Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 29 Mar 2014, at 10:24, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 29 March 2014 19:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Mar 2014, at 23:41, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 29 March 2014 03:24, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit or implicit position on personal identity in functionalism. This is weird. I guess you mean your notion of functionalism, which is too much general I think, but I was still thinking it could have a relation with functionalism in the math sense, where an object is defined by its functional relations with other objects, and the identity *is* in the functionality. Then function is always used in two very different sense, especially in computer science, as it can be extensional function (defined by the functionality), or its intension (the code, the description, the body). Could your functionalist say yes to a doctor, which build the right computer (to replicate his consciousness), and add enough original atoms to preserve the identity? Is someone saying yes to that doctor, but only if a priest blesses the artificial brain with holy water a functionalist? Can you describe an experience refuting functionalism (in your sense)? Just to help me to understand. Thanks. A person could conceivably say the following: it is impossible for a computer to be conscious because consciousness is a magical substance that comes from God. Therefore, if you make an artificial brain it may behave like a real brain, but it will be a zombie. God could by a miracle grant the artificial brain consciousness, and he could even grant it a similar consciousness to my own, so that it will think it is me. Hmm... OK, but usually comp is not just that a computer can be conscious, but that it can be conscious (c= can support consciousness) in virtue of doing computation. That is why I add sometime qua computatio to remind this. If functionalism accept a role for a magical substance, it is obviously non computationalism. Of course, the computer or computing device must be doing the computations; if not it is unconscious or only potentially consciousness. I agree. A non working computer, or a frozen brain, or a Gödel number, cannot think (assuming comp) relatively to us (looking at the non working computer). The person itself might still think from her point of view, in a parallel reality or in arithmetic, etc. But this is because in that parallel reality the computer is supposed to work. If we could freeze all instantiations of that computer, the person associated with it would absolutely dead. Of course that is impossible to do. However, it won't *really* be me, because it could only be me if we were numerically identical, and not even God can make two distinct things numerically identical. Even with God. This makes the argument weird. Even if God cannot do that. But it can make sense, with magic matter, many things can make sense. It's not so weird, since even God or magic can't do something logically impossible like make 1 = 2, Is 1=2 logically impossible? I doubt this. It is certainly arithmetically impossible, but all propositions of arithmetic are independent of most logics. and under one theory of personal identity (which by the way I think is completely wrong) that is what would have to happen for a person to survive teleportation. From her first person points of view, in some non-comp theory. I don't accept this position, but it is the position many people have on personal identity, and it is independent of their position on the possibility of computer consciousness. OK. I think you have to specify whether comp means merely that a computer simulation of a brain can be conscious or go the whole way with Bruno's conclusion that there is no actual physical computer and all possible computations are necessarily implemented by virtue of their status as platonic objects. It is not so much in virtue of their status as platonic object (which seems to imply some metaphysical hypothesis), but in virtue of being true independently of my will, or even of the notion of universe, god, etc. But there is the further notion of implementation. The obvious objection is that computations might be true but they cannot give rise to consciousness unless implemented on a physical computer. Only IF you assume that one universal machine (the physical universe or some part of it) has a special (metaphysical) status, and that it plays a special role. Implementation in computer science is defined purely by a relation between a universal machine/number and a machine/number (which can be universal or not). u implements machine x if phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y) for all y, and that can be
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 28 Mar 2014, at 23:05, meekerdb wrote: On 3/28/2014 8:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Mar 2014, at 15:55, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: Citeren Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: Is electron position a continuous observable? Even if it is and there are an infinity of brains, why should that result in an infinity of minds? It would seem unlikely that brains would evolve so that an arbitrarily small change in the position of an electron would cause a change in consciousness, and we know that even gross changes in the brain, as occur in stroke or head injury, sometimes have remarkably little effect. -- Stathis Papaioannou Yes, there are only a finite number of quantum states that even the entire visible part of the universe can be in. In which theory? I mean, in which QM? I think that even an electron in an atom of hydrogen can be in infinitely many quantum states, in non GR version of QM. I guess I miss something here. That is only true of an idealized hydrogen atom in an otherwise empty, infinite universe. You think about its energy state, but I was thinking more on the position of the electron, without GR. In the real world there are other atoms and fields that disrupt the Rydberg orbits. Supposedly the number of states within the hubble sphere is limited by the holographic principle - although that's speculation based on on semi-classical analysis of horizons. OK. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 28 Mar 2014, at 23:41, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 29 March 2014 03:24, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit or implicit position on personal identity in functionalism. This is weird. I guess you mean your notion of functionalism, which is too much general I think, but I was still thinking it could have a relation with functionalism in the math sense, where an object is defined by its functional relations with other objects, and the identity *is* in the functionality. Then function is always used in two very different sense, especially in computer science, as it can be extensional function (defined by the functionality), or its intension (the code, the description, the body). Could your functionalist say yes to a doctor, which build the right computer (to replicate his consciousness), and add enough original atoms to preserve the identity? Is someone saying yes to that doctor, but only if a priest blesses the artificial brain with holy water a functionalist? Can you describe an experience refuting functionalism (in your sense)? Just to help me to understand. Thanks. A person could conceivably say the following: it is impossible for a computer to be conscious because consciousness is a magical substance that comes from God. Therefore, if you make an artificial brain it may behave like a real brain, but it will be a zombie. God could by a miracle grant the artificial brain consciousness, and he could even grant it a similar consciousness to my own, so that it will think it is me. Hmm... OK, but usually comp is not just that a computer can be conscious, but that it can be conscious (c= can support consciousness) in virtue of doing computation. That is why I add sometime qua computatio to remind this. If functionalism accept a role for a magical substance, it is obviously non computationalism. However, it won't *really* be me, because it could only be me if we were numerically identical, and not even God can make two distinct things numerically identical. Even with God. This makes the argument weird. Even if God cannot do that. But it can make sense, with magic matter, many things can make sense. I don't accept this position, but it is the position many people have on personal identity, and it is independent of their position on the possibility of computer consciousness. OK. I think you have to specify whether comp means merely that a computer simulation of a brain can be conscious or go the whole way with Bruno's conclusion that there is no actual physical computer and all possible computations are necessarily implemented by virtue of their status as platonic objects. It is not so much in virtue of their status as platonic object (which seems to imply some metaphysical hypothesis), but in virtue of being true independently of my will, or even of the notion of universe, god, etc. But there is the further notion of implementation. The obvious objection is that computations might be true but they cannot give rise to consciousness unless implemented on a physical computer. Only IF you assume that one universal machine (the physical universe or some part of it) has a special (metaphysical) status, and that it plays a special role. Implementation in computer science is defined purely by a relation between a universal machine/number and a machine/ number (which can be universal or not). u implements machine x if phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y) for all y, and that can be defined in the theory quoted below. A physicalist, somehow, just pick out one universal being and asserts that it is more fundamental. The computationalist know better, and know that the special physical universal machine has to win some competition below our substitution level. Step 8 of the UDA says the physical computer is not necessary; which is a metaphysical position if anything is. It is metaphysical, OK, but that is part of the subject matter. But it is not a position or opinion, only a logical consequence, with some use of Occam, to be sure, as it is a consequence in *applied* logic. The whole meta-point is that we can do metaphysics and theology in the hypothetico-deductive way, free of a priori metaphysical assumption, except the yes doctor, which is as much metaphysical than practical. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more
Fwd: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 29 March 2014 19:27, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bejavascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','marc...@ulb.ac.be'); wrote: On 28 Mar 2014, at 23:41, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 29 March 2014 03:24, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bejavascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','marc...@ulb.ac.be'); wrote: On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit or implicit position on personal identity in functionalism. This is weird. I guess you mean your notion of functionalism, which is too much general I think, but I was still thinking it could have a relation with functionalism in the math sense, where an object is defined by its functional relations with other objects, and the identity *is* in the functionality. Then function is always used in two very different sense, especially in computer science, as it can be extensional function (defined by the functionality), or its intension (the code, the description, the body). Could your functionalist say yes to a doctor, which build the right computer (to replicate his consciousness), and add enough original atoms to preserve the identity? Is someone saying yes to that doctor, but only if a priest blesses the artificial brain with holy water a functionalist? Can you describe an experience refuting functionalism (in your sense)? Just to help me to understand. Thanks. A person could conceivably say the following: it is impossible for a computer to be conscious because consciousness is a magical substance that comes from God. Therefore, if you make an artificial brain it may behave like a real brain, but it will be a zombie. God could by a miracle grant the artificial brain consciousness, and he could even grant it a similar consciousness to my own, so that it will think it is me. Hmm... OK, but usually comp is not just that a computer can be conscious, but that it can be conscious (c= can support consciousness) in virtue of doing computation. That is why I add sometime qua computatio to remind this. If functionalism accept a role for a magical substance, it is obviously non computationalism. Of course, the computer or computing device must be doing the computations; if not it is unconscious or only potentially consciousness. However, it won't *really* be me, because it could only be me if we were numerically identical, and not even God can make two distinct things numerically identical. Even with God. This makes the argument weird. Even if God cannot do that. But it can make sense, with magic matter, many things can make sense. It's not so weird, since even God or magic can't do something logically impossible like make 1 = 2, and under one theory of personal identity (which by the way I think is completely wrong) that is what would have to happen for a person to survive teleportation. I don't accept this position, but it is the position many people have on personal identity, and it is independent of their position on the possibility of computer consciousness. OK. I think you have to specify whether comp means merely that a computer simulation of a brain can be conscious or go the whole way with Bruno's conclusion that there is no actual physical computer and all possible computations are necessarily implemented by virtue of their status as platonic objects. It is not so much in virtue of their status as platonic object (which seems to imply some metaphysical hypothesis), but in virtue of being true independently of my will, or even of the notion of universe, god, etc. But there is the further notion of implementation. The obvious objection is that computations might be true but they cannot give rise to consciousness unless implemented on a physical computer. Only IF you assume that one universal machine (the physical universe or some part of it) has a special (metaphysical) status, and that it plays a special role. Implementation in computer science is defined purely by a relation between a universal machine/number and a machine/number (which can be universal or not). u implements machine x if phi_u(x,y) = phi_x(y) for all y, and that can be defined in the theory quoted below. A physicalist, somehow, just pick out one universal being and asserts that it is more fundamental. The computationalist know better, and know that the special physical universal machine has to win some competition below our substitution level. But most computationalists are probably physicalists who believe that consciousness can only occur if an actual physical computer is using energy and heating up in the process of implementing computations. They don't believe that the abstract computation on its own is enough. They may be wrong, but that's what they think, and they call themselves computationalists. Step 8 of the UDA says the physical computer is not necessary; which is a
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
This is fabulous (in places - some bits make me feel a bit sick) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xuecSLLXTYM This is like the one Bruno posted, but on hyperdrive... http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ohzJV980PIQhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ohzJV980PIQ This second one zooms to 10^1000 - which means the entire starting frame, at the final resolution, would be far bigger than the universe. This is the sort of thing that makes me think we aren't just inventing maths, but it's out there waiting for the right tools (intellectual, computational) to discover - but I may be wrong. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote: On 3/27/2014 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its material quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size. Why observable? Why not just variable - which it is in current formulations of QM. ? Position, in QM, is represented by an observable (some operator in a Hilbert space). Its eigenvalue are the variable which can be instantiated by a measurement. I am not sure I grasp the remark, nor that it would change anything. If some physical data are actually infinite, a non-computationalist can argue that you can emulate an infinity of mind states in a finite portion of some physical-space-time. But with real valued variables can't there be hypercomputation? Yes. But you can have hypercomputation also when working with only natural numbers, like a machine computing functions from N to N with the help of the Halting Oracle, or with any pi_i or sigma_i oracles. We know this enlarge properly a lot the class of computable functions. I am not convinced by the argument of Kent, but perhaps an improvement can be made. Von Neumann wrote a paper where he estimated that the probability of self-duplication machines apparition on Earth is very low. I am not convinced, but this still suggests that the theory of evolution, when precise enough, might see the trace of the multiverse, in case that probability is so low that the origin of life involves non trivial quantum computations. Gödel also suggested that science might have to admit a God in case the speed of evolution violates the (known) physical laws. Apparently Godel didn't see the Many-world alternative to God, for that function. Godel and Einstein missed the many-thing idea, and I see people resist. Yet, I think that with mechanism, we just cannot avoid that multiplication when we believe statements like Goldbach conjecture is true or false. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 23:33, LizR wrote: On 27 March 2014 21:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 23:26, LizR wrote: On 27 March 2014 10:30, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. With sufficiently advanced technology (e.g. uploading yourself to a digital brain), the upper limit on your brain size is theoretically unbounded, except perhaps by cosmological considerations. Prepare to join the Overmind... Hmm, I can understand that you put your physicalist hat (because it is a day with a T!), but here you put both the physicalist hat, and the comp hat. Should I infer that every day with a T, you are inconsistent? Well this assumes physical supervenience I think, but so did Stathis, I think, so I was responding in kind. One could posit not uploading as such but adding more and more digital implants and so on that eventually one can throw out the organic core when it dies, and continue to exist in the implants. Whether this is you or not being another question. But anyway, yes, I'm sure you can assume I'm inconsistent some of the time! Same for me! I was just alluding that I have much doubt that the physical supervenience can make sense when we postulate the digital mechanist hypothesis. Note that being immortal by having a growing brain might not be funny, and once immortal, people will love forgetting and resetting their mind. To much souvenirs might be heavy to support. When human will be technologically immortal they might regret it and have a strong nostalgia of death and amnesia. The eternal sunshineindeed. If brain size is finite then resetting, or erasing memories at least, becomes necessary eventually if one is to have (and remember) new experiences. To quote some schoolboy, please sir, can I stop now, my brain is full! The real art is in forgetting, and putting the less relevant information in the trash, and keeping the most relevant one, instead of the contrary. The molting of the spiders is also quite intriguing in question of dying and surviving. It is easy to conceive immortal creature with non growing brain, and yes, they will come back an infinity of times on all their experiences, without noticing it of course. In buddhist term, terrestrial or technological immortality might only be a manner to prevent the nirvana, and to pursue our staying in the samsara forever. Then you can develop an infinite karma making harder and harder to get the nirvana and a pacified soul. Well that's true, in Buddhist terms... is there any correspondence between Buddhism and comp? Plotinus, and most of the neoplatonism, is close to the teaching of some buddhism, and there are books on that subject. Then I propose a lexicon between Plotinus and the machine's talk about herself. I think all mystics are close to what the universal machine discover when looking inward, certainly in some literal or formal sense. It is, very roughly, the difference between Plato and Aristotle, or between the mystics and the naturalists, or even between the mathematicians and the physicists. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 17:59, meekerdb wrote: On 3/27/2014 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here. The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after a night's sleep. I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone who associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he is the same person after one night, but not after seven years (assuming the whole material body constitution has been changed). That seems to be equivocation on same. OK. That is what I was trying to illustrate, in the case of some non- comp axiom. In a sense I'm the same person as Brent Meeker of 1944, but I'm certainly very different. And not just because I'm made of different atoms (which are indistinguishable anyway). No problem. Bruno Brent The person I was when I was 3 years old is dead. He died because too much new information was added to his brain. -- Saibal Mitra -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 28 Mar 2014, at 00:00, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 28 March 2014 09:51, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 March 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I would say there is only a finite number of possible biological human minds, Because the number is limited by the Beckenstein bound if we assume physical supervenience ? but an infinite number of possible minds if you are running them on the Turing machine in Platonia. (Or an infinite number of Turing machines, according to comp ;-) Does comp suggest that consciousness corresponds to an infinite number of different possible mental states (rather than a very large, but finite, number of them) ? (If so should I assume we're talkng about a countable infinity?) I think you have to specify whether comp means merely that a computer simulation of a brain can be conscious or go the whole way with Bruno's conclusion that there is no actual physical computer and all possible computations are necessarily implemented by virtue of their status as platonic objects. It is not so much in virtue of their status as platonic object (which seems to imply some metaphysical hypothesis), but in virtue of being true independently of my will, or even of the notion of universe, god, etc. You need just to assume, or accept as true, relations like x + 0 = x, for all x, etc. It is a very weak form of realism, and basically, this is assumed by all scientists. *After* UDA, the assumptions are no more than classical logic and , for all x and y: 0 ≠ (x + 1) ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) - x = y x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x * 0 = 0 x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x The boxes and diamond are defined in that theory, the theology and physics is derived in the extensions of that theory (the observers) simulated by that theory. There are many other equivalent theories. There are some metaphysical or theological consequences, clear with comp, but except for the yes doctor, there is no special ontological commitment done, not even on the numbers, that is no more than in Euclid proofs of the infinity of the prime numbers. The computations are implemented in virtue of the consequences of the axioms above. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 15:55, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: Citeren Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On 27 March 2014 19:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its material quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size. Is electron position a continuous observable? Even if it is and there are an infinity of brains, why should that result in an infinity of minds? It would seem unlikely that brains would evolve so that an arbitrarily small change in the position of an electron would cause a change in consciousness, and we know that even gross changes in the brain, as occur in stroke or head injury, sometimes have remarkably little effect. -- Stathis Papaioannou Yes, there are only a finite number of quantum states that even the entire visible part of the universe can be in. In which theory? I mean, in which QM? I think that even an electron in an atom of hydrogen can be in infinitely many quantum states, in non GR version of QM. I guess I miss something here. Bruno The different mental states I can find myself in can be regarded as different measurement outcomes. Saibal -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 28 Mar 2014, at 1:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Mar 2014, at 11:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 27 March 2014 18:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 13:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's Physics of Immortality view which basically says that identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!) You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness. Assuming comp! If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my liver, the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is conceivable that although conscious like me, the copy might be another person. This makes no sense, if you use some form of comp. This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are. Assuming comp. If the exact infinite state of the bile is required, then by definition, the other person is a different person. I agree this seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice. After all, I *can* conceive that the other might be an impostor an authentically other person. If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a similar brain you will make a similar consciousness. yes, but if the brain secrets consciousness, and if my identity is in the identity of the matter involved, the consciousness is conceivably similar, but not mine. I agree this makes not a lot of sense, but this is because we put the identity (and consciousness) in the relational information, and this uses comp. The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here. The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after a night's sleep. I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone who associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he is the same person after one night, but not after seven years (assuming the whole material body constitution has been changed). That is a difficulty for his theory, but it is logically conceivable if we abandon comp/functionalism/CTM. Comp has not that problem, but then eventually we must explain matter from information handled through number relations/computations. Bruno It doesn't follow that if consciousness is substrate specific it can't be duplicated; OK. But the point is that it might, and that would be the case if my consciousness is attached to both the exact quantum state of my brain and substrate specific (which is a vague thing, yet incompatible with computationalism). it can in fact be duplicated in a straightforward way, by making a biological brain. But we do have evidences that biological copying is at some rather high level, and that it does not copy any piece of matter. It replaces all molecules and atoms with new atoms extracted from food. Here I am just playing the role of devil's advocate and I assume non comp to make a logical point. Even if consciousness is due to an immaterial soul one could say that it could be duplicated if God performs a miracle. Right again, but here too, it might not be the case. God could decide to NOT do a miracle, given that It is so powerful. The claim that the duplicated consciousness isn't really me is a claim about the nature of personal identity, and is independent of any theory of how consciousness is generated. Not if the theory of consciousness is based on personal identity. Your claim makes sense again for a functionalist, but not necessarily to all non-functionalists. A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit or implicit position on personal identity in functionalism. This is weird. I guess you mean your notion of
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 23:37, LizR wrote: On 27 March 2014 23:42, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 March 2014 19:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its material quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size. Is electron position a continuous observable? Even if it is and there are an infinity of brains, why should that result in an infinity of minds? It would seem unlikely that brains would evolve so that an arbitrarily small change in the position of an electron would cause a change in consciousness, and we know that even gross changes in the brain, as occur in stroke or head injury, sometimes have remarkably little effect. I think Bruno must have a materialist hat on here?! Excellent observation! In this context I assume some no-comp, and matter, and real numbers, etc. I can do that too :) It is the context of trying to understand what Stathis is saying, in a proper generalization of comp (still a bit fuzzy to me). In comp the substitution level isn't necessarily at the level of individual electrons, surely... The weak comp I consider is neutral on this, as long as the role of the minimal element is Turing emulable. It could the level of branes or strings, the consequences would still follow. Non-comp needs to give a role to an actual infinities with *all* its decimals. But that raises another question, for me at least - in comp are there only finitely many possible states of mind? They are a priori infinite enumerable. But for some you need *gigantic* brain. Well, they do exist in arithmetic. So one would literally be able to travel full circle through all possible minds - eventually? The UD does that, and although there are many circles, there are also spirales, complex infinite histories which never close on itself. It is hard to conclude, as the 1p and 3p relation is complex, but infinite self-complexifying conscious state cannot be excluded easily neither. A zoom in the mandelbrot set illustrates never-ending self- complification. The more a tiny Mandelbrot set is tiny, the more and more complex will be its filaments. For example: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iL8iZ7lcVnk (3 minutes, + sound). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PD2XgQOyCCk (16 minutes silent zoom). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 29 March 2014 03:24, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit or implicit position on personal identity in functionalism. This is weird. I guess you mean your notion of functionalism, which is too much general I think, but I was still thinking it could have a relation with functionalism in the math sense, where an object is defined by its functional relations with other objects, and the identity *is* in the functionality. Then function is always used in two very different sense, especially in computer science, as it can be extensional function (defined by the functionality), or its intension (the code, the description, the body). Could your functionalist say yes to a doctor, which build the right computer (to replicate his consciousness), and add enough original atoms to preserve the identity? Is someone saying yes to that doctor, but only if a priest blesses the artificial brain with holy water a functionalist? Can you describe an experience refuting functionalism (in your sense)? Just to help me to understand. Thanks. A person could conceivably say the following: it is impossible for a computer to be conscious because consciousness is a magical substance that comes from God. Therefore, if you make an artificial brain it may behave like a real brain, but it will be a zombie. God could by a miracle grant the artificial brain consciousness, and he could even grant it a similar consciousness to my own, so that it will think it is me. However, it won't *really* be me, because it could only be me if we were numerically identical, and not even God can make two distinct things numerically identical. I don't accept this position, but it is the position many people have on personal identity, and it is independent of their position on the possibility of computer consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 29 March 2014 05:15, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Mar 2014, at 00:00, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 28 March 2014 09:51, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 March 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I would say there is only a finite number of possible biological human minds, Because the number is limited by the Beckenstein bound if we assume physical supervenience ? but an infinite number of possible minds if you are running them on the Turing machine in Platonia. (Or an infinite number of Turing machines, according to comp ;-) Does comp suggest that consciousness corresponds to an infinite number of different possible mental states (rather than a very large, but finite, number of them) ? (If so should I assume we're talkng about a countable infinity?) I think you have to specify whether comp means merely that a computer simulation of a brain can be conscious or go the whole way with Bruno's conclusion that there is no actual physical computer and all possible computations are necessarily implemented by virtue of their status as platonic objects. It is not so much in virtue of their status as platonic object (which seems to imply some metaphysical hypothesis), but in virtue of being true independently of my will, or even of the notion of universe, god, etc. But there is the further notion of implementation. The obvious objection is that computations might be true but they cannot give rise to consciousness unless implemented on a physical computer. Step 8 of the UDA says the physical computer is not necessary; which is a metaphysical position if anything is. You need just to assume, or accept as true, relations like x + 0 = x, for all x, etc. It is a very weak form of realism, and basically, this is assumed by all scientists. *After* UDA, the assumptions are no more than classical logic and , for all x and y: 0 ≠ (x + 1) ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) - x = y x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x * 0 = 0 x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x The boxes and diamond are defined in that theory, the theology and physics is derived in the extensions of that theory (the observers) simulated by that theory. There are many other equivalent theories. There are some metaphysical or theological consequences, clear with comp, but except for the yes doctor, there is no special ontological commitment done, not even on the numbers, that is no more than in Euclid proofs of the infinity of the prime numbers. The computations are implemented in virtue of the consequences of the axioms above. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 Mar 2014, at 13:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's Physics of Immortality view which basically says that identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!) You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness. Assuming comp! If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my liver, the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is conceivable that although conscious like me, the copy might be another person. This makes no sense, if you use some form of comp. This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are. Assuming comp. If the exact infinite state of the bile is required, then by definition, the other person is a different person. I agree this seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice. After all, I *can* conceive that the other might be an impostor an authentically other person. If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a similar brain you will make a similar consciousness. yes, but if the brain secrets consciousness, and if my identity is in the identity of the matter involved, the consciousness is conceivably similar, but not mine. I agree this makes not a lot of sense, but this is because we put the identity (and consciousness) in the relational information, and this uses comp. The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here. The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after a night's sleep. I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone who associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he is the same person after one night, but not after seven years (assuming the whole material body constitution has been changed). That is a difficulty for his theory, but it is logically conceivable if we abandon comp/functionalism/CTM. Comp has not that problem, but then eventually we must explain matter from information handled through number relations/computations. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its material quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 Mar 2014, at 23:26, LizR wrote: On 27 March 2014 10:30, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. With sufficiently advanced technology (e.g. uploading yourself to a digital brain), the upper limit on your brain size is theoretically unbounded, except perhaps by cosmological considerations. Prepare to join the Overmind... Hmm, I can understand that you put your physicalist hat (because it is a day with a T!), but here you put both the physicalist hat, and the comp hat. Should I infer that every day with a T, you are inconsistent? Note that being immortal by having a growing brain might not be funny, and once immortal, people will love forgetting and resetting their mind. To much souvenirs might be heavy to support. When human will be technologically immortal they might regret it and have a strong nostalgia of death and amnesia. In buddhist term, terrestrial or technological immortality might only be a manner to prevent the nirvana, and to pursue our staying in the samsara forever. Then you can develop an infinite karma making harder and harder to get the nirvana and a pacified soul. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 March 2014 18:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 13:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's Physics of Immortality view which basically says that identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!) You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness. Assuming comp! If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my liver, the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is conceivable that although conscious like me, the copy might be another person. This makes no sense, if you use some form of comp. This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are. Assuming comp. If the exact infinite state of the bile is required, then by definition, the other person is a different person. I agree this seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice. After all, I *can* conceive that the other might be an impostor an authentically other person. If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a similar brain you will make a similar consciousness. yes, but if the brain secrets consciousness, and if my identity is in the identity of the matter involved, the consciousness is conceivably similar, but not mine. I agree this makes not a lot of sense, but this is because we put the identity (and consciousness) in the relational information, and this uses comp. The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here. The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after a night's sleep. I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone who associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he is the same person after one night, but not after seven years (assuming the whole material body constitution has been changed). That is a difficulty for his theory, but it is logically conceivable if we abandon comp/functionalism/CTM. Comp has not that problem, but then eventually we must explain matter from information handled through number relations/computations. Bruno It doesn't follow that if consciousness is substrate specific it can't be duplicated; it can in fact be duplicated in a straightforward way, by making a biological brain. Even if consciousness is due to an immaterial soul one could say that it could be duplicated if God performs a miracle. The claim that the duplicated consciousness isn't really me is a claim about the nature of personal identity, and is independent of any theory of how consciousness is generated. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 March 2014 19:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its material quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size. Is electron position a continuous observable? Even if it is and there are an infinity of brains, why should that result in an infinity of minds? It would seem unlikely that brains would evolve so that an arbitrarily small change in the position of an electron would cause a change in consciousness, and we know that even gross changes in the brain, as occur in stroke or head injury, sometimes have remarkably little effect. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 11:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 27 March 2014 18:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 13:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's Physics of Immortality view which basically says that identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!) You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness. Assuming comp! If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my liver, the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is conceivable that although conscious like me, the copy might be another person. This makes no sense, if you use some form of comp. This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are. Assuming comp. If the exact infinite state of the bile is required, then by definition, the other person is a different person. I agree this seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice. After all, I *can* conceive that the other might be an impostor an authentically other person. If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a similar brain you will make a similar consciousness. yes, but if the brain secrets consciousness, and if my identity is in the identity of the matter involved, the consciousness is conceivably similar, but not mine. I agree this makes not a lot of sense, but this is because we put the identity (and consciousness) in the relational information, and this uses comp. The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here. The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after a night's sleep. I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone who associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he is the same person after one night, but not after seven years (assuming the whole material body constitution has been changed). That is a difficulty for his theory, but it is logically conceivable if we abandon comp/functionalism/CTM. Comp has not that problem, but then eventually we must explain matter from information handled through number relations/computations. Bruno It doesn't follow that if consciousness is substrate specific it can't be duplicated; OK. But the point is that it might, and that would be the case if my consciousness is attached to both the exact quantum state of my brain and substrate specific (which is a vague thing, yet incompatible with computationalism). it can in fact be duplicated in a straightforward way, by making a biological brain. But we do have evidences that biological copying is at some rather high level, and that it does not copy any piece of matter. It replaces all molecules and atoms with new atoms extracted from food. Here I am just playing the role of devil's advocate and I assume non comp to make a logical point. Even if consciousness is due to an immaterial soul one could say that it could be duplicated if God performs a miracle. Right again, but here too, it might not be the case. God could decide to NOT do a miracle, given that It is so powerful. The claim that the duplicated consciousness isn't really me is a claim about the nature of personal identity, and is independent of any theory of how consciousness is generated. Not if the theory of consciousness is based on personal identity. Your claim makes sense again for a functionalist, but not necessarily to all non-functionalists. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
Citeren Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On 27 March 2014 19:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its material quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size. Is electron position a continuous observable? Even if it is and there are an infinity of brains, why should that result in an infinity of minds? It would seem unlikely that brains would evolve so that an arbitrarily small change in the position of an electron would cause a change in consciousness, and we know that even gross changes in the brain, as occur in stroke or head injury, sometimes have remarkably little effect. -- Stathis Papaioannou Yes, there are only a finite number of quantum states that even the entire visible part of the universe can be in. The different mental states I can find myself in can be regarded as different measurement outcomes. Saibal -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 11:42, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 27 March 2014 19:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its material quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size. Is electron position a continuous observable? It is in most presentation of classical and special-relativistic QM. I would say it is also in String theory, but it would not in Loop gravity like theory. Even if it is and there are an infinity of brains, why should that result in an infinity of minds? Why not, for someone who associate consciousness and identity to its current matter and its continuous transformation. It would seem unlikely With mechanism or functionalism. But I am not sure of the meaning of unlikely when said by a non-mechanist. Some people will find unlikely that you could ever survive with a digital brain if the local priest does not bless it with some holy matter. that brains would evolve so that an arbitrarily small change in the position of an electron would cause a change in consciousness, I agree, and that is a powerful argument in favor of comp. But to invalidate a reasoning, *any* counterexample will do. and we know that even gross changes in the brain, as occur in stroke or head injury, sometimes have remarkably little effect. Yes. My point was only that when you say that there is only an enumerable set of possible brain and mind state, you are using computationalism, that is: digitalism. A non computationalist can consistently conceive a continuum of brain and mind states. It looks non reasonable because we bet on some digitalness acting already in nature. I could argue, with Diderot, that our very conception of explanation, and rationality is essentially computationalist, making comp quasi 3p obvious, and non-comp 3p magical. But from the first person point of view, like Craig illustrates, we feel the other way, comp seems 1p-non sensical, and non-comp seems quasi obvious: intuitively we don't feel like being a robot or machine. Now, for an explicit, still functionalist in your sense, non computationalist, for example for some one who believes that we are aleph_24 machines, that is machines having aleph_24 functional componants, he can conceive that the space of mind states mind be much bigger (like aleph_25 or 2^aleph_24). I think comp is equivalent with saying that the mind states (their type) are enumerable (bijection with N). They are certainly not recursively, or mechanically enumerable (like the total computable functions), although a superset can be (like the phi_i, or the UD). Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 3/27/2014 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here. The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after a night's sleep. I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone who associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he is the same person after one night, but not after seven years (assuming the whole material body constitution has been changed). That seems to be equivocation on same. In a sense I'm the same person as Brent Meeker of 1944, but I'm certainly very different. And not just because I'm made of different atoms (which are indistinguishable anyway). Brent The person I was when I was 3 years old is dead. He died because too much new information was added to his brain. -- Saibal Mitra -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 3/27/2014 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its material quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size. Why observable? Why not just variable - which it is in current formulations of QM. But with real valued variables can't there be hypercomputation? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 28 Mar 2014, at 1:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Mar 2014, at 11:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 27 March 2014 18:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 13:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's Physics of Immortality view which basically says that identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!) You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness. Assuming comp! If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my liver, the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is conceivable that although conscious like me, the copy might be another person. This makes no sense, if you use some form of comp. This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are. Assuming comp. If the exact infinite state of the bile is required, then by definition, the other person is a different person. I agree this seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice. After all, I *can* conceive that the other might be an impostor an authentically other person. If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a similar brain you will make a similar consciousness. yes, but if the brain secrets consciousness, and if my identity is in the identity of the matter involved, the consciousness is conceivably similar, but not mine. I agree this makes not a lot of sense, but this is because we put the identity (and consciousness) in the relational information, and this uses comp. The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here. The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after a night's sleep. I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone who associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he is the same person after one night, but not after seven years (assuming the whole material body constitution has been changed). That is a difficulty for his theory, but it is logically conceivable if we abandon comp/functionalism/CTM. Comp has not that problem, but then eventually we must explain matter from information handled through number relations/computations. Bruno It doesn't follow that if consciousness is substrate specific it can't be duplicated; OK. But the point is that it might, and that would be the case if my consciousness is attached to both the exact quantum state of my brain and substrate specific (which is a vague thing, yet incompatible with computationalism). it can in fact be duplicated in a straightforward way, by making a biological brain. But we do have evidences that biological copying is at some rather high level, and that it does not copy any piece of matter. It replaces all molecules and atoms with new atoms extracted from food. Here I am just playing the role of devil's advocate and I assume non comp to make a logical point. Even if consciousness is due to an immaterial soul one could say that it could be duplicated if God performs a miracle. Right again, but here too, it might not be the case. God could decide to NOT do a miracle, given that It is so powerful. The claim that the duplicated consciousness isn't really me is a claim about the nature of personal identity, and is independent of any theory of how consciousness is generated. Not if the theory of consciousness is based on personal identity. Your claim makes sense again for a functionalist, but not necessarily to all non-functionalists. A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit or implicit position on personal identity in functionalism. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 March 2014 21:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 23:26, LizR wrote: On 27 March 2014 10:30, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. With sufficiently advanced technology (e.g. uploading yourself to a digital brain), the upper limit on your brain size is theoretically unbounded, except perhaps by cosmological considerations. Prepare to join the Overmind... Hmm, I can understand that you put your physicalist hat (because it is a day with a T!), but here you put both the physicalist hat, and the comp hat. Should I infer that every day with a T, you are inconsistent? Well this assumes physical supervenience I think, but so did Stathis, I think, so I was responding in kind. One could posit not uploading as such but adding more and more digital implants and so on that eventually one can throw out the organic core when it dies, and continue to exist in the implants. Whether this is you or not being another question. But anyway, yes, I'm sure you can assume I'm inconsistent some of the time! Note that being immortal by having a growing brain might not be funny, and once immortal, people will love forgetting and resetting their mind. To much souvenirs might be heavy to support. When human will be technologically immortal they might regret it and have a strong nostalgia of death and amnesia. The eternal sunshineindeed. If brain size is finite then resetting, or erasing memories at least, becomes necessary eventually if one is to have (and remember) new experiences. To quote some schoolboy, please sir, can I stop now, my brain is full! In buddhist term, terrestrial or technological immortality might only be a manner to prevent the nirvana, and to pursue our staying in the samsara forever. Then you can develop an infinite karma making harder and harder to get the nirvana and a pacified soul. Well that's true, in Buddhist terms... is there any correspondence between Buddhism and comp? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 March 2014 23:42, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 March 2014 19:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its material quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size. Is electron position a continuous observable? Even if it is and there are an infinity of brains, why should that result in an infinity of minds? It would seem unlikely that brains would evolve so that an arbitrarily small change in the position of an electron would cause a change in consciousness, and we know that even gross changes in the brain, as occur in stroke or head injury, sometimes have remarkably little effect. I think Bruno must have a materialist hat on here?! In comp the substitution level isn't necessarily at the level of individual electrons, surely... But that raises another question, for me at least - in comp are there only finitely many possible states of mind? So one would literally be able to travel full circle through all possible minds - eventually? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 28 March 2014 09:37, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 March 2014 23:42, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 March 2014 19:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its material quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size. Is electron position a continuous observable? Even if it is and there are an infinity of brains, why should that result in an infinity of minds? It would seem unlikely that brains would evolve so that an arbitrarily small change in the position of an electron would cause a change in consciousness, and we know that even gross changes in the brain, as occur in stroke or head injury, sometimes have remarkably little effect. I think Bruno must have a materialist hat on here?! In comp the substitution level isn't necessarily at the level of individual electrons, surely... But that raises another question, for me at least - in comp are there only finitely many possible states of mind? So one would literally be able to travel full circle through all possible minds - eventually? I would say there is only a finite number of possible biological human minds, but an infinite number of possible minds if you are running them on the Turing machine in Platonia. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 28 March 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I would say there is only a finite number of possible biological human minds, Because the number is limited by the Beckenstein bound if we assume physical supervenience ? but an infinite number of possible minds if you are running them on the Turing machine in Platonia. (Or an infinite number of Turing machines, according to comp ;-) Does comp suggest that consciousness corresponds to an infinite number of different possible mental states (rather than a very large, but finite, number of them) ? (If so should I assume we're talkng about a countable infinity?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 28 March 2014 09:51, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 March 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I would say there is only a finite number of possible biological human minds, Because the number is limited by the Beckenstein bound if we assume physical supervenience ? but an infinite number of possible minds if you are running them on the Turing machine in Platonia. (Or an infinite number of Turing machines, according to comp ;-) Does comp suggest that consciousness corresponds to an infinite number of different possible mental states (rather than a very large, but finite, number of them) ? (If so should I assume we're talkng about a countable infinity?) I think you have to specify whether comp means merely that a computer simulation of a brain can be conscious or go the whole way with Bruno's conclusion that there is no actual physical computer and all possible computations are necessarily implemented by virtue of their status as platonic objects. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 28 March 2014 12:00, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 March 2014 09:51, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 March 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I would say there is only a finite number of possible biological human minds, Because the number is limited by the Beckenstein bound if we assume physical supervenience ? but an infinite number of possible minds if you are running them on the Turing machine in Platonia. (Or an infinite number of Turing machines, according to comp ;-) Does comp suggest that consciousness corresponds to an infinite number of different possible mental states (rather than a very large, but finite, number of them) ? (If so should I assume we're talkng about a countable infinity?) I think you have to specify whether comp means merely that a computer simulation of a brain can be conscious or go the whole way with Bruno's conclusion that there is no actual physical computer and all possible computations are necessarily implemented by virtue of their status as platonic objects. So what's the answer in either case? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 28 March 2014 10:16, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 March 2014 12:00, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 March 2014 09:51, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 March 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I would say there is only a finite number of possible biological human minds, Because the number is limited by the Beckenstein bound if we assume physical supervenience ? but an infinite number of possible minds if you are running them on the Turing machine in Platonia. (Or an infinite number of Turing machines, according to comp ;-) Does comp suggest that consciousness corresponds to an infinite number of different possible mental states (rather than a very large, but finite, number of them) ? (If so should I assume we're talkng about a countable infinity?) I think you have to specify whether comp means merely that a computer simulation of a brain can be conscious or go the whole way with Bruno's conclusion that there is no actual physical computer and all possible computations are necessarily implemented by virtue of their status as platonic objects. So what's the answer in either case? Even in the first case it could be infinite if the physical universe is infinite and we allow for post-human brains that can increase without bound. The comment about comp was a general comment. On my understanding it just means that a mind can be simulated on a computer. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 Mar 2014, at 2:23 pm, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 14:57, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The conclusion would still follow in a classical infinite universe. I don't see that, because you can subdivide classical states indefinitely (hence the space-time continuum) while with QM you only have a certain number of allowed states for some things at least (electrons and suchlike), and it's hypothesised this might also apply to space-time (I think it has to for this argument to work.) The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 3/25/2014 9:52 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 1:46 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:50 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will continue if everything that can happen does happen. That's a to casual reading of can happen there are many things in quantum mechanics that can't happen. Just because we can imagine something happening, it doesn't follow that it is nomologically possible. What sorts of things that might conceivably save your life do you think are not nomologically possible? Anything violating the laws of physics and the boundary conditions. But that must not be what you intended to ask. You probably meant to ask, given your death is there not some nomologically possible event that would have prevented it? I don't know - to answer it you would have to be able to trace the history of the multiverse. It might be that death is entailed by the 2nd law of thermodynamics plus the holographic principle. And why pick on death. Is it nomologically possible that I grow wings and turn into a butterfly?...or learn modal logic and turn into Bruno Marchal? Brent Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 3/25/2014 9:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 1:56 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 14:50, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will continue if everything that can happen does happen. Surely in an infinite universe, and assuming the identity of quantum states, you don't need similarity - you will get a quantum state that is a follow-on from your previous one, but in which you continue to be alive... Of course this depends on what it means for quantum states to follow on from other ones. But our brains already seem to know what that means, in that we feel we're the same person we were this morning, and so we feel continuity of similar enough quantum states. Unless QM is wrong about the nature of quantum states, we will feel continuity if the follow on state is actually 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 light years away (or 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 years away) from the preceeding state. I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The conclusion would still follow in a classical infinite universe. Probably not since classical physics is based on real numbers (and so is quantum mechanics for that matter). Of course you could still fall back on similar enough. But in that case you will, as you are dying, pass into a state of consciousness (i.e. none) that is similar enough to a fetus (of some animal) or maybe a cabbage. You don't need an *exact* copy, just a good enough copy. If an exact copy were needed, either at the quantum level or to an infinite number of decimal places, then we could not survive from one moment to the next, since in a very small period there are quite gross physical changes in our bodies. My point exactly - We DON'T survive moment to moment except in rough approximation and so as we deteriorate in old age we may come to approximate topsoil. The question is, why should conscious continuity preserve us while physical continuity doesn't count? Is it just our ego that says consciouness should be preserved - no matter how much it changes? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 3/25/2014 11:06 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 2:23 pm, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 14:57, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote: I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The conclusion would still follow in a classical infinite universe. I don't see that, because you can subdivide classical states indefinitely (hence the space-time continuum) while with QM you only have a certain number of allowed states for some things at least (electrons and suchlike), and it's hypothesised this might also apply to space-time (I think it has to for this argument to work.) The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. And so only a finite number of different possible worlds - assuming comp. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 16:55, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: But that's assuming you *don't* live forever, so you aren't answering the other poster's comment. Sure it does and I'm not assuming that. It makes no difference whether I live forever or not. That's quite an unusual attitude. Most people consider that it matters to them. Personally, lets say whilst my widow, mistresses and admirers are all deep in mourning here, my history continues somewhere else beyond the reach of light. What tangible effect can be measured by the scientists at my wake? What effect does this continuation have here? All you end up with are two identifiably distinct worlds that are unable to causally influence one another. From an operational stand point they simply do not exist relative to one another. The point was that (for most people at least) it matters to the person who either does or doesn't experience immortality. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 17:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 9:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: You don't need an *exact* copy, just a good enough copy. If an exact copy were needed, either at the quantum level or to an infinite number of decimal places, then we could not survive from one moment to the next, since in a very small period there are quite gross physical changes in our bodies. My point exactly - We DON'T survive moment to moment except in rough approximation and so as we deteriorate in old age we may come to approximate topsoil. The question is, why should conscious continuity preserve us while physical continuity doesn't count? Is it just our ego that says consciouness should be preserved - no matter how much it changes? Physical continuity is important only insofar as it leads to psychological continuity. Psychological continuity is important because we are programmed to think it is; it has no intrinsic importance. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 22:38, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 17:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 9:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: You don't need an *exact* copy, just a good enough copy. If an exact copy were needed, either at the quantum level or to an infinite number of decimal places, then we could not survive from one moment to the next, since in a very small period there are quite gross physical changes in our bodies. My point exactly - We DON'T survive moment to moment except in rough approximation and so as we deteriorate in old age we may come to approximate topsoil. The question is, why should conscious continuity preserve us while physical continuity doesn't count? Is it just our ego that says consciouness should be preserved - no matter how much it changes? Physical continuity is important only insofar as it leads to psychological continuity. Psychological continuity is important because we are programmed to think it is; it has no intrinsic importance. What would you say does have intrinsic importance? I thought importance was *always* only psychological ! (Or have scientists developed an importance-detecting device that I should know about? :) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
2014-03-26 2:45 GMT+01:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Type 1 multiverse normally garantee not only similarity but exact match somewhere Quentin Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
2014-03-26 7:13 GMT+01:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: On 3/25/2014 9:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 1:56 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 14:50, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will continue if everything that can happen does happen. Surely in an infinite universe, and assuming the identity of quantum states, you don't need similarity - you will get a quantum state that is a follow-on from your previous one, but in which you continue to be alive... Of course this depends on what it means for quantum states to follow on from other ones. But our brains already seem to know what that means, in that we feel we're the same person we were this morning, and so we feel continuity of similar enough quantum states. Unless QM is wrong about the nature of quantum states, we will feel continuity if the follow on state is actually 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 light years away (or 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 years away) from the preceeding state. I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The conclusion would still follow in a classical infinite universe. Probably not since classical physics is based on real numbers (and so is quantum mechanics for that matter). Of course you could still fall back on similar enough. But in that case you will, as you are dying, pass into a state of consciousness (i.e. none) that is similar enough to a fetus (of some animal) or maybe a cabbage. You don't need an *exact* copy, just a good enough copy. If an exact copy were needed, either at the quantum level or to an infinite number of decimal places, then we could not survive from one moment to the next, since in a very small period there are quite gross physical changes in our bodies. My point exactly - We DON'T survive moment to moment Maybe you don't, but I surely do... saying consciousness or your identity is an illusion is just playing with words. Quentin except in rough approximation and so as we deteriorate in old age we may come to approximate topsoil. The question is, why should conscious continuity preserve us while physical continuity doesn't count? Is it just our ego that says consciouness should be preserved - no matter how much it changes? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 25 Mar 2014, at 21:31, LizR wrote: On 26 March 2014 06:52, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 25 Mar 2014, at 04:24, LizR wrote: But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he says that it is that structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing. I can see the appeal. If the universe ever does prove to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is exactly described by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature of knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never actually reach it with 100% certainty. But this means somehow you might not yet have fully grasped the UDA, if you don't mind my frankness. No of course I don't mind. I was wearing a physicalist hat what I wrote that.because I was replying to Brent who seems to assume physicalism, so I wasn't using a comp perspective. So I started from what I think is called an ultrafinitist view (?) and said that IF the universe proves isomorphic, etc, I would find myself forced to adjust that view. (But I am quite happy to admit I haven't perhaps grasped the UDA fully, too!) OK, just step 8, which shows that the ultrafinitist move will force an ad hoc magic violating a weak version of Occam (making science non sensical) or comp (using some non turing emulable in the primitive matter). OK. Indeed the UDA proves, up to a point, that if we take the idea that consciousness is invariant for the comp digital substitution (even relatively to a physical world) then the physical has eventually to be redefined (if we still want to relate physics with correct first person prediction) as a probability calculus on self-consistent and computably accessible states. So the physical reality is something quite distinct from the mathematical, or the arithmetical reality. It is an inside phenomenon, which generalizes Everett's embedding of the subject in the object from the wave to arithmetic. Normally we should find back the wave, so we can test the hypothesis. No doubt that Tegmark is the physicist the closer to the comp's consequence or to the Löbian universal number theology, but he is still a bit naive in both philosophy of mind and in computer science, and mathematics. Like many he assumes comp implicitly or explicitly all the times, but ignores the consequences like the FPI, or the incompleteness and its intensional variants. With comp the physical realities emerges from a statistical coherence of a variety of first person plural arithmetical dreams. There isn a relation physical reality, but the notion of universe is getting a bit obscure. Spivack was naive, but still correct about the consciousness flux which is more fundamental that the physical, as consciousness is not physical indeed, it is not really mathematical either, it is more theological or computer science theoretical, or arithmetical in the eye of God. Spivack probably just confuses mechanism and materialism, like many. Concerning now the existence of a primitive physical universe, that is really a speculation, despite taking for granted, by many again. Nobody knows, and science has just not yet decided between Plato and Aristotle for the fundamental question (most being still taboo). Yes. On days with a T in them I allow myself to be more physicalist, but today is Wednesday and I am veering towards Plato again. All right. I will note this in my diary. Never send a post to Liz when in a day with T. :) Bruno Bruno On 25 March 2014 15:07, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Original Message Scott Aaronson reviews Max Tegmark's Our Mathematical Universe: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753 The comments section includes Max Tegmark's remarks on Scott Aaronson's remarks, ending for now with: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753#comment-102790 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 Mar 2014, at 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 25 March 2014 16:58, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: I think you're missing Scott's point. The universe is obviously isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges Library of Babel. Almost all of them are just lists of what happens. Scott's point is that this is not very interesting, important, or impressive. It's only some small elegant compression of those lists that's interesting - if it exists. Scott seems to think that it does. I think it does *only* because we're willing to call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness... Hmm, I just read Scott as saying that MUH is scientifically empty in the sense that it makes no significant predictions, the emphasis being on the word significant. The predictions it does make are a little wishy washy. Like, MUH predicts that science will continue to uncover mathematically describable regularities in nature. what would a non-mathematically describable law look like? And how is a mathematically describable regularity in this universe evidence of the existence of another mathematical universe? He also takes Tegmark to task on his use of anthropic reasoning because it allows Tegmark to have his cake and to eat it. The extent to which regularities are elegantly described by maths will be taken as evidence for an inherently mathematical ontology. The extent to which they are not will allow him to invoke the anthropic principle and say well it would be absurdly lucky that the one universe that existed just happened to have these wierd constants that supported life. I think in Popperian terminology Tegmark's predictions just are not risky enough. He's guaranteed to hit one or the other every time. I'll be interested in how Tegmark addresses Scott's last point concerning the physicality of universes beyond the cosmic horizon. I can see both points of view. I can appreciate Tegmark's view that a galaxy 1 light year beyond the cosmic horizon is just like Andromeda but just a bit further away. On the other hand I also see Scott's point that if it is just far enough away to prevent any causal interaction then it doesn't satisfy a reasonable definition of physical. To be physical is to be causally relevant. There doesn't seem to be much semantic difference between a non physical universe and one which is so far away that it couldn't ever effect us. An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. Yes. Eventually physical distance, and time emerge from the consciousness flux (in arithmetic, which defined all possible computations, with the important redundancies). Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's Physics of Immortality view which basically says that identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!) You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness. Assuming comp! If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my liver, the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is conceivable that although conscious like me, the copy might be another person. This makes no sense, if you use some form of comp. This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are. Assuming comp. If the exact infinite state of the bile is required, then by definition, the other person is a different person. I agree this seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice. After all, I *can* conceive that the other might be an impostor an authentically other person. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj...@gmail.comjavascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','lizj...@gmail.com'); wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comjavascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','stath...@gmail.com'); wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's Physics of Immortality view which basically says that identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!) You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness. Assuming comp! If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my liver, the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is conceivable that although conscious like me, the copy might be another person. This makes no sense, if you use some form of comp. This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are. Assuming comp. If the exact infinite state of the bile is required, then by definition, the other person is a different person. I agree this seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice. After all, I *can* conceive that the other might be an impostor an authentically other person. If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a similar brain you will make a similar consciousness. The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here. The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after a night's sleep. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 Mar 2014, at 02:23, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 07:34:56PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: Unless, indeed, or just in part, but he acknowledged my work in some draft he sent me, then they disappeared in the public version, making him either a coward, or an opportunist or both. (Or under influence, as it is easy to defame to me to a physicist by saying I am wrong on Gödel, and to a logician that I am mad in physics (like pretending that I believe in parallel world, that's enough). Which aspect of your work did he acknowledge in the draft? Was it the FPI result? That was unclear. If it was, he possibly changed it to cite Everett, who conceivably was the first to come up with that mechanism for deriving subjective indeteminism from a deterministic theory. OK. But although we can argue some implicit use of comp by Everett, he uses only quantum superposition, and failed to realize that classical mechanics entails it already. This explains also why he missed that we might need to consider the indeterminacy on all computations (quantum or not), and eventually that the FPI bears on arithmetic. Everett was a bit loose on this aspect. As far as I remember the allusion to mechanism is slightly more explicit in Wheeler assessment of Everett. That was the implication in the video clip we watched recently. I wouldn't argue it either way, historically. That still leaves your FPI contribution as original in the computationalist setting, as Everett is not explicitly computationalist. Of course, I would say he is, at least implicitly, but the key point is that he remains physicalist and assumes the FPI is defined only on the universal wave, that he assumes, not seeing that once you make the comp move, the measure problem (roughly solved by Gleason theorem in the quantum context), is no more solved and has to be handled again, in a way capable of justifying the quantum wave. But for Max's purposes, he assumes the Hilbert space is fundamental, so only needs Everett. And some non-comp fuzzy axiom, because with comp, even if the quantum wave was really existing, it would not explain why we can avoid the many-computations context. The Hilbert structure *cannot* be assumed, once we use comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 Mar 2014, at 02:48, Joseph Knight wrote: On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 8:23:10 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 07:34:56PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: Unless, indeed, or just in part, but he acknowledged my work in some draft he sent me, then they disappeared in the public version, making him either a coward, or an opportunist or both. (Or under influence, as it is easy to defame to me to a physicist by saying I am wrong on Gödel, and to a logician that I am mad in physics (like pretending that I believe in parallel world, that's enough). Which aspect of your work did he acknowledge in the draft? Was it the FPI result? If it was, he possibly changed it to cite Everett, who conceivably was the first to come up with that mechanism for deriving subjective indeteminism from a deterministic theory. That was the implication in the video clip we watched recently. I wouldn't argue it either way, historically. That still leaves your FPI contribution as original in the computationalist setting, as Everett is not explicitly computationalist. Everett is explicitly computationalist. That is not so clear. I don't remember having found some explicit axioms, but he does assumes classical memories. As I said to Russell, we can find a more explicit allusion to comp in Wheeler assessment. I might look at this again, as I might have miss a paragraph, but that is not so important. He identifies the observer with an automaton whose memory can be identified with some finite amount of information. He just didn't carry the logic nearly as far as Bruno. (He was martyred anyway.) OK. Bruno But for Max's purposes, he assumes the Hilbert space is fundamental, so only needs Everett. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 Mar 2014, at 04:22, chris peck wrote: It's a pretty significant dodgy metaphysical consequence if you actually live forever. Its many things. Interesting, strange, wonderful and so on but the one thing it isn't is significant. The continuation of an experiential history on some other earth, a history common to the one that just ended here on this earth, is not an effect on this earth. Its as insignificant to this earth as things can be. To this earth, perhaps, but it is significant on where you can be next. The regions do not interact, but they still 1p statistically interfere. Eventually what you call this earth is a Moiré effect on infinitely many computations under our substitution level, normally. Bruno Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2014 19:56:21 -0700 From: meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark On 3/25/2014 6:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 14:50, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will continue if everything that can happen does happen. Surely in an infinite universe, and assuming the identity of quantum states, you don't need similarity - you will get a quantum state that is a follow-on from your previous one, but in which you continue to be alive... Of course this depends on what it means for quantum states to follow on from other ones. But our brains already seem to know what that means, in that we feel we're the same person we were this morning, and so we feel continuity of similar enough quantum states. Unless QM is wrong about the nature of quantum states, we will feel continuity if the follow on state is actually 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 light years away (or 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 years away) from the preceeding state. I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The conclusion would still follow in a classical infinite universe. Probably not since classical physics is based on real numbers (and so is quantum mechanics for that matter). Of course you could still fall back on similar enough. But in that case you will, as you are dying, pass into a state of consciousness (i.e. none) that is similar enough to a fetus (of some animal) or maybe a cabbage. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 3/26/2014 2:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 17:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 9:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: You don't need an *exact* copy, just a good enough copy. If an exact copy were needed, either at the quantum level or to an infinite number of decimal places, then we could not survive from one moment to the next, since in a very small period there are quite gross physical changes in our bodies. My point exactly - We DON'T survive moment to moment except in rough approximation and so as we deteriorate in old age we may come to approximate topsoil. The question is, why should conscious continuity preserve us while physical continuity doesn't count? Is it just our ego that says consciouness should be preserved - no matter how much it changes? Physical continuity is important only insofar as it leads to psychological continuity. Psychological continuity is important because we are programmed to think it is; it has no intrinsic importance. I'd say physical continuity is fairly important to most people - and it's easier to understand natural selection for it than for psychological continuity. Brent I don't want to achieve immortality through my work. I want to achieve immortality by not dying. --- Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 3/26/2014 2:54 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-03-26 2:45 GMT+01:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Type 1 multiverse normally garantee not only similarity but exact match somewhere I think it only guarantees an exact match (and hence only one history) up to the last quantum event that got amplified to the classical level before you died. I don't have a very good feel for the time scale, but it seems that could be a few minutes. And in anycase, dying is not sharp, well defined event. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 3/26/2014 2:57 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-03-26 7:13 GMT+01:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net: On 3/25/2014 9:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 1:56 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 14:50, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will continue if everything that can happen does happen. Surely in an infinite universe, and assuming the identity of quantum states, you don't need similarity - you will get a quantum state that is a follow-on from your previous one, but in which you continue to be alive... Of course this depends on what it means for quantum states to follow on from other ones. But our brains already seem to know what that means, in that we feel we're the same person we were this morning, and so we feel continuity of similar enough quantum states. Unless QM is wrong about the nature of quantum states, we will feel continuity if the follow on state is actually 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 light years away (or 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 years away) from the preceeding state. I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The conclusion would still follow in a classical infinite universe. Probably not since classical physics is based on real numbers (and so is quantum mechanics for that matter). Of course you could still fall back on similar enough. But in that case you will, as you are dying, pass into a state of consciousness (i.e. none) that is similar enough to a fetus (of some animal) or maybe a cabbage. You don't need an *exact* copy, just a good enough copy. If an exact copy were needed, either at the quantum level or to an infinite number of decimal places, then we could not survive from one moment to the next, since in a very small period there are quite gross physical changes in our bodies. My point exactly - We DON'T survive moment to moment Maybe you don't, but I surely do... saying consciousness or your identity is an illusion is just playing with words. Yes, I agree. Survive isn't well defined at the quantum level. The same kind of reasoning that leads people to say we're immortal, also implies we're always dying. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 08:30:41AM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. infinitely big in either space or time ... - yes, well why not? We consider Turing machines that can run for ever with a potentially infinite tape. - Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 March 2014 09:28, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Yes, I agree. Survive isn't well defined at the quantum level. The same kind of reasoning that leads people to say we're immortal, also implies we're always dying. As far as I can tell, quantum immortality requires that we are indeed always dying (nicely put, by the way) in order for us to *be*first-person immortal. And this is also implied by comp and cosmological immortality. Ironically, the one thing that would disprove this sort of immortality, it seems to me, is the existence of a soul, which would tie our identity to one location. ISTM the price you pay for quantum or other forms of immortality is dying every second. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 March 2014 10:30, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. With sufficiently advanced technology (e.g. uploading yourself to a digital brain), the upper limit on your brain size is theoretically unbounded, except perhaps by cosmological considerations. Prepare to join the Overmind... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 March 2014 11:30, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: infinitely big in either space or time ... - yes, well why not? We consider Turing machines that can run for ever with a potentially infinite tape. I think infinite in time but not space implies a Nietzschean eternal recurrence? Which makes said brain effectively finite (well, merely limited to all possible brains, so only finite after it's lived every possible life available to any being, anywhere - or experienced all the pigeonholes up to whatever the Beckenstein brain bound is, probably quite a lot). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 11:31:25AM +1300, LizR wrote: On 27 March 2014 11:30, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: infinitely big in either space or time ... - yes, well why not? We consider Turing machines that can run for ever with a potentially infinite tape. I think infinite in time but not space implies a Nietzschean eternal recurrence? Which makes said brain effectively finite (well, merely limited to all possible brains, so only finite after it's lived every possible life available to any being, anywhere - or experienced all the pigeonholes up to whatever the Beckenstein brain bound is, probably quite a lot). Discuss what this means for Tipler's Omega point (finite amount of space, but an infinite amount of computation). Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 March 2014 11:53, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 11:31:25AM +1300, LizR wrote: On 27 March 2014 11:30, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: infinitely big in either space or time ... - yes, well why not? We consider Turing machines that can run for ever with a potentially infinite tape. I think infinite in time but not space implies a Nietzschean eternal recurrence? Which makes said brain effectively finite (well, merely limited to all possible brains, so only finite after it's lived every possible life available to any being, anywhere - or experienced all the pigeonholes up to whatever the Beckenstein brain bound is, probably quite a lot). Discuss what this means for Tipler's Omega point (finite amount of space, but an infinite amount of computation). It means space-time is infinitely divisible and this can be used to create hypercomputers as a naked singularity is approached, I guess. Or maybe it means that Tipler didn't see any upper limit on the energy levels of some physical system (gravity waves?) that could be used by a sufficiently advanced civilisation (I would think the Planck temperature would put a bound on that in practice???) Sorry it's a long time since I read that book and I'm vague as to the physical mechanism he was proposing. I was only considering brains in flat space-time with a finite number of possible quantum states available (the latter in particular is a standard assumption for a theory of immortality I think, as we discussed earlier). So these would be brains limited by the Beckenstein bound on their volume of space-time. Actually the BB applies to black holes as well so I would guess that might cause a problem for the Big Crunch, I'm not sure, would it apply to a naked singularity? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
I agree that the MUH's predictions are a bit vague, there's the continuing to find maths useful prediction and something about finding ourselves in the most generic universe compatible with our existence, which is not exactly easy to measure. But I guess this is going to be the case for something that's trying to work out why there's something rather than nothing, why maths is unreasonably effective, etc. It's basically philosophy rather than science, and will continue to be until a lot more people have thought about it and maybe someone has come up with some testable results, or someone else has worked out that it's contradictory, flawed or forever untestable. (But, you know, kudos to him for trying - well, unless he stole his ideas from the Everything list :) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 25 Mar 2014, at 04:24, LizR wrote: But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he says that it is that structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing. I can see the appeal. If the universe ever does prove to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is exactly described by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature of knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never actually reach it with 100% certainty. But this means somehow you might not yet have fully grasped the UDA, if you don't mind my frankness. Indeed the UDA proves, up to a point, that if we take the idea that consciousness is invariant for the comp digital substitution (even relatively to a physical world) then the physical has eventually to be redefined (if we still want to relate physics with correct first person prediction) as a probability calculus on self-consistent and computably accessible states. So the physical reality is something quite distinct from the mathematical, or the arithmetical reality. It is an inside phenomenon, which generalizes Everett's embedding of the subject in the object from the wave to arithmetic. Normally we should find back the wave, so we can test the hypothesis. No doubt that Tegmark is the physicist the closer to the comp's consequence or to the Löbian universal number theology, but he is still a bit naive in both philosophy of mind and in computer science, and mathematics. Like many he assumes comp implicitly or explicitly all the times, but ignores the consequences like the FPI, or the incompleteness and its intensional variants. With comp the physical realities emerges from a statistical coherence of a variety of first person plural arithmetical dreams. There isn a relation physical reality, but the notion of universe is getting a bit obscure. Spivack was naive, but still correct about the consciousness flux which is more fundamental that the physical, as consciousness is not physical indeed, it is not really mathematical either, it is more theological or computer science theoretical, or arithmetical in the eye of God. Spivack probably just confuses mechanism and materialism, like many. Concerning now the existence of a primitive physical universe, that is really a speculation, despite taking for granted, by many again. Nobody knows, and science has just not yet decided between Plato and Aristotle for the fundamental question (most being still taboo). Bruno On 25 March 2014 15:07, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Original Message Scott Aaronson reviews Max Tegmark's Our Mathematical Universe: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753 The comments section includes Max Tegmark's remarks on Scott Aaronson's remarks, ending for now with: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753#comment-102790 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 25 Mar 2014, at 04:57, LizR wrote: On 25 March 2014 16:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/24/2014 8:24 PM, LizR wrote: But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he says that it is that structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing. I can see the appeal. If the universe ever does prove to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is exactly described by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. I think you're missing Scott's point. The universe is obviously isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges Library of Babel. Almost all of them are just lists of what happens. Scott's point is that this is not very interesting, important, or impressive. It's only some small elegant compression of those lists that's interesting - if it exists. Scott seems to think that it does. I think it does *only* because we're willing to call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness... Yes, if that's his point I am missing it, because although that may be true it isn't addressing what the MUH claims (at least making the rather large assumption that I've understood it correctly). The MUH as I (perhaps mis-) understand it appears to assume there is some minimal mathematical representation of the universe (known as the laws of physics or TOE or whatver), and that this exists in a manner that allows us to differentiate it from geography - as it seems to, at least for the physical constants that don't appear to vary with time or space, etc. So one has at least got what may be called local laws of physics and local geography as a starting point. If the laws of physics are (somehow - via fire breathing or whatever) able to generate all possible resulting universes, then we have an explanation for all the geography (modulo our particular position in the string landscape etc), but presumably (as per Russell's Theory of Nothing) it all cancels out, assuming that all possibilities are realised. However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature of knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never actually reach it with 100% certainty. We can't reach it because reaching it via infinite lists of what happens isn't worth the trip. Sure, but the MUH assumes there is a unique set of laws of physics, and the infinite lists all cancel out. (I think one should attempt to criticise a theory in terms of what it actually says rather than some other characterisation, surely?) Comp says that the physical is a sort of sum on the whole list. We don't have to do the trip, we already have. As for going near public certainty, with comp, that makes you going near the asylum. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 25 Mar 2014, at 06:58, chris peck wrote: I think you're missing Scott's point. The universe is obviously isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges Library of Babel. Almost all of them are just lists of what happens. Scott's point is that this is not very interesting, important, or impressive. It's only some small elegant compression of those lists that's interesting - if it exists. Scott seems to think that it does. I think it does *only* because we're willing to call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness... Hmm, I just read Scott as saying that MUH is scientifically empty in the sense that it makes no significant predictions, the emphasis being on the word significant. The predictions it does make are a little wishy washy. Like, MUH predicts that science will continue to uncover mathematically describable regularities in nature. what would a non-mathematically describable law look like? And how is a mathematically describable regularity in this universe evidence of the existence of another mathematical universe? He also takes Tegmark to task on his use of anthropic reasoning because it allows Tegmark to have his cake and to eat it. The extent to which regularities are elegantly described by maths will be taken as evidence for an inherently mathematical ontology. The extent to which they are not will allow him to invoke the anthropic principle and say well it would be absurdly lucky that the one universe that existed just happened to have these wierd constants that supported life. I think in Popperian terminology Tegmark's predictions just are not risky enough. I agree. here comp is infinitely more risky, as it predicts exactly what is physics. Only if this gives classical propositional logic, the MW would become a trivial idea explaining nothing in the local geography. But that risk has been taken, and we know now, that there is a non trivial physical (notably) reality. We know more: that its bottom core is quantized and symmetrical. It is matter of time to see if some quantum computer inhabits there or not. Bruno He's guaranteed to hit one or the other every time. I'll be interested in how Tegmark addresses Scott's last point concerning the physicality of universes beyond the cosmic horizon. I can see both points of view. I can appreciate Tegmark's view that a galaxy 1 light year beyond the cosmic horizon is just like Andromeda but just a bit further away. On the other hand I also see Scott's point that if it is just far enough away to prevent any causal interaction then it doesn't satisfy a reasonable definition of physical. To be physical is to be causally relevant. There doesn't seem to be much semantic difference between a non physical universe and one which is so far away that it couldn't ever effect us. Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2014 16:57:05 +1300 Subject: Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 25 March 2014 16:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/24/2014 8:24 PM, LizR wrote: But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he says that it is that structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing. I can see the appeal. If the universe ever does prove to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is exactly described by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. I think you're missing Scott's point. The universe is obviously isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges Library of Babel. Almost all of them are just lists of what happens. Scott's point is that this is not very interesting, important, or impressive. It's only some small elegant compression of those lists that's interesting - if it exists. Scott seems to think that it does. I think it does *only* because we're willing to call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness... Yes, if that's his point I am missing it, because although that may be true it isn't addressing what the MUH claims (at least making the rather large assumption that I've understood it correctly). The MUH as I (perhaps mis-) understand it appears to assume there is some minimal mathematical representation of the universe (known as the laws of physics
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 25 Mar 2014, at 08:46, LizR wrote: I agree that the MUH's predictions are a bit vague, there's the continuing to find maths useful prediction and something about finding ourselves in the most generic universe compatible with our existence, which is not exactly easy to measure. But I guess this is going to be the case for something that's trying to work out why there's something rather than nothing, why maths is unreasonably effective, etc. It's basically philosophy rather than science, and will continue to be until a lot more people have thought about it and maybe someone has come up with some testable results, or someone else has worked out that it's contradictory, flawed or forever untestable. (But, you know, kudos to him for trying - well, unless he stole his ideas from the Everything list :) Unless, indeed, or just in part, but he acknowledged my work in some draft he sent me, then they disappeared in the public version, making him either a coward, or an opportunist or both. (Or under influence, as it is easy to defame to me to a physicist by saying I am wrong on Gödel, and to a logician that I am mad in physics (like pretending that I believe in parallel world, that's enough). I thought you knew that a 100% refutable theory exist. It shows that the mathematical hypothesis is still somehow like Craig's assumption of sense. That assumes too much. There is no mathematical definition of mathematical. With comp, the theological is already arithmetical, so you can bet that the mathematical is also part of the consistent extensions, but all attempt to reify a part of it leads to inconsistencies. Scott critics is the same as Deutsch critics, they find the everything idea trivial, but they see it as the complete explanation. Precise theories, like comp (when made precise!), and already Everett, makes clear that the everything is not the explanation, but the problem. Then with comp, it is a problem in arithmetic, or (intensional) number theory. The arithmetical hypostases refutes Scott critics on the everything provides by arithmetic when we bet on comp. The problem is that very few scientist and philosopher know logic. I mean logic, the branch of math. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 06:52, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 25 Mar 2014, at 04:24, LizR wrote: But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he says that it *is* that structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing. I can see the appeal. If the universe ever *does* prove to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is *exactly described* by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature of knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never actually reach it with 100% certainty. But this means somehow you might not yet have fully grasped the UDA, if you don't mind my frankness. No of course I don't mind. I was wearing a physicalist hat what I wrote that.because I was replying to Brent who seems to assume physicalism, so I wasn't using a comp perspective. So I started from what I think is called an ultrafinitist view (?) and said that IF the universe proves isomorphic, etc, I would find myself forced to adjust that view. (But I am quite happy to admit I haven't perhaps grasped the UDA fully, too!) Indeed the UDA proves, up to a point, that if we take the idea that consciousness is invariant for the comp digital substitution (even relatively to a physical world) then the physical has eventually to be redefined (if we still want to relate physics with correct first person prediction) as a probability calculus on self-consistent and computably accessible states. So the physical reality is something quite distinct from the mathematical, or the arithmetical reality. It is an inside phenomenon, which generalizes Everett's embedding of the subject in the object from the wave to arithmetic. Normally we should find back the wave, so we can test the hypothesis. No doubt that Tegmark is the physicist the closer to the comp's consequence or to the Löbian universal number theology, but he is still a bit naive in both philosophy of mind and in computer science, and mathematics. Like many he assumes comp implicitly or explicitly all the times, but ignores the consequences like the FPI, or the incompleteness and its intensional variants. With comp the physical realities emerges from a statistical coherence of a variety of first person plural arithmetical dreams. There isn a relation physical reality, but the notion of universe is getting a bit obscure. Spivack was naive, but still correct about the consciousness flux which is more fundamental that the physical, as consciousness is not physical indeed, it is not really mathematical either, it is more theological or computer science theoretical, or arithmetical in the eye of God. Spivack probably just confuses mechanism and materialism, like many. Concerning now the existence of a primitive physical universe, that is really a speculation, despite taking for granted, by many again. Nobody knows, and science has just not yet decided between Plato and Aristotle for the fundamental question (most being still taboo). Yes. On days with a T in them I allow myself to be more physicalist, but today is Wednesday and I am veering towards Plato again. Bruno On 25 March 2014 15:07, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Original Message Scott Aaronson reviews Max Tegmark's *Our Mathematical Universe*: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753 The comments section includes Max Tegmark's remarks on Scott Aaronson's remarks, ending for now with: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753#comment-102790 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List
RE: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. I don't think it implies that at all. We don't know what consciousness really is but if it turns out to emerge from or supervene on some localized lump of stuff then there would be lots of independent consciousnesses that experienced similar things to me, rather than one consciousness per person-set that flits about faster than light over the set of infinite universes; somehow making time to get back to me per time iteration. But even if your implication stood, it would open up a huge can of philosophical worms. What exactly constitutes a 'me' 10^10^29 meters away from here? In the infinite space there are a fair few mes, all of whom have some differences, differences in history, differences in location, differences in body, differences in vocations, beliefs even wives etc. An infinite spectrum of me. A happy thought for women everywhere but at what point does it become ridiculous to say this or that copy is still me? This is the problem Lewis faces with modal realism and why he gets wishy washy about whether these copies are me or are not me but are just similar to me in so many regards. More importantly, when we are talking about cause and effect we are talking about something other than dodgy metaphysical consequences such as 'immortality'. We're want something that can be measured. From: stath...@gmail.com Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 10:12:09 +1100 Subject: Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 25 March 2014 16:58, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: I think you're missing Scott's point. The universe is obviously isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges Library of Babel. Almost all of them are just lists of what happens. Scott's point is that this is not very interesting, important, or impressive. It's only some small elegant compression of those lists that's interesting - if it exists. Scott seems to think that it does. I think it does *only* because we're willing to call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness... Hmm, I just read Scott as saying that MUH is scientifically empty in the sense that it makes no significant predictions, the emphasis being on the word significant. The predictions it does make are a little wishy washy. Like, MUH predicts that science will continue to uncover mathematically describable regularities in nature. what would a non-mathematically describable law look like? And how is a mathematically describable regularity in this universe evidence of the existence of another mathematical universe? He also takes Tegmark to task on his use of anthropic reasoning because it allows Tegmark to have his cake and to eat it. The extent to which regularities are elegantly described by maths will be taken as evidence for an inherently mathematical ontology. The extent to which they are not will allow him to invoke the anthropic principle and say well it would be absurdly lucky that the one universe that existed just happened to have these wierd constants that supported life. I think in Popperian terminology Tegmark's predictions just are not risky enough. He's guaranteed to hit one or the other every time. I'll be interested in how Tegmark addresses Scott's last point concerning the physicality of universes beyond the cosmic horizon. I can see both points of view. I can appreciate Tegmark's view that a galaxy 1 light year beyond the cosmic horizon is just like Andromeda but just a bit further away. On the other hand I also see Scott's point that if it is just far enough away to prevent any causal interaction then it doesn't satisfy a reasonable definition of physical. To be physical is to be causally relevant. There doesn't seem to be much semantic difference between a non physical universe and one which is so far away that it couldn't ever effect us. An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's Physics of Immortality view which basically says that identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's Physics of Immortality view which basically says that identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!) You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness. This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 3/25/2014 4:12 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 25 March 2014 16:58, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com mailto:chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: */I think you're missing Scott's point. The universe is obviously isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges Library of Babel. Almost all of them are just lists of what happens. Scott's point is that this is not very interesting, important, or impressive. It's only some small elegant compression of those lists that's interesting - if it exists. Scott seems to think that it does. I think it does *only* because we're willing to call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness... /* Hmm, I just read Scott as saying that MUH is scientifically empty in the sense that it makes no significant predictions, the emphasis being on the word significant. The predictions it does make are a little wishy washy. Like, MUH predicts that science will continue to uncover mathematically describable regularities in nature. what would a non-mathematically describable law look like? And how is a mathematically describable regularity in this universe evidence of the existence of another mathematical universe? He also takes Tegmark to task on his use of anthropic reasoning because it allows Tegmark to have his cake and to eat it. The extent to which regularities are elegantly described by maths will be taken as evidence for an inherently mathematical ontology. The extent to which they are not will allow him to invoke the anthropic principle and say well it would be absurdly lucky that the one universe that existed just happened to have these wierd constants that supported life. I think in Popperian terminology Tegmark's predictions just are not risky enough. He's guaranteed to hit one or the other every time. I'll be interested in how Tegmark addresses Scott's last point concerning the physicality of universes beyond the cosmic horizon. I can see both points of view. I can appreciate Tegmark's view that a galaxy 1 light year beyond the cosmic horizon is just like Andromeda but just a bit further away. On the other hand I also see Scott's point that if it is just far enough away to prevent any causal interaction then it doesn't satisfy a reasonable definition of physical. To be physical is to be causally relevant. There doesn't seem to be much semantic difference between a non physical universe and one which is so far away that it couldn't ever effect us. An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. Brent -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 07:34:56PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: Unless, indeed, or just in part, but he acknowledged my work in some draft he sent me, then they disappeared in the public version, making him either a coward, or an opportunist or both. (Or under influence, as it is easy to defame to me to a physicist by saying I am wrong on Gödel, and to a logician that I am mad in physics (like pretending that I believe in parallel world, that's enough). Which aspect of your work did he acknowledge in the draft? Was it the FPI result? If it was, he possibly changed it to cite Everett, who conceivably was the first to come up with that mechanism for deriving subjective indeteminism from a deterministic theory. That was the implication in the video clip we watched recently. I wouldn't argue it either way, historically. That still leaves your FPI contribution as original in the computationalist setting, as Everett is not explicitly computationalist. But for Max's purposes, he assumes the Hilbert space is fundamental, so only needs Everett. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 11:16, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. I don't think it implies that at all. We don't know what consciousness really is but if it turns out to emerge from or supervene on some localized lump of stuff then there would be lots of independent consciousnesses that experienced similar things to me, rather than one consciousness per person-set that flits about faster than light over the set of infinite universes; somehow making time to get back to me per time iteration. The consciousness doesn't actually go anywhere, it's just that if there are multiple copies producing multiple similar consciousnesses (through whatever mechanism) then you can't know which copy your current consciousness is supervening on. But even if your implication stood, it would open up a huge can of philosophical worms. What exactly constitutes a 'me' 10^10^29 meters away from here? In the infinite space there are a fair few mes, all of whom have some differences, differences in history, differences in location, differences in body, differences in vocations, beliefs even wives etc. An infinite spectrum of me. A happy thought for women everywhere but at what point does it become ridiculous to say this or that copy is still me? This is the problem Lewis faces with modal realism and why he gets wishy washy about whether these copies are me or are not me but are just similar to me in so many regards. It's a problem but you can't avoid it altogether. It's not as if God is going to say, OK mate, it's too difficult to keep track of who you are with all these different copies and near-copies around, so you can just stay this one here. More importantly, when we are talking about cause and effect we are talking about something other than dodgy metaphysical consequences such as 'immortality'. We're want something that can be measured. It's a pretty significant dodgy metaphysical consequence if you actually live forever. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 13:37, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's Physics of Immortality view which basically says that identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!) You don't have to assume comp. I said if you assume comp OR if you assume Frank Tipler's theory of immortailty. I added comp because that has the same implications, but the rest of what I said was assuming Tipler-esque continuity of consciousness through duplication of quantum states. Admittedly I dashed the post off and may not have made myself very clear :) If the theory is that consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness. This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are. Yes, that's what I was trying to get at. Assuming that consciousness arises somehow from the quantum state of your brain, and assuming that identical quantum states are sufficiently identical that consciousness continues when your quantum state is duplicated, regardless of where that happens (as Frank Tipler assumes when he says you can die and wake up in a simulated version of yourself at the end of time) - then you effectively exist in all the (infinite number of) places your brain's quantum state does. I've heard from my good friend the internet that the number of possible quantum states a brain can be in is around 10 ^ 10 ^ 70, which probably makes the nearest exact copy of my brain quite a long way away (assuming an infinite universe with the same laws of physics throughout, and similar initial conditions, and ergodicity whatever that is, etc, etc). But given worlds enough and time, as we are in eternal inflation for example, I'm virtually guaranteed to be peppered around the place, a monstrous regiment which you will be pleased to know is ridiculously far away, well beyond our cosmic horizon for a googolplex years to come. However, this assumes these copies are all me, or maybe I should start using the Royal we from now on (if my name hasn't given that away already). So I am she as she is me as you are me and we are all together, except for you. To not assume this - to assume these are all different people who happen to think they are me - is I think the same as assuming that identical quantum states can nevertheless be distinguished, somehow - but I believe the observed properties of BECs argues against this? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On Tuesday, March 25, 2014 8:23:10 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 07:34:56PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: Unless, indeed, or just in part, but he acknowledged my work in some draft he sent me, then they disappeared in the public version, making him either a coward, or an opportunist or both. (Or under influence, as it is easy to defame to me to a physicist by saying I am wrong on Gödel, and to a logician that I am mad in physics (like pretending that I believe in parallel world, that's enough). Which aspect of your work did he acknowledge in the draft? Was it the FPI result? If it was, he possibly changed it to cite Everett, who conceivably was the first to come up with that mechanism for deriving subjective indeteminism from a deterministic theory. That was the implication in the video clip we watched recently. I wouldn't argue it either way, historically. That still leaves your FPI contribution as original in the computationalist setting, as Everett is not explicitly computationalist. Everett is explicitly computationalist. He identifies the observer with an automaton whose memory can be identified with some finite amount of information. He just didn't carry the logic nearly as far as Bruno. (He was martyred anyway.) But for Max's purposes, he assumes the Hilbert space is fundamental, so only needs Everett. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 12:40, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 13:37, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's Physics of Immortality view which basically says that identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!) You don't have to assume comp. I said if you assume comp OR if you assume Frank Tipler's theory of immortailty. I added comp because that has the same implications, but the rest of what I said was assuming Tipler-esque continuity of consciousness through duplication of quantum states. Admittedly I dashed the post off and may not have made myself very clear :) If the theory is that consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness. This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are. Yes, that's what I was trying to get at. Assuming that consciousness arises somehow from the quantum state of your brain, and assuming that identical quantum states are sufficiently identical that consciousness continues when your quantum state is duplicated, regardless of where that happens (as Frank Tipler assumes when he says you can die and wake up in a simulated version of yourself at the end of time) - then you effectively exist in all the (infinite number of) places your brain's quantum state does. I've heard from my good friend the internet that the number of possible quantum states a brain can be in is around 10 ^ 10 ^ 70, which probably makes the nearest exact copy of my brain quite a long way away (assuming an infinite universe with the same laws of physics throughout, and similar initial conditions, and ergodicity whatever that is, etc, etc). But given worlds enough and time, as we are in eternal inflation for example, I'm virtually guaranteed to be peppered around the place, a monstrous regiment which you will be pleased to know is ridiculously far away, well beyond our cosmic horizon for a googolplex years to come. However, this assumes these copies are all me, or maybe I should start using the Royal we from now on (if my name hasn't given that away already). So I am she as she is me as you are me and we are all together, except for you. To not assume this - to assume these are all different people who happen to think they are me - is I think the same as assuming that identical quantum states can nevertheless be distinguished, somehow - but I believe the observed properties of BECs argues against this? What is the difference between the copies being you and only thinking they are you? I'll put it differently. I propose that, since the matter in your synapses turns over every few minutes, you are not really you a few minutes from now, but merely a copy who thinks you are you. Can you prove if this claim is true or false, and even if you can, does it matter? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 14:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. How does one work out what the upshot is, given an infinite number of identical yous? Isn't there a measure problem or something? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will continue if everything that can happen does happen. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 14:49, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:40, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, that's what I was trying to get at. Assuming that consciousness arises somehow from the quantum state of your brain, and assuming that identical quantum states are sufficiently identical that consciousness continues when your quantum state is duplicated, regardless of where that happens (as Frank Tipler assumes when he says you can die and wake up in a simulated version of yourself at the end of time) - then you effectively exist in all the (infinite number of) places your brain's quantum state does. I've heard from my good friend the internet that the number of possible quantum states a brain can be in is around 10 ^ 10 ^ 70, which probably makes the nearest exact copy of my brain quite a long way away (assuming an infinite universe with the same laws of physics throughout, and similar initial conditions, and ergodicity whatever that is, etc, etc). But given worlds enough and time, as we are in eternal inflation for example, I'm virtually guaranteed to be peppered around the place, a monstrous regiment which you will be pleased to know is ridiculously far away, well beyond our cosmic horizon for a googolplex years to come. However, this assumes these copies are all me, or maybe I should start using the Royal we from now on (if my name hasn't given that away already). So I am she as she is me as you are me and we are all together, except for you. To not assume this - to assume these are all different people who happen to think they are me - is I think the same as assuming that identical quantum states can nevertheless be distinguished, somehow - but I believe the observed properties of BECs argues against this? What is the difference between the copies being you and only thinking they are you? Well, quite, that's what I just said. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 14:50, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will continue if everything that can happen does happen. Surely in an infinite universe, and assuming the identity of quantum states, you don't need similarity - you will get a quantum state that is a follow-on from your previous one, but in which you continue to be alive... Of course this depends on what it means for quantum states to follow on from other ones. But our brains already seem to know what that means, in that we feel we're the same person we were this morning, and so we feel continuity of similar enough quantum states. Unless QM is wrong about the nature of quantum states, we will feel continuity if the follow on state is actually 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 light years away (or 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 years away) from the preceeding state. I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The conclusion would still follow in a classical infinite universe. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 3/25/2014 6:49 PM, LizR wrote: On 26 March 2014 14:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. How does one work out what the upshot is, given an infinite number of identical yous? Isn't there a measure problem or something? There's your problem: There can't be even two identical yous (c.f. Leibniz). So there are only a finite number of yous. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 3/25/2014 6:50 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will continue if everything that can happen does happen. That's a to casual reading of can happen there are many things in quantum mechanics that can't happen. Just because we can imagine something happening, it doesn't follow that it is nomologically possible. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 3/25/2014 6:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR lizj...@gmail.com mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 14:50, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will continue if everything that can happen does happen. Surely in an infinite universe, and assuming the identity of quantum states, you don't need similarity - you will get a quantum state that is a follow-on from your previous one, but in which you continue to be alive... Of course this depends on what it means for quantum states to follow on from other ones. But our brains already seem to know what that means, in that we feel we're the same person we were this morning, and so we feel continuity of similar enough quantum states. Unless QM is wrong about the nature of quantum states, we will feel continuity if the follow on state is actually 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 light years away (or 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 years away) from the preceeding state. I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The conclusion would still follow in a classical infinite universe. Probably not since classical physics is based on real numbers (and so is quantum mechanics for that matter). Of course you could still fall back on similar enough. But in that case you will, as you are dying, pass into a state of consciousness (i.e. none) that is similar enough to a fetus (of some animal) or maybe a cabbage. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 14:57, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The conclusion would still follow in a classical infinite universe. I don't see that, because you can subdivide classical states indefinitely (hence the space-time continuum) while with QM you only have a certain number of allowed states for some things at least (electrons and suchlike), and it's hypothesised this might also apply to space-time (I think it has to for this argument to work.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
It's a pretty significant dodgy metaphysical consequence if you actually live forever. Its many things. Interesting, strange, wonderful and so on but the one thing it isn't is significant. The continuation of an experiential history on some other earth, a history common to the one that just ended here on this earth, is not an effect on this earth. Its as insignificant to this earth as things can be. Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2014 19:56:21 -0700 From: meeke...@verizon.net To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark On 3/25/2014 6:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 14:50, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 March 2014 16:22, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: *It's a pretty significant dodgy metaphysical consequence if you actually live forever.* Its many things. Interesting, strange, wonderful and so on but the one thing it isn't is significant. The continuation of an experiential history on some other earth, a history common to the one that just ended here on this earth, is not an effect on this earth. Its as insignificant to this earth as things can be. But that's assuming you *don't* live forever, so you aren't answering the other poster's comment. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
But that's assuming you don't live forever, so you aren't answering the other poster's comment. Sure it does and I'm not assuming that. It makes no difference whether I live forever or not. Personally, lets say whilst my widow, mistresses and admirers are all deep in mourning here, my history continues somewhere else beyond the reach of light. What tangible effect can be measured by the scientists at my wake? What effect does this continuation have here? All you end up with are two identifiably distinct worlds that are unable to causally influence one another. From an operational stand point they simply do not exist relative to one another. Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2014 16:25:11 +1300 Subject: Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 26 March 2014 16:22, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: It's a pretty significant dodgy metaphysical consequence if you actually live forever. Its many things. Interesting, strange, wonderful and so on but the one thing it isn't is significant. The continuation of an experiential history on some other earth, a history common to the one that just ended here on this earth, is not an effect on this earth. Its as insignificant to this earth as things can be. But that's assuming you don't live forever, so you aren't answering the other poster's comment. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 Mar 2014, at 1:46 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:50 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will continue if everything that can happen does happen. That's a to casual reading of can happen there are many things in quantum mechanics that can't happen. Just because we can imagine something happening, it doesn't follow that it is nomologically possible. What sorts of things that might conceivably save your life do you think are not nomologically possible? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 Mar 2014, at 1:56 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:55, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 14:50, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:45, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/25/2014 6:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:15, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. That seems to imply that one's consciousness is unique and moves around like a soul. There's no dodgy metaphysical mechanism involved. If there are multiple physical copies of you, and each copy has a similar consciousness to you, then you can't know which copy is currently generating your consciousness. I think the idea is that the stream of consciousness is unified so long as all the copies are being realized identically, in fact they are not multiple per Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. When there is some quantum event amplified enough to make a difference in the stream of consciousness then the stream divides and there are two (or more) streams. An implication of this is that if one of the streams terminates your consciousness will continue in the other. But it will, at best be *similar* to the deceased you, just as I am quite different from Brent Meeker of 50yrs ago. And there is no quarantee that some stream will continue. Similar is good enough. There is a guarantee that some branch will continue if everything that can happen does happen. Surely in an infinite universe, and assuming the identity of quantum states, you don't need similarity - you will get a quantum state that is a follow-on from your previous one, but in which you continue to be alive... Of course this depends on what it means for quantum states to follow on from other ones. But our brains already seem to know what that means, in that we feel we're the same person we were this morning, and so we feel continuity of similar enough quantum states. Unless QM is wrong about the nature of quantum states, we will feel continuity if the follow on state is actually 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 light years away (or 10 ^ 10 ^ 100 years away) from the preceeding state. I agree but I don't think you need to refer to QM at all. The conclusion would still follow in a classical infinite universe. Probably not since classical physics is based on real numbers (and so is quantum mechanics for that matter). Of course you could still fall back on similar enough. But in that case you will, as you are dying, pass into a state of consciousness (i.e. none) that is similar enough to a fetus (of some animal) or maybe a cabbage. You don't need an *exact* copy, just a good enough copy. If an exact copy were needed, either at the quantum level or to an infinite number of decimal places, then we could not survive from one moment to the next, since in a very small period there are quite gross physical changes in our bodies. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 26 Mar 2014, at 2:22 pm, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: It's a pretty significant dodgy metaphysical consequence if you actually live forever. Its many things. Interesting, strange, wonderful and so on but the one thing it isn't is significant. The continuation of an experiential history on some other earth, a history common to the one that just ended here on this earth, is not an effect on this earth. Its as insignificant to this earth as things can be. It's not insignificant if you and your experiments are not on this earth but on any number of separate, similar earths. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Fwd: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
Original Message Scott Aaronson reviews Max Tegmark's /Our Mathematical Universe/: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753 The comments section includes Max Tegmark's remarks on Scott Aaronson's remarks, ending for now with: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753#comment-102790 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he says that it *is* that structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing. I can see the appeal. If the universe ever *does* prove to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is *exactly described* by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature of knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never actually reach it with 100% certainty. On 25 March 2014 15:07, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Original Message Scott Aaronson reviews Max Tegmark's *Our Mathematical Universe*: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753 The comments section includes Max Tegmark's remarks on Scott Aaronson's remarks, ending for now with: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753#comment-102790 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
The comments section looks like a mini Everything list in itself. On 25 March 2014 16:24, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he says that it *is* that structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing. I can see the appeal. If the universe ever *does* prove to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is *exactly described* by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature of knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never actually reach it with 100% certainty. On 25 March 2014 15:07, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Original Message Scott Aaronson reviews Max Tegmark's *Our Mathematical Universe*: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753 The comments section includes Max Tegmark's remarks on Scott Aaronson's remarks, ending for now with: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1753#comment-102790 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 25 March 2014 16:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/24/2014 8:24 PM, LizR wrote: But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he says that it *is* that structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing. I can see the appeal. If the universe ever *does* prove to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is *exactly described* by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. I think you're missing Scott's point. The universe is obviously isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges Library of Babel. Almost all of them are just lists of what happens. Scott's point is that this is not very interesting, important, or impressive. It's only some small elegant compression of those lists that's interesting - if it exists. Scott seems to think that it does. I think it does *only* because we're willing to call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness... Yes, if that's his point I am missing it, because although that may be true it isn't addressing what the MUH claims (at least making the rather large assumption that I've understood it correctly). The MUH as I (perhaps mis-) understand it appears to assume there *is* some minimal mathematical representation of the universe (known as the laws of physics or TOE or whatver), and that this exists in a manner that allows us to differentiate it from geography - as it seems to, at least for the physical constants that don't appear to vary with time or space, etc. So one has at least got what may be called local laws of physics and local geography as a starting point. If the laws of physics are (somehow - via fire breathing or whatever) able to generate all possible resulting universes, then we have an explanation for all the geography (modulo our particular position in the string landscape etc), but presumably (as per Russell's Theory of Nothing) it all cancels out, assuming that all possibilities are realised. However we are a long way from that point, and I imagine the nature of knowledge and measurement and so on mean that we can never actually reach it with 100% certainty. We can't reach it because reaching it via infinite lists of what happens isn't worth the trip. Sure, but the MUH assumes there is a unique set of laws of physics, and the infinite lists all cancel out. (I think one should attempt to criticise a theory in terms of what it actually says rather than some other characterisation, surely?) Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
I think you're missing Scott's point. The universe is obviously isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges Library of Babel. Almost all of them are just lists of what happens. Scott's point is that this is not very interesting, important, or impressive. It's only some small elegant compression of those lists that's interesting - if it exists. Scott seems to think that it does. I think it does *only* because we're willing to call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness... Hmm, I just read Scott as saying that MUH is scientifically empty in the sense that it makes no significant predictions, the emphasis being on the word significant. The predictions it does make are a little wishy washy. Like, MUH predicts that science will continue to uncover mathematically describable regularities in nature. what would a non-mathematically describable law look like? And how is a mathematically describable regularity in this universe evidence of the existence of another mathematical universe? He also takes Tegmark to task on his use of anthropic reasoning because it allows Tegmark to have his cake and to eat it. The extent to which regularities are elegantly described by maths will be taken as evidence for an inherently mathematical ontology. The extent to which they are not will allow him to invoke the anthropic principle and say well it would be absurdly lucky that the one universe that existed just happened to have these wierd constants that supported life. I think in Popperian terminology Tegmark's predictions just are not risky enough. He's guaranteed to hit one or the other every time. I'll be interested in how Tegmark addresses Scott's last point concerning the physicality of universes beyond the cosmic horizon. I can see both points of view. I can appreciate Tegmark's view that a galaxy 1 light year beyond the cosmic horizon is just like Andromeda but just a bit further away. On the other hand I also see Scott's point that if it is just far enough away to prevent any causal interaction then it doesn't satisfy a reasonable definition of physical. To be physical is to be causally relevant. There doesn't seem to be much semantic difference between a non physical universe and one which is so far away that it couldn't ever effect us. Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2014 16:57:05 +1300 Subject: Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 25 March 2014 16:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/24/2014 8:24 PM, LizR wrote: But Tegmark goes further. He doesn't say that the universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure; he says that it is that structure, that its physical and mathematical existence are the same thing. I can see the appeal. If the universe ever does prove to be isomorphic to a mathematical structure (and I'm sure that's a long, long, long way from being proved at present) - by which I mean, if the universe is exactly described by said structure, with nothing else needed to completely describe reality - at that point, at least, I would take Max's MUH seriously, if only because Ockham's razor would indicate there was no point in hypothesising the existence of two things that are exactly isomosphic. I think you're missing Scott's point. The universe is obviously isomorphic to a mathematical structure, in fact infinitely many different mathematical structures, all of which are in Borges Library of Babel. Almost all of them are just lists of what happens. Scott's point is that this is not very interesting, important, or impressive. It's only some small elegant compression of those lists that's interesting - if it exists. Scott seems to think that it does. I think it does *only* because we're willing to call a lot of stuff geography as Bruno puts it, aka boundary conditions, symmetry breaking, randomness... Yes, if that's his point I am missing it, because although that may be true it isn't addressing what the MUH claims (at least making the rather large assumption that I've understood it correctly). The MUH as I (perhaps mis-) understand it appears to assume there is some minimal mathematical representation of the universe (known as the laws of physics or TOE or whatver), and that this exists in a manner that allows us to differentiate it from geography - as it seems to, at least for the physical constants that don't appear to vary with time or space, etc. So one has at least got what may be called local laws of physics and local geography as a starting
