On 25 Oct 2011, at 22:40, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 04:08:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but
On 26 Oct 2011, at 05:34, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/25/2011 4:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 04:08:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So the histories,
On 10/26/2011 12:44 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Oct 2011, at 05:34, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/25/2011 4:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 04:08:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM
On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 04:08:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs
(bundles of histories compatible with the
On 10/25/2011 4:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 04:08:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs
On 23 Oct 2011, at 04:41, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs
(bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely
still countable.
This is not obvious for
On 10/22/2011 10:41 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs
(bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely
still countable.
This is not obvious for me. For
On 10/22/2011 10:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:01:40AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Russell,
The Stone duality was first found as an isomorphism between
Boolean algebras and totaly disconnected compact Hausdorff spaces.
Generalizations are being studied.
On 22 Oct 2011, at 16:46, Stephen P. King wrote:
How is a space defined in strictly arithmetic terms?
Why do you want to define it in arithmetic. With comp, arithmetic
can be used for the ontology, but the internal epistemology needs
much more. Remember that the tiny effective
On 21 Oct 2011, at 20:34, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/21/2011 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Oct 2011, at 15:08, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/21/2011 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Oct 2011, at 05:30, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 07:03:38PM +0200, Bruno
On 10/22/2011 8:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Oct 2011, at 20:34, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/21/2011 10:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Oct 2011, at 15:08, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/21/2011 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Oct 2011, at 05:30, Russell Standish wrote:
On
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:14:48PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So the histories, we're agreed, are uncountable in number, but OMs
(bundles of histories compatible with the here and now) are surely
still countable.
This is not obvious for me. For any to computational states which
are in a
On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 02:01:40AM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Russell,
The Stone duality was first found as an isomorphism between
Boolean algebras and totaly disconnected compact Hausdorff spaces.
Generalizations are being studied. Consider what these topological
spaces look
On 10/21/2011 1:05 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 08:00:55PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
There has to be some form of identity thesis between brain and mind
that prevents the Occam catastrophe, and also prevent the full retreat
into solipsism. I think it very much an open
On 19 Oct 2011, at 05:30, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 07:03:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This, ISTM, is a completely different, and more wonderful beast,
than
the UD described in your Brussells thesis, or Schmidhuber's '97
paper. This latter beast must truly give
On 10/21/2011 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Oct 2011, at 05:30, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 07:03:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This, ISTM, is a completely different, and more wonderful beast, than
the UD described in your Brussells thesis, or Schmidhuber's '97
On 10/18/2011 11:30 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 07:03:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This, ISTM, is a completely different, and more wonderful beast, than
the UD described in your Brussells thesis, or Schmidhuber's '97
paper. This latter beast must truly give rise to a
On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 08:00:55PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
There has to be some form of identity thesis between brain and mind
that prevents the Occam catastrophe, and also prevent the full retreat
into solipsism. I think it very much an open problem what that is.
Hi Russell,
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 07:03:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This, ISTM, is a completely different, and more wonderful beast, than
the UD described in your Brussells thesis, or Schmidhuber's '97
paper. This latter beast must truly give rise to a continuum of
histories, due to the random
While the comments made here make interesting and amusing reading the
underlying rationale of COMP as an attempt to resolve the mind-body
problem which worried earlier philosophers is, in my view fatally
flawed. Here are some of the main reasons:
1. There is no longer a mind-body problem.
Hi Peter,
On 18 Oct 2011, at 13:00, Peter Kinnon wrote:
While the comments made here make interesting and amusing reading the
underlying rationale of COMP as an attempt to resolve the mind-body
problem which worried earlier philosophers is, in my view fatally
flawed. Here are some of the
Hi Russell,
I have been guilty of responding a little too quickly to your
posts :).
No problem.
I want to just focus on the following exchange about the
Universal dovetailer, and put aside questions of ontology, measure,
induction, anthropic principle, etc.
On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at
On 15 Oct 2011, at 19:27, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2011, at 22:50, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you are really humble, just don't make any statements about
whether you
reasoning is valid or not.
I don't defend any truth but I am still offering a
On 16 Oct 2011, at 00:10, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Oct 15, 2011 at 06:53:59PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Oct 2011, at 02:50, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 05:01:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2011, at 23:50, Russell Standish wrote:
I don't see
On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 09:33:10AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Fair point. Let me rephrase: Why couldn't the physical universe be a
set of computations, all giving rise to the same experienced history.
If by this you mean that the physical universe is the first person
sharable experience due
On 16 Oct 2011, at 11:31, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 09:33:10AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Fair point. Let me rephrase: Why couldn't the physical universe be a
set of computations, all giving rise to the same experienced
history.
If by this you mean that the physical
Dear Bruno,
I have been guilty of responding a little too quickly to your posts :).
I want to just focus on the following exchange about the
Universal dovetailer, and put aside questions of ontology, measure,
induction, anthropic principle, etc.
On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 04:51:20PM +0200, Bruno
On 15 Oct 2011, at 02:50, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 05:01:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2011, at 23:50, Russell Standish wrote:
I don't see why Bayes' theorem assumes a physical universe.
Bayes' theorem does not assume a physical universe. But some use
On 15 Oct 2011, at 05:44, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 06:40:04PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/14/2011 5:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this
entail
only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2011, at 22:50, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you are really humble, just don't make any statements about
whether you
reasoning is valid or not.
I don't defend any truth but I am still offering a reasoning to you.
If you find it invalid it
On Sat, Oct 15, 2011 at 06:53:59PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Oct 2011, at 02:50, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 05:01:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2011, at 23:50, Russell Standish wrote:
I don't see why Bayes' theorem assumes a physical universe.
On 13 Oct 2011, at 22:50, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you are really humble, just don't make any statements about
whether you
reasoning is valid or not.
I don't defend any truth but I am still offering a reasoning to you.
If you find it invalid it is your task to find the
On 13 Oct 2011, at 23:50, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 05:20:11PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Oct 2011, at 23:48, Russell Standish wrote:
I certainly appreciate you don't use Bayes' theorem in your work,
but
don't understand why you say you cannot use it.
I am
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 05:01:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2011, at 23:50, Russell Standish wrote:
I don't see why Bayes' theorem assumes a physical universe.
Bayes' theorem does not assume a physical universe. But some use of
bayes theorem to justify the laws of physics,
On 10/14/2011 5:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 05:01:26PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2011, at 23:50, Russell Standish wrote:
I don't see why Bayes' theorem assumes a physical universe.
Bayes' theorem does not assume a physical universe. But some use of
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 06:40:04PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/14/2011 5:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I know there are only a countable number of programs. Does this entail
only a countable number of histories too? Or a continuum of histories?
I did think the latter (and you seemed to
On 12 Oct 2011, at 21:43, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
You might say cannot be captured entirely, but anyone has the right
to suggest hypotheses and reasoning in any field. Questions makes
always sense.
I think you might attribute to me pretensions that I do not have.
If you just ask
On 12 Oct 2011, at 23:48, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 02:54:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Oct 2011, at 22:14, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 06:03:42PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With COMP, and via your UDA, our observed universe is
Just to clarify, when I say we need discipline to avoid getting
emotionally attached to beliefs, I don't mean it in the sense of
punishment and reward. I mean disciplined (not lazy) and rigorous
about always being willing to doubt what we hold to be true, and that
this goes against our natural
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you are really humble, just don't make any statements about
whether you
reasoning is valid or not.
I don't defend any truth but I am still offering a reasoning to you.
If you find it invalid it is your task to find the flaw. That's is by
definition of
On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 05:20:11PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Oct 2011, at 23:48, Russell Standish wrote:
I certainly appreciate you don't use Bayes' theorem in your work, but
don't understand why you say you cannot use it.
I am not saying that we cannot use it in some context. I
On 11 Oct 2011, at 19:29, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/11/2011 9:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
My non observed future; or computational extensions, is selected,
making the comp physics explainable in term of statistics on
computations. This leads to general physical laws invariant for all
On 11 Oct 2011, at 22:14, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 06:03:42PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With COMP, and via your UDA, our observed universe is selected from
the set of all infinite strings (which I call descriptions in my
book).
My non observed future; or
On 12 Oct 2011, at 03:01, Terren Suydam wrote:
On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 2:11 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
That's a nice strategy to be right, that's for sure. You just
don't
understand it, study more.
The ideas are understandable if you're willing to depart from
On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
That reminds me an argument of Bruno in Lewis Carroll's Sylvie and Bruno,
about Spinach. If I remember well.
Something like: '---don't make me *love* spinach because thats really the
worst possible which can happen for
I am omitting a lot, honestly most of the stuff isn't that relevant for what
I really want to express. I guess I still talk too much.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Explaining
consciousness in the sense you mean it (explain it *from* something)
is
nonsense, as consciousness is already required
terren wrote:
Hey Benjay,
On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 2:11 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
Honestly, I won't bother to study a theory in much depth that I hold to
be
utterly implausible at the start.
I have to wonder why you're putting so much energy into refuting an
terren wrote:
On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
That reminds me an argument of Bruno in Lewis Carroll's Sylvie and
Bruno,
about Spinach. If I remember well.
Something like: '---don't make me *love* spinach because thats really
the
worst possible
On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 02:54:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Oct 2011, at 22:14, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 06:03:42PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With COMP, and via your UDA, our observed universe is selected from
the set of all infinite strings (which I
On 10 Oct 2011, at 22:50, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:29, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent
logic
with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm
On 11 Oct 2011, at 02:58, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 10, 2011 at 02:13:17PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
here you are summing up well my critics of Schmidhuber and Tegmark
which I have done when entering in this list discussion.
This has given the big debate between ASSA and RSSA (the
On 10/11/2011 9:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
My non observed future; or computational extensions, is selected, making the comp
physics explainable in term of statistics on computations. This leads to general
physical laws invariant for all observers. There is no selection of a particular
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The point is that successor and 0 become meaningless, or just mere
symbols,
when removed from that context.
What context are you talking about. The theory is interpretation
independent. The interpretations themselves are part of model
On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 06:03:42PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With COMP, and via your UDA, our observed universe is selected from
the set of all infinite strings (which I call descriptions in my
book).
My non observed future; or computational extensions, is selected,
making the comp
On Oct 11, 4:14 pm, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
That is the Occam
catastrophe. Something prevents the world from being too simple. I
think that something is the Anthropic Principle, but I'm interested if
you have an alternative suggestion.
In addition to the Anthropic
Hey Benjay,
On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 2:11 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
Honestly, I won't bother to study a theory in much depth that I hold to be
utterly implausible at the start.
I have to wonder why you're putting so much energy into refuting an
idea you feel to be
On 10/6/2011 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I don't see why.
Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about
numbers for *some* people, but they might be
On 09 Oct 2011, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/9/2011 3:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Depends on what you mean by the whole of physics.
Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is
no conceptual mean to distinguish physics from geography, except
for a fuzzy level of
On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:20, John Mikes wrote:
In the Bruno - Brent exchange I enjoyed Bruno''s remarks Usually I
agree with BrentM.
Probability (in my terms) means a distribution within infinite
bounds, no specifics for probable/non probable.
The 'fantasy-world' of physics is a time-related
On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:29, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent
logic
with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't
turn
blue or taste like broccoli.
Assuming
On 09 Oct 2011, at 22:45, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then, unless you see a flaw in the reasoning, you should know
that
at the obtic level, we don't need more, nor can we use more than the
countable collection of finite things, once we assume mechanism.
For the flaw in the
On 10 Oct 2011, at 08:21, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/6/2011 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I don't see why.
Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about
On 10/9/2011 11:21 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Reality is an idea itself.
[SPK]
Whose idea exactly? If there is no one to whom Reality has a meaning does it have
a meaning? No. You seem to assume that meaningfulness exist in the absence of a subject
to whom that meaning obtains. That is a
On 10/9/2011 11:21 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
What do you propose as an alternative theory?
My point is just that if we say yes to the doctor, then we have literally no choice
on this matter.
[SPK]
To assume Yes Doctor is to assume that the physical reality of substitution exists.
This
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:29, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent
logic
with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't
turn
blue or
On 10/10/2011 1:50 PM, benjayk wrote:
I am aware of that. It is obvious that this is what you searching. The point
is, if you try to explain concsciousness you are applying a concept to
something that just doesn't fit what is talked about. Explaining
consciousness in the sense you mean it
meekerdb wrote:
On 10/10/2011 1:50 PM, benjayk wrote:
I am aware of that. It is obvious that this is what you searching. The
point
is, if you try to explain concsciousness you are applying a concept to
something that just doesn't fit what is talked about. Explaining
consciousness in the
On Mon, Oct 10, 2011 at 02:13:17PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
here you are summing up well my critics of Schmidhuber and Tegmark
which I have done when entering in this list discussion.
This has given the big debate between ASSA and RSSA (the absolute
and the relative
On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/8/2011 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the
problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much
On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I don't see why.
Concrete objects can be
On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic
with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn
blue or taste like broccoli.
Assuming non-comp.
There is no assumption needed for that. It is a category error
On 9 October 2011 14:37, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Can you find any number(s) flying around
that has any claim to an internal view right now?
Yes. Although the number per se, like programs and brains, will refer only
to the relations that the 1-person associated with that number
In the Bruno - Brent exchange I enjoyed Bruno''s remarks Usually I agree
with BrentM.
Probability (in my terms) means a distribution within infinite bounds, no
specifics for probable/non probable.
The 'fantasy-world' of physics is a time-related explanatory Procrustean bed
for those partly (maybe
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic
with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn
blue or taste like broccoli.
Assuming non-comp.
There is no assumption needed for
On 10/9/2011 3:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Depends on what you mean by the whole of physics.
Good question. When physics is inferred from observation, there is no conceptual mean to
distinguish physics from geography, except for a fuzzy level of generality.
But UDA explains where the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I don't see why.
benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I don't see why.
Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about
numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others.
On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the
problem is that such fantasy worlds might be too much probable,
contradicting the observations.
I don't see how probability theory is
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
namely the very foundation of computations. We can define
computations in
terms of numbers relations, and we can
Bruno Marchal wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers
are,
you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0
is
not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠
s(y),
things like
On 07 Oct 2011, at 22:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 7, 9:21 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
The point is that a definition
On 10/8/2011 5:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2011, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/7/2011 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Indeed with comp, or with other everything type of theories, the problem is that such
fantasy worlds might be too much probable, contradicting the observations.
I
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I don't see why.
Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about
Bruno Marchal wrote:
and build our number system
around that. Like non-Euclidean arithmetic.
That already exists, even when agreeing with the axioms, of, say,
Peano Arithmetic. We can build model of arithmetic where we have the
truth of provable(0=1), despite the falsity of it in the
On Oct 8, 10:26 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 07 Oct 2011, at 22:33, Craig Weinberg wrote:
The point is that a definition doesn't say anything beyond it's
definition.
This is deeply false. Look at the Mandelbrot set, you can intuit
that
is much more than its
On 05 Oct 2011, at 17:33, benjayk wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
namely the very foundation of computations. We can define
computations in
terms of numbers
On 06 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
The point is that a definition doesn't say anything beyond it's
definition.
This is deeply false. Look at the Mandelbrot set, you can intuit
On 06 Oct 2011, at 23:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote:
I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and
multplication
without using numbers, though.
I am not sure this makes any
On Oct 7, 9:21 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
The point is that a definition doesn't say anything beyond it's
definition.
On Oct 7, 9:27 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Oct 2011, at 23:29, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote:
I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and
multplication
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I don't see why.
Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about
numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others.
Well, we don't need concrete
On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
namely the very foundation of computations. We can define
computations in
terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in
On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:57, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
namely the very foundation of computations. We can define
computations in
terms of numbers relations, and we
On 05 Oct 2011, at 17:33, benjayk wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
namely the very foundation of computations. We can define
computations in
terms of numbers
On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
The point is that a definition doesn't say anything beyond it's
definition.
This is deeply false. Look at the Mandelbrot set, you can intuit that
is much more than its definition. That
On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote:
I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and
multplication
without using numbers, though.
I am not sure this makes any sense. Addition of what?
In scientific theories
meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
namely the very foundation of computations. We can define
computations in
terms of numbers relations, and we can define number
On 03 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote:
COMP is the attempt to solve the mind-body problem with basing
everything on
computations.
This is not correct. Comp is the assumption that the brain functions
without extra magic,
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Just a little correction. I wrote (on 30 Sep 2011) :
On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote:
snip
The only thing that COMP does is to propose a complicated thought
construct
which essentially reveals its own emptiness.
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