Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 08 Apr 2017, at 05:10, David Nyman wrote: On 8 Apr 2017 2:11 a.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote: On 4/7/2017 5:12 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 7 Apr 2017 11:53 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote: On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concea

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 08 Apr 2017, at 02:12, David Nyman wrote: On 7 Apr 2017 11:53 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote: On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concealed from the outside by a two-part public/private encryption scheme. Whereas the public part

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 8 Apr 2017 2:11 a.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote: On 4/7/2017 5:12 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 7 Apr 2017 11:53 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote: On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concealed from the > outside by a two-part public/priva

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 4/7/2017 5:12 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 7 Apr 2017 11:53 p.m., "Brent Meeker" > wrote: On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concealed from the outside by a two-part public/privat

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 7 Apr 2017 11:53 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote: On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concealed from the > outside by a two-part public/private encryption scheme. Whereas the public > part is in principle entirely extrinsically inspect

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 7 Apr 2017 11:22 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 07 Apr 2017, at 14:21, David Nyman wrote: On 7 April 2017 at 11:24, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 07 Apr 2017, at 00:11, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 6 Apr 2017 6:44 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: > > > On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wr

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 4/7/2017 3:22 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: As I remarked before, it is as if consciousness were concealed from the outside by a two-part public/private encryption scheme. Whereas the public part is in principle entirely extrinsically inspectable the decryption can be completed only in terms of

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 07 Apr 2017, at 14:21, David Nyman wrote: On 7 April 2017 at 11:24, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Apr 2017, at 00:11, David Nyman wrote: On 6 Apr 2017 6:44 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wrote: On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 7 April 2017 at 11:24, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 07 Apr 2017, at 00:11, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 6 Apr 2017 6:44 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: > > > On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: > > > On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, Davi

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 07 Apr 2017, at 00:11, David Nyman wrote: On 6 Apr 2017 6:44 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wrote: On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote: On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote:

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 06 Apr 2017, at 22:57, Brent Meeker wrote: On 4/6/2017 12:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2017, at 20:46, Brent Meeker wrote: On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purport

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 6 Apr 2017 6:44 p.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wrote: On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote: On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote: On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 4/6/2017 12:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2017, at 20:46, Brent Meeker wrote: On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported limitations of computation as the basis for h

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 06 Apr 2017, at 12:02, David Nyman wrote: On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote: On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote: On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote: I've been

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 6 Apr 2017 8:45 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote: On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote: On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purp

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 05 Apr 2017, at 22:51, David Nyman wrote: On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote: On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported limitations of computation as the basis f

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 05 Apr 2017, at 20:46, Brent Meeker wrote: On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that Bruno has given a

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 05 Apr 2017, at 12:54, David Nyman wrote: On 5 Apr 2017 9:54 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that Bruno has gi

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 5 Apr 2017 7:46 p.m., "Brent Meeker" wrote: On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that Bruno has given a tech

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 4/5/2017 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but I'm in

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 5 Apr 2017 9:54 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but I'm i

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

I add a commentary. Penrose and Hammerof did agree at the start, but then Hammerof's plea for a quantum brain made him back into computationalism, as a quantum computer is still a universal number. Penrose did not, as he was aware of this, and seem to want "non- computationalism", so he ne

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 05 Apr 2017, at 06:28, Jason Resch wrote: In my view, Penrose's theory that computation could not explain human thought was based on the flawed idea that there exist problems that humans could solve which no computer could. I prepared the following to offer my explanation for why this i

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

On 04 Apr 2017, at 16:47, David Nyman wrote: I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but I'm insufficiently competent in the relevant are

Re: Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

In my view, Penrose's theory that computation could not explain human thought was based on the flawed idea that there exist problems that humans could solve which no computer could. I prepared the following to offer my explanation for why this is an unsupported supposition: - In gener

Question for Bruno about Lucas/Penrose

I've been thinking about the Lucas/Penrose view of the purported limitations of computation as the basis for human thought. I know that Bruno has given a technical refutation of this position, but I'm insufficiently competent in the relevant areas for this to be intuitively convincing for me. So I'

Re: A question for Bruno

I realise I did not answer this post. As the step 7 is crucial, I will make some remark, and try to answer the question. Sorry for the delay Charles. On 28 Aug 2016, at 00:38, Charles Goodwin wrote: Hi everyone and everything, I was discussing comp and similar things with Liz the other day

Re: A question for Bruno

On 16 Sep 2016, at 17:40, Stephen Paul King wrote: On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 11:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Sep 2016, at 01:29, Stephen Paul King wrote: On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: I get that and buy i

Re: A question for Bruno

I apologize but it seems that none of us has time to explain other people's ideas to each other or to read their papers for ourselves. On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 11:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 16 Sep 2016, at 03:27, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > The idea is to think of computations as discret

Re: A question for Bruno

On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 11:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 16 Sep 2016, at 01:29, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > > > On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote: > >> >> >> On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: >> >> I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" C

Re: A question for Bruno

On 16 Sep 2016, at 03:27, Stephen Paul King wrote: The idea is to think of computations as discrete, they do one thing: process one algorithm and halt. or not halt. You limit yourself to halting computation. If each halting computation is simpler than arbitrary computations, it happens th

Re: A question for Bruno

On 16 Sep 2016, at 01:29, Stephen Paul King wrote: On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete version, I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet co

Re: A question for Bruno

On 15 Sep 2016, at 20:03, Stephen Paul King wrote: I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete version, I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet consistent theories and trying to make sense of computational languages that could use those theories. Remembe

Re: A question for Bruno

On 15 Sep 2016, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote: On 9/15/2016 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Sep 2016, at 02:13, Brent Meeker wrote: On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: In the UD model of the world, time as we perce

Re: A question for Bruno

On 15 Sep 2016, at 19:38, Stephen Paul King wrote: I think that time (and physicality) within 1p is sufficient, if there have a large enough plurality of interacting finite minds. What I have trouble with DM is that it is not obvious where we get that plurality. I still suspect that a weak

Re: A question for Bruno

That's a good example, actually! On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 10:17 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > Can you give an example? What I'm led to think of is something like: > % Add two and two > print "4" > halt > > Brent > > > > On 9/15/2016 6:27 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > The idea is to think

Re: A question for Bruno

Can you give an example? What I'm led to think of is something like: % Add two and two print "4" halt Brent On 9/15/2016 6:27 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: The idea is to think of computations as discrete, they do one thing: process one algorithm and halt. Obviously I am not talking

Re: A question for Bruno

The idea is to think of computations as discrete, they do one thing: process one algorithm and halt. Obviously I am not talking about Turing machines... On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 9:03 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 9/15/2016 4:29 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > > > On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47

Re: A question for Bruno

On 9/15/2016 4:29 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote: On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete version, I am looking for the i

Re: A question for Bruno

On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 6:47 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete version, > I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet consistent theories > > > I don't understand what you m

Re: A question for Bruno

What I meant was that the subjective experience of time would be the same whether there was a material universe with real time, a material block universe without time, or no material universe. On 16 September 2016 at 02:16, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 9/15/2016 4:44 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrot

Re: A question for Bruno

On 9/15/2016 11:03 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete version, I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet consistent theories I don't understand what you mean by that. I assume "theories" refers to axiomatic systems. I

Re: A question for Bruno

I get that and buy it too, Brent. Platonia is the "flat" Complete version, I am looking for the infinite tower of incomplete yet consistent theories and trying to make sense of computational languages that could use those theories. Remember that computers do not need to be Turing Complete if they o

Re: A question for Bruno

According to Bruno it's in Platonia. It's timeless and doesn't "go", it just IS, like 2+2 IS 4. Brent On 9/15/2016 10:13 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: OK, but where is the "motivation" that pushes the execution of the UD coming from? Where is the "go!" in the numbers? On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 a

Re: A question for Bruno

I think that time (and physicality) within 1p is sufficient, if there have a large enough plurality of interacting finite minds. What I have trouble with DM is that it is not obvious where we get that plurality. I still suspect that a weak version of Tennenbaum's theorem could solve this problem, b

Re: A question for Bruno

On 15 Sep 2016, at 13:44, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 15 September 2016 at 05:25, Stephen Paul King > wrote: Hi Stathis, I really like this explanation of supervenience. I only worry that we need a lot more detail, of how exactly "A and B are unaffected if the timing, order or dura

Re: A question for Bruno

OK, but where is the "motivation" that pushes the execution of the UD coming from? Where is the "go!" in the numbers? On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 1:11 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > In this case we have a lot of threads and along each thread there is an > implicit order (the execution of the UD), but the

Re: A question for Bruno

In this case we have a lot of threads and along each thread there is an implicit order (the execution of the UD), but there is no inherent relative order of the threads. Brent On 9/15/2016 9:15 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: There is "time is a measure of change" concept, which lines up with w

Re: A question for Bruno

Could it be that the concrete is the subjective reflection of the abstract? On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 12:16 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 9/15/2016 4:44 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On 15 September 2016 at 05:25, Stephen Paul King < > stephe...@provensecure.com> wrote: > >> Hi Stathis

Re: A question for Bruno

On 9/15/2016 4:44 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 15 September 2016 at 05:25, Stephen Paul King mailto:stephe...@provensecure.com>> wrote: Hi Stathis, I really like this explanation of supervenience. I only worry that we need a lot more detail, of how exactly "A and B are

Re: A question for Bruno

There is "time is a measure of change" concept, which lines up with what you're saying: "... 'time' is only a real number..." The numbers are labels, not the change itself. On Thu, Sep 15, 2016 at 11:57 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 9/15/2016 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 14 Sep 201

Re: A question for Bruno

On 9/15/2016 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Sep 2016, at 02:13, Brent Meeker wrote: On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The "execution" of t

Re: A question for Bruno

On 15 September 2016 at 05:25, Stephen Paul King wrote: > Hi Stathis, > >I really like this explanation of supervenience. I only worry that we > need a lot more detail, of how exactly "A and B are unaffected if the > timing, order or duration of a and b are changed." works. AFAIK, this > requ

Re: A question for Bruno

On 14 Sep 2016, at 02:13, Brent Meeker wrote: On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia. So

Re: A question for Bruno

Hi Stathis, I really like this explanation of supervenience. I only worry that we need a lot more detail, of how exactly "A and B are unaffected if the timing, order or duration of a and b are changed." works. AFAIK, this requirement looks a lot like mutual independence, but it clearly can not

Re: A question for Bruno

> On 14 Sep 2016, at 10:13 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > >> On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >> >>> On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The >>> "execution" of the program is timeless a

Re: A question for Bruno

> On 14 Sep 2016, at 11:25 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > >> On 14/09/2016 10:13 am, Brent Meeker wrote: >>> On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The "e

Re: A question for Bruno

On 14 Sep 2016, at 03:25, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 14/09/2016 10:13 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The "execution" of the program

Re: A question for Bruno

Speaking of time: https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.04759 A minimalist approach to conceptualization of time in quantum theory H. Kitada , J. Jeknic-Dugic , M. Arsenijevic

Re: A question for Bruno

On 9/13/2016 6:25 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 14/09/2016 10:13 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The "execution" of the prog

Re: A question for Bruno

On 14/09/2016 11:24 am, Stephen Paul King wrote: "...an "observer moment" or a "thought" are infinitely many threads and there is no reference by which you can define cutting them all at "the same time"." I agree that there is no natural preference for a basis of the threads, but ISTM that e

Re: A question for Bruno

On 14/09/2016 10:13 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia. S

Re: A question for Bruno

"...an "observer moment" or a "thought" are infinitely many threads and there is no reference by which you can define cutting them all at "the same time"." I agree that there is no natural preference for a basis of the threads, but ISTM that each Intelligence has its very own basis of biases wh

Re: A question for Bruno

On 9/13/2016 7:22 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia. So the steps of the UD have no duration, the

Re: A question for Bruno

On 13 Sep 2016, at 16:22, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia. So the steps of the UD have no duration, they a

Re: A question for Bruno

Not to rehash an old chestnut, but can a bit dance on an infinitesimal? On Sep 13, 2016 10:22 AM, "Stathis Papaioannou" wrote: > > > On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The >> "execution" of the program is ti

A question for Bruno

On Sunday, 11 September 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: > In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The > "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia. So the > steps of the UD have no duration, they are logically prior to time and > duration. On the other h

Re: A question for Bruno

On Monday, 12 September 2016, wrote: Ahaa! So it is the monkey typing randomly that creates everything. But > where does he/it get the clock and the notion of a successor element? God > given? AG > Ordering by an external clock is unnecessary for a subjective sense of order. You remember yester

Re: A question for Bruno

On 11 Sep 2016, at 19:23, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, September 11, 2016 at 10:50:17 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Sep 2016, at 16:22, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi, Is there any consideration of the duration of the period of time of the moment? Are they assumed

Re: A question for Bruno

On Sunday, September 11, 2016 at 10:50:17 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 10 Sep 2016, at 16:22, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > Hi, > >Is there any consideration of the duration of the period of time of the > moment? Are they assumed to have vanishingly small durations? > > > > Duratio

Re: A question for Bruno

On 10 Sep 2016, at 16:22, Stephen Paul King wrote: Hi, Is there any consideration of the duration of the period of time of the moment? Are they assumed to have vanishingly small durations? Duration and moment are more like Bergson-Brouwer 1p notion. It emerges in the 1p statistics on

Re: A question for Bruno

In the UD model of the world, time as we perceive it, is emergent. The "execution" of the program is timeless and exists in Platonia. So the steps of the UD have no duration, they are logically prior to time and duration. On the other hand, I think so called "observer moments" must have dura

Re: A question for Bruno

Hi, Is there any consideration of the duration of the period of time of the moment? Are they assumed to have vanishingly small durations? On Saturday, August 27, 2016 at 7:44:16 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: > > On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 11:38 PM, Charles Goodwin > wrote: > > Hi everyone and

Re: A question for Bruno

Hi Charles, On 28 Aug 2016, at 04:37, Charles Goodwin wrote (to Telmo and Russell): Thank you, we should have remembered that zig-zag approach! Yes, that's the dovetailing, and we cannot avoid it because there is no algorithmic procedure to decide if a program (with or without input) will

Re: A question for Bruno

Thank you, we should have remembered that zig-zag approach! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To p

Re: A question for Bruno

On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 03:38:40PM -0700, Charles Goodwin wrote: > Hi everyone and everything, I was discussing comp and similar things with > Liz the other day and we came across a sticking point in what I think (from > memory) is step 7 of the UDA. Maybe you can help? > > I'm assuming AR, "Yes

Re: A question for Bruno

On Sat, Aug 27, 2016 at 11:38 PM, Charles Goodwin wrote: > Hi everyone and everything, I was discussing comp and similar things with > Liz the other day and we came across a sticking point in what I think (from > memory) is step 7 of the UDA. Maybe you can help? > > I'm assuming AR, "Yes, Doctor"

A question for Bruno

Hi everyone and everything, I was discussing comp and similar things with Liz the other day and we came across a sticking point in what I think (from memory) is step 7 of the UDA. Maybe you can help? I'm assuming AR, "Yes, Doctor" and so on. At step 7 we reach the point where we assume that a p

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

On 6 December 2013 14:35, meekerdb wrote: > Yeah, that's Susskinds firewall idea. Just above the event horizon, > within a few Planck lengths, the strings corresponding to stuff that fell > in are spread over the surface and their degrees of freedom account for the > entropy. But the same info

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

On 12/5/2013 5:18 PM, LizR wrote: On 6 December 2013 08:08, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: The hypothesis is that BHs have entropy the same way as everything else, except that the microscopic degrees of freedom are in spacetime - which isn't understood. So are you say

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

On 6 December 2013 08:08, meekerdb wrote: > The hypothesis is that BHs have entropy the same way as everything else, > except that the microscopic degrees of freedom are in spacetime - which > isn't understood. > So are you saying that black holes have emergent entropy, and that it wouldn't be "

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

On 12/5/2013 2:35 AM, LizR wrote: On 5 December 2013 21:53, Alberto G. Corona > wrote: I´m very interested in what you question. One of the wonders of life is how a living being select relevant information from the environment for their needs. I think that

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

I think with black holes there's a physically natural coarse-graining defined by the "no-hair theorem" which says that in classical general relativity, the only distinguishing characteristics of black holes are mass, charge and angular momentum, they bear no other traces of the particular configura

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

As far as I remember, the entropy of the black hole is measured in absolute terms. that is, taking the information from the most fundamental level, at the Planck scale. But the entropy of a jar is relative to the jar broken state, not absolute. The example of a gas is more clear than the one of th

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

On 5 December 2013 21:53, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > I´m very interested in what you question. One of the wonders of life is > how a living being select relevant information from the environment for > their needs. I think that the aestetic sense is a heavy part of the > activity of the mind at th

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

c >>> would be physical in an absolute sense, but a representation of one >>> experience (like a football) within another (a human being's visualization) >>> would allow 'physical' to serve to differentiate the represented football >>> as non-physical

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

e (like a football) within another (a human being's visualization) >> would allow 'physical' to serve to differentiate the represented football >> as non-physical relative to the presented football, but the represented >> football would still be ontologically p

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

Craig > > >> I don't get what his point is? How reductionist (which is philosophy not >> physics) does he want us all to get? This is what I suspect he is going >> for. To be the Dawkins of physics. >> -----Original Message- >> From: freqflyer07281972 >

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

A good exposition. It doesn't address the questions of the alignment of thermodynamic, radiation, and spacetime expansion though. This paper may be of interest: Arrows of Time in the Bouncing Universes of the No-boundary Quantum State James Hartle

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

; -Original Message- > From: Alberto G. Corona > To: everything-list > Sent: Wed, Dec 4, 2013 6:38 am > Subject: Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether > information is physical. > > Yes there is no loss of information* at the lowest level,* that is at

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

not > physics) does he want us all to get? This is what I suspect he is going > for. To be the Dawkins of physics. > -Original Message----- > From: freqflyer07281972 > > To: everything-list > > Sent: Tue, Dec 3, 2013 9:17 pm > Subject: Question for Bruno Regarding t

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

? -Original Message- From: Alberto G. Corona To: everything-list Sent: Wed, Dec 4, 2013 6:38 am Subject: Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical. Yes there is no loss of information at the lowest level, that is at the quantum level . But at the

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

On Wed, Dec 4, 2013 at 12:03 AM, meekerdb wrote: > But if the processes are reversible (and they can be) then there is no > entropy increase and no heat. > But if it's reversible then there is no irreversible change in information either (such as what you'd get if you erased information) and Lan

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

osophy not physics) does he want us all to get? This is what I suspect he is going for. To be the Dawkins of physics. -Original Message- From: freqflyer07281972 To: everything-list Sent: Tue, Dec 3, 2013 9:17 pm Subject: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

-computation-for-life I 2013/12/4 meekerdb > On 12/3/2013 6:17 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: > > Hey everyone, > > Here is a question for Bruno (and anyone else who wants to chime in) -- > > I came across this > post<http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

On 04 Dec 2013, at 03:17, freqflyer07281972 wrote: Hey everyone, Here is a question for Bruno (and anyone else who wants to chime in) -- I came across this post over at Sean Carroll's Preposterous Universe blog, wherein he seems to be claiming that the relationship between inform

Re: Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

On 12/3/2013 6:17 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: Hey everyone, Here is a question for Bruno (and anyone else who wants to chime in) -- I came across this post <http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/11/28/thanksgiving-8/> over at Sean Carroll's Preposterous Universe blog, where

Question for Bruno Regarding the question of whether information is physical.

Hey everyone, Here is a question for Bruno (and anyone else who wants to chime in) -- I came across this post<http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/11/28/thanksgiving-8/>over at Sean Carroll's Preposterous Universe blog, wherein he seems to be claiming that the r

Re: A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains

On 4/3/2012 11:03 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Apr 2, 11:21 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Dick could have the same doubts about any medical treatment short of total brain replacement. Perhaps taking perindopril for hypertension turns people into zombies. The "same" doubts? Really? If philo

Re: A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains

On Apr 2, 11:21 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > >> Dick could have the same doubts about any medical treatment short of > >> total brain replacement. Perhaps taking perindopril for hypertension > >> turns people into zombies. > > > The "same" doubts?  Really? > > If philosophical zombies are p

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