Re: Carlo Rovelli: The Old Fisherman's Mistake

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 02.04.2021 um 22:24 schrieb 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List:



On 4/2/2021 1:10 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Am 02.04.2021 um 20:27 schrieb Brent Meeker:



On 4/1/2021 11:39 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Only philosophically naive neuroscientists reject realism .


I am sorry, I have not understood your answer. Do you mean that a 
person sees red flowers directly? In the same physical location?


I don't know what you mean by "directly". 


I mean direct vs. indirect realism:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_and_indirect_realism


 We have a theory of how people see red flowers.  It involves photons 
and brain processes andred flowers that are in a location.  I'm 
pretty sure you're familiar with this theory.  Do you reject it?


Do you mean the picture from Gray's book? It seems that you reject it, 
not me. I accept this picture and I am just waiting until you accept it.




Or you mean that the virtual world that a person sees is similar to 
the physical world?




Do you agree with the virtual world theory or do you reject it?


I don't know what "the virtual world theory" is.


The theory you are talking about finishes by excitation of neurons in 
the brain. Hence we must say that what a person sees is the brain's 
reconstruction of the external world. So the person sees some virtual 
world made by the brain, hence the name "the virtual world theory".


By that interpretation every theory is a theory about a virtual world, 
so the word "virtual" is empty.  The whole point of any theory or model 
is that it's about something else, F=ma doesn't express a theory about 
m.  Notice that neurons are a theoretical construct as well as flowers.


I agree that neurons are a theoretical construct. This is exactly a 
point in Hoffman's book that in my view in turn makes Rovelli's paper 
obsolete.


Let me cite your question from previous email.

>We have a theory of how people see red flowers.  It involves photons 
and brain processes andred flowers that are in a location.  I'm pretty 
sure you're familiar with this theory.  Do you reject it?


What is here theoretical constructs and what is reality? What we are 
talking about?



Brent



Evgenii


Brent



Evgeny


Am 01.04.2021 um 22:20 schrieb 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List:



On 4/1/2021 8:10 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Am 31.03.2021 um 20:16 schrieb Brent Meeker:
Yes, in general he sees the flowers where they are located (I 
don't know what "physically" adds to "located").  He can reach 
out with stick and accurately touch the flowers.  He can throw a 
ball and hit the flowers. If the lights were extinguished, then 
he could walk to the flowers in complete darkness.  So there is 
evidence that part of seeing the flowers is locating them in his 
model of the world.


But it is also possible he has been deceived by a hologram of 
flowers or he is delusional.


But none the above is affected by whether he accepts the modern 
theory of vision or Plato's theory...which was Rovelli's point.


Let me first remind you that neuroscience rejects naive realism. 


So does Rovelli.  So what?

To this end, I have attached a picture from the book Jeffrey A. 
Gray, Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem. It shows us 
that signals from the external world come to the brain and all 
conscious experiences results from brain's activity. So everything 
what a person feels including "He can throw a ball and hit the 
flowers" is basically generated by the brain (hence the name: 
Virtual world theory). Gray puts it this way


"For, just like those inner sensations, that world out there is 
constructed by our brains and exists within our consciousness. In 
a very real sense, the world as we consciously experience it is 
not out there at all: it is inside each and every of us."


When we speak about physical locations of objects - we speak about 
something that on the picture is shown as "Real unperceived 
world". When we talk about "He can throw a ball and hit the 
flowers", this belongs to three boxes at the bottom (conscious 
experiences) and this is clearly located somewhere else as the 
physical objects.


Do you agree with what neuroscience says? Or you prefer naive 
realism? In my view the attached picture makes a big difference to 
what Rovelli says. Yet, let us clear a position in the respect to 
the attached picture. Do we accept it or do not?


Only philosophically naive neuroscientists reject realism . Gray 
imagines that because perception happens in the brain (a material 
object) that he can dismiss the physical world. The physical world 
is a construct, but that doesn't mean it's unreal.  Here's Galen 
Strawson's explanation of why there is no "hard problem" of 
consciousness, with which I mostly agree: 
https://www.academia.edu/397808/Real_Materialism_2003


Brent






Brent

On 3/31/2021 7:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

"Sp

Re: Carlo Rovelli: The Old Fisherman's Mistake

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 02.04.2021 um 20:27 schrieb Brent Meeker:



On 4/1/2021 11:39 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Only philosophically naive neuroscientists reject realism .


I am sorry, I have not understood your answer. Do you mean that a 
person sees red flowers directly? In the same physical location?


I don't know what you mean by "directly".  


I mean direct vs. indirect realism:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_and_indirect_realism


 We have a theory of how 
people see red flowers.  It involves photons and brain processes and red 
flowers that are in a location.  I'm pretty sure you're familiar with 
this theory.  Do you reject it?


Do you mean the picture from Gray's book? It seems that you reject it, 
not me. I accept this picture and I am just waiting until you accept it.




Or you mean that the virtual world that a person sees is similar to 
the physical world?




Do you agree with the virtual world theory or do you reject it?


I don't know what "the virtual world theory" is.


The theory you are talking about finishes by excitation of neurons in 
the brain. Hence we must say that what a person sees is the brain's 
reconstruction of the external world. So the person sees some virtual 
world made by the brain, hence the name "the virtual world theory".


Evgenii


Brent



Evgeny


Am 01.04.2021 um 22:20 schrieb 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List:



On 4/1/2021 8:10 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Am 31.03.2021 um 20:16 schrieb Brent Meeker:
Yes, in general he sees the flowers where they are located (I don't 
know what "physically" adds to "located").  He can reach out with 
stick and accurately touch the flowers.  He can throw a ball and 
hit the flowers. If the lights were extinguished, then he could 
walk to the flowers in complete darkness.  So there is evidence 
that part of seeing the flowers is locating them in his model of 
the world.


But it is also possible he has been deceived by a hologram of 
flowers or he is delusional.


But none the above is affected by whether he accepts the modern 
theory of vision or Plato's theory...which was Rovelli's point.


Let me first remind you that neuroscience rejects naive realism. 


So does Rovelli.  So what?

To this end, I have attached a picture from the book Jeffrey A. 
Gray, Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem. It shows us 
that signals from the external world come to the brain and all 
conscious experiences results from brain's activity. So everything 
what a person feels including "He can throw a ball and hit the 
flowers" is basically generated by the brain (hence the name: 
Virtual world theory). Gray puts it this way


"For, just like those inner sensations, that world out there is 
constructed by our brains and exists within our consciousness. In a 
very real sense, the world as we consciously experience it is not 
out there at all: it is inside each and every of us."


When we speak about physical locations of objects - we speak about 
something that on the picture is shown as "Real unperceived world". 
When we talk about "He can throw a ball and hit the flowers", this 
belongs to three boxes at the bottom (conscious experiences) and 
this is clearly located somewhere else as the physical objects.


Do you agree with what neuroscience says? Or you prefer naive 
realism? In my view the attached picture makes a big difference to 
what Rovelli says. Yet, let us clear a position in the respect to 
the attached picture. Do we accept it or do not?


Only philosophically naive neuroscientists reject realism . Gray 
imagines that because perception happens in the brain (a material 
object) that he can dismiss the physical world.  The physical world 
is a construct, but that doesn't mean it's unreal.  Here's Galen 
Strawson's explanation of why there is no "hard problem" of 
consciousness, with which I mostly agree: 
https://www.academia.edu/397808/Real_Materialism_2003


Brent






Brent

On 3/31/2021 7:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

"Spatially separated"?   By how many meters?


It is a good question. Let us start with it. So a person sees red 
flowers as it has been shown in the colored part of the picture. 
The person sees the red flowers outside of him. However, could we 
say that the person sees the red flowers in the same position 
where the physical object is located? How would you answer this 
question? You changes in the picture do not give a clear answer to 
this question.


Evgeny


Am 30.03.2021 um 22:21 schrieb 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List:



On 3/30/2021 9:10 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> That is not at all what Rovelli says.  You still see red, but 
youhave
> learned that it is due to 564-580nm photons exciting neurons 
in your eye
> (b) and not rays reaching out from your eyes to contact 
redness (a).


I am afraid that it will not work this way. To show this, I have 
attached a picture from Dav

Re: Carlo Rovelli: The Old Fisherman's Mistake

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

>Only philosophically naive neuroscientists reject realism .

I am sorry, I have not understood your answer. Do you mean that a person 
sees red flowers directly? In the same physical location?


Or you mean that the virtual world that a person sees is similar to the 
physical world?


Do you agree with the virtual world theory or do you reject it?

Evgeny


Am 01.04.2021 um 22:20 schrieb 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List:



On 4/1/2021 8:10 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Am 31.03.2021 um 20:16 schrieb Brent Meeker:
Yes, in general he sees the flowers where they are located (I don't 
know what "physically" adds to "located").  He can reach out with 
stick and accurately touch the flowers.  He can throw a ball and hit 
the flowers. If the lights were extinguished, then he could walk to 
the flowers in complete darkness.  So there is evidence that part of 
seeing the flowers is locating them in his model of the world.


But it is also possible he has been deceived by a hologram of flowers 
or he is delusional.


But none the above is affected by whether he accepts the modern 
theory of vision or Plato's theory...which was Rovelli's point.


Let me first remind you that neuroscience rejects naive realism. 


So does Rovelli.  So what?

To this end, I have attached a picture from the book Jeffrey A. Gray, 
Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem. It shows us that 
signals from the external world come to the brain and all conscious 
experiences results from brain's activity. So everything what a person 
feels including "He can throw a ball and hit the flowers" is basically 
generated by the brain (hence the name: Virtual world theory). Gray 
puts it this way


"For, just like those inner sensations, that world out there is 
constructed by our brains and exists within our consciousness. In a 
very real sense, the world as we consciously experience it is not out 
there at all: it is inside each and every of us."


When we speak about physical locations of objects - we speak about 
something that on the picture is shown as "Real unperceived world". 
When we talk about "He can throw a ball and hit the flowers", this 
belongs to three boxes at the bottom (conscious experiences) and this 
is clearly located somewhere else as the physical objects.


Do you agree with what neuroscience says? Or you prefer naive realism? 
In my view the attached picture makes a big difference to what Rovelli 
says. Yet, let us clear a position in the respect to the attached 
picture. Do we accept it or do not?


Only philosophically naive neuroscientists reject realism .  Gray 
imagines that because perception happens in the brain (a material 
object) that he can dismiss the physical world.  The physical world is a 
construct, but that doesn't mean it's unreal.  Here's Galen Strawson's 
explanation of why there is no "hard problem" of consciousness, with 
which I mostly agree: https://www.academia.edu/397808/Real_Materialism_2003


Brent






Brent

On 3/31/2021 7:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

"Spatially separated"?   By how many meters?


It is a good question. Let us start with it. So a person sees red 
flowers as it has been shown in the colored part of the picture. The 
person sees the red flowers outside of him. However, could we say 
that the person sees the red flowers in the same position where the 
physical object is located? How would you answer this question? You 
changes in the picture do not give a clear answer to this question.


Evgeny


Am 30.03.2021 um 22:21 schrieb 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List:



On 3/30/2021 9:10 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> That is not at all what Rovelli says.  You still see red, but 
youhave
> learned that it is due to 564-580nm photons exciting neurons in 
your eye
> (b) and not rays reaching out from your eyes to contact redness 
(a).


I am afraid that it will not work this way. To show this, I have 
attached a picture from David Gamez, Human and Machine 
Consciousness, 2018. Primary and secondary qualities are not 
essential, what is important that manifest world (bubble of 
experience on the picture) is spatially separated 


"Spatially separated"?   By how many meters?

from the external world (black and white part). Photons from red 
flowers belongs to the external world but a person sees the red 
flowers somewhere else.


Which is completely beside Rovelli's point.  Rovelli is comparing 
two models of the external world that are both compatible with the 
manifest world.  Your cartoon version should be:







The spacial separation of the two worlds sometimes is referred to 
as the virtual world theory (Gamez's book is good illustration to 
this end). This directly follows from what you have written - 
information comes into the eyes and it does not come out. So the 
manifest world that the person sees is completely separated from 
the external physical world.


That's sel

Re: Carlo Rovelli: The Old Fisherman's Mistake

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 31.03.2021 um 20:16 schrieb Brent Meeker:
Yes, in general he sees the flowers where they are located (I don't know 
what "physically" adds to "located").  He can reach out with stick and 
accurately touch the flowers.  He can throw a ball and hit the flowers. 
If the lights were extinguished, then he could walk to the flowers in 
complete darkness.  So there is evidence that part of seeing the flowers 
is locating them in his model of the world.


But it is also possible he has been deceived by a hologram of flowers or 
he is delusional.


But none the above is affected by whether he accepts the modern theory 
of vision or Plato's theory...which was Rovelli's point.


Let me first remind you that neuroscience rejects naive realism. To this 
end, I have attached a picture from the book Jeffrey A. Gray, 
Consciousness: Creeping up on the Hard Problem. It shows us that signals 
from the external world come to the brain and all conscious experiences 
results from brain's activity. So everything what a person feels 
including "He can throw a ball and hit the flowers" is basically 
generated by the brain (hence the name: Virtual world theory). Gray puts 
it this way


"For, just like those inner sensations, that world out there is 
constructed by our brains and exists within our consciousness. In a very 
real sense, the world as we consciously experience it is not out there 
at all: it is inside each and every of us."


When we speak about physical locations of objects - we speak about 
something that on the picture is shown as "Real unperceived world". When 
we talk about "He can throw a ball and hit the flowers", this belongs to 
three boxes at the bottom (conscious experiences) and this is clearly 
located somewhere else as the physical objects.


Do you agree with what neuroscience says? Or you prefer naive realism? 
In my view the attached picture makes a big difference to what Rovelli 
says. Yet, let us clear a position in the respect to the attached 
picture. Do we accept it or do not?





Brent

On 3/31/2021 7:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

"Spatially separated"?   By how many meters?


It is a good question. Let us start with it. So a person sees red 
flowers as it has been shown in the colored part of the picture. The 
person sees the red flowers outside of him. However, could we say that 
the person sees the red flowers in the same position where the 
physical object is located? How would you answer this question? You 
changes in the picture do not give a clear answer to this question.


Evgeny


Am 30.03.2021 um 22:21 schrieb 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List:



On 3/30/2021 9:10 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

> That is not at all what Rovelli says.  You still see red, but youhave
> learned that it is due to 564-580nm photons exciting neurons in 
your eye

> (b) and not rays reaching out from your eyes to contact redness (a).

I am afraid that it will not work this way. To show this, I have 
attached a picture from David Gamez, Human and Machine 
Consciousness, 2018. Primary and secondary qualities are not 
essential, what is important that manifest world (bubble of 
experience on the picture) is spatially separated 


"Spatially separated"?   By how many meters?

from the external world (black and white part). Photons from red 
flowers belongs to the external world but a person sees the red 
flowers somewhere else.


Which is completely beside Rovelli's point.  Rovelli is comparing two 
models of the external world that are both compatible with the 
manifest world.  Your cartoon version should be:







The spacial separation of the two worlds sometimes is referred to as 
the virtual world theory (Gamez's book is good illustration to this 
end). This directly follows from what you have written - information 
comes into the eyes and it does not come out. So the manifest world 
that the person sees is completely separated from the external 
physical world.


That's self-contradictory.  If it's "completely separated" then 
information cannot come in.




One could claim that the external world is still similar to the 
manifest world as on the attached figure. Yet the main point of 
Hoffman's book that evolution must produce an opposite result. 


No.  His point is not that that it's the "opposite" of 
similar...whatever that would mean.  His point is that it's not 
identical and necessarily so in order that it serve natural 
selection. But the scientific theory of he world must be consistent 
with the manifest world...that's what empirical means.


Brent
Science is just common sense writ large and pursued rigorously.

So provided we believe in evolution we must say that the attached 
picture is wrong. Rather we should talk about pic. 2.7 on the link 
below - that is, about a thing in itself.


https://www.openbookpublishers.com/htmlreader/978-1-78374-298-1/ch2.xhtml 



Evgenii

Am 30

Re: Carlo Rovelli: The Old Fisherman's Mistake

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

> "Spatially separated"?   By how many meters?

It is a good question. Let us start with it. So a person sees red 
flowers as it has been shown in the colored part of the picture. The 
person sees the red flowers outside of him. However, could we say that 
the person sees the red flowers in the same position where the physical 
object is located? How would you answer this question? You changes in 
the picture do not give a clear answer to this question.


Evgeny


Am 30.03.2021 um 22:21 schrieb 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List:



On 3/30/2021 9:10 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

> That is not at all what Rovelli says.  You still see red, but you have
> learned that it is due to 564-580nm photons exciting neurons in your 
eye

> (b) and not rays reaching out from your eyes to contact redness (a).

I am afraid that it will not work this way. To show this, I have 
attached a picture from David Gamez, Human and Machine Consciousness, 
2018. Primary and secondary qualities are not essential, what is 
important that manifest world (bubble of experience on the picture) is 
spatially separated 


"Spatially separated"?   By how many meters?

from the external world (black and white part). Photons from red 
flowers belongs to the external world but a person sees the red 
flowers somewhere else.


Which is completely beside Rovelli's point.  Rovelli is comparing two 
models of the external world that are both compatible with the manifest 
world.  Your cartoon version should be:







The spacial separation of the two worlds sometimes is referred to as 
the virtual world theory (Gamez's book is good illustration to this 
end). This directly follows from what you have written - information 
comes into the eyes and it does not come out. So the manifest world 
that the person sees is completely separated from the external 
physical world.


That's self-contradictory.  If it's "completely separated" then 
information cannot come in.




One could claim that the external world is still similar to the 
manifest world as on the attached figure. Yet the main point of 
Hoffman's book that evolution must produce an opposite result. 


No.  His point is not that that it's the "opposite" of 
similar...whatever that would mean.  His point is that it's not 
identical and necessarily so in order that it serve natural selection. 
But the scientific theory of he world must be consistent with the 
manifest world...that's what empirical means.


Brent
Science is just common sense writ large and pursued rigorously.

So provided we believe in evolution we must say that the attached 
picture is wrong. Rather we should talk about pic. 2.7 on the link 
below - that is, about a thing in itself.


https://www.openbookpublishers.com/htmlreader/978-1-78374-298-1/ch2.xhtml

Evgenii

Am 30.03.2021 um 03:29 schrieb 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List:



On 3/29/2021 5:17 PM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
Rovelli is a loop quantum gravitation maven. This is a very 
ontological physics, and explains in part Rovelli's stance. The 
though has occurred to me that maybe LQG states are the kernel of 
some sort of target map. Either than or they are 
epistemic/ontologically uncertain and in an epistemic setting target 
map to zero.


LC

On Monday, March 29, 2021 at 2:05:33 PM UTC-5 use...@rudnyi.ru wrote:

    I have read Rovelli's paper. I am disappointed. What Rovelli
    suggest is eliminativism. Red (a) (what I see) does not exist but
    red (b) (electromagnetic wave peaking near 564–580 nm) exists.



That is not at all what Rovelli says.  You still see red, but you 
have learned that it is due to 564-580nm photons exciting neurons in 
your eye (b) and not rays reaching out from your eyes to contact 
redness (a). Rovelli is replacing one conceptualization with 
another...and telling us we should not become overly attached to a 
conceptualization.  I'm reminded of Lemaitre advising the Pope to not 
tie faith in the creation to the Big Bang.




    Rovelli should have read first:

    Donald D. Hoffman. The Case Against Reality: Why Evolution Hid the
    Truth from Our Eyes, 2019.



I don't think Rovelli would have any argument with it.  He certainly 
doesn't hold that the manifest world, which evolution has provided, 
is the real world.  Physics is all about using instruments and 
experiments and theories to find a more comprehensive and consistent 
concept of the world that produces the manifest world.


Brent



    Evgenii

    Brent schrieb am Sonntag, 28. März 2021 um 00:35:27 UTC+1:




     Forwarded Message 


    *The Old Fisherman's Mistake*

    ROVELLI, Carlo (2021)

    Abstract

    A number of thorny issues such as the nature of time, free
    will, the clash of the manifest and scientific images, the
    possibility of a naturalistic foundation of morality, and
    perhaps even the possibility of accounting for consciousness
   

Re: Carlo Rovelli: The Old Fisherman's Mistake

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

> That is not at all what Rovelli says.  You still see red, but you have
> learned that it is due to 564-580nm photons exciting neurons in your eye
> (b) and not rays reaching out from your eyes to contact redness (a).

I am afraid that it will not work this way. To show this, I have 
attached a picture from David Gamez, Human and Machine Consciousness, 
2018. Primary and secondary qualities are not essential, what is 
important that manifest world (bubble of experience on the picture) is 
spatially separated from the external world (black and white part). 
Photons from red flowers belongs to the external world but a person sees 
the red flowers somewhere else.


The spacial separation of the two worlds sometimes is referred to as the 
virtual world theory (Gamez's book is good illustration to this end). 
This directly follows from what you have written - information comes 
into the eyes and it does not come out. So the manifest world that the 
person sees is completely separated from the external physical world.


One could claim that the external world is still similar to the manifest 
world as on the attached figure. Yet the main point of Hoffman's book 
that evolution must produce an opposite result. So provided we believe 
in evolution we must say that the attached picture is wrong. Rather we 
should talk about pic. 2.7 on the link below - that is, about a thing in 
itself.


https://www.openbookpublishers.com/htmlreader/978-1-78374-298-1/ch2.xhtml

Evgenii

Am 30.03.2021 um 03:29 schrieb 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List:



On 3/29/2021 5:17 PM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
Rovelli is a loop quantum gravitation maven. This is a very 
ontological physics, and explains in part Rovelli's stance. The though 
has occurred to me that maybe LQG states are the kernel of some sort 
of target map. Either than or they are epistemic/ontologically 
uncertain and in an epistemic setting target map to zero.


LC

On Monday, March 29, 2021 at 2:05:33 PM UTC-5 use...@rudnyi.ru wrote:

    I have read Rovelli's paper. I am disappointed. What Rovelli
    suggest is eliminativism. Red (a) (what I see) does not exist but
    red (b) (electromagnetic wave peaking near 564–580 nm) exists.



That is not at all what Rovelli says.  You still see red, but you have 
learned that it is due to 564-580nm photons exciting neurons in your eye 
(b) and not rays reaching out from your eyes to contact redness (a). 
Rovelli is replacing one conceptualization with another...and telling us 
we should not become overly attached to a conceptualization.  I'm 
reminded of Lemaitre advising the Pope to not tie faith in the creation 
to the Big Bang.




    Rovelli should have read first:

    Donald D. Hoffman. The Case Against Reality: Why Evolution Hid the
    Truth from Our Eyes, 2019.



I don't think Rovelli would have any argument with it.  He certainly 
doesn't hold that the manifest world, which evolution has provided, is 
the real world.  Physics is all about using instruments and experiments 
and theories to find a more comprehensive and consistent concept of the 
world that produces the manifest world.


Brent



    Evgenii

    Brent schrieb am Sonntag, 28. März 2021 um 00:35:27 UTC+1:




     Forwarded Message 


    *The Old Fisherman's Mistake*

    ROVELLI, Carlo (2021)

    Abstract

    A number of thorny issues such as the nature of time, free
    will, the clash of the manifest and scientific images, the
    possibility of a naturalistic foundation of morality, and
    perhaps even the possibility of accounting for consciousness
    in naturalistic terms, seem to me to be plagued by the
    conceptual confusion nourished by a single fallacy: the old
    fisherman's mistake.

    http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18837/1/Pescatore.pdf
    


    Rovelli has it exactly right.

    Brent

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Re: Carlo Rovelli: The Old Fisherman's Mistake

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

I have read Rovelli's paper. I am disappointed. What Rovelli suggest is 
eliminativism. Red (a) (what I see) does not exist but red (b) 
(electromagnetic wave peaking near 564–580 nm) exists.

Rovelli should have read first:

Donald D. Hoffman. The Case Against Reality: Why Evolution Hid the Truth 
from Our Eyes, 2019.

Evgenii

Brent schrieb am Sonntag, 28. März 2021 um 00:35:27 UTC+1:

>
>
>
>  Forwarded Message  
>
>
> *The Old Fisherman's Mistake*
>
> ROVELLI, Carlo (2021)  
>
> Abstract
>
> A number of thorny issues such as the nature of time, free will, the clash 
> of the manifest and scientific images, the possibility of a naturalistic 
> foundation of morality, and perhaps even the possibility of accounting for 
> consciousness in naturalistic terms, seem to me to be plagued by the 
> conceptual confusion nourished by a single fallacy: the old fisherman's 
> mistake.
>
> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18837/1/Pescatore.pdf 
>
>
> Rovelli has it exactly right.
>
> Brent
>

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Re: Evolution 2.0 Prize - $10 million

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

I do not know if you have seen this paper:

Molecular Codes in Biological and Chemical Reaction Networks
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0054694

They claim that in random chemical networks one can find some semantic:

"High semantic capacity was found in the studied biochemical systems and 
in random reaction networks where the number of second order reactions 
is twice the number of species."


I guess that they should apply for the prize.

Evgeny

Am 19.01.2021 um 00:58 schrieb smitra:

On 18-01-2021 18:03, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Am 18.01.2021 um 01:01 schrieb Lawrence Crowell:

There are molecules that already do this. DNA and polypeptides are
sequences that are in effect codes.


Yes, this is exactly the point by the prize. The question is to show
how something like this could happen spontaneously.

Evgeny



It requires violating local thermodynamic equilibrium. I'm working on an 
article and a few presentations for upcoming conferences where I explain 
this in detail. This then proves that none of the current models for 
prebiotic chemistry can explain the origin of life. A viable scenario is 
to get to a large random organic structure forged in an interstellar ice 
grain, where organic molecules at low temperatures under UV irradiation 
will only interact with nearest neighbors. Thermodynamic equilibrium is 
never reached, the system moves farther and farther away from this as 
the reactions under UV radiation continue. This way one gets to large 
so-called percolation clusters of organic molecules that have a random 
structure.


Such random organic structures look totally useless to explain the 
origin of life, because what you want are the very specific molecules 
that are involved in the biochemical processes in living organisms. 
However, the structure of these random organic molecules is such that it 
has interior structures with compartments containing large random 
polymers and random interior surface structures. These can then serve as 
micro-environments within which prebiotic chemistry under normal local 
thermodynamic equilibrium conditions can work. With a finite number of N 
structures in a compartment one will break symmetries such as chiral 
symmetry at a level of 1/sqrt(N). Small molecules can escape the 
compartments via pores in the random structure while large molecules get 
trapped inside.


Saibal





LC

On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:28:18 PM UTC-6 use...@rudnyi.ru wrote:


"How do you get from chemicals to code? How do you get a code without
designing one?"

"What You Must Do to Win The Prize

You must arrange for a digital communication system to emerge or
self-evolve without "cheating." The diagram below describes the system.
Without explicitly designing the system, your experiment must generate
an encoder that sends digital code to a decoder. Your system needs to
transmit at least five bits of information. (In other words it has 
to be

able to represent 32 states. The genetic code supports 64.) "

https://www.herox.com/evolution2.0







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Re: Evolution 2.0 Prize - $10 million

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 18.01.2021 um 01:01 schrieb Lawrence Crowell:

There are molecules that already do this. DNA and polypeptides are
sequences that are in effect codes.


Yes, this is exactly the point by the prize. The question is to show how 
something like this could happen spontaneously.


Evgeny



LC

On Monday, January 4, 2021 at 12:28:18 PM UTC-6 use...@rudnyi.ru wrote:


"How do you get from chemicals to code? How do you get a code without
designing one?"

"What You Must Do to Win The Prize

You must arrange for a digital communication system to emerge or
self-evolve without "cheating." The diagram below describes the system.
Without explicitly designing the system, your experiment must generate
an encoder that sends digital code to a decoder. Your system needs to
transmit at least five bits of information. (In other words it has to be
able to represent 32 states. The genetic code supports 64.) "

https://www.herox.com/evolution2.0





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Evolution 2.0 Prize - $10 million

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

"How do you get from chemicals to code? How do you get a code without 
designing one?"


"What You Must Do to Win The Prize

You must arrange for a digital communication system to emerge or 
self-evolve without "cheating." The diagram below describes the system. 
Without explicitly designing the system, your experiment must generate 
an encoder that sends digital code to a decoder. Your system needs to 
transmit at least five bits of information. (In other words it has to be 
able to represent 32 states. The genetic code supports 64.) "


https://www.herox.com/evolution2.0

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Law without law: from observer states to physics via algorithmic information theory

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

"According to our current conception of physics, any valid physical theory 
is supposed to describe the objective evolution of a unique external world. 
However, this condition is challenged by quantum theory, which suggests 
that physical systems should not always be understood as having objective 
properties which are simply revealed by measurement. Furthermore, as argued 
below, several other conceptual puzzles in the foundations of physics and 
related fields point to limitations of our current perspective and motivate 
the exploration of an alternative: to start with the first-person (the 
observer) rather than the third-person perspective (the world). In this 
work, I propose a rigorous approach of this kind on the basis of 
algorithmic information theory. It is based on a single postulate: that 
universal induction determines the chances of what any observer sees next. 
That is, instead of a world or physical laws, it is the local state of the 
observer alone that determines those probabilities. Surprisingly, despite 
its solipsistic foundation, I show that the resulting theory recovers many 
features of our established physical worldview: it predicts that it appears 
to observers as if there was an external world that evolves according to 
simple, computable, probabilistic laws. In contrast to the standard view, 
objective reality is not assumed on this approach but rather provably 
emerges as an asymptotic statistical phenomenon. The resulting theory 
dissolves puzzles like cosmology's Boltzmann brain problem, makes concrete 
predictions for thought experiments like the computer simulation of agents, 
and suggests novel phenomena such as "probabilistic zombies" governed by 
observer-dependent probabilistic chances. It also predicts some basic 
phenomena of quantum theory (Bell inequality violation and no-signalling) 
and suggests a novel "algorithmic" perspective on the foundations of 
quantum mechanics."

https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.01826

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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 13.09.2019 um 03:11 schrieb spudboy100 via Everything List:
On that Evgenii, we do concur. Yet, big companies or big governments probably head to this guy's door, if they need something to ask?Now, that may not be a big deal unless he is contributing to the DoD? 


By organizing a military strike from the parallel universe?

Evgenii


Those comprising this group have interesting mathematical & quantum and cosmological 
philosophy, but we are not so prominent. The thinkers here participate because they love 
these topics, but their immediate impacts are something far off, potentially. Now, for me, 
MWI is fun, in the sense of science fiction is fun--unless we can somehow do trade somehow 
between Earths?I will buy Carroll's book if only for this reason. "A hominid's reach 
must exceed his grasp, or what's a multiverse for?" If he is absolutely wrong and we can 
prove it, then, very well, onward, to the World Series (Think FIFA World Cup).



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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

I am not sure that Carroll could solve a practical problem. To solve 
something I would go to engineers. Evgenii


Am 12.09.2019 um 20:09 schrieb spudboy100 via Everything List:

And yet...when somebody has a problem in physics needing resolving, they likely 
go to Professor Carroll and not many here. Possibly Standish from Aus, or Bruno 
from The Heart of Europe, than anyone on this auguste mailing list. Hilbert 
Space, De Sitter Space, it's probably the same (hypothesis!). It is all phase 
space, sez the Swami.


-Original Message-
From: Evgenii Rudnyi 
To: Everything List 
Sent: Thu, Sep 12, 2019 2:02 pm
Subject: Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

When the physicist says "The best answer we can give is that reality is a vector in 
Hilbert space", it shows that he cannot be cured.
Evgenii

Am Donnerstag, 12. September 2019 06:45:41 UTC+2 schrieb Alan Grayson:
https://www.wired.com/story/ sean-carroll-thinks-we-all- 
exist-on-multiple-worlds/



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Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

When the physicist says "The best answer we can give is that reality is a 
vector in Hilbert space", it shows that he cannot be cured. 

Evgenii

Am Donnerstag, 12. September 2019 06:45:41 UTC+2 schrieb Alan Grayson:

>
> https://www.wired.com/story/sean-carroll-thinks-we-all-exist-on-multiple-worlds/
>

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Re: The Neuroscience of Reality

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

And what about the paper in Scientific American? Is it also about a 
pseudo-problem? If not, what is the difference?


Evgenii

Am 04.09.2019 um 21:59 schrieb 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List:



On 9/3/2019 12:32 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

It looks like this is yet another virtual world theory, cf.

A Cartoon Epistemology by Steve Lehar
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/cartoonepist/cartoonepist.html


This is a pseudo-problem created by taking one view (parallel lines 
converge at infinity) and contrasting it to another view (parallel lines 
look parallel) as though the first was "real".  Obviously what pattern 
in on your retina is interpreted, and that the parallel lines are 
interpreted as parallel is the useful, shareable one.


Brent



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Re: The Neuroscience of Reality

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

It looks like this is yet another virtual world theory, cf.

A Cartoon Epistemology by Steve Lehar
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/cartoonepist/cartoonepist.html

Evgenii

Am 03.09.2019 um 08:12 schrieb Russell Standish:

On Mon, Sep 02, 2019 at 01:56:48AM -0700, Philip Thrift wrote:




Reality is constructed by the brain, and no two brains are exactly alike

By Anil K. Seth  (@anilkseth) | Scientific American September 2019 Issue

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-neuroscience-of-reality/



Interesting article. I might just forward this onto another correspondent of 
mine :)




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Artist and Picture by J.W. Dunne

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

"A certain artist, having escaped from the lunatic asylum in which, 
rightly or wrongly, he had be confined, purchased the materials of his 
craft and set to work to make a complete picture of the universe."


...

"The interpretation of this parable is sufficiently obvious. The artist 
is trying to describe in his picture a creature equipped with all the 
knowledge which he himself possesses, symbolizing that knowledge by the 
picture which the pictured creature would draw. And it becomes 
abundantly evident that the knowledge thus pictured must always be less 
the than the knowledge employed in making the picture. In other words, 
the mind which any human science can describe can never be an adequate 
representation of the mind which can make that science. And the process 
of correcting that inadequacy must follow the serial steps of an 
infinite regress."


https://scienceforartists.wordpress.com/2011/09/20/artist-and-picture-by-j-w-dunne/

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Re: Precision

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 16.05.2019 um 19:05 schrieb Bruno Marchal:



On 15 May 2019, at 19:01, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:

This is not a joke. For internal reason Eddington evaluated the number of 
particles as N = 2 x 136 x 2^256.


Is 136 related to some physical constant? Why 2^(a power of two)? Any idea 
where this estimation comes from, and why it would be exact?

This assumes a lot of thing about the universe, when we still don’t have a 
coherent descriptive theory, nor unanimity of what that could, and if that 
exists.

Then how to verify this?

Bruno


I have not read the Eddington book so I cannot explain on how he came to 
this result. Basically he thought that mind somehow is related to the 
Universe and God. Some kind of mystics.


My source of information is

Helge Kragh, Higher Speculations, Grand Theories and Failed Revolutions 
in Physics and Cosmology, 2011. Chapter 4, Rational Cosmologies.



Evgenii

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Re: Precision

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 15.05.2019 um 07:59 schrieb Philip Thrift:





...


On 12 May 2019, at 09:08, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:

‘I believe there are

15,747,724,136,275,002,577,605,653,961,181,555,468,044,717,914,527,116,709,366,231,425,076,185,631,031,296
protons in the universe, and the same number of electrons.’


Eddington, Arthur S. 1939. The Philosophy of Physical Science.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 170. The beginning of the Chapter
XI, The Physical Universe.




The number of electrons and protons stays the same?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pair_production



Eddington has written it at times where the number of known particles 
has been quite limited.


Evgenii


Pair production is the creation of a subatomic particle and its
antiparticle from a neutral boson. Examples include creating an electron
and a positron, a muon and an antimuon, or a proton and an antiproton. Pair
production often refers specifically to a photon creating an
electron–positron pair near a nucleus.

In 2008 the Titan laser aimed at a 1-millimeter-thick gold target was used
to generate positron–electron pairs in large numbers.

  
That "there is only one electron in the universe. All these electrons we

see are just the same electron weaving through space and time" would
explain telepathy and precognition.

@philipthrift



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Re: Precision

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

This is not a joke. For internal reason Eddington evaluated the number 
of particles as N = 2 x 136 x 2^256. To show it more vividly, he has 
written this result in full.


Evgenii

Am 14.05.2019 um 16:24 schrieb Bruno Marchal:



On 12 May 2019, at 09:08, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote:

‘I believe there are 
15,747,724,136,275,002,577,605,653,961,181,555,468,044,717,914,527,116,709,366,231,425,076,185,631,031,296
 protons in the universe, and the same number of electrons.’

Eddington, Arthur S. 1939. The Philosophy of Physical Science. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 170. The beginning of the Chapter XI, The 
Physical Universe.


Lol.

I guess this concerns the observable universe, which has grown a lot since 
1939. (Cf Hubble and “Hubble)

Any idea of why that particular number? Beyond the apparent joke?

Bruno






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Precision

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

‘I believe there are 
15,747,724,136,275,002,577,605,653,961,181,555,468,044,717,914,527,116,709,366,231,425,076,185,631,031,296 
protons in the universe, and the same number of electrons.’


Eddington, Arthur S. 1939. The Philosophy of Physical Science. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 170. The beginning of the 
Chapter XI, The Physical Universe.


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Re: beautiful visualization of the first million integers

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Thank you. It looks really good. Evgenii 

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Re: On natural selection of the laws of nature, Occam's razor and The Simplest Model

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

In Peirce's *Evolutionary love *there were also *anancasticism*, and 
*agapasticism*.  

"Three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us: evolution by 
fortuitous variation, evolution by mechanical necessity, and evolution by 
creative love. We may term them *tychastic* evolution, or *tychasm*, 
*anancastic* evolution, or *anancasm*, and *agapastic* evolution, or 
*agapasm*. The doctrines which represent these as severally of principal 
importance we may term *tychasticism*, *anancasticism*, and *agapasticism*. 
On the other hand the mere propositions that absolute chance, mechanical 
necessity, and the law of love are severally operative in the cosmos may 
receive the names of *tychism*, *anancism*, and *agapism*." 

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Mathematics as the result of natural selection

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

"In the past decades, recent paradigm shifts in ethology, psychology, 
and the social sciences have given rise to various new disciplines like 
cognitive ethology and evolutionary psychology. These disciplines use 
concepts and theories of evolutionary biology to understand and explain 
the design, function and origin of the brain. I shall argue that there 
are several good reasons why this approach could also apply to human 
mathematical abilities. I will review evidence from various disciplines 
(cognitive ethology, cognitive psychology, cognitive archaeology and 
neuropsychology) that suggests that the human capacity for mathematics 
is a category-specific domain of knowledge, hard-wired in the brain, 
which can be explained as the result of natural selection."


Helen De Cruz. Towards a Darwinian approach to mathematics. Foundations 
of science 11, no. 1-2 (2006): 157-196.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226764172_Towards_a_Darwinian_Approach_to_Mathematics

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Can a Robot Have Free Will?

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Keith Douglas Farnsworth. Can a Robot Have Free Will? Entropy 19, no. 5 
(2017): 237.


http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/19/5/237

"Using insights from cybernetics and an information-based understanding 
of biological systems, a precise, scientifically inspired, definition of 
free-will is offered and the essential requirements for an agent to 
possess it in principle are set out."


"The only systems known to meet all these criteria are living organisms, 
not just humans, but a wide range of organisms. The main impediment to 
free-will in present-day artificial robots, is their lack of being a 
Kantian whole. Consciousness does not seem to be a requirement and the 
minimum complexity for a free-will system may be quite low and include 
relatively simple life-forms that are at least able to learn."


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Mathematicians are machines that are unable to recognize the fact that they are machines

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

I am reading a Russian book about the “no computer thesis” based on the 
Gödel theorem. In the book there was a nice quote - see below - that 
somewhat close to what Bruno says.


"And if such is the case, then we (qua mathematicians) are machines that 
are unable to recognize the fact that they are machines. As the saying 
goes: if our brains could figure out how they work they would have been 
much smarter than they are. Gödel’s incompleteness result provides in 
this case solid grounds for our inability, for it shows it to be a 
mathematical necessity. The upshot is hauntingly reminiscent of 
Spinoza's conception, on which humans are predetermined creatures, who 
derive their sense of freedom from their incapacity to grasp their own 
nature. A human, viz. Spinoza himself, may recognize this general truth; 
but a human cannot know how this predetermination works, that is, the 
full theory. Just so, we can entertain the possibility that all our 
mathematical reasoning is subsumed under some computer program; but we 
can never know how this program works. For if we knew we could 
diagonalize and get a contradiction."


Haim Gaifman,
What Gödel’s Incompleteness Result Does and Does Not Show
http://www.columbia.edu/~hg17/godel-incomp4.pdf

Best wishes,

Evgenii

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Maudlin's Computation and Consciousness

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Dear Bruno,

Long time ago you have discussed Maudlin's paper. At that time I somehow 
did not get interested. Yet, other day I have got strong feeling that I 
must read Maudlin's paper right now. I guess this could be explained by 
peculiarities of the universal dovetailer.


Anyway, I have read Maudlin's paper, then I have read Hoffmanm's 
Sandman, and once more Maudlin's paper. I have enjoyed reading, the 
paper is nicely written. I guess I have understood the argument. Thank you.


Best wishes,

Evgenii

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Re: What are atheists for?

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 01.04.2017 um 23:50 schrieb Brent Meeker:



On 4/1/2017 12:39 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


...


I would like to note that in the paper that I have referenced
discusses a completely different question. Provided that one could
explain religion in the framework of evolutionary advantages, the
question arises whether one should also try to explain atheism in
the same framework.

In the paper there are references to empirical studies that show
that atheists have lower birthrates.


It's also true that atheists have a higher proportion of their
children survive to adulthood.  These are simply correlates: in
technological, educated societies people have fewer children and have
fewer of them die young - and they are less superstitious.


It might be good to check if this statement complies with empirical 
findings.



Dominic Johnson tries to explain this empirical fact in
evolutionary terms.


I looked up Johnson's papers.  Thanks for pointing him out.  Some
the theories in "The Elephant in the Room"  apply equally to current
politics, e.g. in section 3e:


Indeed, Johnson has a paper

Dominic D. P. Johnson, Bradley A. Thayer, The evolution of offensive 
realism: Survival under anarchy from the Pleistocene to the present, 
Politics and the Life Sciences, v. 35, N 1, p. 1 — 26, 2016.


that is pretty similar.

Evgenii




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Re: What are atheists for?

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 01.04.2017 um 10:45 schrieb Russell Standish:

Maybe we can think along the lines of why the "gay gene" persists.
Gay people make attentive uncles, improving the fitness of their
near relatives, or so the "just-so" story goes.

Maybe atheists are freer thinkers, able to think outside the box to
come up with solutions to important social problems. But presumably
society doesn't want too many free-thinkers, limiting the number of
atheists in society. Something like that.

Though how to explain that atheism in practice is probably the
dominant "religion" in Australia. And even more so amongst young
people, it appears. My son, who went to a nominally christian
school, said he only knew of two overtly christian boys amongst the
180-odd in his cohort.

Food for thought.




Yes, in the paper there are different hypotheses to explain evolutionary 
advantages for atheists. I especially like:


7. Catalyst
Presence of atheists facilitates adaptive advantages of belief

"The presence of atheists may indirectly improve the fitness of 
believers by catalyzing their beneficial interactions."


"atheists might, on the contrary, increase the benefits of religion to 
the group."


"This hypothesis is already implicit in some existing evolutionary 
theories of religion, which postulate advantages for believers that 
depend on the co-existence of other individuals with different beliefs."


Well, in Johnson's paper there are no mathematical models. To this end, see

Robert Rowthorn, Religion, fertility and genes: a dual inheritance 
model, Proc. R. Soc. B 2011 278 2519-2527.


Evgenii

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Re: What are atheists for?

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 31.03.2017 um 21:40 schrieb Brent Meeker:



On 3/31/2017 6:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



...



The problem is that the strong atheists called themselves just
atheists, and then claim they have no belief, when in fact they
believe in 0 god, unlike agnostic who say: I don't know, give the
definition and the theory.


There are also strong agnostics, i.e. those who hold it is impossible
to know anything about god(s).

Brent



I would like to note that in the paper that I have referenced discusses 
a completely different question. Provided that one could explain 
religion in the framework of evolutionary advantages, the question 
arises whether one should also try to explain atheism in the same 
framework.


In the paper there are references to empirical studies that show that 
atheists have lower birthrates. Dominic Johnson tries to explain this 
empirical fact in evolutionary terms.


Evgenii

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What are atheists for?

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Dominic Johnson
What are atheists for? Hypotheses on the functions of non-belief in the 
evolution of religion

Religion, Brain & Behavior
Vol. 2, No. 1, February 2012, 48-99

http://dominicdpjohnson.com/publications/pdf/2012JohnsonWhatAreAtheistsFor.pdf

"An explosion of recent research suggests that religious beliefs and 
behaviors are universal, arise from deep-seated cognitive mechanisms, 
and were favored by natural selection over human evolutionary history. 
However, if a propensity towards religious beliefs is a fundamental 
characteristic of human brains (as both by-product theorists and 
adaptationists agree), and/or an important ingredient of Darwinian 
fitness (as adaptationists argue), then how do we explain the existence

and prevalence of atheists - even among ancient and traditional societies?"

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Re: Self-explaining Game of Life?

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 16.10.2016 um 19:32 schrieb John Clark:
...



No, I do not know what life is. I guess, nobody does.



​You know what life is you just don't have a definition, but you
have something much better, examples. After being given a few
examples of things that are alive and things that are not it's easy
to put most new objects in the correct category, although a few
times, such as with viruses, it's a judgement call. Carroll gave us
neither a definition of "free will" nor a set of examples of things
that have it and things that don't, so I have no idea what the term
means.


Indeed, I have pretty good tacit understanding what life is. I guess, 
everybody has such tacit knowledge. The problem comes when one tries to 
express such knowledge explicitly.


Evgenii

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Re: Self-explaining Game of Life?

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Bruno,

I would say that Carroll believes that matter exists. He looks 
suspicious of ideal mathematical objects existing in Platonia, even 
though there is no explicit discussion about this in his book.


Hence, it looks like normal physicalism. Well, Carroll refers to his 
theology as poetic naturalism.


https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/poetic-naturalism/

The difference, in my view, is not that big though.

Evgeny

Am 15.10.2016 um 19:20 schrieb Bruno Marchal:


On 11 Oct 2016, at 19:43, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


I have listened to Sean Carroll's Big Picture. His world view is
actually similar to the Game of Life, well, the rules are a bit
more complicated. Below is the link to the equation that he
proposes.





Either it solves the measure problem, without using the quantum
solution (easy!), but in that case it is Turing equivalent with
"Universal Dovetailer", true (or provable) sigma_1 sentences, etc.
And then the task remains to deduce it from qG and qG*, to get the
genuine qualia relevant with the possible available quanta.

Not yet got the time to look at this. Busy times.






Carroll claims that his equation describes human beings as well.
He takes a compatibilist position in respect to free will: free
will is compatible with the determinism.


Thanks God!





At the same time, he says that his equation is the very strong
intellectual achievement of the mankind.


Now I have a doubt.





I thought that it could be possible to invent some sort of the Game
of Life where during the system evolution one gets the rule of the
game printed on the screen. In my view, this should be somewhat
analogous to what Carroll says. Well, it is hard to say in what
form the rules of the game should appear, but this after all gives
some freedom to invent such a game.

I should mention that I mean nothing fancy. "Explaining" is meant
in pure epiphenomenal fashion: an equation spontaneously appeared
on a sheet of paper, nothing else.

What do you think? Could it be possible to invent a
self-explaining Game of Life in that sense?


It is a standard result in mathematical logic that this is what
happens already in elementary arithmetic. Even just he polynomial
diophantine equation are like that.

And we are always confronted to our first person self localization
relatively to an infinity of "competing on your continuation"
universal machines "execution".

What is Sean Carroll theology? If it is an Aristotelian, it has to
provide the relevant non computationalist theory of mind to make it
internally consistent.

I can't insist more to study the mathematical theory of
self-reference (Gödel, Löb, ...) and its relation with the theory of
computability (Turing, Church, Post, Kleene, ...). Incompleteness
makes basically the rationalist and mystic theory of Moderatus of
Gades (and quite many variants) coherent, and somehow necessary.

You have to extract physics from self-reference if you want benefits
from the G - G* difference and manage the quanta and the qualia, the
sounds and the senses, the justifiable sense and the probable
theology which includes the natural science as a sort of limiting
bord of the universal mind (the mind of the universal machine).

Correct me if I am wrong, but from what I read before Sean Carroll
still assumes the theology of Aristotle (the belief in "Primary
Matter", or in its more modern epsitemological version
"physicalism"), doesn't he?

Bruno





Evgenii

P.S. Carroll's Game of Life:

http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/01/04/the-world-of-everyday-experience-in-one-equation/


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Re: Self-explaining Game of Life?

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

John,

At the level of common sense everything looks clear. Yet, when we start 
to consider the question scientifically, something strange happens: the 
common sense answer disappears, yet there is no other answer.


Evgenii

Am 15.10.2016 um 17:51 schrieb John Mikes:

OK, Evgenii, I am game. Do you have any closer(?) idea what *ALIVE*
may mean? (and watch out, the next question maybe about *"ORGANISM")
.*

I would not go that deeply as to question a (pure???) religious
concept.

Mit vorzüglicher Anerkennung   - (for 'best regards')

John Mikes

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 8:32 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru>
wrote:


John,

No, I do not know what life is. I guess, nobody does.

From what I have seen recently, I like:

"Life is a pure religious concept, based on delusion that there is
something in an organism that makes it alive."

Evgenii



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Re: Self-explaining Game of Life?

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

John,

No, I do not know what life is. I guess, nobody does.

From what I have seen recently, I like:

"Life is a pure religious concept, based on delusion that there is 
something in an organism that makes it alive."


Evgenii

Am 14.10.2016 um 21:08 schrieb John Mikes:

Evgenii,

do you have some idea about  "LIFE", not the '*Game *of it'? Are
there disclaimers that may lead to a STATE - callable 'life'? I would
not rely entirely on the biology, life may be much more and not
quite(?) moelcularly bound. How is 'mentality' involved? Changes???
(and I mean: self induced ones!) We have a very limited image of
Mother Nature. Is 'life' more, or less than our limited knowledge of
'nature'? Please do not forget: I am an agnostic and believe in many
many facets of the Entirety we know nothing about, yet supposedly
exist beyond our world. Is a 'self-induced change'  L I F E ? How
induced?

The question is exciting, I would learn more about it.

John Mikes

On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 1:43 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi <use...@rudnyi.ru>
wrote:


I have listened to Sean Carroll's Big Picture. His world view is
actually similar to the Game of Life, well, the rules are a bit
more complicated. Below is the link to the equation that he
proposes.

Carroll claims that his equation describes human beings as well. He
takes a compatibilist position in respect to free will: free will
is compatible with the determinism. At the same time, he says that
his equation is the very strong intellectual achievement of the
mankind.

I thought that it could be possible to invent some sort of the Game
of Life where during the system evolution one gets the rule of the
game printed on the screen. In my view, this should be somewhat
analogous to what Carroll says. Well, it is hard to say in what
form the rules of the game should appear, but this after all gives
some freedom to invent such a game.

I should mention that I mean nothing fancy. "Explaining" is meant
in pure epiphenomenal fashion: an equation spontaneously appeared
on a sheet of paper, nothing else.

What do you think? Could it be possible to invent a self-explaining
Game of Life in that sense?

Evgenii

P.S. Carroll's Game of Life:

http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/01/04/the-
world-of-everyday-experience-in-one-equation/

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Self-explaining Game of Life?

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

I have listened to Sean Carroll's Big Picture. His world view is 
actually similar to the Game of Life, well, the rules are a bit more 
complicated. Below is the link to the equation that he proposes.


Carroll claims that his equation describes human beings as well. He 
takes a compatibilist position in respect to free will: free will is 
compatible with the determinism. At the same time, he says that his 
equation is the very strong intellectual achievement of the mankind.


I thought that it could be possible to invent some sort of the Game of 
Life where during the system evolution one gets the rule of the game 
printed on the screen. In my view, this should be somewhat analogous to 
what Carroll says. Well, it is hard to say in what form the rules of the 
game should appear, but this after all gives some freedom to invent such 
a game.


I should mention that I mean nothing fancy. "Explaining" is meant in 
pure epiphenomenal fashion: an equation spontaneously appeared on a 
sheet of paper, nothing else.


What do you think? Could it be possible to invent a self-explaining Game 
of Life in that sense?


Evgenii

P.S. Carroll's Game of Life:

http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/01/04/the-world-of-everyday-experience-in-one-equation/

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Re: Conversations Between Trees

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

You may also like

Gagliano Monica and Grimonprez Mavra,  Breaking the Silence—Language and 
the Making of Meaning in Plants, Ecopsychology. September 2015, 7(3): 
145-152.
*http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/eco.2015.0023* 


I guess this belongs to Carroll's poetic naturalism: a way of talking.

Evgenii

Am Freitag, 16. September 2016 23:11:31 UTC+2 schrieb Jason:

> http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3792036/Do-trees-brains.html
>
> Jason
>

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Re: What it Means to Live in a Virtual World Generated by Our Brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 29.08.2016 um 15:02 schrieb Bruno Marchal:




...


Irrealism on the other hand states the the external world is a part
of the virtual world. I guess that Bruno's theory is close to
irrealism.



Except it is not a theory, but a theorem (in the mechanist theory,
which of course is not mine).

To avoid irrealism, you need to do a strong ontological commitment,
which contradicts mechanism + the usual weak use of Occam.

The author does not seem to be aware of the first person
indeterminacy , nor that mechanism and materialism are incompatible
(unless introducing an infinite amount of magic). Few are aware of
this, still, and I am not much astonished, given what I am reported
very often.



I have informed the author about your paper. Let us see what happens.

Best wishes,

Evgenii

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Re: What it Means to Live in a Virtual World Generated by Our Brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 28.08.2016 um 18:07 schrieb Jason Resch:

Why do we dream? I think it is because the brain is a dreaming
machine.

Waking life is merely a dream kept roughly in sync with reality
through clues passed in from the senses.


But this is exactly the question. What reality is for someone that 
cannot leave the virtual world by definition?


Evgenii

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What it Means to Live in a Virtual World Generated by Our Brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

I have found a nice paper

Jan Westerhoff, What it Means to Live in a Virtual World Generated by 
Our Brain, Erkenntnis (2016) 81:507–528


The author considers the logical consequences from the theory that the 
brain generates a virtual world. Below is how Richard Dawkins describes 
the theory in his book Unweaving the Rainbow


"We move through a virtual world of our own brains’ making. Our 
constructed models of rocks and of trees are a part of the environment 
in which we animals live, no less than the real rocks and trees that 
they represent."


"There is an easy way to demonstrate that the brain works as a 
sophisticated virtual reality computer. First, look about you by moving 
your eyes. As you swivel your eyes, the images on your retinas move as 
if you were in an earthquake. But you don’t see an earthquake. To you, 
the scene seems as steady as a rock. I am leading up, of course, to 
saying that the virtual model in your brain is constructed to remain 
steady."


Other proponents of the theory are Thomas Metzinger and Steven Lehar.

Westerhoff offers three accounts for such a theory: strong, weak and 
irrealism. They differ from each other on the account of an external world.


The strong account implies a structural correspondence between the 
virtual and external world. The week account just says that the external 
world exists but one can add almost nothing to this end.


Irrealism on the other hand states the the external world is a part of 
the virtual world. I guess that Bruno's theory is close to irrealism.


Evgeny

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Re: Cryonics in the NYT

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Neuroscience as a new messiah. People's belief in an afterlife will never 
go away. Especially in our enlightenment age.

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Re: Mathematics is Physics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

I would agree with you that my Darwin's quote does not express all the 
Darwin theory. The point was rather that among what Darwin has wrote one 
can find such statements as well.


I should say that I took this quote from Lewontin's review on the book 
Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini What Darwin Got Wrong


http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/27/not-so-natural-selection/

In the book you will find more references on how biologists define 
natural selection. In Lewontin's review by the way you will find similar 
critique of adaptationism.


I personally like a document

Units and Levels of Selection
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/selection-units/

where you will find a modern review of what biologists say. Let me quote 
from Section 2.4 The Manifestor of Adaptation Question about 
engineering adaptation.


Some, if not most, of this confusion is a result of a very important 
but neglected duality in the meaning of “adaptation” (in spite of useful 
discussions in Brandon 1978, Burian 1983, Krimbas 1984, Sober 1984). 
Sometimes “adaptation” is taken to signify any trait at all that is a 
direct result of a selection process at that level. In this view, any 
trait that arises directly from a selection process is claimed to be, by 
definition, an adaptation (e.g. Sober 1984; Brandon 1985, 1990; Arnold 
and Fristrup 1982). Sometimes, on the other hand, the term “adaptation” 
is reserved for traits that are “good for” their owners, that is, those 
that provide a “better fit” with the environment, and that intuitively 
satisfy some notion of “good engineering.”[7] These two meanings of 
adaptation, the selection-product and engineering definitions 
respectively, are distinct, and in some cases, incompatible.


Note that engineering adaptation is exactly selection for. Hence 
Fodor has not made it up. This is what you find reading at least some 
famous biologists.


In general, the starting point for Fodor were explanations as follows

‘We like telling stories because telling stories exercises the 
imagination and an imagination would have been a good thing for a 
hunter-gatherer to have.’


It is a typical explanation based on natural selection that you meet 
quite often nowadays. It is also similar to what was written in the 
paper on mathematics and physics. Yet, to prove it one must assume that 
natural selection can select for. Otherwise it will not work. The 
reason is related to coextensive traits. Provided one would like to 
prove the statement above by natural selection, one must explain 
selection of a particular coextensive trait. Yet, natural selection 
cannot differentiate coextensive traits, as they occur in nature 
simultaneously.


Evgenii


Am 25.08.2015 um 20:29 schrieb meekerdb:

On 8/25/2015 11:09 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

That's what most comments to Fodor's argument look like: this is
false because it must be false. But this king of answers are not
that impressive. It is up to you to believe that Fodor is wrong but
if you what to prove it, you must invest more time.

This is for example how Fodor describes natural selection:

One is its familiar historical account of our phylogeny; the other
is the theory of natural selection, which purports to characterise
the mechanism not just of the formation of species, but of all
evolutionary changes in the innate properties of organisms.
According to selection theory, a creature’s ‘phenotype’ – the
inventory of its heritable traits, including, notably, its
heritable mental traits – is an adaptation to the demands of its
ecological situation.


But that not what evolution says. If it did it would have implied
that Darwin's finches would be a single species, since they were all
in the same environment.  Let's see Fodor cite some reputable
evolutionary biologist who says this.


Adaptation is a name for the process by which environmental
variables select among the creatures in a population the ones whose
heritable properties are most fit for survival and reproduction. So
 environmental selection for fitness is (perhaps plus or minus a
bit) the process par excellence that prunes the evolutionary
tree.

There is more to this end in his paper. Finally, this is what
Darwin writes about natural selection in On the Origin of Species:

[natural selection] is daily and hourly scrutinising, throughout
the world, every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that
which is bad, preserving and adding up all that is good….

This is exactly what Fodor rejects.


Darwin is the first word on evolution, not the last, and you're
cherry picking from him. He also recognized sexual selection and
neutral, random variation.

Fodor writes, Hence natural selection should not only select a
trait, rather it must select for it.  Which is just his fantasy
interpretation of evolution.

Brent



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Re: Mathematics is Physics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

That's what most comments to Fodor's argument look like: this is false 
because it must be false. But this king of answers are not that 
impressive. It is up to you to believe that Fodor is wrong but if you 
what to prove it, you must invest more time.


This is for example how Fodor describes natural selection:

One is its familiar historical account of our phylogeny; the other is 
the theory of natural selection, which purports to characterise the 
mechanism not just of the formation of species, but of all evolutionary 
changes in the innate properties of organisms. According to selection 
theory, a creature’s ‘phenotype’ – the inventory of its heritable 
traits, including, notably, its heritable mental traits – is an 
adaptation to the demands of its ecological situation. Adaptation is a 
name for the process by which environmental variables select among the 
creatures in a population the ones whose heritable properties are most 
fit for survival and reproduction. So environmental selection for 
fitness is (perhaps plus or minus a bit) the process par excellence that 
prunes the evolutionary tree.


There is more to this end in his paper. Finally, this is what Darwin 
writes about natural selection in On the Origin of Species:


[natural selection] is daily and hourly scrutinising, throughout the 
world, every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, 
preserving and adding up all that is good….


This is exactly what Fodor rejects.

Evgenii

Am 24.08.2015 um 20:10 schrieb meekerdb:

On 8/24/2015 10:27 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Am 23.08.2015 um 19:47 schrieb meekerdb:

On 8/23/2015 12:07 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


...


The comments do not answer Fodor's argument. To this end, you
can read his answer to comments.


I read his answer and it's silly. He says that Darwin's
explanation of why polar bears are white is incoherent because
the natural selection of white polar bears doesn't entail
Darwin's explanation. But that's silly because scientific
explanations are never entailed by the experimental evidence they
explain.



To understand Fodor's answer it is necessary to understand his
argument. Shortly:

1) Natural selection is assumed to be unintentional. It just
happens but it does not has a goal.

2) The existence of coextensive traits in the organism is the rule.
 Hence natural selection should not only select a trait, rather it
must select for.


But that's Fodor's made up, imaginary version of natural selection.
Natural selection isn't required to select for some trait.  It only
means that given a situation some traits lead to more successful
reproduction than others.  Fodor is taking a metaphorical phrase,
reinterpreting it anthropomorphically, and then saying, See that
phrase doesn't apply.

Brent




3) Select for is a part of an intentional process. Hence
according to the point 1, natural selection cannot select for.

Whiteness of a polar bear is an coextensive trait. To select it
means to select it for. Natural selection cannot do it.

Well, one has also to define natural selection more carefully, as
it happens that different people understand what natural selection
is differently. Fodor's definition to this end is in the paper.

Evgenii





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Re: Mathematics is Physics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 23.08.2015 um 19:47 schrieb meekerdb:

On 8/23/2015 12:07 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


...


The comments do not answer Fodor's argument. To this end, you can
read his answer to comments.


I read his answer and it's silly. He says that Darwin's explanation
of why polar bears are white is incoherent because the natural
selection of white polar bears doesn't entail Darwin's explanation.
But that's silly because scientific explanations are never entailed
by the experimental evidence they explain.



To understand Fodor's answer it is necessary to understand his argument. 
Shortly:


1) Natural selection is assumed to be unintentional. It just happens but 
it does not has a goal.


2) The existence of coextensive traits in the organism is the rule. 
Hence natural selection should not only select a trait, rather it must 
select for.


3) Select for is a part of an intentional process. Hence according to 
the point 1, natural selection cannot select for.


Whiteness of a polar bear is an coextensive trait. To select it means to 
select it for. Natural selection cannot do it.


Well, one has also to define natural selection more carefully, as it 
happens that different people understand what natural selection is 
differently. Fodor's definition to this end is in the paper.


Evgenii

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Re: Mathematics is Physics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 23.08.2015 um 00:27 schrieb meekerdb:

On 8/22/2015 9:07 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

An argument based on a selection might be empty. See

Jerry Fodor, Why Pigs Don’t Have Wings
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n20/jerry-fodor/why-pigs-dont-have-wings


I guess you might get that impression if you read Fodor. But I
suggest you read the comments first and save yourself the trouble.


The comments do not answer Fodor's argument. To this end, you can read 
his answer to comments.


Evgenii

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Re: Mathematics is Physics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

An argument based on a selection might be empty. See

Jerry Fodor, Why Pigs Don’t Have Wings
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n20/jerry-fodor/why-pigs-dont-have-wings

Evgenii

Am Mittwoch, 19. August 2015 02:18:00 UTC+2 schrieb Brent:

 I like Wenmackers essay too. 

 http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Wenmackers_Wenmackers_FQXiE.pdf 

 Brent 

 On 8/18/2015 3:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
  
  
 http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.02770 
  
  
  (reverse of Tegmark) 
  
  cf. http://phil.elte.hu/leszabo/matfil/2015-2016-1/ 
  
  - pt 



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Leibniz: When God calculates, the world is made

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Leibniz' note on his Dialogs:

When God calculates and thinks things through, the world is made.

Cum Deus calculat et cogitationem exercet, mundus fit.

I have found it in M. Heller, Ultimate Explanations of the Universe.

Evgenii

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Re: In case anyone's in doubt, Daniel Dennett thinks consciousness is an illusion

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Philosopher Dan Dennett makes a compelling argument that not only don't we 
understand our own consciousness, but that half the time our brains are 
actively fooling us.

I wonder if Dennett has mentioned what percentage of time his brain was 
actively fooling him during his talk.

Am Dienstag, 2. Juni 2015 03:31:30 UTC+2 schrieb Liz R:

 http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_dennett_on_our_consciousness



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Re: Consciousness creates physics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Dear John,

Recently I have found a nice statement from David Hume, one of the 
greatest skeptics. Interestingly enough that Hume has declared that 
Nature is always too strong for principle, see below this statement in 
the context:


But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any 
constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would 
be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he 
will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his 
principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all 
action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till 
the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable 
existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. 
Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a Pyrrhonian may 
throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his 
profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put 
to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every 
point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other 
sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical 
researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join 
in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections 
are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the 
whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; 
though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy 
themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove 
the objections, which may be raised against them.


Evgenii

Am 26.04.2015 um 22:44 schrieb John Mikes:

Evgeniy, I, for one, like your approach on the Hoffmann-Prokosh
idea. In my terms (Ccness = REPLY (reflection?) to RELATIONS
definitely points to the Berkeley wisdom (to accept as existing one
must perceive the item, in concise Latin: *ESSE* (to include into our
worldview) *est PERCIPI*. Difference may be in faith-based religion
where ACCEPTANCE is also good enough. It may be an extension for the
Kantian 'revolution': our entire image of the WORLD (the Everything,
Nature, you name it) is the product of our mind. (And please, do not
ask what I mean by 'mind').

All our 'knowledge' about the WORLD(?) is the reflection of the human
mind on phenomena (items, processes) perceived in adjusted formats
available to the mind.  No justification and no formatting to any
'reality'. That includes the Hoffmann-Prakash Psychology as well. (I
did not read the paper). JM

On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 4:01 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru
wrote:


Dear Brent,

I would agree that it is unclear what conscious agents introduced
in the paper have to do with human consciousness.

For me it was interesting to see that the cognitive science is
close to Kantian revolution (space and time are created by the
mind) and that Berkeley's to be is to be perceived (esse est
percipi) is still actual.

The next natural step for the cognitive science would be radical
constructivism.

Evgenii

Am 26.04.2015 um 21:35 schrieb meekerdb:


I think the authors are more interested in being provocative than
in being clear.  For example:

/The interface theory entails that these first two steps were
mere warm up. The next step in the intellectual history of H.
sapiens is a big one. We must recognize that all of our
perceptions of space, time and objects no more reflect reality
than does our perception of a flat earth. It's not just this or
that aspect of our perceptions that must be corrected, it is the
entire framework of a space-time containing objects, the
fundamental organization of our perceptual systems, that must be
recognized as a mere species-specific mode of perception rather
than an insight into objective reality./ / //By this time it
should be clear that, if the arguments given here are sound, then
the current Bayesian models of object perception need more than
tinkering around the edges, they need fundamental transformation.
And this transformation will necessarily have ramifications for
scientific questions well-beyond the confines of computational
models of object perception./

There's no justification for the mere.  Our perception has
gone well beyond what biology provided.  Nor is there any reason
to suppose that the transformation they propose will be THE
OBJECTIVE TRUTH either. / //Similarly, most of my mental
processes are not directly conscious to me, but that does not
entail that they are unconscious./


This just seems to make of muddle of what is meant by
conscious.

Anyway, I'll finish reading it.  I think an explanation of
consciousness based on evolution is one useful approach.

Brent

On 4/26/2015 1:22 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


Enjoy. Evgenii

Donald David Hoffman, Chetan Prakash, Objects of
consciousness, Frontiers in Psychology, v. 5, N 00577, 2014.

http://journal.frontiersin.org/article

Consciousness creates physics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Enjoy. Evgenii

Donald David Hoffman, Chetan Prakash, Objects of consciousness, 
Frontiers in Psychology, v. 5, N 00577, 2014.


http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00577/full

“We develop the dynamics of interacting conscious agents, and study how 
the perception of objects and space-time can emerge from such dynamics. 
We show that one particular object, the quantum free particle, has a 
wave function that is identical in form to the harmonic functions that 
characterize the asymptotic dynamics of conscious agents; particles are 
vibrations not of strings but of interacting conscious agents. This 
allows us to reinterpret physical properties such as position, momentum, 
and energy as properties of interacting conscious agents, rather than as 
preexisting physical truths.”


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Re: Consciousness creates physics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Dear Brent,

I would agree that it is unclear what conscious agents introduced in the 
paper have to do with human consciousness.


For me it was interesting to see that the cognitive science is close to 
Kantian revolution (space and time are created by the mind) and that 
Berkeley's to be is to be perceived (esse est percipi) is still actual.


The next natural step for the cognitive science would be radical 
constructivism.


Evgenii

Am 26.04.2015 um 21:35 schrieb meekerdb:

I think the authors are more interested in being provocative than in
 being clear.  For example:

/The interface theory entails that these first two steps were mere
warm up. The next step in the intellectual history of H. sapiens is a
big one. We must recognize that all of our perceptions of space, time
and objects no more reflect reality than does our perception of a
flat earth. It's not just this or that aspect of our perceptions that
must be corrected, it is the entire framework of a space-time
containing objects, the fundamental organization of our perceptual
systems, that must be recognized as a mere species-specific mode of
perception rather than an insight into objective reality./ / //By
this time it should be clear that, if the arguments given here are
sound, then the current Bayesian models of object perception need
more than tinkering around the edges, they need fundamental
transformation. And this transformation will necessarily have
ramifications for scientific questions well-beyond the confines of
computational models of object perception./

There's no justification for the mere.  Our perception has gone
well beyond what biology provided.  Nor is there any reason to
suppose that the transformation they propose will be THE OBJECTIVE
TRUTH either. / //Similarly, most of my mental processes are not
directly conscious to me, but that does not entail that they are
unconscious./

This just seems to make of muddle of what is meant by conscious.

Anyway, I'll finish reading it.  I think an explanation of
consciousness based on evolution is one useful approach.

Brent

On 4/26/2015 1:22 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Enjoy. Evgenii

Donald David Hoffman, Chetan Prakash, Objects of consciousness,
Frontiers in Psychology, v. 5, N 00577, 2014.

http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00577/full




“We develop the dynamics of interacting conscious agents, and study

how the perception of objects and space-time can emerge from such
dynamics. We show that one particular object, the quantum free
particle, has a wave function that is identical in form to the
harmonic functions that characterize the asymptotic dynamics of
conscious agents; particles are vibrations not of strings but of
interacting conscious agents. This allows us to reinterpret
physical properties such as position, momentum, and energy as
properties of interacting conscious agents, rather than as
preexisting physical truths.”





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Re: Galen Strawson: Consciousness myth

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 16.03.2015 um 17:13 schrieb Bruno Marchal:


On 15 Mar 2015, at 20:37, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


http://www.the-tls.co.uk/tls/public/article1523413.ece

An interesting paper that reviews the history on consciousness in
philosophy in order to display that

Twenty years ago, however, an instant myth was born: a myth about
a dramatic resurgence of interest in the topic of consciousness in
 philosophy, in the mid-1990s, after long neglect.


I am not sure that it was a myth. I have wittnessed it, as the
subject of consciousness was an ultra-taboo subject, even for most
psychologist. Scientist were, more or less consciously, influence by
positivisme. There are just been an understanding that positivism and
 instrumentalistm where incoherent.


If to speak about psychology or neuroscience, then you are write. But 
this is a myth when we speak about philosophy. A quote is below.


In the case of psychology the story of resurgence has some truth. There 
are doubts about its timing. The distinguished psychologist of memory 
Endel Tulving places it in the 1980s. “Consciousness has recently again 
been declared to be the central problem of psychology”, he wrote in 
1985, citing a number of other authors. The great dam of behaviouristic 
psychology was cracking and spouting. It was bursting. Even so, there 
was a further wave of liberation in psychology in the 1990s. Discussion 
of consciousness regained full respectability after seventy years of 
marginalization, although there were of course (and still are) a few 
holdouts.


In the case of philosophy, however, the story of resurgence is simply a 
myth. There was a small but fashionable group of philosophers of mind 
who in the 1970s and 80s focused particularly on questions about belief 
and “intentionality”, and had relatively little to say about 
consciousness. Their intensely parochial outlook may be one of the 
origins of the myth. But the problem of consciousness, the “hard 
problem”, remained central throughout those years. It never shifted from 
the heart of the discipline taken as a whole.



Evgeny

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Galen Strawson: Consciousness myth

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

http://www.the-tls.co.uk/tls/public/article1523413.ece

An interesting paper that reviews the history on consciousness in 
philosophy in order to display that


Twenty years ago, however, an instant myth was born: a myth about a 
dramatic resurgence of interest in the topic of consciousness in 
philosophy, in the mid-1990s, after long neglect.


It happens that philosophical zombies have been invented already in 18th 
century


'In 1755 Charles Bonnet observed that God “could create an automaton 
that would imitate perfectly all the external and internal actions of 
man”. In 1769, following Locke, he made a nice point against those who 
resisted materialism on religious grounds: “if someone ever proved that 
the mind is material, then far from being alarmed, we should have to 
admire the power that was able to give matter the capacity to think”.'


Evgenii


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Re: Long term memory is extra-corporeal

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

I should say that I am not an expert in this issue, however I have found 
the paper entertaining. The history of Samuel Butler is quite 
interesting. Butler in 19th century held that heredity and brain memory 
both involved the storage of information and that the two forms of 
storage were the same. Now there are even more papers along this line, 
see for example the abstract


DNA methylation and memory formation
http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v13/n11/abs/nn.2666.html

Memory formation and storage require long-lasting changes in 
memory-related neuronal circuits. Recent evidence indicates that DNA 
methylation may serve as a contributing mechanism in memory formation 
and storage.


Although the meaning of the term long term memory might not be exactly 
the same.


Evgeii


Am 26.12.2014 um 22:06 schrieb meekerdb:

On 12/26/2014 11:56 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Am 26.12.2014 um 19:55 schrieb meekerdb:



But to say that DNA provides long term memory seems like an
abuse of terminology, making a metaphor into a factual
description. DNA provides memory only in that sometimes parts
of it get to reproduce.  Genes are more persistent units, but
their memory is just get copied to not. There's nothing
Lamarckian about it, much less extra-corporeal survival of
memories.  Memories are necessarily things that are remembered.
I don't remember any previous life and I doubt that you do
either.


From the paper:

In the twenty-first century the Hebbian network hypothesis came
under attack and attention returned to storage of specific items of
mental information as DNA (Dietrich and Been, 2001; Arshavsky,
2006a).

Dietrich, A., Been, W., 2001. Memory and DNA. J. Theor. Biol. 208,
 145-149.

Arshavsky, Y. I., 2006a. ‘The seven sins’ of the Hebbian synapse:
can the hypothesis of synaptic plasticity explain long-term memory?
Prog. Neurobiol. 80, 99-113.


Evgenii



I can't get the first paper.  The second is nonsense.  Arshavsky
claims that long-term memory can't be based on network structure
because it's not stable - but he doesn't provide any empirical
evidence that it's not stable enough.  He ignores the fact that very
little information is actually retained in long-term memory (do you
remember what you had for lunch on this day last month?) and
concentrates on the small amount that is.  He ignores the studies
finding that recalling memories tends to change them.  And he does
nothing to support his DNA theory except to say DNA is more stable.
It would be trivial to look at some brain cells and see whether they
have identical DNA or not - which would blow away his theory.

Brent



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Re: Long term memory is extra-corporeal

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 27.12.2014 um 22:33 schrieb meekerdb:

On 12/27/2014 12:05 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

I should say that I am not an expert in this issue, however I have
 found the paper entertaining. The history of Samuel Butler is
quite interesting. Butler in 19th century held that heredity and
brain memory both involved the storage of information and that the
two forms of storage were the same. Now there are even more papers
along this line, see for example the abstract

DNA methylation and memory formation
http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v13/n11/abs/nn.2666.html

Memory formation and storage require long-lasting changes in
memory-related neuronal circuits. Recent evidence indicates that
DNA methylation may serve as a contributing mechanism in memory
formation and storage.


Notice how vague may serve as a contributing mechanism is.  He
starts the paper by claiming that memory must be at the molecular
level because it lasts a lifetime, BUT the only molecule that is
persistent over that span is DNA.  So he's skipped right over the
possibility of structural persistence of neural networks.  He might
as well have concluded that memory is in bones, because the last a
lifetime.  But then when he tries to imagine a way of coding
information in DNA the only possibility if methylation. Unfortunately
for his theory he finds methylation is dynamic (which he would have
called unstable except that would make his hypothesis obviously
wrong).  The whole paper is speculation to support and conclusion
that was assumed at the beginning.



I would agree that the idea is vague. Yet, scientists discuss it and 
this is not the only paper in this direction, Google Scholar shows that 
this theme is quite popular nowadays.


The main point here is that what these scientists claim is close to 
Butler's ideas. An interesting twist in thinking especially if to 
observe it from historical perspective.


Evgenii

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Re: Long term memory is extra-corporeal

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Am 26.12.2014 um 19:55 schrieb meekerdb:



But to say that DNA provides long term memory seems like an abuse
of terminology, making a metaphor into a factual description.  DNA
provides memory only in that sometimes parts of it get to
reproduce.  Genes are more persistent units, but their memory is
just get copied to not. There's nothing Lamarckian about it, much
less extra-corporeal survival of memories.  Memories are necessarily
things that are remembered.  I don't remember any previous life and I
doubt that you do either.


From the paper:

In the twenty-first century the Hebbian network hypothesis came under 
attack and attention returned to storage of specific items of mental 
information as DNA (Dietrich and Been, 2001; Arshavsky, 2006a).


Dietrich, A., Been, W., 2001. Memory and DNA. J. Theor. Biol. 208, 145-149.

Arshavsky, Y. I., 2006a. ‘The seven sins’ of the Hebbian synapse: can 
the hypothesis of synaptic plasticity explain long-term memory? Prog. 
Neurobiol. 80, 99-113.



Evgenii

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Long term memory is extra-corporeal

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

In paper

Forsdyke, D.R. (2009). Samuel Butler and human long term memory: is the 
cupboard bare? Journal of Theoretical Biology 258(1), 156-164. (see 
http://post.queensu.ca/~forsdyke/mind01.htm)


the author considers a possibility that the long term memory is outside 
the brain. I guess that Bruno should like it.


The suggestion of the medieval physician Avicenna that the brain 
‘cupboard’ is bare, – i.e. the brain is a perceptual, not storage, organ 
– is consistent with a mysterious ‘universe as holograph’ model.


Charles Darwin spent much time setting out various combinations of 26 
units in linear order on paper. Yet, that each cell of an organism might 
contain similar digital information, now known as DNA, was beyond his 
conceptual horizon. Likewise, many today compute using remote 
information storage yet are unlikely to countenance the possibility that 
their own brains might functioning similarly.


Best wishes,

Evgenii

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Karl Pribram: the holographic brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

I once have heard that Karl Pribram has a theory of a holographic brain 
and decided to read his latest book


Karl H Pribram, The Form Within: My Point of View.

Unfortunately I was unable to understand his theory, as for me the book 
was too eclectic. One quote that I like is below, but I have failed to 
understand how he has come exactly to such a conclusion based on 
neuroscience.


Does someone here know his theory? Is there somewhere a better 
description of his ideas as in his book?


Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/karl-h-pribram

p. 531-532 “Most important, ‘in ancient times’ we navigated our world 
and discovered experiences in ourselves that reflected what we observed 
in the world: We woke at sunrise and slept at sunset. We were intimately 
connected at every level with the cycles of nature. This process was 
disrupted by the Copernican revolution, by its aftermaths in biology – 
even by our explorations of quantum physics and cosmology – and in the 
resulting interpretations of our personal experiences. But today, once 
again, we have rediscovered that it is we who observe our cosmos and are 
aware that we observe; that it is we who observe our navigation of our 
world and observe our own observations.”


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Re: David Bohm: Thought as a System

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

I have finished reading the book. As usual, there is no direct answer. 
Well,


p. 220 freedom is the creative perception of a new order of necessity.

Evgenii
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http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/david-bohm

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Re: David Bohm: Thought as a System

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 01.09.2013 21:52 meekerdb said the following:

Unconditioned=random works.


I do not think so. I would say that

If we say that the unconditioned is random, then it
would be foolish for us to try to do anything with the
conditioning.

Evgenii



Brent

On 9/1/2013 6:39 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

I am reading David Bohm, Thought as a System. A few quotes below to
 the theme that is quite often under discussion here.

Evgenii

p.  72 “We have to be able to think on this clearly; even though,
as I said, that by itself won’t really change the reflexes. But if
we don’t think of it clearly then all our attempts to get into this
will go wrong. Clear thinking implies that we are in some way
awakened a little bit. Perhaps there is something beyond the reflex
which is at work – in other words, something unconditioned.”

p. 72 “The question is really: is there the unconditioned? If
everything is conditioned, then there’s no way out. But the very
fact that we are sometimes able to see new things would suggest
that there is unconditioned. Maybe the deeper material structure of
the brain is unconditioned, or maybe beyond.”

p. 72 “If there is the unconditioned, which could be the movement
of intelligence, then there is some possibility of getting into
this.”

p. 73 “If we say that there cannot be the unconditioned, then it
would be foolish for us to try to do anything with the
conditioning. Is that clear?”

p. 72 “If we once assume that there cannot be the unconditioned,
then we’re stuck. On the other hand, if we assume that there is the
 unconditioned, again we are going to be stuck – we will produce an
 image of the unconditioned in the system of conditioning, and
mistake the image for the unconditioned. Therefore, let’s say that
there may be the unconditioned. We leave room for that. We have to
leave room in our thought for possibilities.”





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Re: David Bohm: Thought as a System

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 02.09.2013 20:41 meekerdb said the following:

On 9/2/2013 10:11 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 01.09.2013 21:52 meekerdb said the following:

Unconditioned=random works.


I do not think so. I would say that

If we say that the unconditioned is random, then it would be
foolish for us to try to do anything with the conditioning.


?? How do you conclude that?  Just because there is something Bohm
calls the unconditioned doesn't mean there is not also
conditioning, which may modify the unconditioned (=random).


I am in the middle of the book, so I cannot tell you exactly what would 
Bohm say. The answer was mine.


If I have understood Bohm correctly, he believes that we can somewhat 
influence the thought process. Along this way however, I doubt that 
random process will help. My logic is close to that of Rex Allen


http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/t/5ab5303cdb696ef5

Yet, I did not want to say that this is Bohm's opinion. If I find 
something to this end in his book, I will let you know.


Evgenii




My point is just that if you go thru the excerpts below and
substitute random for unconditioned everywhere then the meaning
is unchanged. Bohm says, If everything is conditioned there's no way
out.  I don't know where he thinks out is, but if somethings are
random then he can get there.

Brent



Evgenii



Brent

On 9/1/2013 6:39 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

I am reading David Bohm, Thought as a System. A few quotes
below to the theme that is quite often under discussion here.

Evgenii

p.  72 “We have to be able to think on this clearly; even
though, as I said, that by itself won’t really change the
reflexes. But if we don’t think of it clearly then all our
attempts to get into this will go wrong. Clear thinking implies
that we are in some way awakened a little bit. Perhaps there is
something beyond the reflex which is at work – in other words,
something unconditioned.”

p. 72 “The question is really: is there the unconditioned? If
everything is conditioned, then there’s no way out. But the
very fact that we are sometimes able to see new things would
suggest that there is unconditioned. Maybe the deeper material
structure of the brain is unconditioned, or maybe beyond.”

p. 72 “If there is the unconditioned, which could be the
movement of intelligence, then there is some possibility of
getting into this.”

p. 73 “If we say that there cannot be the unconditioned, then
it would be foolish for us to try to do anything with the
conditioning. Is that clear?”

p. 72 “If we once assume that there cannot be the
unconditioned, then we’re stuck. On the other hand, if we
assume that there is the unconditioned, again we are going to
be stuck – we will produce an image of the unconditioned in the
system of conditioning, and mistake the image for the
unconditioned. Therefore, let’s say that there may be the
unconditioned. We leave room for that. We have to leave room in
our thought for possibilities.”









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David Bohm: Thought as a System

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

I am reading David Bohm, Thought as a System. A few quotes below to the 
theme that is quite often under discussion here.


Evgenii

p.  72 “We have to be able to think on this clearly; even though, as I 
said, that by itself won’t really change the reflexes. But if we don’t 
think of it clearly then all our attempts to get into this will go 
wrong. Clear thinking implies that we are in some way awakened a little 
bit. Perhaps there is something beyond the reflex which is at work – in 
other words, something unconditioned.”


p. 72 “The question is really: is there the unconditioned? If everything 
is conditioned, then there’s no way out. But the very fact that we are 
sometimes able to see new things would suggest that there is 
unconditioned. Maybe the deeper material structure of the brain is 
unconditioned, or maybe beyond.”


p. 72 “If there is the unconditioned, which could be the movement of 
intelligence, then there is some possibility of getting into this.”


p. 73 “If we say that there cannot be the unconditioned, then it would 
be foolish for us to try to do anything with the conditioning. Is that 
clear?”


p. 72 “If we once assume that there cannot be the unconditioned, then 
we’re stuck. On the other hand, if we assume that there is the 
unconditioned, again we are going to be stuck – we will produce an image 
of the unconditioned in the system of conditioning, and mistake the 
image for the unconditioned. Therefore, let’s say that there may be the 
unconditioned. We leave room for that. We have to leave room in our 
thought for possibilities.”


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Neuroscience about Newton

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Lovely quotes from

Michael S. Gazzaniga, Who’s in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the 
Brain


that show how physics is made.

“I can’t Believe My Eyes!

In moment-to-moment activity, the interpreter [in the brain] is always 
dealing  with the changing inputs from sites in the brain where activity 
is going on.  Sitting under the apple tree, Isaac Newton, indulging in 
that most human traits to constantly seek explanations and causes for 
things,  asked himself, ‘Why did the apple fall down?  H … Nothing 
pushed it. Why doesn’t it go up?’ Newton was engaging in two different 
types of processing concerned with causality,  and we have found one 
type occurs in right hemisphere, and the other in the left.”


“So when Newton observed that the apple fell but perceived no observable 
interaction that caused it, he was using his right hemisphere. For other 
animals, that is the end of the story. But it was not good enough for 
Newton. He went to employ causal inference, the application of logical 
rules, which, as you may have guessed, is a bailiwick of the left 
hemisphere.”


Evgenii
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http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/07/neuroscience-about-newton.html

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Re: Everett and Einstein

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 29.06.2013 22:14 smi...@zonnet.nl said the following:

Well, there is no point in living if you don't want to live. And if
you don't live from some time onward, you still live at earlier
times. In fact, you are alive today, because you are going to die in
the future (otherwise the probability of being alive today would be
vanishingly small).

In the block time picture, today, tomorrow, and yesterday have the
same status. So, if you don't exist tomorrow, you still exist today
and yesterday.

Saibal


“When his lifelong friend Besso died, Einstein wrote a letter to Besso’s 
family, saying that although Besso had preceded him in death, it was of 
no consequence,”for men who have knowledge of physics know that the 
separation between past, present, and future is only an illusion, 
although a convincing one.“


Evgenii
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http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/08/einstein-on-time.html

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Everett and Einstein

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Quote from Peter Byrne, The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III: Multiple 
Universes, Mutual Assured Destruction, and the Meltdown of a Nuclear Family


p. 25 Nancy about Everett: This is a guy who at the tender age of 12 
wrote a letter to Albert Einstein, and received a reply! I think his mom 
- K.K. may have influenced him [to write that letter].


p. 26 Everett long lost letter to Albert Einstein apparently claimed to 
have solved the paradox of what happens when an irresistible force meet 
an immoveable object. Nance thought he had written it as a 'hoax', to 
see if he could fool the great man. Graciously, Einstein wrote back on 
June 11, 1943,


'There is no such thing like an irresistible force and immoveable body. 
But there seems to be  a very stubborn boy who has forced his way 
victoriously through strange difficulties created by himself for this 
purpose.'


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Re: Cybersemiotics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 29.06.2013 11:19 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 28 Jun 2013, at 20:35, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...


Do you mean this sentence

But the theories of the phenomenological life world and the
hermeneutics of the meaning of communication seem to defy classical
 scientific explanations.


This one, yes. the hermeneutics might defy Aristotle metaphysics, but
 why to subscribe to it given that we have not yet abroad the
mind-body problem.

The problem is not with classical science, but with the fact that the
 author seems unable to challenge *some* theories.

But this was from the abstract you gave, so if the paper is more
interesting, don't take this too much seriously. But it seems to me
that he was confusing science with Aristotle metaphysics (like
many).



I believe that your term Aristotle metaphysics is misleading. I am 
afraid that you give it your own specific meaning that for example to me 
is unclear. I guess that you mean an association of science with 
materialism. I am not sure though that Aristotle's philosophy belongs to 
materialism. Say, Aristotle has not shared atomistic world view and he 
has four causes including final cause. Classic science that Brier refers 
to is primarily atomistic and is based on effective cause only. One 
could probably find some relationship with Aristotle's metaphysics but 
to say that they are equivalent, in my view, it is overkill.


Evgenii

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Re: Everett and Einstein

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

The Liz's episode is sad indeed:

p. 352 Ten weeks later on July 11, in Hawaii, a few days after her 39th 
birthday, Liz succeed in killing herself with an overdose of sleeping pills.


She left a note, that read, in part:

'Funeral requests: I prefer no church stuff. Please burn me and DON'T 
FILE ME(:. Please sprinkle me in some nice body of water ... or the 
garbage, maybe that way I'll end up in the correct parallel universe to 
meet up w/Daddy'.


Compare with

p. 347 Nancy kept his [Hugh Everett III] ashes in an urn inside a 
filing cabinet in the dining room for a few years. Then, one day, in 
accordance with his express wishes, she tossed the cremains into a 
garbage can.


Yet, the death of Liz seems to be unrelated to the Many World Theory. 
This is probably the consequence of her education at Everett's house.


p. 339 But Liz and Mark were largely unsupervised - allowed to drink, 
smoke dope, and have sex with friends at home. The were not chastised or 
put on restriction or given the limits that children need to learn who 
they are. ... By her late teens, Liz was a full-blown mess. 
Manic-depressive, she turned to sex, alcohol, and a variety of drugs - 
from LSD and pot to cocaine and heroin - to kill the pain of being alive.


Evgenii
--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/tag/hugh-everett-iii



On 29.06.2013 15:20 spudboy...@aol.com said the following:


It was sad about his daughter, determined to follow her father to
whatever world awaits. But, Everett himself had a good way
emotionally, of battling death anxiety. His daughter as you've
already read, suffered from schitzophrenia, and cut out of this
version of planet earth, way too early. Jacque Mallah who used to
post to this list, wrote a paper against quantum immortality,
probably, as a message to prevent suicides?

Mitch



-Original Message- From: Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sat, Jun
29, 2013 3:17 am Subject: Everett and Einstein


Quote from Peter Byrne, The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III:
Multiple niverses, Mutual Assured Destruction, and the Meltdown of a
Nuclear Family p. 25 Nancy about Everett: This is a guy who at the
tender age of 12 rote a letter to Albert Einstein, and received a
reply! I think his mom K.K. may have influenced him [to write that
letter]. p. 26 Everett long lost letter to Albert Einstein
apparently claimed to ave solved the paradox of what happens when an
irresistible force meet n immoveable object. Nance thought he had
written it as a 'hoax', to ee if he could fool the great man.
Graciously, Einstein wrote back on une 11, 1943, 'There is no such
thing like an irresistible force and immoveable body. ut there seems
to be  a very stubborn boy who has forced his way ictoriously through
strange difficulties created by himself for this urpose.'



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Re: Cybersemiotics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 26.06.2013 15:53 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 23 Jun 2013, at 22:12, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 23.06.2013 20:07 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 23 Jun 2013, at 15:07, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


Soren Brier, Cybersemiotics: A New Foundation for
Transdisciplinary Theory of Information, Cognition, Meaningful
Communication and the Interaction Between Nature and Culture,
INTEGRAL REVIEW, June 2013, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 220-263.

http://integral-review.org/documents/Brier,%20Cybersemiotics,%20Vol.%209,%20No.%202.pdf




...



I would not oppose this to scientific classical explanation.
By doing this, Brier makes impossible to change the theories
which fail, and that can lead to the frequent means of hiding the
question by a verbal sort of hypnotism, I think. If the current
explanation does not work, we have to try to understand why and
correct it accordingly.


I believe that the author remains within science. Well, this
clearly depends on definition. The author just wanted to include
humanitarian sciences into science. You means that this does not
make sense?


You should not have unquote it. I remember reading that he was
criticizing the use of classical science, and my point is that this
is exactly what we should not done in the human science. He was, like
the pseudo-priests, excluding humantarian science from science.


Do you mean this sentence

But the theories of the phenomenological life world and the 
hermeneutics of the meaning of communication seem to defy classical 
scientific explanations.


Or this one

I begin with a brief introduction to my view of scientific thinking on 
deep theories and a few words about the limitation of the word ‘science’ 
in the English language and my proposal to use the German 
transdisciplinary term ‘Wissenschaft’, which includes qualitative 
research into meaning.


Frankly speaking, I do not see how your comment is related to the paper.

Evgenii

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Re: Cybersemiotics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 27.06.2013 03:15 Craig Weinberg said the following:



On Sunday, June 23, 2013 9:07:08 AM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


Soren Brier, Cybersemiotics: A New Foundation for
Transdisciplinary Theory of Information, Cognition, Meaningful
Communication and the Interaction Between Nature and Culture,
INTEGRAL REVIEW, June 2013, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 220-263.


http://integral-review.org/documents/Brier,%20Cybersemiotics,%20Vol.%209,%20No.%202.pdf



...


This was how I started - seeing semiotics as the bridge between mind
and matter and therefore pattern as the fundamental feature of
nature. The only problem that I have with it is that pattern
ultimately in nothing without a capacity for pattern recognition, aka
sense. Because we have sense, (or because we *are* sense) it is easy
to take patterns for granted and not factor in our own capacity to
render them as a coherent experience, but to be absolutely objective
about the universe, we cannot overlook ourselves and our own privacy
or reduce it to unconscious interactions.


The question what is I and we remains indeed. Yet, it seems to be 
the same for your approach.


By the way, pattern recognition on its own does not solve the problem of 
universals. For pattern recognition, it is first necessary to split the 
world to an agent and its surrounding.


Evgenii

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Cybersemiotics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Soren Brier, Cybersemiotics: A New Foundation for Transdisciplinary 
Theory of Information, Cognition, Meaningful Communication and the 
Interaction Between Nature and Culture, INTEGRAL REVIEW, June 2013, Vol. 
9, No. 2, p. 220-263.


http://integral-review.org/documents/Brier,%20Cybersemiotics,%20Vol.%209,%20No.%202.pdf

Cybersemiotics constructs a non-reductionist framework in order to 
integrate third person knowledge from the exact sciences and the life 
sciences with first person knowledge described as the qualities of 
feeling in humanities and second person intersubjective knowledge of the 
partly linguistic communicative interactions, on which the social and 
cultural aspects of reality are based. The modern view of the universe 
as made through evolution in irreversible time, forces us to view man as 
a product of evolution and therefore an observer from inside the 
universe. This changes the way we conceptualize the problem and the role 
of consciousness in nature and culture. The theory of evolution forces 
us to conceive the natural and social sciences as well as the humanities 
together in one theoretical framework of unrestricted or absolute 
naturalism, where consciousness as well as culture is part of nature. 
But the theories of the phenomenological life world and the hermeneutics 
of the meaning of communication seem to defy classical scientific 
explanations. The humanities therefore send another insight the opposite 
way down the evolutionary ladder, with questions like: What is the role 
of consciousness, signs and meaning in the development of our knowledge 
about evolution? Phenomenology and hermeneutics show the sciences that 
their prerequisites are embodied living conscious beings imbued with 
meaningful language and with a culture. One can see the world view that 
emerges from the work of the sciences as a reconstruction back into time 
of our present ecological and evolutionary selfunderstanding as semiotic 
intersubjective conscious cultural and historical creatures, but unable 
to handle the aspects of meaning and conscious awareness and therefore 
leaving it out of the story. Cybersemiotics proposes to solve the 
dualistic paradox by starting in the middle with semiotic cognition and 
communication as a basic sort of reality in which all our knowledge is 
created and then suggests that knowledge develops into four aspects of 
human reality: Our surrounding nature described by the physical and 
chemical natural sciences, our corporality described by the life 
sciences such as biology and medicine, our inner world of subjective 
experience described by phenomenologically based investigations and our 
social world described by the social sciences. I call this alternative 
model to the positivistic hierarchy the cybersemiotic star. The article 
explains the new understanding of Wissenschaft that emerges from 
Peirce’s and Luhmann’s conceptions.


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Re: Cybersemiotics

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 23.06.2013 20:07 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 23 Jun 2013, at 15:07, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


Soren Brier, Cybersemiotics: A New Foundation for Transdisciplinary
 Theory of Information, Cognition, Meaningful Communication and the
 Interaction Between Nature and Culture, INTEGRAL REVIEW, June
2013, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 220-263.

http://integral-review.org/documents/Brier,%20Cybersemiotics,%20Vol.%209,%20No.%202.pdf


...



I would not oppose this to scientific classical explanation. By
doing this, Brier makes impossible to change the theories which fail,
and that can lead to the frequent means of hiding the question by a
verbal sort of hypnotism, I think. If the current explanation does
not work, we have to try to understand why and correct it
accordingly.


I believe that the author remains within science. Well, this clearly 
depends on definition. The author just wanted to include humanitarian 
sciences into science. You means that this does not make sense?



There are surely good ideas there, but to oppose it to science is
like cutting the branch of the tree where you seat, something like
that.  It is almost like saying we have seriously tried to solve the
problem, but we have failed, so let us try now by being non serious.


I am not sure, from what this follows.


I can accept a lack of seriousness in the phenomenological reports,
and that can constitute key data, but the analyses and understanding
have to be made in the usual classical way, I think. If not, you add
bs on bs, I am afraid.

Actually he does present the current Aristotelian view like if it was
 granted, which already hides the main problem.


The paper is based on the Peircean framework. It is not an Aristotelian 
view.


Evgenii

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http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/06/cybersemiotics.html

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The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from 
experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that 
non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and 
neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the 
capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors.  Consequently, the weight of 
evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the 
neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, 
including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including 
octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.


http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf

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Re: Natural vs. Artificial

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 15.05.2013 21:02 meekerdb said the following:

On 5/15/2013 12:02 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 14.05.2013 21:45 meekerdb said the following:

On 5/14/2013 12:29 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2013, at 19:12, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 14.05.2013 16:51 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 14 May 2013, at 15:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...


If you are monist, that distinction is quite artificial,
because humans have no special status.


They have the special status of being humans.


If you are dualist and anthropomorphic, then you can absolutize
the distinction (but this seems ad hoc to me).


I don't see what is has to do with dualism.  If you can distinguish
humans from not-humans then you can distinguish made by humans
 from not made by humans.  It's as scientific as any concept:
table, chair, tiger, star, amoeba,...


What is a scientific difference between humans and not-humans? How
would you define it?


What difference does it make?  Why do you have this obsession with
definition of words? Are you going to try to prove a theorem about humans?


My question was not about strict definitions. My goal was better to 
understand the difference physical vs. mental. I believe that most 
people on this list state that


1) mental is physical

and that to this end there is no ambiguity. Now let us assume 1) and 
based on this find the difference between natural and artificial. Could 
you find that difference assuming 1)?


Evgenii

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Re: Natural vs. Artificial

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 16.05.2013 08:22 meekerdb said the following:

On 5/15/2013 11:00 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 15.05.2013 21:02 meekerdb said the following:

On 5/15/2013 12:02 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 14.05.2013 21:45 meekerdb said the following:

On 5/14/2013 12:29 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2013, at 19:12, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 14.05.2013 16:51 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 14 May 2013, at 15:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...


If you are monist, that distinction is quite
artificial, because humans have no special status.


They have the special status of being humans.


If you are dualist and anthropomorphic, then you can
absolutize the distinction (but this seems ad hoc to
me).


I don't see what is has to do with dualism.  If you can
distinguish humans from not-humans then you can
distinguish made by humans from not made by humans.  It's
as scientific as any concept: table, chair, tiger, star,
amoeba,...


What is a scientific difference between humans and
not-humans? How would you define it?


What difference does it make?  Why do you have this obsession
with definition of words? Are you going to try to prove a theorem
about humans?


My question was not about strict definitions. My goal was better to
 understand the difference physical vs. mental. I believe that most
 people on this list state that

1) mental is physical


I haven't seen anyone state that.  I'm not even sure what it means.
Does it mean a thought is something that kicks back if you kick it?


A quick search in the archives find a message

https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/msg/43038189fd3b4c44

that in my view implies mental is physical:

I disagree since there are experiments (e.g. healing prayer, NDE tests) 
that could have provided evidence for these extra-physical phenomena. 
By their null result they provide evidence against them.


I might be wrong and it might be interesting to look the archives 
through more carefully. Well, this was my impression that mental is 
physical was expressed quite often here.


What is the meaning of mental is physical, I do not know. This would 
be exactly the goal to understand such a statement better. The comparison


1) mental vs. physical

with

2) natural. vs. artificial

could probably help.

Evgenii


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Reversing the flow of oil

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

http://vimeo.com/52888178

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Re: Natural vs. Artificial

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 16.05.2013 15:50 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 16 May 2013, at 08:00, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 15.05.2013 21:02 meekerdb said the following:

On 5/15/2013 12:02 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 14.05.2013 21:45 meekerdb said the following:

On 5/14/2013 12:29 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2013, at 19:12, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 14.05.2013 16:51 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 14 May 2013, at 15:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...


If you are monist, that distinction is quite
artificial, because humans have no special status.


They have the special status of being humans.


If you are dualist and anthropomorphic, then you can
absolutize the distinction (but this seems ad hoc to
me).


I don't see what is has to do with dualism.  If you can
distinguish humans from not-humans then you can
distinguish made by humans from not made by humans.  It's
as scientific as any concept: table, chair, tiger, star,
amoeba,...


What is a scientific difference between humans and
not-humans? How would you define it?


What difference does it make?  Why do you have this obsession
with definition of words? Are you going to try to prove a theorem
about humans?


My question was not about strict definitions. My goal was better to
 understand the difference physical vs. mental. I believe that most
 people on this list state that

1) mental is physical


Never heard this on this list. What would that mean? I don't see that
in the link you sent to Brent.


This could mean for example:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

“The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the 
universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the 
condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don’t deny that the 
world might contain many items that at first glance don’t seem physical 
— items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social nature. 
But they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are 
either physical or supervene on the physical.”


Evgenii

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Re: Natural vs. Artificial

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 16.05.2013 18:22 meekerdb said the following:

On 5/16/2013 12:41 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


...



I might be wrong and it might be interesting to look the archives
through more carefully. Well, this was my impression that mental
is physical was expressed quite often here.


What is expressed often here is that the mental, i.e. thoughts,
supervene on physical processes.   This is implicit in saying yes
to the doctor since that is betting that the doctor can provide
physical processes on which your consciousness will supervene.



What is the meaning of mental is physical, I do not know. This
would be exactly the goal to understand such a statement better.


Why not just understand it is not true.


Let me put is this way. Let us assume that

 mental, i.e. thoughts,
 supervene on physical processes.

Does mental has its own casual power as in strong emergence?


The comparison

1) mental vs. physical

with

2) natural. vs. artificial

could probably help.


Comparison on what measure?


On casual power of mental.

Evgenii

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Re: Natural vs. Artificial

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 14.05.2013 21:45 meekerdb said the following:

On 5/14/2013 12:29 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 May 2013, at 19:12, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 14.05.2013 16:51 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 14 May 2013, at 15:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...


If you are monist, that distinction is quite artificial,
because humans have no special status.


They have the special status of being humans.


If you are dualist and anthropomorphic, then you can absolutize
the distinction (but this seems ad hoc to me).


I don't see what is has to do with dualism.  If you can distinguish
humans from not-humans then you can distinguish made by humans
 from not made by humans.  It's as scientific as any concept:
table, chair, tiger, star, amoeba,...


What is a scientific difference between humans and not-humans? How 
would you define it?


Evgenii


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Re: Natural vs. Artificial

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 14.05.2013 23:45 John Mikes said the following:

On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 3:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:





...


* The difference between natural and artificial is ... artificial.

And thus it is natural ... for creatures which are developing some ego.
artificial is a human indexical. Even with comp, we are part of nature.
I think.

Bruno*



Beautiful, Bruno.
If I may add: I would call NATURAL also :ARTIFICIAL, because the way WE
look at Nature is the way WE LOOK AT NATURE. Would you include that into
artificial, too?
JOhn M


An interesting point, John. Thank you. Evgenii

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Re: Natural vs. Artificial

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 14.05.2013 21:29 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 14 May 2013, at 19:12, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


...


In the last case, a male bird catches a fish and gives it to the
bride. Could we consider a fish as a sign in this case?

I do not know what happens under comp but I personally see no
possibility to find signs under physicalism. Hence currently I follow
people who preach Peircean metaphysics of the sign.


OK.
I think that with comp you can interpret the sign as the elements of
recursively enumerable set (of numbers, or whatever), with their
intensional meaning defined by the (universal numbers) supporting them
(context). Signs are interesting, they live near the syntax/semantic
fixed points. They plausibly speed up computations. But I have not
studied Peirce, like I would say ... I give time to Plato and Plotinus
(and Descartes, and the Taoists notably Lie Ze, and Lewis Carroll, Alan
Watts, ...).


A nice definition of a sign. Do you have some more written in this 
respect? I would like to understand it.



About the fish you should ask the bride. I think it is a sign.

Yeah, the correct signs, for a male spider is a matter of mating or be
eaten:


What is the difference in comp between a fish and a human being?

Evgenii

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Re: Natural vs. Artificial

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 14.05.2013 11:01 Telmo Menezes said the following:

On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:


On 13 May 2013, at 18:29, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...


The author failed to make definitions for artificial and natural.
Could you define these terms?



The difference between natural and artificial is ... artificial.

And thus it is natural ... for creatures which are developing some
ego. artificial is a human indexical. Even with comp, we are part
of nature. I think.


Yes, I agree with this.

The distinction is useful to simply qualify something as being the
product of human engineering (as in Artificial Intelligence). The


Well, if we cannot define artificial vs. natural, then the question 
actually remains. Are computers for example artificial products or natural?



search for ETs, interestingly, forces the distinction into an
uncomfortable territory, because it's now the product of some
intelligence's engineering. We have no way of knowing the full
spectrum of possibilities for alternative biologies, so we can never
be sure if, for example, a signal we receive from outer space is
natural or artificial.


This means that this kind of research is just a way to throw taxpayers 
money out. Hence, to be consistent, the government funding of search for 
extraterrestrial intelligence should be banned.


Evgenii


Or can we?

Telmo.


Bruno








Evgenii


Telmo.


It might be this is a good chance to look from another
perspective on an ASCII string that has no meaning for John
Clark. Could we find the difference between natural and
artificial if we say that a term free will is meaningless?

Evgenii --
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/03/natural-vs-artificial.html

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: Natural vs. Artificial

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 14.05.2013 13:39 Telmo Menezes said the following:

On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 1:05 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru
wrote:

On 14.05.2013 11:01 Telmo Menezes said the following:


On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Bruno Marchal
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:



On 13 May 2013, at 18:29, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:



...



The author failed to make definitions for artificial and
natural. Could you define these terms?




The difference between natural and artificial is ...
artificial.

And thus it is natural ... for creatures which are developing
some ego. artificial is a human indexical. Even with comp, we
are part of nature. I think.



Yes, I agree with this.

The distinction is useful to simply qualify something as being
the product of human engineering (as in Artificial
Intelligence). The



Well, if we cannot define artificial vs. natural, then the question
actually remains. Are computers for example artificial products or
natural?


I guess an answer that would make sense to me would be: both.

I think artificial is a useful concept, but just that. Natural is a
bit silly because, obviously, everything is a part of nature. So you
can have the artificial / non-artificial distinction, which is
already implicit in intelligence vs. artificial intelligence or
sugar vs. artificial sweetener.

The opposite of natural would be unnatural (?). For example, a neon
blue cat the size of Europe is unnatural (as far as we know).


No, I am interested in the difference between natural and artificial. So 
a computer both natural and artificial. Do you know things that are just 
natural and where the term artificial is not applicable? If yes, what is 
the difference in your view between things that


1) Natural

2) Natural and artificial





search for ETs, interestingly, forces the distinction into an
uncomfortable territory, because it's now the product of some
intelligence's engineering. We have no way of knowing the full
spectrum of possibilities for alternative biologies, so we can
never be sure if, for example, a signal we receive from outer
space is natural or artificial.



This means that this kind of research is just a way to throw
taxpayers money out. Hence, to be consistent, the government
funding of search for extraterrestrial intelligence should be
banned.


I don't think that follows. SETI is looking for ETs which are
similar enough to us to be detected by looking for stuff we're
familiar with. That seems like a reasonable goal to me.



Well, if scientists cannot say what is the difference between natural 
and artificial, then it is unclear what they are doing. In this case, in 
my view, the goal is ill-defined.


Evgenii

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Re: Natural vs. Artificial

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 14.05.2013 16:51 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 14 May 2013, at 15:33, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


I am interested in the difference between natural and artificial.
So a computer both natural and artificial. Do you know things that
are just natural and where the term artificial is not applicable?
If yes, what is the difference in your view between things that

1) Natural

2) Natural and artificial


For the human, the distinction is:

Natural = not man made. Artificial = man made

So TV, castles, churches, planes, computers, houses, etc. are
artificial, and clouds, volcano, sea, fishes, comets, stars, etc. are
 natural.

If you are monist, that distinction is quite artificial, because
humans have no special status. If you are dualist and
anthropomorphic, then you can absolutize the distinction (but this
seems ad hoc to me).


This means that a scientific answer to this question is impossible. One 
has just to take a position, or in other words, make his/her bet.



A fly might consider that termites' nest are quite artificial
buildings, for example.

Artificial is an indexical, like now, here or yesterday, or
modern, or contemporary, etc. The meaning depends on the person
using the word and his/her relative position.

For a quite advanced alien, silicon computers and atomic bombs might
be considered as natural products on certain type of planets, for a
different example.

What do you think if humans receives this message from the stars,
with A, B, C, D, ... being token easy to identified and differentiate
as physical signals:

ABACAADAABACAAADABAAACDAABAACDBCDFBACADAAAGAACAAD


etc.

Can you guess the intent? Can you guess what F and G are for? What
would you think if we get such a message (probably longer) coming
from far away?


I do not know. Right now there is discussion at biosemiotics list on 
what is sign. For example, let us consider a mating courtship between birds


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jwG7l7bp4t4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AkshIwdw7DY
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-zJhlr016VU

In the last case, a male bird catches a fish and gives it to the bride. 
Could we consider a fish as a sign in this case?


I do not know what happens under comp but I personally see no 
possibility to find signs under physicalism. Hence currently I follow 
people who preach Peircean metaphysics of the sign.


Evgenii

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Natural vs. Artificial

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Recently I have listened to a nice talk about the search of 
extraterrestrial intelligence


http://embryogenesisexplained.com/2013/03/the-starivore-hypothesis.html

The author has mentioned two fallacies (slides 6 and 7)

Artificiality-of-the-gaps

and

Naturality-of-the-gaps

However, I was unable to understand his difference between artificial 
and natural. It might be this is a good chance to look from another 
perspective on an ASCII string that has no meaning for John Clark. Could 
we find the difference between natural and artificial if we say that a 
term free will is meaningless?


Evgenii
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http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/03/natural-vs-artificial.html

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Re: Natural vs. Artificial

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 13.05.2013 17:41 Telmo Menezes said the following:

On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 10:33 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru
wrote:

Recently I have listened to a nice talk about the search of
extraterrestrial intelligence

http://embryogenesisexplained.com/2013/03/the-starivore-hypothesis.html




The author has mentioned two fallacies (slides 6 and 7)


Artificiality-of-the-gaps

and

Naturality-of-the-gaps

However, I was unable to understand his difference between
artificial and natural.


I believe he just means generated by an intelligent biological
entity vs generated directly by nature. UFOs, the New York City
and burritos are artificial in this sense, while Clouds, the Grand
Canyon and apples are not.

He's then specifically alluding to the fallacy of assuming that
extra-terrestrial intelligent entities would be sufficiently similar
to us for us to notice them (an old but interesting debate).


Yes, but my point was to take this just as a starting point to ask 
ourselves how we distinguish what is artificial and what is natural.


The author failed to make definitions for artificial and natural. Could 
you define these terms?


Evgenii


Telmo.


It might be this is a good chance to look from another perspective
on an ASCII string that has no meaning for John Clark. Could we
find the difference between natural and artificial if we say that a
term free will is meaningless?

Evgenii --
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/03/natural-vs-artificial.html

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The Uses of a Screwdriver Cannot be Listed Algorithmically

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

I am reading now Beyond Mechanism: Putting Life back into Biology. In 
Foreword: Evolution beyond Newton, Darwin, and Entailing Law, Stuart A. 
Kauffman writes:


p. 9 Here is the first 'strange' step. Can you name all the uses of a 
screwdriver, alone, or with other objects or process? Well, screw in a a 
screw, open a paint can, wedge open a door, wedge closed a door, scrape 
putty off a window, stab an assailant, be an objet d'art, tied to a 
stick a fish spear, the spear rented to 'natives' for a 5 percent fish 
catch return becomes a new business, and so on. I think that we all are 
convinced that the following two statements are true: (1) the number of 
uses of a screw driver is indefinite; and (2) unlike the integers which 
can be ordered, there is no natural ordering of the uses of a screw 
driver. The uses are unordered. But these two claims entail that there 
is no 'Turing Effective Procedure' to list all the uses of a screwdriver 
alone or with other objects or processes. In short, there is no 
algorithm to list all the uses of a screwdriver.


Any comment?

Evgenii

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Re: The world is in the brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 12.04.2013 16:01 Telmo Menezes said the following:

On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 8:07 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru
wrote:

On 10.04.2013 23:59 meekerdb said the following:


On 4/10/2013 1:55 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 10.04.2013 22:52 Telmo Menezes said the following:

...


I suspect life is just meaningless from the outside. I'd say
that pain and pleasure are fine-tunned by evolution to
maximise the survivability of species in an environment that
is largely also generated by evolution. It's a strange loop.



What difference do you see when one changes evolution in your
sentence by god?



Do you see no difference?  Are the operation of both equally
mysterious to you?



I do not see any difference. I do not see that the explanation
through Evolution in the sentence above is better than the
explanation through God. In the sentence above, in my view, the
explanatory power is at the same level, either with Evolution or
with God.


Hi Evgenii,

The difference is that with the evolutionary explanation above you
can create a model that you can test and make predictions with. I've
done part of this computationally for my PhD thesis.

Telmo.


Could you please describe a bit more on what you can predict? Right now 
this is just a declaration.


Evgenii

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Re: The world is in the brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 10.04.2013 23:59 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/10/2013 1:55 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 10.04.2013 22:52 Telmo Menezes said the following:

...


I suspect life is just meaningless from the outside. I'd say
that pain and pleasure are fine-tunned by evolution to maximise
the survivability of species in an environment that is largely
also generated by evolution. It's a strange loop.



What difference do you see when one changes evolution in your
sentence by god?


Do you see no difference?  Are the operation of both equally
mysterious to you?


I do not see any difference. I do not see that the explanation through 
Evolution in the sentence above is better than the explanation through 
God. In the sentence above, in my view, the explanatory power is at the 
same level, either with Evolution or with God.


Evgenii

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Re: The world is in the brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 10.04.2013 22:58 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/10/2013 1:38 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 10.04.2013 22:34 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/10/2013 1:18 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 10.04.2013 07:16 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/9/2013 12:19 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:




...


You'd better look at what biologist say. For example:

http://www.icr.org/article/270/

“and that the idea of their improving rather than harming
organisms is contrary to the Second Law of Thermodynamics,
which tells us that matter and energy naturally tend toward
greater randomness rather than greater order and complexity.”

Do you like it?


You're referring me to an article on biological evolution by a
guy with a Masters of Art on a Creationist website??

Do YOU like it?


You will find a similar sentence also on an evolutionary website.


That wasn't the question.  The question was do you like it, do you
believe it, can you support it with your own arguments?


No, I do not like it. I have made this example to show what happens when 
people start mixing the thermodynamic entropy and biology. My note to 
this was


I am afraid that this is a misunderstanding. The Second Law tells that 
the entropy increases in the isolated system. This is not the case with 
life on the Earth, as energy comes in and go out. In this case, if to 
speak of a system not far from the stationary state, Ilya Prigogine has 
proved that then the production of the entropy should be minimal. 
However, even this could not be generalized to the case when a system is 
far from equilibrium (this seems to be case with life on the Earth). 
Hence it is unlikely that the Second Law could help us when one 
considers evolution problems. In any case, I would recommend you the 
works of Ilya Prigogine – he was a great thermodynamicist.




Such a statement will be the same. Look for example at

Annila, A.  S.N. Salthe (2010) Physical foundations of
evolutionary theory. Journal of Non-equilibrium Thermodynamics 35:
301-321, http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jnetdy.2010.019


Which is behind a paywall ($224), and says nothing like that in the
abstract.


If you type the title in Google, you will find a free version. My 
comment to this paper is at


http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/02/physical-foundations-of-evolutionary-theory.html

You will find a link to a free version there as well.

Evgenii

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Re: The world is in the brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 10.04.2013 07:16 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/9/2013 12:19 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


...


I have seen that this could be traced to Schrödinger’s What is
Life?, reread his chapter on Order, Disorder and Entropy and made
my comments

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/04/schrodinger-disorder-and-entropy.html






Still tilting at that windmill?

A) From thermodynamic tables, the mole entropy of silver at standard
 conditions S(Ag, cr) = 42.55 J K-1 mol-1 is bigger than that of
aluminum S(Al, cr) = 28.30 J K-1 mol-1. Does it mean that there is
more disorder in silver as in aluminium?

Yes, there is more disorder in the sense that raising the temperature
of a mole of Ag 1deg increases the number of accessible conduction
electron states available more than does raising the temperature of a
mole of Al does.

I agree that disorder is not necessarily a good metaphor for entropy.
 But dispersal of energy isn't always intuitively equal to entropy
either. Consider dissolving ammonium nitrate in water. The process is
 endothermic, so the temperature drops and energy is absorbed, but
the process goes spontaneously because the entropy increases; the are
a lot more microstates accessible in the solution even at the lower
temperature.



You'd better look at what biologist say. For example:

http://www.icr.org/article/270/

“and that the idea of their improving rather than harming organisms is 
contrary to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which tells us that matter 
and energy naturally tend toward greater randomness rather than greater 
order and complexity.”


Do you like it?

Evgenii

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Re: The world is in the brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 10.04.2013 22:34 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/10/2013 1:18 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 10.04.2013 07:16 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/9/2013 12:19 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


...


I have seen that this could be traced to Schrödinger’s What is
Life?, reread his chapter on Order, Disorder and Entropy and
made my comments

http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/04/schrodinger-disorder-and-entropy.html










Still tilting at that windmill?


A) From thermodynamic tables, the mole entropy of silver at
standard conditions S(Ag, cr) = 42.55 J K-1 mol-1 is bigger than
that of aluminum S(Al, cr) = 28.30 J K-1 mol-1. Does it mean that
there is more disorder in silver as in aluminium?

Yes, there is more disorder in the sense that raising the
temperature of a mole of Ag 1deg increases the number of
accessible conduction electron states available more than does
raising the temperature of a mole of Al does.

I agree that disorder is not necessarily a good metaphor for
entropy. But dispersal of energy isn't always intuitively equal
to entropy either. Consider dissolving ammonium nitrate in water.
The process is endothermic, so the temperature drops and energy
is absorbed, but the process goes spontaneously because the
entropy increases; the are a lot more microstates accessible in
the solution even at the lower temperature.



You'd better look at what biologist say. For example:

http://www.icr.org/article/270/

“and that the idea of their improving rather than harming organisms
is contrary to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which tells us
that matter and energy naturally tend toward greater randomness
rather than greater order and complexity.”

Do you like it?


You're referring me to an article on biological evolution by a guy
with a Masters of Art on a Creationist website??

Do YOU like it?


You will find a similar sentence also on an evolutionary website. Such a 
statement will be the same. Look for example at


Annila, A.  S.N. Salthe (2010) Physical foundations of evolutionary 
theory. Journal of Non-equilibrium Thermodynamics  35: 301-321, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jnetdy.2010.019


Evgenii

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Re: The world is in the brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 10.04.2013 22:36 Terren Suydam said the following:

This is close to an idea I have been mulling over for some time...
that the source of the phenomenological feeling of pleasure is in
some way identified with decreases in entropy, and pain is in some
way identified with increases in entropy. It is a way to map the
subjective experience of pain and pleasure to a 3p description of,
say, a nervous system.  Damage to the body (associated with pain) can
usually (always?) be characterized in terms of a sudden increase in
entropy of the body. Perhaps this is also true in the mental domain,
so that emotional loss (or e.g. embarrassment) can also be
characterized as an increase in entropy of one's mental models, but
this is pure speculation. The case is even harder to make with
pleasure. It would be weird if it were true, but so far it is the
only way I know of to map pleasure and pain onto anything objective
at all.



This was my point. The entropy in your statement has nothing to do with 
the thermodynamic entropy and the Second Law.


Evgenii

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Re: The world is in the brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 10.04.2013 22:52 Telmo Menezes said the following:

...


I suspect life is just meaningless from the outside. I'd say that
pain and pleasure are fine-tunned by evolution to maximise the
survivability of species in an environment that is largely also
generated by evolution. It's a strange loop.



What difference do you see when one changes evolution in your sentence 
by god?


Evgenii

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Re: The world is in the brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 08.04.2013 11:38 Bruno Marchal said the following:


On 07 Apr 2013, at 19:20, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


On 07.04.2013 19:12 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/6/2013 11:54 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 07.04.2013 02:40 Craig Weinberg said the following:

Ok, here's my modified version of Fig 11

http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/33ost_diagram.jpg








I believe that you have understood the paper wrong. The authors

literally believe that the observed 3D world is geometrically
speaking in the brain.


Yes our 3d model of the world is in our minds (not our brains).
It's not there geometrically speaking.  Geometry and there
are part of the model.  Dog bites man.


Well, if you look into the paper, you see that authors take it
literally as in neuroscience mind means brain. Mind belongs to
philosophy.



But mind is different from brain. And mind is part of both cognitive
 science and theoretical computer science. To identify mind and brain
is possible in some strong non computationalist theories, but such
theories don't yet exist, and are only speculated about. To confuse
mind and brain, is like confusing literature and ink. Neurophilophers
are usually computationalist and weakly materialist, and so are
basically inconsistent.


I guess, this is a way how science develops. Neuroscientists study brain 
and they just take a priori from the materialist and reductionism 
paradigm that mind must be in the brain. After that, they write papers 
to bring this idea to the logical conclusion. To this end, they seem to 
have two options. Either they should say that the 3D visual world is 
illusion (I guess, Dennett goes this way) or put phenomenological 
consciousness into the brain. Let us see what happens along this way.


The paper in a way is well written. The only flaw (that actually is 
irrelevant to the content of the paper) that I have seen in it, is THE 
ENTROPY. Biologists like the entropy so much that they use it in any 
occasion. For example from the paper:


“Thus, changes in entropy provide an important window into 
self-organization: a sudden increase of entropy just before  the 
emergence of a new structure, followed by brief period of negative 
entropy (or negentropy).”


I have seen that this could be traced to Schrödinger’s What is Life?, 
reread his chapter on Order, Disorder and Entropy and made my comments


http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/04/schrodinger-disorder-and-entropy.html

Evgenii

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Re: The world is in the brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 07.04.2013 19:12 meekerdb said the following:

On 4/6/2013 11:54 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 07.04.2013 02:40 Craig Weinberg said the following:

Ok, here's my modified version of Fig 11

http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/33ost_diagram.jpg





I believe that you have understood the paper wrong. The authors

literally believe that the observed 3D world is geometrically
speaking in the brain.


Yes our 3d model of the world is in our minds (not our brains). It's
not there geometrically speaking.  Geometry and there are part of
the model.  Dog bites man.


Well, if you look into the paper, you see that authors take it literally 
as in neuroscience mind means brain. Mind belongs to philosophy.


Evgenii


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The world is in the brain

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Fingelkurts, A., Fingelkurts, A., and Neves, C. (2010). “Natural World 
Physical, Brain Operational, and Mind Phenomenal Space-Time”. *Physics 
of Life Reviews* 7(2): 195-249.


http://scireprints.lu.lv/141/1/Fingelkurts_Space-time_in_Physics_brain_and_mind.pdf

“We would like to discuss the hypothesis that via the brain operational 
space-time the mind subjective space-time is connected to otherwise 
distant physical space-time reality.”


See Fig 11 where the phenomenal world is in the brain.

Evgenii

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Religious Robots

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

Quotes from Robert Geraci, Apocalyptic AI: Visions of Heaven in 
Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, and Virtual Reality


p. 133 Ray Kurzweil believes that intelligent machines will be more 
spiritual than human being and believes that the future will include 
real and virtual houses of worship where intelligent machines will 
congregate (Kurzweil 1999, 153). Naturally, since all human mental 
phenomena are, from Kurzweil's point of view, computational processes, 
religious experiences must be as well. 


p. 133-134 Some human being, however, might welcome robots into their 
religious communities and some robots might wish to join them. 
Fundamentally, if robots become conscious and, thereafter, acquire 
'beliefs', a state that involves intentionality and meaning, then some 
of those beliefs will surely be religious. Both theologians and computer 
scientists have supported such a view, including Anne Foerst, David 
Levy, and Edmund Furse.


p. 134 The artificial intelligence researcher David Levy has argued 
that robots will join in religious practices as a necessary by-product 
of their emotional range and conscious beliefs.


p. 134 Without doubt, the interest that computer scientists have in the 
religious life of robots is fascinating but the fact that theologians 
have engaged robotics is considerably more so.


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http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/03/religious-robots.html

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Re: Religious Robots

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 22.03.2013 13:06 Alberto G. Corona said the following:

These beliefs in robotic religión has some reasons behind or it is
simply wishful thinking?


In the book, the author just describes/documents what other people say. 
The reason from others, as far as I have understood it correctly, is 
similar to what Brent recently has written


On 21.03.2013 01:26 meekerdb said the following:

 When we can build robots that act just like people and
 report their qualia to us - then we'll think we've explained qualia,
 and questions like Yes, but what is it really? will seem
 anachronistic.

If robots could do that, then presumably they could also tell us about 
their attitude to God. I mean that if someone believes that robot could 
be conscious then as a corollary robot's beliefs follow.


Evgenii



2013/3/22 Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru


Quotes from Robert Geraci, Apocalyptic AI: Visions of Heaven in
Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, and Virtual Reality

p. 133 Ray Kurzweil believes that intelligent machines will be
more spiritual than human being and believes that the future will
include real and virtual houses of worship where intelligent
machines will congregate (Kurzweil 1999, 153). Naturally, since all
human mental phenomena are, from Kurzweil's point of view,
computational processes, religious experiences must be as well. 

p. 133-134 Some human being, however, might welcome robots into
their religious communities and some robots might wish to join
them. Fundamentally, if robots become conscious and, thereafter,
acquire 'beliefs', a state that involves intentionality and
meaning, then some of those beliefs will surely be religious. Both
theologians and computer scientists have supported such a view,
including Anne Foerst, David Levy, and Edmund Furse.

p. 134 The artificial intelligence researcher David Levy has
argued that robots will join in religious practices as a necessary
by-product of their emotional range and conscious beliefs.

p. 134 Without doubt, the interest that computer scientists have
in the religious life of robots is fascinating but the fact that
theologians have engaged robotics is considerably more so.

--
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/03/**religious-robots.htmlhttp://blog.rudnyi.ru/2013/03/religious-robots.html


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Re: Religious Robots

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 22.03.2013 13:41 Richard Ruquist said the following:

On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 8:06 AM, Alberto G. Corona
agocor...@gmail.com wrote:

These beliefs in robotic religión has some reasons behind or it is
simply wishful thinking?


...



Religious beliefs will be programmed just as they are in most
humans. Richard


What about non-religious beliefs in humans and robots. Are they 
programmed or not?


Evgenii

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Re: Religious Robots

[Evgenii Rudnyi]

On 22.03.2013 13:47 Stephen P. King said the following:


On 3/22/2013 7:16 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

Quotes from Robert Geraci, Apocalyptic AI: Visions of Heaven in
Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, and Virtual Reality


...




Dear Evgennii,

In your reading of Kurzweil, does he ever explain how AI minds come
to be aware of themselves as 'being in a world' with other being
that have minds of their own? Does it seem that he just assumes that
AI have no solipsism problem when 'born'?



I know about Kurzweil's view from secondary sources only. Otherwise a 
good question.


Evgenii

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