RE: Tegmark and consciousness

RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1 [quant-ph] 6 Jan 2014 Consciousness as a State of Matter Max Tegmark, January 8, 2014 Hi Folk, Grrr! I confess that after 12 years of deep immersion in science's grapplings with consciousness, the blindspot I see operating is so obvious and so pervasive and

RE: Tegmark and consciousness

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb Sent: Sunday, 12 January 2014 5:54 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and consciousness On 1/11/2014 8:12 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: RE: arXiv: 1401.1219v1

Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? Computer "Science"

http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25377 Neil Gershenfeld Physicist, Director, MIT's Center for Bits and Atoms; Author, FAB Totally agree: He blames Turing and von Neumann So do I. We stopped doing real empirical work on the inorganic brain 60 ye

RE: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor

http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25336 Rodney A. Brooks Roboticist; Panasonic Professor of Robotics (emeritus) , MIT; Founder, Chairman & CTO, Rethink Robotics; Author, Flesh and Machines While we're at it Lots of good stuff in these respons

RE: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289 Daniel C. Dennett Philosopher; Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Co-Director, Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University; Author, Intuition Pumps And again Cheers Niloc -- You received

RE: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem

IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Hard Problem Ah, well, I would expect Dennett to say that! On 16 January 2014 16:19, Colin Geoffrey Hales mailto:cgha...@unimelb.edu.au>> wrote: http://www.edge.org/response-detail/25289 Daniel C. Dennett<http://www.edge.org/memberbio/daniel_c_dennet

I am the de-phlogistonator!

Hi, Hales, C. G. 2012 The modern phlogiston: why 'thinking machines' don't need computers TheConversation. The Conversation media Group. http://www.theconversation.edu.au/the-modern-phlogiston-why-thinking-machines-dont-need-computers-7881 Cheers Colin P.S. I am done with this issue. I'

RE: Atheism is wish fulfillment

Religion? There's a Tim Minchin video for that. It'll cure you. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kr1I3mBojc0 or maybe http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZeWPScnolo cheers colin -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of m

RE: Why do particles decay randomly?

Colin's Wackier Version: Because the space they operate in, at the scale in which the decay operates, there are far more dimensions than 3. They decay deterministically in >>3D and it appears, to us, to be random because of the collapse of the spatial dimensions to 3, where we humble observers

RE: Why do particles decay randomly?

-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Stathis Papaioannou Sent: Friday, 12 April 2013 11:30 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why do particles decay randomly? On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:35 AM, C

RE: bruno list

-Original Message- From: On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg Sent: Monday, 25 July 2011 10:43 AM To: Everything List Subject: Re: bruno list On Jul 24, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Craig, I agree with 1Z, it is hard to comment some of your statements > because we don't know what are the assu

RE: bruno list

[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg Sent: Monday, 25 July 2011 11:31 AM To: Everything List Subject: Re: bruno list On Jul 24, 9:02 pm, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > artificially. i.e. REPLICATE. Not emulate. Not simulate. You master the > natural vers

RE: Simulated Brains

A computed theory of a hurricane is not a hurricane. A computed theory of cognition is not cognition. We don't want a simulation of the thing. We want an instance of the thing. -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf O

RE: Simulated Brains

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jesse Mazer Sent: Wednesday, 3 August 2011 3:26 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Simulated Brains On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 1:14 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/2/2011 10:03 PM, Stephen

SINGULARITY SUMMIT 2011, Melbourne Australia

‘THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY’ SINGULARITY SUMMIT 2011 AUGUST 20-21 RMIT UNIVERSITY Melbourne http://summit.singinst.org.au/ This August, leading scientists, inventors and philosophers will gather in Melbourne to discuss the upcoming ‘intelligence explosion’ that many now refer to as ‘The Singul

RE: Turing Machines

Great video ... a picture of simplicity Q. 'What is it like to be a Turing Machine?" = Hard Problem. A. It's like being the pile of gear in the video, NO MATTER WHAT IS ON THE TAPE. Colin From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf

RE: Turing Machines

-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg Sent: Monday, 15 August 2011 10:07 AM To: Everything List Subject: Re: Turing Machines On Aug 14, 7:29 pm, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > Great video ..

RE: Turing Machines

Colin and Craig, Imagine that God has such a machine on his desk, which he uses to compute the updated positions of each particle in some universe over each unit of Planck time. Would you agree it is possible for the following to occur in the simulation: 1. Stars to coalesce due to gravity and

RE: Turing Machines

Read all your commentscutting/snipping to the chase... [Jason ] Your belief that AGI is impossible to achieve through computers depends on at least one of the following propositions being true: 1. Accurate simulation of the chemistry or physics underlying the brain is impossible 2. Human in

RE: Turing Machines

On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 2:06 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: Read all your commentscutting/snipping to the chase... It is a little unfortunate you did not answer all of the questions. I hope that you will answer both questions (1) and (2) below. Yeah sorry about that... I'm r

RE: Turing Machines

On 8/15/2011 7:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: just like you can simulate flight if you simulate the environment you are flying in. But do we need to simulate the entire atmosphere in order to simulate flight, or just the atmosphere in the immediate area around the surfaces of the plane?

RE: IBM produces first 'brain chips'

[Col] I've just had a whole bunch of fun at the Melbourne Singularity Summit. What a 'hoot'! At the conference I made a somewhat thwarted attempt to introduce physical replication as a 'roadmap item' for AGI. I tried to show that AGI may be reached by constructing the actual necessary physics of

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Rex Allen Sent: Monday, 27 June 2011 5:59 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Bruno

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Geoffrey Hales wrote: > Can I recalibrate this a little so that you can scientifically handle > consciousness? > > 1) science is based on observation. > > 2) scientific 'observation' is 100% implemented by the consciousness of > scientists. > > 3) regular

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Rex Allen Sent: Monday, 27 June 2011 1:58 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out On Sun, Jun 26, 2011 at 11:29 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Hi Richard et. al., Wow that thread just keeps on going! I am designing chips that do what the brain does. There is ZERO computing. The use of the chips is, I believe a viable source of empirical verification of the claims of the kind that have been discussed in this thread, insofar as any practic

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jason Resch Sent: Thursday, 7 July 2011 4:16 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 10:22 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Hi, You have missed the point. When you feel pain in your hand your are feeling it because the physics of specific specialized small regions of the cranial central nervous system are doing things. Yes, they are passing signals back and forth, performing additions, multiplications, and comp

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Hi, You have missed the point. When you feel pain in your hand your are feeling it because the physics of specific specialized small regions of the cranial central nervous system are doing things. This includes (1) action potentials mutually resonating with (2) a gigantic EM field system in ext

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > Hi, > > > > You have missed the point. When you feel pain in your hand your are feeling > it because the physics of specific specialized small regions of the cranial > central nervous system are doing things. This includes (1) action

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com on behalf of Bruno Marchal Sent: Sat 7/9/2011 10:14 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out On 09 Jul 2011, at 07:07, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > Down the bottom if

RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out

-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com on behalf of Colin Geoffrey Hales Sent: Sun 7/10/2011 4:44 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: COMP refutation paper - finally out -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com on behalf

RE: COMP refutation GAME OVER

Hi Bruno et.al. Once again we have come to grief on the old conflation. (A) You speak of a universe _AS_ computation (described _as if_ on some abstract mega-turing machine) (B) I speak of computation _OF_ laws of nature, by a computer made of natural material, where the laws of nature are tho

RE: COMP refutation GAME OVER

-Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Monday, 11 July 2011 1:16 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: COMP refutation GAME OVER On 10 Jul 2011, at 09:37, Colin Geoffrey Hales

Poking the bear.

Hi all, You might be interested in a little article I wrote, published here: http://theconversation.edu.au/learning-experience-lets-take-consciousness-in-from-the-cold-6739 I am embarked on the long process of getting science to self-review. Enjoy! Colin -- You received this message because

RE: Why is there something rather than nothing?

Why didn't you just ask me in the first place? It's easy. "Nothing" (noun) is intrinsically unstable. Think about it. It takes an infinity of energy to maintain a perfect Nothing. So Nothing breaks up into its components. There. You can all rest easy now. Cheers Colin -Original Message-

Church Turing be dammed.

Here's a story I just wrote. I'll get it published in due course. Just posted it to the FoR list, thought you might appreciate the sentiments It's 100,000 BCE. You are a politically correct caveperson. You want dinner. The cooling body

RE: Church Turing be dammed.

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jason Resch Sent: Tuesday, 29 May 2012 3:45 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Church Turing be dammed. On Tue, May 29, 2012 at 12:21 AM, Colin Geoffrey Hales mailto:cgha

Re: To observe is to......EC

=== STEP 7: Something from nothing. (the big bang) U(.) = (*) from previous STEP. = (()()()()()()()()()()...()()()()()) There is some need to deal with this issue because it leads to the mathematical drive of EC that we inside see as the seco

Re: To observe is to......EC

Hi, Having got deeper into the analysis, what I have found is that EC is literally an instantated lamba calculus by Church. So all I have to do is roughly axiomatise EC in Church's form and I'm done. So that is what I am doing. I'll be directly referring to church's original work. Once that is do

Re: To observe is to......EC

Hi, Having got deeper into the analysis, what I have found is that EC is literally an instantated lamba calculus by Church. So all I have to do is roughly axiomatise EC in Church's form and I'm done. So that is what I am doing. I'll be directly referring to church's original work. Once that is

Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7

> > Addition to my "lost and found" 1st post in this topic to > Marc: > > I wonder how would you define besides 'universe' and 'computer' the " > IS > "? > * > I agree that 'existence' is more than a definitional question. > Any suggestion yet of an (insufficient?) definition? > (Not Desc

Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7

>>It makes sense (I have to translate YOUR vocabujlaryh > into mine, of course). > It ramifies into "SELF" and "Not-SELF" and into the > "relational view" of the totality. > > Also: it leads into my old beef that "everything" is > consckious at its own level. > What to include into 'everything' i

Calculus 101

Hi, Being a clunky autodidact in these things, I have trouble finding my way thru the various mathematical genres. I was wondering if there is a name for the sort of calulus that has no left/right associative/precedence one that performs reductions that are built into the calculus itself.

Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7

See below > > See below, please > John > - Original Message ----- > From: "Colin Geoffrey Hales" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: > Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 12:58 AM > Subject: Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7 >

Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7

See below > > See below, please > John > - Original Message ----- > From: "Colin Geoffrey Hales" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: > Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 12:58 AM > Subject: Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7 >

Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7

see below.. > > See below, please > John > - Original Message ----- > From: "Colin Geoffrey Hales" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: > Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 12:58 AM > Subject: Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7 >

Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7

sorry about all the posts. something weird going on. > > see below.. > >> >> See below, please >> John >> - Original Message ----- >> From: "Colin Geoffrey Hales" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> To: >> Sent: Tuesday, November

Re: To observe is to......EC

> > Are you saying that you disallow lambda expression having the shape: > > (LAMBDA (X) F) > > with no occurrence of X in F? The brackets I have used to date are not the brackets of the lambda calculus. I think physically, not symbolically. I find the jargon really hard to relate to. > > P

Re: To observe is to......EC

> > > Le 10-nov.-06, ࠰5:53, Colin Geoffrey Hales a 飲it : > >> The brackets I have used to date are not the brackets of the lambda >> calculus. I think physically, not symbolically. I find the jargon >> really >> hard to relate to. > > I thought you were

Re: To observe is to......EC

As I stuff my head with the bird menagerie, and try to see if I need to breed a new bird, I find that EC is best thought of as a form of combinatorics (as you thought, Bruno!). Is there anyone out there who has any intuitions as to which bird(s) would correspond to 'coherence' or 'symmetry breaki

Re: To observe is to......EC

I'll take that as a 'no'. Meanwhile I have gone far enough that I think I want to take it elsewhere and publish something. I'll find a local logician and infect them with EC/lambda calc. It's oing to look basically the same: (()()()()) etc There is no end product computation. The act of B-reduc

RE: Natural Order & Belief

> I'm curious: how many people on this list are theists? > > Stathis Papaioannou > I don't believe in any theistic garbage. As a scientist the truth or otherwise of the proposition X = "There is a god and he did this" sits forever perched on the verge of disproof through lack of evidence in the

Re: UDA revisited

> Since it makes no difference in any observable respect whether we are living in a computer simulation running on a bare substrate, as one that is incidently computated as part of a universal dovetailer, or an infinite chain of dovetailers, we really can make use of Laplace's ripost to Napoleon

Re: UDA revisited

Bruno wrote: > In yet another post you say: > >> When talking about minds, the self/other boundary need not occur on the biological boundary (skin). I would say that when dreaming, or hallucinating, the random firing we perceive as coming from our input centres (visual cortex for instance) is com

Re: UDA revisited

> > Bruno wrote: > >> In yet another post you say: >>> When talking about minds, the self/other boundary need not occur on the > biological boundary (skin). I would say that when dreaming, or > hallucinating, the random firing we perceive as coming from our input centres (visual cortex for instanc

Re: UDA revisited

>> >> 1) There is a platonic realm of number. Call it NUM, where numbers are >> real and existence is the act of numerical computation and, >> simultaneously, theorem proving in relation to numbers. > > > I would separate completely "computations" which is an absolute notion > (at least with Churc

Re: UDA revisited

<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED] u> I've cogitated a little on the difference in approach. I think we might contrast as follows: Colin: 1) NUM realm is a platonic realm of idealise

Re: UDA revisited

<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED] au> With reference to the other thread Re: Hypostases (was: Natural Order & Belief) > The other problem is how all > of this logic connects to Everything. That is why I am trying to > understand the 0-person. I think

Re: UDA revisited

> > On Fri, Nov 24, 2006 at 12:12:07PM +1100, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >> >> My paper proves zombies can't do science. You have all said that the UD >> is >> not conscious. This is another way of saying that any creatures within >> (computed by) a UD h

Re: UDA revisited

>> >> I assume by "the universe" you mean ours. Understanding human >> consciousness properly means we will eventually be able to prescribe >> what >> level of consciousness applies to the rest of the universe that is 'not >> humans'. Including animals ...I predict 'not as much'rocks, fridges

Re: UDA revisited

>> > Fair enough, but this is a direct contradiction with the assumption of >> > computationalism. >> >> This is a 'assume comp' playground only? I am up for not assuming >> anything.but if computationalism is actually false then it becomes a >> religion or a club or something. > > Not at all.

Re: UDA revisited

Hi Quentin, > > Hi Colin, > <> >> ... I am more interested in proving scientists aren't/can't be >> zombiesthat it seems to also challenge computationalism in a certain >> sense... this is a byproduct I can't help, not the central issue. Colin > > > I don't see how the idea of zombies could ch

Re: UDA revisited

> > Hi, > > Le Vendredi 24 Novembre 2006 22:54, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit : >> Now that there is a definite role of consciousness (access to novelty), >> the statement 'functional equivalent' makes the original 'philosophical >> zombie' a

RE: UDA revisited

Stathis wrote: > > It still isn't clear to me whether you believe it is possible > for a digital computer to be conscious or not. > Digital computers of the type we currently have? In any/all combinations, including the whole internet? No... that they have the consciousness of the kind we have.

Re: UDA revisited

<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Hi Brent, Please see the post/replies to Quentin/LZ. I am trying to understand the context in which I can be wrong and how other people view the proposition. There can be a mixture of mistakes and p

RE: UDA revisited

> > > Colin Hales writes: > >> So, I have my zombie scientist and my human scientist and >> I ask them to do science on exquisite novelty. What happens? >> The novelty is invisible to the zombie, who has the internal >> life of a dreamless sleep. The reason it is invisible is >> because there is n

RE: UDA revisited

> > You don't think paramecium behaviour could be modelled on a computer? > > Stathis Papaiaonnou A paramecium can behave like it's perceiving something. I haven't observed it myself but I have spoken to people who have and they say they have behaviours which betray some sort of awareness beyond

Re: UDA revisited

Colin: > When you take away phenomenal consciousness what can't you do? Brent: I don't know, because I don't know what it is. What it is? ..is what changes radically when you close your eyes. ..is what you lose when you have a dreamless sleep. ..is what totally stops you doing science when it's

Re: UDA revisited

Colin > I am not talking about the creative process. I am talking about the > perception of a natural world phenomena that has never before been > encountered. There can be no a-priori scientific knowledge in such > situations. It is as far from a metaphor as you can get. I mean literal > invisibi

Re: UDA revisited

Colin >That is the invisibility I claim at the center of > the zombie's difficulty. Brent But it will also present the same difficulty to the human scientist. An in fact it is easy to build a robot that detects and responds to radio waves that are completely invisible to a human scientist. Coli

Re: UDA revisited

The "PHENOMENAL" Colin > What I have done is try to figure out a valid test for phenomenal > consciousness. Brent What is the functional definition of "phenomenal"? Is there "non-phenomenal consciousness"? Colin Phenomena are things that happen in the universe. Those things are perceived by hum

Re: UDA revisited

>> > > I understand that there is a difference between sensing and perception. > Perception includes sensing and also interpreting the sensations in a > model of the world. Which is why unusual appearances can literally be > difficult to perceive. But you still have not said why a digital comput

Re: UDA revisited

>> If all you have is a bunch of numbers (or 4-20mA current loop >> signals or 1-5V signals) dancing away, and you have no >> a-priori knowledge of the external world, how are you to >> create any sort of model of the external world in the first >> place? You don't even know it is there. That is t

RE: UDA revisited

>> >> soyes the zombie can 'behave'. What I am claiming is they >> cannot do _science_ i.e. they cannot behave scientifically. >> This is a very specific claim, not a general claim. > > You're being unfair to the poor zombie robots. How could they > possibly tell if they were in the factory or

RE: UDA revisited

Stathis, I am answering all the mail in time order. I can see below you are making some progress! This is cool. > Colin Hales writes: >> >> So, I have my zombie scientist and my human scientist and >> >> I ask them to do science on exquisite novelty. What happens? >> >> The novelty is invisible t

Re: UDA revisited

> a) Darwinian evolution b) genetic learning algorithm. None of which have any innate capacity to launch or generate phenomenal consciousness and BOTH of which have to be installed by humans a-priori. When you don;t have either of that then what do you do? You are constantly assuming the existan

Richard Dawkins..... Douglas Adams' Bulldog

Hereby named by yours truly in honour of Huxley's similar canine representation of Darwin. Richard Dawkins radio program: http://www.abc.net.au/rn/backgroundbriefing/default.htm see also... http://www.abc.net.au/rn/encounter/default.htm on the design argument. cheers Colin Hales --~--~

RE: UDA revisited

>> Also...paramecium is not noted for its >> scientific behaviour! > > The computer driving the paramecium shell might be difficult > to build, but in principle it would be the same sort of task as, say, a computer running an analogue clock or projecting a film > (i.e., originally filmed on a cel

RE: UDA revisited

Ooops...I forgot the 'quantum level' issue in the paramecium discussion. No. I would disagree. Quantum mechanics is just another "law of appearances" - how the world appears when we look. The universe is not made of quantum mechanics. It is made of 'something'. That 'something' is behaving quantu

Re: UDA revisited

> Le 25-nov.-06, ࠰2:38, Colin Geoffrey Hales a 飲it : > >> [A zombie] doesn't even know there is a world to do science on. > > > *we* don't *know* either. (Even if it is highly dubious there is no world at all, but that is resting on a pure, strictly speaking not t

Re: UDA revisited

<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Le 24-nov.-06, ࠰5:48, Colin Geoffrey Hales a dit : > >> I agree very 'not interesting' ... a bit like saying "assuming comp" endlessly.and never being able to give it teeth. > > I gues

Re: UDA revisited

>> Scientific behaviour demanded of the zombie condition is a clearly >> identifiable behavioural benchmark where we can definitely claim that >> phenomenality is necessary...see below... > > It is all to easy to consider scientific behaviour without > phenomenality. > Scientist looks at test-tube

Re: UDA revisited

> Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: > >> BTW there's no such thing as a truly digital computer. They are all >> actually analogue. We just ignore the analogue parts of the state >> transitions and time it all so it makes sense. > > And if the analogue part intrudes,

Re: UDA revisited

> > > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >> > >> > You don't think paramecium behaviour could be modelled on a computer? >> > >> > Stathis Papaiaonnou >> >> A paramecium can behave like it's perceiving something. I haven't >>

Re: UDA revisited

>> Stathis: >> > All I have to work on is sensory data also. >> >> No you don't! You have an entire separate set of perceptual/experiential >> fields constructed from sensory feeds. The fact of this is proven - >> think >> of hallucination. When the senory data gets overidden by the internal >> im

Re: UDA revisited

>> Colin >> I'm not talking about invisibility of within a perceptual field. That is >> an invisibility humans can deal with to some extent using instruments. >> We >> inherit the limits of that process, but at least we have something >> presented to us from the outside world. The invisibility I s

RE: UDA revisited

> > > Colin Hales writes: > >> > You're being unfair to the poor zombie robots. How could they >> > possibly tell if they were in the factory or on the benchtop >> > when the benchtop (presumably) exactly replicates the sensory >> > feeds they would receive in the factory? >> > Neither humans nor

RE: UDA revisited

> > > Colin Hales writes: > >> You are a zombie. What is it about sensory data that suggests an >> external world? The science you can do is the science of >> zombie sense data, not an external world. Your hypotheses >> about an external world would be treated >> as wild metaphysics by your zombie

Re: UDA revisited

> > But you have no way to know whether phenomenal scenes are created by a > particular computer/robot/program or not because it's just mystery > property defined as whatever creates phenomenal scenes. You're going > around in circles. At some point you need to anchor your theory to an > operati

RE: UDA revisited

> > You seem to be implying that there is some special physics > involved in living processes: isn't that skimming a little > close to vitalism?. All I see is the chemistry > of large organic molecules, the fundamentals of which are > well understood, even if the level of complexity is beyond > wh

RE: UDA revisited

Stathis: > > See my previous post, I'm also answering them in the order that I read > them > (otherwise I'll never get back to them). > > If your model is adequate, then it should allow you to implement a replica > of what > it is that you're modelling such that the replica behaves the same as the

Re: UDA revisited

<> >> No confusion at all. The zombie is behaving. 'Wide awake' >> in the sense that it is fully functional. > > Well, adaptive behaviour -- dealing with novelty --- is functioning. Yes - but I'm not talking about merely functioning. I am talking about the specialised function called scientific b

Re: UDA revisited

>> >> Except that in time, as people realise what I just said above, the >> hypothesis has some emprical support: If the universe were made of >> appearances when we opened up a cranium we'd see them. We don't. > > Or appearances don't appear to be appearances to a third party. > Precisely. Now a

Re: UDA revisited

>> >> Absolutely! But the humans have phenomenal consciousness in lieu of ESP, >> which the zombies do not. > > PC doesn't magically solve the problem.It just involves a more > sophisticated form of guesswork. It can be fooled. We been here before and I'll say it again if I have to Yes! It c

Re: UDA revisited

>> >> You are a zombie. What is it about sensory data that suggests an >> external world? > > What is it about sensory data that suggests an external world to > human? Nothing. That's the point. That's why we incorporate the usage of natural world properties to contextualise it in the external wo

Re: UDA revisited

> > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >>> But you have no way to know whether phenomenal scenes are created by a >>> particular computer/robot/program or not because it's just mystery >>> property defined as whatever creates phenomenal scenes. You're goin

Re: UDA revisited

> > What the zombie argument says (and I repeat it again) is that you SHOULD > (if you are an honest rational person) accept ONE (and only > one as they are contradictory proposition) of the following propositions: > > 1) Consciousness is not tied to a given behavior nor to a given physical > attr

Re: UDA revisited

> > > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >> >> Scientific behaviour demanded of the zombie condition is a clearly >> >> identifiable behavioural benchmark where we can definitely claim that >> >> phenomenality is necessary...see below... >> > &

Re: UDA revisited

> > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: >> <> >>>> No confusion at all. The zombie is behaving. 'Wide awake' >>>> in the sense that it is fully functional. >>> Well, adaptive behaviour -- dealing with novelty --- is functioning. >> >&g

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