subject:"Re\: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations \?"


On 10/17/2012 4:12 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Life may support mathematics.

Hi Alberto,

OK, we can think of Life, in a very abstract sense, as the 
generator of variety and pattern, so that might work. This makes Life = God!



Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in 
order to self preserve .


I would say that if the above stipulation is true, then this claim 
applies to the individual life forms and not Life (the Form), no?



This is only possible in a world where natural computers are possible:


What other kind of computers could there be? Are we not part of the 
natural world, Reality and thus Nature and thus what we make is natural 
computers? I do not understand the word artificial, I must tell you, 
it seems oxymoronic! Why the Man v nature dichotomy? This seems a 
vestige of the doctrine of The Fall within Abrahamic religions. ...




in a world where the phisical laws have a mathematical nature.


Kinda redundant, no? If the physical laws are not capable of being 
represented by mathematics, what would they be? Patternless chaos in 
randomness?


Instead of comp creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the 
mathematical reality what creates the computations in which we live.


Those two semi-sentences seem equivalent to me...

So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some) 
mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is, 
observers.


Sure, all universes that have patterns that repeat more than once. 
But do we even need to stipulate universes that don't contain observers? 
Or are you considering only anthropomorphic observers: observers that 
can create elaborate narratives and/or even confabulations to each other?


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 11:57:43 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  On 10/16/2012 10:03 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 6:48:51 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: 

  On 10/16/2012 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 

  On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: 

 On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:
  
 On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 

 Hi Alberto,

 OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously 
 wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for 
 almost anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a 
 level of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a form of 
 consciousness becomes a necessity. 
 How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is 
 evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable 
 complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an 
 irreducible primitive or it is not?
 I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such 
 as reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a 
 subjective experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued 
 to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.


 If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a 
 sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple 
 interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the 
 content of this subjective experience?

 Brent
  -- 

  Hi Brent,

 How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of photonsas 
 actual experiential content? 


 No, but Craig thinks electrons do.
  

 Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that 
 they are only the shared experience of atoms.
  

 Hi Craig,

 Well, we differ on that point! If we accept atoms, we also have to 
 accept electrons! Best not go there!
  

 Unfortunately if I doubt photons really the whole Standard Model is 
 potentially up for grabs. The wide variation in the modeling of atoms tells 
 me that it is not a given that electrons are not just an accounting of 
 atomic charge states. It may be that electrons are objective in some senses 
 but subjective in others (photons being subjective in more ways). That 
 seems the most likely.

  Hi Craig,

 Interesting challenge! What if we jettison as a confabulation all of 
 physical theory... What is left? Shall we cast aside the nice predictive 
 values that we have gotten? What then? I am willing to go there for the 
 sake of discussion, but to where?


I don't see any reason to question any other aspects of physics except 
those which the uncertainty principle apply.  If we can't measure 
something's position and momentum at the same time, or if we cannot state 
clearly whether something is a particle or a wave made out of a substance 
which is independent of matter, then I think we have to assume that it is 
possibly a subjective experience associated with those things that do seem 
physically certain and definite to us as objects in space.


 Let's try something. Consider the Bpp idea. Belief in a proposition 
 and it is true. Can we reconstruct explanations from this? We would have to 
 have a plurality of entities that would have the beliefs, no? Where do we 
 get that plurality? Let's stipulate that we have a plurality somehow. There 
 should be something that distinguishes them, something other than positions 
 in space and time... or is there anything that would generate distinctions? 


Perceptual inertia distinguishes them. Every body has unique experiences 
which shape its sense capacities to the extent that they are unique on some 
level (on primitive levels it may be that this level is minimized, or at 
least it is as far as we are concerned). On the cognitive level they are 
beliefs or preferences, but every sense channel has it's version...harmony, 
beauty, satisfaction, etc. Whatever refers back to the solitrope (solace of 
perfect private peace/self identification).

Maybe the beliefs are frames in different languages that require some 
 transformation to translate the propositions of one into something 
 equivalent for all others. My assumption is that we have to have a common 
 reality to recover something like physical theories and we can get that 
 either by imbedding our entities into a single space or by simply having a 
 common set of propositions that form a non-contradictory set, something 
 isomorphic to a Boolean algebra if and only if the propositions are 
 satisfiable http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_satisfiability_problemsuch 
 that the total logical formulation is TRUE. I favor the latter idea, 
 but it requires that the physical universe that we observe to be 
 representable as a true Boolean algebra and a repudiation of the idea that 
 substance is ontologically priomitive.

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 12:14:25 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  On 10/16/2012 10:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:42:16 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: 

  On 10/16/2012 5:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: 

 Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to 
 how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to 
 contradict that claim: I.G., These experiential phenomena 
 (telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are 
 different levels of same thing. 


 I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that atoms, 
 molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of the same thing.
  

 Hi Craig,

 I see a problem here. The concept of levels is too simplistic and 
 one-dimensional. I think it would help us to dig a bit into mereology and 
 discuss different types of organization such that we have a broader and 
 deeper indexing structure to relate the atoms, molecules, cells, organs, 
 and bodies.
  

 I think it is the simplicity which we are after. The reason that we can 
 say 'atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies' and understand a 
 qualitative hierarchy related to physical scale and evolutionary age is 
 because that is how our perception naturally stereotypes it. The deeper 
 structure is a distraction, takes us further into the impersonal 3p view, 
 which tries to reconcile all views of all other views rather than the 
 significant themes that allow us to make sense of it in the first place. To 
 do big picture, I think it has to be broad strokes.
  

  Hi Craig,

 But we sacrifice detail that matters for those broad strokes...


The detail is still there, you just can't look at it at the same time as 
you look at the big picture. Adjusting to the new big picture could take a 
long time. Much longer than relativity and QM took - which still only a few 
people grasp.

Craig
 


  
   
   
  

 Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to 
 be what we refer to as COMP. 


 COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false.


 I understand COMP to be true but only in a very deep, yet narrow, way.
  

 What seems true about COMP?
  

 The argument as Bruno presents it.

   
  
  
  Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause.


 I say neither. Computation is a representation, or better, an 
 externalization of sense. 


 I agree with that. That's pretty much what I meant.
  

 Good!

  
  

 We cannot say that sense is this or sense is not that while pointing 
 outside of 1p.


 There is nothing outside of (the totality of) 1p.
  

 I agree, but consider what happens in the limit of the totality. 
 Distinguishability itself vanishes and with it 1p. The totality of what 
 exists, the necessarily possible, does not have a single consistent 1p, it 
 has all possible 1p's simultaneously.

   
  
  It is the assumption that sense is ___ that must be understood to be 
 problematic; it cannot be anything other than itself! Sure we can discuss 
 sense in as if terms, but we cannot forget that it is not the symbols or 
 the terms we use and cannot be.
  

 I agree, although part of the nature of sense is it's self-reflection and 
 translucence. We can say things about it, but only because the things we 
 say can remind us of what we experience first hand.
  
  

 OK, but we can tease detail from this!

   
  COMP is an unsupported assumption about the supremacy of computation.
  

 Wrong. It is very supported by a broad landscape of mathematical 
 truths, with the small exception that numbers can alone do the work that 
 they are required to do. After all, comp only works in Platonia! It is the 
 inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem that is its Achilles 
 heel.
  

 Comp supporting itself isn't a surprise though. Every supreme idealism 
 supports itself. What supports it outside of mathematics?
  

 Mathematics is just a collection of  representations that are 
 internally logically consistent (note that the total mathematical universe 
 is not a single consistent set!), so outside of that what is there? Comp is 
 a mathematical model, its support outside of math remains to be seen.


 -- 
 Onward!

 Stephen

  

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Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 6:33:15 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

 Hi Craig Weinberg 

 By sense do you mean Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness? 
 Or all three as a process ? 

 Using these as a guide:

(from http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/thirdness.html)
  Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
positively and without reference to anything else. 
  Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with 
respect to a second but regardless of any third. 
  Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in 
bringing a second and third into relation to each other. 

I would say that sense is primordial Sixthness. The meta juxaposition of 
all three modalities. Sense is the totality within which Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness are defined and directly experienced. Fourthness 
could be thought of as the change that thirdness brings to firstness and 
Fifthness could be perhaps the juxtaposition of that change with it's 
canonical conjugate in Secondness. There is no Firstness without Sixthness. 
In quantitative terms, the universe doesn't begin with 0 or 1, it 'begins' 
with the instantaneous/perpetual division of 1 into infinite fractions. 
Timespace is only real at the periphery/circumference of that division.

Craig


 Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net javascript: 
 10/17/2012   
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 


 - Receiving the following content -   
 From: Craig Weinberg   
 Receiver: everything-list   
 Time: 2012-10-16, 14:11:14 
 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly 
 complexcomputations ? 




 On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:54:10 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: 
 On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:   
  Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you 
 could   
  have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.   
  Craig   

 Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is   
 and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already   
 have. But I missed it.   


 This post http://s33light.org/post/24159233874 talks about why I use the 
 word sense. I am saying that the only thing that the universe can be 
 reduced to which is irreducible is sense, and by that I really mean sense 
 in every sense, but in particular sensation, intuition, subjective feeling, 
 pattern recognition, and categorization or discernment. 

 Craig 
   

 Richard   

  On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:   

  Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex 
 computations   
  ?   

  The short answer is that I am proposing that :   

  1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position   
  that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.   

  2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make   
  such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the   
  range of computabilitlity.  Instead, it exposes these halted   
  upward-directed   
  calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed 
 platonic   
  reason,   
  the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know   
  enough   
  mathematics to be more specific.   

  If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.   




  ===   
  A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:   
  Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent   
  property   
  of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: 
   

  A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's 
   
  condition of non-computability ?   

  
 http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html  

  Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent 
 property   
  of classical   
  computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.   
  The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that   

  1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 
   
  2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex   
  temporally bind information,   
  and   
  3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational 
 complexity   
  among neurons.   



  B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?   

  Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or   
  emerge through looking at a phenomenon   
  at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an 
   
  emergent property of   
  the behavior of many minds.   

  IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser   
  position.   

  Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:   

  http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html   

  One is his belief that

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-17 Thread Alberto G. Corona

2012/10/17 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net

 On 10/17/2012 4:12 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 Life may support mathematics.

 Hi Alberto,

 OK, we can think of Life, in a very abstract sense, as the generator
 of variety and pattern, so that might work. This makes Life = God!



  Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in order
 to self preserve .


 I would say that if the above stipulation is true, then this claim
 applies to the individual life forms and not Life (the Form), no?

 yes


  This is only possible in a world where natural computers are possible:


 What other kind of computers could there be? Are we not part of the
 natural world, Reality and thus Nature and thus what we make is natural
 computers? I do not understand the word artificial, I must tell you, it
 seems oxymoronic! Why the Man v nature dichotomy? This seems a vestige of
 the doctrine of The Fall within Abrahamic religions. ...

 Natural computers are the living beings, that maintain homeostasis
(internal entropy) . artificial computers simply help to maintain the
entropy/homeostasis of the social being from which we are a part. (by
driving a robotic factory that produce car pieces for example). So they are
a very concrete part of a concrete natural computer.

 A company can be a  living being considered at some level. Therefore it is
a natural computer.
A PC in the company is a part of it.



  in a world where the phisical laws have a mathematical nature.


 Kinda redundant, no? If the physical laws are not capable of being
 represented by mathematics, what would they be? Patternless chaos in
 randomness?

 A bit redundant, yes. But I can imagine some weird laws. In fact,
computability impose restrictions to the macroscopical laws: they have to
be continuous, smooth, irreversible (increase entropy) and local (distant
objects must affect less to predictions than nearest ones).


  Instead of comp creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the
 mathematical reality what creates the computations in which we live.


 Those two semi-sentences seem equivalent to me...

 Not really, from my point of view, natural computers are made of or
ordinary matter, which has a mathematical nature. This does not pressupose
a computational nature of reality, but a mathematical one But this
mathematical nature is a prerequisite for computations, some of which are
minds. Bruno postulate that the mind  is a product of computations and
reality a product of the mind therefore computation is at the root of
everithing. I say that computation mind and math are mutually necessary


  So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some)
 mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is,
 observers.


 Sure, all universes that have patterns that repeat more than once. But
 do we even need to stipulate universes that don't contain observers? Or are
 you considering only anthropomorphic observers: observers that can create
 elaborate narratives and/or even confabulations to each other?

 Here a definition of existence is necessary. I don´t know why people take
for granted that existence is a predefined world. The definition of
existence is at the root of everything

 --
 Onward!

 Stephen


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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
say that intuiton does. But that just seems
to be a conjecture of his.


ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


Hi Roger,

IMHO, computability can only capture at most a simulation of  
the content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...


So you do say no to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the  
existence of p-zombie?


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/17/2012 8:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
say that intuiton does. But that just seems
to be a conjecture of his.


ugh, rclo...@verizon.net mailto:%20rclo...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


Hi Roger,

IMHO, computability can only capture at most a simulation of 
the content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...


So you do say no to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the 
existence of p-zombie?


Bruno



Dear Bruno,

If the Doctor's replacement parts preserve the possibility of 
quantum entanglement then I would say, Yes to her. No, otherwise. I do 
not believe that p-zombies can exist.


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

On 16 Oct 2012, at 21:56, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2012 12:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 2:42:26 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You
previously wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough complexity
has been advocated for almost anything. and now you suggest that
consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: ... in
this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a
necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity?
What is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate
increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe?
Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues
such as reportablity of consciousness, but the property of
having a subjective experience of being in the world itself can
be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows
differences.

If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in
a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple
interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what
will be the content of this subjective experience?

For a person, sensory deprivation typically leads to powerful
phenomenological perceptions or unconsciousness. Hard to guess what
happens on a subatomic level, but there is no reason to assume that
sense is limited to perceptions of the outside. Sense comes from
within as well (it's just different than what comes from without).

As I recall, what happens is that after about 45min, a person's
conscious thoughts tend to enter an loop.

That seems to me rather weird. If you have references on the
statistics and criteria of loop-detection in human, or the reports of
those experience. I find this weird. Of course all finite machine
loops after some time, even with inputs. The possible inputs will loop
too. As universal being we always need more space, we can only extends
ourselves or loop.

Bruno

Brent

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

On 17 Oct 2012, at 02:42, Stephen P. King wrote:
It is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem
that is its Achilles heel.

No. It is the strongest point of comp. It does solve it
constructively, so it makes comp testable and/or our simulation level
measurable.

You can see it in another way, comp explains how and where the laws of
physics, and psychology, come from, and with the whole consciousness/
matter coupling. It does not solve the problem because the math are
hard, only. Then the logic of observability, perhaps in a toy case,
are already given and tested.

That there is a body problem is the interesting thing, imo.

The other theories assume the body, and the mind, and some relation
shown incompatible with comp.

Comp, as such, is not an explanation. Just a frame where we can
formulate the problem mathematically, and that is the main reason to
study it, even if false. In fact, you need to study to comp to develop
an authentic non-comp theory.

Comp is not an explanation per se, neither of the mind nor of the
body. The explanation is in the reasoning and the math. Comp itself is
just the bet that we are Turing emulable at *some* level.

Bruno

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 12:11:00 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 17 Oct 2012, at 02:42, Stephen P. King wrote: 
  It is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem   
  that is its Achilles heel. 

 No. It is the strongest point of comp. It does solve it   
 constructively, so it makes comp testable and/or our simulation level   
 measurable. 

 You can see it in another way, comp explains how and where the laws of   
 physics, and psychology, come from, and with the whole consciousness/ 
 matter coupling. It does not solve the problem because the math are   
 hard, only. Then the logic of observability, perhaps in a toy case,   
 are already given and tested. 

 That there is a body problem is the interesting thing, imo. 

 The other theories assume the body, and the mind, and some relation   
 shown incompatible with comp. 

 Comp, as such, is not an explanation. Just a frame where we can   
 formulate the problem mathematically, and that is the main reason to   
 study it, even if false. In fact, you need to study to comp to develop   
 an authentic non-comp theory. 

 Comp is not an explanation per se, neither of the mind nor of the   
 body. The explanation is in the reasoning and the math. Comp itself is   
 just the bet that we are Turing emulable at *some* level. 


This is exactly why Comp is misguided, as awareness is by definition not 
emulable in any way.

In order to even conceptualize 'emulation' there has to already be an a 
priori discernment between authenticity and inauthenticity, i.e. emulation 
requires the existence of something to emulate which is itself ultimately 
traceable back to something which is genuine and unique.

Comp bets on the Baudrillard simulacra - the copy without an original, 
beyond even the capacity to recover the deception. A copy through which no 
trace of an original can be accessed. 

This is indeed an interesting and powerful hypothesis, however it is 
ultimately inside out. You can't claim to be revealing the primacy of 
unreality while insisting on the same time of the reality of that 
revelation. In Comp, Comp itself is just another Bp, and the significance 
of whether it is Bp or Bp + p is really an obscure footnote.

Craig

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote:





Life may support mathematics.



Arithmetic may support life. It is full of life and dreams.



Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in  
order to self preserve . This is only possible in a world where  
natural computers are possible: in a world where the phisical laws  
have a mathematical nature. Instead of comp creating a mathematical- 
phisical reality, is the mathematical reality what creates the  
computations in which we live.


So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some)  
mathematical ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is,  
observers.


OK. But harboring self-preserving computation is not enough, it must  
do in a first person measure winning way  on all computations going  
through our state. That's nice as this explain that your idea of  
evolution needs to be extended up to the origin of the physical laws.





Mathematics is just a collection of  representations that are  
internally logically consistent (note that the total mathematical  
universe is not a single consistent set!), so outside of that what  
is there? Comp is a mathematical model, its support outside of  
math remains to be seen.


Comp, is a bet involving the physical world, and the first person  
subject. But by its very nature, it leads to doubt the necessity to  
bet about something outside of a tiny part of arithmetic, for the  
ontology, as the inside view will already explode in a non  
mathematically unboundable way.


You need only the Turing universal reality. It is not important to  
choose numbers, or lambda terms, or combinators, or the game of life  
pattern, as they all lead to the same couplings consciousness/realities.


The arithmetical reality escapes the computable reality, but the  
computed beings are confronted to both the computable and the non  
computable, and a complete transfinite ladder of surprises.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-17 Thread Richard Ruquist

In string theory compact dimensions support arithmetic,
which in turn supports the evolution of life and dreams.
Richard

On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 at 2:03 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote:




 Life may support mathematics.



 Arithmetic may support life. It is full of life and dreams.



 Life is a computation devoted to making guesses about the future in order to
 self preserve . This is only possible in a world where natural computers are
 possible: in a world where the phisical laws have a mathematical nature.
 Instead of comp creating a mathematical-phisical reality, is the
 mathematical reality what creates the computations in which we live.

 So all kind of arbitrary universes may exist, but only (some) mathematical
 ones can harbour self preserving computations, that is, observers.


 OK. But harboring self-preserving computation is not enough, it must do in a
 first person measure winning way  on all computations going through our
 state. That's nice as this explain that your idea of evolution needs to be
 extended up to the origin of the physical laws.




 Mathematics is just a collection of  representations that are
 internally logically consistent (note that the total mathematical universe
 is not a single consistent set!), so outside of that what is there? Comp is
 a mathematical model, its support outside of math remains to be seen.


 Comp, is a bet involving the physical world, and the first person subject.
 But by its very nature, it leads to doubt the necessity to bet about
 something outside of a tiny part of arithmetic, for the ontology, as the
 inside view will already explode in a non mathematically unboundable way.

 You need only the Turing universal reality. It is not important to choose
 numbers, or lambda terms, or combinators, or the game of life pattern, as
 they all lead to the same couplings consciousness/realities.

 The arithmetical reality escapes the computable reality, but the computed
 beings are confronted to both the computable and the non computable, and a
 complete transfinite ladder of surprises.

 Bruno

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/17/2012 12:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 12:11:00 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 17 Oct 2012, at 02:42, Stephen P. King wrote:
 It is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem
 that is its Achilles heel.

No. It is the strongest point of comp. It does solve it
constructively, so it makes comp testable and/or our simulation level
measurable.

You can see it in another way, comp explains how and where the
laws of
physics, and psychology, come from, and with the whole consciousness/
matter coupling. It does not solve the problem because the math are
hard, only. Then the logic of observability, perhaps in a toy case,
are already given and tested.

That there is a body problem is the interesting thing, imo.

The other theories assume the body, and the mind, and some relation
shown incompatible with comp.

Comp, as such, is not an explanation. Just a frame where we can
formulate the problem mathematically, and that is the main reason to
study it, even if false. In fact, you need to study to comp to
develop
an authentic non-comp theory.

Comp is not an explanation per se, neither of the mind nor of the
body. The explanation is in the reasoning and the math. Comp
itself is
just the bet that we are Turing emulable at *some* level.


This is exactly why Comp is misguided, as awareness is by definition 
not emulable in any way.


Hi Craig,

I think that you and Bruno are using different dictionaries of 
words and are tangled in a web of semantic miscommunication. The 1p 
demands that it is possible for a conscious entity to have an emulation 
of its content of awareness if that 1p content is anything more than 
just a momentary singular coincidence of BP P - like a Boltzmann 
brain... What you might not understand is that Bruno is using the Kleene 
(of Church-Curry) relation between equivalent computations to collapse 
into each other all of the emulations of the same experiential content 
of the entity.




In order to even conceptualize 'emulation' there has to already be an 
a priori discernment between authenticity and inauthenticity, i.e. 
emulation requires the existence of something to emulate which is 
itself ultimately traceable back to something which is genuine and unique.


Comp bets on the Baudrillard simulacra - the copy without an original, 
beyond even the capacity to recover the deception. A copy through 
which no trace of an original can be accessed.


Nice idea! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulacra_and_Simulation 
But the concept of a self-erasing copy (a copy without an original) is 
just a restatement of the Kleene 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kleene%27s_recursion_theorem/Church-Curry 
http://pages.cpsc.ucalgary.ca/%7Erobin/FMCS/FMCS_04/material/seldin.pdf relation 
of the application of computable functions to their own descriptions! 
This idea is interesting to me because this sorta backs up Bruno's 
claims about quantum aspects implied by comp!




This is indeed an interesting and powerful hypothesis, however it is 
ultimately inside out.


So? Why are you kicking against the pricks? All you need to show is 
that your concept of Sense is just the involution of Bruno's object of 
bets and thus bridge the gap between your ideas that are mutually 
exclusive at this point.


You can't claim to be revealing the primacy of unreality while 
insisting on the same time of the reality of that revelation. In Comp, 
Comp itself is just another Bp, and the significance of whether it is 
Bp or Bp + p is really an obscure footnote.


Wow, reflexivity! Nice, but your going too far, Craig. Your 
argument does not demolish Bruno's comp, it just shows that it is 
different from yours.


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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 3:56:26 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

On 10/17/2012 12:38 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 12:11:00 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Oct 2012, at 02:42, Stephen P. King wrote:
It is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem
that is its Achilles heel.

No. It is the strongest point of comp. It does solve it
constructively, so it makes comp testable and/or our simulation level
measurable.

That there is a body problem is the interesting thing, imo.

The other theories assume the body, and the mind, and some relation
shown incompatible with comp.

Comp is not an explanation per se, neither of the mind nor of the
body. The explanation is in the reasoning and the math. Comp itself is
just the bet that we are Turing emulable at *some* level.

This is exactly why Comp is misguided, as awareness is by definition not
emulable in any way.

Hi Craig,

I think that you and Bruno are using different dictionaries of words
and are tangled in a web of semantic miscommunication. The 1p demands that
it is possible for a conscious entity to have an emulation of its content
of awareness if that 1p content is anything more than just a momentary
singular coincidence of BP P - like a Boltzmann brain... What you might
not understand is that Bruno is using the Kleene (of Church-Curry) relation
between equivalent computations to collapse into each other all of the
emulations of the same experiential content of the entity.

I meant that awareness is not emulable outside of awareness. You can't make
something which pretends to itself that it is experiencing something. Once
you have 1p awareness though, sure, you can re-present and meta-represent
all kinds of awareness within itself.

In order to even conceptualize 'emulation' there has to already be an a
priori discernment between authenticity and inauthenticity, i.e. emulation
requires the existence of something to emulate which is itself ultimately
traceable back to something which is genuine and unique.

Comp bets on the Baudrillard simulacra - the copy without an original,
beyond even the capacity to recover the deception. A copy through which no
trace of an original can be accessed.

Nice idea! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulacra_and_Simulation But
the concept of a self-erasing copy (a copy without an original) is just a
restatement of the
Kleenehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kleene%27s_recursion_theorem
/Church-Curryhttp://pages.cpsc.ucalgary.ca/%7Erobin/FMCS/FMCS_04/material/seldin.pdfrelation
of the application of computable functions to their own
descriptions! This idea is interesting to me because this sorta backs up
Bruno's claims about quantum aspects implied by comp!

I wouldn't say that a simulacra is a self-erasing copy, rather it is
something that doesn't even pretend to be authentic, like blue popsicles.
There isn't even a framework to pose the question of authenticity. Is it
'really' blue flavored?

This is indeed an interesting and powerful hypothesis, however it is
ultimately inside out.

So? Why are you kicking against the pricks? All you need to show is
that your concept of Sense is just the involution of Bruno's object of bets
and thus bridge the gap between your ideas that are mutually exclusive at
this point.

It's an involution, but so is materialism. The reason why Sense has to come
first is that neither substance nor function has any plausible path to
generate sense if it doesn't need it to begin with. When we turn it around,
we can easily see how function and substance are desirable ways of
elaborating sense. Bruno is quite enthusiastic about showing how substance
can be expected from an arithmetic primitive, but he is evasive when it
comes to putting arithmetic itself under the exact same scrutiny regarding
a sensorimotor-experiential primitive. It's true, we can build mathematical
puppets which remind us of minds, of cells, windmills, whatever, but they
don't do anything. They are inert and empty.

Instead of revealing essence and vitality, this approach yields shadow and
insignificance. It is seductive because you have to use your actual human
sense capacities to appreciate this. The shadow model has no capacity to
reveal the limitations of it's own

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/17/2012 4:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I meant that awareness is not emulable outside of awareness. You can't 
make something which pretends to itself that it is experiencing 
something. Once you have 1p awareness though, sure, you can re-present 
and meta-represent all kinds of awareness within itself.



Hi Craig,

But that is exactly the same thing that both I and Bruno agree on. 
We call it 1p. The trick is to figure out how to chain together a 
sequence of 1p's to create a mathematical model of a flow of conscious 
awareness. ;-) I have an idea as to how to do this as Pratt explains it.


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Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 5:44:40 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  On 10/17/2012 4:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  
 I meant that awareness is not emulable outside of awareness. You can't 
 make something which pretends to itself that it is experiencing something. 
 Once you have 1p awareness though, sure, you can re-present and 
 meta-represent all kinds of awareness within itself. 
  
   Hi Craig,

 But that is exactly the same thing that both I and Bruno agree on. We 
 call it 1p. 


I am saying that it is 1p and 3p both though. Not ideal 3p, but actual 3p 
as it is a 1p experience which reflects other 1p experiences in a 
qualitatively flattened way.
 

 The trick is to figure out how to chain together a sequence of 1p's to 
 create a mathematical model of a flow of conscious awareness. ;-) I have 
 an idea as to how to do this as Pratt explains it.


Music is a pretty good model of that already.

Craig
 


 -- 
 Onward!

 Stephen

  

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/17/2012 6:08 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 5:44:40 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

On 10/17/2012 4:40 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

I meant that awareness is not emulable outside of awareness. You
can't make something which pretends to itself that it is
experiencing something. Once you have 1p awareness though, sure,
you can re-present and meta-represent all kinds of awareness
within itself.


Hi Craig,

But that is exactly the same thing that both I and Bruno agree
on. We call it 1p.


I am saying that it is 1p and 3p both though. Not ideal 3p, but actual 
3p as it is a 1p experience which reflects other 1p experiences in a 
qualitatively flattened way.


I'm OK with that.



The trick is to figure out how to chain together a sequence of
1p's to create a mathematical model of a flow of conscious
awareness. ;-) I have an idea as to how to do this as Pratt
explains it.


Music is a pretty good model of that already.


Our hearing and understanding of music.. interesting! Like a model 
of entrainment. I always notice a sense of anticipating the next note as 
I listen to music...




Craig


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Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

Hi Richard Ruquist  

I'm well aware of that, except you don't need
Godel to reach an impossibly complex state of
calculations.  My own position is that if you 
can't calculate upward any more, you calculate 
downward. From Platonia, except that you begin
to use the forms, numbers, reason, all of that
stuff. Consciousness is created from Platonia,
probably more form philosophy than math.
After some study, it turns out that 
Leibniz's substances are not based on
physical materials but on their forms. 
Just like Plato except that there are an
infinite types of materials.




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/16/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Richard Ruquist  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-16, 08:33:45 
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly 
complexcomputations ? 


Roger, 
Philosophers such as Lucas, Hofstadter and Chalmers as well as Penrose 
and Godel suggest that consciousness may be due to incompleteness 
itself allowing for emergence... 
See http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf 
Richard 

On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 7:48 AM, Roger Clough  wrote: 
 Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? 
 
 The short answer is that I am proposing that : 
 
 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position 
 that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 
 
 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make 
 such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the 
 range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed 
 calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic 
 reason, 
 the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough 
 mathematics to be more specific. 
 
 If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. 
 
 
 
 
 === 
 A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: 
 Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property 
 of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: 
 
 A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's 
 condition of non-computability ? 
 
 http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html 
 
 Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of 
 classical 
 computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. 
 The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 
 
 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 
 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex 
 temporally bind information, 
 and 
 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity 
 among neurons. 
 
 
 
 B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? 
 
 Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge 
 through looking at a phenomenon 
 at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an 
 emergent property of 
 the behavior of many minds. 
 
 IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser 
 position. 
 
 Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: 
 
 http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html 
 
 One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably 
 that of Platonia as experienced. 
 All art and insight comes from such an experience. 
 
 On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the 
 universe is made up of 
 quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex 
 entities. 
 He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to 
 the realm 
 of spin networks. 
 
 This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability, 
 and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, 
 to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. 
 
 Instead, I propose the following: 
 
 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position 
 that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 
 
 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make 
 such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the 
 range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed 
 calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic 
 reason, 
 the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough 
 mathematics to be more specific. 
 = 
 
 
 
 Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
 10/16/2012 
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 
 
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Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

Hi Craig Weinberg  

You said,

 Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. 
If you could have computation without sense, then there would be no 
consciousness.

That sounds potent, I'm but not sure what it means.
Could you expand on it a little ?


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/16/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Craig Weinberg  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-16, 08:29:38 
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly 
complexcomputations ? 


Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you could 
have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness.  

Craig 


On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 7:50:17 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: 
Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?  

The short answer is that I am proposing that : 

1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position 
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.  

2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make  
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the 
range of computabilitlity.  Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed 
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic 
reason, 
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough 
mathematics to be more specific. 

If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. 




=== 
A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: 
Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property  
of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:  

A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's 
condition of non-computability ?  

http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html  

Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of 
classical  
computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.  
The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that  

1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,  
2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally 
bind information,  
and  
3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among 
neurons.  



B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?  

Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge 
through looking at a phenomenon  
at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an emergent 
property of  
the behavior of many minds.  

IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position.  

Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:  

http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html  

One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that 
of Platonia as experienced.  
All art and insight comes from such an experience.  

On the other hand, if I am not mistaken, Penrose seems to believe that the 
universe is made up of  
quantum spin networks, which presumably can model even the most complex 
entities.  
He does not seem to deny that the non-computational calculations belong to 
the realm 
of spin networks.   

This casts some doubt on his belief in the possibility of non-computability, 
and may even allow his spin networks, which are presumably complete, 
to escape intact from Godel's incompleteness limitation. 

Instead, I propose the following:  

1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position 
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.  

2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make  
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the 
range of computabilitlity. Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed 
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic 
reason, 
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough 
mathematics to be more specific. 
= 



Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net  
10/16/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 

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Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

Hi Stephen P. King 

Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?) 
the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
say that intuiton does. But that just seems
to be a conjecture of his.


ugh, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/16/2012 
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content - 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-10-16, 08:55:23 
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly 
complexcomputations ? 


Hi Roger, 

On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 

Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ? 

No! 



The short answer is that I am proposing that : 

1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position 
that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity. 

No! 



2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make 
such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the 
range of computabilitlity. 


No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has already 
shown this! 


 Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed 
calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic 
reason, 
the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know enough 
mathematics to be more specific. 

Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of L? property. This is also available from 
http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/ 

L?'s Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own soundness 
without becoming inconsistent. 

A slightly more technical discussion here: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox 



If you would like a more complete discussion, read below. 



I will! 




=== 
A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER: 
Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent property 
of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions: 

A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's 
condition of non-computability ? 

http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html 

Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property of 
classical 
computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks. 
The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that 

1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states, 
2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex temporally 
bind information, 
and 
3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity among 
neurons. 



That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se... 




B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ? 

Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or emerge 
through looking at a phenomenon 
at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an emergent 
property of 
the behavior of many minds. 


Sure, but the integrity or wholeness of an individual mind is only 
subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure under 
consistent self-reference (which is what L?'s Theorem is all about.) But this 
makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the symmetry somehow! 



IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser position. 

Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia: 

http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html 

One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably that 
of Platonia as experienced. 
All art and insight comes from such an experience. 



No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on Platonia! 
You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it straight from the 
Horse's mouth. 

http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf 

This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking: 

In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines, 
circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately 
realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those 
mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited, 
instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of 
mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible 
objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is 
accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead, 
via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's 
world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving 
it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and 
insight. This ideal world was regarded as distinct and more perfect 
than the material world of our external experiences, 
but just as real. 

Exactly how the contact is made between the realms remains to be 
explained! This, BTW, is my one bone of contention with Bruno's COMP program 
and I am desperately trying

Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

Hi Stephen P. King  

This may have little connection to what you said,
but in one of Brain Greene's talks (on time) he
made mention that the subjective state, the
experiential state, always just experiences now. 

Similarly calculations flow in time as they are made,
and the one being made is made now.

There seems to be a connection but I can't express what it is. 



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/16/2012  
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-16, 09:08:49 
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly 
complexcomputations ? 


On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: 
 On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 8:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
 Computation is an overly simplified emergent property of sense. If you 
 could 
 have computation without sense, then there would be no consciousness. 
 Craig 
  
 Could you provide a link where you more fully explain what sense is 
 and how it relates to comp and consciousness? You probably already 
 have. But I missed it. 
 Richard 
Hi Richard, 

 Unless you are a zombie, you are experiencing right now exactly  
what Sense is. Only you can know exactly what the Sense of Richard  
Ruquist and Craig can only experience (and thus know) what his Sense  
is. What you need to understand is that Sense is strictly 1p, it has no  
3p aspect. You either experience your own version of it or, like Dennett  
and the materialist, try to deny its existence. 

--  
Onward! 

Stephen 


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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
say that intuiton does. But that just seems
to be a conjecture of his.


ugh, rclo...@verizon.net mailto:%20rclo...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


Hi Roger,

IMHO, computability can only capture at most a simulation of the 
content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...



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Re: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-16 Thread Alberto G. Corona

Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost
anything. Most of the time as an excuse for  not saying I don´t know,
that is the prerequisite for thinking deeper about the problem. I prefer to
say I don´t know.

2012/10/16 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net

  Hi Stephen P. King

 Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
 consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
 the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
 say that intuiton does. But that just seems
 to be a conjecture of his.



 ugh, rclo...@verizon.net +rclo...@verizon.net
 10/16/2012
 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen


 - Receiving the following content -
 From: Stephen P. King
 Receiver: everything-list
 Time: 2012-10-16, 08:55:23
 Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly
 complexcomputations ?


 Hi Roger,

 On 10/16/2012 7:48 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

 Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations
 ?

 No!



 The short answer is that I am proposing that :

 1) Penrose's noncomputability position is equivalent to the position
 that consciousness emerges at such a level of complexity.

 No!



 2) In addition, that while Godel's incompleteness theorem may make
 such calculations incomplete, it does not make them beyond the
 range of computabilitlity.


 No, it puts them beyond the domain of computability. Bruno has already
 shown this!


  Instead, it exposes these halted upward-directed
 calculations to the possibility of continuing downward-directed platonic
 reason,
 the numbers themselves, and plato's geometrical forms. I do not know
 enough
 mathematics to be more specific.

 Look up Bruno's resent cartoon of L? property. This is also available
 from http://lesswrong.com/lw/t6/the_cartoon_guide_to_l%C3%B6bs_theorem/

 L?'s Theorem shows that a mathematical system cannot assert its own
 soundness without becoming inconsistent.

 A slightly more technical discussion here:
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox



 If you would like a more complete discussion, read below.



 I will!




 ===
 A MORE COMPLETE ANSWER:
 Contemporary thinking on consciousness is that it is an emergent
 property
 of computational complexity among neurons. This raises some questions:

 A. Is the emergence of consciouness simply a another name for Penrose's
 condition of non-computability ?

 http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/presentations/whatisconsciousness.html

 Conventional explanations portray consciousness as an emergent property
 of classical
 computer-like activities in the brain's neural networks.
 The prevailing views among scientists in this camp are that

 1) patterns of neural network activities correlate with mental states,
 2) synchronous network oscillations in thalamus and cerebral cortex
 temporally bind information,
 and
 3) consciousness emerges as a novel property of computational complexity
 among neurons.



 That is Stuart Hameroff's idea, not Penrose's per se...




 B. Or is there another way to look at this emergence ?

 Now my understanding of emergent properties is that they appear or
 emerge through looking at a phenomenon
 at a lower degree of magnification from above.  Thus sociology is an
 emergent property of
 the behavior of many minds.


 Sure, but the integrity or wholeness of an individual mind is only
 subject to a threshold in the sense of the requirement of closure under
 consistent self-reference (which is what L?'s Theorem is all about.) But
 this makes a mind solipsistic unless we can break the symmetry somehow!



 IMHO from above means looking downward from Platonia. From a wiser
 position.

 Penrose seems to take take two views of Platonia:

 http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Yasue.html

 One is his belief that there is a realm of non-computability, presumably
 that of Platonia as experienced.
 All art and insight comes from such an experience.



 No, that is what Kunio Yasue thinks that Penrose's position on
 Platonia! You might read The Emperor's New Mind for yourself and get it
 straight from the Horse's mouth.

 http://www.thiruvarunai.com/eBooks/penrose/The%20Emperors%20New%20Mind.pdf

 This quote might give us a flavor of Penrose's thinking:

 In Plato's view, the objects of pure geometry straight lines,
 circles, triangles, planes, etc. --were only approximately
 realized in terms of the world of actual physical things. Those
 mathematically precise objects of pure geometry inhabited,
 instead, a different world Plato's ideal world of
 mathematical concepts. Plato's world consists not of tangible
 objects, but of 'mathematical things'. This world is
 accessible to us not in the ordinary physical way but, instead,
 via the intellect. One's mind makes contact with Plato's
 world whenever it contemplates a mathematical truth, perceiving
 it by the exercise of mathematical reasoning and

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 9:36 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for 
almost anything. Most of the time as an excuse for  not saying I 
don´t know, that is the prerequisite for thinking deeper about the 
problem. I prefer to say I don´t know.


Hi Alberto,

I say  I am not sure, but will not retreat to a hypothesis non 
fingo http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypotheses_non_fingo stance. It is 
better to guess and possibly be wrong (or right!) than to not guess (or 
bet) at all.





2012/10/16 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net mailto:rclo...@verizon.net

Hi Stephen P. King

Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
the level of noncomputability.  He just seems to
say that intuiton does. But that just seems
to be a conjecture of his.



ugh, rclo...@verizon.net mailto:+rclo...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen



--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously 
wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated 
for almost anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is 
contingent on a level of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution 
a form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is 
evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable 
complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an 
irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such 
as reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a 
subjective experience of being in the world itself can be strongly 
argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.



On 10/16/2012 10:04 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
I  argued previously about that the most primitive conciousness 
emerged from predation/prey dynamics and the neural machinery 
necessary for them. Because in this stage of evolution a form of 
consciousness becomes a necessity, not a gift given by the Gods of 
computation Turing and Godel, among others ;)


2012/10/16 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net 
mailto:stephe...@charter.net


On 10/16/2012 9:36 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated
for almost anything. Most of the time as an excuse for  not
saying I don´t know, that is the prerequisite for thinking
deeper about the problem. I prefer to say I don´t know.





--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-16 Thread Alberto G. Corona

The difference between consciousness as an emergence from complexity and
consciousness is a functionality necessary for, and evolved with  by
natural selection is that the latter is a falsable  theory  (if we  find
an observable effect of consciousness) while the former is not even a
theory.

It´s like if  someone say that the accumulation of meat produce
consciousness and he claim that because predation produce consciousness and
predation need muscle meat, then accumulation of meat produce
consciousness..

2012/10/16 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net

  Hi Alberto,

 OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote:
 Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost
 anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level
 of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness
 becomes a necessity.
 How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is
 evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable
 complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an
 irreducible primitive or it is not?
 I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as
 reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective
 experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at
 the most basic level that allows differences.



 On 10/16/2012 10:04 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 I  argued previously about that the most primitive conciousness emerged
 from predation/prey dynamics and the neural machinery necessary for them.
 Because in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a
 necessity, not a gift given by the Gods of computation Turing and Godel,
 among others ;)

 2012/10/16 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net

  On 10/16/2012 9:36 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

 Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for
 almost anything. Most of the time as an excuse for  not saying I don´t
 know, that is the prerequisite for thinking deeper about the problem. I
 prefer to say I don´t know.



 --
 Onward!

 Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-16 Thread meekerdb


On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: Magic 
emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything. and now 
you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: ... in this 
stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other 
than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the 
physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as reportablity 
of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective experience of being in the 
world itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows 
differences.


If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a sensory deprivation 
tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron 
scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?


Brent

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 2:42:26 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

  On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 

 Hi Alberto,

 OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: 
 Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost 
 anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level 
 of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness 
 becomes a necessity. 
 How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is 
 evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable 
 complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an 
 irreducible primitive or it is not?
 I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as 
 reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective 
 experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at 
 the most basic level that allows differences.


 If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a 
 sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple 
 interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the 
 content of this subjective experience?


For a person, sensory deprivation typically leads to powerful 
phenomenological perceptions or unconsciousness. Hard to guess what happens 
on a subatomic level, but there is no reason to assume that sense is 
limited to perceptions of the outside. Sense comes from within as well 
(it's just different than what comes from without).

Craig
 


 Brent
  

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously 
wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been 
advocated for almost anything. and now you suggest that 
consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: ... in 
this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What 
is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing 
stable complex structures in the physical universe? Either 
consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues 
such as reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having 
a subjective experience of being in the world itself can be strongly 
argued to flow at the most basic level that allows differences.


If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a 
sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple 
interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will 
be the content of this subjective experience?


Brent
--


Hi Brent,

How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of photons 
as actual experiential content? It seems to me that all talk of orbital 
electron scattering a photon that is an abstract narrative that we talk 
to each other about and use to make predictions of phenomena that is 
within our sphere of mutual non-contradiction. Our knowledge of physical 
laws, like all content of experience is 1p that could be defined as 3p 
iff possible.



--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-16 Thread meekerdb

On 10/16/2012 12:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 2:42:26 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote:
Magic
emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost
anything. and
now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala:
...
in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is
evolution
other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex
structures
in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive
or it is
not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as
reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective
experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at
the most
basic level that allows differences.

If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a
sensory
deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g.
an orbital
electron scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective
experience?

For a person, sensory deprivation typically leads to powerful phenomenological
perceptions or unconsciousness. Hard to guess what happens on a subatomic level, but
there is no reason to assume that sense is limited to perceptions of the outside. Sense
comes from within as well (it's just different than what comes from without).

As I recall, what happens is that after about 45min, a person's conscious thoughts tend to
enter an loop.

Brent

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-16 Thread meekerdb


On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: Magic 
emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost anything. and 
now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: ... in 
this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is evolution other 
than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in the 
physical universe? Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as 
reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective experience 
of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level 
that allows differences.


If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a sensory 
deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital 
electron scattering a photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?


Brent
--


Hi Brent,

How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of photons as actual 
experiential content? 


No, but Craig thinks electrons do.

It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a photon that is an 
abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use to make predictions of 
phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual non-contradiction. 


Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective agreement about 1p 
experience.  But my point is that consciousness is not basic, otherwise it wouldn't need 
external stimuli to avoid infinite loops.


Brent

Our knowledge of physical laws, like all content of experience is 1p that could be 
defined as 3p iff possible.



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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

  On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: 

 On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:
  
 On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 

 Hi Alberto,

 OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote: 
 Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost 
 anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level 
 of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness 
 becomes a necessity. 
 How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is 
 evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable 
 complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an 
 irreducible primitive or it is not?
 I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as 
 reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective 
 experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at 
 the most basic level that allows differences.


 If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a 
 sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple 
 interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the 
 content of this subjective experience?

 Brent
  -- 

  Hi Brent,

 How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of photons as 
 actual experiential content? 


 No, but Craig thinks electrons do.


Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that they 
are only the shared experience of atoms.
 


 It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a photonthat is 
 an abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use to 
 make predictions of phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual 
 non-contradiction. 


 Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective agreement 
 about 1p experience.  But my point is that consciousness is not basic, 
 otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid infinite loops.


I can't find anything about infinite loops associated with sensory 
deprivation. I have never heard it mentioned and even the author of this 
article 
http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/the-nothing-eaters/Content?oid=5539022 
spent 90 to 2.5 hours in there with no mention of any such thing.

Craig


 Brent

 Our knowledge of physical laws, like all content of experience is 1p that 
 could be defined as 3p iff possible.


 -- 
 Onward!

 Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-16 Thread Richard Ruquist

Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to
how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to
contradict that claim: I.G., These experiential phenomena
(telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are
different levels of same thing.

Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to
be what we refer to as COMP.


On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


 On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

 On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

 On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:

 On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

 Hi Alberto,

 OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously wrote:
 Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for almost
 anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a level
 of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness
 becomes a necessity.
 How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is
 evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable
 complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an
 irreducible primitive or it is not?
 I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as
 reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective
 experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at
 the most basic level that allows differences.


 If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a
 sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple interactions,
 e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the content of
 this subjective experience?

 Brent
 --

 Hi Brent,

 How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of photons as
 actual experiential content?


 No, but Craig thinks electrons do.


 Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that they
 are only the shared experience of atoms.



 It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a photon
 that is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use to
 make predictions of phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual
 non-contradiction.


 Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective agreement
 about 1p experience.  But my point is that consciousness is not basic,
 otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid infinite loops.


 I can't find anything about infinite loops associated with sensory
 deprivation. I have never heard it mentioned and even the author of this
 article
 http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/the-nothing-eaters/Content?oid=5539022
 spent 90 to 2.5 hours in there with no mention of any such thing.

 Craig


 Brent

 Our knowledge of physical laws, like all content of experience is 1p that
 could be defined as 3p iff possible.


 --
 Onward!

 Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:

 Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to 
 how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to 
 contradict that claim: I.G., These experiential phenomena 
 (telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are 
 different levels of same thing. 


I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that atoms, 
molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of the same thing.
 


 Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to 
 be what we refer to as COMP. 


COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false. 
Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause. COMP is an unsupported 
assumption about the supremacy of computation.

Craig
 



 On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript: 
 wrote: 
  
  
  On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 
  
  On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: 
  
  On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote: 
  
  On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 
  
  Hi Alberto, 
  
  OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously 
 wrote: 
  Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for 
 almost 
  anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a 
 level 
  of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a form of 
 consciousness 
  becomes a necessity. 
  How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is 
  evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing 
 stable 
  complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an 
  irreducible primitive or it is not? 
  I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such 
 as 
  reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a 
 subjective 
  experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow 
 at 
  the most basic level that allows differences. 
  
  
  If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a 
  sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple 
 interactions, 
  e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the content 
 of 
  this subjective experience? 
  
  Brent 
  -- 
  
  Hi Brent, 
  
  How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of photons 
 as 
  actual experiential content? 
  
  
  No, but Craig thinks electrons do. 
  
  
  Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that 
 they 
  are only the shared experience of atoms. 
  
  
  
  It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a photon 
  that is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use 
 to 
  make predictions of phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual 
  non-contradiction. 
  
  
  Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective 
 agreement 
  about 1p experience.  But my point is that consciousness is not basic, 
  otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid infinite loops. 
  
  
  I can't find anything about infinite loops associated with sensory 
  deprivation. I have never heard it mentioned and even the author of this 
  article 
  
 http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/the-nothing-eaters/Content?oid=5539022
  
  spent 90 to 2.5 hours in there with no mention of any such thing. 
  
  Craig 
  
  
  Brent 
  
  Our knowledge of physical laws, like all content of experience is 1p 
 that 
  could be defined as 3p iff possible. 
  
  
  -- 
  Onward! 
  
  Stephen 
  
  -- 
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 Groups 
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 Groups 
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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 4:19 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously 
wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been 
advocated for almost anything. and now you suggest that 
consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala: ... in 
this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What 
is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate 
increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe? 
Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues 
such as reportablity of consciousness, but the property of 
having a subjective experience of being in the world itself can 
be strongly argued to flow at the most basic level that allows 
differences.


If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in 
a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple 
interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will 
be the content of this subjective experience?


Brent
--


Hi Brent,

How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of 
photons as actual experiential content? 


No, but Craig thinks electrons do.


Hi Brent,

So do I, it is very primitive, but present. The reasoning is 
simple, there must be something that it is like to be an electron. My 
belief in this follows from my agreement with panprotopsychism and 
explained in David Chalmers book /The Conscious Mind/. I don't have time 
to defend the idea now, but you might read Chalmers book and decide for 
yourself.




It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a 
photon that is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other 
about and use to make predictions of phenomena that is within our 
sphere of mutual non-contradiction. 


Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective 
agreement about 1p experience.  But my point is that consciousness is 
not basic, otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid 
infinite loops.


Who claims that it needs to avoid endless loops? In fact, endless 
looping is required! At our level, we need external stimuli just to stay 
coherent with each other. Consciousness is, on its own, solipsistic and 
thus lost in its hall of mirrors. Interactions are a break in this 
symmetry of ME ME ME ME ME ME




Brent

Our knowledge of physical laws, like all content of experience is 1p 
that could be defined as 3p iff possible.





--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You
previously wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough complexity
has been advocated for almost anything. and now you suggest
that consciousness is contingent on a level of evolution, ala:
... in this stage of evolution a form of consciousness becomes
a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity?
What is evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate
increasing stable complex structures in the physical universe?
Either consciousness is an irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider
issues such as reportablity of consciousness, but the
property of having a subjective experience of being in the
world itself can be strongly argued to flow at the most basic
level that allows differences.


If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person
in a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very
simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a
photon what will be the content of this subjective experience?

Brent
-- 


Hi Brent,

How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of
photons as actual experiential content? 


No, but Craig thinks electrons do.


Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that 
they are only the shared experience of atoms.


Hi Craig,

Well, we differ on that point! If we accept atoms, we also have to 
accept electrons! Best not go there!






It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a
photon that is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other
about and use to make predictions of phenomena that is within our
sphere of mutual non-contradiction. 


Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective
agreement about 1p experience.  But my point is that consciousness
is not basic, otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid
infinite loops.


I can't find anything about infinite loops associated with sensory 
deprivation. I have never heard it mentioned and even the author of 
this article 
http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/the-nothing-eaters/Content?oid=5539022 
spent 90 to 2.5 hours in there with no mention of any such thing.


Craig


It follows from the necessary definition of self-representation. As 
some might say, it's in the math, man!.


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 5:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:

Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense
as to
how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to
contradict that claim: I.G., These experiential phenomena
(telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are
different levels of same thing.


I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that 
atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of 
the same thing.


Hi Craig,

I see a problem here. The concept of levels is too simplistic and 
one-dimensional. I think it would help us to dig a bit into mereology 
and discuss different types of organization such that we have a broader 
and deeper indexing structure to relate the atoms, molecules, cells, 
organs, and bodies.





Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not
seem to
be what we refer to as COMP.


COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false.


I understand COMP to be true but only in a very deep, yet narrow, way.


Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause.


I say neither. Computation is a representation, or better, an 
externalization of sense. We cannot say that sense is this or sense 
is not that while pointing outside of 1p. It is the assumption that 
sense is ___ that must be understood to be problematic; it cannot be 
anything other than itself! Sure we can discuss sense in as if terms, 
but we cannot forget that it is not the symbols or the terms we use and 
cannot be.



COMP is an unsupported assumption about the supremacy of computation.


Wrong. It is very supported by a broad landscape of mathematical 
truths, with the small exception that numbers can alone do the work 
that they are required to do. After all, comp only works in Platonia! It 
is the inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem that is 
its Achilles heel.


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 6:48:51 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  On 10/16/2012 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote: 

  On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: 

 On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:
  
 On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: 

 Hi Alberto,

 OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You previously 
 wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough complexity has been advocated for 
 almost anything. and now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a 
 level of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a form of 
 consciousness becomes a necessity. 
 How is this not an argument for emergence from complexity? What is 
 evolution other than a mechanism in Nature to generate increasing stable 
 complex structures in the physical universe? Either consciousness is an 
 irreducible primitive or it is not?
 I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider issues such as 
 reportablity of consciousness, but the property of having a subjective 
 experience of being in the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at 
 the most basic level that allows differences.


 If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a person in a 
 sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions' are very simple 
 interactions, e.g. an orbital electron scattering a photon what will be the 
 content of this subjective experience?

 Brent
  -- 

  Hi Brent,

 How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering of photonsas 
 actual experiential content? 


 No, but Craig thinks electrons do.
  

 Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance that they 
 are only the shared experience of atoms.
  

 Hi Craig,

 Well, we differ on that point! If we accept atoms, we also have to 
 accept electrons! Best not go there!


Unfortunately if I doubt photons really the whole Standard Model is 
potentially up for grabs. The wide variation in the modeling of atoms tells 
me that it is not a given that electrons are not just an accounting of 
atomic charge states. It may be that electrons are objective in some senses 
but subjective in others (photons being subjective in more ways). That 
seems the most likely.

Do we have a way of isolating electrons which are independent of ions? When 
I look up the research online, it is always (naturally) a foregone 
conclusion that they do exist in isolation but I haven't found anything 
which explains how specifically we know that (or how we could know that).

I'm not anxious to try to advocate for electron agnosticism on top of 
photon agnosticism, but if there is nothing convince me otherwise, then 
there is no reason not to go there as well (other than fear of ridicule, 
which I only care about if I'm actually wrong).

Craig

 


   
  
  
 It seems to me that all talk of orbital electron scattering a photonthat 
 is an abstract narrative that we talk to each other about and use to 
 make predictions of phenomena that is within our sphere of mutual 
 non-contradiction. 


 Sure, the 3p story is one we create to explain intersubjective agreement 
 about 1p experience.  But my point is that consciousness is not basic, 
 otherwise it wouldn't need external stimuli to avoid infinite loops.
  

 I can't find anything about infinite loops associated with sensory 
 deprivation. I have never heard it mentioned and even the author of this 
 article 
 http://www.portlandmercury.com/portland/the-nothing-eaters/Content?oid=5539022spent
  90 to 2.5 hours in there with no mention of any such thing.

 Craig
  
 
 It follows from the necessary definition of self-representation. As 
 some might say, it's in the math, man!.

 -- 
 Onward!

 Stephen

  

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 8:42:16 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

  On 10/16/2012 5:26 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
  


 On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:41:59 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: 

 Sorry Craig but http://s33light.org/SEEES did not make any sense as to 
 how sense underlies consciousness and comp. In fact you seem to 
 contradict that claim: I.G., These experiential phenomena 
 (telesemantics, sense, perception, awareness, consciousness) are 
 different levels of same thing. 


 I don't see any contradiction. Its no difference than saying that atoms, 
 molecules, cells, organs, and bodies are different levels of the same thing.
  

 Hi Craig,

 I see a problem here. The concept of levels is too simplistic and 
 one-dimensional. I think it would help us to dig a bit into mereology and 
 discuss different types of organization such that we have a broader and 
 deeper indexing structure to relate the atoms, molecules, cells, organs, 
 and bodies.


I think it is the simplicity which we are after. The reason that we can say 
'atoms, molecules, cells, organs, and bodies' and understand a qualitative 
hierarchy related to physical scale and evolutionary age is because that is 
how our perception naturally stereotypes it. The deeper structure is a 
distraction, takes us further into the impersonal 3p view, which tries to 
reconcile all views of all other views rather than the significant themes 
that allow us to make sense of it in the first place. To do big picture, I 
think it has to be broad strokes.


   
  

 Computation is mentioned 3 time (comp not at all) but does not seem to 
 be what we refer to as COMP. 


 COMP I don't talk about much because I understand it to be false.


 I understand COMP to be true but only in a very deep, yet narrow, way.


What seems true about COMP?
 


  Computation is an effect of sense, not a cause.


 I say neither. Computation is a representation, or better, an 
 externalization of sense. 


I agree with that. That's pretty much what I meant.

 

 We cannot say that sense is this or sense is not that while pointing 
 outside of 1p.


There is nothing outside of (the totality of) 1p.
 

 It is the assumption that sense is ___ that must be understood to be 
 problematic; it cannot be anything other than itself! Sure we can discuss 
 sense in as if terms, but we cannot forget that it is not the symbols or 
 the terms we use and cannot be.


I agree, although part of the nature of sense is it's self-reflection and 
translucence. We can say things about it, but only because the things we 
say can remind us of what we experience first hand.
 


  COMP is an unsupported assumption about the supremacy of computation.
  

 Wrong. It is very supported by a broad landscape of mathematical 
 truths, with the small exception that numbers can alone do the work that 
 they are required to do. After all, comp only works in Platonia! It is the 
 inability of comp to solve the arithmetic body problem that is its Achilles 
 heel.


Comp supporting itself isn't a surprise though. Every supreme idealism 
supports itself. What supports it outside of mathematics?


Craig


 -- 
 Onward!

 Stephen

  

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Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?


On 10/16/2012 10:03 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 6:48:51 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

On 10/16/2012 4:31 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:19:54 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:

On 10/16/2012 12:41 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 10/16/2012 2:42 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/16/2012 7:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

Hi Alberto,

OK, I am officially confused by your statements. You
previously wrote: Magic emergence from magic enough
complexity has been advocated for almost anything. and
now you suggest that consciousness is contingent on a
level of evolution, ala: ... in this stage of evolution a
form of consciousness becomes a necessity.
How is this not an argument for emergence from
complexity? What is evolution other than a mechanism in
Nature to generate increasing stable complex structures in
the physical universe? Either consciousness is an
irreducible primitive or it is not?
I agree that complexity *is* involved when we consider
issues such as reportablity of consciousness, but the
property of having a subjective experience of being in
the world itself can be strongly argued to flow at the
most basic level that allows differences.


If there are no inputs from the world to perceive, e.g. a
person in a sensory deprivation tank, or the 'perceptions'
are very simple interactions, e.g. an orbital electron
scattering a photon what will be the content of this
subjective experience?

Brent
-- 


Hi Brent,

How so? Do we humans have orbital electron scattering
of photons as actual experiential content? 


No, but Craig thinks electrons do.


Only if electrons actually exist. I think there is a good chance
that they are only the shared experience of atoms.


Hi Craig,

Well, we differ on that point! If we accept atoms, we also
have to accept electrons! Best not go there!


Unfortunately if I doubt photons really the whole Standard Model is 
potentially up for grabs. The wide variation in the modeling of atoms 
tells me that it is not a given that electrons are not just an 
accounting of atomic charge states. It may be that electrons are 
objective in some senses but subjective in others (photons being 
subjective in more ways). That seems the most likely.



Hi Craig,

Interesting challenge! What if we jettison as a confabulation all 
of physical theory... What is left? Shall we cast aside the nice 
predictive values that we have gotten? What then? I am willing to go 
there for the sake of discussion, but to where?


Let's try something. Consider the Bpp idea. Belief in a 
proposition and it is true. Can we reconstruct explanations from this? 
We would have to have a plurality of entities that would have the 
beliefs, no? Where do we get that plurality? Let's stipulate that we 
have a plurality somehow. There should be something that distinguishes 
them, something other than positions in space and time... or is there 
anything that would generate distinctions?
Maybe the beliefs are frames in different languages that require 
some transformation to translate the propositions of one into something 
equivalent for all others. My assumption is that we have to have a 
common reality to recover something like physical theories and we can 
get that either by imbedding our entities into a single space or by 
simply having a common set of propositions that form a non-contradictory 
set, something isomorphic to a Boolean algebra if and only if the 
propositions are satisfiable 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_satisfiability_problem such that 
the total logical formulation is TRUE. I favor the latter idea, but it 
requires that the physical universe that we observe to be representable 
as a true Boolean algebra and a repudiation of the idea that substance 
is ontologically priomitive.


How is it determined to be satisfiable becomes an interesting 
question! Most thinkers seem to assume that its global logical 
consistency is completely determined ab initio by the combination of 
physical laws and initial conditions. But exactly how did the physical 
laws come to exist such that they never generate a logical inconsistency 
(violating satisfiability) and thus white rabbits? I think that the 
physical laws are the result of an underlying process that is, in the 
ontological sense, eternal and that what we observe as a physical 
universe is just an intersection of logically true beliefs for some 
finite collection of entities.



Do we have a way of isolating electrons which are independent of ions? 
When I look up the research online, it is always (naturally) a 
foregone conclusion that they do exist in isolation but I haven't 
found anything which explains how

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?