subject:"Re\: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation"



On 31 Oct 2011, at 06:30, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:


On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standishli...@hpcoders.com.au  wrote:


My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it,  
you remain in

superposition.


- Show quoted text -

I thought that in the everett interpretation everything was unitary?


best wishes
Nick



Right.  In Everett's interpretation Nick's consciousness exists in  
many superpositions and there must be some additional mechanism of  
consciousness that accounts for the separation of these conscious  
streams of experience.


That is just memory of the experiencer. It is not conceptually  
different than the mechanist first person indeterminacy.

I agree that in Everett everything evolve unitarily.



This would be the same mechanism that collapses the wave function in  
the Copenhagen interpretation - something like decoherence except  
that when the cross terms become sufficiently small they become  
exactly zero.


Decoherence is just entanglement, as see from a chosen basis.


This would be a small non-unitary step.  But it requires that  
there be distinguished variables in which the density matrix becomes  
diagonal - the pointer basis.


If reality is discrete. If, not matrix might never become diagonal,  
and in that case QTI follows, and first person, from their first  
person view cannot be annihilated. With mechanism, it is trivial that  
only this happen (no first person annihilation) and mechanism favor  
the existence of some continuous (real) observable. I think.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-31 Thread Nick Prince



On Oct 31, 5:30 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
 On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:



  On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standishli...@hpcoders.com.au  wrote:

  My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
  Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it, you 
  remain in
  superposition.

  - Show quoted text -
  I thought that in the everett interpretation everything was unitary?

  best wishes
  Nick

 Right.  In Everett's interpretation Nick's consciousness exists in many 
 superpositions and
 there must be some additional mechanism of consciousness that accounts for 
 the separation
 of these conscious streams of experience.  This would be the same mechanism 
 that collapses
 the wave function in the Copenhagen interpretation - something like 
 decoherence except
 that when the cross terms become sufficiently small they become exactly zero. 
  This would
 be a small non-unitary step.  But it requires that there be distinguished 
 variables in
 which the density matrix becomes diagonal - the pointer basis.

 Brent


Hi Brent
Ok, after I'd posted the line above I thought again and wondered if my
misunderstanding of Russell's answer was that he was indicating that a
measurement made would cause the click which is essentally due to an
hermitian non unitary operator.  Yet in many accounts of the
measurement procedure they follow my resoning that the apparatus doing
the measuring, and the object being measured interact for some time
via a unitary operation i.e. obey the SE.  So I got confused.  I
understand that unitary operators are not observable operators yet
they do describe the evolution of a state from one to another (as does
the action of an observable operator) how do these accounts of the
measurement process end up being consistent with each other?  My
understanding of QM must be lacking here.

I read your answer but can't quite connect with it.  Why must there be
some additional mechanism of consciousness that accounts for the
separation
 of these conscious streams of experience? In two branches of the
multiverse can my consciousness  not be at the end of the
superposition that  I put in the original post.

exp(-iHt/hbar) (|s0|a0|Cons_0


= exp(-iHt/hbar) (c1|s1|a0|Cons_0 + c2|s2|a0|Cons_0)  (3)

= (c1|s1|a1|Cons_1 + c2|s2|a2|Cons_2)

|s = system, |a = apparatus states
|Cons_i standing for conscious state of observer of the measurement.

This accounts for 3p viewponts.

I thought that 1p viewponts in any branch just change according to
some U(t) such that U(t) |cons_i(0) = |cons_i(t).  Can you (anyone)
help me to understand?

Best wishes

Nick


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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation



On 31 Oct 2011, at 06:20, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/30/2011 5:09 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
A common response to the idea of QTI is, Why should I care if I die  
and someone else in another world who thinks he is me survives? But  
this objection shows a lack of understanding of consciousness works  
if there are multiple instantiations.


But multiple instantiations is exactly what we do not experience.   
So the existence of other people who think they are me is purely a  
speculative inference.  According the theory they aren't me, they  
just share some past history.   Bruno emphasizes that his experience  
with Salvia implies that he exists independent of his history.   
But this he is still not multiple.  I haven't used Salvia, but I  
suspect that experience still requires at least short histories.


Hmm... let me try to restate what I tried to convey. In fact I have  
always thought that consciousness always relate to time or a time  
quale. So I was very happy that the simplest definition of first  
person, given by the Theatetus' notion of knower (Bp  p) leads both  
to a logic of knowledge (S4) and of time (S4Grz = (roughly) a temporal  
logic with a notion of irreversiblity). In that way the knower is a  
time builder, and it explains why consciousness/knowledge is  
intrinsically related to time. It consolidate also the relation  
between the first person and the intuitionist conception of the  
conscious subject (Brouwer).


I mentioned the salvia experience as providing a very curious  
hallucination looking like a counter-example to this.
It seems indeed possible to be conscious without any feeling of time- 
duration. This is absolutely unimaginable. Even a color qualia seems  
to be conceivable only through some duration. Yet, under salvia, it  
happens that we can get a state of consciousness which seems to be  
completely atemporal. In reports, some describe this as a form of  
eternity, but this is because, I think, we have just no word for that  
type of consciousness, because it does not refer to something lasting  
an infinite time, nor a short time, just no time at all. It is just  
not lasting at all. This makes me doubt that the knower is the  
originator of consciousness, and that consciousness might be deeper  
than we can think from the simple knower theory related to the  
mechanist hypothesis. Unfortunately such intuition are impossible to  
convey (and indeed altered state consciousness can only refute a  
theory, or inspire a theory, but cannot be taken as communicable data).


Now, I am not sure that any of this is relevant for criticizing  
Stathis' comment. In a quantum differentiation, like when we observe,  
with a {up, down} discriminating apparatus, a particle in a state like  
1/sqrt(2)(up + down), as well as in a digital mechanist  
differentiation, like when we are annihilated in some place and  
reconstituted in two different places, consciousness remains singular  
by virtue of having the whole mechanist brain made into two (could  
be two infinities with similar measure) brains. Without introducing  
some telepathic powers, each brain can only refer to itself (or to the  
person corresponding to that brain), for the same reason that if you  
play chess with a machine, you can copy its state, and play two  
different ends-game from that. You would find supernatural that, when  
playing a second end-game, the machine could refer to the first end- 
game (that would be magical). In other words, personal identity is an  
illusion which is very simple to explain (by the connexity used for  
memory and self-reference). Consciousness is harder to explain, and is  
hardly an illusion.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

On 30 Oct 2011, at 10:34, benjayk wrote:

Nick Prince-2 wrote:

This is not even required. The decaying brain can become no brain, and
consciousness proceeds from no brain. Of course this means that some
continuity of consciousness needs to be preserved outside of brains.
Theoretically this doesn't even require that structures other than
brains
can be conscious, since we know from our experience that even when/
while a
structure is unconscious it can preserve continuity (we awake from
deep

sleep and experience a coherent history).
The continuity may be preserved simply through similarity of
structure. Like
our continuity of personhood is preserved through the similarity of
our
brains states (even though the brain changes vastly from childhood
until old
age), continuity of human consciousness may be preserved through
similarity

of brains (even though brains have big differences is structure).

So this could even be a materialist sort of non-technological
immortality.

Sure. I would say that's the one exploited by nature, and that's the
reason why we do children, and why we might be tented to be angry when
the children looks of behave to much differently than us.

It's just that most materialists firmly identify with the person, so
they

mostly won't care much about it (What's it worth that consciousness
survives, when *I* don't survive.).

That's something like a total individualistic illusion, which might be
less common that we might think, as people easily dies for their (good
or bad) ideas or values. There are bad forces in play in the sense
that a form of marketing encourage some abuse in the little ego
values, and some politics disencourage solid and valid education, to
even more control that marketing issue (and that leads to harmful
paradoxes (like alcohol encouraged (see almost any movies) and
cannabis illegal, just for one typical example).
people care more about values than the actual political world does
reflect (due to a lot of complex historical partially contingent
factors).

If they like the idea of immortality, they will rather hope for the
singularity. But impersonal immortality seems more in accord with our
observations than a pipe dream of personal immortality through a
technological singularity,

In my opinion, the singularity is the discovery of the universal
machine. Church's thesis if you want.

The rest is a sequence of deeper echoes.

and also much more elegant (surviving through
forgetting seems much simpler than surviving through acquiring
abitrarily

much memory and personal identity).

I sort of agree with this. But I'm not sure if this is communicable,
or need to be communicated.

I wonder why less people consider this possiblity of immortality,

I think that if you do that properly, you realize that all people does
that. The *moment* when they do that is irrelevant from that *moment*
perspective. That's one reason more to let people doing as they do,
which does not mean accepting they coerce against different personal
ways.

as it both
fits more with our intuition (does it really seem probable that all
persons
grow abitrarily old?) and with observation (people do actually die)
than

other forms of immortality.

Mechanism is really a many-immortality theory. There is a plethora of
path.

Some are short and provide shortcuts to the Nirvana, say.
Others are more like sequence of multiple incarnations and
reincarnations, and they prolonged the Samsara.

Bruno

What, you ask, was the beginning of it all?

And it is this ...
Existence that multiplied itself
For sheer delight of being
And plunged into numberless trillions of forms
So that it might
Find
Itself
Innumerably (Aurobindo)

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-31 Thread meekerdb

On 10/31/2011 6:01 AM, Nick Prince wrote:

On Oct 31, 5:30 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:

On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standishli...@hpcoders.com.auwrote:

My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it, you remain in
superposition.
- Show quoted text -

I thought that in the everett interpretation everything was unitary?
best wishes
Nick

Right. In Everett's interpretation Nick's consciousness exists in many
superpositions and
there must be some additional mechanism of consciousness that accounts for the
separation
of these conscious streams of experience. This would be the same mechanism
that collapses
the wave function in the Copenhagen interpretation - something like decoherence
except
that when the cross terms become sufficiently small they become exactly zero.
This would
be a small non-unitary step. But it requires that there be distinguished
variables in
which the density matrix becomes diagonal - the pointer basis.

Brent

Hi Brent
Ok, after I'd posted the line above I thought again and wondered if my
misunderstanding of Russell's answer was that he was indicating that a
measurement made would cause the click which is essentally due to an
hermitian non unitary operator. Yet in many accounts of the
measurement procedure they follow my resoning that the apparatus doing
the measuring, and the object being measured interact for some time
via a unitary operation i.e. obey the SE. So I got confused. I
understand that unitary operators are not observable operators yet
they do describe the evolution of a state from one to another (as does
the action of an observable operator) how do these accounts of the
measurement process end up being consistent with each other? My
understanding of QM must be lacking here.

I read your answer but can't quite connect with it. Why must there be
some additional mechanism of consciousness that accounts for the
separation
of these conscious streams of experience? In two branches of the
multiverse can my consciousness not be at the end of the
superposition that I put in the original post.

exp(-iHt/hbar) (|s0|a0|Cons_0

= exp(-iHt/hbar) (c1|s1|a0|Cons_0 + c2|s2|a0|Cons_0) (3)

= (c1|s1|a1|Cons_1 + c2|s2|a2|Cons_2)

|s = system, |a = apparatus states
|Cons_i standing for conscious state of observer of the measurement.

This accounts for 3p viewponts.

I thought that 1p viewponts in any branch just change according to
some U(t) such that U(t) |cons_i(0) = |cons_i(t). Can you (anyone)
help me to understand?

I don't think I understand it any better than you do. But ISTM we need a quantum theory
of consciousness in order to write eqns like (3) above. In the standard theory it implies
that there is some experience of both system states at the same time. A change of basis
changes the labelling of 1 and 2. In other words, if the brain is in a superposition
then there is *a* conscious experience of *both* states. If you deny this and postulate
that consciousness must be unique (i.e. classical), as we directly experience it, then it
seems you have gotten back to the theory that consciousness collapses the wave function.

To me, decoherence offers a better explanation, i.e. that the off diagonal terms in the
density matrix become practically zero already at the brain level; or more accurately at
the level of the detector of the particle that initiates breaking the vial. This
explanation still has a problem though in that there must be some canonical pointer states
in which the off diagonal terms become zero. I think it may be possible to justify a
pointer basis; but it hasn't been found yet.

Brent

Best wishes

Nick

Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation



On 31 Oct 2011, at 18:13, meekerdb wrote:


On 10/31/2011 6:01 AM, Nick Prince wrote:



On Oct 31, 5:30 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:

On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:




On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standishli...@hpcoders.com.au  wrote:

My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it,  
you remain in

superposition.
- Show quoted text -
I thought that in the everett interpretation everything was  
unitary?

best wishes
Nick
Right.  In Everett's interpretation Nick's consciousness exists in  
many superpositions and
there must be some additional mechanism of consciousness that  
accounts for the separation
of these conscious streams of experience.  This would be the same  
mechanism that collapses
the wave function in the Copenhagen interpretation - something  
like decoherence except
that when the cross terms become sufficiently small they become  
exactly zero.  This would
be a small non-unitary step.  But it requires that there be  
distinguished variables in

which the density matrix becomes diagonal - the pointer basis.

Brent


Hi Brent
Ok, after I'd posted the line above I thought again and wondered if  
my
misunderstanding of Russell's answer was that he was indicating  
that a
measurement made would cause the click which is essentally due to  
an

hermitian non unitary operator.  Yet in many accounts of the
measurement procedure they follow my resoning that the apparatus  
doing

the measuring, and the object being measured interact for some time
via a unitary operation i.e. obey the SE.  So I got confused.  I
understand that unitary operators are not observable operators yet
they do describe the evolution of a state from one to another (as  
does

the action of an observable operator) how do these accounts of the
measurement process end up being consistent with each other?  My
understanding of QM must be lacking here.

I read your answer but can't quite connect with it.  Why must there  
be

some additional mechanism of consciousness that accounts for the
separation
 of these conscious streams of experience? In two branches of the
multiverse can my consciousness  not be at the end of the
superposition that  I put in the original post.

exp(-iHt/hbar) (|s0|a0|Cons_0


= exp(-iHt/hbar) (c1|s1|a0|Cons_0 + c2|s2|a0|Cons_0)  (3)

= (c1|s1|a1|Cons_1 + c2|s2|a2|Cons_2)

|s = system, |a = apparatus states
|Cons_i standing for conscious state of observer of the measurement.

This accounts for 3p viewponts.

I thought that 1p viewponts in any branch just change according to
some U(t) such that U(t) |cons_i(0) = |cons_i(t).  Can you (anyone)
help me to understand?


I don't think I understand it any better than you do.  But ISTM we  
need a quantum theory of consciousness in order to write eqns like  
(3) above. In the standard theory it implies that there is some  
experience of both system states at the same time.  A change of  
basis changes the labelling of 1 and 2.   In other words, if the  
brain is in a superposition then there is a conscious experience of  
both states.


Why? Everett shows convincingly that, being a memory machine, when we  
measure a superposition state, we just entangle ourself with the  
superposition state, but this differentiate the consciousness/memory  
of the machine,  and she can feel the split. The theory of  
consciousness used in Everett QM is simple mechanism. It is the major  
interest of Everett.




If you deny this and postulate that consciousness must be unique  
(i.e. classical), as we directly experience it, then it seems you  
have gotten back to the theory that consciousness collapses the wave  
function.


?
On the contrary. Everett QM applies the unitarity and the linearity to  
each branch of the superposition, and the memory mechanism of the  
machines reveals, from each machine points of view, a classical state.





To me, decoherence offers a better explanation, i.e. that the off  
diagonal terms in the density matrix become practically zero already  
at the brain level; or more accurately at the level of the detector  
of the particle that initiates breaking the vial.  This explanation  
still has a problem though in that there must be some canonical  
pointer states in which the off diagonal terms become zero.  I think  
it may be possible to justify a pointer basis; but it hasn't been  
found yet.


Decoherence is unitary. Decoherence is many worlds. The diagonal terms  
get close to zero, but this does only mean that macroscopic quantum  
erasing of memory is technically not doable, so that the branch of  
realities diverge irreversibly (FAPP)  and it is impossible to  
macroscopically self-interfere. David Deutsch suggests that we might  
do it with a possibly future quantum brain, though.


Bruno





Brent



Best wishes

Nick





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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-31 Thread meekerdb

On 10/31/2011 11:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why? Everett shows convincingly that, being a memory machine, when we measure a
superposition state, we just entangle ourself with the superposition state, but this
differentiate the consciousness/memory of the machine, and she can feel the split.

I don't feel the split. Do you? I just experience one outcome.

The theory of consciousness used in Everett QM is simple mechanism. It is the major
interest of Everett.

I don't think it is so simple because, like decoherence, it assumes that there is
something that picks out the classical view of the world and that's what consciousness
supervenes on, rather than supervening on linear combinations of classical states. If you
have some reason that the pointer-states are canonical, then Everett explains why you
split in such a way that you don't experience a mixture. But within QM there doesn't seem
to be any good explanation for why the classical world, the pointer states, are picked
out. The only good proposals I've heard are that it is only by limiting perception to
particular bases that life and intelligence can arise.

Brent

Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-30 Thread Russell Standish

On Sat, Oct 29, 2011 at 03:44:46PM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
 
 [NP]
   Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
   here, in which case I agree.  What I was doing in my analysis was
   thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
   are the only variety for the moment, then my analysis does indicate
   that cul de sacs arise only if the unitary development during
   interactions follow the ideal measurement prescription.  You can see
   this because in the times between the action of operator Mdev and Mc
   the cat is alive in both branches but destined to die in one of them.
 
 [RS]
 Why do you think there are conscious moments during the unitary
  evolution between Mdev and Mc? Surely the evolution between successive
  observer moments must be nonunitary. Unitary evolution is essentially
  unobservable.
 
 [NP]
 
 Perhaps I should have said between Msg and Mdev (although the argument
 is still similar)  that U(t) |moves up= |moves up over the period t.
 i.e. once the electron interacted with the SG device it took a while
 to reach the detector but the state of the system did not change in an
 important way.  I know that perhaps I should have put some position
 representation in there but I don't think that's what your getting
 at?
 
 I'm assuming that there is no collapse of the wavefunction so my
 experiences are all experienced because states evolve unitarily. I
 understand that the unitary operator is not an observable operator but
 I can observe the consequences of its action on a system because I
 measure observables that give different eigenvalues each time I look
 (experience things - my experiencing is a form of measurement).  Are
 you saying that during an OM there is no change i.e. it is a static
 picture? Are you thinking that unitary evolution goes on in between
 the static pictures? Surely the t in the exponential means that the
 system evolves over that t.  As a ist person I can observe things
 changing over this t. Can you help me to see if I am making an error
 of thinking?
 
 Nick
 

The question is - when did the cat become aware of which way the
electron was spinning as it left the Stern-Gerlach apparatus? I would
say it was when it discovered the vial didn't smash, and it was still alive.

The other question, from the DD perspective, is when did the sphere of
differentiation propagate from the SG apparatus to include the cat.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-30 Thread benjayk

Nick Prince-2 wrote:

This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/4514b50b8eb469c3/c49c3aa24c265a4b?lnk=gstq=homomorphic#c49c3aa24c265a4b
where I suggest that very old or dying brains might
deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition of 1st person
experiences from an old to
a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic
to a new young brain which allows an extension of consciousness.
This is not even required. The decaying brain can become no brain, and
consciousness proceeds from no brain. Of course this means that some
continuity of consciousness needs to be preserved outside of brains.
Theoretically this doesn't even require that structures other than brains
can be conscious, since we know from our experience that even when/while a
structure is unconscious it can preserve continuity (we awake from deep
sleep and experience a coherent history).
The continuity may be preserved simply through similarity of structure. Like
our continuity of personhood is preserved through the similarity of our
brains states (even though the brain changes vastly from childhood until old
age), continuity of human consciousness may be preserved through similarity
of brains (even though brains have big differences is structure).

So this could even be a materialist sort of non-technological immortality.
It's just that most materialists firmly identify with the person, so they
mostly won't care much about it (What's it worth that consciousness
survives, when *I* don't survive.).
If they like the idea of immortality, they will rather hope for the
singularity. But impersonal immortality seems more in accord with our
observations than a pipe dream of personal immortality through a
technological singularity, and also much more elegant (surviving through
forgetting seems much simpler than surviving through acquiring abitrarily
much memory and personal identity).

I wonder why less people consider this possiblity of immortality, as it both
fits more with our intuition (does it really seem probable that all persons
grow abitrarily old?) and with observation (people do actually die) than
other forms of immortality.

benjayk
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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com

Nick Prince-2 wrote:

This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post

http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/4514b50b8eb469c3/c49c3aa24c265a4b?lnk=gstq=homomorphic#c49c3aa24c265a4b
where I suggest that very old or dying brains might
deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition of 1st person
experiences from an old to
a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic
to a new young brain which allows an extension of consciousness.
This is not even required. The decaying brain can become no brain, and
consciousness proceeds from no brain. Of course this means that some
continuity of consciousness needs to be preserved outside of brains.
Theoretically this doesn't even require that structures other than brains
can be conscious, since we know from our experience that even when/while a
structure is unconscious it can preserve continuity (we awake from deep
sleep and experience a coherent history).
The continuity may be preserved simply through similarity of structure.
Like
our continuity of personhood is preserved through the similarity of our
brains states (even though the brain changes vastly from childhood until
old
age), continuity of human consciousness may be preserved through similarity
of brains (even though brains have big differences is structure).

So this could even be a materialist sort of non-technological immortality.
It's just that most materialists firmly identify with the person, so they
mostly won't care much about it (What's it worth that consciousness
survives, when *I* don't survive.).
If they like the idea of immortality, they will rather hope for the
singularity. But impersonal immortality seems more in accord with our
observations than a pipe dream of personal immortality through a
technological singularity, and also much more elegant (surviving through
forgetting seems much simpler than surviving through acquiring abitrarily
much memory and personal identity).

I wonder why less people consider this possiblity of immortality, as it
both
fits more with our intuition (does it really seem probable that all persons
grow abitrarily old?) and with observation (people do actually die) than
other forms of immortality.

Simply because it is just using immortality for meaning death . Immortality
means the 'I' survive... if it's not the case then it is simply plain old
death.

Quentin

--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-30 Thread Nick Prince




 [RS]
The question is - when did the cat become aware of which way the
 electron was spinning as it left the Stern-Gerlach apparatus? I would
 say it was when it discovered the vial didn't smash, and it was still alive.

 The other question, from the DD perspective, is when did the sphere of
 differentiation propagate from the SG apparatus to include the cat.

[NP]
Well suppose the device triggers the flask smashing part of the
detector apparatus depending on whether the electron is moving up and
spinning up or vice versa as in my analysis. Also say it does this on
recieiving a click from one of two geiger counters, one in the upper
area and one which picks up electrons in the lower area.  The cat (or
a human in the cat's place even) can hear a click whichever area the
electron ends up in.  Moreover if it takes a while for the hammer to
fall and hit the flask and this is all in full view of the cat  (there
inevitably must be some  length time for the device to work which is
why I pointed out the locally causal requirement) then the cat will
know that it will die if it sees the hammer start to fall. It must die
because as I have said all devices are assumed in the ideal system to
work properly so the cat is in a cul de sac from the time it sees
the hammer start to fall to the time it chokes on the gas - and it
knows it! (or a substituted human would) . If you replace the ideal
apparatus with non ideal systems then you can use something like the
alternate evolutions to model the situation

 exp(-iHt/hbar)(|s1|a0)=|s1(a|a0 + b|a1 + c|a2)

exp(-iHt/hbar)(|s2|a0)=|s2(a|a0 + c|a1 + b|a2)

which I gave originally.  with these forms the cat can't know whether
it will survive or not but by standard QTI it always will from 1st p.
so QTI requires imperfect devices.



As far as DD's differentiation is concerned I think the
differentiation propagate from the SG apparatus to include the cat.
during the time Msg operates.

So assuming a causally functioning ideally working system, then we
can write:


(Mc) (Mdev) ( Msg) |Ca |Dn |moves to right |Xr


=(Mc) |Ca  (Mdev) |Dn ( Msg) |moves to right (1/sqrt2)(|Zu +|Zd)


=(Mc) |Ca  (Mdev) |Dn(1/sqrt2) [|moves up|Zu+|moves down|Zd]
during *this* time the differentiation into two bundles occurs but the
cat is still alive in both bundles (nervously watching the hammer).
However, the cul de sac is there!! because all devices including
killing machines will work properly.


=(Mc) |Ca  (1/sqrt2) [|Du|moves up|Zu+Dd|moves down|Zd]  at
this stage the cat will watch the hammer fall (or )not and know the
worst (or not) but at the

moment it's still alive in both bundles and there's no further
differentiation - all of that is done with now. But the cul de sac is
there and now the cats from the original bundle  will be finding out
which of the new bundles they are in.


= (1/sqrt2) [|Cd|Du|moves up|Zu+|Ca|Dd|moves down|Zd]
During Mc's effect  the killing or sparing occurs depending on which
bundle you (the cat) are in - still no more differentiation just
separate types of evolution as the effects of the original
differentiation are propogated causally in each bundle.

If I'm making an error of thinking here then please let me know what
you think. To account for any time gap we could always assume the
operators

(Mc) (Mdev) ( Msg) operate consecutively with no time gaps in
between.  My understanding of DD's differentiation is more inferred
than concrete and I'm still trying to wade through BOI on the run .
I was also puzzled about your comments regarding the unitarity of what
was going on and am concerned I'm not thinking correctly in some way.

Best wishes

Nick


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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-30 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 29 Oct 2011, at 20:07, Nick Prince wrote:




On Oct 29, 6:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On Oct 30, 2011, at 3:17 AM, Nick Prince  
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:






Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type  
multiverses

here, in which case I agree.  What I was doing in my analysis was
thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
are the only variety for the moment, then my analysis does indicate
that cul de sacs arise only if the unitary development during
interactions follow the ideal measurement prescription.  You can see
this because in the times between the action of operator Mdev and Mc
the cat is alive in both branches but destined to die in one of  
them.

This has to be true for both ist and 3person points of view because
there is nowhere for the consciousness to go.  If you are going to
include the other types of multiverse then yes,  all sorts of
possibilities open up. Indeed dreaming cats would be included too.
Moreover, it seems to me from Bruno's Sane papers that ist person
indeterminacy is non local in space and in time so, I guess in
principle it's possible according to that reasoning, that the cat
could find a contiuation of its consciousness in some other cat far
off in the future in some universe.  If we restrict ourselves to  
level

3 type QM branching of fungible universes then perfect functioning
flask gassing mechanisms would provide cul de sacs.



I was hoping that this might give a start to some form of extra
support (although not a proof )of the no cul de sac conjecture  
because

in the limit as the number of degrees of freedom in the devices
introduce more and more branches due to evolutions of the form (4)
(which could  possibly be infinite  linear combinations), then  
perhaps
once the environment was included as well, the limit would ensure  
that

the cul de sacs were avoided.  If we factor in other level 1 and 2
type universes then this only helps the argument.


I didn't think that level 1 and 2 multiverses were any richer in  
their variety than level 3.


-- Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -


I'm not sure whether they are or not.  What matters is where will my
next observer moment come from? For now let's say it's just from  type
3 QM unitary evolutions. Then in this case with the perfect
interaction prescription usually used to describe measurement/
interactions then you can have cul de sacs.


With loop gravity, I can imagine that it might be possible, although  
I'm not sure. But with classical QM, even putting the cat near an  
atomic bomb will not prevent the unitary evolution to have a branch  
where the cat will survive. This uses continuous position and  
impulsion observable, and so is rather theoretical, I agree.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-30 Thread Russell Standish

On Sun, Oct 30, 2011 at 05:10:34AM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
 Well suppose the device triggers the flask smashing part of the
 detector apparatus depending on whether the electron is moving up and
 spinning up or vice versa as in my analysis. Also say it does this on
 recieiving a click from one of two geiger counters, one in the upper
 area and one which picks up electrons in the lower area.  The cat (or
 a human in the cat's place even) can hear a click whichever area the
 electron ends up in.  Moreover if it takes a while for the hammer to
 fall and hit the flask and this is all in full view of the cat  (there
 inevitably must be some  length time for the device to work which is
 why I pointed out the locally causal requirement) then the cat will
 know that it will die if it sees the hammer start to fall. It must die
 because as I have said all devices are assumed in the ideal system to
 work properly so the cat is in a cul de sac from the time it sees
 the hammer start to fall to the time it chokes on the gas - and it
 knows it! (or a substituted human would) . If you replace the ideal
 apparatus with non ideal systems then you can use something like the
 alternate evolutions to model the situation
 

OK, this is different from the usual thought experiment. You have
engineered a cul de sac here. A QTI enthusiast will point out that
macroscopic devices working perfectly is impossible, of course. Just
because you hear the vial smash, does not entail you will die the next
second, just rather likely to!

BTW - this same impossibility of perfect devices really prevents you
from exploiting QTI to get rich from winning the lottery.

My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it, you remain in
superposition. 


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-30 Thread benjayk

Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:

2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com

Nick Prince-2 wrote:

This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post

http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/4514b50b8eb469c3/c49c3aa24c265a4b?lnk=gstq=homomorphic#c49c3aa24c265a4b
where I suggest that very old or dying brains might
deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition of 1st person
experiences from an old to
a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic
to a new young brain which allows an extension of consciousness.
This is not even required. The decaying brain can become no brain, and
consciousness proceeds from no brain. Of course this means that some
continuity of consciousness needs to be preserved outside of brains.
Theoretically this doesn't even require that structures other than brains
can be conscious, since we know from our experience that even when/while
a
structure is unconscious it can preserve continuity (we awake from deep
sleep and experience a coherent history).
The continuity may be preserved simply through similarity of structure.
Like
our continuity of personhood is preserved through the similarity of our
brains states (even though the brain changes vastly from childhood until
old
age), continuity of human consciousness may be preserved through
similarity
of brains (even though brains have big differences is structure).

So this could even be a materialist sort of non-technological
immortality.
It's just that most materialists firmly identify with the person, so they
mostly won't care much about it (What's it worth that consciousness
survives, when *I* don't survive.).
If they like the idea of immortality, they will rather hope for the
singularity. But impersonal immortality seems more in accord with our
observations than a pipe dream of personal immortality through a
technological singularity, and also much more elegant (surviving through
forgetting seems much simpler than surviving through acquiring abitrarily
much memory and personal identity).

I wonder why less people consider this possiblity of immortality, as it
both
fits more with our intuition (does it really seem probable that all
persons
grow abitrarily old?) and with observation (people do actually die) than
other forms of immortality.

Simply because it is just using immortality for meaning death .
Immortality
means the 'I' survive... if it's not the case then it is simply plain old
death.

OK, I can see that this a possible perspective on that. Indeed most of the
time immortality is used to refer to personal immortality (especially in the
west). I agree with materialists there is no good reason to suppose that
this exists.
Quantum immortality rests on the premise that the supposed continuations
that exist in the MWs of quantum mechanics are lived as real for the person
that dies, while we have no clue how these possibilities are actually lived.
It is much more plausible - and consistent with our experience and
observation - that the other possibilities are merely dreams, imagination,
or - if more consistent - are lived by other persons (which, for example,
didn't get into the deadly situation in the first place).

On the other hand, I don't see why we would ignore immortality of
consciousness, considering that the I is just a psychosocial
construct/illusion anyway. We don't find an actual I anywhere. It seems
very relevant to know that the actual essence of experience can indeed
survive eternally. Why would I care whether an imagined I experiences it
or not?

How would you call this, if not immortality? Actually eternal youth seems
closer to eternal life to me than eternally growing old, which would be more
properly termed eternal existing or not-quite-mortality. If we are cut
off from experiencing the undeveloped innocent freshness of children - not
knowing who you are - we miss something that is absolutely essential to
life. It is not by chance that children are generally more open and happy,
and learn faster, than adults.

benjayk
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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux

2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com

Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:

2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com

Nick Prince-2 wrote:

This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post

http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/4514b50b8eb469c3/c49c3aa24c265a4b?lnk=gstq=homomorphic#c49c3aa24c265a4b
where I suggest that very old or dying brains might
deterorate in a specific way that allows the transition of 1st person
experiences from an old to
a young mind i.e. the decaying brain becomes in some way homomorphic
to a new young brain which allows an extension of consciousness.
This is not even required. The decaying brain can become no brain, and
consciousness proceeds from no brain. Of course this means that some
continuity of consciousness needs to be preserved outside of brains.
Theoretically this doesn't even require that structures other than
brains
can be conscious, since we know from our experience that even when/while
a
structure is unconscious it can preserve continuity (we awake from deep
sleep and experience a coherent history).
The continuity may be preserved simply through similarity of structure.
Like
our continuity of personhood is preserved through the similarity of our
brains states (even though the brain changes vastly from childhood until
old
age), continuity of human consciousness may be preserved through
similarity
of brains (even though brains have big differences is structure).

So this could even be a materialist sort of non-technological
immortality.
It's just that most materialists firmly identify with the person, so
they
mostly won't care much about it (What's it worth that consciousness
survives, when *I* don't survive.).
If they like the idea of immortality, they will rather hope for the
singularity. But impersonal immortality seems more in accord with our
observations than a pipe dream of personal immortality through a
technological singularity, and also much more elegant (surviving through
forgetting seems much simpler than surviving through acquiring
abitrarily
much memory and personal identity).

I wonder why less people consider this possiblity of immortality, as it
both
fits more with our intuition (does it really seem probable that all
persons
grow abitrarily old?) and with observation (people do actually die) than
other forms of immortality.

Simply because it is just using immortality for meaning death .
Immortality
means the 'I' survive... if it's not the case then it is simply plain
old
death.

OK, I can see that this a possible perspective on that. Indeed most of the
time immortality is used to refer to personal immortality (especially in
the
west). I agree with materialists there is no good reason to suppose that
this exists.
Quantum immortality rests on the premise that the supposed continuations
that exist in the MWs of quantum mechanics are lived as real for the person
that dies, while we have no clue how these possibilities are actually
lived.
It is much more plausible - and consistent with our experience and
observation - that the other possibilities are merely dreams, imagination,
or - if more consistent - are lived by other persons (which, for example,
didn't get into the deadly situation in the first place).

On the other hand, I don't see why we would ignore immortality of
consciousness, considering that the I is just a psychosocial
construct/illusion anyway. We don't find an actual I anywhere. It seems
very relevant to know that the actual essence of experience can indeed
survive eternally. Why would I care whether an imagined I experiences it
or not?

How would you call this, if not immortality?

Death.

Actually eternal youth seems
closer to eternal life to me than eternally growing old, which would be
more
properly termed eternal existing or not-quite-mortality. If we are cut
off from experiencing the undeveloped innocent freshness of children - not
knowing who you are - we miss something that is absolutely essential to
life. It is not by chance that children are generally more open and happy,
and learn faster, than adults.

benjayk
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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-30 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Oct 31, 2011, at 8:15 AM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:

 OK, I can see that this a possible perspective on that. Indeed most of the
 time immortality is used to refer to personal immortality (especially in the
 west). I agree with materialists there is no good reason to suppose that
 this exists.
 Quantum immortality rests on the premise that the supposed continuations
 that exist in the MWs of quantum mechanics are lived as real for the person
 that dies, while we have no clue how these possibilities are actually lived.
 It is much more plausible - and consistent with our experience and
 observation - that the other possibilities are merely dreams, imagination,
 or - if more consistent - are lived by other persons (which, for example,
 didn't get into the deadly situation in the first place).

A common response to the idea of QTI is, Why should I care if I die and someone 
else in another world who thinks he is me survives? But this objection shows a 
lack of understanding of consciousness works if there are multiple 
instantiations.

 On the other hand, I don't see why we would ignore immortality of
 consciousness, considering that the I is just a psychosocial
 construct/illusion anyway. We don't find an actual I anywhere. It seems
 very relevant to know that the actual essence of experience can indeed
 survive eternally. Why would I care whether an imagined I experiences it
 or not?
 
 How would you call this, if not immortality? Actually eternal youth seems
 closer to eternal life to me than eternally growing old, which would be more
 properly termed eternal existing or not-quite-mortality. If we are cut
 off from experiencing the undeveloped innocent freshness of children - not
 knowing who you are - we miss something that is absolutely essential to
 life. It is not by chance that children are generally more open and happy,
 and learn faster, than adults.
 
 benjayk
 -- 
 View this message in context: 
 http://old.nabble.com/QTI%2C-Cul-de-sacs-and-differentiation-tp32721336p32748927.html
 Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.
 
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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-30 Thread Nick Prince



On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:

 My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
 Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it, you remain in
 superposition.


 - Show quoted text -

I thought that in the everett interpretation everything was unitary?


best wishes
Nick

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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-30 Thread meekerdb


On 10/30/2011 5:09 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

A common response to the idea of QTI is, Why should I care if I die and someone 
else in another world who thinks he is me survives? But this objection shows a 
lack of understanding of consciousness works if there are multiple 
instantiations.


But multiple instantiations is exactly what we do not experience.  So the existence of 
other people who think they are me is purely a speculative inference.  According the 
theory they aren't me, they just share some past history.   Bruno emphasizes that his 
experience with Salvia implies that he exists independent of his history.  But this he 
is still not multiple.  I haven't used Salvia, but I suspect that experience still 
requires at least short histories.


Brent

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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-30 Thread meekerdb


On 10/30/2011 5:13 PM, Nick Prince wrote:


On Oct 30, 8:56 pm, Russell Standishli...@hpcoders.com.au  wrote:


My point about the unitary evolution was that the clicking of the
Geiger counter is not a unitary process - and until you hear it, you remain in
superposition.


- Show quoted text -

I thought that in the everett interpretation everything was unitary?


best wishes
Nick



Right.  In Everett's interpretation Nick's consciousness exists in many superpositions and 
there must be some additional mechanism of consciousness that accounts for the separation 
of these conscious streams of experience.  This would be the same mechanism that collapses 
the wave function in the Copenhagen interpretation - something like decoherence except 
that when the cross terms become sufficiently small they become exactly zero.  This would 
be a small non-unitary step.  But it requires that there be distinguished variables in 
which the density matrix becomes diagonal - the pointer basis.


Brent

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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-29 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Oct 26, 2011, at 10:00 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:

 QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation
 
 I’m trying to get a  picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
 differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI.  With a
 standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs for  a
 dying cat.  However I think I can see why this conclusion could be
 wrong.  Maybe someone could check my reasoning for this and tell me if
 there are any flaws.
 
 I’ve entered this on both the FOR and the Everything list because I
 hope it is relevant to both Forums.
 
 Firstly I am adopting the position that consciousness supervenes on
 all identical  worldlines and where the multiverse differentiates, the
 first person experience is indeterminate. Secondly I assume local
 causality applies. Thirdly (to begin with anyway) I assume that all
 “measuring” systems function as they should do to obtain  “correct
 measurements/outcomes”  (I’ll drop this part later though).   Now
 suppose a SINGLE electron is prepared so that its spin is aligned in
 the x - right direction (  |Xr – for x spin in the right direction)
 is sent through a SG device and that, whether the electron comes out
 spinning up in the z direction or down determines the triggering of a
 device which breaks the flask of gas – (let’s say it is the electron
 with spin up and moving upwards which is the lethal combination) which
 kills the cat. On the other hand, an electron emerging with spin down,
 and moving down in the z direction leaves the measuring device
 triggered in the down state but this does nothing to the flask)  So
 there is a 50% chance of the cat being killed for each electron fired
 through. This means there would be interaction Hamiltonians which
 would make up unitary evolution operators of the form
 
 M = exp(-iHt/hbar) which would act on states as follows:
 
 (Mc) (Mdev) ( Msg) |Ca |Dn |moves to right |Xr
 
 Msg = stern gerlach interaction evolution operator
 Mdev = triggering and flask breaking evolution operator
 Mc = cat /poisonous gas evolution operator.
 |Dn = neutral detector state
 |Ca = alive cat state etc.
 
 Now standard QM gives |Xr = (1/sqrt2)(|Zu +|Zd)
 
 Notice how I have put operators in time order so that the rightmost
 operator is implied to operate earlier than those to the left. The
 order of the state vectors reflects this too.
 
 Msg is the unitary operator which causes an evolution from |moves to
 right to either moves up |moves up  or moves down |moves down.
 Mdev allows evolution of the detector device plus flask smashing
 mechanism which, if it causes evolution to  |Du,  breaks open the
 flask of poisonous gas.  |Dd leaves the flask intact.   Finally the
 interaction of the gas with the cat due to the evolution operator Mc
 leaves the cat either dead |Cd or alive |Ca.
 
 Now, assuming a causally functioning system, then we can write:
 
 (Mc) (Mdev) ( Msg) |Ca |Dn |moves to right |Xr
 
 =(Mc) |Ca  (Mdev) |Dn ( Msg) |moves to right (1/sqrt2)(|Zu +|Zd)
 
 =(Mc) |Ca  (Mdev) |Dn(1/sqrt2) [|moves up|Zu+|moves down|Zd]
 
 =(Mc) |Ca  (1/sqrt2) [|Du|moves up|Zu+Dd|moves down|Zd]
 
 = (1/sqrt2) [|Cd|Du|moves up|Zu+|Ca|Dd|moves down|Zd]
 
 All this is just the standard Schrödinger’s cat problem.  However note
 that if one thinks in terms of a differentiated multiverse we begin
 with an infinite number of identical experiments in identical
 universes.  By the end of the first evolution due to Msg, the infinite
 bundle of universes has partitioned into two bundles i.e. one bundle
 of universes that have a Z spin up electron moving upwards with a
 neutral detector reading and an alive cat, and another bundle of
 universes  that have a Z spin down electron moving downwards with a
 neutral detector reading and an alive cat.  As time progresses the
 partition is communicated through the system and by the end of the
 period during which operator Md operates we have two bundles that are
 even more differentiated because the strands (universes) now are those
 that have either a Z spin up electron which moved upwards causing a
 detector to  smash the flask but with an, (as yet) still alive cat in
 one of them and another bundle of universes  that had a  Z spin down
 electron which moved downwards, which triggered the detector in a way
 which did not smash the flask and thus, as yet still also has an alive
 cat. Finally by the time the last (Mc) operator’s effect has finished
 its evolutionary action,  the cat lays dead (or alive) and thus the
 final bundles are now partitioned into either a Z spin up electron
 that moved upwards with a detector that  smashed the flask that killed
 the cat; or, a Z spin down electron that moved downwards with a
 detector reading that triggered no flask smashing and left the cat
 alive.
 
 
 There’s nothing new in any of this. It is just the standard paradox
 normally used to illustrate the problem of collapse.  However I have
 highlighted the fact that the experiment takes time

Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation



On Oct 29, 1:53 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Oct 26, 2011, at 10:00 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com 
 wrote:

  QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

  I’m trying to get a  picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
  differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI.  With a
  standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs for  a
  dying cat.  However I think I can see why this conclusion could be
  wrong.  Maybe someone could check my reasoning for this and tell me if
  there are any flaws.

  I’ve entered this on both the FOR and the Everything list because I
  hope it is relevant to both Forums.

  Firstly I am adopting the position that consciousness supervenes on
  all identical  worldlines and where the multiverse differentiates, the
  first person experience is indeterminate. Secondly I assume local
  causality applies. Thirdly (to begin with anyway) I assume that all
  “measuring” systems function as they should do to obtain  “correct
  measurements/outcomes”  (I’ll drop this part later though).   Now
  suppose a SINGLE electron is prepared so that its spin is aligned in
  the x - right direction (  |Xr – for x spin in the right direction)
  is sent through a SG device and that, whether the electron comes out
  spinning up in the z direction or down determines the triggering of a
  device which breaks the flask of gas – (let’s say it is the electron
  with spin up and moving upwards which is the lethal combination) which
  kills the cat. On the other hand, an electron emerging with spin down,
  and moving down in the z direction leaves the measuring device
  triggered in the down state but this does nothing to the flask)  So
  there is a 50% chance of the cat being killed for each electron fired
  through. This means there would be interaction Hamiltonians which
  would make up unitary evolution operators of the form

  M = exp(-iHt/hbar) which would act on states as follows:

  (Mc) (Mdev) ( Msg) |Ca |Dn |moves to right |Xr

  Msg = stern gerlach interaction evolution operator
  Mdev = triggering and flask breaking evolution operator
  Mc = cat /poisonous gas evolution operator.
  |Dn = neutral detector state
  |Ca = alive cat state etc.

  Now standard QM gives |Xr = (1/sqrt2)(|Zu +|Zd)

  Notice how I have put operators in time order so that the rightmost
  operator is implied to operate earlier than those to the left. The
  order of the state vectors reflects this too.

  Msg is the unitary operator which causes an evolution from |moves to
  right to either moves up |moves up  or moves down |moves down.
  Mdev allows evolution of the detector device plus flask smashing
  mechanism which, if it causes evolution to  |Du,  breaks open the
  flask of poisonous gas.  |Dd leaves the flask intact.   Finally the
  interaction of the gas with the cat due to the evolution operator Mc
  leaves the cat either dead |Cd or alive |Ca.

  Now, assuming a causally functioning system, then we can write:

  (Mc) (Mdev) ( Msg) |Ca |Dn |moves to right |Xr

  =(Mc) |Ca  (Mdev) |Dn ( Msg) |moves to right (1/sqrt2)(|Zu +|Zd)

  =(Mc) |Ca  (Mdev) |Dn(1/sqrt2) [|moves up|Zu+|moves down|Zd]

  =(Mc) |Ca  (1/sqrt2) [|Du|moves up|Zu+Dd|moves down|Zd]

  = (1/sqrt2) [|Cd|Du|moves up|Zu+|Ca|Dd|moves down|Zd]

  All this is just the standard Schrödinger’s cat problem.  However note
  that if one thinks in terms of a differentiated multiverse we begin
  with an infinite number of identical experiments in identical
  universes.  By the end of the first evolution due to Msg, the infinite
  bundle of universes has partitioned into two bundles i.e. one bundle
  of universes that have a Z spin up electron moving upwards with a
  neutral detector reading and an alive cat, and another bundle of
  universes  that have a Z spin down electron moving downwards with a
  neutral detector reading and an alive cat.  As time progresses the
  partition is communicated through the system and by the end of the
  period during which operator Md operates we have two bundles that are
  even more differentiated because the strands (universes) now are those
  that have either a Z spin up electron which moved upwards causing a
  detector to  smash the flask but with an, (as yet) still alive cat in
  one of them and another bundle of universes  that had a  Z spin down
  electron which moved downwards, which triggered the detector in a way
  which did not smash the flask and thus, as yet still also has an alive
  cat. Finally by the time the last (Mc) operator’s effect has finished
  its evolutionary action,  the cat lays dead (or alive) and thus the
  final bundles are now partitioned into either a Z spin up electron
  that moved upwards with a detector that  smashed the flask that killed
  the cat; or, a Z spin down electron that moved downwards with a
  detector reading that triggered no flask smashing and left the cat
  alive.

  There’s nothing new in any of this. It is just the standard

Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-29 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



On Oct 30, 2011, at 3:17 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com wrote:

 Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
 here, in which case I agree.  What I was doing in my analysis was
 thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
 are the only variety for the moment, then my analysis does indicate
 that cul de sacs arise only if the unitary development during
 interactions follow the ideal measurement prescription.  You can see
 this because in the times between the action of operator Mdev and Mc
 the cat is alive in both branches but destined to die in one of them.
 This has to be true for both ist and 3person points of view because
 there is nowhere for the consciousness to go.  If you are going to
 include the other types of multiverse then yes,  all sorts of
 possibilities open up. Indeed dreaming cats would be included too.
 Moreover, it seems to me from Bruno's Sane papers that ist person
 indeterminacy is non local in space and in time so, I guess in
 principle it's possible according to that reasoning, that the cat
 could find a contiuation of its consciousness in some other cat far
 off in the future in some universe.  If we restrict ourselves to level
 3 type QM branching of fungible universes then perfect functioning
 flask gassing mechanisms would provide cul de sacs.
 
 I was hoping that this might give a start to some form of extra
 support (although not a proof )of the no cul de sac conjecture because
 in the limit as the number of degrees of freedom in the devices
 introduce more and more branches due to evolutions of the form (4)
 (which could  possibly be infinite  linear combinations), then perhaps
 once the environment was included as well, the limit would ensure that
 the cul de sacs were avoided.  If we factor in other level 1 and 2
 type universes then this only helps the argument.

I didn't think that level 1 and 2 multiverses were any richer in their variety 
than level 3.


-- Stathis Papaioannou 
 

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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation



On Oct 29, 6:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Oct 30, 2011, at 3:17 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com 
 wrote:





  Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
  here, in which case I agree.  What I was doing in my analysis was
  thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
  are the only variety for the moment, then my analysis does indicate
  that cul de sacs arise only if the unitary development during
  interactions follow the ideal measurement prescription.  You can see
  this because in the times between the action of operator Mdev and Mc
  the cat is alive in both branches but destined to die in one of them.
  This has to be true for both ist and 3person points of view because
  there is nowhere for the consciousness to go.  If you are going to
  include the other types of multiverse then yes,  all sorts of
  possibilities open up. Indeed dreaming cats would be included too.
  Moreover, it seems to me from Bruno's Sane papers that ist person
  indeterminacy is non local in space and in time so, I guess in
  principle it's possible according to that reasoning, that the cat
  could find a contiuation of its consciousness in some other cat far
  off in the future in some universe.  If we restrict ourselves to level
  3 type QM branching of fungible universes then perfect functioning
  flask gassing mechanisms would provide cul de sacs.

  I was hoping that this might give a start to some form of extra
  support (although not a proof )of the no cul de sac conjecture because
  in the limit as the number of degrees of freedom in the devices
  introduce more and more branches due to evolutions of the form (4)
  (which could  possibly be infinite  linear combinations), then perhaps
  once the environment was included as well, the limit would ensure that
  the cul de sacs were avoided.  If we factor in other level 1 and 2
  type universes then this only helps the argument.

 I didn't think that level 1 and 2 multiverses were any richer in their 
 variety than level 3.

 -- Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text -

 - Show quoted text -

I'm not sure whether they are or not.  What matters is where will my
next observer moment come from? For now let's say it's just from  type
3 QM unitary evolutions. Then in this case with the perfect
interaction prescription usually used to describe measurement/
interactions then you can have cul de sacs.

Nick

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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation



On Oct 29, 6:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
 On Oct 30, 2011, at 3:17 AM, Nick Prince nickmag.pri...@googlemail.com 
 wrote:





  Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
  here, in which case I agree.  What I was doing in my analysis was
  thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
  are the only variety for the moment, then my analysis does indicate
  that cul de sacs arise only if the unitary development during
  interactions follow the ideal measurement prescription.  You can see
  this because in the times between the action of operator Mdev and Mc
  the cat is alive in both branches but destined to die in one of them.
  This has to be true for both ist and 3person points of view because
  there is nowhere for the consciousness to go.  If you are going to
  include the other types of multiverse then yes,  all sorts of
  possibilities open up. Indeed dreaming cats would be included too.
  Moreover, it seems to me from Bruno's Sane papers that ist person
  indeterminacy is non local in space and in time so, I guess in
  principle it's possible according to that reasoning, that the cat
  could find a contiuation of its consciousness in some other cat far
  off in the future in some universe.  If we restrict ourselves to level
  3 type QM branching of fungible universes then perfect functioning
  flask gassing mechanisms would provide cul de sacs.

  I was hoping that this might give a start to some form of extra
  support (although not a proof )of the no cul de sac conjecture because
  in the limit as the number of degrees of freedom in the devices
  introduce more and more branches due to evolutions of the form (4)
  (which could  possibly be infinite  linear combinations), then perhaps
  once the environment was included as well, the limit would ensure that
  the cul de sacs were avoided.  If we factor in other level 1 and 2
  type universes then this only helps the argument.

 I didn't think that level 1 and 2 multiverses were any richer in their 
 variety than level 3.

 -- Stathis Papaioannou- Hide quoted text -

 - Show quoted text -

I'm also thinking that Level 1 and 2 universes may not be infinite in
extent which limits the possible observer moments I have access to. I
have argued before on the list that the question of topology of the
universe is far from clear. Those OM available from level 3 are
possibly more directly accessible ( if MWI is true in the right form).

Nick

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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-29 Thread Russell Standish

On Sat, Oct 29, 2011 at 09:17:17AM -0700, Nick Prince wrote:
 Hi Stathis
 
 Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
 here, in which case I agree.  What I was doing in my analysis was
 thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
 are the only variety for the moment, then my analysis does indicate
 that cul de sacs arise only if the unitary development during
 interactions follow the ideal measurement prescription.  You can see
 this because in the times between the action of operator Mdev and Mc
 the cat is alive in both branches but destined to die in one of them.

Why do you think there are conscious moments during the unitary
evolution between Mdev and Mc? Surely the evolution between successive
observer moments must be nonunitary. Unitary evolution is essentially
unobservable. 


-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

On Oct 27, 11:52 am, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:

On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 6:00 PM, Nick Prince
nickmag.pri...@googlemail.comwrote:

QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

I’m trying to get a picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI. With a
standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs for a
dying cat. However I think I can see why this conclusion could be
wrong. Maybe someone could check my reasoning for this and tell me if
there are any flaws.

Nick,

I think such cul de sacs exist only from third person perspectives. E.g.,
the experimenter's view of what happens to the cat. When considering the
perspective from the first person (cat) perspective, there are no cul de
sacs for a much simpler reason: The cat might be mistaken, dreaming, or
even
an altogether different being choosing to temporarily experience a cat's
point of view.

No matter how foolproof a setup an experimenter designs, it is impossible
to
capture and terminate the cat's continued consciousness as seen from the
perspective of the cat.

The lower the chance the cat has of surviving through some malfunction of
the device, the more likely it becomes that the cat survives via
improbable
extensions. For the same reasons, I think it is more probable that you
will
wake up as some trans- or post-human playing a realistic sim ancestor
game
than for you to live to 200 by some QTI accident (not counting medical
advances). Eventually, those alternatives just become more probable.

Jason

One thing I wonder about: Do the extensions necessarily become improbable?
Why is it not possible that the cat just forgets that it is that particular
cat, and wakes up as new born cat, or dog, or other animal (maybe human?).
It even seems more plausible that as long as the cat is alive, relatively
improbable extensions/narrow are required (since there are less futures
where the cat is alive, than where it is not).

It seems to me it is one step to far to assume that after its death the cat
has to continue in a unlikely future in a form very similiar to its current
form.
That is taking egocentric notions of survival for granted. Maybe it is not
required that much of memory or personality or physical form survives for
the experience of survival. For example, during dream states, meditation or
drug experiences, (almost) all memory and sense of personhood may be lost
and still consciousness experiences surviving.

This would be an argument in favor of a modern form of reincarnation. When
the form is destroyed, consciousness just backtracks (maybe through some
dream like experience) and is born anew.
We don't even need much assumptions in terms of QTI or non-physical plane
for that. All individual memory is lost, and thus consciousness can continue
in very many probable futures, namely all newborn individuals that share a
similar collective consciousness (which may just be the environment - or
world - of the dead one, which obviously does not die). For the person,
this is not really immortality, but this isn't required. Only consciousness
has to survive in order for basic subjective immortality.
It is a quite natural notion of immortality, with natural consequences with
regard to immortality experiments (the subject just dies, and consciousness
continues from memory loss).

This would also explain positive near death experiences: As the person dies,
consciousness feels itself opening up, as more consistent future experiences
become available.

benjayk
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Nick

Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation


[NP]
  Maybe you are thinking of Tegmark level 1 or level 2 type multiverses
  here, in which case I agree.  What I was doing in my analysis was
  thinking about QM type 3 multiverses only. Let's pretend that these
  are the only variety for the moment, then my analysis does indicate
  that cul de sacs arise only if the unitary development during
  interactions follow the ideal measurement prescription.  You can see
  this because in the times between the action of operator Mdev and Mc
  the cat is alive in both branches but destined to die in one of them.

[RS]
Why do you think there are conscious moments during the unitary
 evolution between Mdev and Mc? Surely the evolution between successive
 observer moments must be nonunitary. Unitary evolution is essentially
 unobservable.

[NP]

Perhaps I should have said between Msg and Mdev (although the argument
is still similar)  that U(t) |moves up= |moves up over the period t.
i.e. once the electron interacted with the SG device it took a while
to reach the detector but the state of the system did not change in an
important way.  I know that perhaps I should have put some position
representation in there but I don't think that's what your getting
at?

I'm assuming that there is no collapse of the wavefunction so my
experiences are all experienced because states evolve unitarily. I
understand that the unitary operator is not an observable operator but
I can observe the consequences of its action on a system because I
measure observables that give different eigenvalues each time I look
(experience things - my experiencing is a form of measurement).  Are
you saying that during an OM there is no change i.e. it is a static
picture? Are you thinking that unitary evolution goes on in between
the static pictures? Surely the t in the exponential means that the
system evolves over that t.  As a ist person I can observe things
changing over this t. Can you help me to see if I am making an error
of thinking?

Nick


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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-28 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 28 Oct 2011, at 01:56, Nick Prince wrote:




[BM]
The QTI, or the more general comp immortality, or arithmetical
immortality is a complex subject, if only because it depends on
what
you mean by you.


[NP]

Can you be more specific on this?


Well, we have discuss this a lot on this list. Once you accept the  
hypothesis that we are digitally emulable, it can be shown that we  
have to distinguish the first person subjective life from the  
plausible third person description of the body related to that person,  
and that the problem of relating those first person description and  
the third person description are not yet solved. But for the  
immortality question, we are obliged to consider thought experience  
involving amnesia, and those experiences illustrates that the notion  
of personal identity is quite relative, and, with mechanism, they  
makes no absolute sense at all. They might depend on what *you* want  
to consider as being *you*. You might consider to be immortal just by  
succeeding to identify you with your core universal identity (the  
universal machine that you are), and in that case you can consider  
that you could survive a strong amnesia. Some drug can help some  
people to realize such identification. But we are programmed by  
nature to resist such identification, and to identify ourselves with  
our little ego which contains our mundane personal histories, and  
this can make you doubt that you could survive amnesia. Immortality  
might be a question of personal choice. Assuming mechanism, the  
question of afterlife can today be shown as being very difficult.  
Indeed, mechanism breaks the usual mind-brain identity thesis, and  
consciousness is related to the infinitely many arithmetical relations  
defining consistent extensions of (relative) computational states. The  
math leads to a sequence of open problems.







[BM]
Do you know Kripke semantic? A Kripke frame is just a set (of
elements
called worlds) with an accessibility relation among the worlds. In
modal logic they can be used to characterize modal logical systems.
The basic idea is that []p is true in world alpha, if p is true in
all
the worlds accessible from alpha. Dually, p is true in alpha is p
is
true in at least one world accessible from alpha. For example the
law
[]p - p will be satisfied in all reflexive frames---independently
of
the truth value of p. (a frame is reflexive if all the worlds in
the
frame access to themselves; for all alpha alpha R alpha, with R the
accessibility relation).


[NP]
Sorry but I have no experience in this area but I can see that if yoU
adopt non classical logic then it opens up all sorts of
possibilities.


With the mechanist theory/assumption, I find it better to keep  
classical logic, and to derive the non classical logic from the  
intensional variants of the logic of self-reference. We have the  
mathematical tools to study in a clean transparent way all those  
intensional nuances (which can be proved to exist necessarily as a  
consequence of the incompleteness phenomena).


It should be obvious that with the mechanist hypothesis, computer  
science and mathematical logic can put much light on those questions.  
But those math are not very well knows (beyond professional logicians).





Testing the consequences in reality is the tricky
part.   tHE Quantum mechanical formalism has been successful in so
many respects so it gives us some  confidence of being on the right
track.


But then you do have the QM interpretation problem. The Everett theory  
is based on comp (alias mechanism), and I have shown that comp  
generalizes QM. A priori there are more computations than quantum  
computations, but a posteriori the quanyum computations can win a  
measure battle in the limit.






[BM]

 Then, as other have already mentioned, what will remain unclear
(and
hard to compute) is the probability that you survive through some
memory backtracking. The cat might survive in the worlds where he
has
been lucky enough to not participate to that experience, and, for
all
we know, such consistent continuation might have bigger weight than
surviving through some quantum tunnel effect saving the brain's cat
from the poison. The computation here are just not tractable, if we
assume quantum mechanics, and still less, assuming only the comp
hypothesis. The only certainty, assuming comp or QM, is that you
cannot die. But obviously you can become amnesic of some part, if
not
all, your existence, or you existences. Like Otto Rossler summed up
well : consciousness is a prison. With comp, and I think with QM,
there is no escapes from being conscious, in a way or another. I
don't
like that, but then it is a consequence of those theories.

[NP]
Consciousness could be a prison yes.  but MWI may be false of course,
in which case maybe not.  If comp says yes it is - as you suggest,
then that's another matter.  The question then is: is comp more
fundamental than QM and if this be the case,

Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-28 Thread Nick Prince

Thanks Bruno for being so patient with me and taking the time to
carefully answer my queries.

Nick

On Oct 28, 3:42 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
 On 28 Oct 2011, at 01:56, Nick Prince wrote:



  [BM]
  The QTI, or the more general comp immortality, or arithmetical
  immortality is a complex subject, if only because it depends on
  what
  you mean by you.

  [NP]

  Can you be more specific on this?

 Well, we have discuss this a lot on this list. Once you accept the  
 hypothesis that we are digitally emulable, it can be shown that we  
 have to distinguish the first person subjective life from the  
 plausible third person description of the body related to that person,  
 and that the problem of relating those first person description and  
 the third person description are not yet solved. But for the  
 immortality question, we are obliged to consider thought experience  
 involving amnesia, and those experiences illustrates that the notion  
 of personal identity is quite relative, and, with mechanism, they  
 makes no absolute sense at all. They might depend on what *you* want  
 to consider as being *you*. You might consider to be immortal just by  
 succeeding to identify you with your core universal identity (the  
 universal machine that you are), and in that case you can consider  
 that you could survive a strong amnesia. Some drug can help some  
 people to realize such identification. But we are programmed by  
 nature to resist such identification, and to identify ourselves with  
 our little ego which contains our mundane personal histories, and  
 this can make you doubt that you could survive amnesia. Immortality  
 might be a question of personal choice. Assuming mechanism, the  
 question of afterlife can today be shown as being very difficult.  
 Indeed, mechanism breaks the usual mind-brain identity thesis, and  
 consciousness is related to the infinitely many arithmetical relations  
 defining consistent extensions of (relative) computational states. The  
 math leads to a sequence of open problems.







  [BM]
  Do you know Kripke semantic? A Kripke frame is just a set (of
  elements
  called worlds) with an accessibility relation among the worlds. In
  modal logic they can be used to characterize modal logical systems.
  The basic idea is that []p is true in world alpha, if p is true in
  all
  the worlds accessible from alpha. Dually, p is true in alpha is p
  is
  true in at least one world accessible from alpha. For example the
  law
  []p - p will be satisfied in all reflexive frames---independently
  of
  the truth value of p. (a frame is reflexive if all the worlds in
  the
  frame access to themselves; for all alpha alpha R alpha, with R the
  accessibility relation).

  [NP]
  Sorry but I have no experience in this area but I can see that if yoU
  adopt non classical logic then it opens up all sorts of
  possibilities.

 With the mechanist theory/assumption, I find it better to keep  
 classical logic, and to derive the non classical logic from the  
 intensional variants of the logic of self-reference. We have the  
 mathematical tools to study in a clean transparent way all those  
 intensional nuances (which can be proved to exist necessarily as a  
 consequence of the incompleteness phenomena).

 It should be obvious that with the mechanist hypothesis, computer  
 science and mathematical logic can put much light on those questions.  
 But those math are not very well knows (beyond professional logicians).

  Testing the consequences in reality is the tricky
  part.   tHE Quantum mechanical formalism has been successful in so
  many respects so it gives us some  confidence of being on the right
  track.

 But then you do have the QM interpretation problem. The Everett theory  
 is based on comp (alias mechanism), and I have shown that comp  
 generalizes QM. A priori there are more computations than quantum  
 computations, but a posteriori the quanyum computations can win a  
 measure battle in the limit.







  [BM]

   Then, as other have already mentioned, what will remain unclear
  (and
  hard to compute) is the probability that you survive through some
  memory backtracking. The cat might survive in the worlds where he
  has
  been lucky enough to not participate to that experience, and, for
  all
  we know, such consistent continuation might have bigger weight than
  surviving through some quantum tunnel effect saving the brain's cat
  from the poison. The computation here are just not tractable, if we
  assume quantum mechanics, and still less, assuming only the comp
  hypothesis. The only certainty, assuming comp or QM, is that you
  cannot die. But obviously you can become amnesic of some part, if
  not
  all, your existence, or you existences. Like Otto Rossler summed up
  well : consciousness is a prison. With comp, and I think with QM,
  there is no escapes from being conscious, in a way or another. I
  don't
  like that, but then it is

Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-27 Thread benjayk



Jason Resch-2 wrote:
 
 On Tue, Oct 25, 2011 at 6:00 PM, Nick Prince
 nickmag.pri...@googlemail.comwrote:
 
 QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

 I’m trying to get a  picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
 differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI.  With a
 standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs for  a
 dying cat.  However I think I can see why this conclusion could be
 wrong.  Maybe someone could check my reasoning for this and tell me if
 there are any flaws.

 
 Nick,
 
 I think such cul de sacs exist only from third person perspectives.  E.g.,
 the experimenter's view of what happens to the cat.  When considering the
 perspective from the first person (cat) perspective, there are no cul de
 sacs for a much simpler reason: The cat might be mistaken, dreaming, or
 even
 an altogether different being choosing to temporarily experience a cat's
 point of view.
 
 No matter how foolproof a setup an experimenter designs, it is impossible
 to
 capture and terminate the cat's continued consciousness as seen from the
 perspective of the cat.
 
 The lower the chance the cat has of surviving through some malfunction of
 the device, the more likely it becomes that the cat survives via
 improbable
 extensions.  For the same reasons, I think it is more probable that you
 will
 wake up as some trans- or post-human playing a realistic sim ancestor
 game
 than for you to live to 200 by some QTI accident (not counting medical
 advances).  Eventually, those alternatives just become more probable.
 
 Jason
 
 
One thing I wonder about: Do the extensions necessarily become improbable?
Why is it not possible that the cat just forgets that it is that particular
cat, and wakes up as new born cat, or dog, or other animal (maybe human?).
It even seems more plausible that as long as the cat is alive, relatively
improbable extensions/narrow are required (since there are less futures
where the cat is alive, than where it is not).

It seems to me it is one step to far to assume that after its death the cat
has to continue in a unlikely future in a form very similiar to its current
form.
That is taking egocentric notions of survival for granted. Maybe it is not
required that much of memory or personality or physical form survives for
the experience of survival. For example, during dream states, meditation or
drug experiences, (almost) all memory and sense of personhood may be lost
and still consciousness experiences surviving.

This would be an argument in favor of a modern form of reincarnation. When
the form is destroyed, consciousness just backtracks (maybe through some
dream like experience) and is born anew.
We don't even need much assumptions in terms of QTI or non-physical plane
for that. All individual memory is lost, and thus consciousness can continue
in very many probable futures, namely all newborn individuals that share a
similar collective consciousness (which may just be the environment - or
world - of the dead one, which obviously does not die). For the person,
this is not really immortality, but this isn't required. Only consciousness
has to survive in order for basic subjective immortality.
It is a quite natural notion of immortality, with natural consequences with
regard to immortality experiments (the subject just dies, and consciousness
continues from memory loss).

This would also explain positive near death experiences: As the person dies,
consciousness feels itself opening up, as more consistent future experiences
become available.

benjayk
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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-27 Thread Stephen P. King


On 10/25/2011 7:00 PM, Nick Prince wrote:

QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

I’m trying to get a  picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI.  With a
standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs for  a
dying cat.  However I think I can see why this conclusion could be
wrong.  Maybe someone could check my reasoning for this and tell me if
there are any flaws.

I’ve entered this on both the FOR and the Everything list because I
hope it is relevant to both Forums.

Firstly I am adopting the position that consciousness supervenes on
all identical  worldlines and where the multiverse differentiates, the
first person experience is indeterminate. Secondly I assume local
causality applies. Thirdly (to begin with anyway) I assume that all
“measuring” systems function as they should do to obtain  “correct
measurements/outcomes”  (I’ll drop this part later though).   Now
suppose a SINGLE electron is prepared so that its spin is aligned in
the x - right direction (  |Xr  – for x spin in the right direction)
is sent through a SG device and that, whether the electron comes out
spinning up in the z direction or down determines the triggering of a
device which breaks the flask of gas – (let’s say it is the electron
with spin up and moving upwards which is the lethal combination) which
kills the cat. On the other hand, an electron emerging with spin down,
and moving down in the z direction leaves the measuring device
triggered in the down state but this does nothing to the flask)  So
there is a 50% chance of the cat being killed for each electron fired
through. This means there would be interaction Hamiltonians which
would make up unitary evolution operators of the form

  M = exp(-iHt/hbar) which would act on states as follows:

(Mc) (Mdev) ( Msg) |Ca  |Dn  |moves to right  |Xr

Msg = stern gerlach interaction evolution operator
Mdev = triggering and flask breaking evolution operator
Mc = cat /poisonous gas evolution operator.
|Dn  = neutral detector state
|Ca  = alive cat state etc.

Now standard QM gives |Xr  = (1/sqrt2)(|Zu  +|Zd)

Notice how I have put operators in time order so that the rightmost
operator is implied to operate earlier than those to the left. The
order of the state vectors reflects this too.

Hi,

Are we sure that this ordering, at the level of the state vectors, 
really matters? We are, after all, only considering observables that 
mutually commute and thus ordering should be irrelevant.




Msg is the unitary operator which causes an evolution from |moves to
right  to either moves up |moves up   or moves down |moves down.
Mdev allows evolution of the detector device plus flask smashing
mechanism which, if it causes evolution to  |Du,  breaks open the
flask of poisonous gas.  |Dd  leaves the flask intact.   Finally the
interaction of the gas with the cat due to the evolution operator Mc
leaves the cat either dead |Cd  or alive |Ca.

Now, assuming a causally functioning system, then we can write:

(Mc) (Mdev) ( Msg) |Ca  |Dn  |moves to right  |Xr

=(Mc) |Ca   (Mdev) |Dn  ( Msg) |moves to right  (1/sqrt2)(|Zu  +|Zd)

=(Mc) |Ca   (Mdev) |Dn(1/sqrt2) [|moves up|Zu+|moves down|Zd]

=(Mc) |Ca   (1/sqrt2) [|Du|moves up|Zu+Dd|moves down|Zd]

= (1/sqrt2) [|Cd|Du|moves up|Zu+|Ca|Dd|moves down|Zd]

All this is just the standard Schrödinger’s cat problem.  However note
that if one thinks in terms of a differentiated multiverse we begin
with an infinite number of identical experiments in identical
universes.  By the end of the first evolution due to Msg, the infinite
bundle of universes has partitioned into two bundles i.e. one bundle
of universes that have a Z spin up electron moving upwards with a
neutral detector reading and an alive cat, and another bundle of
universes  that have a Z spin down electron moving downwards with a
neutral detector reading and an alive cat.  As time progresses the
partition is communicated through the system and by the end of the
period during which operator Md operates we have two bundles that are
even more differentiated because the strands (universes) now are those
that have either a Z spin up electron which moved upwards causing a
detector to  smash the flask but with an, (as yet) still alive cat in
one of them and another bundle of universes  that had a  Z spin down
electron which moved downwards, which triggered the detector in a way
which did not smash the flask and thus, as yet still also has an alive
cat. Finally by the time the last (Mc) operator’s effect has finished
its evolutionary action,  the cat lays dead (or alive) and thus the
final bundles are now partitioned into either a Z spin up electron
that moved upwards with a detector that  smashed the flask that killed
the cat; or, a Z spin down electron that moved downwards with a
detector reading that triggered no flask smashing and left the cat
alive.


There’s nothing new in any of this. It is just the standard paradox
normally used to

Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 26 Oct 2011, at 01:00, Nick Prince wrote:


QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

I’m trying to get a  picture of how David Deutsch’s idea of
differentiation works – especially in relation to QTI.  With a
standard treatment it looks as if there might be cul de sacs for  a
dying cat.  However I think I can see why this conclusion could be
wrong.  Maybe someone could check my reasoning for this and tell me if
there are any flaws.

I’ve entered this on both the FOR and the Everything list because I
hope it is relevant to both Forums.

Firstly I am adopting the position that consciousness supervenes on
all identical  worldlines and where the multiverse differentiates, the
first person experience is indeterminate. Secondly I assume local
causality applies. Thirdly (to begin with anyway) I assume that all
“measuring” systems function as they should do to obtain  “correct
measurements/outcomes”  (I’ll drop this part later though).   Now
suppose a SINGLE electron is prepared so that its spin is aligned in
the x - right direction (  |Xr – for x spin in the right direction)
is sent through a SG device and that, whether the electron comes out
spinning up in the z direction or down determines the triggering of a
device which breaks the flask of gas – (let’s say it is the electron
with spin up and moving upwards which is the lethal combination) which
kills the cat. On the other hand, an electron emerging with spin down,
and moving down in the z direction leaves the measuring device
triggered in the down state but this does nothing to the flask)  So
there is a 50% chance of the cat being killed for each electron fired
through. This means there would be interaction Hamiltonians which
would make up unitary evolution operators of the form

M = exp(-iHt/hbar) which would act on states as follows:

(Mc) (Mdev) ( Msg) |Ca |Dn |moves to right |Xr

Msg = stern gerlach interaction evolution operator
Mdev = triggering and flask breaking evolution operator
Mc = cat /poisonous gas evolution operator.
|Dn = neutral detector state
|Ca = alive cat state etc.

Now standard QM gives |Xr = (1/sqrt2)(|Zu +|Zd)

Notice how I have put operators in time order so that the rightmost
operator is implied to operate earlier than those to the left. The
order of the state vectors reflects this too.

Msg is the unitary operator which causes an evolution from |moves to
right to either moves up |moves up  or moves down |moves down.
Mdev allows evolution of the detector device plus flask smashing
mechanism which, if it causes evolution to  |Du,  breaks open the
flask of poisonous gas.  |Dd leaves the flask intact.   Finally the
interaction of the gas with the cat due to the evolution operator Mc
leaves the cat either dead |Cd or alive |Ca.

Now, assuming a causally functioning system, then we can write:

(Mc) (Mdev) ( Msg) |Ca |Dn |moves to right |Xr

=(Mc) |Ca  (Mdev) |Dn ( Msg) |moves to right (1/sqrt2)(|Zu +|Zd)

=(Mc) |Ca  (Mdev) |Dn(1/sqrt2) [|moves up|Zu+|moves down|Zd]

=(Mc) |Ca  (1/sqrt2) [|Du|moves up|Zu+Dd|moves down|Zd]

= (1/sqrt2) [|Cd|Du|moves up|Zu+|Ca|Dd|moves down|Zd]

All this is just the standard Schrödinger’s cat problem.  However note
that if one thinks in terms of a differentiated multiverse we begin
with an infinite number of identical experiments in identical
universes.  By the end of the first evolution due to Msg, the infinite
bundle of universes has partitioned into two bundles i.e. one bundle
of universes that have a Z spin up electron moving upwards with a
neutral detector reading and an alive cat, and another bundle of
universes  that have a Z spin down electron moving downwards with a
neutral detector reading and an alive cat.  As time progresses the
partition is communicated through the system and by the end of the
period during which operator Md operates we have two bundles that are
even more differentiated because the strands (universes) now are those
that have either a Z spin up electron which moved upwards causing a
detector to  smash the flask but with an, (as yet) still alive cat in
one of them and another bundle of universes  that had a  Z spin down
electron which moved downwards, which triggered the detector in a way
which did not smash the flask and thus, as yet still also has an alive
cat. Finally by the time the last (Mc) operator’s effect has finished
its evolutionary action,  the cat lays dead (or alive) and thus the
final bundles are now partitioned into either a Z spin up electron
that moved upwards with a detector that  smashed the flask that killed
the cat; or, a Z spin down electron that moved downwards with a
detector reading that triggered no flask smashing and left the cat
alive.


There’s nothing new in any of this. It is just the standard paradox
normally used to illustrate the problem of collapse.  However I have
highlighted the fact that the experiment takes time to untangle the
different strands of the differentiated multiverse such that the cat
can discover which type of strand he is in.

Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

[CW]

I can't help with that unfortunately. My own TOE explains why QM may
be a misinterpretation to begin with (even though the observations and
 predictions of QM are of course valid).

[NP]

Ok thanks for your comments Craig.  I would be interested in your
TOE.  If you have explained it on this list can you give me the topic
reference - I'd like to consider it.


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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

[JR]
I think such cul de sacs exist only from third person perspectives.
E.g.,
the experimenter's view of what happens to the cat.  When considering
the
perspective from the first person (cat) perspective, there are no cul
de
sacs for a much simpler reason: The cat might be mistaken, dreaming,
or even
an altogether different being choosing to temporarily experience a
cat's
point of view.


No matter how foolproof a setup an experimenter designs, it is
impossible to
capture and terminate the cat's continued consciousness as seen from
the
perspective of the cat.


The lower the chance the cat has of surviving through some malfunction
of
the device, the more likely it becomes that the cat survives via
improbable
extensions.  For the same reasons, I think it is more probable that
you will
wake up as some trans- or post-human playing a realistic sim
ancestor game
than for you to live to 200 by some QTI accident (not counting
medical
advances).  Eventually, those alternatives just become more probable.


Jason

[NP]
Hi Jason, thank you for this response.  I can see where you are coming
from and this idea is intuitively appealing.
What I was trying to do was use a simple alternave unitary evolution
example which could open up possible alternative worlds thereby
allowing consciousness, from the ist person POV to have access to some
of these worlds.  I chose a simple low dimensionsional space for the
eigenvectors |si|aj but in reality  I suspect it is infinite to
reflect all possible alternatives.

I suppose I'm trying to bridge the gap between possible worlds and the
QM formalism so that I still feel in touch with theory that is known
to
be a good model of reality.

Nick

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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

[SPK]
  Are we sure that this ordering, at the level of the state vectors,
 really matters? We are, after all, only considering observables that
 mutually commute and thus ordering should be irrelevant.

[NP]

Hi Stephen.  I stressed the order because it is how the cat perceives
events and therefore how, from the first person POV the cat feels like
his bundle of worlds which are originally identical (fungible) are
becoming different - but not all at once

[SPK]
   It seems to me that we have to take the environment of the system
 into account, so we have to have a {environment in the equation, no?
  From what I can tell, cul de sac's would have 3p consequences that
 would have an effect on the distribution of branches. Maybe we should
 consider what effect the 'rest of the universe' has on the 1p of the cat.

[NP]
I agree that the environment needs to be factored in. Especially to
ensure the worlds quickly decohere.
I need to think about your comment on consequences  - it is an
interesting point and I'd like to pick it
 up again when I've had chance to consider it.  Thank you for that.

Nick





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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-27 Thread meekerdb


On 10/27/2011 3:26 PM, Nick Prince wrote:

[SPK]
   Are we sure that this ordering, at the level of the state vectors,

really matters? We are, after all, only considering observables that
mutually commute and thus ordering should be irrelevant.


[NP]

Hi Stephen.  I stressed the order because it is how the cat perceives
events and therefore how, from the first person POV the cat feels like
his bundle of worlds which are originally identical (fungible) are
becoming different - but not all at once

[SPK]
It seems to me that we have to take the environment of the system

into account, so we have to have a {environment  in the equation, no?
  From what I can tell, cul de sac's would have 3p consequences that
would have an effect on the distribution of branches. Maybe we should
consider what effect the 'rest of the universe' has on the 1p of the cat.

[NP]
I agree that the environment needs to be factored in. Especially to
ensure the worlds quickly decohere.


But you don't need the environment.  The cat itself, or even just the cats brain, even 
just a neuron in the cat's brain already has an enormous number of states and will 
decohere almost instantly, i.e. the brain is essentially a classical object.  What you 
need is a better theory of being a cat instead of  just |alive cat or |dead cat


Brent


I need to think about your comment on consequences  - it is an
interesting point and I'd like to pick it
  up again when I've had chance to consider it.  Thank you for that.

Nick




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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation



[BM]
The QTI, or the more general comp immortality, or arithmetical
immortality is a complex subject, if only because it depends on
what
you mean by you.


[NP]

Can you be more specific on this?

[BM]
Do you know Kripke semantic? A Kripke frame is just a set (of
elements
called worlds) with an accessibility relation among the worlds. In
modal logic they can be used to characterize modal logical systems.
The basic idea is that []p is true in world alpha, if p is true in
all
the worlds accessible from alpha. Dually, p is true in alpha is p
is
true in at least one world accessible from alpha. For example the
law
[]p - p will be satisfied in all reflexive frames---independently
of
the truth value of p. (a frame is reflexive if all the worlds in
the
frame access to themselves; for all alpha alpha R alpha, with R the
accessibility relation).


[NP]
Sorry but I have no experience in this area but I can see that if yoU
adopt non classical logic then it opens up all sorts of
possibilities.  Testing the consequences in reality is the tricky
part.   tHE Quantum mechanical formalism has been successful in so
many respects so it gives us some  confidence of being on the right
track.

 [BM]

  Then, as other have already mentioned, what will remain unclear
(and
hard to compute) is the probability that you survive through some
memory backtracking. The cat might survive in the worlds where he
has
been lucky enough to not participate to that experience, and, for
all
we know, such consistent continuation might have bigger weight than
surviving through some quantum tunnel effect saving the brain's cat
from the poison. The computation here are just not tractable, if we
assume quantum mechanics, and still less, assuming only the comp
hypothesis. The only certainty, assuming comp or QM, is that you
cannot die. But obviously you can become amnesic of some part, if
not
all, your existence, or you existences. Like Otto Rossler summed up
well : consciousness is a prison. With comp, and I think with QM,
there is no escapes from being conscious, in a way or another. I
don't
like that, but then it is a consequence of those theories.

[NP]
 Consciousness could be a prison yes.  but MWI may be false of course,
in which case maybe not.  If comp says yes it is - as you suggest,
then that's another matter.  The question then is: is comp more
fundamental than QM and if this be the case,  should there not be some
way we can utilise its predictive capabilities to distinguish (prove?)
which interpretation of QM is the right one?

Nick


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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation

2011-10-27 Thread meekerdb


On 10/27/2011 4:56 PM, Nick Prince wrote:

With comp, and I think with QM,
there is no escapes from being conscious, in a way or another. I
don't
like that, but then it is a consequence of those theories.


Have you never been unconscious?  Concussion?  Anesthesia?

Brent

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Re: QTI, Cul de sacs and differentiation