On 21 March 2010 19:50, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno, I've been continuing to pummel my brain, on and off, about the
issues in this thread, and also reading and thinking about different
perspectives on the "knowledge paradox" (such as Gregg Rosenberg's).
If I may, let me put some thoughts to you in
On 20 Mar 2010, at 21:34, David Nyman wrote:
On 20 March 2010 18:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Well, if by 3-p Chalmers you mean some 'body', such a body *is* a
zombie.
The 1-p Chalmers is Chalmers, the person. Its body does not think,
but makes
higher the probability that the 1-p thoughts ref
On 20 March 2010 18:22, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Well, if by 3-p Chalmers you mean some 'body', such a body *is* a zombie.
> The 1-p Chalmers is Chalmers, the person. Its body does not think, but makes
> higher the probability that the 1-p thoughts refers to the most probable
> computations you are
On 20 Mar 2010, at 16:56, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2010 17:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Please, keep in mind I may miss your point, even if I prefer to say
that you
are missing something, for being shorter and keeping to the point.
You
really put your finger right on the hardest part
On 24 February 2010 17:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Please, keep in mind I may miss your point, even if I prefer to say that you
> are missing something, for being shorter and keeping to the point. You
> really put your finger right on the hardest part of the mind-body problem.
Bruno, I've been co
Bruno,
Thanks for this deeply profound reply.
marty a.
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal"
To:
Sent: Friday, February 26, 2010 6:08 AM
Subject: Re: On the comput
On 23 Feb 2010, at 15:38, Diego Caleiro wrote:
I'm not reading the whole discussion here, but the reason I
recommended those readings is that I sensed a mix between accounting
for phenomenal consciousness and access conciousness in the
discussion.Both were used as 1p and 3p, depending
come from.
marty a.
- Original Message ----- From: "Bruno Marchal"
To:
Sent: Wednesday, February 24, 2010 1:59 PM
Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness
On 24 Feb 2010, at 08:22, Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 23 F
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 1:59 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> No representation is conscious. Nor any body (which are relative
> representations).
> Consciousness or knowledge, like truth, but unlike consistency, has no
> finite representation whatsoever.
> It is more the platonic and non representable
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 12:08 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Rex Allen wrote:
>> Is hard determinism as bad an outcome as solipsism? If not, why not?
>>
>
> I don't know about good or bad - but since you post on the internet I infer
> that you are not a solipist.
Since posting on the internet produce
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 7:28 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
> Hi Rex and Members,
>
> There is a very compelling body of work in logic that allows for
> circularity. Please take a look at:
> http://www.springerlink.com/content/m06t7w0163945350/
> and http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonwellfou
Hi,
-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Rex Allen
Sent: Thursday, February 25, 2010 10:31 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 7:17
On Wed, Feb 24, 2010 at 7:17 AM, David Nyman wrote:
> On 24 February 2010 07:03, Rex Allen wrote:
>
>> With this in mind, I'm not sure what you mean by "two undeniably
>> manifest perpectives." Only ONE seems undeniable to me, and that's
>> 1-p.
>>
>> My proposal is that "seeming" is all there i
l and important. These people feel
fulfilled no matter which group they come from.
marty a.
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal"
To:
Sent: Wednesday, February 24, 2010 1:59 PM
Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness
On 24 Feb 2010, at 08:22,
On 24 Feb, 16:09, David Nyman wrote:
> We would seek unambiguous evidence
> that, in the absence of specific subjective 1-p qualitative states,
> certain subsequent 3-p events would be unaccountable without the
> hypothesis of 1-p --> 3-p causal influence.
In the unlikely event that anyone else
On 24 Feb 2010, at 08:22, Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote:
It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard
problem.
1) Get rid of 1-p. (A la Dennettian eliminative materialism)
OR
2)
Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 1:52 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused
while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the
idea that conscious experience exists fundamentally and unca
2010/2/23 Diego Caleiro :
Thanks for this. I have to say, though, that Yablo's approach strikes
me again as waving-away, or defining-out-of-existence, a real issue
that doesn't deserve such treatment. The motive for this seems to be
that academic philosophy has become embarrassed by this questio
David,
please, do not put me down as a Schopenhauerist. My "mini-solipsist" views
stem from Colin Hayes' earlier Everything-list posts about "perceived
reality" as we MAY know it.
I condone the existence (?!) of the world I am part of, just restrict
whatever I "CAN" know to the content (and functio
, February 24, 2010 2:48 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: On the computability of consciousness
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 1:52 AM, Brent Meeker
wrote:
> Rex Allen wrote:
>> The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused
>> while giving rise t
On 24 February 2010 07:03, Rex Allen wrote:
> With this in mind, I'm not sure what you mean by "two undeniably
> manifest perpectives." Only ONE seems undeniable to me, and that's
> 1-p.
>
> My proposal is that "seeming" is all there is to reality. It's all
> surface, no depth. However, using
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 1:52 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Rex Allen wrote:
>> The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused
>> while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the
>> idea that conscious experience exists fundamentally and uncaused and
>> gives
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote:
>
>> It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard
>> problem.
>>
>> 1) Get rid of 1-p. (A la Dennettian eliminative materialism)
>>
>> OR
>>
>> 2) Get rid of 3-p. (subject
On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 7:18 AM, David Nyman wrote:
> On 23 February 2010 05:45, Rex Allen wrote:
>
>> The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused
>> while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the
>> idea that conscious experience exists fundamental
On 22 February 2010 21:03, John Mikes wrote:
> I think the hard problem is not just 'hard to solve': it requires knowledge
> of necessary ingredients (steps in the 'process') still unknown - but
> cleverly spoken about in the sciences, within the framework of those
> portions we already (think) w
Bruno, I want to thank you for such a complete commentary on my recent
posts - I will need to spend quite a bit of time thinking carefully
about everything you have said before I respond at length. I'm sure
that I'm quite capable of becoming confused between a theory and its
subject, though I am o
David,
First of all, as I have already said, you seem to be well aware of the
hardest part of the hard problem of consciousness. And this gives me
the opportunity to try to explain what you are missing. Indeed, in
this post, I will try to explain how comp does solve completely the
concept
On 23 Feb 2010, at 06:45, Rex Allen wrote:
It seems to me that there are two easy ways to get rid of the hard
problem.
1) Get rid of 1-p. (A la Dennettian eliminative materialism)
OR
2) Get rid of 3-p. (subjective idealism)
For the reasons I've touched on above I don't see that introd
I'm not reading the whole discussion here, but the reason I recommended
those readings is that I sensed a mix between accounting for phenomenal
consciousness and access conciousness in the discussion.Both were used
as 1p and 3p, depending on what was being talked about.
This is the reason for r
On 23 February 2010 05:45, Rex Allen wrote:
> For the reasons I've touched on above I don't see that introducing the
> idea of a material world explains anything at all. Therefore, I vote
> for getting rid of 3-p, except as a calculational device.
>
> The idea of a material world that exists fun
Rex Allen wrote:
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 9:52 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman
wrote:
The only rationale for adducing the additional
existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
possess it (or "see
Rex Allen wrote:
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:50 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen wrote:
So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p.
However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the
weaker subordinate position of needing
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 9:52 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Rex Allen wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> The only rationale for adducing the additional
>>> existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
>>> possess it (or "seem" to, a
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:50 PM, David Nyman wrote:
> On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen wrote:
>
>> So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p.
>> However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the
>> weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained
David:
how about: we have our 1p and THINK about a 3p - only as adjusted
(interpreted) by our 1p AS an imagined realistic 3p world? Nobody walks the
shoes of another person (mentally, I mean).
Even reading books or learning from lectures does not impart the message of
the 'author', only the 1p-adj
On 22 February 2010 07:37, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> What do you mean by "implicit" here? What is implicit is that the
> subjectivity (1-p), to make sense, has to be referentially correct
> relatively to the most probable histories/consistent extensions.
What I mean by implicit is "already accounte
On 21 Feb 2010, at 17:31, David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are
related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously
computable, not even partially).
Yes, I do understand that.
Rex Allen wrote:
On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman wrote:
The only rationale for adducing the additional
existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
possess it (or "seem" to, according to some). We can't "compute" the
existence of any 1-p experiential c
On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen wrote:
> So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p.
> However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the
> weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained "in terms of"
> 3-p, while 3-p is implicitly taken to be un
On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman wrote:
> The only rationale for adducing the additional
> existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we
> possess it (or "seem" to, according to some). We can't "compute" the
> existence of any 1-p experiential component of a 3
On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are
> related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously
> computable, not even partially).
Yes, I do understand that. What I'm particularly interested in, with
re
On 16 Feb 2010, at 19:07, David Nyman wrote:
Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first-
person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third-
person perspective?
There is an ambiguity in you phrasing. I will proceed like I always
do, by interpreting your term favorably, relative
On 17 February 2010 02:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
> My intuition is that once we have a really good 3-p theory, 1-p will seem
> like a kind of shorthand way of speaking about brain processes. That
> doesn't mean you questions will be answered. It will be like Bertrand
> Russell's neutral monoids.
On 17 February 2010 07:28, Diego Caleiro wrote:
> You guys should Read Chalmers: Philosophy of Mind, Classical and
> contemporary Readings
> and
>
> Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Richard Rorty
>
> In particular "The Concepts of Counsciousness" By Ned Block and "Mental
> Causation" by step
On 17 February 2010 02:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I'm not sure in what sense you mean "gratuitous". In a sense it is
> gratuitous to describe anything - hence the new catch-phrase, "It is what it
> is." If one is just a different description of the other then they have the
> same consequences -
You guys should Read Chalmers: Philosophy of Mind, Classical and
contemporary Readings
and
Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Richard Rorty
In particular "The Concepts of Counsciousness" By Ned Block and "Mental
Causation" by stephen Yablo will get you nearer to where you are trying to
get.
B
David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2010 00:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
But suppose we had a really good theory and understanding of the brain so
that we could watch yours in operation on some kind of scope (like an fMRI,
except in great detail) and from our theory we could infer that "David's no
David Nyman wrote:
On 17 February 2010 00:06, Brent Meeker wrote:
I don't see that my 1-p experience is at all "causally closed". In fact,
thoughts pop into my head all the time with no provenance and no hint of
what caused them.
The problem is that if one believes that the 3-p narr
On 17 February 2010 00:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
> But suppose we had a really good theory and understanding of the brain so
> that we could watch yours in operation on some kind of scope (like an fMRI,
> except in great detail) and from our theory we could infer that "David's now
> thinking X. An
On 17 February 2010 00:06, Brent Meeker wrote:
> I don't see that my 1-p experience is at all "causally closed". In fact,
> thoughts pop into my head all the time with no provenance and no hint of
> what caused them.
The problem is that if one believes that the 3-p narrative is causally
suffici
David Nyman wrote:
On 16 February 2010 22:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the
computation, you have the experience.
Yes, but that's precisely not the sense I was referring to. Rather
the sense I'm picking out is that neit
David Nyman wrote:
Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?
I suspect there's a problem either way. AFAICS the issue is that, in
3-p and 1-p, there exist two ir
On 16 February 2010 22:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the
> computation, you have the experience.
Yes, but that's precisely not the sense I was referring to. Rather
the sense I'm picking out is that neither the existence, nor the
> Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
> combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
> trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?
I suspect there's a problem either way. AFAICS the issue is that, in
3-p and 1-p, there exist two irreducibly different r
On 17 February 2010 05:07, David Nyman wrote:
> This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every
> morning for the last week. Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first-
> person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third-
> person perspective? The only rationale
David Nyman wrote:
This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every
morning for the last week. Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first-
person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third-
person perspective? The only rationale for adducing the additional
existe
Hi,
Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some
combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep
trying to derive 1-p from 3-p?
Onward!
Stephen
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