Just to be fair with Torgny, it seems he changed his mind on
ultrafinitism:
On 10 May 2009, at 19:05, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
2009/5/8 Torgny Tholerus tor...@dsv.su.se:
I was an ultrafinitist before, but I have changed my mind. Now I
accept
that you can say that the natural numbers are
by the particles of my brain at that
instant. And that if you transfer that information to a computer
and
run a simulation that updates that information appropriately, my
consciousness will continue in that computer simulation,
regardless of
the hardware (digital computer, mechanical computer
to a computer and
run a simulation that updates that information appropriately, my
consciousness will continue in that computer simulation, regardless of
the hardware (digital computer, mechanical computer, massively
parallel or single processor, etc) or algorithmic details of that
computer
Hi Jesse,
On 01 May 2009, at 19:36, Jesse Mazer wrote:
I found a paper on the Mandelbrot set and computability, I
understand very little but maybe Bruno would be able to follow it:
http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.CC/0604003
The same author has a shorter outline or slides for a presentation
On 03 Jun 2009, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, May 22, 2009 at 4:37 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
universe that it could be made conscious,
But a computer is never conscious, nor is a brain. Only a person is
On Thu, Jun 4, 2009 at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 03 Jun 2009, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, May 22, 2009 at 4:37 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
universe that it could be made conscious,
On Fri, May 22, 2009 at 4:37 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
universe that it could be made conscious,
But a computer is never conscious, nor is a brain. Only a person is
conscious, and a computer or a brain can only make it
On 02 Jun 2009, at 18:46, Kelly Harmon wrote:
First, in the multiplication experience, the question of your choice
is not addressed, nor needed.
The question is really: what will happen to you. You give the right
answer above.
You're saying that there are no low probability worlds?
On 29 May 2009, at 18:53, Kelly Harmon wrote:
On Thu, May 28, 2009 at 3:49 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
What do you thing is the more probable events that you will live
which
one is the more probable? What is your most rational choice among
So if nothing is riding on
Hi Marty,
On 29 May 2009, at 02:32, m.a. wrote:
Bruno,
Thank you for this detailed reply. May I pose one follow-
up question? Is the universal dovetailer some sort of God/Machine
that is mathematical like the rest of creation but separate from it
and of a higher order of
a.*
**
**
**
**
**
**
- Original Message - From: Kelly Harmon harmon...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2009 3:02 AM
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
On Wed, May 27, 2009 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote
On Thu, May 28, 2009 at 3:49 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
What do you thing is the more probable events that you will live which
one is the more probable? What is your most rational choice among
So if nothing is riding on the outcome of my choice, then it seems
rational to
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Hi Marty,
On 29 May 2009, at 02:32, m.a. wrote:
Bruno,
Thank you for this detailed reply. May I pose one follow-up
question? Is the universal dovetailer some sort of God/Machine that is
mathematical like the rest of creation
On Wed, May 27, 2009 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Since you told me that you accept comp, after all, and do no more
oppose it to your view, I think we agree, at least on many things.
Indeed you agree with the hypothesis, and your philosophy appears to
be a consequence
On 28/05/2009, at 12:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Also, I will from now on, abandon the term machine for the term
number. Relatively to a fixed chosen universal machine, like
Robinson arithmetic, such an identification can be done precisely. I
will come back on this to my explanation to Kim,
?
marty a.
- Original Message -
From: Kelly Harmon harmon...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2009 3:02 AM
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
On Wed, May 27, 2009 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal marc
On 28 May 2009, at 09:18, Kim Jones wrote:
Am still interested and possessed of infinite patience
Nice!
Soon ! (in the relative platonist way ... :)
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you
On 28 May 2009, at 09:02, Kelly Harmon wrote:
On Wed, May 27, 2009 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Since you told me that you accept comp, after all, and do no more
oppose it to your view, I think we agree, at least on many things.
Indeed you agree with the
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
On Wed, May 27, 2009 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal
marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Since you told me that you accept comp, after all, and do no more
oppose it to your view, I think we agree, at least on many things.
Indeed you agree with the hypothesis
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2009 4:33 PM
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Marty,
On 28 May 2009, at 15:41, m.a. wrote:
If there was never a physical world to which living creatures
adapted after millions of years
On Mon, May 25, 2009 at 11:21 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Actually I still have no clue of what you mean by information.
Well, I don't think I can say it much better than I did before:
In my view, there are ungrounded abstract symbols that acquire
meaning via constraints
of Shannon, or Kolmogorov, or Solomonov, or
Solovay or even Landauer (which one precisely?), in which case
information = consciousness is as much non sensical than saying
consciousness is neuron's firing, or you use it, as I think you do,
in the everyday sense of information like when we ask
Kelly wrote:
On May 23, 12:54 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Either of these ideas is definite
enough that they could actually be implemented (in contrast to many
philosophical ideas about consciousness).
Once you had implemented the ideas, how would you then
On Sun, May 24, 2009 at 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
May be you could study the UDA, and directly tell me at which step
your theory departs from the comp hyp.
Okay, I read over your SANE2004 paper again.
From step 1 of UDA:
The scanned (read) information is send by
On 23 May 2009, at 06:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 May 2009, at 18:25, Jason Resch wrote:
...
Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
universe that it could be made conscious,
But a computer is never conscious, nor is a brain. Only a person is
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 May 2009, at 06:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 May 2009, at 18:25, Jason Resch wrote:
...
Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
universe that it could be made conscious,
But a computer is never
Okay, below are three passages that I think give a good sense of what
I mean by information when I say that consciousness is
information. The first is from David Chalmers' Facing up to the
Problem of Consciousness. The second is from the SEP article on
Semantic Conceptions of Information
On 23 May 2009, at 09:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
But why? Why not RA without induction? Is it necessary that there be
infinite schema? Since you phrase your answer as I am willing... is
it a matter of your intuition or is it a matter of degree of
consciousness.
OK. I could have taken
I missed the meaning of *'conscious'* as applied in this discussion. *If we
accept* that it means 'responding to information' ( used in the wides sense:
in *responding* there is an *absorption* of the result of an observer
moment and *completenig relations thereof* and te *information* as the
On 23 May 2009, at 09:35, Kelly Harmon wrote:
Okay, below are three passages that I think give a good sense of what
I mean by information when I say that consciousness is
information. The first is from David Chalmers' Facing up to the
Problem of Consciousness. The second is from the SEP
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 May 2009, at 09:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
But why? Why not RA without induction? Is it necessary that there be
infinite schema? Since you phrase your answer as I am willing... is
it a matter of your intuition or is it a matter of degree of
consciousness.
On 23 May 2009, at 18:54, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think it is related. I'm just trying to figure out the implications
of your theory for the problem of creating artificial, conscious
intelligences. What I gather from the above is that you think there
are
degrees of consciousness marked
completely abstract platonic symbols.
I insist on this well before Chalmers. We are agreeing on this.
But then you associate consciousness with the experience of information.
This is what I told you. I can understand the relation between
consciousness and information content.
Information. Information
On May 23, 12:54 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Either of these ideas is definite
enough that they could actually be implemented (in contrast to many
philosophical ideas about consciousness).
Once you had implemented the ideas, how would you then know whether
consciousness
symbols.
I insist on this well before Chalmers. We are agreeing on this.
But then you associate consciousness with the experience of
information.
This is what I told you. I can understand the relation between
consciousness and information content.
Information. Information content. H
On 21 May 2009, at 12:28, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
Hi Bruno.
Thanks for the link. As an physicist and computer researcher I have
knowledge of some of the fields involved in UDA, but at the first
sight I fear that I will have a hard time understanding it.
We can do the reasoning step by
On 22 May 2009, at 18:25, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, May 22, 2009 at 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Indeed assuming comp I support Arithmetic - Mind - Matter
I could almost define mind by intensional arithmetic: the numbers
when
studied by the numbers. This does
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 May 2009, at 18:25, Jason Resch wrote:
...
Do you believe if we create a computer in this physical
universe that it could be made conscious,
But a computer is never conscious, nor is a brain. Only a person is
conscious, and a computer or a brain can
Hi Bruno.
Thanks for the link. As an physicist and computer researcher I have
knowledge of some of the fields involved in UDA, but at the first
sight I fear that I will have a hard time understanding it.
and my subjective experience is the most objective fact
that I can reach.
t
I see
Hi Bruno
On May 19, 7:37 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
... UDA is an argument showing that the current
paradigmatic chain MATTER = CONSCIOUSNESS = NUMBER is reversed: with
comp I can explain too you in details (it is long) that the chain
should be NUMBER =
Hi Alberto,
On 20 May 2009, at 13:08, Alberto G.Corona wrote:
On May 19, 7:37 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
... UDA is an argument showing that the current
paradigmatic chain MATTER = CONSCIOUSNESS = NUMBER is reversed:
with
comp I can explain too you in details (it is
On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 4:22 PM, George Levy gl...@quantics.net wrote:
Kelly Harmon wrote:
What if you used a lookup table for only a single neuron in a computer
simulation of a brain?
Hi Kelly
Zombie arguments involving look up tables are faulty because look up tables
are not closed
is associated with, can be identified by, certain
behavior. So to say that physical systems are too representationally
ambiguous seems to me to beg the question. It is based on assuming that
consciousness is information and since the physical representation of
information is ambiguous
On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 6:36 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I agree with your critic of consciousness = information. This is not
even wrong,
Ouch! Et tu, Bruno???
and Kelly should define what he means by information so
that we could see what he really means.
Okay, okay! I
to consciousness.
Consciousness is information. Physical systems can be interpreted as
representing, or storing, information, but that act of storage
isn't what gives rise to conscious experience.
You're aware of course that the same things were said about the
physio/chemical bases of life
Kelly Harmon wrote:
...
So I think the possibility (conceivability?) of conscious computer
simulations is what throws a kink into this line of thought.
No, that's why I wrote ...relative to an environment. In Moravec's
thought experiment the consciousness is relative to simulation.
On 19 May 2009, at 10:13, Kelly Harmon wrote:
On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 6:36 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
I agree with your critic of consciousness = information. This is
not
even wrong,
Ouch! Et tu, Bruno???
Apology. I was a bit rude.
and Kelly should define
of the brain at a fine enough
scale,
we'd see physical events that didn't have physical causes (ones that
were caused by mental events?).
No, no, no. I'm not saying that at all. Ultimately I'm saying that
if there is a physical world, it's irrelevant to consciousness.
Consciousness is information
Note also that, by being universal machine, our look-up table are
infinite.
Bruno
Le 18-mai-09, à 03:11, Kelly Harmon a écrit :
On Fri, May 15, 2009 at 12:32 AM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com
wrote:
I don't have a problem with the idea that a giant lookup table is
just a
sort of
by its own this very special theory of qualia and quanta.
I agree with your critic of consciousness = information. This is not
even wrong, and Kelly should define what he means by information so
that we could see what he really means. I suspect Kelly is confusing
information and information
Kelly Harmon wrote:
What if you used a lookup table for only a single neuron in a computer
simulation of a brain?
Hi Kelly
Zombie arguments involving look up tables are faulty because look up
tables are not closed systems. They require someone to fill them up.
To resolve these arguments
have in common that would explain this mutual experience of
consciousness?
The information processing?
Brent
On Sat, May 16, 2009 at 3:22 AM, Alberto G.Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote:
No. Consciousness is not information. It is an additional process that
handles its own generated
this mutual experience of
consciousness?
On Sat, May 16, 2009 at 3:22 AM, Alberto G.Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote:
No. Consciousness is not information. It is an additional process that
handles its own generated information. I you don´t recognize the
driving mechanism towards order
...@gmail.com
wrote:
No. Consciousness is not information. It is an additional process that
handles its own generated information. I you don´t recognize the
driving mechanism towards order in the universe, you will be running
on empty. This driving mechanism is natural selection. Things gets
a change in process or algorithm to produce a different
subjective experience if the information that was being
processed/output remained the same.
So for this reason I go with consciousness is information, not
consciousness is information processing.
Processes just describe ways that different
On Sun, May 17, 2009 at 8:07 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
A fitting computer simulation would include ALL aspects involved - call it
mind AND body, 'physically' observable 'activity' and 'consciousness as
cause' -- but alas, no such thing so far. Our embryonic machine with its
On Fri, May 15, 2009 at 12:32 AM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
I don't have a problem with the idea that a giant lookup table is just a
sort of zombie, since after all the way you'd create a lookup table for a
given algorithmic mind would be to run a huge series of actual
that
if there is a physical world, it's irrelevant to consciousness.
Consciousness is information. Physical systems can be interpreted as
representing, or storing, information, but that act of storage
isn't what gives rise to conscious experience.
You're aware of course that the same things were said about
. Ultimately I'm saying that
if there is a physical world, it's irrelevant to consciousness.
Consciousness is information. Physical systems can be interpreted as
representing, or storing, information, but that act of storage
isn't what gives rise to conscious experience.
You're aware
No. Consciousness is not information. It is an additional process that
handles its own generated information. I you don´t recognize the
driving mechanism towards order in the universe, you will be running
on empty. This driving mechanism is natural selection. Things gets
selected, replicated
:
No. Consciousness is not information. It is an additional process that
handles its own generated information. I you don´t recognize the
driving mechanism towards order in the universe, you will be running
on empty. This driving mechanism is natural selection. Things gets
selected, replicated and selected again
Hi Jesse,
On 15 May 2009, at 06:32, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Maudlin shows that you can reduce almost arbitrarily the amount of
physical activity for running any computation, and keep their
computational genuineness through the use of inert material. So the
isomorphism you introduce vanish
Stathis,
I agree halfway with you and expected something (maybe more).
Do you mean the others are zombies? not ME (you, etc. 1st pers).
I take it one step further, the fun (I agree) includes a satisfaction that
here is a bunch of really smart guys and I can tell them something in their
profession
2009/5/15 John Mikes jami...@gmail.com:
Stathis,
I agree halfway with you and expected something (maybe more).
Do you mean the others are zombies? not ME (you, etc. 1st pers).
I don't think others are zombies, but it is interesting nevertheless
to consider the possibility.
I take it one
Hi Bruno, I meant to reply to this earlier:
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Date: Sat, 2 May 2009 14:45:13 +0200
On 30 Apr 2009, at 18:29, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2009, at 23:30, Jesse Mazer
Jason, thanks for your reply.
Those BIG questions? IMO: typical SO WHAT ones. AND if we know?
There is one (practical?) point though: knowing some 'right(?)' answer will
reduce our danger to succumb to underhanded assumptions that mostly involve
pressure to do what otherwise we wouldn't do.
(Like
John,
On 12 May 2009, at 22:42, John Mikes wrote:
(because she believes in her love that I am into all that, -
understanding):
What do you guys hope to achieve by all this speculation?
I think there is a difference between speculating on the truth on some
theories, and trying just to
2009/5/13 John Mikes jami...@gmail.com:
Bruno,
merci pour le nom Jean Cocteau. J'ai voulu montrer que je semble
vivant.
I told my young bride of 61 years (originally economist, but follows all the
plaisantries I speculate on) about the assumptions you guys speculate on and
connect to
Hi Torgny,
I come from Stockholm, Sweden. I was constructed by my parents. In
reality I think that all humans are zombies, but because I am a polite
person, I do not tell the other zombies that they are zombies. I do
not
want to hurt the other zombies by telling them the truth.
I
Hi John,
On 11 May 2009, at 22:49, John Mikes wrote:
who was that French poet who made puns after death?
...
A french poet said, after he died (!) : friends, pretend only to
cry because poet pretends only to dye. (Faites semblant de pleurer
mes amis puisque les poètes font semblant
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 08 May 2009, at 19:15, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Yes it is right. There is no infinity of natural numbers. But the
natural numbers are UNLIMITED, you can construct as many natural
Bruno,
merci pour le nom Jean Cocteau. J'ai voulu montrer que je semble
vivant.
I told my young bride of 61 years (originally economist, but follows all the
plaisantries I speculate on) about the assumptions you guys speculate on and
connect to assumptions of assumptions, Torgny the zombie,
John,
Great question I am glad you asked it. I think I was driven to this
list because of big questions, especially those which most people seem
to believe are unanswerable. Questions such as: Where did this
universe come from? Why are we here and why am I me? Is there a God?
What is
Bruno,
who was that French poet who made puns after death?
JohnM
On Sun, May 10, 2009 at 3:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 08 May 2009, at 19:15, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Quentin Anciaux skrev:
Hi,
2009/5/8 Torgny Tholerus tor...@dsv.su.se:
I was an ultrafinitist before, but I have changed my mind. Now I accept
that you can say that the natural numbers are unlimited. I only deny
actual infinities. The set of all natural numbers are always finite,
but
On 08 May 2009, at 19:15, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
you are human, all right?
I look exactly as a human. When you look at me, you will not be
able to know if I am a human or a zombie, because I
On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 06 May 2009, at 11:35, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Someone unconscious cannot doubt either ... (A zombie can only fake
doubts)
Yes, you are right. I can only fake doubts...
I suspect you
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
you are human, all right?
I look exactly as a human. When you look at me, you will not be
able to know if I am a human or a zombie, because I behave exacly like a
human.
Hi,
2009/5/8 Torgny Tholerus tor...@dsv.su.se:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 07 May 2009, at 18:29, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
you are human, all right?
I look exactly as a human. When you look at me, you will not be
able to know if I am a human or a zombie, because I
On 06 May 2009, at 11:35, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its
consciousness, I think, although it can doubt everything else it can
be conscious *about*.
It is the unprovable (but coverable) fixed point of Descartes
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 06 May 2009, at 11:35, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Someone unconscious cannot doubt either ... (A zombie can only fake
doubts)
Yes, you are right. I can only fake doubts...
I suspect you are faking faking doubts, but of
: Thursday, May 07, 2009 11:10 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
On 06 May 2009, at 11:35, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its
consciousness, I think, although it can doubt
Bruno Marchal skrev:
Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its
consciousness, I think, although it can doubt everything else it can
be conscious *about*.
It is the unprovable (but coverable) fixed point of Descartes
systematic doubting procedure (this fit well with the
On 04 May 2009, at 13:31, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/5/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
...
It seems to me that we agree that physical supervenience leads to
many
absurdities. Is your argument purely academical, or do you think it
can be used to prevent the conclusion that
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 05, 2009 1:33 PM
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
snip
Something conscious cannot doubt about the existence of its consciousness, I
think, although it can doubt everything else it can be conscious *about
On Sun, May 3, 2009 at 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
With just arithmetic, when we stop to postulate a primitive or
ontological material world, all primitive ad-hocness is removed, given
that the existing internal interpretations are all determined, with
their relative
On 05 May 2009, at 22:31, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, May 3, 2009 at 10:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
With just arithmetic, when we stop to postulate a primitive or
ontological material world, all primitive ad-hocness is removed,
given
that the existing internal
2009/5/4 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
in the same way a
message is obscured if encoded with a one-time pad that is
subsequently destroyed and forgotten. In fact, even with the
store-bought computer the computation is obscured if there are no
intelligent beings around who can understand
On 03 May 2009, at 17:09, John Mikes wrote:
I would like to go along with Maudlin's point emphasized in Bruno's
text below, adding that causal structure is restricted to the
limited model of which we CAN choose likely 'causes' within our
perceived reality, while the unlimited
2009/5/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
I think that if you take a real forest with birds, here and there, you
can interpret some behavior as NAND or NOR, but you will not succeed
ever in finding the computation of factorial(5).
But you can interpret *any* behaviour as a NAND gate, in an
Stathis, and listers,
I cannot help: I read the text. (Not always, sometimes it seems too obtuse
for me even to 'read' it).
The Subject? ( Consciousness = information )
what happens to that darn 'information'? Oops, 'you' are AWARE of it!?
Meaning: you *DO* something with it (to be - become
I would like to go along with Maudlin's point emphasized in Bruno's text
below, adding that causal structure is restricted to the limited model of
which we *CAN *choose likely 'causes' within our perceived reality, while
the unlimited possibilities include wider 'intrusions' of domains 'beyond
our
On 03 May 2009, at 09:00, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/5/3 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
I think that if you take a real forest with birds, here and there,
you
can interpret some behavior as NAND or NOR, but you will not succeed
ever in finding the computation of factorial(5).
On Apr 29, 2:26 am, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
What extra information do you have in mind? I'd gladly update my
priors with anything I can lay my hands on.
So changes to neural structure and the concentrations of various
chemicals within neurons and around neural synapses
On 30 Apr 2009, at 18:29, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2009, at 23:30, Jesse Mazer wrote:
But I'm not convinced that the basic Olympia machine he describes
doesn't already have a complex causal structure--the causal
structure would be in the way different troughs
On 30 Apr 2009, at 19:39, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Apr 2009, at 15:49, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Marchal wrote
That is weird.
I think that you believe that a rock implements computations, because
you believe a computation can be decomposed in tiny computations,
On 01 May 2009, at 17:02, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/5/1 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
That is, you can't say that the rock
implements one computation but not another.
I don't think it implements any computations. I could accept some
tiny
apparition of tiny pieces of of tiny
On 01 May 2009, at 19:36, Jesse Mazer wrote:
I found a paper on the Mandelbrot set and computability, I
understand very little but maybe Bruno would be able to follow it:
http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.CC/0604003
The same author has a shorter outline or slides for a presentation
on this
On Thu, Apr 30, 2009 at 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The mathematical Universal Dovetailer, the splashed universal Turing
Machine, the rational Mandelbrot set, or any creative sets in the
sense of Emil Post, does all computations. Really all, with Church
thesis. This is
I found a paper on the Mandelbrot set and computability, I understand very
little but maybe Bruno would be able to follow it:
http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.CC/0604003
The same author has a shorter outline or slides for a presentation on this
subject at
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