Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-06-02 Thread meekerdb

On 6/2/2012 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Jun 2012, at 20:18, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You might be disturbed by the fact that in experience 2, the "original" remains the 
same person, so we don't count him as a new person, each time he steps in the box. 
This, in my opinion, illustrates again that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA.


Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind.  Then the probability 
the original went to Mars is 1.


The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a "step 5" case. The 
probability to feel to stay the original is 1/2.


Everybody feels they are the original.


"original" refer to the third person body. By definition it is the one being 
copied.


It doesn't really solve the identity problem to assume it is physical continuity.  The 
"copy" also  has physical continuity; and in any even slightly realistic case the 
'original' will be destroyed in the process of extracting information, so there will 
really be two copies and no 'original'.





The question before he enters the box is, "Will you find yourself on Mars?"  To which 
he could reply, "What does 'you' refer to?"


The question is about your future subjective feeling as seen from your future first 
person perspective.If you assume comp, you know in advance that you will feel entire and 
unique,


No, I expect that two someones will feel entire and unique.

either on Earth or on Mars, and you know that you cannot that in advance (or give me the 
algorithm).


But all that assumes that 'you' and 'your' have meaningful referents.  According to comp 
they are no more meaningful than referring to this number 2 and that number 2 and asking 
which number 2 counts the moons of Mars.


Brent



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-06-02 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Jun 2, 2:39 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > I think that Matter-Energy and Sense-Motive are dual aspects of the
> > same thing. If you are talking about the brain only, then you are
> > talking about matter and energy, but no person exists if you limit the
> > discussion to that. The matter and energy side of what we are is just
> > organs. There is no person there. The brain is not responsible for
> > consciousness anymore than your computer is responsible for the
> > internet. It is the necessary vehicle through which human level
> > awareness is accessed.
>
> Would you say, at least, that the brain is responsible for behavior?

In the sense that buildings, streets, highways, and real estate are
responsible for a city's behavior.

>
> This conversation was originally on the topic of artificial intelligence,
> so whatever it is in us that leads to physical changes which manifest as
> third-person observable behavior, do you believe that to be entirely
> influenced by physical and (in theory) detectable matter/energy/fields?

I'm not saying that though. We *are* the physical changes. Third
person and first person seem to us to be separate because the first
person end is the 'head' end. You are saying that I think 'whatever it
that is our head leads to physical changes which manifest as our tail'
and you are trying to get me to see that it makes more sense to say
that it is our tail which is responsible for the existence of the head
- that the head is what the tail needs to lead it to food and
reproduction. That's not my position though. I'm saying head-tail mind-
body are a function of the symmetry of sense.

As far as fields being detectable - detectable by what? I have no
problem detecting humor, irony, style, beauty...to a human being these
are detectable energy fields, only higher up on the monochord/chakra-
like escalator of qualitative interiority/significance. The universe
for us is much more readily detectable by us as a combination of
fiction and fact than it is in terms of matter/energy/fields. Those
things are a posteriori ideas about the universe of our body, as
verified by consensus of inanimate objects interacting. That is only
half of the universe - the tail half which is the polar opposite of
awareness. It is the perspective from which no life, order, meaning or
significance can be detected.

>
> If not, what mechanism do you theorize mediates between mental and physical
> events?  Is it one way or two way?  If two way (or if as you often say it
> is just the other side of the coin) then why not say it is physical?

I do say it's physical. Physical feelings, physical stories, physical
personalities and identities - all physical, but not as objects in
space, as experiences through time. There is no mechanism that
mediates spacetime-matter-energy with timespace-sense-motive, they are
the same thing except the more something is you or is like you, the
more it seems to you like the latter instead of the former.

>
> If such a mechanism exists, it must conform to some set of laws, some rhyme
> or reason, as otherwise how could the mental world (or side) so reliably
> control our physical actions, and how do the sensations picked up from
> physical sensors (retinas, nerve endings) so reliably make their way into
> our mind?

The 'mechanism' is sense. It doesn't conform to laws but it develops
habits which become as laws to those who arise out of them. It's only
a mechanism when the insider looks outside. What we are doing now is
looking outside as the insider's exterior and finding it lacking any
trace of the insider, concluding that the insider is an illusion. When
the insider looks inside however, there is more animism than
mechanism. Sense experience and meaning. On the outside, the nerves
are literal fibers and cells. On the inside 'nerve' is strength,
courage, self-legitimizing ontology. They are part of the same thing
but don't correlate one-to-one, they correlate as the whole history
and potential future of the universe twisting orthogonally into an
event horizon of a whole universe of 'here and now'


  If there is a separation between the mental and physical worlds,
> there must be reliable rules that govern any interaction between the mind
> and the physical world, and the interaction must be two way.  How then, can
> they rightly be called two separate worlds?

Exactly, they are not separate except to the participant. We are the
head looking at our tail, but objectively, if we were not a head, we
would see both head and tail are the body with two ends, each being
everything that the other is not. If there were rules, then the rules
would need rules. What makes the rules? Where to they come from and
what mechanism do they use to rule?

As you say, and we agree, the interaction must be two way, but no
external rules are required to govern the interaction, because both
mind and body are, on one level, the same thing (essentially) 

Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-06-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Jun 2012, at 20:18, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You might be disturbed by the fact that in experience 2, the  
"original" remains the same person, so we don't count him as a  
new person, each time he steps in the box. This, in my opinion,  
illustrates again that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA.


Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind.  Then  
the probability the original went to Mars is 1.


The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a  
"step 5" case. The probability to feel to stay the original is 1/2.


Everybody feels they are the original.


"original" refer to the third person body. By definition it is the one  
being copied.



The question before he enters the box is, "Will you find yourself on  
Mars?"  To which he could reply, "What does 'you' refer to?"


The question is about your future subjective feeling as seen from your  
future first person perspective. If you assume comp, you know in  
advance that you will feel entire and unique, either on Earth or on  
Mars, and you know that you cannot that in advance (or give me the  
algorithm).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-06-01 Thread Jason Resch
On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> On May 31, 2:33 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg  >wrote:
> >
> > > On May 29, 1:45 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> >
> > > > So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you
> take
> > > > issue with?
> >
> > > > A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy
> >
> > > So does a cadaver's brain and body. The fact that a cadaver is not
> > > intelligent should show us that the difference between life and death
> > > can't be meaningfully reduced to matter and energy.
> >
> > That some organizations of matter/energy are intelligent and others are
> not
> > is irrelevant, what matters is whether or not you agree that the brain is
> > made of matter and energy.  Do you agree the brain is made of matter and
> > energy, and that the brain is responsible for your consciousness (or at
> > least one of the many possible manifestations of it)?
>
> I think that Matter-Energy and Sense-Motive are dual aspects of the
> same thing. If you are talking about the brain only, then you are
> talking about matter and energy, but no person exists if you limit the
> discussion to that. The matter and energy side of what we are is just
> organs. There is no person there. The brain is not responsible for
> consciousness anymore than your computer is responsible for the
> internet. It is the necessary vehicle through which human level
> awareness is accessed.
>


Would you say, at least, that the brain is responsible for behavior?

This conversation was originally on the topic of artificial intelligence,
so whatever it is in us that leads to physical changes which manifest as
third-person observable behavior, do you believe that to be entirely
influenced by physical and (in theory) detectable matter/energy/fields?

If not, what mechanism do you theorize mediates between mental and physical
events?  Is it one way or two way?  If two way (or if as you often say it
is just the other side of the coin) then why not say it is physical?

If such a mechanism exists, it must conform to some set of laws, some rhyme
or reason, as otherwise how could the mental world (or side) so reliably
control our physical actions, and how do the sensations picked up from
physical sensors (retinas, nerve endings) so reliably make their way into
our mind?  If there is a separation between the mental and physical worlds,
there must be reliable rules that govern any interaction between the mind
and the physical world, and the interaction must be two way.  How then, can
they rightly be called two separate worlds?


>
> >
> > > > B. that matter and energy follow natural laws,
> >
> > > No, laws follow from our observation of natural matter and energy.
> >
> > You are mistaking our approximations and inferences concerning the
> natural
> > laws for the natural laws themselves.
>
> No, you are mistaking the interaction of concretely real natural
> phenomena with abstract principles which we have derived from
> measurement and intellectual extension.
>

Regardless of who is making the mistake, above you seem to agree with
my premise that there are real natural phenomenon.


>
> > Before there were any humans, or any
> > life, there must have been laws that the universe obeyed to reach the
> point
> > where Earth formed and life could develop.
>
> Before there was matter, there were no laws that the universe obeyed
> pertaining to matter, just as there were no laws of biology before
> biology.


This is an interesting way of looking at things: that the capabilities of
natural phenomenon change as it develops more and more complex states of
being.  However, I think the potentiality for those capabilities was there
from the beginning, and the determination of whether or not such
potentialities existed in the primordial universe could in theory, have
been made by a sufficiently great intelligence that had a proper
understanding of the natural phenomenon.


> The universe makes laws by doing. It isn't only a disembodied
> set of invisible laws which creates obedient bodies.


What did the universe have to do to set the speed of light?


> Laws are not
> primordial.


If not laws, then what?


> You have to have some kind of capacity to sense and make
> sense before any kind of regularity of pattern can be established.
>

You might need sense to notice the pattern, but patterns exist that we are
unaware of.  If this were not the case, there would be no room for
discovery.


> Something has to be able to happen in the first place before you can
> separate out what can happen under which conditions. The reality of
> something being able to happen - experience - possibility - prefigures
> all other principles.
>
>
I'm not opposed to the idea that possibility or experience could in some
sense be more fundamental, but I don't see how this could change the fact
that we observe matter and energy to always follow certain rules, and find
evidence (when we loo

Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-06-01 Thread meekerdb

On 6/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You might be disturbed by the fact that in experience 2, the "original" remains the 
same person, so we don't count him as a new person, each time he steps in the box. 
This, in my opinion, illustrates again that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA.


Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind.  Then the probability the 
original went to Mars is 1.


The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a "step 5" case. The 
probability to feel to stay the original is 1/2.


Everybody feels they are the original.  The question before he enters the box is, "Will 
you find yourself on Mars?"  To which he could reply, "What does 'you' refer to?"


Brent



Bruno



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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-06-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Jun 2012, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/1/2012 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 31 May 2012, at 21:38, Jason Resch wrote:




On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal  
 wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal  
 wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy  
won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But  
his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a  
teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars  
is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try  
again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from  
your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got  
the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on  
earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry  
Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as  
a probability near one to go quickly on Mars.



Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I  
intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought  
while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear  
up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is  
(1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations.


Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability  
inferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of  
course. Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is  
"harry-Potter-like".





I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth  
after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations  
continue, does it remain 50%?


Yes.



Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and  
1 copy on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth  
be equal to 1/6th?


You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.





While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so  
that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport  
button is pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see  
how this works in quantum mechanics under the following  
experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y- 
axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state  
is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings),


OK.


but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to  
5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.


That is a different protocol. The one above is the one  
corresponding to the earth/mars experience.




In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the  
following records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.
The way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter  
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and  
5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the  
transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.


This is ambiguous.


What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the  
net result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just  
like stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then  
creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars.


Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif

Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies  
created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).


When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies  
created on Mars (with various delays between each one being  
produced) is the probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th?


Yes.
That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the  
one, or a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on  
earth will be in front of the "looser", even if you multiply by  
20. billions your delayed copies on mars.





Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the  
knowledge that the other copy made it to Mars before stepping  
into the Teleporter again?


I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is the  
difference between 24.



I apologize for not being clear.  There are two different  
experiments I am contrasting:


1. A person steps into a teleporter, and 5 copies (with varying  
delays) are reproduced on Mars.


2. A person steps into a teleporter, and a duplicate is created on  
Mars.  To increase the chance of subjectively finding himself on  
Mars, he does it again (when he fails) and the copy on Earth does  
so 5 times before giving up.


For experiment 1, you and I seem to agree that subjectively, that  
person person has a 1 i

Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-06-01 Thread meekerdb

On 6/1/2012 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 31 May 2012, at 21:38, Jason Resch wrote:




On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:



On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won 
a
price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state 
law
forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars 
without
annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of 
earth
complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the
observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see 
the guy
who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, 
staying on
earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter
experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a 
probability
near one to go quickly on Mars.


Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to 
get back
to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above
experiment that I wanted to clear up.

You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, 
where n
is the number of teleportations. 


Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by 
the
person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the 
probability
is 1/2, but his experience is "harry-Potter-like".





I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the 
first
teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? 


Yes.




Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy 
on
earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 
1/6th?


You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.





While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I 
see
the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is 
pressed, I
split in two).  It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum
mechanics under the following experiment:

I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the
probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I 
have
caused 5 splittings), 


OK.



but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 
electrons,
but stop once you find one in the up state. 


That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to 
the
earth/mars experience.




In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following 
records:

1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The 
way I
see it is they have the following probabilities:

1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter 
experiment, it
seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is 
no
different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on 
Mars at
once. 


This is ambiguous.



What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net result 
being
1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping into the 
teleporter
once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars.

Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif 


Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created 
with
delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).

When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on Mars 
(with
various delays between each one being produced) is the probability of 
remaining on
Earth 1/6th?


Yes.
That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or a 
one,
finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in front of the
"looser", even if you multiply by 20. billions your delayed copies on mars.




Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge that 
the other
copy made it to Mars before 

Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-06-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 31 May 2012, at 21:38, Jason Resch wrote:




On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal  
 wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy  
won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his  
state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation  
to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy,  
and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again,  
and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view,  
you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be  
infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n  
experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter  
experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a  
probability near one to go quickly on Mars.



Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend  
to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading  
about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is  
(1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations.


Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability  
inferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course.  
Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is "harry- 
Potter-like".





I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after  
the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations  
continue, does it remain 50%?


Yes.



Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1  
copy on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be  
equal to 1/6th?


You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.





While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so  
that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport  
button is pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see  
how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis,  
the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in  
32 (as I have caused 5 splittings),


OK.


but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5  
electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.


That is a different protocol. The one above is the one  
corresponding to the earth/mars experience.




In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following  
records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.
The way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter  
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5  
copies on mars) is no different from the case where the  
transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.


This is ambiguous.


What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the  
net result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just  
like stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then  
creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars.


Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif

Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies  
created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).


When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created  
on Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) is  
the probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th?


Yes.
That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one,  
or a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will  
be in front of the "looser", even if you multiply by 20. billions  
your delayed copies on mars.





Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge  
that the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into the  
Teleporter again?


I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is the  
difference between 24.



I apologize for not being clear.  There are two different  
experiments I am contrasting:


1. A person steps into a teleporter, and 5 copies (with varying  
delays) are reproduced on Mars.


2. A person steps into a teleporter, and a duplicate is created on  
Mars.  To increase the chance of subjectively finding himself on  
Mars, he does it again (when he fails) and the copy on Earth does so  
5 times before giving up.


For experiment 1, you and I seem to agree that subjectively, that  
person person has a 1 in 6 chance of experiencing a continued  
presence on earth, and a 5/6 chance of finding himse

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On May 31, 2:22 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> > > To know what an interface is... how 2 programs communicate. The way you
> > > talk is like "hey dude it's in the OS !"... like the operating system was
> > > not a software...
>
> > No, I'm saying it's all software, except for the hardware. That has
> > been my point from the start. You can make as many virtual worlds
> > nested within each other as you like and it doesn't matter. No
> > interface is required because they are all being physically hosted by
> > the semiconducting microelectronics.
>
> >  It is not a problem to have an avatar have virtual dinner in virtual
> > Paris by using his virtual computer. He can dive into the monitor and
> > end up on the Champs-Élysées if the programmer writes the virtual
> > worlds that way. No interface can allow or restrict anything within a
> > virtual context
>
> You simply don't know what the terms means or you're stupid... one or the
> other or both.

No, it's just that you aren't seeing my point that there is a
difference between a device that is ontologically necessary and one
that that is entirely optional. I don't think that means you're
stupid, just that you cannot tolerate being wrong. It doesn't matter
if you call it an interface, what matters is that I need a way to turn
my free will into electronic changes in a computer, but electronic
changes don't need a way to turn themselves into other electronic
changes.

>
> > - it's all an election by the programmer, not an
> > ontological barrier.
>
> > > like if you want to access the network you're not calling
> > > a software... like in the end it was not writing something into some
> > place
> > > in memory... pfff only thing I can say is "AhAhAh !!!"... as your "sense"
> > > BS.
>
> > When I use my keyboard to type these words, I am using hardware.
>
> Which calls software, basically calling an interrupt and setting something
> into memory to be read by other programs (os or driver or whatever)

No, it calls hardware, and the behavior of part of that hardware seems
to us like software when it is displayed back to us through screen
hardware. Programs are nothing but logical scripts to control
hardware. Hardware doesn't need a program, but programs need hardware.
Programs can run in other programs, but only if they all ultimately
run on hardware. They have no existence on their own. There is no
virtual universe being created, it is just a well maintained facade.

>
> > When
> > an avatar uses a virtual keyboard, or when that avatar's avatar's
> > avatar uses a virtual virtual virtual keyboard, there is no keyboard
> > there.
>
> If you don't do a simulation no.. so what.

So you are not limited to the logic of physics in a virtual world
because it's not physically real.

>
> > The keyboard can be a turnip or a cloud, it doesn't matter. For
> > me, in hardware world, it matters.
>
> > > The way you don't understand "level"... when a emulator is in a
> > emulator...
> > > the second level emulator run on the first level emulated hardware...
>
> > No, I understand exactly how you understand level but I am telling you
> > that you are wrong. You are mistaking marketing hype for reality.
>
> I write emulator, I know exactly how this works contrary to you.

But you don't know how it fails to work, which is the more relevant
issue. Emulation is a theory that fails in reality.

>
> > Emulation is a figure of speech.
>
> No

Yes

>
> > There is no virtual hardware.
>
> There is.

Prove it.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 

> On May 31, 2:22 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> > To know what an interface is... how 2 programs communicate. The way you
> > talk is like "hey dude it's in the OS !"... like the operating system was
> > not a software...
>
> No, I'm saying it's all software, except for the hardware. That has
> been my point from the start. You can make as many virtual worlds
> nested within each other as you like and it doesn't matter. No
> interface is required because they are all being physically hosted by
> the semiconducting microelectronics.
>
>  It is not a problem to have an avatar have virtual dinner in virtual
> Paris by using his virtual computer. He can dive into the monitor and
> end up on the Champs-Élysées if the programmer writes the virtual
> worlds that way. No interface can allow or restrict anything within a
> virtual context


You simply don't know what the terms means or you're stupid... one or the
other or both.


> - it's all an election by the programmer, not an
> ontological barrier.
>
> > like if you want to access the network you're not calling
> > a software... like in the end it was not writing something into some
> place
> > in memory... pfff only thing I can say is "AhAhAh !!!"... as your "sense"
> > BS.
>
> When I use my keyboard to type these words, I am using hardware.


Which calls software, basically calling an interrupt and setting something
into memory to be read by other programs (os or driver or whatever)


> When
> an avatar uses a virtual keyboard, or when that avatar's avatar's
> avatar uses a virtual virtual virtual keyboard, there is no keyboard
> there.


If you don't do a simulation no.. so what.


> The keyboard can be a turnip or a cloud, it doesn't matter. For
> me, in hardware world, it matters.
>
> >
> > The way you don't understand "level"... when a emulator is in a
> emulator...
> > the second level emulator run on the first level emulated hardware...
>
> No, I understand exactly how you understand level but I am telling you
> that you are wrong. You are mistaking marketing hype for reality.
>

I write emulator, I know exactly how this works contrary to you.


> Emulation is a figure of speech.


No


> There is no virtual hardware.


There is.


> It's
> just one piece of software that acts like several. The organization of
> it is meaningless ontologically. The entire program is an
> epiphenomenon of the same piece of hardware.
>
> > which
> > run itself run on physical hardware, no program in the nth level could
> > access n-1 level hardware without the n-1 level emulator giving interface
> > to it.
>
> That is just not true and you aren't listening to what I'm saying. You
> are confusing user permissions with hardware to software interface.
> Every week I see nth level programs break n-1 OS and take down the
> entire node. It's not what you think. They use the same OS. There is
> only one copy of Windows Server 2008 that every container shares. If
> they had separate copies, there would still be a meta-OS that they
> share.
>
> Craig
>
> --
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> "Everything List" group.
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>
>


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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 2:29 pm, "Stephen P. King"  wrote:

>
>      It seems that we might be glossing over the difference between
> hardware and software...
>

Hi Stephen,

Yes, that seems to be the case a lot. I guess it can be confusing, but
I'm not sure why. If a cat can pee on it, then it's hardware.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 2:22 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> To know what an interface is... how 2 programs communicate. The way you
> talk is like "hey dude it's in the OS !"... like the operating system was
> not a software...

No, I'm saying it's all software, except for the hardware. That has
been my point from the start. You can make as many virtual worlds
nested within each other as you like and it doesn't matter. No
interface is required because they are all being physically hosted by
the semiconducting microelectronics.

 It is not a problem to have an avatar have virtual dinner in virtual
Paris by using his virtual computer. He can dive into the monitor and
end up on the Champs-Élysées if the programmer writes the virtual
worlds that way. No interface can allow or restrict anything within a
virtual context - it's all an election by the programmer, not an
ontological barrier.

> like if you want to access the network you're not calling
> a software... like in the end it was not writing something into some place
> in memory... pfff only thing I can say is "AhAhAh !!!"... as your "sense"
> BS.

When I use my keyboard to type these words, I am using hardware. When
an avatar uses a virtual keyboard, or when that avatar's avatar's
avatar uses a virtual virtual virtual keyboard, there is no keyboard
there. The keyboard can be a turnip or a cloud, it doesn't matter. For
me, in hardware world, it matters.

>
> The way you don't understand "level"... when a emulator is in a emulator...
> the second level emulator run on the first level emulated hardware...

No, I understand exactly how you understand level but I am telling you
that you are wrong. You are mistaking marketing hype for reality.
Emulation is a figure of speech. There is no virtual hardware. It's
just one piece of software that acts like several. The organization of
it is meaningless ontologically. The entire program is an
epiphenomenon of the same piece of hardware.

> which
> run itself run on physical hardware, no program in the nth level could
> access n-1 level hardware without the n-1 level emulator giving interface
> to it.

That is just not true and you aren't listening to what I'm saying. You
are confusing user permissions with hardware to software interface.
Every week I see nth level programs break n-1 OS and take down the
entire node. It's not what you think. They use the same OS. There is
only one copy of Windows Server 2008 that every container shares. If
they had separate copies, there would still be a meta-OS that they
share.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-31 Thread meekerdb

On 5/31/2012 12:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:



On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won 
a
price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state 
law
forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars 
without
annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of 
earth
complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the
observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see 
the guy
who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, 
staying on
earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter
experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a 
probability
near one to go quickly on Mars.


Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to 
get back
to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above
experiment that I wanted to clear up.

You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, 
where n
is the number of teleportations. 


Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by 
the
person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the 
probability is
1/2, but his experience is "harry-Potter-like".





I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the 
first
teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? 


Yes.




Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy 
on
earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 
1/6th?


You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.





While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I 
see the
probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I 
split
in two).  It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum 
mechanics under
the following experiment:

I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the
probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I 
have
caused 5 splittings), 


OK.



but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 
electrons,
but stop once you find one in the up state. 


That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to 
the
earth/mars experience.




In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following 
records:

1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The 
way I see
it is they have the following probabilities:

1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter 
experiment, it
seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is 
no
different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on 
Mars at
once. 


This is ambiguous.



What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net result 
being 1
copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping into the 
teleporter
once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars.

Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif



Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created 
with delay
on Mars (instead of one with delay).

When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on Mars 
(with
various delays between each one being produced) is the probability of 
remaining on
Earth 1/6th?


Yes.
That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or a 
one,
finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in front of the
"looser", even if you multiply by 20. billions your delayed copies on mars.




Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge that 
the other
copy made it to Mars before stepping into the Teleporter again?


I

Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-31 Thread Jason Resch
On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a
>>> price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law
>>> forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without
>>> annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth
>>> complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer,
>>> and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the
>>> feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n
>>> experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience).
>>> Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go
>>> quickly on Mars.
>>>
>>>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get
>> back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above
>> experiment that I wanted to clear up.
>>
>> You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n,
>> where n is the number of teleportations.
>>
>>
>> Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by
>> the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the
>> probability is 1/2, but his experience is "harry-Potter-like".
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the
>> first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it
>> remain 50%?
>>
>>
>> Yes.
>>
>>
>>
>> Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on
>> earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?
>>
>>
>> You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I
>> see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is
>> pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see how this works in
>> quantum mechanics under the following experiment:
>>
>> I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the
>> probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I
>> have caused 5 splittings),
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>> but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5
>> electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.
>>
>>
>> That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to
>> the earth/mars experience.
>>
>>
>>
>> In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following
>> records:
>>
>> 1. D
>> 2. DU
>> 3. DDU
>> 4. DDDU
>> 5. U
>> 6. D
>>
>> However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The way
>> I see it is they have the following probabilities:
>>
>> 1. D (1/2)
>> 2. DU (1/4)
>> 3. DDU (1/8)
>> 4. DDDU (1/16)
>> 5. U (1/32)
>> 6. D (1/32)
>>
>> I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter
>> experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies
>> on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5
>> copies on Mars at once.
>>
>>
>> This is ambiguous.
>>
>
>
> What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net
> result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping
> into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with
> delay) on Mars.
>
> Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif
>
> Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created
> with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).
>
> When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on
> Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) is the
> probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th?
>
>
> Yes.
> That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or a
> one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in front
> of the "looser", even if you multiply by 20. billions your delayed copies
> on mars.
>
>
>
> Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge that
> the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into the Teleporter again?
>
>
> I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is the difference
> between 24.
>


I apologize for not being clear.  There are two different experiments I am
contrasting:

1. A person steps into a teleporter, and 5 copies (with varying delays) are
reproduced on Mars.

2. A person steps into a teleporter, and a duplicate is created on Mars.
 To increase the chance of subjectively finding himself on Mars, he does it
again (when he fails) and the copy on Earth does so 5 times before giving
up.

For expe

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 31 May 2012, at 18:56, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/31/2012 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


I think there are many tricks the brain employs against itself to  
aid the selfish propagation of its genes.  One example is the  
concept of the ego (having an identity).


Agreed. As I said just above.


So having an identity, a unity of thoughts, depends on there being a  
brain which depends on physics.  Which is why I argue that, whatever  
is fundamental, physics is essential to consciousness.


I can agree. This does not make physics primitive though. Just that  
that the physical realm might delude us on our identity, as it does on  
materiality. Keep in mind that physics, with comp, is a statistic on  
computations as seen from some points of view.









Many drugs can temporarily disable whatever mechanism in our brain  
creates this feeling, leading to ego death, feelings of  
connectedness, oneness with other or the universe, etc.  Perhaps  
one of our ancestors always felt this way, but died out when the  
egoist gene developed and made its carriers exploitative of the  
egoless.


Probably. I think so.


Evolutionarily the ego must have preceded Lobian programming by many  
generations.


I agree, for the human egos, but arithmetic is full of relative  
"egos", non lobian and lobian one.



Competition and natural selection must have occurred even in the  
primordial soup.


No doubt. From our perspective. ("our" can include the bacteria, and  
all living creatures).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-31 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won  
a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state  
law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to  
Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and  
the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and  
again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you  
can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely  
unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has  
probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the  
infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly  
on Mars.



Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend  
to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading  
about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is  
(1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations.


Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred  
by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time  
the probability is 1/2, but his experience is "harry-Potter-like".





I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after  
the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue,  
does it remain 50%?


Yes.



Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1  
copy on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be  
equal to 1/6th?


You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.





While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so  
that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport  
button is pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see how  
this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis,  
the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in  
32 (as I have caused 5 splittings),


OK.


but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5  
electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.


That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding  
to the earth/mars experience.




In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following  
records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.
The way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter  
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5  
copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter  
creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.


This is ambiguous.


What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net  
result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like  
stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then creating  
5 copies (with delay) on Mars.


Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif

Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies  
created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).


When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created  
on Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) is the  
probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th?


Yes.
That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or  
a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in  
front of the "looser", even if you multiply by 20. billions your  
delayed copies on mars.





Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge  
that the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into the  
Teleporter again?


I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is the difference  
between 24.


In this thought experience you were supposed to be an external  
observer on earth, not the candidate doing the duplication.
In your diary, you will always write things like, "he try to multiply  
the copy on mars, push on the button and told me "this fails again".


Bruno








In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth  
should be (1/6th)


Yes. In that case.



but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same,  
why should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all  
at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case?


RSSA has to be applied. Your first protocol is faithful, isomorphic,  
to the experience I was describing. Te second is not.

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Stephen P. King

On 5/31/2012 12:10 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On May 31, 1:45 am, Jason Resch  wrote:

Craig,

You mentioned that you can open a remote desktop connection from a
virtualized computer to a real computer (or even the one running the
virtualization).

This, as Quentin mentioned, requires an interface.  In this case it is
provided by the virtual network card made available to the virtual OS.

A 'virtual network card' is just a name for the part of OS. There is
no interface. The 'real computer' is no more real than the virtual
computer. The partition is purely fictional - a presentation layer to
appeal to our sense of organization and convenience. No virtual
network card is required. You could just call it the part of the OS
that we call virtual.

The partition between the OS and the actual hardware however, does
require an interface for our hands and eyes to make changes to the
hardware that affects the software.


When the virtual OS writes network traffic to this virtual interface, it is
read by the host computer, and from there on can be interpreted and
processed.  It is only because the host computer is monitoring the state of
this virtual network card and forwarding its traffic that the virtual OS is
able to send any network traffic outside it.

No, the containers all share the same root OS. The virtual interface
is a convenient fiction.

Craig


Hi Craig,

It seems that we might be glossing over the difference between 
hardware and software...


--
Onward!

Stephen

"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon


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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 

> On May 31, 1:58 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On May 31, 12:26 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > > > 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 
> >
> > > > > On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > > > > > 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 
> >
> > > > > > > On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
> >
> > > > > > > > > You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that
> you
> > > are
> > > > > > > > > smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a
> Church-Turing
> > > > > > > > > Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level
> > > separation?
> > > > > The
> > > > > > > > > whole point is that there is no fundamental difference
> between
> > > one
> > > > > > > > > Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
> >
> > > > > > > > A program is running on a machine... a program interact
> through
> > > > > interface
> > > > > > > > and that's the **only** way to interact.
> >
> > > > > > > Huh? A program interacts with another program directly.
> >
> > > > > > Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared
> memory
> > > (and
> > > > > > eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So
> give
> > > me a
> > > > > > program that can talk/share thing with another program without
> any
> > > > > > interface between them...
> >
> > > > > You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the
> > > > > necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality.
> To
> > > > > use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an
> interface
> > > > > that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to
> > > > > microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial
> > > > > universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be
> > > > > prevented by the lack of such a thing.
> >
> > > > > Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with
> anything
> > > > > else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all
> > > > > virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or
> > > > > The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon
> > > > > facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic
> > > > > representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to
> pass
> > > > > from one area of memory to another.
> >
> > > > > > > There is no
> > > > > > > interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node
> whether
> > > the
> > > > > > > program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the
> physical
> > > > > > > machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual
> machines.
> >
> > > > > > Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine
> > > has no
> > > > > > direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist)
> on the
> > > > > > physical hardware.
> >
> > > > > The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as
> > > > > the root level.
> >
> > > > That's complete bullshit... If my emulator does not give you access
> to
> > > the
> > > > host hardware it does not...
> >
> > > I'm not talking about the user having access to the host hardware, I'm
> > > talking about the virtual machine: the software. It is using the host
> > > machines's memory and CPUs, is it not?
> >
> > > > The point is that the program running on the
> > > > emulator *HAS NO WAY* to know it does not run on physical
> > > hardware
> > > > if no interface is present to give it access to it.
> >
> > > No program has any way of knowing whether it is running on physical
> > > hardware or not, even if it has an interface. Whether the program is
> > > running on an emulator or not makes no difference.
> >
> > > > Shared memory IS an interface. But anyway, I leave this
> > > discussion
> > > > here, can't cure your stupidity.
> >
> > > Despite your ad hominem retort, there is no basis for it if you
> > > understand the points I am making. It is your understanding that is a
> > > little fuzzy. I am an MCSE and CCEA btw, and I have been configuring
> > > and managing hundreds of RDP, Citrix, and virtual servers every day
> > > for over 13 years.
> >
> > Yes but you still have to learn what a program is... then come back
> talking.
> >
>
> What 'come back'? Did I leave? What understanding about what a program
> is do you have that could possibly make an difference in this
> conversation?
>


To know what an interface is... how 2 programs communicate. The way you
talk is like "hey dude it's in the OS !"... like the operating system was
not a software... like if you want to access the network you're not calling
a software... like in the end it was not writing something into some place
in memory... pfff only thing I can say is "AhAhAh !!!"... as your "sense"
BS.

The way you don't understand "level"... when a emulator is in a emulator...
the second level emulator run on the first level emulated hardware... which
run itself ru

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 1:58 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On May 31, 12:26 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > > 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 
>
> > > > On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > > > > 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 
>
> > > > > > On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> > > > > > > > You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you
> > are
> > > > > > > > smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
> > > > > > > > Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level
> > separation?
> > > > The
> > > > > > > > whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between
> > one
> > > > > > > > Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
>
> > > > > > > A program is running on a machine... a program interact through
> > > > interface
> > > > > > > and that's the **only** way to interact.
>
> > > > > > Huh? A program interacts with another program directly.
>
> > > > > Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory
> > (and
> > > > > eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give
> > me a
> > > > > program that can talk/share thing with another program without any
> > > > > interface between them...
>
> > > > You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the
> > > > necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To
> > > > use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface
> > > > that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to
> > > > microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial
> > > > universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be
> > > > prevented by the lack of such a thing.
>
> > > > Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything
> > > > else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all
> > > > virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or
> > > > The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon
> > > > facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic
> > > > representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass
> > > > from one area of memory to another.
>
> > > > > > There is no
> > > > > > interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether
> > the
> > > > > > program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical
> > > > > > machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines.
>
> > > > > Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine
> > has no
> > > > > direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the
> > > > > physical hardware.
>
> > > > The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as
> > > > the root level.
>
> > > That's complete bullshit... If my emulator does not give you access to
> > the
> > > host hardware it does not...
>
> > I'm not talking about the user having access to the host hardware, I'm
> > talking about the virtual machine: the software. It is using the host
> > machines's memory and CPUs, is it not?
>
> > > The point is that the program running on the
> > > emulator *HAS NO WAY* to know it does not run on physical
> > hardware
> > > if no interface is present to give it access to it.
>
> > No program has any way of knowing whether it is running on physical
> > hardware or not, even if it has an interface. Whether the program is
> > running on an emulator or not makes no difference.
>
> > > Shared memory IS an interface. But anyway, I leave this
> > discussion
> > > here, can't cure your stupidity.
>
> > Despite your ad hominem retort, there is no basis for it if you
> > understand the points I am making. It is your understanding that is a
> > little fuzzy. I am an MCSE and CCEA btw, and I have been configuring
> > and managing hundreds of RDP, Citrix, and virtual servers every day
> > for over 13 years.
>
> Yes but you still have to learn what a program is... then come back talking.
>

What 'come back'? Did I leave? What understanding about what a program
is do you have that could possibly make an difference in this
conversation?

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 

> On May 31, 12:26 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > > > 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 
> >
> > > > > On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> >
> > > > > > > You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you
> are
> > > > > > > smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
> > > > > > > Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level
> separation?
> > > The
> > > > > > > whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between
> one
> > > > > > > Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
> >
> > > > > > A program is running on a machine... a program interact through
> > > interface
> > > > > > and that's the **only** way to interact.
> >
> > > > > Huh? A program interacts with another program directly.
> >
> > > > Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory
> (and
> > > > eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give
> me a
> > > > program that can talk/share thing with another program without any
> > > > interface between them...
> >
> > > You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the
> > > necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To
> > > use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface
> > > that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to
> > > microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial
> > > universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be
> > > prevented by the lack of such a thing.
> >
> > > Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything
> > > else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all
> > > virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or
> > > The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon
> > > facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic
> > > representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass
> > > from one area of memory to another.
> >
> > > > > There is no
> > > > > interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether
> the
> > > > > program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical
> > > > > machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines.
> >
> > > > Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine
> has no
> > > > direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the
> > > > physical hardware.
> >
> > > The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as
> > > the root level.
> >
> > That's complete bullshit... If my emulator does not give you access to
> the
> > host hardware it does not...
>
> I'm not talking about the user having access to the host hardware, I'm
> talking about the virtual machine: the software. It is using the host
> machines's memory and CPUs, is it not?
>
> > The point is that the program running on the
> > emulator *HAS NO WAY* to know it does not run on physical
> hardware
> > if no interface is present to give it access to it.
>
> No program has any way of knowing whether it is running on physical
> hardware or not, even if it has an interface. Whether the program is
> running on an emulator or not makes no difference.
>
> >
> > Shared memory IS an interface. But anyway, I leave this
> discussion
> > here, can't cure your stupidity.
>
> Despite your ad hominem retort, there is no basis for it if you
> understand the points I am making. It is your understanding that is a
> little fuzzy. I am an MCSE and CCEA btw, and I have been configuring
> and managing hundreds of RDP, Citrix, and virtual servers every day
> for over 13 years.


Yes but you still have to learn what a program is... then come back talking.

Quentin

I can assure you that you can break an entire
> hardware node by doing something on one container. Virtual is a
> relative term, it is not literal. The virtual machines are all really
> the same physical computer.
>
> Craig
>
> --
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> "Everything List" group.
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>
>


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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 12:26 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > > 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 
>
> > > > On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> > > > > > You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
> > > > > > smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
> > > > > > Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation?
> > The
> > > > > > whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
> > > > > > Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
>
> > > > > A program is running on a machine... a program interact through
> > interface
> > > > > and that's the **only** way to interact.
>
> > > > Huh? A program interacts with another program directly.
>
> > > Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory (and
> > > eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give me a
> > > program that can talk/share thing with another program without any
> > > interface between them...
>
> > You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the
> > necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To
> > use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface
> > that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to
> > microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial
> > universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be
> > prevented by the lack of such a thing.
>
> > Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything
> > else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all
> > virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or
> > The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon
> > facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic
> > representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass
> > from one area of memory to another.
>
> > > > There is no
> > > > interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the
> > > > program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical
> > > > machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines.
>
> > > Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine has no
> > > direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the
> > > physical hardware.
>
> > The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as
> > the root level.
>
> That's complete bullshit... If my emulator does not give you access to the
> host hardware it does not...

I'm not talking about the user having access to the host hardware, I'm
talking about the virtual machine: the software. It is using the host
machines's memory and CPUs, is it not?

> The point is that the program running on the
> emulator *HAS NO WAY* to know it does not run on physical hardware
> if no interface is present to give it access to it.

No program has any way of knowing whether it is running on physical
hardware or not, even if it has an interface. Whether the program is
running on an emulator or not makes no difference.

>
> Shared memory IS an interface. But anyway, I leave this discussion
> here, can't cure your stupidity.

Despite your ad hominem retort, there is no basis for it if you
understand the points I am making. It is your understanding that is a
little fuzzy. I am an MCSE and CCEA btw, and I have been configuring
and managing hundreds of RDP, Citrix, and virtual servers every day
for over 13 years. I can assure you that you can break an entire
hardware node by doing something on one container. Virtual is a
relative term, it is not literal. The virtual machines are all really
the same physical computer.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 2:33 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On May 29, 1:45 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > > So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you take
> > > issue with?
>
> > > A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy
>
> > So does a cadaver's brain and body. The fact that a cadaver is not
> > intelligent should show us that the difference between life and death
> > can't be meaningfully reduced to matter and energy.
>
> That some organizations of matter/energy are intelligent and others are not
> is irrelevant, what matters is whether or not you agree that the brain is
> made of matter and energy.  Do you agree the brain is made of matter and
> energy, and that the brain is responsible for your consciousness (or at
> least one of the many possible manifestations of it)?

I think that Matter-Energy and Sense-Motive are dual aspects of the
same thing. If you are talking about the brain only, then you are
talking about matter and energy, but no person exists if you limit the
discussion to that. The matter and energy side of what we are is just
organs. There is no person there. The brain is not responsible for
consciousness anymore than your computer is responsible for the
internet. It is the necessary vehicle through which human level
awareness is accessed.

>
> > > B. that matter and energy follow natural laws,
>
> > No, laws follow from our observation of natural matter and energy.
>
> You are mistaking our approximations and inferences concerning the natural
> laws for the natural laws themselves.

No, you are mistaking the interaction of concretely real natural
phenomena with abstract principles which we have derived from
measurement and intellectual extension.

> Before there were any humans, or any
> life, there must have been laws that the universe obeyed to reach the point
> where Earth formed and life could develop.

Before there was matter, there were no laws that the universe obeyed
pertaining to matter, just as there were no laws of biology before
biology. The universe makes laws by doing. It isn't only a disembodied
set of invisible laws which creates obedient bodies. Laws are not
primordial. You have to have some kind of capacity to sense and make
sense before any kind of regularity of pattern can be established.
Something has to be able to happen in the first place before you can
separate out what can happen under which conditions. The reality of
something being able to happen - experience - possibility - prefigures
all other principles.

> Do you agree that such natural
> laws exist (regardless of our human approximations of them)?

No. It has nothing to do with human approximations though. If an
audience cheers it is not because there is a law of cheering they are
following, it is because they personally are participating in a
context of sense and motive which they and their world mutually push
and pull. The understanding of when cheering happens and under what
conditions it can be produced is an a posterior abstraction. We can
call it a law, and indeed, it is highly regular and useful to think of
it that way, but ultimately the law itself is nothing. It is a set of
meta-observations about reality, not an ethereal authoritative core
around which concrete reality constellates and obeys. Laws come from
within. Human laws from within humans, atomic laws from within atoms,
etc.

>
>
>
> > > C. that these laws are describable in mathematical terms
>
> > You have jumped from physics to abstraction. It's like saying 'I have
> > a rabbit > rabbits act like rabbits > Bugs Bunny is modeled after the
> > behavior of rabbits > Bugs Bunny is a rabbit'.
>
> I haven't jumped there yet.  All "C" says is that there exists some formal
> system that is capable of describing the natural laws as they are.  You may
> accept or reject this.  If you reject this, simply say so and provide some
> justification if you have one.

The formal system doesn't exist until some sentient being
intentionally brings it into existence. Bugs Bunny requires a
cartoonist to draw him. Bugs is a formal system that is capable of
describing rabbit behaviors as they are but he doesn't exist
'there' ('he' insists 'here' instead).

>
> Note that I have not made any statement to the effect that "an abstract
> rabbit is the same as a physical rabbit", only that natural laws that the
> matter and energy in (a rabbit or any other physical thing) follow can be
> described.

You aren't factoring in the limitation of perception. Think of a young
child trying to imitate an accent from another language. To the child,
they perceive that they are doing a pretty good job of emulating
exactly how that way of speaking sounds. To an adult though,
especially one who is a native speaker of the language being imitated,
there is an obvious difference. This is where we are in our
contemporary belief that we have accounted for physical forces. I
think that we are looking at a

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread meekerdb

On 5/31/2012 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I think there are many tricks the brain employs against itself to aid the selfish 
propagation of its genes.  One example is the concept of the ego (having an identity).


Agreed. As I said just above.


So having an identity, a unity of thoughts, depends on there being a brain which depends 
on physics.  Which is why I argue that, whatever is fundamental, physics is essential to 
consciousness.





Many drugs can temporarily disable whatever mechanism in our brain creates this 
feeling, leading to ego death, feelings of connectedness, oneness with other or the 
universe, etc.  Perhaps one of our ancestors always felt this way, but died out when 
the egoist gene developed and made its carriers exploitative of the egoless.


Probably. I think so.


Evolutionarily the ego must have preceded Lobian programming by many generations.  
Competition and natural selection must have occurred even in the primordial soup.


Brent

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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-31 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a
>> price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law
>> forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without
>> annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth
>> complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer,
>> and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the
>> feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n
>> experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience).
>> Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go
>> quickly on Mars.
>>
>>
> Bruno,
>
> Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get
> back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above
> experiment that I wanted to clear up.
>
> You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where
> n is the number of teleportations.
>
>
> Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by
> the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the
> probability is 1/2, but his experience is "harry-Potter-like".
>
>
>
>
> I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the
> first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it
> remain 50%?
>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
> Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on
> earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?
>
>
> You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.
>
>
>
>
> While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see
> the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I
> split in two).  It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum
> mechanics under the following experiment:
>
> I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the
> probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I
> have caused 5 splittings),
>
>
> OK.
>
>
> but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5
> electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.
>
>
> That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to
> the earth/mars experience.
>
>
>
> In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records:
>
> 1. D
> 2. DU
> 3. DDU
> 4. DDDU
> 5. U
> 6. D
>
> However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The way I
> see it is they have the following probabilities:
>
> 1. D (1/2)
> 2. DU (1/4)
> 3. DDU (1/8)
> 4. DDDU (1/16)
> 5. U (1/32)
> 6. D (1/32)
>
> I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment,
> it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is
> no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on
> Mars at once.
>
>
> This is ambiguous.
>


What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net result
being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping into
the teleporter once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with delay)
on Mars.

Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif

Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created
with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).

When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on Mars
(with various delays between each one being produced) is the probability of
remaining on Earth 1/6th?

Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge that
the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into the Teleporter again?

Thanks,

Jason



>
>
>
> In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be
> (1/6th)
>
>
> Yes. In that case.
>
>
>
> but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why
> should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do
> RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case?
>
>
> RSSA has to be applied. Your first protocol is faithful, isomorphic, to
> the experience I was describing. Te second is not.
>
> OK?
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 

> On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 
> >
> > > On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> >
> > > > > You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
> > > > > smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
> > > > > Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation?
> The
> > > > > whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
> > > > > Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
> >
> > > > A program is running on a machine... a program interact through
> interface
> > > > and that's the **only** way to interact.
> >
> > > Huh? A program interacts with another program directly.
> >
> > Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory (and
> > eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give me a
> > program that can talk/share thing with another program without any
> > interface between them...
>
> You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the
> necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To
> use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface
> that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to
> microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial
> universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be
> prevented by the lack of such a thing.
>
> Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything
> else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all
> virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or
> The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon
> facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic
> representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass
> from one area of memory to another.
>
> >
> > > There is no
> > > interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the
> > > program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical
> > > machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines.
> >
> > Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine has no
> > direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the
> > physical hardware.
>
> The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as
> the root level.


That's complete bullshit... If my emulator does not give you access to the
host hardware it does not... The point is that the program running on the
emulator *HAS NO WAY* to know it does not run on physical hardware
if no interface is present to give it access to it.


Shared memory IS an interface. But anyway, I leave this discussion
here, can't cure your stupidity.

Quentin


> It's entirely up to the programmer how direct they
> want it to appear to the user, but ultimately, it is still just a
> program running on the hardware. The virtual machine cannot run
> without hardware.
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > > > > If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation
> (simulation in
> > > a
> > > > > > simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like
> > > multi
> > > > > > level.
> >
> > > > > > Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you
> > > > > virtualize
> > > > > > an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another
> os
> > > > > inside
> > > > > > it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first
> level
> > > > > can't
> > > > > > reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.
> >
> > > > > No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node -
> pick a
> > > > > virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote
> desktop
> > > > > there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if
> I
> > > > > want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level
> within
> > > > > the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are
> all
> > > > > running on the same physical hardware node.
> >
> > > > Well you can't read "unless an interface between them exists."
> >
> > > What interface are you talking about? I can make a million nested
> > > layers of virtual worlds and I can make it so the same virtual fire
> > > burns in all of them, with no interface required.
> >
> > Well I know you do it through magic mushroom... but hey, that doesn't
> work.
>
> Sounds like you are conceding my point though.
>
> Craig
>
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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 
>
> > On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> > > > You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
> > > > smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
> > > > Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The
> > > > whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
> > > > Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
>
> > > A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface
> > > and that's the **only** way to interact.
>
> > Huh? A program interacts with another program directly.
>
> Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory (and
> eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give me a
> program that can talk/share thing with another program without any
> interface between them...

You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the
necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To
use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface
that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to
microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial
universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be
prevented by the lack of such a thing.

Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything
else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all
virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or
The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon
facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic
representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass
from one area of memory to another.

>
> > There is no
> > interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the
> > program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical
> > machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines.
>
> Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine has no
> direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the
> physical hardware.

The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as
the root level. It's entirely up to the programmer how direct they
want it to appear to the user, but ultimately, it is still just a
program running on the hardware. The virtual machine cannot run
without hardware.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > > > > If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in
> > a
> > > > > simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like
> > multi
> > > > > level.
>
> > > > > Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you
> > > > virtualize
> > > > > an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os
> > > > inside
> > > > > it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level
> > > > can't
> > > > > reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.
>
> > > > No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
> > > > virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
> > > > there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I
> > > > want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within
> > > > the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all
> > > > running on the same physical hardware node.
>
> > > Well you can't read "unless an interface between them exists."
>
> > What interface are you talking about? I can make a million nested
> > layers of virtual worlds and I can make it so the same virtual fire
> > burns in all of them, with no interface required.
>
> Well I know you do it through magic mushroom... but hey, that doesn't work.

Sounds like you are conceding my point though.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 1:45 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
> Craig,
>
> You mentioned that you can open a remote desktop connection from a
> virtualized computer to a real computer (or even the one running the
> virtualization).
>
> This, as Quentin mentioned, requires an interface.  In this case it is
> provided by the virtual network card made available to the virtual OS.

A 'virtual network card' is just a name for the part of OS. There is
no interface. The 'real computer' is no more real than the virtual
computer. The partition is purely fictional - a presentation layer to
appeal to our sense of organization and convenience. No virtual
network card is required. You could just call it the part of the OS
that we call virtual.

The partition between the OS and the actual hardware however, does
require an interface for our hands and eyes to make changes to the
hardware that affects the software.

> When the virtual OS writes network traffic to this virtual interface, it is
> read by the host computer, and from there on can be interpreted and
> processed.  It is only because the host computer is monitoring the state of
> this virtual network card and forwarding its traffic that the virtual OS is
> able to send any network traffic outside it.

No, the containers all share the same root OS. The virtual interface
is a convenient fiction.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 31 May 2012, at 08:02, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote:






The question I have in mind is "Does a brain produce consciousness,  
or does the brain filter consciousness?


I had some thoughts on this same topic a few months ago.  I was  
thinking about what the difference is between a God-mind that knows  
everything, and an empty mind that knew nothing.  Both contain zero  
information (in an information theoretic sense), so perhaps if  
someone has no brain they become omniscient (in a certain sense).


"In a certain sense". OK. (The devil is there). But an empty mind has  
still to be the mind of a machine, probably the virgin (unprogrammed)  
universal machine, or the Löbian one (I still dunno).



If we consider RSSA, our consciousness followed some path to get to  
the current moment.


Key point. I just used this in a reply on the FOAR list (where I  
explain UDA/AUDA).




If we look at brain development, we find our consciousness formed  
from what was previously not conscious matter.


Not really. It is counter-intuitive, but matter is the last thing that  
emanates from the ONE (in Plato/Plotinus, and in comp, and even in the  
information theoretic view of QM as explained by Ron Garrett and that  
you compare rightly to the comp consequence). Matter can even be seen  
as what God loose control on. It is almost pure absolute  
indetermination. The primitive matter is really a product of  
consciousness differentiation (cf UDA). But I see what you mean. I  
think.




Therefore, there is some path from a (null conscious state)->(you),  
and perhaps, there are paths from the null state to every possible  
conscious state.


Yes, and vice versa by amnesia, plausibly.


If so, then every time we go to sleep, or go under anesthesia, or  
die, we can wake up as anyone.


In a sense, we do that all the time. This points to the idea that  
there is only one (universal) dreaming person, and that personal  
identity is a relative illusion.






We "know" that consciousness is in "platonia", and that local brains  
are just relative universal numbers making possible for a person (in  
a large sense which can include an amoeba) to manifest itself  
relatively to its most probable computation/environment. But this  
does not completely answer the question. I think that many thinks  
that the more a brain is big, the more it can be conscious, which is  
not so clear when you take the reversal into account. It might be  
the exact contrary.


I think there are many tricks the brain employs against itself to  
aid the selfish propagation of its genes.  One example is the  
concept of the ego (having an identity).


Agreed. As I said just above.


Many drugs can temporarily disable whatever mechanism in our brain  
creates this feeling, leading to ego death, feelings of  
connectedness, oneness with other or the universe, etc.  Perhaps one  
of our ancestors always felt this way, but died out when the egoist  
gene developed and made its carriers exploitative of the egoless.


Probably. I think so.





And this might be confirmed by studies showing that missing some  
part of the brain, like an half hippocampus, can lead to to a  
permanent feeling of presence.
Recently this has been confirmed by the showing that LSD and  
psilocybe decrease the activity of the brain during the  
hallucinogenic phases. And dissociative drugs disconnect parts of  
the brain, with similar increase of the first person experience.  
Clinical studies of Near death experiences might also put evidence  
in that direction. haldous Huxley made a similar proposal for  
mescaline.


This is basically explained with the Bp & Dt hypostases. By  
suppressing material in the brain you make the "B" poorer (you  
eliminate belief), but then you augment the possibility so you make  
the consistency Dt stronger. Eventually you come back to the  
universal consciousness of the virgin simple universal numbers,  
perhaps.


Here are some recent papers on this:

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=do-psychedelics-expand-mind-reducing-brain-activity&WT.mc_id=SA_WR_20120523

http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/01/17/1119598109.short


Thanks for the links and your thoughts.  They are, as always, very  
interesting.


Thanks Jason,

Bruno




PS I asked Colin on the FOR list if he is aware of the European  
Brain Project, which is relevant for this thread. Especially that  
they are aware of "simulating nature at some level":


http://www.humanbrainproject.eu/introduction.html



Has he replied on the FOR list?  It seems he has been absent from  
this list for the past few days.


He has disappeared again, apparently.

Best,

Bruno





Jason






If you have _everything_ in your model (external world included),  
then you can simulate it. But you don’t. So you can’t simulate it.



Would you stop behaving intelligently if the gravity 

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> On May 29, 1:45 am, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you take
> > issue with?
> >
> > A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy
>
> So does a cadaver's brain and body. The fact that a cadaver is not
> intelligent should show us that the difference between life and death
> can't be meaningfully reduced to matter and energy.
>
>
That some organizations of matter/energy are intelligent and others are not
is irrelevant, what matters is whether or not you agree that the brain is
made of matter and energy.  Do you agree the brain is made of matter and
energy, and that the brain is responsible for your consciousness (or at
least one of the many possible manifestations of it)?



> > B. that matter and energy follow natural laws,
>
> No, laws follow from our observation of natural matter and energy.
>

You are mistaking our approximations and inferences concerning the natural
laws for the natural laws themselves.  Before there were any humans, or any
life, there must have been laws that the universe obeyed to reach the point
where Earth formed and life could develop.  Do you agree that such natural
laws exist (regardless of our human approximations of them)?


>
> > C. that these laws are describable in mathematical terms
>
> You have jumped from physics to abstraction. It's like saying 'I have
> a rabbit > rabbits act like rabbits > Bugs Bunny is modeled after the
> behavior of rabbits > Bugs Bunny is a rabbit'.
>

I haven't jumped there yet.  All "C" says is that there exists some formal
system that is capable of describing the natural laws as they are.  You may
accept or reject this.  If you reject this, simply say so and provide some
justification if you have one.

Note that I have not made any statement to the effect that "an abstract
rabbit is the same as a physical rabbit", only that natural laws that the
matter and energy in (a rabbit or any other physical thing) follow can be
described.



>
> > D. that mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by
> > algorithms
> >
>
> Precision only determines the probability that a particular detector
> fails to detect the fraud of simulation over time. It says nothing
> about the genuine equivalence of the simulation and the reality.
>
>
It sounds like you accept that mathematics can be simulated to any degree
of precision by algorithms, but your objection is that without absolutely
perfect precision, the simulation will eventually diverge from the object
being simulated in some noticeable way.  I think this is a valid
objection.  However, I don't see this objection serving as the basis for
Colin's argument against artificial general intelligence.  Let's say we
have a near perfect simulation of the physics of Einstein's brain running
in a computer.  It is near-perfect, rather than perfect, because due to
rounding errors, it is predicted that there will  be one neuron misfire
every 50 years of operation.  (Where a misfire is a neuron that fires when
the actual brain would not have, or doesn't fire when the actual brain
would not have).  Maybe this misfire causes the simulated brain to develop
a wrong idea when he would have otherwise had the right one, but who would
argue that this simulated Einstein brain is not intelligent?  Perhaps it
has an IQ of 159 instead of the 160 of the genuine brain, but it would
still be consider an example of AGI.  If you don't like the 1 error every
50 years, then you can double the amount of memory used in the floating
point numbers (going from 64 bits to 128 bits per number), and then you
make the system have a precision that is 2^64 times finer, so there would
not be a deviation in the simulation during the whole life of the universe.

So while I accept your argument that a digital machine cannot perfectly
simulate a continuous one perfectly, I do not see how that could serve as a
practical barrier in the creation of AGI.

Jason

>

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 29 May 2012, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 2:02 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales <
> cgha...@unimelb.edu.au> wrote:
>
>>  ** **
>>
>> ** **
>>
>> *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Jason Resch
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, 29 May 2012 3:45 PM
>> *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
>> *Subject:* Re: Church Turing be dammed.
>>
>>
>> Natural physics is a computation. Fine.
>>
>> But a computed natural physics model is NOT the natural physicsit is
>> the natural physics of a computer.
>>
>>
>>
>> Colin,
>>
>> I recently read the following excerpt from "The Singularity is Near" on
>> page 454:
>>
>> "The basis of the strong (Church-Turing thesis) is that problems that are
>> not solvable on a Turing Machine cannot be solved by human thought,
>> either.  The basis of this thesis is that human thought is performed by the
>> human brain (with some influence by the body), that the human brain (and
>> body) comprises matter and energy, that matter and energy follow natural
>> laws, that these laws are describable in mathematical terms, and that
>> mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by algorithms.
>> Therefore there exist algorithms that can simulate human thought.  The
>> strong version of the Church-Turing thesis postulates an essential
>> equivalence between what a human can think or know, and what is computable."
>>
>> So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you take
>> issue with?
>>
>> A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy
>> B. that matter and energy follow natural laws,
>> C. that these laws are describable in mathematical terms
>> D. that mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by
>> algorithms
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>  
>>
>> Hi Jason,
>>
>> Brain physics is there to cognise the (external) world. You do not know
>> the external world.
>>
>> Your brain is there to apprehend it. The physics of the brain inherits
>> properties of the (unknown) external world. This is natural cognition.
>> Therefore you have no model to compute. Game over.
>>
>
> If I understand this correctly, your point is that we don't understand the
> physics and chemistry that is important in the brain?  Assuming this is the
> case, it would be only a temporary barrier, not a permanent reason that
> prohibits AI in practice.
>
>
> You are right. That would neither prohibit AI,  nor comp.
>
>
>
>
> There are also reasons to believe we already understand the mechanisms of
> neurons to a sufficient degree to simulate them.  There are numerous
> instances where computer simulated neurons apparently behaved in the same
> ways as biological neurons have been observed to.  If you're interested I
> can dig up the references.
>
>
> Meaning: there are reasonable levels to bet on.
>
> Here, for once, I will give my opinion, if you don't mind. First, about
> the level, the question will be "this level, this year, or that more finest
> grained level next year, because technology evolves. In between it *is* a
> possible Pascal Wag, in the sense that if you have a fatal brain disease,
> you might not afford the time to wait for possible technological deeper
> levels.
>
> And my opinion is that I can imagine saying "yes" to a doctor for a cheap
> "neuronal simulator", but I expect getting an altered state of
> consciousness, and some awareness of it. Like being stone or something. For
> a long run machine, I doubt we can copy the brain without respecting the
> entire electromagnetic relation of its constituents. I think it is highly
> plausible that we are indeed digital with respect to the law of chemistry,
> and my feeling is that the brain is above all a drug designer, and is a
> machine where only some part of the communication use the "cable". So I
> would ask to the doctor to take into account the glial cells, who seems to
> communicate a lot, by mechano-chemical diffusion waves, including some
> chatting with the neurons. And those immensely complex dialog are mainly
> chemical. This is quite close to the Heizenberg uncertainty level, which is
> probably our first person plural level (in which case comp is equivalent
> with QM).
>
> Also, by the first person indeterminacy, a curious happenin

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg 

> On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> > > You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
> > > smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
> > > Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The
> > > whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
> > > Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
> >
> > A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface
> > and that's the **only** way to interact.
>
> Huh? A program interacts with another program directly.


Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory (and
eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give me a
program that can talk/share thing with another program without any
interface between them...


> There is no
> interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the
> program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical
> machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines.
>

Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine has no
direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the
physical hardware.

>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > > If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in
> a
> > > > simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like
> multi
> > > > level.
> >
> > > > Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you
> > > virtualize
> > > > an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os
> > > inside
> > > > it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level
> > > can't
> > > > reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.
> >
> > > No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
> > > virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
> > > there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I
> > > want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within
> > > the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all
> > > running on the same physical hardware node.
> >
> > Well you can't read "unless an interface between them exists."
>
> What interface are you talking about? I can make a million nested
> layers of virtual worlds and I can make it so the same virtual fire
> burns in all of them, with no interface required.


Well I know you do it through magic mushroom... but hey, that doesn't work.

Quentin


> It would magically
> burn on command if I wanted it to. It's no problem at all unless I
> want it to burn outside of the root level - into the literal reality
> of time-space-matter-energy.
>
> Craig
>
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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Jason Resch
Craig,

You mentioned that you can open a remote desktop connection from a
virtualized computer to a real computer (or even the one running the
virtualization).

This, as Quentin mentioned, requires an interface.  In this case it is
provided by the virtual network card made available to the virtual OS.
When the virtual OS writes network traffic to this virtual interface, it is
read by the host computer, and from there on can be interpreted and
processed.  It is only because the host computer is monitoring the state of
this virtual network card and forwarding its traffic that the virtual OS is
able to send any network traffic outside it.

Jason

On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 8:32 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> On May 30, 6:13 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> >
> > >> No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
> > >> virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
> >
> > So for you a remote desktop is not an interface... "remote" is a magic
> > mushroom ?
>
> It's not an interface, it's just the OS. It doesn't have to be a
> remote desktop, it can be anything. I can open a local folder or a
> remote folder, it makes no difference.
>
>
> >
> > So for you when two programs "talk" they do it through wishful thinking ?
> > read what **interface** means.
>
> Then programs are made of 'interfaces'? Each line of code interfaces
> with another? Each byte interfaces with the next byte? There is no
> difference between running code on the root level and running it on a
> nested virtual level. There is a big difference between running code
> on the root level and causing changes in the outside world. There is
> no 'interface' that will allow a computer to control all matter and
> energy in the universe and there is no 'interface' required for a
> program to control any software running in a given digital environment
> that it is designed to control.
>
> Craig
>
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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 30, 6:13 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

>
> >> No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
> >> virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
>
> So for you a remote desktop is not an interface... "remote" is a magic
> mushroom ?

It's not an interface, it's just the OS. It doesn't have to be a
remote desktop, it can be anything. I can open a local folder or a
remote folder, it makes no difference.


>
> So for you when two programs "talk" they do it through wishful thinking ?
> read what **interface** means.

Then programs are made of 'interfaces'? Each line of code interfaces
with another? Each byte interfaces with the next byte? There is no
difference between running code on the root level and running it on a
nested virtual level. There is a big difference between running code
on the root level and causing changes in the outside world. There is
no 'interface' that will allow a computer to control all matter and
energy in the universe and there is no 'interface' required for a
program to control any software running in a given digital environment
that it is designed to control.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> > You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
> > smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
> > Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The
> > whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
> > Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
>
> A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface
> and that's the **only** way to interact.

Huh? A program interacts with another program directly. There is no
interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the
program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical
machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines.

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > > If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a
> > > simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi
> > > level.
>
> > > Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you
> > virtualize
> > > an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os
> > inside
> > > it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level
> > can't
> > > reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.
>
> > No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
> > virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
> > there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I
> > want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within
> > the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all
> > running on the same physical hardware node.
>
> Well you can't read "unless an interface between them exists."

What interface are you talking about? I can make a million nested
layers of virtual worlds and I can make it so the same virtual fire
burns in all of them, with no interface required. It would magically
burn on command if I wanted it to. It's no problem at all unless I
want it to burn outside of the root level - into the literal reality
of time-space-matter-energy.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/31 Quentin Anciaux 

>
>
> 2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg 
>
>> On May 30, 4:36 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>> > 2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg 
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > > On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>> >
>> > > > You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect
>> to
>> > > have
>> > > > dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you
>> want an
>> > > > computational AI to interact with you, it must be able to control
>> real
>> > > > world appendices that permits it to *interact* or likewise if it
>> was in a
>> > > > virtual world, you should use a interface with this virtual world
>> for you
>> > > > to interact.
>> >
>> > > > You can't expect level to be mixed without an interface and I don't
>> see
>> > > any
>> > > > problem with that.
>> >
>> > > Why not? In a virtual world you could mix levels without an interface.
>> >
>> > No you can't, if in your virtual world, you made a real computer
>> simulator,
>> > what runs in the simulator cannot escape in the upper virtual world
>> unless
>> > you've made an interface to it.
>>
>> You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
>> smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
>> Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The
>> whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
>> Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
>>
>
> A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface
> and that's the **only** way to interact.
>
>
>>
>> >
>> > If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a
>> > simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi
>> > level.
>> >
>> > Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you
>> virtualize
>> > an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os
>> inside
>> > it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level
>> can't
>> > reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.
>>
>> No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
>> virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
>>
>
So for you a remote desktop is not an interface... "remote" is a magic
mushroom ?

So for you when two programs "talk" they do it through wishful thinking ?
read what **interface** means.


>  there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I
>> want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within
>> the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all
>> running on the same physical hardware node.
>>
>>
> Well you can't read "unless an interface between them exists."
>
>
>>  Craig
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
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>>
>>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>



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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg 

> On May 30, 4:36 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> > 2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg 
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> >
> > > > You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect to
> > > have
> > > > dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you
> want an
> > > > computational AI to interact with you, it must be able to control
> real
> > > > world appendices that permits it to *interact* or likewise if it was
> in a
> > > > virtual world, you should use a interface with this virtual world
> for you
> > > > to interact.
> >
> > > > You can't expect level to be mixed without an interface and I don't
> see
> > > any
> > > > problem with that.
> >
> > > Why not? In a virtual world you could mix levels without an interface.
> >
> > No you can't, if in your virtual world, you made a real computer
> simulator,
> > what runs in the simulator cannot escape in the upper virtual world
> unless
> > you've made an interface to it.
>
> You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
> smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
> Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The
> whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
> Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
>

A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface
and that's the **only** way to interact.


>
> >
> > If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a
> > simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi
> > level.
> >
> > Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you
> virtualize
> > an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os
> inside
> > it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level
> can't
> > reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.
>
> No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
> virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
> there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I
> want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within
> the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all
> running on the same physical hardware node.
>
>
Well you can't read "unless an interface between them exists."


>  Craig
>
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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 30, 4:36 pm, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg 
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> > > You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect to
> > have
> > > dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you want an
> > > computational AI to interact with you, it must be able to control real
> > > world appendices that permits it to *interact* or likewise if it was in a
> > > virtual world, you should use a interface with this virtual world for you
> > > to interact.
>
> > > You can't expect level to be mixed without an interface and I don't see
> > any
> > > problem with that.
>
> > Why not? In a virtual world you could mix levels without an interface.
>
> No you can't, if in your virtual world, you made a real computer simulator,
> what runs in the simulator cannot escape in the upper virtual world unless
> you've made an interface to it.

You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The
whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.

>
> If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a
> simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi
> level.
>
> Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you virtualize
> an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os inside
> it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level can't
> reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.

No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I
want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within
the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all
running on the same physical hardware node.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg 

> On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> > You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect to
> have
> > dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you want an
> > computational AI to interact with you, it must be able to control real
> > world appendices that permits it to *interact* or likewise if it was in a
> > virtual world, you should use a interface with this virtual world for you
> > to interact.
> >
> > You can't expect level to be mixed without an interface and I don't see
> any
> > problem with that.
>
> Why not? In a virtual world you could mix levels without an interface.
>

No you can't, if in your virtual world, you made a real computer simulator,
what runs in the simulator cannot escape in the upper virtual world unless
you've made an interface to it.

If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a
simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi
level.

Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you virtualize
an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os inside
it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level can't
reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.

Quentin


You could have a virtual world where your avatar has dinner in a
> virtual virtual Paris on his virtual computer and in a virtual Paris
> at the same time. You could have a virtual factory where virtual
> virtual drawings of robots make root level virtual cars.
>
> There is something more than level which makes the difference between
> real and virtual. Level itself is an abstraction. Virtual worlds
> aren't really worlds at all. They are nothing but sophisticated
> stories using pictures instead of words. Characters in stories don't
> really think or feel.
>
> It's confusing because what we know of reality is in our mind, and so
> is what we know of a virtual reality, so it is easy to conflate the
> two and imagine that reality is nothing more than we think it is. We
> reduce them both to seem like phenomenological peers, but they aren't.
> If you look at a mirror in another mirror, they may look the same but
> one of them is an actual piece of glass. You can't break the reflected
> mirror. It's not a matter of level, it is a matter of mistaking a
> purely visual-semantic text for a concrete multi-sense presentation
> that is rooted in a single historical context that goes back to the
> beginning of time.
>
> Craig
>
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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 29, 1:45 am, Jason Resch  wrote:

> So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you take
> issue with?
>
> A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy

So does a cadaver's brain and body. The fact that a cadaver is not
intelligent should show us that the difference between life and death
can't be meaningfully reduced to matter and energy.

> B. that matter and energy follow natural laws,

No, laws follow from our observation of natural matter and energy.

> C. that these laws are describable in mathematical terms

You have jumped from physics to abstraction. It's like saying 'I have
a rabbit > rabbits act like rabbits > Bugs Bunny is modeled after the
behavior of rabbits > Bugs Bunny is a rabbit'.

> D. that mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by
> algorithms
>

Precision only determines the probability that a particular detector
fails to detect the fraud of simulation over time. It says nothing
about the genuine equivalence of the simulation and the reality.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect to have
> dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you want an
> computational AI to interact with you, it must be able to control real
> world appendices that permits it to *interact* or likewise if it was in a
> virtual world, you should use a interface with this virtual world for you
> to interact.
>
> You can't expect level to be mixed without an interface and I don't see any
> problem with that.

Why not? In a virtual world you could mix levels without an interface.
You could have a virtual world where your avatar has dinner in a
virtual virtual Paris on his virtual computer and in a virtual Paris
at the same time. You could have a virtual factory where virtual
virtual drawings of robots make root level virtual cars.

There is something more than level which makes the difference between
real and virtual. Level itself is an abstraction. Virtual worlds
aren't really worlds at all. They are nothing but sophisticated
stories using pictures instead of words. Characters in stories don't
really think or feel.

It's confusing because what we know of reality is in our mind, and so
is what we know of a virtual reality, so it is easy to conflate the
two and imagine that reality is nothing more than we think it is. We
reduce them both to seem like phenomenological peers, but they aren't.
If you look at a mirror in another mirror, they may look the same but
one of them is an actual piece of glass. You can't break the reflected
mirror. It's not a matter of level, it is a matter of mistaking a
purely visual-semantic text for a concrete multi-sense presentation
that is rooted in a single historical context that goes back to the
beginning of time.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-30 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 May 2012, at 18:16, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/30/2012 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 29 May 2012, at 22:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/29/2012 1:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal  
 wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy  
won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his  
state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a  
teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars  
is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try  
again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from  
your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got  
the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on  
earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry  
Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a  
probability near one to go quickly on Mars.



Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend  
to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while  
reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is  
(1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations.  I can see  
clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the  
first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue,  
does it remain 50%?  Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5  
copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of  
remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?



While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so  
that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport  
button is pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see  
how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y- 
axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state  
is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), but what if the  
experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but  
stop once you find one in the up state.  In this case it seems  
there are 6 copies of me, with the following records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.
The way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter  
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and  
5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the  
transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.  In that case,  
it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be  
(1/6th) but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are  
the same, why should it matter if the replication is done  
iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different  
predictions in this case?


Thanks,

Jason


I think you are right, Jason.  For the probability to be (1/2^n)  
implies that there is some single "soul" that is "you" and it's  
not really duplicated so that if it went to Mars on the first try  
there would be zero probability of it going on the second.  Then  
the probability of your "soul" being on Mars is  
(1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)+...+(1/2^n).


Under the alternative, that "you" really are duplicated the  
probability that some "you" chosen at random is on Mars is (n-1/ 
n).  But in this case there is really no "you", there are n+1  
people who have some common history.


The probability bears on the first experiences, which are indeed  
never duplicated from their 1-pov, and we ask for the probability  
of "staying" on earth. It is equivalent with the probability of  
always getting head in a throw of a coin. So, from the perspective  
of the guy who stays on Earth, he is living an Harry-Potter like  
experience.


No more than the guys who went to Mars.  If they compare experiences  
they will find that although they only had probability 1/2 of it  
happening, they all went to Mars.


They almost all went to Mars ... eventually, with one exception.  
Besides this was just used in a protocol where the observer is the one  
looking his friend, that is the exception. It is his 3-view on the 1- 
view of the guy who never succeed to go on Mars. I have a collection  
of strategies that he can try, like  introducing delays, or using  
random coin between "original" and "copy", unfortunately for the guy  
remaining on earth, by "definition", he cannot succeed, and he will  
have hard time to believe things are not conspiring against his will  
to go on Mars, and this proportionally to the ingenuity developed to  
assure to be the one going on Mars.


If you make that experience, the chance to go on mars is always rather  
great, but of course, we, the spectators, will have to live with the  
unlucky (from its first person view) who remains o

Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-30 Thread meekerdb

On 5/30/2012 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 22:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/29/2012 1:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:



To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price
consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid
annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without 
annihilation.
The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and 
so try
again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of 
view,
you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely 
unlucky,
as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n 
(that the
Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a
probability near one to go quickly on Mars.


Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it 
later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I 
wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the 
number of teleportations.  I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on 
earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does 
it remain 50%?  Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy 
on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?



While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the 
probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two).  
It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following 
experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability 
that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), 
but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop 
once you find one in the up state.  In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, 
with the following records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The way I see it is 
they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems 
the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the 
case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.  In that case, it is 
clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the beginning and 
end states of the experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is 
done iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case?


Thanks,

Jason


I think you are right, Jason.  For the probability to be (1/2^n) implies that there is 
some single "soul" that is "you" and it's not really duplicated so that if it went to 
Mars on the first try there would be zero probability of it going on the second.  Then 
the probability of your "soul" being on Mars is (1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)+...+(1/2^n).


Under the alternative, that "you" really are duplicated the probability that some "you" 
chosen at random is on Mars is (n-1/n).  But in this case there is really no "you", 
there are n+1 people who have some common history.


The probability bears on the first experiences, which are indeed never duplicated from 
their 1-pov, and we ask for the probability of "staying" on earth. It is equivalent with 
the probability of always getting head in a throw of a coin. So, from the perspective of 
the guy who stays on Earth, he is living an Harry-Potter like experience.


No more than the guys who went to Mars.  If they compare experiences they will find that 
although they only had probability 1/2 of it happening, they all went to Mars.


Brent



But the experience is "trivial" for the observer looking at it from outside.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-30 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 29 May 2012, at 22:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/29/2012 1:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won  
a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state  
law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to  
Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and  
the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and  
again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you  
can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely  
unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has  
probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the  
infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly  
on Mars.



Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend  
to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading  
about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is  
(1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations.  I can see  
clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first  
teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it  
remain 50%?  Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on  
Mars, and 1 copy on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining  
on Earth be equal to 1/6th?



While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so  
that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport  
button is pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see how  
this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis,  
the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in  
32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), but what if the experiment is:  
measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you  
find one in the up state.  In this case it seems there are 6 copies  
of me, with the following records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.
The way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter  
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5  
copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter  
creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.  In that case, it is clear  
that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the  
beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why should  
it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do  
RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case?


Thanks,

Jason


I think you are right, Jason.  For the probability to be (1/2^n)  
implies that there is some single "soul" that is "you" and it's  
notreally duplicated so that if it went to Mars on the first try  
there would be zero probability of it going on the second.  Then  
theprobability of your "soul" being on Mars is  
(1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)+...+(1/2^n).


Under the alternative, that "you" really are duplicated the  
probability that some "you" chosen at random is on Mars is (n-1/n).   
But in this case there is really no "you", there are n+1 people who  
have some common history.


The probability bears on the first experiences, which are indeed never  
duplicated from their 1-pov, and we ask for the probability of  
"staying" on earth. It is equivalent with the probability of always  
getting head in a throw of a coin. So, from the perspective of the guy  
who stays on Earth, he is living an Harry-Potter like experience. But  
the experience is "trivial" for the observer looking at it from outside.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-30 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won  
a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state  
law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars  
without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the  
version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and  
again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can  
of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely  
unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has  
probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the  
infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly  
on Mars.



Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to  
get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading  
about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n,  
where n is the number of teleportations.


Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred  
by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time  
the probability is 1/2, but his experience is "harry-Potter-like".





I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after  
the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue,  
does it remain 50%?


Yes.



Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1  
copy on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be  
equal to 1/6th?


You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.





While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that  
I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button  
is pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see how this  
works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis,  
the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in  
32 (as I have caused 5 splittings),


OK.


but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5  
electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.


That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding  
to the earth/mars experience.




In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following  
records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The  
way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter  
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5  
copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter  
creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.


This is ambiguous.



In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth  
should be (1/6th)


Yes. In that case.



but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same,  
why should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all  
at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case?


RSSA has to be applied. Your first protocol is faithful, isomorphic,  
to the experience I was describing. Te second is not.


OK?

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-29 Thread Stephen P. King

On 5/29/2012 4:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:



To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy
won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his
state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation
to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy,
and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again,
and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view,
you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be
infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n
experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter
experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a
probability near one to go quickly on Mars.


Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to 
get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about 
the above experiment that I wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, 
where n is the number of teleportations.  I can see clearly that the 
probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 
50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%?  Let's 
say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on 
earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?



While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I 
see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is 
pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see how this works 
in quantum mechanics under the following experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the 
probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as 
I have caused 5 splittings), but what if the experiment is: measure 
the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in 
the up state.  In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with 
the following records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The 
way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter 
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 
copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter 
creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.  In that case, it is clear that 
the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the 
beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why should it 
matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA 
and ASSA make different predictions in this case?


Thanks,

Jason
--

Hi Jason,

Fascinating! This decrease in probability given an increase in the 
number of copies would also hold if the copies had amnesia and could not 
identify themselves with the "original"?


--
Onward!

Stephen

"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-29 Thread meekerdb

On 5/29/2012 1:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:



To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price
consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid 
annihilation
of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The 
version of
Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again 
and again,
and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of 
course
only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 
1/2,
staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry 
Potter
experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near 
one to
go quickly on Mars.


Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it 
later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I 
wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the 
number of teleportations.  I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth 
after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 
50%?  Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth.  
Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?



While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the 
probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two).  
It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following 
experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that 
I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), but 
what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once 
you find one in the up state.  In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the 
following records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The way I see it is 
they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the 
end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case 
where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.  In that case, it is clear 
that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the beginning and end 
states of the experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is done 
iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case?


Thanks,

Jason


I think you are right, Jason.  For the probability to be (1/2^n) implies that there is 
some single "soul" that is "you" and it's not really duplicated so that if it went to Mars 
on the first try there would be zero probability of it going on the second.  Then the 
probability of your "soul" being on Mars is (1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)+...+(1/2^n).


Under the alternative, that "you" really are duplicated the probability that some "you" 
chosen at random is on Mars is (n-1/n).  But in this case there is really no "you", there 
are n+1 people who have some common history.


Brent

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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-29 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a
> price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law
> forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without
> annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth
> complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer,
> and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the
> feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n
> experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience).
> Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go
> quickly on Mars.
>
>
Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get
back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above
experiment that I wanted to clear up.

You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where
n is the number of teleportations.  I can see clearly that the probability
of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the
teleportations continue, does it remain 50%?  Let's say that N = 5,
therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth.  Wouldn't the
probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?


While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see
the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I
split in two).  It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum
mechanics under the following experiment:

I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the
probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I
have caused 5 splittings), but what if the experiment is: measure the spin
states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.
In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records:

1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The way I
see it is they have the following probabilities:

1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment,
it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is
no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on
Mars at once.  In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on
Earth should be (1/6th) but if the beginning and end states of the
experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is done
iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in
this case?

Thanks,

Jason

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-29 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 29 May 2012, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 2:02 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales > wrote:





From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com 
] On Behalf Of Jason Resch

Sent: Tuesday, 29 May 2012 3:45 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Church Turing be dammed.


Natural physics is a computation. Fine.

But a computed natural physics model is NOT the natural  
physicsit is the natural physics of a computer.





Colin,

I recently read the following excerpt from "The Singularity is Near"  
on page 454:


"The basis of the strong (Church-Turing thesis) is that problems  
that are not solvable on a Turing Machine cannot be solved by human  
thought, either.  The basis of this thesis is that human thought is  
performed by the human brain (with some influence by the body), that  
the human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy, that matter  
and energy follow natural laws, that these laws are describable in  
mathematical terms, and that mathematics can be simulated to any  
degree of precision by algorithms.  Therefore there exist algorithms  
that can simulate human thought.  The strong version of the Church- 
Turing thesis postulates an essential equivalence between what a  
human can think or know, and what is computable."


So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you  
take issue with?


A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy
B. that matter and energy follow natural laws,
C. that these laws are describable in mathematical terms
D. that mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by  
algorithms


Thanks,

Jason

 

Hi Jason,

Brain physics is there to cognise the (external) world. You do not  
know the external world.


Your brain is there to apprehend it. The physics of the brain  
inherits properties of the (unknown) external world. This is natural  
cognition. Therefore you have no model to compute. Game over.



If I understand this correctly, your point is that we don't  
understand the physics and chemistry that is important in the  
brain?  Assuming this is the case, it would be only a temporary  
barrier, not a permanent reason that prohibits AI in practice.


You are right. That would neither prohibit AI,  nor comp.





There are also reasons to believe we already understand the  
mechanisms of neurons to a sufficient degree to simulate them.   
There are numerous instances where computer simulated neurons  
apparently behaved in the same ways as biological neurons have been  
observed to.  If you're interested I can dig up the references.


Meaning: there are reasonable levels to bet on.

Here, for once, I will give my opinion, if you don't mind. First,  
about the level, the question will be "this level, this year, or that  
more finest grained level next year, because technology evolves. In  
between it *is* a possible Pascal Wag, in the sense that if you have a  
fatal brain disease, you might not afford the time to wait for  
possible technological deeper levels.


And my opinion is that I can imagine saying "yes" to a doctor for a  
cheap "neuronal simulator", but I expect getting an altered state of  
consciousness, and some awareness of it. Like being stone or  
something. For a long run machine, I doubt we can copy the brain  
without respecting the entire electromagnetic relation of its  
constituents. I think it is highly plausible that we are indeed  
digital with respect to the law of chemistry, and my feeling is that  
the brain is above all a drug designer, and is a machine where only  
some part of the communication use the "cable". So I would ask to the  
doctor to take into account the glial cells, who seems to communicate  
a lot, by mechano-chemical diffusion waves, including some chatting  
with the neurons. And those immensely complex dialog are mainly  
chemical. This is quite close to the Heizenberg uncertainty level,  
which is probably our first person plural level (in which case comp is  
equivalent with QM).


Also, by the first person indeterminacy, a curious happening is made  
when you accept an artificial brain with a level above the first  
person plural corresponding level. From your point of view, you  
survive, but with a larger spectrum of possibilities, just because you  
miss finer grained constraints. (It the "Galois connection", probably  
where the logical time reverses the arrow and "become" physical time,  
to do a pleasure to Stephen).
In that situation, an observer of the candidate for a high level  
artificial brain (higher than the first person plural level) will get  
with a higher probability realilties disconnected from yours. His mind  
might even live an "Harry Potter" type of experience.


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a  
pric

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-29 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 2:02 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales <
cgha...@unimelb.edu.au> wrote:

>  ** **
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:
> everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Jason Resch
> *Sent:* Tuesday, 29 May 2012 3:45 PM
> *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
> *Subject:* Re: Church Turing be dammed.
>
>
> Natural physics is a computation. Fine.
>
> But a computed natural physics model is NOT the natural physicsit is
> the natural physics of a computer.
>
>
>
> Colin,
>
> I recently read the following excerpt from "The Singularity is Near" on
> page 454:
>
> "The basis of the strong (Church-Turing thesis) is that problems that are
> not solvable on a Turing Machine cannot be solved by human thought,
> either.  The basis of this thesis is that human thought is performed by the
> human brain (with some influence by the body), that the human brain (and
> body) comprises matter and energy, that matter and energy follow natural
> laws, that these laws are describable in mathematical terms, and that
> mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by algorithms.
> Therefore there exist algorithms that can simulate human thought.  The
> strong version of the Church-Turing thesis postulates an essential
> equivalence between what a human can think or know, and what is computable."
>
> So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you take
> issue with?
>
> A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy
> B. that matter and energy follow natural laws,
> C. that these laws are describable in mathematical terms
> D. that mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by
> algorithms
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jason
>
>  
>
> Hi Jason,
>
> Brain physics is there to cognise the (external) world. You do not know
> the external world.
>
> Your brain is there to apprehend it. The physics of the brain inherits
> properties of the (unknown) external world. This is natural cognition.
> Therefore you have no model to compute. Game over.
>

If I understand this correctly, your point is that we don't understand the
physics and chemistry that is important in the brain?  Assuming this is the
case, it would be only a temporary barrier, not a permanent reason that
prohibits AI in practice.

There are also reasons to believe we already understand the mechanisms of
neurons to a sufficient degree to simulate them.  There are numerous
instances where computer simulated neurons apparently behaved in the same
ways as biological neurons have been observed to.  If you're interested I
can dig up the references.


> 
>
> ** **
>
> If you have _*everything*_ in your model (external world included), then
> you can simulate it. But you don’t. So you can’t simulate it.
>

Would you stop behaving intelligently if the gravity and light from
Andromeda stopped reaching us?  If not, is _everything_ truly required?


> C-T Thesis is 100% right _but 100% *irrelevant* to the process at hand:
> encountering the unknown.
>

It is not irrelevant in the theoretical sense.  It implies: "_If_ we knew
what algorithms to use, we could implement human-level intelligence in a
computer."  Do you agree with this?



> 
>
> ** **
>
> The C-T Thesis is irrelevant, so you need to get a better argument from
> somewhere and start to answer some of the points in my story: 
>
> ** **
>
> Q. Why doesn’t a computed model of fire burst into flames?
>


If this question is a serious, it indicates to me that you might not
understand what a computers is.  If its not serious, why ask it?

There is a burst of flames (in the computed model).  Just as in a computed
model of a brain, there will be intelligence within the model.  We can peer
into the model to obtain the results of the intelligent behavior, as
intelligent behavior can be represented as information.

Similarly we can peer into the model of the fire to obtain an understanding
of what happened during the combustion and see all the by-products.  What
we cannot do, is peer into a simulated model of fire to obtain the
byproducts of the combustion.  Nor can we peer into the model of the
simulated brain and extract neurotransmitters or blood vessels.

To me, this "fire argument" is as empty as saying "We can't take physical
objects from our dreams with us into our waking life.  Therefore we cannot
dream."



> 
>
> ** **
>
> This should the natural expectation by anyone that thinks a computed model
> of cognition physics is cognition. You should be expected answer this.
> Until this is answered I have no need to justify my position on building
> AGI

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-29 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 29 May 2012, at 09:49, Quentin Anciaux wrote:




2012/5/29 Quentin Anciaux 


2012/5/29 Colin Geoffrey Hales 
Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the  
sentiments



It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want  
dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be  
your option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable.  
The fire is kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you  
have a clue what it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't  
care.


It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You  
have just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have  
killed off an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance  
called phlogiston. You will not be popular, but the facts speak for  
you. You are happy with your day's work. You go to the kitchen and  
cook your fine pheasant meal. You realise that oxidation never had  
to figure in your understanding of how to make dinner. Food for  
thought is your dessert.


It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL  
Multiphysics on your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet  
configuration and the flames finally get the dead pocket in the  
corner up to temperature. The toilet bowls will be well cooked here,  
you think to yourself. If you suggested to your project leader that  
the project was finished she would think you are insane. Later, in  
commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the target of  
your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable  
and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the  
physics of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the  
same thing - that fact has made your job a lot easier, but you  
cannot compute yourself a toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly  
afterwards in the bathroom.


It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You  
think you can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You  
experiment with shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind  
tunnel. You figure out that certain shapes seems to drag less and  
lift more. Eventually you flew a few feet. And you have absolutely  
no clue about the microscopic physics of flight.


It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch  
and go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the  
massive computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you  
stall your jetliner and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today  
you have flown 146, 341 km. As you leave the simulator, you remind  
yourself that the physics of flight in the computer and flight  
itself are not the same thing, and that nobody died today.


No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner  
with it. We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of  
combustion.


No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to  
fly. We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked.


This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the  
natural world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one  
of us could think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of  
process. In a modern world of computing and physics, never before  
have we had more power to examine in detail, whatever are the  
objects of our study. And in each and every case, if anyone told you  
that a computed model of the natural world and the natural world are  
literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft or deluded and  
probably not entertain their contribution as having any value.


Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very  
delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the  
behaviour, you are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed  
systematic raft of unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed  
from mentor to novice with such unquestioning faith that entire  
scientific disciplines are enrolled in the delusion.


Q. What scientific discipline could this be?

A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence.

It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you  
find people that look at the only example of natural general  
intelligence - you, the human reading this - accept a model of a  
brain, put it in a computer and then expect the result to be a  
brain. This is done without a shred of known physical law, in spite  
of thousands of years of contrary experience, and despite decades of  
abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an artificial  
intelligence like us.


This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave  
person drawing a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it  
to cook dinner. It is exactly like getting into a flight simulator,  
flying it to Paris and then expe

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-29 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/29 Quentin Anciaux 

>
>
> 2012/5/29 Colin Geoffrey Hales 
>
>> Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
>> Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the
>> sentiments
>>
>> 
>> It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want
>> dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your
>> option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is
>> kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what
>> it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't care.
>>
>> It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have
>> just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off
>> an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston.
>> You will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with
>> your day's work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal.
>> You realise that oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how
>> to make dinner. Food for thought is your dessert.
>>
>> It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics
>> on your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames
>> finally get the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet
>> bowls will be well cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to
>> your project leader that the project was finished she would think you are
>> insane. Later, in commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the
>> target of your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable
>> and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics
>> of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the same thing - that
>> fact has made your job a lot easier, but you cannot compute yourself a
>> toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly afterwards in the bathroom.
>>
>> It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think
>> you can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment
>> with shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure
>> out that certain shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you
>> flew a few feet. And you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic
>> physics of flight.
>>
>> It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and
>> go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive
>> computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner
>> and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km.
>> As you leave the simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight
>> in the computer and flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody
>> died today.
>>
>> No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with
>> it. We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion.
>>
>> No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly.
>> We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked.
>>
>> This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural
>> world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could
>> think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern
>> world of computing and physics, never before have we had more power to
>> examine in detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and
>> every case, if anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world
>> and the natural world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft
>> or deluded and probably not entertain their contribution as having any
>> value.
>>
>> Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very
>> delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you
>> are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of
>> unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with
>> such unquestioning faith that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in
>> the delusion.
>>
>> Q. What scientific discipline could this be?
>>
>> A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence.
>>
>> It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you find
>> people that look at the only example of natural general intelligence - you,
>> the human reading this - accept a model of a brain, put it in a computer
>> and then expect the result to be a brain. This is done without a shred of
>> known physical law, in spite of thousands of years of contrary experience,
>> and despite decades of abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an
>> artificial intelligence like us.
>>
>> This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person
>> drawing a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook
>> dinner. It is exactly like getting i

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-29 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 29 May 2012, at 09:02, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:




From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com 
] On Behalf Of Jason Resch

Sent: Tuesday, 29 May 2012 3:45 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Church Turing be dammed.



On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:21 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales > wrote:

Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the  
sentiments



It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want  
dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be  
your option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable.  
The fire is kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you  
have a clue what it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't  
care.


It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You  
have just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have  
killed off an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance  
called phlogiston. You will not be popular, but the facts speak for  
you. You are happy with your day's work. You go to the kitchen and  
cook your fine pheasant meal. You realise that oxidation never had  
to figure in your understanding of how to make dinner. Food for  
thought is your dessert.


It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL  
Multiphysics on your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet  
configuration and the flames finally get the dead pocket in the  
corner up to temperature. The toilet bowls will be well cooked here,  
you think to yourself. If you suggested to your project leader that  
the project was finished she would think you are insane. Later, in  
commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the target of  
your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable  
and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the  
physics of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the  
same thing - that fact has made your job a lot easier, but you  
cannot compute yourself a toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly  
afterwards in the bathroom.


It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You  
think you can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You  
experiment with shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind  
tunnel. You figure out that certain shapes seems to drag less and  
lift more. Eventually you flew a few feet. And you have absolutely  
no clue about the microscopic physics of flight.


It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch  
and go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the  
massive computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you  
stall your jetliner and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today  
you have flown 146, 341 km. As you leave the simulator, you remind  
yourself that the physics of flight in the computer and flight  
itself are not the same thing, and that nobody died today.


No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner  
with it. We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of  
combustion.


No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to  
fly. We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked.


This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the  
natural world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one  
of us could think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of  
process. In a modern world of computing and physics, never before  
have we had more power to examine in detail, whatever are the  
objects of our study. And in each and every case, if anyone told you  
that a computed model of the natural world and the natural world are  
literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft or deluded and  
probably not entertain their contribution as having any value.


Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very  
delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the  
behaviour, you are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed  
systematic raft of unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed  
from mentor to novice with such unquestioning faith that entire  
scientific disciplines are enrolled in the delusion.


Q. What scientific discipline could this be?

A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence.

It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you  
find people that look at the only example of natural general  
intelligence - you, the human reading this - accept a model of a  
brain, put it in a computer and then expect the result to be a  
brain. This is done without a shred of known physical law, in spite  
of thousands of years of contrary experience, and despite deca

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-29 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/29 Colin Geoffrey Hales 

>  ** **
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:
> everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Jason Resch
> *Sent:* Tuesday, 29 May 2012 3:45 PM
> *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
> *Subject:* Re: Church Turing be dammed.
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:21 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales <
> cgha...@unimelb.edu.au> wrote:
>
> Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
> Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the
> sentiments
>
> 
> It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want
> dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your
> option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is
> kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what
> it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't care.
>
> It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have
> just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off
> an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston.
> You will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with
> your day's work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal.
> You realise that oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how
> to make dinner. Food for thought is your dessert.
>
> It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics on
> your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames
> finally get the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet
> bowls will be well cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to
> your project leader that the project was finished she would think you are
> insane. Later, in commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the
> target of your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable
> and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics
> of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the same thing - that
> fact has made your job a lot easier, but you cannot compute yourself a
> toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly afterwards in the bathroom.
>
> It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think you
> can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment with
> shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure out
> that certain shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you flew a
> few feet. And you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic physics of
> flight.
>
> It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and
> go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive
> computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner
> and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km.
> As you leave the simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight
> in the computer and flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody
> died today.
>
> No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with it.
> We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion.
>
> No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly.
> We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked.
>
> This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural
> world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could
> think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern
> world of computing and physics, never before have we had more power to
> examine in detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and
> every case, if anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world
> and the natural world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft
> or deluded and probably not entertain their contribution as having any
> value.
>
> Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very
> delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you
> are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of
> unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with
> such unquestioning faith that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in
> the delusion.
>
> Q. What scientific discipline could this be?
>
> A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence.
>
> It is something to behold. He

RE: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-29 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales


From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jason Resch
Sent: Tuesday, 29 May 2012 3:45 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Church Turing be dammed.


On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:21 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales 
mailto:cgha...@unimelb.edu.au>> wrote:
Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the sentiments


It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want dinner. 
The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your option. You 
have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is kept alive by 
the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what it is, but it makes 
the food edible and you don't care.

It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have just 
worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off an 
eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston. You 
will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with your day's 
work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal. You realise that 
oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how to make dinner. Food 
for thought is your dessert.

It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics on your 
supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames finally get 
the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet bowls will be well 
cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to your project leader 
that the project was finished she would think you are insane. Later, in 
commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the target of your optical 
pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable and you're glad you're not 
the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics of fire and the physics of fire 
are, thankfully, not the same thing - that fact has made your job a lot easier, 
but you cannot compute yourself a toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly 
afterwards in the bathroom.

It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think you can 
make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment with shaped 
wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure out that certain 
shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you flew a few feet. And 
you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic physics of flight.

It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and go' 
landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive computer 
system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner and crash it 
into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km. As you leave the 
simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight in the computer and 
flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody died today.

No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with it. We 
cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion.

No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly. We 
few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked.

This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural world. 
It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could think of a 
hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern world of 
computing and physics, never before have we had more power to examine in 
detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and every case, if 
anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world and the natural 
world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft or deluded and 
probably not entertain their contribution as having any value.

Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very delusion 
practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you are suddenly 
confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of unjustified excuses, 
perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with such unquestioning faith 
that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in the delusion.

Q. What scientific discipline could this be?

A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence.

It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you find people 
that look at the only example of natural general intelligence - you, the human 
reading this - accept a model of a brain, put it in a computer and then expect 
the result to be a brain. This is done without a shred of known physical law, 
in spite of thousands of years of contrary experience, and despite decades of 
abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an artificial intelligence like us.

This belief system 

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-29 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/29 Colin Geoffrey Hales 

> Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
> Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the
> sentiments
>
> 
> It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want
> dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your
> option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is
> kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what
> it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't care.
>
> It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have
> just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off
> an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston.
> You will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with
> your day's work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal.
> You realise that oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how
> to make dinner. Food for thought is your dessert.
>
> It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics on
> your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames
> finally get the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet
> bowls will be well cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to
> your project leader that the project was finished she would think you are
> insane. Later, in commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the
> target of your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable
> and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics
> of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the same thing - that
> fact has made your job a lot easier, but you cannot compute yourself a
> toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly afterwards in the bathroom.
>
> It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think you
> can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment with
> shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure out
> that certain shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you flew a
> few feet. And you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic physics of
> flight.
>
> It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and
> go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive
> computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner
> and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km.
> As you leave the simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight
> in the computer and flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody
> died today.
>
> No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with it.
> We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion.
>
> No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly.
> We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked.
>
> This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural
> world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could
> think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern
> world of computing and physics, never before have we had more power to
> examine in detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and
> every case, if anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world
> and the natural world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft
> or deluded and probably not entertain their contribution as having any
> value.
>
> Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very
> delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you
> are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of
> unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with
> such unquestioning faith that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in
> the delusion.
>
> Q. What scientific discipline could this be?
>
> A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence.
>
> It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you find
> people that look at the only example of natural general intelligence - you,
> the human reading this - accept a model of a brain, put it in a computer
> and then expect the result to be a brain. This is done without a shred of
> known physical law, in spite of thousands of years of contrary experience,
> and despite decades of abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an
> artificial intelligence like us.
>
> This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person
> drawing a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook
> dinner. It is exactly like getting into a flight simulator, flying it to
> Paris and then expecting to get out and have dinner on the banks of the
> Seine.

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-28 Thread meekerdb

On 5/28/2012 10:21 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person drawing 
a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook dinner. It is 
exactly like getting into a flight simulator, flying it to Paris and then 
expecting to get out and have dinner on the banks of the Seine. It is exactly 
like expecting your computer simulated furnace roasting you a toilet bowl.


I'd say it's more like trying to fly by sticking feathers on your arms like 
Icarus.

Brent

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-28 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:21 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales <
cgha...@unimelb.edu.au> wrote:

> Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
> Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the
> sentiments
>
> 
> It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want
> dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your
> option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is
> kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what
> it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't care.
>
> It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have
> just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off
> an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston.
> You will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with
> your day's work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal.
> You realise that oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how
> to make dinner. Food for thought is your dessert.
>
> It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics on
> your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames
> finally get the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet
> bowls will be well cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to
> your project leader that the project was finished she would think you are
> insane. Later, in commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the
> target of your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable
> and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics
> of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the same thing - that
> fact has made your job a lot easier, but you cannot compute yourself a
> toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly afterwards in the bathroom.
>
> It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think you
> can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment with
> shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure out
> that certain shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you flew a
> few feet. And you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic physics of
> flight.
>
> It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and
> go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive
> computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner
> and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km.
> As you leave the simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight
> in the computer and flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody
> died today.
>
> No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with it.
> We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion.
>
> No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly.
> We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked.
>
> This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural
> world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could
> think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern
> world of computing and physics, never before have we had more power to
> examine in detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and
> every case, if anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world
> and the natural world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft
> or deluded and probably not entertain their contribution as having any
> value.
>
> Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very
> delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you
> are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of
> unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with
> such unquestioning faith that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in
> the delusion.
>
> Q. What scientific discipline could this be?
>
> A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence.
>
> It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you find
> people that look at the only example of natural general intelligence - you,
> the human reading this - accept a model of a brain, put it in a computer
> and then expect the result to be a brain. This is done without a shred of
> known physical law, in spite of thousands of years of contrary experience,
> and despite decades of abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an
> artificial intelligence like us.
>
> This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person
> drawing a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook
> dinner. It is exactly like getting into a flight simulator, flying it to
> Paris and then expecting