  
problematic as it is not computable. Bruno's rejection of  
infinities seems to disallow for such priors to work for comp,  
IMHO.)


Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although  
"objective", concerned the 1p, which might contains actual  
infinities (at least in some sense).


Dear Bruno,

OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted  
within comp's theoretical structure.


You can see them as useful epistemological fictions to ease the  
reasoning of the L　bian machines (like PA) when emulated by the non  
L　bian reality (RA or the UD).








I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is  
somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that  
is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human  
or a giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be  
remembered and passed along in continuations. It is the one  
complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that  
some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical  
bodies can be continued. I think that the 'I' is not much  
different from the center of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not  
really exist at all as a substance or physical object and yet it  
has causal efficacy in some way...
Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind  
of substance that has persistent existence, like material  
substances in Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this  
assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of  
mass of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are  
altered? What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a  
'process' - something more like a 'stream'. Computer science has  
no problem with streams that I know of... I am trying to get  
Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with Quine  
atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)


Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?


I do not know how to

Re: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-21 Thread Roger Clough 
Hi Bruno Marchal 

Isn't the Godel problem similar or related to saying that the 
subject cannot be part of the predicate ? Then in any system
there will always be at least one subject, and that subject
cannot be part of the rest of the system ?

Which is the same as saying, along with Leibniz, that
in any system (of monads ) there must be at least one
supreme monad, whose subject or identity or soul
cannot be part of anything below it, because it is supreme.

 


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
11/21/2012 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-20, 11:56:31
Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation




On 20 Nov 2012, at 03:52, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.

Hi Russell,

And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we are 
humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a particular basis that 
some set of "observers with compatible bases can sharing their realities". Is a 
reality something that is 1p in your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll 
put that aside for now.
That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about the 
distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's catastrophe. It seems to me 
that there is something that is being assumed about consciousness in those 
reasonings, something that is being taken for granted. (For one thing, the 
Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a universal ensemble that is very much 
like Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus problematic as it is not 
computable. Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors 
to work for comp, IMHO.)



Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although "objective", 
concerned the 1p, which might contains actual infinities (at least in some 
sense).

Dear Bruno,

OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted within 
comp's theoretical structure.



You can see them as useful epistemological fictions to ease the reasoning of 
the L bian machines (like PA) when emulated by the non L bian reality (RA or 
the UD).










I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is somehow a 
difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, as I claim, 
instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a giant Black Cloud and that 
this difference can somehow be remembered and passed along in continuations. It 
is the one complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that 
some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be 
continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the center of mass 
of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a substance or physical 
object and yet it has causal efficacy in some way...
Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of substance 
that has persistent existence, like material substances in Parmenidean and 
Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens 
to the center of mass of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are 
altered? What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something 
more like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem with streams that I know 
of... I am trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK 
with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)



Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?

I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this time. Please 
allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for some thought on your part.

From: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams

"A stream of numbers is an ordered pair whose first coordinate is a number and 
whose second coordinate is again a stream of numbers. The first coordinate is 
called the head, and the second the tail. The tail of a given stream might be

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-20 Thread Russell Standish 
On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 03:23:55PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, November 20, 2012 5:58:15 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 07:39:02AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > > 
> > > Why does a multiverse need an internal view? Especially since our 
> > > experience is that all participants in the universe already provide 1p 
> > > internal views of the same universe. 
> > > 
> >
> > The only way a multiverse could not have an internal view is if 
> > observers are flatly impossible. That not only contradicts the facts, 
> > it would make for a totally uninteresting entity, for which it is not 
> > even wrong to say could exist. 
> >
> 
> What you're saying seems circular to me. 'A multiverse needs universes 
> because we know that beings observe the universe.'
> 

A multiverse that didn't have universes wouldn't be a multiverse. A
soccer team that didn't have soccer players wouldn't be a soccer
team. Sheesh!

> >
> > You are already going off on a rant that makes it difficult to 
> > interpret your objection. But to say that the multiverse fragrantly 
> > violates Occam's razor as you seem to be is a well-rebutted furphy. 
> 
> 
> Your saying that something has been rebutted isn't really information that 
> I can do anything with. I'm sure from your perspective that seems to be the 
> case, but even though we live in the same universe, I am not persuaded by 
> your assurance because I already know that you see the theory in a positive 
> light.
>  

You are showing your ignorance here. Read chapter 2 of my book,
understand it, _then_ come back with your objections. As I said, this
is everything list 101. If you just stick your fingers in your ears
and sing "la la la", you will not be persuaded of anything.


> 
> > To 
> > see why does require a modicum of mathematical knowledge, but its not 
> > rocket science. It is easily managed with the sort of mathematics 
> > taught at high school. 
> >
> 
> Why does it require any knowledge? A theory that suggests that quintillions 
> of universes must be generated by every mouse turd could not violate 
> Occam's razor any more if it tried. 

Because, quite simply, it doesn't! This is a gross, gross
misunderstanding of Occam's razor. Just because it is commonly held,
does not make it any more right.

The fact that the Emperor's Clothes 
> require special glasses to see doesn't inspire any confidence in me. Again 
> - my perspective is different from yours, yet we are talking about the same 
> universe.
>  

This is not a question of perspective.

> >
> > I don't understand your objection. 
> 
> 
> My objection is that it is a hypocritical appeal to superfluous 
> complication of concrete reality for the purpose of avoiding complication 
> in abstract mathematical theory.
>  

This statement is based on (unfortunately widely held) misconception,
as mentioned above. As a consequence, it is a load of baloney.

> 
> If you have a multiverse, what is the point of having beings who experience 
> an illusion of choice? All choices would be inevitable.
> 

An illusion seems to be good enough for some people. For me, the term is
misleading, as the "illusion" is just as real as the computer in front
of me, and the table it sits on. You pays your money and takes your choices.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-20 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Tuesday, November 20, 2012 5:58:15 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 07:39:02AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Monday, November 19, 2012 6:27:56 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 1) Why a universe, given a multiverse. A universe is the internal (ie 
> > > 1p) view of the multiverse. 
> > > 
> > 
> > Why does a multiverse need an internal view? Especially since our 
> > experience is that all participants in the universe already provide 1p 
> > internal views of the same universe. 
> > 
>
> The only way a multiverse could not have an internal view is if 
> observers are flatly impossible. That not only contradicts the facts, 
> it would make for a totally uninteresting entity, for which it is not 
> even wrong to say could exist. 
>

What you're saying seems circular to me. 'A multiverse needs universes 
because we know that beings observe the universe.'

>From my view, with a universe composed only of beings who not only observe 
but participate in the universe, the idea of a multiverse is superfluous.

>
> > 
> > > 2) Why a multiverse instead of a universe. The answer is the zero 
> > > information principle + Occams razor. Multiverses are actually much 
> > > simpler than universes. 
> > > 
> > 
> > Keeping with the simplicity theme, I'll just paste something I wrote 
> this 
> > morning for a conversation on Facebook, and then for a post on my blog 
> > (this way I don't need to recreate the universe just to say the same 
> thing 
> > I've already said... makes 'sense', right?): 
> > 
> > To me, the problem with MWI is not that it’s exotic, or that it is too 
> > bold, or that it seems silly, or that it’s that it is unparsimonious, it 
> is 
> > that it is radically hypocritical. It’s one thing to throw out Occam’s 
> > Razor in the service of explaining reality as it seems to us to actually 
> > be, but it’s another to throw it out for the purpose of preserving 
> Occam’s 
> > Razor for mathematical purposes. MWI is like proposing that “The 
> shortest 
> > distance between two lines is the creation of a fantastic number of 
> > universes.” This is only compelling if you are trying to squeeze 
> something 
> > which is not arithmetic into an arithmetic framework. 
> > 
>
> You are already going off on a rant that makes it difficult to 
> interpret your objection. But to say that the multiverse fragrantly 
> violates Occam's razor as you seem to be is a well-rebutted furphy. 


Your saying that something has been rebutted isn't really information that 
I can do anything with. I'm sure from your perspective that seems to be the 
case, but even though we live in the same universe, I am not persuaded by 
your assurance because I already know that you see the theory in a positive 
light.
 

> To 
> see why does require a modicum of mathematical knowledge, but its not 
> rocket science. It is easily managed with the sort of mathematics 
> taught at high school. 
>

Why does it require any knowledge? A theory that suggests that quintillions 
of universes must be generated by every mouse turd could not violate 
Occam's razor any more if it tried. The fact that the Emperor's Clothes 
require special glasses to see doesn't inspire any confidence in me. Again 
- my perspective is different from yours, yet we are talking about the same 
universe.
 

>
> > What I see clearly is that the whole of arithmetic - algebra, topology, 
> > information, etc, is nothing compared to the richness of sensory 
> coherence. 
> > Mathematics is a powerful tool because it is like a sterile skeleton of 
> > sense-making which can imitate anything that can be imitated 
> (Church-Turing 
> > basically formalizes this). But my conjecture formalizes the 
> understanding 
> > that awareness is defined specifically as *that which cannot be imitated 
> or 
> > substituted*. Math is useful if you are trying to make sense of a lot of 
> > things, but sense isn’t useful to math in any conceivable way. Math is a 
> > way of making sense, but it has no possibility of participation, so it 
> must 
> > be a character within the story of the universe rather than the universe 
> > being an idea within math. *This is where MWI goes wrong. It puts an 
> > infinity of carts before each other so that we won’t notice there’s no 
> > horse.* 
>
> I don't understand your objection. 


My objection is that it is a hypocritical appeal to superfluous 
complication of concrete reality for the purpose of avoiding complication 
in abstract mathematical theory.
 

> The observer has a critical role to 
> play in Multiverse theories (including the MWI), just not a physical 
> role (which is the problem with the Heisenberg/von Neumann version of 
> Copenhagen). The observer can be formalised to a certain extent, 
> providing useful insights (eg Bruno's AUDA), but nobody has completely 
> replaced the observer with mathematics, and quite possibly never will 
> (if you're to believe Chalmers and h

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-20 Thread Russell Standish 
On Tue, Nov 20, 2012 at 07:39:02AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, November 19, 2012 6:27:56 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> >
> > 1) Why a universe, given a multiverse. A universe is the internal (ie 
> > 1p) view of the multiverse. 
> >
> 
> Why does a multiverse need an internal view? Especially since our 
> experience is that all participants in the universe already provide 1p 
> internal views of the same universe.
> 

The only way a multiverse could not have an internal view is if
observers are flatly impossible. That not only contradicts the facts,
it would make for a totally uninteresting entity, for which it is not
even wrong to say could exist.

> 
> > 2) Why a multiverse instead of a universe. The answer is the zero 
> > information principle + Occams razor. Multiverses are actually much 
> > simpler than universes. 
> >
> 
> Keeping with the simplicity theme, I'll just paste something I wrote this 
> morning for a conversation on Facebook, and then for a post on my blog 
> (this way I don't need to recreate the universe just to say the same thing 
> I've already said... makes 'sense', right?):
> 
> To me, the problem with MWI is not that it’s exotic, or that it is too 
> bold, or that it seems silly, or that it’s that it is unparsimonious, it is 
> that it is radically hypocritical. It’s one thing to throw out Occam’s 
> Razor in the service of explaining reality as it seems to us to actually 
> be, but it’s another to throw it out for the purpose of preserving Occam’s 
> Razor for mathematical purposes. MWI is like proposing that “The shortest 
> distance between two lines is the creation of a fantastic number of 
> universes.” This is only compelling if you are trying to squeeze something 
> which is not arithmetic into an arithmetic framework. 
> 

You are already going off on a rant that makes it difficult to
interpret your objection. But to say that the multiverse fragrantly
violates Occam's razor as you seem to be is a well-rebutted furphy. To
see why does require a modicum of mathematical knowledge, but its not
rocket science. It is easily managed with the sort of mathematics
taught at high school.

> What I see clearly is that the whole of arithmetic - algebra, topology, 
> information, etc, is nothing compared to the richness of sensory coherence. 
> Mathematics is a powerful tool because it is like a sterile skeleton of 
> sense-making which can imitate anything that can be imitated (Church-Turing 
> basically formalizes this). But my conjecture formalizes the understanding 
> that awareness is defined specifically as *that which cannot be imitated or 
> substituted*. Math is useful if you are trying to make sense of a lot of 
> things, but sense isn’t useful to math in any conceivable way. Math is a 
> way of making sense, but it has no possibility of participation, so it must 
> be a character within the story of the universe rather than the universe 
> being an idea within math. *This is where MWI goes wrong. It puts an 
> infinity of carts before each other so that we won’t notice there’s no 
> horse.*

I don't understand your objection. The observer has a critical role to
play in Multiverse theories (including the MWI), just not a physical
role (which is the problem with the Heisenberg/von Neumann version of
Copenhagen). The observer can be formalised to a certain extent,
providing useful insights (eg Bruno's AUDA), but nobody has completely
replaced the observer with mathematics, and quite possibly never will
(if you're to believe Chalmers and his "hard problem").

Cheers
-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-20 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 20 Nov 2012, at 03:52, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that  
then

gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how  
'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even  
particles

could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I  
point

out in my book.


Hi Russell,

And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that  
we are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a  
particular basis that some set of "observers with compatible bases  
can sharing their realities". Is a reality something that is 1p in  
your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for  
now.
That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered  
about the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's  
catastrophe. It seems to me that there is something that is being  
assumed about consciousness in those reasonings, something that is  
being taken for granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin  
distribution assumes a universal ensemble that is very much like  
Leibniz' pre-established harmony and thus problematic as it is not  
computable. Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for  
such priors to work for comp, IMHO.)


Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although  
"objective", concerned the 1p, which might contains actual  
infinities (at least in some sense).


Dear Bruno,

OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted  
within comp's theoretical structure.


You can see them as useful epistemological fictions to ease the  
reasoning of the Löbian machines (like PA) when emulated by the non  
Löbian reality (RA or the UD).








I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is  
somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that  
is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or  
a giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be  
remembered and passed along in continuations. It is the one  
complaint that I have with reincarnation theories, the idea that  
some memories that can only be defined with reference to physical  
bodies can be continued. I think that the 'I' is not much  
different from the center of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not  
really exist at all as a substance or physical object and yet it  
has causal efficacy in some way...
Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind  
of substance that has persistent existence, like material  
substances in Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this  
assumption is 'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass  
of an aggregate when the members of that aggregate are altered?  
What if consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' -  
something more like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem  
with streams that I know of... I am trying to get Bruno to  
consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with Quine atoms (which  
are the canonical case of a stream!)


Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?


I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this  
time. Please allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for some  
thought on your part.


From: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams

"A stream of numbers is an ordered pair whose first coordinate is a  
number and whose second coordinate is again a stream of numbers. The  
first coordinate is called the head, and the second the tail. The  
tail of a given stream might be different from it, but again, it  
might be the very same stream. For example, consider the stream s  
whose head is 0 and whose tail is s again. Thus the tail of the tail  
of s is s itself. We have s = ⟨ 0, s⟩ , s = ⟨ 0, ⟨ 0,  
s⟩  ⟩ , etc. This stream s exhibits object circularity. It is  
natural to “unravel” its definition as:

(0,0,…,0,…)
It is natural to understand the unraveled form is as an infinite  
sequence; standardly, infinite sequences are taken to be functions  
whose domain is the set N of natural numbers. So we can take the  
unraveled form to be the constant function with value 0. Whether we  
want to take the stream s described above to be this function is an  
issue we want to explore in a general way in this entry. Notice that  
since we defined s to be an ordered pair, it follows from the way  
pairs are constructed in ordinary mathematics that s will not itse

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-20 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Monday, November 19, 2012 6:27:56 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 02:45:43PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > What I am asking is why does the idea of a multiverse help explain why 
> any 
> > one universe exists in the first place. 
> > 
>
> This could be one of two different questions, both of which are 
> evrything-list 101: 
>
> 1) Why a universe, given a multiverse. A universe is the internal (ie 
> 1p) view of the multiverse. 
>

Why does a multiverse need an internal view? Especially since our 
experience is that all participants in the universe already provide 1p 
internal views of the same universe.


> 2) Why a multiverse instead of a universe. The answer is the zero 
> information principle + Occams razor. Multiverses are actually much 
> simpler than universes. 
>

Keeping with the simplicity theme, I'll just paste something I wrote this 
morning for a conversation on Facebook, and then for a post on my blog 
(this way I don't need to recreate the universe just to say the same thing 
I've already said... makes 'sense', right?):

To me, the problem with MWI is not that it’s exotic, or that it is too 
bold, or that it seems silly, or that it’s that it is unparsimonious, it is 
that it is radically hypocritical. It’s one thing to throw out Occam’s 
Razor in the service of explaining reality as it seems to us to actually 
be, but it’s another to throw it out for the purpose of preserving Occam’s 
Razor for mathematical purposes. MWI is like proposing that “The shortest 
distance between two lines is the creation of a fantastic number of 
universes.” This is only compelling if you are trying to squeeze something 
which is not arithmetic into an arithmetic framework. 

What I see clearly is that the whole of arithmetic - algebra, topology, 
information, etc, is nothing compared to the richness of sensory coherence. 
Mathematics is a powerful tool because it is like a sterile skeleton of 
sense-making which can imitate anything that can be imitated (Church-Turing 
basically formalizes this). But my conjecture formalizes the understanding 
that awareness is defined specifically as *that which cannot be imitated or 
substituted*. Math is useful if you are trying to make sense of a lot of 
things, but sense isn’t useful to math in any conceivable way. Math is a 
way of making sense, but it has no possibility of participation, so it must 
be a character within the story of the universe rather than the universe 
being an idea within math. *This is where MWI goes wrong. It puts an 
infinity of carts before each other so that we won’t notice there’s no 
horse.*

I am saying, if we are going to make the creation of the universe 
infinitely easy, then why have a creation requirement at all? If every 
change to every molecule on every hair on a dust mite’s head needs its own 
Andromeda galaxy to help make that change…and really every *possible* 
change on every hair on every dust mite in the Andromeda galaxy also needs 
universes in which each of the first dust mite’s possible changes exist, 
then why have these changes at all? Why hop between a matrix of static 
possibilities if those possibilities are already realized? 


> I don't see that regressions, infinite or otherwise, have a role to 
> play in either question. 
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>
>

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/19/2012 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

 I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.


Hi Russell,

And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we 
are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a 
particular basis that some set of "observers with compatible bases 
can sharing their realities". Is a reality something that is 1p in 
your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for now.
That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about 
the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum 
) 
and Occam's catastrophe 
. 
It seems to me that there is something that is being assumed about 
consciousness in those reasonings, something that is being taken for 
granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a 
universal ensemble that is very much like Leibniz' pre-established 
harmony and thus problematic as it is not computable 
. 
Bruno's rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors to 
work for comp, IMHO.)


Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although 
"objective", concerned the 1p, which might contains actual infinities 
(at least in some sense).


Dear Bruno,

OK, I need to understand where actual infinities are permitted 
within comp's theoretical structure.




I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is 
somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, 
as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a 
giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be remembered 
and passed along in continuations. It is the one complaint that I 
have with reincarnation theories, the idea that some memories that 
can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be 
continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the center 
of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a 
substance or physical object and yet it has causal efficacy in some 
way...
Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of 
substance that has persistent existence, like material substances in 
Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not 
even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass of an aggregate when 
the members of that aggregate are altered? What if consciousness is 
not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something more like a 'stream 
'. 
Computer science has no problem with streams that I know of... I am 
trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK 
with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)


Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?


I do not know how to explain this relation is words at this time. 
Please allow me to refer to some definitions and ask for some thought on 
your part.


From: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfounded-set-theory/#sectionstreams


"A/stream of numbers/is an ordered pair whose first coordinate is a 
number and whose second coordinate is again a stream of numbers. The 
first coordinate is called the/head/, and the second the/tail/. The tail 
of a given stream might be different from it, but again, it might be the 
very same stream. For example, consider the stream/s/whose head is 0 and 
whose tail is/s/again. Thus the tail of the tail of/s/is/s/itself. We 
have/s/= ? 0, /s/? ,/s/= ? 0, ? 0, /s/? ? , etc. This stream/s /exhibits 
object circularity. It is natural to "unravel" its definition as:


   (0,0,...,0,...)

It is natural to understand the unraveled form is as an/infinite 
sequence/; standardly, infinite sequences are taken to be functions 
whose domain is the set/N/of natural numbers. So we can take the 
unraveled form to be the constant function with value 0. Whether we want 
to take the stream/s/described above to/be/this function is an issue we 
want to explore in a general way in this entry. Notice that since we 
defined/s/to be an ordered pair, it follows from the way pairs are 
constructed in ordinary mathematics that/

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Russell Standish 
On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 04:48:14PM -0600, meekerdb wrote:
> On 11/19/2012 4:52 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >What does this even mean? Anyone else know?
> 
> It means Craig is a wordbot?  :-)
> 
> Brent
> 

:)

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Russell Standish 
On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 02:45:43PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> 
> What I am asking is why does the idea of a multiverse help explain why any 
> one universe exists in the first place.
> 

This could be one of two different questions, both of which are
evrything-list 101:

1) Why a universe, given a multiverse. A universe is the internal (ie
1p) view of the multiverse.

2) Why a multiverse instead of a universe. The answer is the zero
information principle + Occams razor. Multiverses are actually much
simpler than universes.

I don't see that regressions, infinite or otherwise, have a role to
play in either question.

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread meekerdb 

On 11/19/2012 4:52 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 02:12:33PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:


I'm postulating infinite regress because the idea that universes are being
created and preserved implies an meta-universal support which also must be
made of some kind of information-theoretic functionality which would have
its own meta-quantum reasoning for existing.

What does this even mean? Anyone else know?


It means Craig is a wordbot?  :-)

Brent

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Monday, November 19, 2012 5:41:22 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 02:12:33PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Monday, November 19, 2012 4:37:44 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: 
> > > 
> > > On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 09:29:58AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > What I am asking is why would the single multiverse be any less 
> > > dependent 
> > > > upon multiplicity to accomplish its infinities of preserved 
> separations 
> > > > than a single universe does? If a universe needs a multiverse to 
> justify 
> > > > superposition, then why doesn't a multiverse also need a 
> meta-multiverse 
> > > to 
> > > > keep track of all the possible ways of regulating the creation and 
> > > > preservation of universes? How is infinite regress avoided? 
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > There is no regress in the picture. Please reread my text (or my book) 
> > > I have no clue as to why you are postulating one Can anyone else 
> > > explain Craig's concerns? 
> > > 
> > 
> > I'm postulating infinite regress because the idea that universes are 
> being 
> > created and preserved implies an meta-universal support which also must 
> be 
> > made of some kind of information-theoretic functionality which would 
> have 
> > its own meta-quantum reasoning for existing. 
>
> What does this even mean? Anyone else know? 
>

What I am asking is why does the idea of a multiverse help explain why any 
one universe exists in the first place.


> > How does having many worlds 
> > better explain the existence of any world or world-making condition? 
> Mainly 
> > it buries the problem under a mountain of infinities. 
> > 
> > Craig 
> > 
> > 
> > > -- 
> > > 
> > > 
>  
>
> > > 
> > > Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> > > Principal, High Performance Coders 
> > > Visiting Professor of Mathematics  
> > > hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
>
> > > University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
> > > 
>  
>
> > > 
> > > 
> > 
> > -- 
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> -- 
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>  
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> Principal, High Performance Coders 
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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Russell Standish 
On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 02:12:33PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, November 19, 2012 4:37:44 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 09:29:58AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > What I am asking is why would the single multiverse be any less 
> > dependent 
> > > upon multiplicity to accomplish its infinities of preserved separations 
> > > than a single universe does? If a universe needs a multiverse to justify 
> > > superposition, then why doesn't a multiverse also need a meta-multiverse 
> > to 
> > > keep track of all the possible ways of regulating the creation and 
> > > preservation of universes? How is infinite regress avoided? 
> > > 
> >
> > There is no regress in the picture. Please reread my text (or my book) 
> > I have no clue as to why you are postulating one Can anyone else 
> > explain Craig's concerns? 
> >
> 
> I'm postulating infinite regress because the idea that universes are being 
> created and preserved implies an meta-universal support which also must be 
> made of some kind of information-theoretic functionality which would have 
> its own meta-quantum reasoning for existing. 

What does this even mean? Anyone else know?

> How does having many worlds 
> better explain the existence of any world or world-making condition? Mainly 
> it buries the problem under a mountain of infinities.
> 
> Craig 
> 
> 
> > -- 
> >
> > 
> >  
> >
> > Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> > Principal, High Performance Coders 
> > Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> > University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
> > 
> >  
> >
> >
> 
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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Monday, November 19, 2012 4:37:44 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 09:29:58AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > What I am asking is why would the single multiverse be any less 
> dependent 
> > upon multiplicity to accomplish its infinities of preserved separations 
> > than a single universe does? If a universe needs a multiverse to justify 
> > superposition, then why doesn't a multiverse also need a meta-multiverse 
> to 
> > keep track of all the possible ways of regulating the creation and 
> > preservation of universes? How is infinite regress avoided? 
> > 
>
> There is no regress in the picture. Please reread my text (or my book) 
> I have no clue as to why you are postulating one Can anyone else 
> explain Craig's concerns? 
>

I'm postulating infinite regress because the idea that universes are being 
created and preserved implies an meta-universal support which also must be 
made of some kind of information-theoretic functionality which would have 
its own meta-quantum reasoning for existing. How does having many worlds 
better explain the existence of any world or world-making condition? Mainly 
it buries the problem under a mountain of infinities.

Craig 


> -- 
>
>  
>
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>
>

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Russell Standish 
On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 03:16:53PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:
> 
> 
> >which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
> >out in my book.
> >
> >I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
> >possible observers.
> 
> Do you think that apes are not conscious?


Not at all. (nonhuman-)Apes are not that much less complex mentally
than ourselves, at least according to our current crude notions of
complexity. I'm skeptical about your jumping spiders though ...

> 
> Do you exclude that other beings, perhaps very similar to humans,
> exist in the Mutliverse? or in arithmetic?
> 

Not at all. Of course in nearby universes, actual humans exist. But I
would also expect many beings of similar mental capacity and structure
to be spread throughout the universe. But very few super intelligent
beings (and they are probably hive minds anyway). And none that are
orders of magnitude less complex.

> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Russell Standish 
On Mon, Nov 19, 2012 at 09:29:58AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> 
> 
> What I am asking is why would the single multiverse be any less dependent 
> upon multiplicity to accomplish its infinities of preserved separations 
> than a single universe does? If a universe needs a multiverse to justify 
> superposition, then why doesn't a multiverse also need a meta-multiverse to 
> keep track of all the possible ways of regulating the creation and 
> preservation of universes? How is infinite regress avoided?
> 

There is no regress in the picture. Please reread my text (or my book)
I have no clue as to why you are postulating one Can anyone else
explain Craig's concerns?

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Craig Weinberg 


On Sunday, November 18, 2012 4:23:14 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 08:12:51AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > Can you explain, in the simplest layman terms, why this argument can be 
> > thrown out? The details are over my head, but it seems to me that the 
> > argument is simply that in order to make universes separate, you would 
> need 
> > a whole other information architecture (which would also have to be 
> > information-theoretically multiplied) to create and preserve that 
> > separation. For each universe, you would need multiple universes of 
> > overhead outside of all universes. Or if that is not his argument in the 
> > paper, then consider it mine. Why does MWI not in itself require a 
> second 
> > order MW to propagate and maintain the multiplicity? If it needs no 
> > resources, then why not use the same argument for the single universe? 
> > 
> > Craig 
>
> There is no external multiplicity - only a single multiverse 


What I am asking is why would the single multiverse be any less dependent 
upon multiplicity to accomplish its infinities of preserved separations 
than a single universe does? If a universe needs a multiverse to justify 
superposition, then why doesn't a multiverse also need a meta-multiverse to 
keep track of all the possible ways of regulating the creation and 
preservation of universes? How is infinite regress avoided?

Craig
 

> (of which 
> there is a range of opinion as to what that is exactly), which has far 
> less complexity than any one of the contained universes. The 
> individual universes, or worlds, multiply within the heads of the 
> observers, and observers with it, so there is a 1-1 relationship 
> between world and observer. 
>
> There is no issue of preferred basis, as each observer has their own 
> chosen basis. Observers with incompatible bases can never communicate 
> with each other - they simply pass by each other unnoticed. Only 
> observers with compatible bases can share their realities - giving 
> rise to the "illusion" (as it were) of a single external classical 
> reality. 
>
> Hope that helps. I'd say go and read my book, but I'm not convinced I 
> found the perfect explanation of this in that book either 
> ... :(. Others may have different suggestions. 
>
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>
>

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

  I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that  
then

gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.



I doubt that very much, ...


Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict  
comp, which is assumed also.

Dear Bruno,

   Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p  
that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with  
each other as a 'physical reality"?


There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from  
observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.

And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.




I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a  
physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell,  can consider... Is  
it necessarily inconsistent with comp?


? ? ?

Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical  
reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges  
from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a first person  
plural product, with the persons being all Löbian machines, etc.


Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical laws,  
making comp testable, even if that is technically difficult, but up to  
now, it fits remarkably, and that would not have been the case without  
QM. That would not have the case if "p->[]<>p" was not a theorem of  
the Z1* logics (matter).


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

   I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.



I doubt that very much, ...


Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict 
comp, which is assumed also. 

Dear Bruno,

Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p 
that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with each 
other as a 'physical reality"? I hope that we can agree that there is at 
least an illusion of a physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell,  
can consider... Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 19 Nov 2012, at 05:03, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I  
point

out in my book.


Hi Russell,

And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we  
are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a  
particular basis that some set of "observers with compatible bases  
can sharing their realities". Is a reality something that is 1p in  
your thinking? It isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for  
now.
That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about  
the distribution arguments (ala Bostrum) and Occam's catastrophe. It  
seems to me that there is something that is being assumed about  
consciousness in those reasonings, something that is being taken for  
granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a  
universal ensemble that is very much like Leibniz' pre-established  
harmony and thus problematic as it is not computable. Bruno's  
rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors to work  
for comp, IMHO.)


Partially OK. It is more complex as the probabilities, although  
"objective", concerned the 1p, which might contains actual infinities  
(at least in some sense).





I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is  
somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that  
is, as I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a  
giant Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be remembered  
and passed along in continuations. It is the one complaint that I  
have with reincarnation theories, the idea that some memories that  
can only be defined with reference to physical bodies can be  
continued. I think that the 'I' is not much different from the  
center of mass of physics. The C.o.M. does not really exist at all  
as a substance or physical object and yet it has causal efficacy in  
some way...
Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of  
substance that has persistent existence, like material substances in  
Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is  
'not even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass of an aggregate  
when the members of that aggregate are altered? What if  
consciousness is not a 'thing', but is a 'process' - something more  
like a 'stream'. Computer science has no problem with streams that I  
know of... I am trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does  
seem to be OK with Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a  
stream!)


Could explain the realtion between Quine atoms and streams?

Note that the UD dovetails on all programs, with all inputs including  
all streams.





Are you assuming that consciousness is somehow independent of  
bodies, ala Bruno's immaterialism of numbers? Isn't this just an  
obscure form of Cartesian dualism that just argues away the  
existence of the 'res extensa' as being, as per Bruno's argument,  
something that Occam's razor cuts out of ontology and thus are left  
with a 'arithmetic body problem' where the 'res extensa' used to be?


But you need to postulate a small physical universe, and to speculate  
on a flaw in step 8, to get this. I thought for a long time on this  
list that the step 8 was not needed here, as the postulation of a  
small primitive physical universe cut the benefits of everything-like  
philosophy, which was the starting of this very list.


Also, to be "left with the body problem" is what is intersting in  
comp, as it gives the realm, and the ways, matter can appear and be  
explained. All the other theories assumed matter at the start.


Bruno




I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.


Is this because of your argument that self-awareness is  
necessary for consciousness? Maybe you are right but thinking of it  
backwards; could you consider that there is a difference between  
being able to 'know' that one is conscious and simply being  
conscious? I think that Craig is making the case that 'sense' or raw  
'something that is like being in the world' is not separable from  
the 'being in the world'. What we have is the case where the  
'simulation of the entity' is the entity itself; yet this wording  
does violence to the concept that I have been trying to explain.


The best explanation that I have to poin

Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-19 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

   I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.



I doubt that very much, ...


Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict  
comp, which is assumed also.





... as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles,


That was my critics on the ASSA idea (Absolute self-sampling  
assumption). But both in comp and in QM all probabilities are relative  
to a "prepared state". They have the shape , meaning: being in  
the Ia> state, what is the probability to be in the Ib> state (or  
finding some b eigenvalue).






which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.

I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.


Do you think that apes are not conscious?

Do you exclude that other beings, perhaps very similar to humans,  
exist in the Mutliverse? or in arithmetic?


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/18/2012 11:03 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

To Russell,

Maybe you are right but thinking of it backwards


That I meant by this is that it is our ability to know that we are 
conscious that allows us to think about that consciousness is and ask 
questions like" could other entities be conscious?".


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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/18/2012 8:12 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Russell,

 I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.


I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.


Hi Russell,

And how could we know that we are not particles dreaming that we 
are humans? Particles are, after all, just an artifact of a particular 
basis that some set of "observers with compatible bases can sharing 
their realities". Is a reality something that is 1p in your thinking? It 
isn't in my thinking but I'll put that aside for now.
That is a very interesting point and I have long wondered about the 
distribution arguments (ala Bostrum 
) and 
Occam's catastrophe 
. 
It seems to me that there is something that is being assumed about 
consciousness in those reasonings, something that is being taken for 
granted. (For one thing, the Solomonoff-Levin distribution assumes a 
universal ensemble that is very much like Leibniz' pre-established 
harmony and thus problematic as it is not computable 
. Bruno's 
rejection of infinities seems to disallow for such priors to work for 
comp, IMHO.)
I think that we can think of this cryptic idea that there is 
somehow a difference of the 'we' or, more correctly, the 'I' that is, as 
I claim, instantiated in a electron or an ant or a human or a giant 
Black Cloud and that this difference can somehow be remembered and 
passed along in continuations. It is the one complaint that I have with 
reincarnation theories, the idea that some memories that can only be 
defined with reference to physical bodies can be continued. I think that 
the 'I' is not much different from the center of mass of physics. The 
C.o.M. does not really exist at all as a substance or physical object 
and yet it has causal efficacy in some way...
Could be that consciousness is being assumed to be some kind of 
substance that has persistent existence, like material substances in 
Parmenidean and Aristotelian science? What if this assumption is 'not 
even wrong'? What happens to the center of mass of an aggregate when the 
members of that aggregate are altered? What if consciousness is not a 
'thing', but is a 'process' - something more like a 'stream 
'. 
Computer science has no problem with streams that I know of... I am 
trying to get Bruno to consider streams, as he does seem to be OK with 
Quine atoms (which are the canonical case of a stream!)
Are you assuming that consciousness is somehow independent of 
bodies, ala Bruno's immaterialism of numbers? Isn't this just an obscure 
form of Cartesian dualism that just argues away the existence of the 
'res extensa' as being, as per Bruno's argument, something that Occam's 
razor cuts out of ontology and thus are left with a 'arithmetic body 
problem' where the 'res extensa 
' used to be?



I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.


Is this because of your argument that self-awareness is necessary 
for consciousness? Maybe you are right but thinking of it backwards; 
could you consider that there is a difference between being able to 
'know' that one is conscious and simply being conscious? I think that 
Craig is making the case that 'sense' or raw 'something that is like 
being in the world' is not separable from the 'being in the world'. What 
we have is the case where the 'simulation of the entity' is the entity 
itself; yet this wording does violence to the concept that I have been 
trying to explain.


The best explanation that I have to point to is Kaufman and 
Zuckerman & Miranker's Russell operator idea and the Quine atom as a 
formal mathematical concept and its identification of the object with 
itself. It cannot be understood so long as one is embedded in the vision 
of the universe as being well founded and 'regular 
' - that there are a 
single set of 'irreducible' parts that make it up. It amazes me that the 
ideas of those Greek guys from 2000 years ago still carry so much 
influence over our thinking!



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Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Russell Standish 
Application of the Occam's razor theorem to Anthropic Selection. See
Section 5.1 of my book "Theory of Nothing".

Cheers

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 06:59:52PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Sunday, November 18, 2012 8:01:20 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all 
> > possible observers. 
> >
> 
> why?
> 
> Craig
>  
> 
> >
> >
> > 
> >  
> >
> > Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> > Principal, High Performance Coders 
> > Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> > University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
> > 
> >  
> >
> >
> 
> -- 
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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Craig Weinberg 
On Sunday, November 18, 2012 8:01:20 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
>
> I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all 
> possible observers. 
>

why?

Craig
 

>
>
>  
>
> Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
> University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>
>

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Russell Standish 
On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:
> Hi Russell,
> 
> I agree with this view, especially the part about the
> compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then
> gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
> phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
> can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
> could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
> panpsychism.
> 

I doubt that very much, as if true, then we should expect to find
ourselves as particles, which is the Occam's catastrophe redux I point
out in my book.

I suspect that as human beings, we rank amongst the simplest of all
possible observers.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/18/2012 4:34 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 08:12:51AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Can you explain, in the simplest layman terms, why this argument can be
thrown out? The details are over my head, but it seems to me that the
argument is simply that in order to make universes separate, you would need
a whole other information architecture (which would also have to be
information-theoretically multiplied) to create and preserve that
separation. For each universe, you would need multiple universes of
overhead outside of all universes. Or if that is not his argument in the
paper, then consider it mine. Why does MWI not in itself require a second
order MW to propagate and maintain the multiplicity? If it needs no
resources, then why not use the same argument for the single universe?

Craig

There is no external multiplicity - only a single multiverse (of which
there is a range of opinion as to what that is exactly), which has far
less complexity than any one of the contained universes. The
individual universes, or worlds, multiply within the heads of the
observers, and observers with it, so there is a 1-1 relationship
between world and observer.

There is no issue of preferred basis, as each observer has their own
chosen basis. Observers with incompatible bases can never communicate
with each other - they simply pass by each other unnoticed. Only
observers with compatible bases can share their realities - giving
rise to the "illusion" (as it were) of a single external classical
reality.

Hope that helps. I'd say go and read my book, but I'm not convinced I
found the perfect explanation of this in that book either
... :(. Others may have different suggestions.



Hi Russell,

I agree with this view, especially the part about the compatibility 
of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that then gives rise to an 
illusion of a single classical reality; I just phrase the concepts 
differently. My question to you is how 'simple' can an observer be, as a 
system? It seems to me that even particles could be considered as 
observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for panpsychism.


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Russell Standish 
On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 08:12:51AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Can you explain, in the simplest layman terms, why this argument can be 
> thrown out? The details are over my head, but it seems to me that the 
> argument is simply that in order to make universes separate, you would need 
> a whole other information architecture (which would also have to be 
> information-theoretically multiplied) to create and preserve that 
> separation. For each universe, you would need multiple universes of 
> overhead outside of all universes. Or if that is not his argument in the 
> paper, then consider it mine. Why does MWI not in itself require a second 
> order MW to propagate and maintain the multiplicity? If it needs no 
> resources, then why not use the same argument for the single universe?
> 
> Craig

There is no external multiplicity - only a single multiverse (of which
there is a range of opinion as to what that is exactly), which has far
less complexity than any one of the contained universes. The
individual universes, or worlds, multiply within the heads of the
observers, and observers with it, so there is a 1-1 relationship
between world and observer.

There is no issue of preferred basis, as each observer has their own
chosen basis. Observers with incompatible bases can never communicate
with each other - they simply pass by each other unnoticed. Only
observers with compatible bases can share their realities - giving
rise to the "illusion" (as it were) of a single external classical
reality.

Hope that helps. I'd say go and read my book, but I'm not convinced I
found the perfect explanation of this in that book either
... :(. Others may have different suggestions.


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Craig Weinberg 
Can you explain, in the simplest layman terms, why this argument can be 
thrown out? The details are over my head, but it seems to me that the 
argument is simply that in order to make universes separate, you would need 
a whole other information architecture (which would also have to be 
information-theoretically multiplied) to create and preserve that 
separation. For each universe, you would need multiple universes of 
overhead outside of all universes. Or if that is not his argument in the 
paper, then consider it mine. Why does MWI not in itself require a second 
order MW to propagate and maintain the multiplicity? If it needs no 
resources, then why not use the same argument for the single universe?

Craig


On Sunday, November 18, 2012 8:29:54 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Nov 2012, at 09:19, Russell Standish wrote: 
>
> > On Sat, Nov 17, 2012 at 11:01:49PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> In a recent paper entitled 
> >>> “Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation”: 
> >>> http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8447 
> >>> Jan-Markus Schwindt has presented an impressive argument against the 
> >>> many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
> >>> 
> >>> The argument he presents is not new, but, in my opinion, nobody ever 
> >>> presented this argument so clearly. 
> >>> 
> >>> In a nutshell, the argument is this: 
> >>> To define separate worlds of MWI, one needs a preferred basis,   
> >>> which is an 
> >>> old well-known problem of MWI. In modern literature, one often   
> >>> finds the 
> >>> claim that the basis problem is solved by decoherence. What J-M   
> >>> Schwindt 
> >>> points out is that decoherence is not enough. Namely, decoherence   
> >>> solves 
> >>> the basis problem only if it is already known how to split the   
> >>> system into 
> >>> subsystems (typically, the measured system and the environment).   
> >>> But if the 
> >>> state in the Hilbert space is all what exists, then such a split   
> >>> is not 
> >>> unique. Therefore, MWI claiming that state in the Hilbert space is   
> >>> all what 
> >>> exists cannot resolve the basis problem, and thus cannot define   
> >>> separate 
> >>> worlds. Period! One needs some additional structure not present in   
> >>> the 
> >>> states of the Hilbert space themselves. 
> >>> 
> >>> As reasonable possibilities for the additional structure, he   
> >>> mentions 
> >>> observers of the Copenhagen interpretation, particles of the Bohmian 
> >>> interpretation, and the possibility that quantum mechanics is not 
> >>> fundamental at all. 
> >>> 
> >> source  
> > 
> > Rather than Copenhagen observers, the many minds of Everett fits the 
> > bill. 
> > 
> > See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation 
> > 
> > As I see it - the argument is not new, 
>
> Yes old argument keep getting copied and pasted, probably due to   
> "perish or publish". 
>
>
>
> > and has been adequately 
> > addressed within the Everett framework. 
>
> Absolutely so. Even in Everett original long version text (his thesis). 
>
>
> > What surprises me are people 
> > like Deutsch sticking to their preferred bases... 
>
> I agree, although I thought that David changed his mind on this.   
> People does not read the original work of Everett which shows clearly   
> the independence from the choice of a basis, even if the global   
> picture remains unclear. About this, with comp we know why (there are   
> no global physical picture a priori). 
>
> Best, 
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 18 Nov 2012, at 09:19, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, Nov 17, 2012 at 11:01:49PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:



In a recent paper entitled

“Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation”:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8447
Jan-Markus Schwindt has presented an impressive argument against the
many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics.

The argument he presents is not new, but, in my opinion, nobody ever
presented this argument so clearly.

In a nutshell, the argument is this:
To define separate worlds of MWI, one needs a preferred basis,  
which is an
old well-known problem of MWI. In modern literature, one often  
finds the
claim that the basis problem is solved by decoherence. What J-M  
Schwindt
points out is that decoherence is not enough. Namely, decoherence  
solves
the basis problem only if it is already known how to split the  
system into
subsystems (typically, the measured system and the environment).  
But if the
state in the Hilbert space is all what exists, then such a split  
is not
unique. Therefore, MWI claiming that state in the Hilbert space is  
all what
exists cannot resolve the basis problem, and thus cannot define  
separate
worlds. Period! One needs some additional structure not present in  
the

states of the Hilbert space themselves.

As reasonable possibilities for the additional structure, he  
mentions

observers of the Copenhagen interpretation, particles of the Bohmian
interpretation, and the possibility that quantum mechanics is not
fundamental at all.


source 


Rather than Copenhagen observers, the many minds of Everett fits the
bill.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation

As I see it - the argument is not new,


Yes old argument keep getting copied and pasted, probably due to  
"perish or publish".





and has been adequately
addressed within the Everett framework.


Absolutely so. Even in Everett original long version text (his thesis).



What surprises me are people
like Deutsch sticking to their preferred bases...


I agree, although I thought that David changed his mind on this.  
People does not read the original work of Everett which shows clearly  
the independence from the choice of a basis, even if the global  
picture remains unclear. About this, with comp we know why (there are  
no global physical picture a priori).


Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation

2012-11-18 Thread Russell Standish 
On Sat, Nov 17, 2012 at 11:01:49PM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> 
> 
> In a recent paper entitled
> > “Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation”:
> > http://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8447
> > Jan-Markus Schwindt has presented an impressive argument against the 
> > many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics.
> >
> > The argument he presents is not new, but, in my opinion, nobody ever 
> > presented this argument so clearly. 
> >
> > In a nutshell, the argument is this:
> > To define separate worlds of MWI, one needs a preferred basis, which is an 
> > old well-known problem of MWI. In modern literature, one often finds the 
> > claim that the basis problem is solved by decoherence. What J-M Schwindt 
> > points out is that decoherence is not enough. Namely, decoherence solves 
> > the basis problem only if it is already known how to split the system into 
> > subsystems (typically, the measured system and the environment). But if the 
> > state in the Hilbert space is all what exists, then such a split is not 
> > unique. Therefore, MWI claiming that state in the Hilbert space is all what 
> > exists cannot resolve the basis problem, and thus cannot define separate 
> > worlds. Period! One needs some additional structure not present in the 
> > states of the Hilbert space themselves. 
> >
> > As reasonable possibilities for the additional structure, he mentions 
> > observers of the Copenhagen interpretation, particles of the Bohmian 
> > interpretation, and the possibility that quantum mechanics is not 
> > fundamental at all.
> >
> source 

Rather than Copenhagen observers, the many minds of Everett fits the
bill.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation

As I see it - the argument is not new, and has been adequately
addressed within the Everett framework. What surprises me are people
like Deutsch sticking to their preferred bases...

Cheers
-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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