Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-06-02 Thread Jason Resch
On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:15 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

 On May 31, 2:33 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
  On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
   On May 29, 1:45 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 
So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you
 take
issue with?
 
A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy
 
   So does a cadaver's brain and body. The fact that a cadaver is not
   intelligent should show us that the difference between life and death
   can't be meaningfully reduced to matter and energy.
 
  That some organizations of matter/energy are intelligent and others are
 not
  is irrelevant, what matters is whether or not you agree that the brain is
  made of matter and energy.  Do you agree the brain is made of matter and
  energy, and that the brain is responsible for your consciousness (or at
  least one of the many possible manifestations of it)?

 I think that Matter-Energy and Sense-Motive are dual aspects of the
 same thing. If you are talking about the brain only, then you are
 talking about matter and energy, but no person exists if you limit the
 discussion to that. The matter and energy side of what we are is just
 organs. There is no person there. The brain is not responsible for
 consciousness anymore than your computer is responsible for the
 internet. It is the necessary vehicle through which human level
 awareness is accessed.



Would you say, at least, that the brain is responsible for behavior?

This conversation was originally on the topic of artificial intelligence,
so whatever it is in us that leads to physical changes which manifest as
third-person observable behavior, do you believe that to be entirely
influenced by physical and (in theory) detectable matter/energy/fields?

If not, what mechanism do you theorize mediates between mental and physical
events?  Is it one way or two way?  If two way (or if as you often say it
is just the other side of the coin) then why not say it is physical?

If such a mechanism exists, it must conform to some set of laws, some rhyme
or reason, as otherwise how could the mental world (or side) so reliably
control our physical actions, and how do the sensations picked up from
physical sensors (retinas, nerve endings) so reliably make their way into
our mind?  If there is a separation between the mental and physical worlds,
there must be reliable rules that govern any interaction between the mind
and the physical world, and the interaction must be two way.  How then, can
they rightly be called two separate worlds?



 
B. that matter and energy follow natural laws,
 
   No, laws follow from our observation of natural matter and energy.
 
  You are mistaking our approximations and inferences concerning the
 natural
  laws for the natural laws themselves.

 No, you are mistaking the interaction of concretely real natural
 phenomena with abstract principles which we have derived from
 measurement and intellectual extension.


Regardless of who is making the mistake, above you seem to agree with
my premise that there are real natural phenomenon.



  Before there were any humans, or any
  life, there must have been laws that the universe obeyed to reach the
 point
  where Earth formed and life could develop.

 Before there was matter, there were no laws that the universe obeyed
 pertaining to matter, just as there were no laws of biology before
 biology.


This is an interesting way of looking at things: that the capabilities of
natural phenomenon change as it develops more and more complex states of
being.  However, I think the potentiality for those capabilities was there
from the beginning, and the determination of whether or not such
potentialities existed in the primordial universe could in theory, have
been made by a sufficiently great intelligence that had a proper
understanding of the natural phenomenon.


 The universe makes laws by doing. It isn't only a disembodied
 set of invisible laws which creates obedient bodies.


What did the universe have to do to set the speed of light?


 Laws are not
 primordial.


If not laws, then what?


 You have to have some kind of capacity to sense and make
 sense before any kind of regularity of pattern can be established.


You might need sense to notice the pattern, but patterns exist that we are
unaware of.  If this were not the case, there would be no room for
discovery.


 Something has to be able to happen in the first place before you can
 separate out what can happen under which conditions. The reality of
 something being able to happen - experience - possibility - prefigures
 all other principles.


I'm not opposed to the idea that possibility or experience could in some
sense be more fundamental, but I don't see how this could change the fact
that we observe matter and energy to always follow certain rules, and find
evidence (when we look at stars and galaxies 

Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-06-02 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Jun 2012, at 20:18, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You might be disturbed by the fact that in experience 2, the  
original remains the same person, so we don't count him as a  
new person, each time he steps in the box. This, in my opinion,  
illustrates again that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA.


Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind.  Then  
the probability the original went to Mars is 1.


The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a  
step 5 case. The probability to feel to stay the original is 1/2.


Everybody feels they are the original.


original refer to the third person body. By definition it is the one  
being copied.



The question before he enters the box is, Will you find yourself on  
Mars?  To which he could reply, What does 'you' refer to?


The question is about your future subjective feeling as seen from your  
future first person perspective. If you assume comp, you know in  
advance that you will feel entire and unique, either on Earth or on  
Mars, and you know that you cannot that in advance (or give me the  
algorithm).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-06-02 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Jun 2, 2:39 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:15 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

  I think that Matter-Energy and Sense-Motive are dual aspects of the
  same thing. If you are talking about the brain only, then you are
  talking about matter and energy, but no person exists if you limit the
  discussion to that. The matter and energy side of what we are is just
  organs. There is no person there. The brain is not responsible for
  consciousness anymore than your computer is responsible for the
  internet. It is the necessary vehicle through which human level
  awareness is accessed.

 Would you say, at least, that the brain is responsible for behavior?

In the sense that buildings, streets, highways, and real estate are
responsible for a city's behavior.


 This conversation was originally on the topic of artificial intelligence,
 so whatever it is in us that leads to physical changes which manifest as
 third-person observable behavior, do you believe that to be entirely
 influenced by physical and (in theory) detectable matter/energy/fields?

I'm not saying that though. We *are* the physical changes. Third
person and first person seem to us to be separate because the first
person end is the 'head' end. You are saying that I think 'whatever it
that is our head leads to physical changes which manifest as our tail'
and you are trying to get me to see that it makes more sense to say
that it is our tail which is responsible for the existence of the head
- that the head is what the tail needs to lead it to food and
reproduction. That's not my position though. I'm saying head-tail mind-
body are a function of the symmetry of sense.

As far as fields being detectable - detectable by what? I have no
problem detecting humor, irony, style, beauty...to a human being these
are detectable energy fields, only higher up on the monochord/chakra-
like escalator of qualitative interiority/significance. The universe
for us is much more readily detectable by us as a combination of
fiction and fact than it is in terms of matter/energy/fields. Those
things are a posteriori ideas about the universe of our body, as
verified by consensus of inanimate objects interacting. That is only
half of the universe - the tail half which is the polar opposite of
awareness. It is the perspective from which no life, order, meaning or
significance can be detected.


 If not, what mechanism do you theorize mediates between mental and physical
 events?  Is it one way or two way?  If two way (or if as you often say it
 is just the other side of the coin) then why not say it is physical?

I do say it's physical. Physical feelings, physical stories, physical
personalities and identities - all physical, but not as objects in
space, as experiences through time. There is no mechanism that
mediates spacetime-matter-energy with timespace-sense-motive, they are
the same thing except the more something is you or is like you, the
more it seems to you like the latter instead of the former.


 If such a mechanism exists, it must conform to some set of laws, some rhyme
 or reason, as otherwise how could the mental world (or side) so reliably
 control our physical actions, and how do the sensations picked up from
 physical sensors (retinas, nerve endings) so reliably make their way into
 our mind?

The 'mechanism' is sense. It doesn't conform to laws but it develops
habits which become as laws to those who arise out of them. It's only
a mechanism when the insider looks outside. What we are doing now is
looking outside as the insider's exterior and finding it lacking any
trace of the insider, concluding that the insider is an illusion. When
the insider looks inside however, there is more animism than
mechanism. Sense experience and meaning. On the outside, the nerves
are literal fibers and cells. On the inside 'nerve' is strength,
courage, self-legitimizing ontology. They are part of the same thing
but don't correlate one-to-one, they correlate as the whole history
and potential future of the universe twisting orthogonally into an
event horizon of a whole universe of 'here and now'


  If there is a separation between the mental and physical worlds,
 there must be reliable rules that govern any interaction between the mind
 and the physical world, and the interaction must be two way.  How then, can
 they rightly be called two separate worlds?

Exactly, they are not separate except to the participant. We are the
head looking at our tail, but objectively, if we were not a head, we
would see both head and tail are the body with two ends, each being
everything that the other is not. If there were rules, then the rules
would need rules. What makes the rules? Where to they come from and
what mechanism do they use to rule?

As you say, and we agree, the interaction must be two way, but no
external rules are required to govern the interaction, because both
mind and body are, on one level, the same thing 

Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-06-02 Thread meekerdb

On 6/2/2012 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Jun 2012, at 20:18, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You might be disturbed by the fact that in experience 2, the original remains the 
same person, so we don't count him as a new person, each time he steps in the box. 
This, in my opinion, illustrates again that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA.


Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind.  Then the probability 
the original went to Mars is 1.


The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a step 5 case. The 
probability to feel to stay the original is 1/2.


Everybody feels they are the original.


original refer to the third person body. By definition it is the one being 
copied.


It doesn't really solve the identity problem to assume it is physical continuity.  The 
copy also  has physical continuity; and in any even slightly realistic case the 
'original' will be destroyed in the process of extracting information, so there will 
really be two copies and no 'original'.





The question before he enters the box is, Will you find yourself on Mars?  To which 
he could reply, What does 'you' refer to?


The question is about your future subjective feeling as seen from your future first 
person perspective.If you assume comp, you know in advance that you will feel entire and 
unique,


No, I expect that two someones will feel entire and unique.

either on Earth or on Mars, and you know that you cannot that in advance (or give me the 
algorithm).


But all that assumes that 'you' and 'your' have meaningful referents.  According to comp 
they are no more meaningful than referring to this number 2 and that number 2 and asking 
which number 2 counts the moons of Mars.


Brent



Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-06-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 31 May 2012, at 21:38, Jason Resch wrote:




On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal  
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy  
won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his  
state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation  
to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy,  
and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again,  
and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view,  
you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be  
infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n  
experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter  
experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a  
probability near one to go quickly on Mars.



Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend  
to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading  
about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is  
(1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations.


Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability  
inferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course.  
Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is harry- 
Potter-like.





I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after  
the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations  
continue, does it remain 50%?


Yes.



Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1  
copy on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be  
equal to 1/6th?


You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.





While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so  
that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport  
button is pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see  
how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis,  
the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in  
32 (as I have caused 5 splittings),


OK.


but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5  
electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.


That is a different protocol. The one above is the one  
corresponding to the earth/mars experience.




In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following  
records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.
The way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter  
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5  
copies on mars) is no different from the case where the  
transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.


This is ambiguous.


What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the  
net result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just  
like stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then  
creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars.


Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif

Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies  
created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).


When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created  
on Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) is  
the probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th?


Yes.
That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one,  
or a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will  
be in front of the looser, even if you multiply by 20. billions  
your delayed copies on mars.





Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge  
that the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into the  
Teleporter again?


I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is the  
difference between 24.



I apologize for not being clear.  There are two different  
experiments I am contrasting:


1. A person steps into a teleporter, and 5 copies (with varying  
delays) are reproduced on Mars.


2. A person steps into a teleporter, and a duplicate is created on  
Mars.  To increase the chance of subjectively finding himself on  
Mars, he does it again (when he fails) and the copy on Earth does so  
5 times before giving up.


For experiment 1, you and I seem to agree that subjectively, that  
person person has a 1 in 6 chance of experiencing a continued  

Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-06-01 Thread meekerdb

On 6/1/2012 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 31 May 2012, at 21:38, Jason Resch wrote:




On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won 
a
price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state 
law
forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars 
without
annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of 
earth
complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the
observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see 
the guy
who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, 
staying on
earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter
experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a 
probability
near one to go quickly on Mars.


Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to 
get back
to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above
experiment that I wanted to clear up.

You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, 
where n
is the number of teleportations. 


Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by 
the
person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the 
probability
is 1/2, but his experience is harry-Potter-like.





I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the 
first
teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? 


Yes.




Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy 
on
earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 
1/6th?


You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.





While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I 
see
the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is 
pressed, I
split in two).  It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum
mechanics under the following experiment:

I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the
probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I 
have
caused 5 splittings), 


OK.



but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 
electrons,
but stop once you find one in the up state. 


That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to 
the
earth/mars experience.




In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following 
records:

1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The 
way I
see it is they have the following probabilities:

1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter 
experiment, it
seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is 
no
different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on 
Mars at
once. 


This is ambiguous.



What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net result 
being
1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping into the 
teleporter
once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars.

Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif

Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created 
with
delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).

When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on Mars 
(with
various delays between each one being produced) is the probability of 
remaining on
Earth 1/6th?


Yes.
That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or a 
one,
finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in front of the
looser, even if you multiply by 20. billions your delayed copies on mars.




Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the 

Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-06-01 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 01 Jun 2012, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/1/2012 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 31 May 2012, at 21:38, Jason Resch wrote:




On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal  
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal  
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy  
won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But  
his state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a  
teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars  
is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try  
again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from  
your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got  
the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on  
earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry  
Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as  
a probability near one to go quickly on Mars.



Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I  
intend to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought  
while reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear  
up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is  
(1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations.


Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability  
inferred by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of  
course. Each time the probability is 1/2, but his experience is  
harry-Potter-like.





I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth  
after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations  
continue, does it remain 50%?


Yes.



Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and  
1 copy on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth  
be equal to 1/6th?


You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.





While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so  
that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport  
button is pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see  
how this works in quantum mechanics under the following  
experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y- 
axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state  
is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings),


OK.


but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to  
5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.


That is a different protocol. The one above is the one  
corresponding to the earth/mars experience.




In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the  
following records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.
The way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter  
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and  
5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the  
transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.


This is ambiguous.


What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the  
net result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just  
like stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then  
creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars.


Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif

Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies  
created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).


When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies  
created on Mars (with various delays between each one being  
produced) is the probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th?


Yes.
That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the  
one, or a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on  
earth will be in front of the looser, even if you multiply by  
20. billions your delayed copies on mars.





Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the  
knowledge that the other copy made it to Mars before stepping  
into the Teleporter again?


I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is the  
difference between 24.



I apologize for not being clear.  There are two different  
experiments I am contrasting:


1. A person steps into a teleporter, and 5 copies (with varying  
delays) are reproduced on Mars.


2. A person steps into a teleporter, and a duplicate is created on  
Mars.  To increase the chance of subjectively finding himself on  
Mars, he does it again (when he fails) and the copy on Earth does  
so 5 times before giving up.


For experiment 1, you and I seem to agree 

Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-06-01 Thread meekerdb

On 6/1/2012 10:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You might be disturbed by the fact that in experience 2, the original remains the 
same person, so we don't count him as a new person, each time he steps in the box. 
This, in my opinion, illustrates again that we have to use RSSA instead of ASSA.


Suppose the original goes to Mars and the copy stays behind.  Then the probability the 
original went to Mars is 1.


The question is asked before the guy enter in the box. This is a step 5 case. The 
probability to feel to stay the original is 1/2.


Everybody feels they are the original.  The question before he enters the box is, Will 
you find yourself on Mars?  To which he could reply, What does 'you' refer to?


Brent



Bruno



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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 29 May 2012, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 2:02 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales 
 cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote:

  ** **

 ** **

 *From:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:
 everything-list@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Jason Resch
 *Sent:* Tuesday, 29 May 2012 3:45 PM
 *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
 *Subject:* Re: Church Turing be dammed.


 Natural physics is a computation. Fine.

 But a computed natural physics model is NOT the natural physicsit is
 the natural physics of a computer.



 Colin,

 I recently read the following excerpt from The Singularity is Near on
 page 454:

 The basis of the strong (Church-Turing thesis) is that problems that are
 not solvable on a Turing Machine cannot be solved by human thought,
 either.  The basis of this thesis is that human thought is performed by the
 human brain (with some influence by the body), that the human brain (and
 body) comprises matter and energy, that matter and energy follow natural
 laws, that these laws are describable in mathematical terms, and that
 mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by algorithms.
 Therefore there exist algorithms that can simulate human thought.  The
 strong version of the Church-Turing thesis postulates an essential
 equivalence between what a human can think or know, and what is computable.

 So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you take
 issue with?

 A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy
 B. that matter and energy follow natural laws,
 C. that these laws are describable in mathematical terms
 D. that mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by
 algorithms

 Thanks,

 Jason

  

 Hi Jason,

 Brain physics is there to cognise the (external) world. You do not know
 the external world.

 Your brain is there to apprehend it. The physics of the brain inherits
 properties of the (unknown) external world. This is natural cognition.
 Therefore you have no model to compute. Game over.


 If I understand this correctly, your point is that we don't understand the
 physics and chemistry that is important in the brain?  Assuming this is the
 case, it would be only a temporary barrier, not a permanent reason that
 prohibits AI in practice.


 You are right. That would neither prohibit AI,  nor comp.




 There are also reasons to believe we already understand the mechanisms of
 neurons to a sufficient degree to simulate them.  There are numerous
 instances where computer simulated neurons apparently behaved in the same
 ways as biological neurons have been observed to.  If you're interested I
 can dig up the references.


 Meaning: there are reasonable levels to bet on.

 Here, for once, I will give my opinion, if you don't mind. First, about
 the level, the question will be this level, this year, or that more finest
 grained level next year, because technology evolves. In between it *is* a
 possible Pascal Wag, in the sense that if you have a fatal brain disease,
 you might not afford the time to wait for possible technological deeper
 levels.

 And my opinion is that I can imagine saying yes to a doctor for a cheap
 neuronal simulator, but I expect getting an altered state of
 consciousness, and some awareness of it. Like being stone or something. For
 a long run machine, I doubt we can copy the brain without respecting the
 entire electromagnetic relation of its constituents. I think it is highly
 plausible that we are indeed digital with respect to the law of chemistry,
 and my feeling is that the brain is above all a drug designer, and is a
 machine where only some part of the communication use the cable. So I
 would ask to the doctor to take into account the glial cells, who seems to
 communicate a lot, by mechano-chemical diffusion waves, including some
 chatting with the neurons. And those immensely complex dialog are mainly
 chemical. This is quite close to the Heizenberg uncertainty level, which is
 probably our first person plural level (in which case comp is equivalent
 with QM).

 Also, by the first person indeterminacy, a curious happening is made when
 you accept an artificial brain with a level above the first person plural
 corresponding level. From your point of view, you survive, but with a
 larger spectrum of possibilities, just because you miss finer grained
 constraints. (It the Galois connection, probably where the logical time
 reverses the arrow and become physical time, to do a pleasure to Stephen).
 In that situation, an observer of the candidate for a high level
 artificial brain (higher than the first person plural level) will get with
 a higher probability realilties disconnected from yours. His mind might
 even live an Harry Potter type of experience.

 To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a
 price consisting in visiting

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 31 May 2012, at 08:02, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote:






The question I have in mind is Does a brain produce consciousness,  
or does the brain filter consciousness?


I had some thoughts on this same topic a few months ago.  I was  
thinking about what the difference is between a God-mind that knows  
everything, and an empty mind that knew nothing.  Both contain zero  
information (in an information theoretic sense), so perhaps if  
someone has no brain they become omniscient (in a certain sense).


In a certain sense. OK. (The devil is there). But an empty mind has  
still to be the mind of a machine, probably the virgin (unprogrammed)  
universal machine, or the Löbian one (I still dunno).



If we consider RSSA, our consciousness followed some path to get to  
the current moment.


Key point. I just used this in a reply on the FOAR list (where I  
explain UDA/AUDA).




If we look at brain development, we find our consciousness formed  
from what was previously not conscious matter.


Not really. It is counter-intuitive, but matter is the last thing that  
emanates from the ONE (in Plato/Plotinus, and in comp, and even in the  
information theoretic view of QM as explained by Ron Garrett and that  
you compare rightly to the comp consequence). Matter can even be seen  
as what God loose control on. It is almost pure absolute  
indetermination. The primitive matter is really a product of  
consciousness differentiation (cf UDA). But I see what you mean. I  
think.




Therefore, there is some path from a (null conscious state)-(you),  
and perhaps, there are paths from the null state to every possible  
conscious state.


Yes, and vice versa by amnesia, plausibly.


If so, then every time we go to sleep, or go under anesthesia, or  
die, we can wake up as anyone.


In a sense, we do that all the time. This points to the idea that  
there is only one (universal) dreaming person, and that personal  
identity is a relative illusion.






We know that consciousness is in platonia, and that local brains  
are just relative universal numbers making possible for a person (in  
a large sense which can include an amoeba) to manifest itself  
relatively to its most probable computation/environment. But this  
does not completely answer the question. I think that many thinks  
that the more a brain is big, the more it can be conscious, which is  
not so clear when you take the reversal into account. It might be  
the exact contrary.


I think there are many tricks the brain employs against itself to  
aid the selfish propagation of its genes.  One example is the  
concept of the ego (having an identity).


Agreed. As I said just above.


Many drugs can temporarily disable whatever mechanism in our brain  
creates this feeling, leading to ego death, feelings of  
connectedness, oneness with other or the universe, etc.  Perhaps one  
of our ancestors always felt this way, but died out when the egoist  
gene developed and made its carriers exploitative of the egoless.


Probably. I think so.





And this might be confirmed by studies showing that missing some  
part of the brain, like an half hippocampus, can lead to to a  
permanent feeling of presence.
Recently this has been confirmed by the showing that LSD and  
psilocybe decrease the activity of the brain during the  
hallucinogenic phases. And dissociative drugs disconnect parts of  
the brain, with similar increase of the first person experience.  
Clinical studies of Near death experiences might also put evidence  
in that direction. haldous Huxley made a similar proposal for  
mescaline.


This is basically explained with the Bp  Dt hypostases. By  
suppressing material in the brain you make the B poorer (you  
eliminate belief), but then you augment the possibility so you make  
the consistency Dt stronger. Eventually you come back to the  
universal consciousness of the virgin simple universal numbers,  
perhaps.


Here are some recent papers on this:

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=do-psychedelics-expand-mind-reducing-brain-activityWT.mc_id=SA_WR_20120523

http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/01/17/1119598109.short


Thanks for the links and your thoughts.  They are, as always, very  
interesting.


Thanks Jason,

Bruno




PS I asked Colin on the FOR list if he is aware of the European  
Brain Project, which is relevant for this thread. Especially that  
they are aware of simulating nature at some level:


http://www.humanbrainproject.eu/introduction.html



Has he replied on the FOR list?  It seems he has been absent from  
this list for the past few days.


He has disappeared again, apparently.

Best,

Bruno





Jason






If you have _everything_ in your model (external world included),  
then you can simulate it. But you don’t. So you can’t simulate it.



Would you stop behaving intelligently if the 

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com

  On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The
whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.

   A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface
   and that's the **only** way to interact.

  Huh? A program interacts with another program directly.

 Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory (and
 eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give me a
 program that can talk/share thing with another program without any
 interface between them...

You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the
necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To
use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface
that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to
microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial
universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be
prevented by the lack of such a thing.

Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything
else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all
virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or
The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon
facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic
representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass
from one area of memory to another.


  There is no
  interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the
  program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical
  machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines.

 Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine has no
 direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the
 physical hardware.

The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as
the root level. It's entirely up to the programmer how direct they
want it to appear to the user, but ultimately, it is still just a
program running on the hardware. The virtual machine cannot run
without hardware.












 If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in
  a
 simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like
  multi
 level.

 Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you
virtualize
 an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os
inside
 it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level
can't
 reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.

No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I
want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within
the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all
running on the same physical hardware node.

   Well you can't read unless an interface between them exists.

  What interface are you talking about? I can make a million nested
  layers of virtual worlds and I can make it so the same virtual fire
  burns in all of them, with no interface required.

 Well I know you do it through magic mushroom... but hey, that doesn't work.

Sounds like you are conceding my point though.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com

 On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
  2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
 
   On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
 smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
 Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation?
 The
 whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
 Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
 
A program is running on a machine... a program interact through
 interface
and that's the **only** way to interact.
 
   Huh? A program interacts with another program directly.
 
  Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory (and
  eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give me a
  program that can talk/share thing with another program without any
  interface between them...

 You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the
 necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To
 use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface
 that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to
 microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial
 universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be
 prevented by the lack of such a thing.

 Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything
 else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all
 virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or
 The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon
 facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic
 representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass
 from one area of memory to another.

 
   There is no
   interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the
   program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical
   machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines.
 
  Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine has no
  direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the
  physical hardware.

 The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as
 the root level.


That's complete bullshit... If my emulator does not give you access to the
host hardware it does not... The point is that the program running on the
emulator *HAS NO WAY* to know it does not run on physical hardware
if no interface is present to give it access to it.


Shared memory IS an interface. But anyway, I leave this discussion
here, can't cure your stupidity.

Quentin


 It's entirely up to the programmer how direct they
 want it to appear to the user, but ultimately, it is still just a
 program running on the hardware. The virtual machine cannot run
 without hardware.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation
 (simulation in
   a
  simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like
   multi
  level.
 
  Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you
 virtualize
  an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another
 os
 inside
  it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first
 level
 can't
  reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.
 
 No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node -
 pick a
 virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote
 desktop
 there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if
 I
 want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level
 within
 the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are
 all
 running on the same physical hardware node.
 
Well you can't read unless an interface between them exists.
 
   What interface are you talking about? I can make a million nested
   layers of virtual worlds and I can make it so the same virtual fire
   burns in all of them, with no interface required.
 
  Well I know you do it through magic mushroom... but hey, that doesn't
 work.

 Sounds like you are conceding my point though.

 Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-31 Thread Jason Resch
On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a
 price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law
 forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without
 annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth
 complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer,
 and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the
 feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n
 experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience).
 Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go
 quickly on Mars.


 Bruno,

 Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get
 back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above
 experiment that I wanted to clear up.

 You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where
 n is the number of teleportations.


 Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by
 the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the
 probability is 1/2, but his experience is harry-Potter-like.




 I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the
 first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it
 remain 50%?


 Yes.



 Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on
 earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?


 You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.




 While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see
 the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I
 split in two).  It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum
 mechanics under the following experiment:

 I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the
 probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I
 have caused 5 splittings),


 OK.


 but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5
 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.


 That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to
 the earth/mars experience.



 In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records:

 1. D
 2. DU
 3. DDU
 4. DDDU
 5. U
 6. D

 However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The way I
 see it is they have the following probabilities:

 1. D (1/2)
 2. DU (1/4)
 3. DDU (1/8)
 4. DDDU (1/16)
 5. U (1/32)
 6. D (1/32)

 I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment,
 it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is
 no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on
 Mars at once.


 This is ambiguous.



What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net result
being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping into
the teleporter once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with delay)
on Mars.

Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif

Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created
with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).

When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on Mars
(with various delays between each one being produced) is the probability of
remaining on Earth 1/6th?

Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge that
the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into the Teleporter again?

Thanks,

Jason






 In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be
 (1/6th)


 Yes. In that case.



 but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why
 should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do
 RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case?


 RSSA has to be applied. Your first protocol is faithful, isomorphic, to
 the experience I was describing. Te second is not.

 OK?

 Bruno


 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread meekerdb

On 5/31/2012 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I think there are many tricks the brain employs against itself to aid the selfish 
propagation of its genes.  One example is the concept of the ego (having an identity).


Agreed. As I said just above.


So having an identity, a unity of thoughts, depends on there being a brain which depends 
on physics.  Which is why I argue that, whatever is fundamental, physics is essential to 
consciousness.





Many drugs can temporarily disable whatever mechanism in our brain creates this 
feeling, leading to ego death, feelings of connectedness, oneness with other or the 
universe, etc.  Perhaps one of our ancestors always felt this way, but died out when 
the egoist gene developed and made its carriers exploitative of the egoless.


Probably. I think so.


Evolutionarily the ego must have preceded Lobian programming by many generations.  
Competition and natural selection must have occurred even in the primordial soup.


Brent

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 2:33 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

  On May 29, 1:45 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

   So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you take
   issue with?

   A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy

  So does a cadaver's brain and body. The fact that a cadaver is not
  intelligent should show us that the difference between life and death
  can't be meaningfully reduced to matter and energy.

 That some organizations of matter/energy are intelligent and others are not
 is irrelevant, what matters is whether or not you agree that the brain is
 made of matter and energy.  Do you agree the brain is made of matter and
 energy, and that the brain is responsible for your consciousness (or at
 least one of the many possible manifestations of it)?

I think that Matter-Energy and Sense-Motive are dual aspects of the
same thing. If you are talking about the brain only, then you are
talking about matter and energy, but no person exists if you limit the
discussion to that. The matter and energy side of what we are is just
organs. There is no person there. The brain is not responsible for
consciousness anymore than your computer is responsible for the
internet. It is the necessary vehicle through which human level
awareness is accessed.


   B. that matter and energy follow natural laws,

  No, laws follow from our observation of natural matter and energy.

 You are mistaking our approximations and inferences concerning the natural
 laws for the natural laws themselves.

No, you are mistaking the interaction of concretely real natural
phenomena with abstract principles which we have derived from
measurement and intellectual extension.

 Before there were any humans, or any
 life, there must have been laws that the universe obeyed to reach the point
 where Earth formed and life could develop.

Before there was matter, there were no laws that the universe obeyed
pertaining to matter, just as there were no laws of biology before
biology. The universe makes laws by doing. It isn't only a disembodied
set of invisible laws which creates obedient bodies. Laws are not
primordial. You have to have some kind of capacity to sense and make
sense before any kind of regularity of pattern can be established.
Something has to be able to happen in the first place before you can
separate out what can happen under which conditions. The reality of
something being able to happen - experience - possibility - prefigures
all other principles.

 Do you agree that such natural
 laws exist (regardless of our human approximations of them)?

No. It has nothing to do with human approximations though. If an
audience cheers it is not because there is a law of cheering they are
following, it is because they personally are participating in a
context of sense and motive which they and their world mutually push
and pull. The understanding of when cheering happens and under what
conditions it can be produced is an a posterior abstraction. We can
call it a law, and indeed, it is highly regular and useful to think of
it that way, but ultimately the law itself is nothing. It is a set of
meta-observations about reality, not an ethereal authoritative core
around which concrete reality constellates and obeys. Laws come from
within. Human laws from within humans, atomic laws from within atoms,
etc.




   C. that these laws are describable in mathematical terms

  You have jumped from physics to abstraction. It's like saying 'I have
  a rabbit  rabbits act like rabbits  Bugs Bunny is modeled after the
  behavior of rabbits  Bugs Bunny is a rabbit'.

 I haven't jumped there yet.  All C says is that there exists some formal
 system that is capable of describing the natural laws as they are.  You may
 accept or reject this.  If you reject this, simply say so and provide some
 justification if you have one.

The formal system doesn't exist until some sentient being
intentionally brings it into existence. Bugs Bunny requires a
cartoonist to draw him. Bugs is a formal system that is capable of
describing rabbit behaviors as they are but he doesn't exist
'there' ('he' insists 'here' instead).


 Note that I have not made any statement to the effect that an abstract
 rabbit is the same as a physical rabbit, only that natural laws that the
 matter and energy in (a rabbit or any other physical thing) follow can be
 described.

You aren't factoring in the limitation of perception. Think of a young
child trying to imitate an accent from another language. To the child,
they perceive that they are doing a pretty good job of emulating
exactly how that way of speaking sounds. To an adult though,
especially one who is a native speaker of the language being imitated,
there is an obvious difference. This is where we are in our
contemporary belief that we have accounted for physical forces. I
think that we are looking at a 

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com

 On May 31, 12:26 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
  2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
 
 On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
 
   You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you
 are
   smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
   Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level
 separation?
   The
   whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between
 one
   Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
 
  A program is running on a machine... a program interact through
   interface
  and that's the **only** way to interact.
 
 Huh? A program interacts with another program directly.
 
Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory
 (and
eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give
 me a
program that can talk/share thing with another program without any
interface between them...
 
   You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the
   necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To
   use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface
   that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to
   microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial
   universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be
   prevented by the lack of such a thing.
 
   Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything
   else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all
   virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or
   The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon
   facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic
   representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass
   from one area of memory to another.
 
 There is no
 interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether
 the
 program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical
 machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines.
 
Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine
 has no
direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the
physical hardware.
 
   The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as
   the root level.
 
  That's complete bullshit... If my emulator does not give you access to
 the
  host hardware it does not...

 I'm not talking about the user having access to the host hardware, I'm
 talking about the virtual machine: the software. It is using the host
 machines's memory and CPUs, is it not?

  The point is that the program running on the
  emulator *HAS NO WAY* to know it does not run on physical
 hardware
  if no interface is present to give it access to it.

 No program has any way of knowing whether it is running on physical
 hardware or not, even if it has an interface. Whether the program is
 running on an emulator or not makes no difference.

 
  Shared memory IS an interface. But anyway, I leave this
 discussion
  here, can't cure your stupidity.

 Despite your ad hominem retort, there is no basis for it if you
 understand the points I am making. It is your understanding that is a
 little fuzzy. I am an MCSE and CCEA btw, and I have been configuring
 and managing hundreds of RDP, Citrix, and virtual servers every day
 for over 13 years.


Yes but you still have to learn what a program is... then come back talking.

Quentin

I can assure you that you can break an entire
 hardware node by doing something on one container. Virtual is a
 relative term, it is not literal. The virtual machines are all really
 the same physical computer.

 Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 1:58 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com









  On May 31, 12:26 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
   2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com

On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com

  On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you
  are
smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level
  separation?
The
whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between
  one
Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.

   A program is running on a machine... a program interact through
interface
   and that's the **only** way to interact.

  Huh? A program interacts with another program directly.

 Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory
  (and
 eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give
  me a
 program that can talk/share thing with another program without any
 interface between them...

You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the
necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality. To
use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an interface
that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to
microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial
universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be
prevented by the lack of such a thing.

Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with anything
else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all
virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or
The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon
facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic
representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to pass
from one area of memory to another.

  There is no
  interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether
  the
  program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical
  machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines.

 Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine
  has no
 direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the
 physical hardware.

The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as
the root level.

   That's complete bullshit... If my emulator does not give you access to
  the
   host hardware it does not...

  I'm not talking about the user having access to the host hardware, I'm
  talking about the virtual machine: the software. It is using the host
  machines's memory and CPUs, is it not?

   The point is that the program running on the
   emulator *HAS NO WAY* to know it does not run on physical
  hardware
   if no interface is present to give it access to it.

  No program has any way of knowing whether it is running on physical
  hardware or not, even if it has an interface. Whether the program is
  running on an emulator or not makes no difference.

   Shared memory IS an interface. But anyway, I leave this
  discussion
   here, can't cure your stupidity.

  Despite your ad hominem retort, there is no basis for it if you
  understand the points I am making. It is your understanding that is a
  little fuzzy. I am an MCSE and CCEA btw, and I have been configuring
  and managing hundreds of RDP, Citrix, and virtual servers every day
  for over 13 years.

 Yes but you still have to learn what a program is... then come back talking.


What 'come back'? Did I leave? What understanding about what a program
is do you have that could possibly make an difference in this
conversation?

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com

 On May 31, 1:58 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
  2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   On May 31, 12:26 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
 
 On May 31, 1:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
  2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
 
   On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
 wrote:
 
 You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that
 you
   are
 smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a
 Church-Turing
 Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level
   separation?
 The
 whole point is that there is no fundamental difference
 between
   one
 Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
 
A program is running on a machine... a program interact
 through
 interface
and that's the **only** way to interact.
 
   Huh? A program interacts with another program directly.
 
  Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared
 memory
   (and
  eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So
 give
   me a
  program that can talk/share thing with another program without
 any
  interface between them...
 
 You brought in the term interface specifically to talk about the
 necessity to intentionally bridge two separate layers of reality.
 To
 use a computer, I need a KVM or touchscreen or whatever, an
 interface
 that samples the behavior of physical matter and maps it to
 microelectronic settings. I pointed out that in a truly digitial
 universe, no such thing would be necessary and nothing would be
 prevented by the lack of such a thing.
 
 Once something is native digital, it can be integrated with
 anything
 else that is digital native - that is sort of the point. It's all
 virtual. Any formalized virtual interfaces, a KVM in Second Life or
 The Matrix or whatever, are purely decorative. They are cartoon
 facades. The actual code doesn't need any kind of graphic
 representation or digital-to-something-to-digital transduction to
 pass
 from one area of memory to another.
 
   There is no
   interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node
 whether
   the
   program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the
 physical
   machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual
 machines.
 
  Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine
   has no
  direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist)
 on the
  physical hardware.
 
 The virtual machine has the same access to the physical hardware as
 the root level.
 
That's complete bullshit... If my emulator does not give you access
 to
   the
host hardware it does not...
 
   I'm not talking about the user having access to the host hardware, I'm
   talking about the virtual machine: the software. It is using the host
   machines's memory and CPUs, is it not?
 
The point is that the program running on the
emulator *HAS NO WAY* to know it does not run on physical
   hardware
if no interface is present to give it access to it.
 
   No program has any way of knowing whether it is running on physical
   hardware or not, even if it has an interface. Whether the program is
   running on an emulator or not makes no difference.
 
Shared memory IS an interface. But anyway, I leave this
   discussion
here, can't cure your stupidity.
 
   Despite your ad hominem retort, there is no basis for it if you
   understand the points I am making. It is your understanding that is a
   little fuzzy. I am an MCSE and CCEA btw, and I have been configuring
   and managing hundreds of RDP, Citrix, and virtual servers every day
   for over 13 years.
 
  Yes but you still have to learn what a program is... then come back
 talking.
 

 What 'come back'? Did I leave? What understanding about what a program
 is do you have that could possibly make an difference in this
 conversation?



To know what an interface is... how 2 programs communicate. The way you
talk is like hey dude it's in the OS !... like the operating system was
not a software... like if you want to access the network you're not calling
a software... like in the end it was not writing something into some place
in memory... pfff only thing I can say is AhAhAh !!!... as your sense
BS.

The way you don't understand level... when a emulator is in a emulator...
the second level emulator run on the first level emulated hardware... which
run itself run on physical hardware, no program in the nth level could
access n-1 level hardware without the n-1 level emulator giving interface
to it.

Quentin



 Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Stephen P. King

On 5/31/2012 12:10 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On May 31, 1:45 am, Jason Reschjasonre...@gmail.com  wrote:

Craig,

You mentioned that you can open a remote desktop connection from a
virtualized computer to a real computer (or even the one running the
virtualization).

This, as Quentin mentioned, requires an interface.  In this case it is
provided by the virtual network card made available to the virtual OS.

A 'virtual network card' is just a name for the part of OS. There is
no interface. The 'real computer' is no more real than the virtual
computer. The partition is purely fictional - a presentation layer to
appeal to our sense of organization and convenience. No virtual
network card is required. You could just call it the part of the OS
that we call virtual.

The partition between the OS and the actual hardware however, does
require an interface for our hands and eyes to make changes to the
hardware that affects the software.


When the virtual OS writes network traffic to this virtual interface, it is
read by the host computer, and from there on can be interpreted and
processed.  It is only because the host computer is monitoring the state of
this virtual network card and forwarding its traffic that the virtual OS is
able to send any network traffic outside it.

No, the containers all share the same root OS. The virtual interface
is a convenient fiction.

Craig


Hi Craig,

It seems that we might be glossing over the difference between 
hardware and software...


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Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon


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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-31 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won  
a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state  
law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to  
Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and  
the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and  
again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you  
can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely  
unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has  
probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the  
infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly  
on Mars.



Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend  
to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading  
about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is  
(1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations.


Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred  
by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time  
the probability is 1/2, but his experience is harry-Potter-like.





I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after  
the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue,  
does it remain 50%?


Yes.



Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1  
copy on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be  
equal to 1/6th?


You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.





While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so  
that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport  
button is pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see how  
this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis,  
the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in  
32 (as I have caused 5 splittings),


OK.


but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5  
electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.


That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding  
to the earth/mars experience.




In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following  
records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.
The way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter  
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5  
copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter  
creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.


This is ambiguous.


What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net  
result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like  
stepping into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then creating  
5 copies (with delay) on Mars.


Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif

Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies  
created with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).


When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created  
on Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) is the  
probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th?


Yes.
That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or  
a one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in  
front of the looser, even if you multiply by 20. billions your  
delayed copies on mars.





Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge  
that the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into the  
Teleporter again?


I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is the difference  
between 24.


In this thought experience you were supposed to be an external  
observer on earth, not the candidate doing the duplication.
In your diary, you will always write things like, he try to multiply  
the copy on mars, push on the button and told me this fails again.


Bruno








In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth  
should be (1/6th)


Yes. In that case.



but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same,  
why should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all  
at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case?


RSSA has to be applied. Your first protocol is faithful, isomorphic,  
to the experience I was 

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 31 May 2012, at 18:56, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/31/2012 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


I think there are many tricks the brain employs against itself to  
aid the selfish propagation of its genes.  One example is the  
concept of the ego (having an identity).


Agreed. As I said just above.


So having an identity, a unity of thoughts, depends on there being a  
brain which depends on physics.  Which is why I argue that, whatever  
is fundamental, physics is essential to consciousness.


I can agree. This does not make physics primitive though. Just that  
that the physical realm might delude us on our identity, as it does on  
materiality. Keep in mind that physics, with comp, is a statistic on  
computations as seen from some points of view.









Many drugs can temporarily disable whatever mechanism in our brain  
creates this feeling, leading to ego death, feelings of  
connectedness, oneness with other or the universe, etc.  Perhaps  
one of our ancestors always felt this way, but died out when the  
egoist gene developed and made its carriers exploitative of the  
egoless.


Probably. I think so.


Evolutionarily the ego must have preceded Lobian programming by many  
generations.


I agree, for the human egos, but arithmetic is full of relative  
egos, non lobian and lobian one.



Competition and natural selection must have occurred even in the  
primordial soup.


No doubt. From our perspective. (our can include the bacteria, and  
all living creatures).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-31 Thread Jason Resch
On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote:


 To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a
 price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law
 forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without
 annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth
 complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer,
 and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the
 feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n
 experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience).
 Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go
 quickly on Mars.


 Bruno,

 Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get
 back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above
 experiment that I wanted to clear up.

 You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n,
 where n is the number of teleportations.


 Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by
 the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the
 probability is 1/2, but his experience is harry-Potter-like.




 I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the
 first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it
 remain 50%?


 Yes.



 Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on
 earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?


 You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.




 While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I
 see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is
 pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see how this works in
 quantum mechanics under the following experiment:

 I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the
 probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I
 have caused 5 splittings),


 OK.


 but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5
 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.


 That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to
 the earth/mars experience.



 In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following
 records:

 1. D
 2. DU
 3. DDU
 4. DDDU
 5. U
 6. D

 However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The way
 I see it is they have the following probabilities:

 1. D (1/2)
 2. DU (1/4)
 3. DDU (1/8)
 4. DDDU (1/16)
 5. U (1/32)
 6. D (1/32)

 I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter
 experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies
 on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5
 copies on Mars at once.


 This is ambiguous.



 What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net
 result being 1 copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping
 into the teleporter once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with
 delay) on Mars.

 Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif

 Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created
 with delay on Mars (instead of one with delay).

 When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on
 Mars (with various delays between each one being produced) is the
 probability of remaining on Earth 1/6th?


 Yes.
 That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or a
 one, finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in front
 of the looser, even if you multiply by 20. billions your delayed copies
 on mars.



 Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge that
 the other copy made it to Mars before stepping into the Teleporter again?


 I don't understand the sentence. It looks like what is the difference
 between 24.



I apologize for not being clear.  There are two different experiments I am
contrasting:

1. A person steps into a teleporter, and 5 copies (with varying delays) are
reproduced on Mars.

2. A person steps into a teleporter, and a duplicate is created on Mars.
 To increase the chance of subjectively finding himself on Mars, he does it
again (when he fails) and the copy on Earth does so 5 times before giving
up.

For experiment 1, you and I seem to agree that subjectively, that person
person has a 1 in 6 chance of experiencing a continued presence on earth,
and a 5/6 chance of finding himself on mars.

For experiment 2, I believe you 

Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-31 Thread meekerdb

On 5/31/2012 12:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



On 31 May 2012, at 18:29, Jason Resch wrote:




On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won 
a
price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state 
law
forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars 
without
annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of 
earth
complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the
observer, and from your point of view, you can of course only see 
the guy
who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, 
staying on
earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter
experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a 
probability
near one to go quickly on Mars.


Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to 
get back
to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above
experiment that I wanted to clear up.

You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, 
where n
is the number of teleportations. 


Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred by 
the
person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time the 
probability is
1/2, but his experience is harry-Potter-like.





I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the 
first
teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%? 


Yes.




Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy 
on
earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 
1/6th?


You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.





While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I 
see the
probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I 
split
in two).  It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum 
mechanics under
the following experiment:

I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the
probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I 
have
caused 5 splittings), 


OK.



but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 
electrons,
but stop once you find one in the up state. 


That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding to 
the
earth/mars experience.




In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following 
records:

1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The 
way I see
it is they have the following probabilities:

1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter 
experiment, it
seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is 
no
different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on 
Mars at
once. 


This is ambiguous.



What I mean is me stepping into the teleporter 5 times, with the net result 
being 1
copy on Earth and 5 copies on Mars, seems just like stepping into the 
teleporter
once, and the teleporter then creating 5 copies (with delay) on Mars.

Like the diagram on step 4 of UDA:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL_fichiers/image012.gif

Except there is no annihilation on Earth, and there are 4 copies created 
with delay
on Mars (instead of one with delay).

When stepping into the teleporter once, and having 5 copies created on Mars 
(with
various delays between each one being produced) is the probability of 
remaining on
Earth 1/6th?


Yes.
That would be a good idea to enhance the probability to be the one, or a 
one,
finding himself of mars. But again, the guy on earth will be in front of the
looser, even if you multiply by 20. billions your delayed copies on mars.




Is the difference with the iterated example receiving the knowledge that 
the other
copy made it to 

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 2:22 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 To know what an interface is... how 2 programs communicate. The way you
 talk is like hey dude it's in the OS !... like the operating system was
 not a software...

No, I'm saying it's all software, except for the hardware. That has
been my point from the start. You can make as many virtual worlds
nested within each other as you like and it doesn't matter. No
interface is required because they are all being physically hosted by
the semiconducting microelectronics.

 It is not a problem to have an avatar have virtual dinner in virtual
Paris by using his virtual computer. He can dive into the monitor and
end up on the Champs-Élysées if the programmer writes the virtual
worlds that way. No interface can allow or restrict anything within a
virtual context - it's all an election by the programmer, not an
ontological barrier.

 like if you want to access the network you're not calling
 a software... like in the end it was not writing something into some place
 in memory... pfff only thing I can say is AhAhAh !!!... as your sense
 BS.

When I use my keyboard to type these words, I am using hardware. When
an avatar uses a virtual keyboard, or when that avatar's avatar's
avatar uses a virtual virtual virtual keyboard, there is no keyboard
there. The keyboard can be a turnip or a cloud, it doesn't matter. For
me, in hardware world, it matters.


 The way you don't understand level... when a emulator is in a emulator...
 the second level emulator run on the first level emulated hardware...

No, I understand exactly how you understand level but I am telling you
that you are wrong. You are mistaking marketing hype for reality.
Emulation is a figure of speech. There is no virtual hardware. It's
just one piece of software that acts like several. The organization of
it is meaningless ontologically. The entire program is an
epiphenomenon of the same piece of hardware.

 which
 run itself run on physical hardware, no program in the nth level could
 access n-1 level hardware without the n-1 level emulator giving interface
 to it.

That is just not true and you aren't listening to what I'm saying. You
are confusing user permissions with hardware to software interface.
Every week I see nth level programs break n-1 OS and take down the
entire node. It's not what you think. They use the same OS. There is
only one copy of Windows Server 2008 that every container shares. If
they had separate copies, there would still be a meta-OS that they
share.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 2:29 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote:


      It seems that we might be glossing over the difference between
 hardware and software...


Hi Stephen,

Yes, that seems to be the case a lot. I guess it can be confusing, but
I'm not sure why. If a cat can pee on it, then it's hardware.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com

 On May 31, 2:22 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

  To know what an interface is... how 2 programs communicate. The way you
  talk is like hey dude it's in the OS !... like the operating system was
  not a software...

 No, I'm saying it's all software, except for the hardware. That has
 been my point from the start. You can make as many virtual worlds
 nested within each other as you like and it doesn't matter. No
 interface is required because they are all being physically hosted by
 the semiconducting microelectronics.

  It is not a problem to have an avatar have virtual dinner in virtual
 Paris by using his virtual computer. He can dive into the monitor and
 end up on the Champs-Élysées if the programmer writes the virtual
 worlds that way. No interface can allow or restrict anything within a
 virtual context


You simply don't know what the terms means or you're stupid... one or the
other or both.


 - it's all an election by the programmer, not an
 ontological barrier.

  like if you want to access the network you're not calling
  a software... like in the end it was not writing something into some
 place
  in memory... pfff only thing I can say is AhAhAh !!!... as your sense
  BS.

 When I use my keyboard to type these words, I am using hardware.


Which calls software, basically calling an interrupt and setting something
into memory to be read by other programs (os or driver or whatever)


 When
 an avatar uses a virtual keyboard, or when that avatar's avatar's
 avatar uses a virtual virtual virtual keyboard, there is no keyboard
 there.


If you don't do a simulation no.. so what.


 The keyboard can be a turnip or a cloud, it doesn't matter. For
 me, in hardware world, it matters.

 
  The way you don't understand level... when a emulator is in a
 emulator...
  the second level emulator run on the first level emulated hardware...

 No, I understand exactly how you understand level but I am telling you
 that you are wrong. You are mistaking marketing hype for reality.


I write emulator, I know exactly how this works contrary to you.


 Emulation is a figure of speech.


No


 There is no virtual hardware.


There is.


 It's
 just one piece of software that acts like several. The organization of
 it is meaningless ontologically. The entire program is an
 epiphenomenon of the same piece of hardware.

  which
  run itself run on physical hardware, no program in the nth level could
  access n-1 level hardware without the n-1 level emulator giving interface
  to it.

 That is just not true and you aren't listening to what I'm saying. You
 are confusing user permissions with hardware to software interface.
 Every week I see nth level programs break n-1 OS and take down the
 entire node. It's not what you think. They use the same OS. There is
 only one copy of Windows Server 2008 that every container shares. If
 they had separate copies, there would still be a meta-OS that they
 share.

 Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-31 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 31, 5:15 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
 2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com









  On May 31, 2:22 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

   To know what an interface is... how 2 programs communicate. The way you
   talk is like hey dude it's in the OS !... like the operating system was
   not a software...

  No, I'm saying it's all software, except for the hardware. That has
  been my point from the start. You can make as many virtual worlds
  nested within each other as you like and it doesn't matter. No
  interface is required because they are all being physically hosted by
  the semiconducting microelectronics.

   It is not a problem to have an avatar have virtual dinner in virtual
  Paris by using his virtual computer. He can dive into the monitor and
  end up on the Champs-Élysées if the programmer writes the virtual
  worlds that way. No interface can allow or restrict anything within a
  virtual context

 You simply don't know what the terms means or you're stupid... one or the
 other or both.

No, it's just that you aren't seeing my point that there is a
difference between a device that is ontologically necessary and one
that that is entirely optional. I don't think that means you're
stupid, just that you cannot tolerate being wrong. It doesn't matter
if you call it an interface, what matters is that I need a way to turn
my free will into electronic changes in a computer, but electronic
changes don't need a way to turn themselves into other electronic
changes.


  - it's all an election by the programmer, not an
  ontological barrier.

   like if you want to access the network you're not calling
   a software... like in the end it was not writing something into some
  place
   in memory... pfff only thing I can say is AhAhAh !!!... as your sense
   BS.

  When I use my keyboard to type these words, I am using hardware.

 Which calls software, basically calling an interrupt and setting something
 into memory to be read by other programs (os or driver or whatever)

No, it calls hardware, and the behavior of part of that hardware seems
to us like software when it is displayed back to us through screen
hardware. Programs are nothing but logical scripts to control
hardware. Hardware doesn't need a program, but programs need hardware.
Programs can run in other programs, but only if they all ultimately
run on hardware. They have no existence on their own. There is no
virtual universe being created, it is just a well maintained facade.


  When
  an avatar uses a virtual keyboard, or when that avatar's avatar's
  avatar uses a virtual virtual virtual keyboard, there is no keyboard
  there.

 If you don't do a simulation no.. so what.

So you are not limited to the logic of physics in a virtual world
because it's not physically real.


  The keyboard can be a turnip or a cloud, it doesn't matter. For
  me, in hardware world, it matters.

   The way you don't understand level... when a emulator is in a
  emulator...
   the second level emulator run on the first level emulated hardware...

  No, I understand exactly how you understand level but I am telling you
  that you are wrong. You are mistaking marketing hype for reality.

 I write emulator, I know exactly how this works contrary to you.

But you don't know how it fails to work, which is the more relevant
issue. Emulation is a theory that fails in reality.


  Emulation is a figure of speech.

 No

Yes


  There is no virtual hardware.

 There is.

Prove it.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-30 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 29 May 2012, at 22:26, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won  
a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state  
law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars  
without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the  
version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and  
again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can  
of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely  
unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has  
probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the  
infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly  
on Mars.



Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to  
get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading  
about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n,  
where n is the number of teleportations.


Not really. I pretend that this is the relative probability inferred  
by the person in front of you. But he is wrong of course. Each time  
the probability is 1/2, but his experience is harry-Potter-like.





I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after  
the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue,  
does it remain 50%?


Yes.



Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1  
copy on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be  
equal to 1/6th?


You cannot use absolute sampling. I don't think it makes any sense.





While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that  
I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button  
is pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see how this  
works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis,  
the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in  
32 (as I have caused 5 splittings),


OK.


but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5  
electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.


That is a different protocol. The one above is the one corresponding  
to the earth/mars experience.




In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following  
records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The  
way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter  
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5  
copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter  
creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.


This is ambiguous.



In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth  
should be (1/6th)


Yes. In that case.



but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are the same,  
why should it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all  
at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case?


RSSA has to be applied. Your first protocol is faithful, isomorphic,  
to the experience I was describing. Te second is not.


OK?

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-30 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 29 May 2012, at 22:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/29/2012 1:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won  
a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state  
law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to  
Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and  
the version of earth complained, and so try again and again, and  
again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you  
can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely  
unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has  
probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience). Assuming the  
infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go quickly  
on Mars.



Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend  
to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading  
about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is  
(1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations.  I can see  
clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the first  
teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it  
remain 50%?  Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on  
Mars, and 1 copy on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining  
on Earth be equal to 1/6th?



While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so  
that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport  
button is pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see how  
this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis,  
the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in  
32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), but what if the experiment is:  
measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you  
find one in the up state.  In this case it seems there are 6 copies  
of me, with the following records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.
The way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter  
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5  
copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter  
creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.  In that case, it is clear  
that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the  
beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why should  
it matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do  
RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case?


Thanks,

Jason


I think you are right, Jason.  For the probability to be (1/2^n)  
implies that there is some single soul that is you and it's  
notreally duplicated so that if it went to Mars on the first try  
there would be zero probability of it going on the second.  Then  
theprobability of your soul being on Mars is  
(1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)+...+(1/2^n).


Under the alternative, that you really are duplicated the  
probability that some you chosen at random is on Mars is (n-1/n).   
But in this case there is really no you, there are n+1 people who  
have some common history.


The probability bears on the first experiences, which are indeed never  
duplicated from their 1-pov, and we ask for the probability of  
staying on earth. It is equivalent with the probability of always  
getting head in a throw of a coin. So, from the perspective of the guy  
who stays on Earth, he is living an Harry-Potter like experience. But  
the experience is trivial for the observer looking at it from outside.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-30 Thread meekerdb

On 5/30/2012 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 29 May 2012, at 22:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/29/2012 1:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price
consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid
annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without 
annihilation.
The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and 
so try
again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of 
view,
you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely 
unlucky,
as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n 
(that the
Harry Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a
probability near one to go quickly on Mars.


Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it 
later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I 
wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the 
number of teleportations.  I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on 
earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does 
it remain 50%?  Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy 
on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?



While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the 
probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two).  
It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following 
experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability 
that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), 
but what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop 
once you find one in the up state.  In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, 
with the following records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The way I see it is 
they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems 
the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the 
case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.  In that case, it is 
clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the beginning and 
end states of the experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is 
done iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case?


Thanks,

Jason


I think you are right, Jason.  For the probability to be (1/2^n) implies that there is 
some single soul that is you and it's not really duplicated so that if it went to 
Mars on the first try there would be zero probability of it going on the second.  Then 
the probability of your soul being on Mars is (1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)+...+(1/2^n).


Under the alternative, that you really are duplicated the probability that some you 
chosen at random is on Mars is (n-1/n).  But in this case there is really no you, 
there are n+1 people who have some common history.


The probability bears on the first experiences, which are indeed never duplicated from 
their 1-pov, and we ask for the probability of staying on earth. It is equivalent with 
the probability of always getting head in a throw of a coin. So, from the perspective of 
the guy who stays on Earth, he is living an Harry-Potter like experience.


No more than the guys who went to Mars.  If they compare experiences they will find that 
although they only had probability 1/2 of it happening, they all went to Mars.


Brent



But the experience is trivial for the observer looking at it from outside.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-30 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 30 May 2012, at 18:16, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/30/2012 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 29 May 2012, at 22:41, meekerdb wrote:


On 5/29/2012 1:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal  
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy  
won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his  
state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a  
teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars  
is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try  
again and again, and again ... You are the observer, and from  
your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got  
the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on  
earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry  
Potter experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a  
probability near one to go quickly on Mars.



Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend  
to get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while  
reading about the above experiment that I wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is  
(1/2)^n, where n is the number of teleportations.  I can see  
clearly that the probability of remaining on earth after the  
first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue,  
does it remain 50%?  Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5  
copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth.  Wouldn't the probability of  
remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?



While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so  
that I see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport  
button is pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see  
how this works in quantum mechanics under the following experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y- 
axis, the probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state  
is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), but what if the  
experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but  
stop once you find one in the up state.  In this case it seems  
there are 6 copies of me, with the following records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.
The way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter  
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and  
5 copies on mars) is no different from the case where the  
transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.  In that case,  
it is clear that the chance of remaining on Earth should be  
(1/6th) but if the beginning and end states of the experiment are  
the same, why should it matter if the replication is done  
iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different  
predictions in this case?


Thanks,

Jason


I think you are right, Jason.  For the probability to be (1/2^n)  
implies that there is some single soul that is you and it's  
not really duplicated so that if it went to Mars on the first try  
there would be zero probability of it going on the second.  Then  
the probability of your soul being on Mars is  
(1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)+...+(1/2^n).


Under the alternative, that you really are duplicated the  
probability that some you chosen at random is on Mars is (n-1/ 
n).  But in this case there is really no you, there are n+1  
people who have some common history.


The probability bears on the first experiences, which are indeed  
never duplicated from their 1-pov, and we ask for the probability  
of staying on earth. It is equivalent with the probability of  
always getting head in a throw of a coin. So, from the perspective  
of the guy who stays on Earth, he is living an Harry-Potter like  
experience.


No more than the guys who went to Mars.  If they compare experiences  
they will find that although they only had probability 1/2 of it  
happening, they all went to Mars.


They almost all went to Mars ... eventually, with one exception.  
Besides this was just used in a protocol where the observer is the one  
looking his friend, that is the exception. It is his 3-view on the 1- 
view of the guy who never succeed to go on Mars. I have a collection  
of strategies that he can try, like  introducing delays, or using  
random coin between original and copy, unfortunately for the guy  
remaining on earth, by definition, he cannot succeed, and he will  
have hard time to believe things are not conspiring against his will  
to go on Mars, and this proportionally to the ingenuity developed to  
assure to be the one going on Mars.


If you make that experience, the chance to go on mars is always rather  
great, but of course, we, the spectators, will have to live with the  
unlucky (from its first person view) who remains on 

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect to have
 dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you want an
 computational AI to interact with you, it must be able to control real
 world appendices that permits it to *interact* or likewise if it was in a
 virtual world, you should use a interface with this virtual world for you
 to interact.

 You can't expect level to be mixed without an interface and I don't see any
 problem with that.

Why not? In a virtual world you could mix levels without an interface.
You could have a virtual world where your avatar has dinner in a
virtual virtual Paris on his virtual computer and in a virtual Paris
at the same time. You could have a virtual factory where virtual
virtual drawings of robots make root level virtual cars.

There is something more than level which makes the difference between
real and virtual. Level itself is an abstraction. Virtual worlds
aren't really worlds at all. They are nothing but sophisticated
stories using pictures instead of words. Characters in stories don't
really think or feel.

It's confusing because what we know of reality is in our mind, and so
is what we know of a virtual reality, so it is easy to conflate the
two and imagine that reality is nothing more than we think it is. We
reduce them both to seem like phenomenological peers, but they aren't.
If you look at a mirror in another mirror, they may look the same but
one of them is an actual piece of glass. You can't break the reflected
mirror. It's not a matter of level, it is a matter of mistaking a
purely visual-semantic text for a concrete multi-sense presentation
that is rooted in a single historical context that goes back to the
beginning of time.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 29, 1:45 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:

 So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you take
 issue with?

 A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy

So does a cadaver's brain and body. The fact that a cadaver is not
intelligent should show us that the difference between life and death
can't be meaningfully reduced to matter and energy.

 B. that matter and energy follow natural laws,

No, laws follow from our observation of natural matter and energy.

 C. that these laws are describable in mathematical terms

You have jumped from physics to abstraction. It's like saying 'I have
a rabbit  rabbits act like rabbits  Bugs Bunny is modeled after the
behavior of rabbits  Bugs Bunny is a rabbit'.

 D. that mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by
 algorithms


Precision only determines the probability that a particular detector
fails to detect the fraud of simulation over time. It says nothing
about the genuine equivalence of the simulation and the reality.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com

 On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

  You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect to
 have
  dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you want an
  computational AI to interact with you, it must be able to control real
  world appendices that permits it to *interact* or likewise if it was in a
  virtual world, you should use a interface with this virtual world for you
  to interact.
 
  You can't expect level to be mixed without an interface and I don't see
 any
  problem with that.

 Why not? In a virtual world you could mix levels without an interface.


No you can't, if in your virtual world, you made a real computer simulator,
what runs in the simulator cannot escape in the upper virtual world unless
you've made an interface to it.

If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a
simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi
level.

Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you virtualize
an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os inside
it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level can't
reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.

Quentin


You could have a virtual world where your avatar has dinner in a
 virtual virtual Paris on his virtual computer and in a virtual Paris
 at the same time. You could have a virtual factory where virtual
 virtual drawings of robots make root level virtual cars.

 There is something more than level which makes the difference between
 real and virtual. Level itself is an abstraction. Virtual worlds
 aren't really worlds at all. They are nothing but sophisticated
 stories using pictures instead of words. Characters in stories don't
 really think or feel.

 It's confusing because what we know of reality is in our mind, and so
 is what we know of a virtual reality, so it is easy to conflate the
 two and imagine that reality is nothing more than we think it is. We
 reduce them both to seem like phenomenological peers, but they aren't.
 If you look at a mirror in another mirror, they may look the same but
 one of them is an actual piece of glass. You can't break the reflected
 mirror. It's not a matter of level, it is a matter of mistaking a
 purely visual-semantic text for a concrete multi-sense presentation
 that is rooted in a single historical context that goes back to the
 beginning of time.

 Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 30, 4:36 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
 2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com









  On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

   You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect to
  have
   dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you want an
   computational AI to interact with you, it must be able to control real
   world appendices that permits it to *interact* or likewise if it was in a
   virtual world, you should use a interface with this virtual world for you
   to interact.

   You can't expect level to be mixed without an interface and I don't see
  any
   problem with that.

  Why not? In a virtual world you could mix levels without an interface.

 No you can't, if in your virtual world, you made a real computer simulator,
 what runs in the simulator cannot escape in the upper virtual world unless
 you've made an interface to it.

You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The
whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.


 If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a
 simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi
 level.

 Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you virtualize
 an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os inside
 it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level can't
 reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.

No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I
want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within
the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all
running on the same physical hardware node.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com

 On May 30, 4:36 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
  2012/5/30 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   On May 29, 3:02 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
 
You always put that level confusion on the table. You could expect to
   have
dinner in a virtual paris if you were in a virtual world. If you
 want an
computational AI to interact with you, it must be able to control
 real
world appendices that permits it to *interact* or likewise if it was
 in a
virtual world, you should use a interface with this virtual world
 for you
to interact.
 
You can't expect level to be mixed without an interface and I don't
 see
   any
problem with that.
 
   Why not? In a virtual world you could mix levels without an interface.
 
  No you can't, if in your virtual world, you made a real computer
 simulator,
  what runs in the simulator cannot escape in the upper virtual world
 unless
  you've made an interface to it.

 You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
 smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
 Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The
 whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
 Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.


A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface
and that's the **only** way to interact.



 
  If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a
  simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi
  level.
 
  Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you
 virtualize
  an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os
 inside
  it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level
 can't
  reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.

 No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
 virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
 there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I
 want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within
 the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all
 running on the same physical hardware node.


Well you can't read unless an interface between them exists.


  Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Craig Weinberg
On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

  You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
  smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
  Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The
  whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
  Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.

 A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface
 and that's the **only** way to interact.

Huh? A program interacts with another program directly. There is no
interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the
program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical
machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines.












   If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in a
   simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like multi
   level.

   Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you
  virtualize
   an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os
  inside
   it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level
  can't
   reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.

  No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
  virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
  there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I
  want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within
  the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all
  running on the same physical hardware node.

 Well you can't read unless an interface between them exists.

What interface are you talking about? I can make a million nested
layers of virtual worlds and I can make it so the same virtual fire
burns in all of them, with no interface required. It would magically
burn on command if I wanted it to. It's no problem at all unless I
want it to burn outside of the root level - into the literal reality
of time-space-matter-energy.

Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Jason Resch
Craig,

You mentioned that you can open a remote desktop connection from a
virtualized computer to a real computer (or even the one running the
virtualization).

This, as Quentin mentioned, requires an interface.  In this case it is
provided by the virtual network card made available to the virtual OS.
When the virtual OS writes network traffic to this virtual interface, it is
read by the host computer, and from there on can be interpreted and
processed.  It is only because the host computer is monitoring the state of
this virtual network card and forwarding its traffic that the virtual OS is
able to send any network traffic outside it.

Jason

On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 8:32 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

 On May 30, 6:13 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

 
   No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
   virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
 
  So for you a remote desktop is not an interface... remote is a magic
  mushroom ?

 It's not an interface, it's just the OS. It doesn't have to be a
 remote desktop, it can be anything. I can open a local folder or a
 remote folder, it makes no difference.


 
  So for you when two programs talk they do it through wishful thinking ?
  read what **interface** means.

 Then programs are made of 'interfaces'? Each line of code interfaces
 with another? Each byte interfaces with the next byte? There is no
 difference between running code on the root level and running it on a
 nested virtual level. There is a big difference between running code
 on the root level and causing changes in the outside world. There is
 no 'interface' that will allow a computer to control all matter and
 energy in the universe and there is no 'interface' required for a
 program to control any software running in a given digital environment
 that it is designed to control.

 Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/31 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com

 On May 30, 6:09 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:

   You are defining a 'real computer' in terms in terms that you are
   smuggling in from our real world of physics. In a Church-Turing
   Matrix, why would there be any kind of arbitrary level separation? The
   whole point is that there is no fundamental difference between one
   Turing emulation and another. Paris is a program.
 
  A program is running on a machine... a program interact through interface
  and that's the **only** way to interact.

 Huh? A program interacts with another program directly.


Yes ? Give me an example, the most basic interface is shared memory (and
eventually, any shared thing is done via memory access)... So give me a
program that can talk/share thing with another program without any
interface between them...


 There is no
 interface. It makes no difference to the OS of the HW node whether the
 program is running virtual Paris on the root level of the physical
 machine or virtual virtual Paris on one of the virtual machines.


Yes there is a difference, the paris running on a virtual machine has no
direct access (and can't know of it unless an interface exist) on the
physical hardware.


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If not you aren't really doing multi level simulation (simulation in
 a
simulation)... but a single level one where you made it look like
 multi
level.
 
Example: if you run a virtual machine (like virtual box) and you
   virtualize
an OS and inside that one you run a virtual box that run another os
   inside
it, the second level cannot go to the first level (as the first level
   can't
reach the host) unless an interface between them exists.
 
   No, you can. I can log into the root level on a hardware node - pick a
   virtual machine on that node and log into it, open up a remote desktop
   there and log back into the hardware node that the VM box is on if I
   want. I can reboot the hardware machine from any nested level within
   the node. There doesn't need to be an interface at all. They are all
   running on the same physical hardware node.
 
  Well you can't read unless an interface between them exists.

 What interface are you talking about? I can make a million nested
 layers of virtual worlds and I can make it so the same virtual fire
 burns in all of them, with no interface required.


Well I know you do it through magic mushroom... but hey, that doesn't work.

Quentin


 It would magically
 burn on command if I wanted it to. It's no problem at all unless I
 want it to burn outside of the root level - into the literal reality
 of time-space-matter-energy.

 Craig

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-29 Thread meekerdb

On 5/28/2012 10:21 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:

This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person drawing 
a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook dinner. It is 
exactly like getting into a flight simulator, flying it to Paris and then 
expecting to get out and have dinner on the banks of the Seine. It is exactly 
like expecting your computer simulated furnace roasting you a toilet bowl.


I'd say it's more like trying to fly by sticking feathers on your arms like 
Icarus.

Brent

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-29 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/29 Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au

 Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
 Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the
 sentiments

 
 It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want
 dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your
 option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is
 kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what
 it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't care.

 It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have
 just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off
 an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston.
 You will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with
 your day's work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal.
 You realise that oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how
 to make dinner. Food for thought is your dessert.

 It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics on
 your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames
 finally get the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet
 bowls will be well cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to
 your project leader that the project was finished she would think you are
 insane. Later, in commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the
 target of your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable
 and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics
 of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the same thing - that
 fact has made your job a lot easier, but you cannot compute yourself a
 toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly afterwards in the bathroom.

 It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think you
 can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment with
 shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure out
 that certain shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you flew a
 few feet. And you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic physics of
 flight.

 It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and
 go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive
 computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner
 and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km.
 As you leave the simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight
 in the computer and flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody
 died today.

 No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with it.
 We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion.

 No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly.
 We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked.

 This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural
 world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could
 think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern
 world of computing and physics, never before have we had more power to
 examine in detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and
 every case, if anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world
 and the natural world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft
 or deluded and probably not entertain their contribution as having any
 value.

 Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very
 delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you
 are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of
 unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with
 such unquestioning faith that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in
 the delusion.

 Q. What scientific discipline could this be?

 A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence.

 It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you find
 people that look at the only example of natural general intelligence - you,
 the human reading this - accept a model of a brain, put it in a computer
 and then expect the result to be a brain. This is done without a shred of
 known physical law, in spite of thousands of years of contrary experience,
 and despite decades of abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an
 artificial intelligence like us.

 This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person
 drawing a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook
 dinner. It is exactly like getting into a flight simulator, flying it to
 Paris and then expecting to get out and have dinner on the banks of the
 Seine.


You always put that level confusion on the table. You could 

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-29 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 29 May 2012, at 09:02, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:




From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com 
] On Behalf Of Jason Resch

Sent: Tuesday, 29 May 2012 3:45 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Church Turing be dammed.



On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:21 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au 
 wrote:

Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the  
sentiments



It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want  
dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be  
your option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable.  
The fire is kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you  
have a clue what it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't  
care.


It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You  
have just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have  
killed off an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance  
called phlogiston. You will not be popular, but the facts speak for  
you. You are happy with your day's work. You go to the kitchen and  
cook your fine pheasant meal. You realise that oxidation never had  
to figure in your understanding of how to make dinner. Food for  
thought is your dessert.


It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL  
Multiphysics on your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet  
configuration and the flames finally get the dead pocket in the  
corner up to temperature. The toilet bowls will be well cooked here,  
you think to yourself. If you suggested to your project leader that  
the project was finished she would think you are insane. Later, in  
commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the target of  
your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable  
and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the  
physics of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the  
same thing - that fact has made your job a lot easier, but you  
cannot compute yourself a toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly  
afterwards in the bathroom.


It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You  
think you can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You  
experiment with shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind  
tunnel. You figure out that certain shapes seems to drag less and  
lift more. Eventually you flew a few feet. And you have absolutely  
no clue about the microscopic physics of flight.


It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch  
and go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the  
massive computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you  
stall your jetliner and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today  
you have flown 146, 341 km. As you leave the simulator, you remind  
yourself that the physics of flight in the computer and flight  
itself are not the same thing, and that nobody died today.


No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner  
with it. We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of  
combustion.


No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to  
fly. We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked.


This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the  
natural world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one  
of us could think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of  
process. In a modern world of computing and physics, never before  
have we had more power to examine in detail, whatever are the  
objects of our study. And in each and every case, if anyone told you  
that a computed model of the natural world and the natural world are  
literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft or deluded and  
probably not entertain their contribution as having any value.


Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very  
delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the  
behaviour, you are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed  
systematic raft of unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed  
from mentor to novice with such unquestioning faith that entire  
scientific disciplines are enrolled in the delusion.


Q. What scientific discipline could this be?

A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence.

It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you  
find people that look at the only example of natural general  
intelligence - you, the human reading this - accept a model of a  
brain, put it in a computer and then expect the result to be a  
brain. This is done without a shred of known physical law, in spite  
of thousands of years of contrary experience, and despite decades of  
abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an artificial

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-29 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/5/29 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com



 2012/5/29 Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au

 Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
 Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the
 sentiments

 
 It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want
 dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your
 option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is
 kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what
 it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't care.

 It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have
 just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off
 an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston.
 You will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with
 your day's work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal.
 You realise that oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how
 to make dinner. Food for thought is your dessert.

 It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics
 on your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames
 finally get the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet
 bowls will be well cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to
 your project leader that the project was finished she would think you are
 insane. Later, in commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the
 target of your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable
 and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics
 of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the same thing - that
 fact has made your job a lot easier, but you cannot compute yourself a
 toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly afterwards in the bathroom.

 It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think
 you can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment
 with shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure
 out that certain shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you
 flew a few feet. And you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic
 physics of flight.

 It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and
 go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive
 computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner
 and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km.
 As you leave the simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight
 in the computer and flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody
 died today.

 No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with
 it. We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion.

 No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly.
 We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked.

 This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural
 world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could
 think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern
 world of computing and physics, never before have we had more power to
 examine in detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and
 every case, if anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world
 and the natural world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft
 or deluded and probably not entertain their contribution as having any
 value.

 Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very
 delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you
 are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of
 unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with
 such unquestioning faith that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in
 the delusion.

 Q. What scientific discipline could this be?

 A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence.

 It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you find
 people that look at the only example of natural general intelligence - you,
 the human reading this - accept a model of a brain, put it in a computer
 and then expect the result to be a brain. This is done without a shred of
 known physical law, in spite of thousands of years of contrary experience,
 and despite decades of abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an
 artificial intelligence like us.

 This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person
 drawing a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook
 dinner. It is exactly like getting into a flight simulator, flying it to
 Paris and then expecting to get out and have dinner on the banks of the
 Seine.


 You always 

Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-29 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 29 May 2012, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 2:02 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au 
 wrote:





From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com 
] On Behalf Of Jason Resch

Sent: Tuesday, 29 May 2012 3:45 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Church Turing be dammed.


Natural physics is a computation. Fine.

But a computed natural physics model is NOT the natural  
physicsit is the natural physics of a computer.





Colin,

I recently read the following excerpt from The Singularity is Near  
on page 454:


The basis of the strong (Church-Turing thesis) is that problems  
that are not solvable on a Turing Machine cannot be solved by human  
thought, either.  The basis of this thesis is that human thought is  
performed by the human brain (with some influence by the body), that  
the human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy, that matter  
and energy follow natural laws, that these laws are describable in  
mathematical terms, and that mathematics can be simulated to any  
degree of precision by algorithms.  Therefore there exist algorithms  
that can simulate human thought.  The strong version of the Church- 
Turing thesis postulates an essential equivalence between what a  
human can think or know, and what is computable.


So which of the following four link(s) in the logical chain do you  
take issue with?


A. human brain (and body) comprises matter and energy
B. that matter and energy follow natural laws,
C. that these laws are describable in mathematical terms
D. that mathematics can be simulated to any degree of precision by  
algorithms


Thanks,

Jason

 

Hi Jason,

Brain physics is there to cognise the (external) world. You do not  
know the external world.


Your brain is there to apprehend it. The physics of the brain  
inherits properties of the (unknown) external world. This is natural  
cognition. Therefore you have no model to compute. Game over.



If I understand this correctly, your point is that we don't  
understand the physics and chemistry that is important in the  
brain?  Assuming this is the case, it would be only a temporary  
barrier, not a permanent reason that prohibits AI in practice.


You are right. That would neither prohibit AI,  nor comp.





There are also reasons to believe we already understand the  
mechanisms of neurons to a sufficient degree to simulate them.   
There are numerous instances where computer simulated neurons  
apparently behaved in the same ways as biological neurons have been  
observed to.  If you're interested I can dig up the references.


Meaning: there are reasonable levels to bet on.

Here, for once, I will give my opinion, if you don't mind. First,  
about the level, the question will be this level, this year, or that  
more finest grained level next year, because technology evolves. In  
between it *is* a possible Pascal Wag, in the sense that if you have a  
fatal brain disease, you might not afford the time to wait for  
possible technological deeper levels.


And my opinion is that I can imagine saying yes to a doctor for a  
cheap neuronal simulator, but I expect getting an altered state of  
consciousness, and some awareness of it. Like being stone or  
something. For a long run machine, I doubt we can copy the brain  
without respecting the entire electromagnetic relation of its  
constituents. I think it is highly plausible that we are indeed  
digital with respect to the law of chemistry, and my feeling is that  
the brain is above all a drug designer, and is a machine where only  
some part of the communication use the cable. So I would ask to the  
doctor to take into account the glial cells, who seems to communicate  
a lot, by mechano-chemical diffusion waves, including some chatting  
with the neurons. And those immensely complex dialog are mainly  
chemical. This is quite close to the Heizenberg uncertainty level,  
which is probably our first person plural level (in which case comp is  
equivalent with QM).


Also, by the first person indeterminacy, a curious happening is made  
when you accept an artificial brain with a level above the first  
person plural corresponding level. From your point of view, you  
survive, but with a larger spectrum of possibilities, just because you  
miss finer grained constraints. (It the Galois connection, probably  
where the logical time reverses the arrow and become physical time,  
to do a pleasure to Stephen).
In that situation, an observer of the candidate for a high level  
artificial brain (higher than the first person plural level) will get  
with a higher probability realilties disconnected from yours. His mind  
might even live an Harry Potter type of experience.


To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a  
price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law  
forbid annihilation of human

Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-29 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a
 price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law
 forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without
 annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy, and the version of earth
 complained, and so try again and again, and again ... You are the observer,
 and from your point of view, you can of course only see the guy who got the
 feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n
 experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter experience).
 Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near one to go
 quickly on Mars.


Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get
back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above
experiment that I wanted to clear up.

You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where
n is the number of teleportations.  I can see clearly that the probability
of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the
teleportations continue, does it remain 50%?  Let's say that N = 5,
therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth.  Wouldn't the
probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?


While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see
the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I
split in two).  It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum
mechanics under the following experiment:

I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the
probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I
have caused 5 splittings), but what if the experiment is: measure the spin
states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in the up state.
In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the following records:

1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The way I
see it is they have the following probabilities:

1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment,
it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is
no different from the case where the transporter creates all 5 copies on
Mars at once.  In that case, it is clear that the chance of remaining on
Earth should be (1/6th) but if the beginning and end states of the
experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is done
iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in
this case?

Thanks,

Jason

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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-29 Thread meekerdb

On 5/29/2012 1:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy won a price
consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his state law forbid 
annihilation
of human. So he made a teleportation to Mars without annihilation. The 
version of
Mars is very happy, and the version of earth complained, and so try again 
and again,
and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view, you can of 
course
only see the guy who got the feeling to be infinitely unlucky, as if P = 
1/2,
staying on earth for n experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry 
Potter
experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a probability near 
one to
go quickly on Mars.


Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to get back to it 
later, but I had a strange thought while reading about the above experiment that I 
wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, where n is the 
number of teleportations.  I can see clearly that the probability of remaining on earth 
after the first teleportation is 50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 
50%?  Let's say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on earth.  
Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?



While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I see the 
probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is pressed, I split in two).  
It is easier for me to see how this works in quantum mechanics under the following 
experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the probability that 
I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as I have caused 5 splittings), but 
what if the experiment is: measure the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once 
you find one in the up state.  In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with the 
following records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The way I see it is 
they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter experiment, it seems the 
end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 copies on mars) is no different from the case 
where the transporter creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.  In that case, it is clear 
that the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the beginning and end 
states of the experiment are the same, why should it matter if the replication is done 
iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA and ASSA make different predictions in this case?


Thanks,

Jason


I think you are right, Jason.  For the probability to be (1/2^n) implies that there is 
some single soul that is you and it's not really duplicated so that if it went to Mars 
on the first try there would be zero probability of it going on the second.  Then the 
probability of your soul being on Mars is (1/2)+(1/4)+(1/8)+...+(1/2^n).


Under the alternative, that you really are duplicated the probability that some you 
chosen at random is on Mars is (n-1/n).  But in this case there is really no you, there 
are n+1 people who have some common history.


Brent

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Re: Church Turing be dammed. (Probability Question)

2012-05-29 Thread Stephen P. King

On 5/29/2012 4:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



To see this the following thought experience can help. Some guy
won a price consisting in visiting Mars by teleportation. But his
state law forbid annihilation of human. So he made a teleportation
to Mars without annihilation. The version of Mars is very happy,
and the version of earth complained, and so try again and again,
and again ... You are the observer, and from your point of view,
you can of course only see the guy who got the feeling to be
infinitely unlucky, as if P = 1/2, staying on earth for n
experience has probability 1/2^n (that the Harry Potter
experience). Assuming the infinite iteration, the guy as a
probability near one to go quickly on Mars.


Bruno,

Thanks for your very detailed reply in the other thread, I intend to 
get back to it later, but I had a strange thought while reading about 
the above experiment that I wanted to clear up.


You mentioned that the probability of remaining on Earth is (1/2)^n, 
where n is the number of teleportations.  I can see clearly that the 
probability of remaining on earth after the first teleportation is 
50%, but as the teleportations continue, does it remain 50%?  Let's 
say that N = 5, therefore there are 5 copies on Mars, and 1 copy on 
earth.  Wouldn't the probability of remaining on Earth be equal to 1/6th?



While I can see it this way, I can also shift my perspective so that I 
see the probability as 1/32 (since each time the teleport button is 
pressed, I split in two).  It is easier for me to see how this works 
in quantum mechanics under the following experiment:


I choose 5 different electrons and measure the spin on the y-axis, the 
probability that I measure all 5 to be in the up state is 1 in 32 (as 
I have caused 5 splittings), but what if the experiment is: measure 
the spin states of up to 5 electrons, but stop once you find one in 
the up state.  In this case it seems there are 6 copies of me, with 
the following records:


1. D
2. DU
3. DDU
4. DDDU
5. U
6. D

However, not all of these copies should have the same measure.   The 
way I see it is they have the following probabilities:


1. D (1/2)
2. DU (1/4)
3. DDU (1/8)
4. DDDU (1/16)
5. U (1/32)
6. D (1/32)

I suppose what is bothering me is that in the Mars transporter 
experiment, it seems the end result (having 1 copy on earth, and 5 
copies on mars) is no different from the case where the transporter 
creates all 5 copies on Mars at once.  In that case, it is clear that 
the chance of remaining on Earth should be (1/6th) but if the 
beginning and end states of the experiment are the same, why should it 
matter if the replication is done iteratively or all at once? Do RSSA 
and ASSA make different predictions in this case?


Thanks,

Jason
--

Hi Jason,

Fascinating! This decrease in probability given an increase in the 
number of copies would also hold if the copies had amnesia and could not 
identify themselves with the original?


--
Onward!

Stephen

Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
~ Francis Bacon

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Re: Church Turing be dammed.

2012-05-28 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:21 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales 
cgha...@unimelb.edu.au wrote:

 Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course.
 Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the
 sentiments

 
 It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want
 dinner. The cooling body of the dead thing at your feet seems to be your
 option. You have fire back at camp. That'll make it palatable. The fire is
 kept alive by the fire-warden of your tribe. None of you have a clue what
 it is, but it makes the food edible and you don't care.

 It's 1700ish AD. You are a French scientist called Lavoisier. You have
 just worked out that burning adds oxygen to the fuel. You have killed off
 an eternity of dogma involving a non-existent substance called phlogiston.
 You will not be popular, but the facts speak for you. You are happy with
 your day's work. You go to the kitchen and cook your fine pheasant meal.
 You realise that oxidation never had to figure in your understanding of how
 to make dinner. Food for thought is your dessert.

 It is 2005 and you are designing a furnace. You use COMSOL Multiphysics on
 your supercomputer. You modify the gas jet configuration and the flames
 finally get the dead pocket in the corner up to temperature. The toilet
 bowls will be well cooked here, you think to yourself. If you suggested to
 your project leader that the project was finished she would think you are
 insane. Later, in commissioning your furnace, a red hot toilet bowl is the
 target of your optical pyrometer. The fierceness of the furnace is palpable
 and you're glad you're not the toilet bowl. The computation of the physics
 of fire and the physics of fire are, thankfully, not the same thing - that
 fact has made your job a lot easier, but you cannot compute yourself a
 toilet bowl. A fact made more real shortly afterwards in the bathroom.

 It is the early 20th century and you are a 'Wright Brother'. You think you
 can make a contraption fly. Your inspiration is birds. You experiment with
 shaped wood, paper and canvas in a makeshift wind tunnel. You figure out
 that certain shapes seems to drag less and lift more. Eventually you flew a
 few feet. And you have absolutely no clue about the microscopic physics of
 flight.

 It is a hundred years later and you are a trainee pilot doing 'touch and
 go' landings in a simulator. The physics of flight is in the massive
 computer system running the simulator. Just for fun you stall your jetliner
 and crash it into a local shopping mall. Today you have flown 146, 341 km.
 As you leave the simulator, you remind yourself that the physics of flight
 in the computer and flight itself are not the same thing, and that nobody
 died today.

 No-one ever needed a theory of combustion prior to cooking dinner with it.
 We cooked dinner and then we eventually learned a theory of combustion.

 No-one needed the deep details of flight physics to work out how to fly.
 We few, then we figured out how the physics of flight worked.

 This is the story of the growth of scientific knowledge of the natural
 world. It has been this way for thousands of years. Any one of us could
 think of a hundred examples of exactly this kind of process. In a modern
 world of computing and physics, never before have we had more power to
 examine in detail, whatever are the objects of our study. And in each and
 every case, if anyone told you that a computed model of the natural world
 and the natural world are literally the same thing, you'd brand them daft
 or deluded and probably not entertain their contribution as having any
 value.

 Well almost. There's one special place where not only is that very
 delusion practised on a massive scale, if you question the behaviour, you
 are suddenly confronted with a generationally backed systematic raft of
 unjustified excuses, perhaps 'policies'?, handed from mentor to novice with
 such unquestioning faith that entire scientific disciplines are enrolled in
 the delusion.

 Q. What scientific discipline could this be?

 A. The 'science' of artificial intelligence.

 It is something to behold. Here, for the first time in history, you find
 people that look at the only example of natural general intelligence - you,
 the human reading this - accept a model of a brain, put it in a computer
 and then expect the result to be a brain. This is done without a shred of
 known physical law, in spite of thousands of years of contrary experience,
 and despite decades of abject failure to achieve the sacred goal of an
 artificial intelligence like us.

 This belief system is truly bizarre. It is exactly like the cave person
 drawing a picture of a flame on a rock and then expecting it to cook
 dinner. It is exactly like getting into a flight simulator, flying it to
 Paris and then expecting to get out and have dinner on the banks of the
 Seine. It is exactly like expecting