On Oct 20, 1:51 am, Terren Suydam wrote:
> Hey Craig,
>
> Sorry for not answering sooner. I am very busy at the moment and
> realistically I cannot participate to the degree I'd like to. So this
> may be my last reply... I will try to keep it short.
No problem, I understand.
> > Emergent propert
On Oct 20, 1:51 am, Terren Suydam wrote:
> Hey Craig,
>
> Sorry for not answering sooner. I am very busy at the moment and
> realistically I cannot participate to the degree I'd like to. So this
> may be my last reply... I will try to keep it short.
No problem, I understand.
> > Emergent propert
Hey Craig,
Sorry for not answering sooner. I am very busy at the moment and
realistically I cannot participate to the degree I'd like to. So this
may be my last reply... I will try to keep it short.
On Oct 16, 2:43 pm, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Emergent properties of electromagnetism are also elec
On 17 Oct 2011, at 12:50, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 1:22 PM, Terren Suydam > wrote:
We are on the exact same page. This is why I keep barking in Stathis
direction - his view is that there are no emergent properties
because
everything that exists must be reducible to
On Oct 17, 12:19 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> There is a mapping between the image and thing imaged (which could be noise).
Only if you can see and make sense out of what you are looking at.
That is the only mapping going on.
>
> > If there existed nothing in
> > the universe who could see, there woul
On 10/17/2011 4:27 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 16, 10:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/16/2011 5:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 16, 8:38 pm, meekerdbwrote:
On 10/16/2011 11:43 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Emergent properties of electromagnetism are also electromagnetic, are
they not?
On Oct 17, 7:02 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Suppose I decide to arrange three stones in a triangle. Do the stones
> "create" the triangle (upward causation), or does the triangle
> "constrain" the stones (downward causation)?
The triangle does not exist. If anything, it 'insists'. The stone
On Oct 17, 6:50 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 1:22 PM, Terren Suydam
> wrote:
> > Well I'm going to stop guessing about what Stathis thinks and let him
> > chime in if he wants to.
> There is no downward causation from high
> level to low level, since that would look
On Oct 16, 10:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/16/2011 5:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Oct 16, 8:38 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> >> On 10/16/2011 11:43 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>> Emergent properties of electromagnetism are also electromagnetic, are
> >>> they not?
> >> No. Forming images i
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 4:37 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
> 2011/10/16 Bruno Marchal
>>
>> On 16 Oct 2011, at 04:22, Terren Suydam wrote (answering Craig):
>>
>> Exactly. I think that it can be better understood as a phenomenon
>>
>> which is not only an emergent property of ensembles of neuron
On Sun, Oct 16, 2011 at 1:22 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>> We are on the exact same page. This is why I keep barking in Stathis
>> direction - his view is that there are no emergent properties because
>> everything that exists must be reducible to a molecular level or else
>> it's magic.
>
> Well I
On 10/16/2011 5:53 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 16, 8:38 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/16/2011 11:43 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Emergent properties of electromagnetism are also electromagnetic, are
they not?
No. Forming images is an emergent property of electromagnetic waves which in
turn a
On Oct 16, 8:38 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/16/2011 11:43 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > Emergent properties of electromagnetism are also electromagnetic, are
> > they not?
>
> No. Forming images is an emergent property of electromagnetic waves which in
> turn are an
> emergent phenomena of Max
On 10/16/2011 11:43 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Emergent properties of electromagnetism are also electromagnetic, are
they not?
No. Forming images is an emergent property of electromagnetic waves which in turn are an
emergent phenomena of Maxwell's electromagnetism.
Electromagnetism is inten
On Oct 16, 1:37 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> That's what I wanted to explain to craig... when you run a program on a
> computer... the low level of the computer (the transistors of the cpu) are
> constraint by the program, it is the high level (the program) that "drives"
> the physical states of
On Oct 15, 10:22 pm, Terren Suydam wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 15, 2011 at 2:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> I think we are talking past each other. There is the behavior of
> >> neurons at the single-neuron level. That is fairly well understood.
> >> Nothing about the spontaneous activity you referen
2011/10/16 Bruno Marchal
>
> On 16 Oct 2011, at 04:22, Terren Suydam wrote (answering Craig):
>
>
>
> Exactly. I think that it can be better understood as a phenomenon
>
> which is not only an emergent property of ensembles of neurons, but
>
> granular properties in the moment of an individual en
On 16 Oct 2011, at 04:22, Terren Suydam wrote (answering Craig):
Exactly. I think that it can be better understood as a phenomenon
which is not only an emergent property of ensembles of neurons, but
granular properties in the moment of an individual entity's behavior
over time. It has to go b
On Sat, Oct 15, 2011 at 2:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> I think we are talking past each other. There is the behavior of
>> neurons at the single-neuron level. That is fairly well understood.
>> Nothing about the spontaneous activity you referenced really
>> challenges anything about our underst
On Oct 15, 10:59 am, John Mikes wrote:
> Dear Craig,
>
> where did you take it from that *"WILL"* does exist indeed?
Technically I think that will could be said to 'insist' rather than
exist, and as such a subjective experiential phenomenon, it is nothing
like a discrete object or mechanism. What
On Oct 15, 3:02 am, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/14/2011 8:48 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Oct 14, 10:46 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> >> On 10/14/2011 7:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>> On Oct 14, 9:00 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/14/2011 5:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
On Oct 14, 11:48 pm, Terren Suydam wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 7:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > I have said many times already, if you think that I am talking about
> > something thay contradicts physics then you don't understand what I'm
> > talking about. Some people do, but you don't. T
Dear Craig,
where did you take it from that *"WILL"* does exist indeed? We experience a
*decision* - sometimes with the 'urge(?)' to fulfill
it, based on comparing partially conscious circumstances (anticipatory
included) and getting into some 'evaluation'(?) of what
seems to be advantageous and w
On 10/14/2011 8:48 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 14, 10:46 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/14/2011 7:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 14, 9:00 pm, meekerdbwrote:
On 10/14/2011 5:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
You already noted that diurnal cycles get synced by light/dark cycles. The
poin
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 7:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> I have said many times already, if you think that I am talking about
> something thay contradicts physics then you don't understand what I'm
> talking about. Some people do, but you don't. Thats ok, not everyone
> is interested enough to try
On Oct 14, 10:46 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/14/2011 7:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Oct 14, 9:00 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> >> On 10/14/2011 5:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >> You already noted that diurnal cycles get synced by light/dark cycles.
> >> The point is that
> >> you don't wil
On 10/14/2011 7:13 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 14, 9:00 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/14/2011 5:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
You already noted that diurnal cycles get synced by light/dark cycles. The
point is that
you don't will these cycles, yet you rely on them: to wake up on time, to
re
On Oct 14, 9:00 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/14/2011 5:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> You already noted that diurnal cycles get synced by light/dark cycles. The
> point is that
> you don't will these cycles, yet you rely on them: to wake up on time, to
> remember
> appointments, etc.
We do wi
On 10/14/2011 5:16 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
We all have many clocks that we can turn to to help us arrange our
activities. Sometimes what we see when we look at the clock makes us
do something that we would rather have waited longer to do. In that
sense, a clock on the wall is 'providing some ti
On Oct 14, 3:58 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/14/2011 12:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> > I think spontaneous in the context of the video and papers you linked
> > means, "unexplainable activity in terms of what you would expect
> > neural circuits to be doing when the organism doesn't appear to be
On Oct 14, 3:40 pm, Terren Suydam wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 2:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> Actually, Stathis's interpretation is the one shared by most of the
> >> neuroscientific community. By and large most scientists do not take
> >> seriously the idea that the behavior of neurons
On 10/14/2011 12:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
I think spontaneous in the context of the video and papers you linked
means, "unexplainable activity in terms of what you would expect
neural circuits to be doing when the organism doesn't appear to be
doing anything". But it certainly does not mean (
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 2:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> Actually, Stathis's interpretation is the one shared by most of the
>> neuroscientific community. By and large most scientists do not take
>> seriously the idea that the behavior of neurons and other cells is
>> explainable in terms of anyt
On Oct 13, 11:21 pm, Terren Suydam wrote:
> Hey Craig,
>
> On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 6:39 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> You have
> >> misunderstood what spontaneous neural activity means.
>
> > There is no misunderstanding. It's not even controversial, you're just
> > plain denying the uncontested
Hey Craig,
On Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 6:39 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> You have
>> misunderstood what spontaneous neural activity means.
>
> There is no misunderstanding. It's not even controversial, you're just
> plain denying the uncontested facts. Don't you think that if there
> were any other t
On Fri, Oct 14, 2011 at 9:39 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> The external inputs themselves are not modelled, they are provided by
>> the environment.
>
> What is an 'external input' made of? Are you saying that there are
> physical pieces of the outside world stuck inside of your brain?
The outsid
On Oct 13, 12:47 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 4:17 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>The model of a neuron does not include the inputs. A
> >> larger model of a network of neurons includes inputs and outputs from
> >> all the neurons in the network but does not include ext
On Wed, Oct 12, 2011 at 4:17 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>The model of a neuron does not include the inputs. A
>> larger model of a network of neurons includes inputs and outputs from
>> all the neurons in the network but does not include external inputs.
>
> Without any external inputs, and witho
On Oct 11, 8:45 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 1:27 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> If you simulate a neuron, then you predict what the neuron will do
> >> given certain inputs. The model of the neuron does not include the
> >> inputs.
>
> > No. Your claim is that all inp
On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 11:33 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Sep 29, 11:14 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>> Craig, do the neurons violate the conservation of energy and
>> momentum? And if not, then how can they have any unexpected effects?
>
>
> Here's a post I did today that hopefully helps clarify h
On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 1:27 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> If you simulate a neuron, then you predict what the neuron will do
>> given certain inputs. The model of the neuron does not include the
>> inputs.
>
> No. Your claim is that all inputs must also be neurological. You say
> over and over th
On Oct 11, 2:52 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2011/10/11 Craig Weinberg
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Oct 10, 10:32 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > 2011/10/10 Craig Weinberg
>
> > > > No. Your claim is that all inputs must also be neurological.
>
> > > He *never* said that. What he said is this : "I
2011/10/11 Craig Weinberg
> On Oct 10, 10:32 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > 2011/10/10 Craig Weinberg
> >
> > > No. Your claim is that all inputs must also be neurological.
> >
> > He *never* said that. What he said is this : "If you know the input + the
> > working of a neuron, you can predict
On Sep 29, 11:14 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
> Craig, do the neurons violate the conservation of energy and
> momentum? And if not, then how can they have any unexpected effects?
Here's a post I did today that hopefully helps clarify how I think it
works: http://s33light.org/post/11288327147
but
On Oct 10, 10:32 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2011/10/10 Craig Weinberg
>
> > No. Your claim is that all inputs must also be neurological.
>
> He *never* said that. What he said is this : "If you know the input + the
> working of a neuron, you can predict the output (fire or not fire), the
> inpu
2011/10/10 Craig Weinberg
> On Oct 10, 7:57 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
> > A simple model of a car's steering would involve knowing the gear
> > ratio between the steering wheel and the front wheels. You could then
> > predict which way the car will turn given the driver's input.
>
> T
On Oct 10, 7:57 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> A simple model of a car's steering would involve knowing the gear
> ratio between the steering wheel and the front wheels. You could then
> predict which way the car will turn given the driver's input.
The same is true of a neuron. If you know t
On Mon, Oct 10, 2011 at 3:29 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Oct 9, 12:09 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 8:06 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> > On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg
>> >> wrote:
>> >> >> Of co
On Oct 8, 7:21 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2011/10/8 Craig Weinberg
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg
> > wrote:
> > > >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
> > > >> pred
On Oct 9, 12:09 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 8:06 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg
> >> wrote:
> >> >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You c
On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 8:06 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
>> >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how
2011/10/8 Craig Weinberg
> On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg
> wrote:
> > >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
> > >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
> > >>
On Oct 8, 12:12 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
> >> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
> >> have the inputs.
>
> > What you are ta
On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> Of course all the parts of the car determine how it will move! You can
>> predict exactly what the car will do if you know how it works and you
>> have the inputs.
>
> What you are talking about is either tautological and obvious or
> delus
On Oct 7, 8:23 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Oct 7, 7:10 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 7:06 AM, Craig Weinberg
> >> wrote:
> >> >> If a motor neuron involved in voluntary activity fires where you woul
On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 10:48 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Oct 7, 7:10 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 7:06 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> >> If a motor neuron involved in voluntary activity fires where you would
>> >> not predict it would fire given its internal state a
On Oct 7, 7:10 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 7:06 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> If a motor neuron involved in voluntary activity fires where you would not
> >> predict it would fire given its internal state and the inputs then it is
> >> *by definition* acting contrar
On Sat, Oct 8, 2011 at 7:06 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> If a motor neuron involved in voluntary activity fires where you would not
>> predict it would fire given its internal state and the inputs then it is *by
>> definition* acting contrary to physical law.
>
> Every firing of motor neurons i
On Oct 7, 1:15 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On 08/10/2011, at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> >> it is something-it-is-like to be a
> >> leaf, and the qualia may differ depending on whether the leaf goes
> >> left or right. As with a brain, the leaf does not break any physical
> >> la
>On Oct 7, 12:38 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> If you have the prediction and not the model... then you don't have the same
> external input.
>
> The internal stimuli are modeled by the model, that's the all point of the
> model.
Subjective internal, not medical internal.
>
> If it's not the cas
On 08/10/2011, at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>> it is something-it-is-like to be a
>> leaf, and the qualia may differ depending on whether the leaf goes
>> left or right. As with a brain, the leaf does not break any physical
>> laws and its behaviour can be completely described in ter
If you have the prediction and not the model... then you don't have the same
external input.
The internal stimuli are modeled by the model, that's the all point of the
model.
If it's not the case, then simply the model is wrong.
2011/10/7 Craig Weinberg
> >On Oct 7, 10:28 am, Quentin Anciaux
>On Oct 7, 10:28 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2011/10/7 Craig Weinberg
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Oct 6, 10:24 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg
> > wrote:
> > > >> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
> > > >> the observ
2011/10/7 Craig Weinberg
> On Oct 6, 10:24 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg
> wrote:
> > >> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
> > >> the observable behaviour of the brain can be.
> >
> > > Yes, the 3-p physica
On Oct 6, 10:24 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
> >> the observable behaviour of the brain can be.
>
> > Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our
On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but
>> the observable behaviour of the brain can be.
>
> Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our
> contemporary instruments can be understood in terms
On Oct 6, 9:14 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2011/10/6 Craig Weinberg
>
> Likewise for a program running on a computer... The physical attributes of
> the cpu are modified by the program..
Sort of, but not exactly. The program exists in the minds of the
programmers, not as an independent entity.
2011/10/6 Craig Weinberg
> On Oct 5, 10:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Craig Weinberg
> wrote:
> > >> If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in
> > >> the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that
> > >> ne
On Oct 5, 10:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in
> >> the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that
> >> neurons firing in the brain can't be just
On Oct 5, 10:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in
> >> the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that
> >> neurons firing in the brain can't be just
On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in
>> the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that
>> neurons firing in the brain can't be just due to a chain of
>> biochemical events.
>
> They can
On Oct 5, 7:10 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 2:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Oct 5, 10:15 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> >> No they are not saying that. They are saying that a model of the brain fed
> >> with the same inputs as a real brain will act as the real
On Oct 5, 6:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 2:24 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >> In fact, Craig himself
> >> denies that his theory would manifest as violation of physical law,
> >> and is therefore inconsistent.
>
> > There is no inconsistency. You're just not understan
On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 2:44 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Oct 5, 10:15 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> No they are not saying that. They are saying that a model of the brain fed
>> with the same inputs as a real brain will act as the real brain... if it was
>> not the case, the model would be wr
On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 2:24 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> In fact, Craig himself
>> denies that his theory would manifest as violation of physical law,
>> and is therefore inconsistent.
>
> There is no inconsistency. You're just not understanding what I'm
> saying because you are only willing to t
On Oct 5, 11:54 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg
>
> > On Oct 5, 10:15 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> > > No they are not saying that. They are saying that a model of the brain
> > fed
> > > with the same inputs as a real brain will act as the real brain... if it
> > was
> >
2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg
> On Oct 5, 10:15 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> > No they are not saying that. They are saying that a model of the brain
> fed
> > with the same inputs as a real brain will act as the real brain... if it
> was
> > not the case, the model would be wrong so you could not
On Oct 5, 10:15 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> No they are not saying that. They are saying that a model of the brain fed
> with the same inputs as a real brain will act as the real brain... if it was
> not the case, the model would be wrong so you could not label it as a model
> of the brain.
Tha
On 04 Oct 2011, at 02:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 3, 11:16 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't think that there are any arithmetical beings.
In which theory?
In reality.
That type of assertion is equivalent with "because God say so".
Reality is what we try to figure out.
If you kno
2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg
> On Oct 5, 2:54 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > 2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg
>
> > > Consciousness happens. Physics has nothing to say about what the
> > > content of any particular brain's thoughts should be. If give you a
> > > book about Marxism then you will
On Oct 5, 2:54 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
>
> 2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg
> > Consciousness happens. Physics has nothing to say about what the
> > content of any particular brain's thoughts should be. If give you a
> > book about Marxism then you will have thoughts about Marxism - not
> > abo
On Oct 5, 12:27 am, meekerdb wrote:
>
> > According to Craig, the 1-p
> > influence (which is equivalent to an immaterial soul) is ubiquitous in
> > living things, and possibly in other things as well.
>
> But he doesn't say what effect is has. It could be anything and hence could
> explain any
On Oct 5, 12:23 am, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/4/2011 8:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> >> On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>> On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
> >>>
Hi,
2011/10/5 Craig Weinberg
> On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> > On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >
> > > On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> >
> > >> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
> observable state at t
> > >> is sufficient to predict t
On 10/4/2011 6:32 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdb wrote:
This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig
wants add to this that there is additional information wh
On 10/4/2011 8:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:
This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p observable
state at t
is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt
On Oct 4, 9:32 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdb wrote:
> > This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
> > observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig
> > wants add to this that there is additional inform
On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:
>
> >> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
> >> observable state at t
> >> is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this
On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdb wrote:
> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p
> observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig
> wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p
> observable and which makes a
On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:
This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p observable
state at t
is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there
is
additional information which is not 3-p o
On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb wrote:
>
> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p observable
> state at t
> is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that
> there is
> additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a
> diff
On 10/3/2011 11:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 2:30 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
The neurons are firing in my brain as I'm thinking, but if you could
go down to the microscopic level you would see that they are firing
due to the various physical factors that make neurons
On 04 Oct 2011, at 02:29, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 4:09 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
I agree with Craig, although the way he presents it might seems a bit
uncomputationalist, (if I can say(*)).
Thoughts act on matter all the time. It is a selection of histories
+ a
On Oct 4, 8:54 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2011/10/4 Craig Weinberg
>
> > On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > > The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only
> > > binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the
> > > synapse when the presyna
2011/10/4 Craig Weinberg
> On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> >
> > The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only
> > binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the
> > synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires. And so on.
>
> It's the 'and so
On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only
> binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the
> synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires. And so on.
It's the 'and so on' where your explanation breaks down.
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 2:30 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>> The neurons are firing in my brain as I'm thinking, but if you could
>> go down to the microscopic level you would see that they are firing
>> due to the various physical factors that make neurons fire, eg. fluxes
>> of calcium and potassiu
On Oct 3, 9:22 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 11:56 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > We do see neurons firing in response to no other stimulation other
> > than the subjects conscious attention and intention. It's not magic,
> > it's how it actually works. It's how you are m
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 11:56 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> We do see neurons firing in response to no other stimulation other
> than the subjects conscious attention and intention. It's not magic,
> it's how it actually works. It's how you are making sense of these
> words right now. You can have y
On Oct 3, 8:29 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 4:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > I agree with Craig, although the way he presents it might seems a bit
> > uncomputationalist, (if I can say(*)).
>
> > Thoughts act on matter all the time. It is a selection of histories + a
>
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