Just to be fair with Torgny, it seems he changed his mind on
ultrafinitism:
On 10 May 2009, at 19:05, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
2009/5/8 Torgny Tholerus :
I was an ultrafinitist before, but I have changed my mind. Now I
accept
that you can say that the natural numbers are unlimited. I only
Many people believe something like
objectivity = serious, truth, rationality etc.
subjectivity = not serious, childish, unscientific, irrational
when truth is (if I can say, to be short):
subjectivity = what you cannot doubt, what you know, truth
objectivity = hypothetical, theoretical, but s
On Apr 24, 4:39 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Any content of consciousness can be an illusion. Consciousness itself
> cannot, because without consciousness there is no more illusion at all.
- just catching up with the thread, but I feel compelled to comment
that this is beautifully and clearly put
On Thu, Jun 4, 2009 at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 03 Jun 2009, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>>
>> On Fri, May 22, 2009 at 4:37 PM, Bruno Marchal
>> wrote:
>>
Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
universe that it could be made conscious,
>>>
>>> But a co
On 03 Jun 2009, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Fri, May 22, 2009 at 4:37 PM, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>
>>> Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
>>> universe that it could be made conscious,
>>
>> But a computer is never conscious, nor is a brain. Only a person is
>> con
Hi Jesse,
On 01 May 2009, at 19:36, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
> I found a paper on the Mandelbrot set and computability, I
> understand very little but maybe Bruno would be able to follow it:
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.CC/0604003
>
> The same author has a shorter outline or slides for a presentatio
On Fri, May 22, 2009 at 4:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
>> universe that it could be made conscious,
>
> But a computer is never conscious, nor is a brain. Only a person is
> conscious, and a computer or a brain can only make it possible f
On 02 Jun 2009, at 18:46, Kelly Harmon wrote:
>
>> First, in the multiplication experience, the question of your choice
>> is not addressed, nor needed.
>> The question is really: what will happen to you. You give the right
>> answer above.
>>
>
> You're saying that there are no low probabili
On Sun, May 31, 2009 at 1:46 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> BUT, if there is significant suffering likely in the worlds where I
>> lose, I might very well focus making a choice that will minimize that
>> suffering. In which case I will generally not base much of my
>> decision on the "probabil
On 29 May 2009, at 18:53, Kelly Harmon wrote:
>
> On Thu, May 28, 2009 at 3:49 PM, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>> What do you thing is the more probable events that you will live
>> which
>> one is the more probable? What is your most rational choice among
>
> So if nothing is riding on the o
y opt for many, but
really short posts in the form of questions/easy exercise. We will see.
Best,
Bruno
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: Bruno Marchal
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Sent: Friday, May 29, 2009 6:59 AM
> Subject: Re: Conscious
59 AM
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Hi Marty,
On 29 May 2009, at 02:32, m.a. wrote:
Bruno,
Thank you for this detailed reply. May I pose one follow-up
question? Is the universal dovetailer some sort of God/Machine that is
mathematical like the rest of cre
On Thu, May 28, 2009 at 3:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> What do you thing is the more probable events that you will live which
> one is the more probable? What is your most rational choice among
So if nothing is riding on the outcome of my choice, then it seems
rational to choose the option th
we see about us? If so, how did
> such purposefulness and intentionality get into pure comp? *
> *
> marty a.*
> **
> **
> **
> **
> **
> **
> - Original Message - From: "Kelly Harmon"
> To:
> Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2009 3:02 AM
> Subject: R
Hi Marty,
On 29 May 2009, at 02:32, m.a. wrote:
> Bruno,
> Thank you for this detailed reply. May I pose one follow-
> up question? Is the universal dovetailer some sort of God/Machine
> that is mathematical like the rest of creation but separate from it
> and of a higher order
rchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2009 4:33 PM
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Marty,
On 28 May 2009, at 15:41, m.a. wrote:
If there was never a physical world to which living creatures
adapted after millions of years
omness.
Monkeys = numbers = not very rich.
Universe emerge not from numbers, but from the logical relations among
the numbers. That is so rich that there is no TOE for that!
Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Kelly Harmon"
> T
On 28 May 2009, at 09:02, Kelly Harmon wrote:
>
> On Wed, May 27, 2009 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>> Since you told me that you accept comp, after all, and do no more
>> oppose it to your view, I think we agree, at least on many things.
>> Indeed you agree with the hypothesis, and
On 28 May 2009, at 09:18, Kim Jones wrote:
> Am still interested and possessed of infinite patience
Nice!
Soon ! (in the relative platonist way ... :)
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you
?
marty a.
- Original Message -
From: "Kelly Harmon"
To:
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2009 3:02 AM
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
>
> On Wed, May 27, 2009 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Since you
On 28/05/2009, at 12:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Also, I will from now on, abandon the term machine for the term
> number. Relatively to a fixed chosen universal "machine", like
> Robinson arithmetic, such an identification can be done precisely. I
> will come back on this to my explanation to
On Wed, May 27, 2009 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Since you told me that you accept comp, after all, and do no more
> oppose it to your view, I think we agree, at least on many things.
> Indeed you agree with the hypothesis, and your philosophy appears to
> be a consequence of the hypoth
Kelly,
Since you told me that you accept comp, after all, and do no more
oppose it to your view, I think we agree, at least on many things.
Indeed you agree with the hypothesis, and your philosophy appears to
be a consequence of the hypothesis. That is all my work is about.
Indeed I show yo
On Mon, May 25, 2009 at 11:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Actually I still have no clue of what you mean by "information".
Well, I don't think I can say it much better than I did before:
In my view, there are ungrounded abstract symbols that acquire
meaning via constraints placed on them by
On 25 May 2009, at 07:41, Kelly Harmon wrote:
>
> On Sun, May 24, 2009 at 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>> May be you could study the UDA, and directly tell me at which step
>> your "theory" departs from the comp hyp.
>
> Okay, I read over your SANE2004 paper again.
>
> From step 1 of UD
On Sun, May 24, 2009 at 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> May be you could study the UDA, and directly tell me at which step
> your "theory" departs from the comp hyp.
Okay, I read over your SANE2004 paper again.
>From step 1 of UDA:
"The scanned (read) information is send by traditional means
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> ...
>
> (*) Once and for all, when I say I am a modal realist, I really mean
> this "I have an argument showing that the comp theory imposes modal
> realism". I am really not defending any theory. I am just showing
> that the comp theory leads to precise and verifiabl
Kelly wrote:
>
> On May 23, 12:54 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> Either of these ideas is definite
>> enough that they could actually be implemented (in contrast to many
>> philosophical ideas about consciousness).
>>
>
> Once you had implemented the ideas, how would you then know whether
>
OK. So, now, Kelly, just to understand what you mean by your theory, I
have to ask you what your theory predicts in case of self-
multiplication.
You have to see that, personally, I don't have a theory other than the
assumption that the brain is emulable by a Turing machine, and by
brain I
On May 23, 12:54 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Either of these ideas is definite
> enough that they could actually be implemented (in contrast to many
> philosophical ideas about consciousness).
Once you had implemented the ideas, how would you then know whether
consciousness experience had actu
On Sat, May 23, 2009 at 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>> To repeat my
>> earlier Chalmers quote, "Experience is information from the inside;
>> physics is information from the outside." It is this subjective
>> experience of information that provides meaning to the otherwise
>> completely ab
On 23 May 2009, at 18:54, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> I think it is related. I'm just trying to figure out the implications
> of your theory for the problem of creating artificial, conscious
> intelligences. What I gather from the above is that you think there
> are
> degrees of consciousness ma
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 23 May 2009, at 09:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
>> But why? Why not RA without induction? Is it necessary that there be
>> infinite schema? Since you phrase your answer as "I am willing..." is
>> it a matter of your intuition or is it a matter of "degree" of
>> con
On 23 May 2009, at 09:35, Kelly Harmon wrote:
>
> Okay, below are three passages that I think give a good sense of what
> I mean by "information" when I say that "consciousness is
> information". The first is from David Chalmers' "Facing up to the
&
I missed the meaning of *'conscious'* as applied in this discussion. *If we
accept* that it means 'responding to information' ( used in the wides sense:
in *responding* there is an *absorption* of the result of an observer
moment and *completenig relations thereof* and te *information* as the
*abso
On 23 May 2009, at 09:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
> But why? Why not RA without induction? Is it necessary that there be
> infinite schema? Since you phrase your answer as "I am willing..." is
> it a matter of your intuition or is it a matter of "degree" of
> consciousness.
OK. I could have
Okay, below are three passages that I think give a good sense of what
I mean by "information" when I say that "consciousness is
information". The first is from David Chalmers' "Facing up to the
Problem of Consciousness." The second is from the SEP article on
&
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 23 May 2009, at 06:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 22 May 2009, at 18:25, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> ...
>>>
Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
universe that it could be made conscious,
On 23 May 2009, at 06:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 22 May 2009, at 18:25, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> ...
>>> Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
>>> universe that it could be made conscious,
>>>
>>
>> But a computer is never conscious, nor is a brain.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 May 2009, at 18:25, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> ...
>> Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
>> universe that it could be made conscious,
>>
>
> But a computer is never conscious, nor is a brain. Only a person is
> conscious, and a computer or a
On 22 May 2009, at 18:25, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Fri, May 22, 2009 at 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Indeed assuming comp I support Arithmetic -> Mind -> Matter
>> I could almost define mind by intensional arithmetic: the numbers
>> when
>> studied by the numbers. This does not
On Fri, May 22, 2009 at 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Indeed assuming comp I support Arithmetic -> Mind -> Matter
> I could almost define mind by intensional arithmetic: the numbers when
> studied by the numbers. This does not work because I have to say:
> the numbers as studied by the numb
On 21 May 2009, at 12:28, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
>
> Hi Bruno.
> Thanks for the link. As an physicist and computer researcher I have
> knowledge of some of the fields involved in UDA, but at the first
> sight I fear that I will have a hard time understanding it.
We can do the reasoning step b
Hi Bruno.
Thanks for the link. As an physicist and computer researcher I have
knowledge of some of the fields involved in UDA, but at the first
sight I fear that I will have a hard time understanding it.
> > and my subjective experience is the most objective fact
> > that I can reach.
> t
> I s
Hi Alberto,
On 20 May 2009, at 13:08, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
> On May 19, 7:37 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> ... UDA is an argument showing that the current
>> paradigmatic chain MATTER => CONSCIOUSNESS => NUMBER is reversed:
>> with
>> comp I can explain too you in details (it is long) that
Hi Bruno
On May 19, 7:37 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> ... UDA is an argument showing that the current
> paradigmatic chain MATTER => CONSCIOUSNESS => NUMBER is reversed: with
> comp I can explain too you in details (it is long) that the chain
> should be NUMBER => CONSCIOUSNESS => MATTER
>>>> But they don't CAUSE our conscious experience.
>>
>>> So if we could track the functions of the brain at a fine enough
>>> scale,
>>> we'd see physical events that didn't have physical causes (ones that
>>> were caused by m
On 19 May 2009, at 10:13, Kelly Harmon wrote:
>
> On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 6:36 AM, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>> I agree with your critic of "consciousness = information". This is
>> "not
>> even wrong",
>
> Ouch! Et tu, Bruno???
Apology. I was a bit rude.
>
>
>
>> and Kelly should def
Kelly Harmon wrote:
> ...
> So I think the possibility (conceivability?) of conscious computer
> simulations is what throws a kink into this line of thought.
>
No, that's why I wrote "...relative to an environment". In Moravec's
thought experiment the consciousness is relative to simulation.
'm not saying that at all. Ultimately I'm saying that
> if there is a physical world, it's irrelevant to consciousness.
> Consciousness is information. Physical systems can be interpreted as
> representing, or "storing", information, but that act of "storage
On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 6:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I agree with your critic of "consciousness = information". This is "not
> even wrong",
Ouch! Et tu, Bruno???
> and Kelly should define what he means by "information" so
> that we could see what he really means.
Okay, okay! I was hopi
ouldn't necessarily mean that we'd be correct in
doing so.
>>
>> Well, here's where it gets tricky. Conscious experience is associated
>> with information.
>
> I think that's the point in question. However, we all agree that
> consciousnes
On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 4:22 PM, George Levy wrote:
> Kelly Harmon wrote:
>
> What if you used a lookup table for only a single neuron in a computer
> simulation of a brain?
>
>
> Hi Kelly
>
> Zombie arguments involving look up tables are faulty because look up tables
> are not closed systems. Th
Kelly Harmon wrote:
>
> What if you used a lookup table for only a single neuron in a computer
> simulation of a brain?
>
Hi Kelly
Zombie arguments involving look up tables are faulty because look up
tables are not closed systems. They require someone to fill them up.
To resolve these argument
Le 17-mai-09, à 12:43, Alberto G.Corona a écrit :
>
> The hard problem may be unsolvable, but I think it would be much more
> unsolvable if we don´t fix the easy problem, isn´t?
I think that the hard problem is more easy to solve than the easy
problem.
Indeed it is a theorem in computer scien
Note also that, by being universal machine, our look-up table are
infinite.
Bruno
Le 18-mai-09, à 03:11, Kelly Harmon a écrit :
>
> On Fri, May 15, 2009 at 12:32 AM, Jesse Mazer
> wrote:
>>
>> I don't have a problem with the idea that a giant lookup table is
>> just a
>> sort of "zombie", s
l causes (ones that
>> were caused by mental events?).
>>
>>
>
> No, no, no. I'm not saying that at all. Ultimately I'm saying that
> if there is a physical world, it's irrelevant to consciousness.
> Consciousness is information. Physical
no, no. I'm not saying that at all. Ultimately I'm saying that
if there is a physical world, it's irrelevant to consciousness.
Consciousness is information. Physical systems can be interpreted as
representing, or "storing", information, but that act of "storage"
is
Kelly Harmon wrote:
> On Sun, May 17, 2009 at 2:03 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> Do you suppose that something could behave just as humans do yet not be
>> conscious, i.e. could there be a philosophical zombie?
>>
>
> I think that somewhere there would have to be a conscious experience
> a
On Fri, May 15, 2009 at 12:32 AM, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
> I don't have a problem with the idea that a giant lookup table is just a
> sort of "zombie", since after all the way you'd create a lookup table for a
> given algorithmic mind would be to run a huge series of actual simulations
> of that mi
On Sun, May 17, 2009 at 8:07 AM, John Mikes wrote:
>
> A fitting computer simulation would include ALL aspects involved - call it
> mind AND body, 'physically' observable 'activity' and 'consciousness as
> cause' -- but alas, no such thing so far. Our embryonic machine with its
> binary algorithm
On Sun, May 17, 2009 at 6:43 AM, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
>
> Therefore I think that I answer your question: it´s not only
> information; It´s about a certain kind of information and their own
> processor. The exact nature of this processor that permits qualia is
> not known; that’s true, and it´s
" could produce the same information. And I would
not expect a change in "process" or algorithm to produce a different
subjective experience if the information that was being
processed/output remained the same.
So for this reason I go with "consciousness is information&
Let me please insert my remarks into this remarkable chain of thoughts below
(my inserts in bold)
John M
On Sun, May 17, 2009 at 2:03 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Kelly Harmon wrote:
> > I think your discussing the functional aspects of consciousness. AKA,
> > the "easy problems" of consciousness
The hard problem may be unsolvable, but I think it would be much more
unsolvable if we don´t fix the easy problem, isn´t? With a clear idea
of the easy problem it is possible to infer something about the hard
problem:
For example, the latter is a product of the former, because we
perceive things
Kelly Harmon wrote:
> I think your discussing the functional aspects of consciousness. AKA,
> the "easy problems" of consciousness. The question of how human
> behavior is produced.
>
> My question was what is the source of "phenomenal" consciousness.
> What is the absolute minimum requirement
I think your discussing the functional aspects of consciousness. AKA,
the "easy problems" of consciousness. The question of how human
behavior is produced.
My question was what is the source of "phenomenal" consciousness.
What is the absolute minimum requirement which must be met in order
for c
No. Consciousness is not information. It is an additional process that
handles its own generated information. I you don´t recognize the
driving mechanism towards order in the universe, you will be running
on empty. This driving mechanism is natural selection. Things gets
selected, replicated and s
Hi Jesse,
On 15 May 2009, at 06:32, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
>
> >Maudlin shows that you can reduce almost arbitrarily the amount of
> physical activity for running any computation, and keep their
> computational genuineness through the use of inert material. So the
> isomorphism you introduce
Hi Bruno, I meant to reply to this earlier:
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Date: Sat, 2 May 2009 14:45:13 +0200
On 30 Apr 2009, at 18:29, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2009, at 23:30, Jesse Mazer
2009/5/15 John Mikes :
> Stathis,
> I agree halfway with you and expected something (maybe more).
> Do you mean "the others" are zombies? not ME (you, etc. 1st pers).
I don't think others are zombies, but it is interesting nevertheless
to consider the possibility.
> I take it one step further, t
Stathis,
I agree halfway with you and expected something (maybe more).
Do you mean "the others" are zombies? not ME (you, etc. 1st pers).
I take it one step further, the "fun" (I agree) includes a satisfaction that
"here is a bunch of really smart guys and I can tell them something in their
profess
2009/5/13 John Mikes :
> Bruno,
> merci pour le nom Jean Cocteau. J'ai voulu montrer que je semble
> vivant.
> I told my young bride of 61 years (originally economist, but follows all the
> plaisantries I speculate on) about the assumptions you guys speculate on and
> connect to assumptions of ass
John,
On 12 May 2009, at 22:42, John Mikes wrote:
> (because she believes in her love that I am into all that, -
> understanding):
> "What do you guys hope to achieve by all this speculation?"
I think there is a difference between speculating on the truth on some
theories, and trying just
Jason, thanks for your reply.
Those BIG questions? IMO: typical "SO WHAT" ones. AND if we know?
There is one (practical?) point though: knowing some 'right(?)' answer will
reduce our danger to succumb to underhanded assumptions that mostly involve
pressure to do what otherwise we wouldn't do.
(Like
John,
Great question I am glad you asked it. I think I was driven to this
list because of big questions, especially those which most people seem
to believe are unanswerable. Questions such as: Where did this
universe come from? Why are we here and why am I me? Is there a God?
What is respon
Bruno,
merci pour le nom Jean Cocteau. J'ai voulu montrer que je semble
vivant.
I told my young bride of 61 years (originally economist, but follows all the
plaisantries I speculate on) about the assumptions you guys speculate on and
connect to assumptions of assumptions, Torgny the zombie, Stephe
Bruno Marchal skrev:
> On 08 May 2009, at 19:15, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>
>>> On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>>
Yes it is right. There is no infinity of natural numbers. But the
natural numbers are UNLIMITED, you can construc
Hi John,
On 11 May 2009, at 22:49, John Mikes wrote:
>
> who was that French poet who made puns after death?
>
>> ...
> A french poet said, after he died (!) : "friends, pretend only to
> cry because poet pretends only to dye". (Faites semblant de pleurer
> mes amis puisque les poètes font s
Hi Torgny,
> I come from Stockholm, Sweden. I was constructed by my parents. In
> reality I think that all humans are zombies, but because I am a polite
> person, I do not tell the other zombies that they are zombies. I do
> not
> want to hurt the other zombies by telling them the truth.
Bruno,
who was that French poet who made puns after death?
JohnM
On Sun, May 10, 2009 at 3:04 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 08 May 2009, at 19:15, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
> >
> > Bruno Marchal skrev:
> >> On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 08 May 2009, at 19:15, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>> On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>>
>>>
you are human, all right?
>>> I look exactly as a human. When you look at me, you will not be
>>> able to know if I am a
Quentin Anciaux skrev:
> Hi,
>
> 2009/5/8 Torgny Tholerus :
>
>> I was an ultrafinitist before, but I have changed my mind. Now I accept
>> that you can say that the natural numbers are unlimited. I only deny
>> actual infinities. The set of all natural numbers are always finite,
>> but you
Hi,
2009/5/8 Torgny Tholerus :
>
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>> On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>>
>>>
you are human, all right?
>>> I look exactly as a human. When you look at me, you will not be
>>> able to know if I am a human or a zombie,
Bruno Marchal skrev:
> On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
>
>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>
>>
>>> you are human, all right?
>>>
>> I look exactly as a human. When you look at me, you will not be
>> able to know if I am a human or a zombie, because I behave exacly like
On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>> On 06 May 2009, at 11:35, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>>
Someone unconscious cannot doubt either ... (A zombie can only fake
doubts)
>>> Yes, you are right. I can only fake dou
Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2009 11:10 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
On 06 May 2009, at 11:35, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>
>> Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its
>> consciousness, I
Bruno Marchal skrev:
> On 06 May 2009, at 11:35, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
>
>> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>
>>> Someone unconscious cannot doubt either ... (A zombie can only fake
>>> doubts)
>>>
>> Yes, you are right. I can only fake doubts...
>>
>
>
>
> I suspect you are faking f
On 06 May 2009, at 11:35, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal skrev:
>>
>> Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its
>> consciousness, I think, although it can doubt everything else it can
>> be conscious *about*.
>> It is the unprovable (but coverable) fixed point of Desc
Bruno Marchal skrev:
>
> Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its
> consciousness, I think, although it can doubt everything else it can
> be conscious *about*.
> It is the unprovable (but coverable) fixed point of Descartes
> systematic doubting procedure (this fit well with
o: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2009 1:33 PM
> Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
>
>
> snip
>
> Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its
> consciousness, I think, although it can doubt everything else it can
> be
On 05 May 2009, at 22:31, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Sun, May 3, 2009 at 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> With just arithmetic, when we stop to postulate a primitive or
>> ontological material world, all primitive ad-hocness is removed,
>> given
>> that the existing internal interpr
On Sun, May 3, 2009 at 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> With just arithmetic, when we stop to postulate a primitive or
> ontological material world, all primitive ad-hocness is removed, given
> that the existing internal interpretations are all determined, with
> their relative frequency, by
-
From: Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2009 1:33 PM
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
snip
Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its consciousness, I
think, although it can doubt everything else it can be consci
On 04 May 2009, at 13:31, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> 2009/5/4 Bruno Marchal :
>
>>> ...
>
>> It seems to me that we agree that physical supervenience leads to
>> many
>> absurdities. Is your argument purely academical, or do you think it
>> can be used to prevent the conclusion that physics
On 03 May 2009, at 17:09, John Mikes wrote:
> I would like to go along with Maudlin's point emphasized in Bruno's
> text below, adding that "causal" structure is restricted to the
> limited model of which we CAN choose likely 'causes' within our
> perceived reality, while the unlimited poss
2009/5/4 Bruno Marchal :
>> in the same way a
>> message is obscured if encoded with a one-time pad that is
>> subsequently destroyed and forgotten. In fact, even with the
>> store-bought computer the computation is obscured if there are no
>> intelligent beings around who can understand it.
>
>
On 03 May 2009, at 09:00, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> 2009/5/3 Bruno Marchal :
>
>> I think that if you take a real forest with birds, here and there,
>> you
>> can interpret some behavior as NAND or NOR, but you will not succeed
>> ever in finding the computation of factorial(5).
>
> But y
I would like to go along with Maudlin's point emphasized in Bruno's text
below, adding that "causal" structure is restricted to the limited model of
which we *CAN *choose likely 'causes' within our perceived reality, while
the unlimited possibilities include wider 'intrusions' of domains 'beyond
ou
Stathis, and listers,
I cannot help: I read the text. (Not always, sometimes it seems too obtuse
for me even to 'read' it).
The Subject? ( Consciousness = information )
what happens to that darn 'information'? Oops, 'you' are AWARE of it!?
Meaning: you *DO* something with it (to "be - become?"
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