Isn't there a difference here between (1) accepting specific
subsidies (federal funds) that the government insists be used for behavior
that furthers specific government goals, and (2) operat[ing] in the public
sphere by running hospitals and universities? By way of analogy,
Marty: I had always thought that substantial burden meant, in
relevant part, a requirement that I/we do something that I/we believe to be
religiously wrong. If this is so, then isn't the only substantial burden
question whether this particular taxpayer or organization holds
Folks: The list software is configured to block posts that are longer than 40
Kbytes, and I prefer to keep that block, since it helps avoid overflowing
users' mailboxes. Almost always, the long posts are ones that just
automatically quote lots of earlier posts in the thread. If you get a
I'm with Jim in what I see as his skepticism as to the
suggestion that exceptions from a law make it not of general applicability
for Free Exercise Clause purposes. (I realize that some post-Smith cases take
this view, but I think they are mistaken.) A vast range of laws,
Whoops, sorry for the jarring shift from the second person to
the third person in the third paragraph
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2012 9:36 PM
To: Law Religion
Marty: Doesn't this all depend on what you mean by facially plausible in
whether the objector has at least articulated a facially plausible explanation
of why being compelled to engage in the conduct in question would impose a
materially different and more severe burden on religious exercise
A question: Say that an employee believes that God wants him to move across
country to be near his family, which needs his help. He quits his job, moves,
but can't find a job where his family lives. Should he be seen as
constitutionally entitled to unemployment compensation?
Eugene
I agree with Chip that some burdens aren't treated as
substantial, see Lyng and Bowen (both of which I think were correctly decided).
But Lyng and Bowen involved situations where the restriction did not require a
claimant to do something that the claimant believed to be
Mark: A few hypotheticals: (1) Say that a state provides
that adequate provocation makes killing manslaughter rather than murder, and
that a particular set of behaviors - having sex with the defendant's spouse,
having just beaten a defendant (but in a situation where the
to respond to your hypos later today, but here is a non-hypothetical
question: Do you think Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark was correctly
decided?
Best,
Mark
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Wednesday, February
?
Eugene,
I will try to respond to your hypos later today, but here is a non-hypothetical
question: Do you think Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark was correctly
decided?
Best,
Mark
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
?
Best,
Mark
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]mailto:[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2012 9:44 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law
The trouble with “common sense” is that it often points in
different directions. Common sense tells us there is real value to following
rules with no exceptions, so that one doesn’t have to later deal with questions
of “you accommodated them, why don’t you accommodate” us (even
How would travel concerns affect this? Since Orthodox Jews
can't drive on the Sabbath, I assume they would often have to drive out during
the day Friday and stay over the Sabbath. Would that be an acceptable burden
on the students? Or would this itself be seen as a sufficient
I wonder whether religious liberty is exactly the right term here, where
we're talking about access to a privately provided program, and one that is
hardly essential for life or livelihood. The question isn't just whether
Orthodox Jews are free to live as good Orthodox Jews, or even are free
of the rule
of law that does not make allowance, either implicitly or explicitly, for
ignoring, avoiding, disobeying, or violating rules resembles madness more
closely than it does common sense.
Best to all,
Paul Horwitz
University of Alabama School of Law
On Mar 3, 2012, at 5:41 PM, Volokh, Eugene
I wonder whether this further shows the value of distinguishing
not just exemptions and accommodations, but discriminatory action and
nondiscriminatory action. For instance, I expect that few people would view a
bookstore owner's decision to close the store as censorship, or a
From: Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 11:32 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Israeli Postal Workers Object to Delivering New Testaments
There are, it seems to me, two significant differences between
the postal worker refusal and the taxi
Alan: You give examples of deliberate discrimination, but I thought we
were generally speaking about decisions not to change one's own affirmative
practices -- not just one's prohibitions (e.g., no-headgear rules) but also
one's choices to, for instance, play on a particular day -- in
Can this possibly be the right analysis?
(1) It seems to me that the law routinely distinguishes
between X discriminating against Y based on Y’s race or Y’s religion, and X
discriminating against Y based on X’s own religious beliefs that are
independent of Y’s
In a sense this may be obvious, but it might be worth
restating: One thing that is facing the cabbies is that for complex reasons
cabbies are stripped of liberties that the rest of us take for granted. If we
disapprove of alcohol – whether because we’re Muslim or Methodist, or
It may well be that intentionally discriminatory actions by private
athletic organizations are better labeled as threats to religious equality
and not religious liberty; on the other hand, sometimes liberty rules
themselves embody equality norms (see, e.g., the shape of free speech
My sense is that the system would work better than Steve
thinks, since I suspect that it would be rare that six cabbies in a row will
have this objection. It's true that, at least according to
http://www.startribune.com/462/story/709262.html, most cabbies in Minneapolis
are
It may well be that there were specifically anti-Muslim
statements made in the Target controversy that Greg describes. But it seems to
me that, in general, the analogy between religious objections and medical
objections tends to be somewhat overstated. (I thought the same of
I think I understand Paul's point, and the arguments in favor it,
but I wonder whether it might get things backward. TAPPS could likely have
focused itself on Christian private schools with little difficulty for it. (It
might have benefited from including secular schools, but it
I think the analysis below is mistaken: Whether or not cabbies' refusal to
carry alcohol should be barred by some general common-carriage requirement, it
shouldn't be treated as religious discrimination. What's more, I think the
argument that such a refusal is religious discrimination itself
But the Minnesota Constitution has been interpreted as
following Sherbert and Yoder, so isn't the question indeed why the cab drivers
aren't constitutionally entitled to an exemption? As it happens, I oppose
constitutional exemption regimes, at the state and federal levels, and
Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Discrimination against people with religious motivations for their
actions
I have to say that I find Steve's analysis more sound and based on common sense.
Marci
On Mar 7, 2012, at 3:07 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu
the
religious cabbie loses. So then it is just a matter of public policy.I
will leave that to the lawmakers
On Mar 7, 2012, at 6:55 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
So let me make sure I understand your view correctly:
1
that is illegal?
Thanks!
On Mar 7, 2012, at 3:11 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
But the Minnesota Constitution has been interpreted as
following Sherbert and Yoder, so isn’t the question indeed why the cab drivers
aren’t constitutionally entitled
(1) Can you say a bit more about the circumstances of the
hour-long delays, given that it seems that many cab drivers were happy to
transport anyone who is willing to pay? Were they at the airport, with
dispatches cabs, or with cabs hailed on the street?
(2)
of the others.
If a system can be worked out with minimal harm to all involved, that is best.
But I would favor the weaker party to the stronger -- in this situation the one
needing the cab is decidedly in the weaker position.
Steve
On Mar 7, 2012, at 3:07 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
I think
I would think that narrow tailoring requires a good deal more
justification than that. Can it really be that a ban on discrimination against
passengers who carry alcohol – discrimination that, outside the context of
taxicabs and a few similar common carriers, would be legal in
Steve writes that religious motivation matters, for purposes
of making an action taken with religious motivation illegal when the same
action taken with secular motivation is legal. I see no basis for that in
antidiscrimination law, which generally bans discrimination against
From: mailman-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:mailman-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On
Behalf Of McKnite, Jacob
Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 9:11 PM
To: religionlaw-ow...@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Call for Papers: Religion and the Public Schools
Dear Professor Volokh,
I am devoting Volume 39, Issue
any need to create controversial exceptions for religious
entities, avoid piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall
scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for
religious accommodation?
On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol
River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012),
http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/RiversvMohr.pdf .
Eugene
___
To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
piece-meal litigation, and ease administration of the overall scheme), even
though
the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for religious
accommodation?
On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr
, and ease administration of the overall
scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for
religious accommodation?
On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012),
http
My apology for bringing this up again, but I'd like to hear what people
think about it, and I thought it might be a relevant analogy.
In 1998, California banned the sale of horsemeat for human consumption,
based on nonrational aesthetic / moral judgments about the impropriety of
litigation, and ease administration of the overall
scheme), even though the impetus for change derived from a demand by some for
religious accommodation?
On Wed, Apr 11, 2012 at 6:48 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
River v. Mohr (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2012),
http
against Establishment Clause
challenge
Cutter only addressed the facial Establishment Clause attack on the prison
provisions of RLUIPA. It did not protect any particular program or exemption
from attack
Marci
On Apr 12, 2012, at 7:19 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol
. Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Yeshiva University
New York, NY 10003
On Apr 20, 2012, at 9:09 AM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
There's an interesting op-ed at
http://blog.nj.com/njv_guest_blog/2012/04
There's an interesting op-ed at
http://blog.nj.com/njv_guest_blog/2012/04/among_nj_orthodox_jewish_women.html
that faults the child custody law preference for stability of religious
upbringing: When women leave arranged marriages in the ultra-Orthodox Jewish
community -- and leave
...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Sunday, May 13, 2012 7:56 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Minister convicted for teaching parishioners to punish children
by hitting them on the bare buttocks with wooden dowels
:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Sunday, May 13, 2012 7:56 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Minister convicted for teaching parishioners
I would think that such a conviction would likely be
unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause, given Brandenburg v. Ohio, even
without regard to any special religious freedom claim (note that Wisconsin
courts read the Wisconsin Constitution following Sherbert/Yoder). It
was
convicted of conspiracy, not solicitation. Wholly apart from the First
Amendment, is it really the case that he can be said to have agreed with the
parents to engage in child abuse under Wisconsin law?)
On Mon, May 14, 2012 at 12:24 AM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol
, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
Folks: I think that, if we soften the rhetoric and get more
concrete, we could arrive at the following:
1. There’s been a debate about whether religious freedom
protections insulate churches
Anecdotal evidence and surmise is all we have for most laws –
it’s all we have for the proposition that, for instance, having RFRAs actually
increases religious freedom; it’s not like we have social science or criminal
statistics to support that. And social science and criminal
Thanks for the pointer. Out of this list at the ndagainst3.com site, the only
item that seems at all plausible is that people could break certain laws on
non-discrimination, though almost certainly not employment discrimination
laws. The other claims would either be almost certainly rejected
value.
Bob Ritter
On June 14, 2012 at 7:29 PM Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
Thanks for the pointer. Out of this list at the ndagainst3.com site, the only
item that seems at all plausible is that “people could break” certain “laws on
non-discrimination
Very well stated, Eugene. My compliments.
Alan
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Thursday, June 14, 2012 7:24 PM
OK, sorry, that wasn't meant for the whole list D'oh!
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thursday, June 14, 2012 8:11 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Religious
Marc: It seems to me that state RFRAs are aimed at protecting
religious observers and religious institutions more than at least many other
social interests. Conversely, as I understand the church liability cases,
plaintiffs usually aim to simply apply normal negligent
Excellent points, both in the first paragraph and in the third.
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Graber, Mark
Sent: Friday, June 15, 2012 6:46 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Religious
No, actually I think the quote was an unnecessarily pugnacious
attempt to capture an important point. Some religious groups have apparently
failed to reasonably investigate and monitor people whom they put in positions
of influence over children, and some of those people have used
From: Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, June 15, 2012 10:44 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Strict scrutiny, from Sherbert/Yoder to RFRA
I disagree on very much with Marci, and I’m not sure that the
Sherbert/Yoder test would have been inapplicable
But as I understand it, some states – though a minority – do
indeed protect churches from negligent supervision/retention/hiring liability;
and since generally speaking respondeat superior is usually unavailable in such
cases, the effect is indeed an immunity of churches from
I think this is combining under the rubric of “discrimination”
many different things. First, item 2 doesn’t involve discrimination based on
the passenger’s race, religion, sex, and so on which is why businesses
generally are free to discriminate against patrons with wine, or
'
Subject: RE: Religious exemptions in ND
That is true.
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, June 15, 2012 10:49 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Religious exemptions in ND
From: mailman-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:mailman-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On
Behalf Of Ryan Morrison
Sent: Monday, June 18, 2012 6:48 PM
To: religionlaw-ow...@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: 2012 Elon Law Review Symposium
Good evening,
My name is Ryan Morrison, and I am a Symposium Editor for the
: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-
boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Monday, June 18, 2012 4:47 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Religious exemptions in ND
But I suspect the Texas Statutes includes many
I share some list members’ discomfort with Zorach, and with the
South Carolina law that gives favored treatment to religious studies classes,
rather than just releasing students to take a class at any other accredited
school or at any unaccredited school if the class is
Any chance we could have some helpful analysis of the decision,
rather than one-liners? The question of the degree to which parents should be
able to permanently alter their children's bodies - for religious reasons or
otherwise - is not, it seems to me, one that has a
An analogy between male circumcision and ear-piercing is no
more dispositive than an analogy between male circumcision and female
circumcision, it seems to me. There’s a spectrum here: Normal ear-piercing
has virtually no effects on bodily function, since there seem to be no
is irreversable.
That's what makes the case so difficult.
On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 at 11:56 AM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
Any chance we could have some helpful analysis of the decision,
rather than one-liners? The question of the degree to which
Scotland Avenue
Albany, NY 12208
518-445-3386tel:518-445-3386 (p)
518-445-3363tel:518-445-3363 (f)
paul.finkel...@albanylaw.edumailto:paul.finkel...@albanylaw.edu
www.paulfinkelman.comhttp://www.paulfinkelman.com
From: Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol
It seems to me that a vast range of laws - including laws that
Paul and others would very much support - can equally be described as imposing
semi-religious, ethical view[s] on others. After all, at the bottom of many
laws is an ethical judgment that can't be proven or
Alan: But our legal system also bars parents from physically
acting towards their children in various other ways. Parents may not beat
their children beyond a certain point. Parents may not excise their girls'
genitalia. Parents may not consent to their children's having sex
I'm skeptical about Mark's historical argument (though I do
agree that if foreskin regeneration were easy and reliable, we'd have much less
of an argument for banning circumcision). But as to the reprehensible
ethics of the decision, the question is why we should weigh
...@albanylaw.edumailto:paul.finkel...@albanylaw.edu
www.paulfinkelman.comhttp://www.paulfinkelman.com
*
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
on behalf of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Sunday
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Sunday, July 01, 2012 2:39 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: What parents may or may not do
weight. This is especially
true in criminal cases, where the standard of statutory interpretation requires
that crimes be clearly specified--none of this do no harm generalizing!
On Wed, Jul 4, 2012 at 4:24 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
Sorry
This raises a fascinating and practically very important
question (because there are more than 10 times as many American parents who
authorize circumcision for nonreligious reasons than for religious reasons):
Do Meyer/Pierce rights extend to the right to raise one's child in
?
Howard Friedman
-Original Message-
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thu 7/5/2012 10:57 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Parental rights and physical conduct
The difficulty is that newborn males aren't Jewish in the sense
of actually believing in the Jewish religion - they are, after all, newborns.
When they are 18, they might be religious enough (or culturally identified
enough) to appreciate being circumcised if they had been
Isn't the key problem precisely that the claimed religious
liberty ... of the family here refers to the claimed religious liberty of one
individual to alter the body of a different individual? And I don't see why
that is a normatively appealing liberty, given that it impinges
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-
boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Thursday, July 05, 2012 12:31 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Parental rights and physical conduct
I
medical motives.
On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 at 10:46 AM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
Here's an analogy from another area in which the normal rule -
one person may not alter or injure another's body without permission - is
relaxed: self-defense
The quote from Boldt rather strikingly focuses on how forcing a
12-year-old to be circumcised is bad for the 12-year-old because it could
seriously affect the relationship between [him] and father. Is that really
all there is to it? Might it not also be bad because a 12-year-old
I agree with Chris entirely when it comes to questions having
to do with what to teach the child, whom to expose the child to, where to live
with the child, and similar child-rearing questions: There, in an intact
family, a court may not intrude simply on the grounds that some
I think that accurately captures the rule - and likely the
right rule - with regard to decisions made for medical reasons, when the
decisions are within the range of plausible medical decisions. (As I've said
all along, I think circumcision decisions may well fall in this
:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[religionlaw-
boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, July 04, 2012 4:24 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: German circumcision decision
And that “non-Jewish standard of ‘Jewishness’” – that newborn
males aren’t Jewish – is, I think, precisely the standard that our government
must adopt. Our law cannot (with some excepts related to political
distinctions, such as membership in an Indian tribe) accept a notion of
From what I understand, think the health arguments for
circumcision are substantial, and, as I've noted before, to the extent that
parents are making a medical choice in favor of circumcision, I think it makes
sense to defer to their judgment, just as it does for other medical
indeed give great weight to that long-standing and
wide-spread legal tradition (Troxel v. Granville).
On Thu, Jul 5, 2012 at 10:57 AM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
This raises a fascinating and practically very important
question (because
, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
From what I understand, think the health arguments for
circumcision are substantial, and, as I've noted before, to the extent that
parents are making a medical choice in favor of circumcision
Part of the reason, I think, is that irreversible decisions
should, when possible, be left to the adult that the child will become; and
while lack of circumcision is painful to reverse in adulthood, it's possible,
while circumcision is at the very least much harder to reverse
?
As to harms, shouldn't the burden be on the proponent of banning the procedure?
Sent from my iPhone
On Jul 7, 2012, at 3:40 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
Part of the reason, I think, is that irreversible decisions
should, when possible
...@lists.ucla.edu
on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Sun 7/8/2012 12:29 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Equivocal evidence, and the right to choose
(1) I'm not sure why A's interest in B's religion should give
A the right to alter B's body - even if A is B's
:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Sun 7/8/2012 12:29 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Equivocal evidence, and the right to choose
(1) I'm not sure why A's interest in B's religion should
.
Sent from my iPhone
On Jul 9, 2012, at 7:13 AM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
The theoretical principle behind my claim that, “As to ‘the
sons' own interest in conforming to their religion,’ I don't think it's ‘their
religion’ at age 8 days
I would think that a distinction between physical alteration of
a child's body and other actions would indeed be a sensible one (though not
always a dispositive one), and one that is consistent with our general view
that physical alteration of another's body is an especially
Folks: I'm trying to make an argument using religious contributions as an
analogy, and wanted to make sure I'm not missing something in the thing I'm
analogizing to.
I wanted to say something about the protecting shareholders rationale for
limiting corporate campaign-related speech, and
I don't think it changes my analysis, since I've all along
acknowledged that there are plausible medical arguments in favor of
circumcision. I'm hesitant to treat the AAP statement as materially changing
that, since I take it that there's some disagreement among pediatric groups -
with the decisions that parents make for their
children regarding circumcision.
Even if the outcomes will be the same whether one views the issue through the
first framing or the second, the two seem worth distinguishing.
On Aug 24, 2012, at 7:56 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol
Sorry for the delay responding -- I was working on a cert petition all
week, and just handed it off to my cite-checker.
As list readers might recall, my position was not that circumcision
restriction would be justified. Rather, I wrote, From what I understand,
think the health
Let me try to respond, relatively briefly, to Eric's long and
interesting argument about the philosophical issues raised by the circumcision
debate.
Here is my general thought -- I don't know whether most
Americans, most Finns, most Germans, or most of anyone
This might be a great opportunity for some of our former students, so I thought
I'd pass it along:
Stanford Law School
Religious Liberty Clinic
Staff Attorney
The Mills Legal Clinic of Stanford Law School invites applicants for the staff
attorney position with its Religious Liberty Clinic
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