And how much is that 2 kg in that 'other' universe?
JM
On 11/23/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 20 Nov 2008, at 19:08, m.a. wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC +
MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is
On 23 Nov 2008, at 17:46, John Mikes wrote:
And how much is that 2 kg in that 'other' universe?
Like two kg, when weighted on Earth. I was literal for the sake of the
reasoning.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You
On 19 Nov 2008, at 22:16, m.a. wrote:
Bruno,
I was just quoting you: And if you do the math, you get
a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm
mechanism or to refute it. Did you mean refutes materialism?
Thanks for quoting the entire sentence,
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC +
MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with
- the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT (mechanism refutes
materialism).
- the proposition saying that MAT implies NON
On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote:
So you're saying that a physics extracted from mechanism which
(let's assume) refutes mechanism,
If a physics extracted from mechanism refutes mechanism, then
mechanism is refuted. (p implies not p) is equivalent with (not p).
I guess you meant
Bruno,
I was just quoting you: And if you do the math, you get a
physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm
mechanism or to refute it. Did you mean refutes materialism?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote:
*So you're saying that a
On Nov 16, 2008, at 1:32 PM, Günther Greindl wrote:
nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position
quite accurately :-)
Thanks, Günther! It'll be interesting to see if we continue to agree
as the MGA thread progresses. :)
-- Kory
*So you're saying that matter is as much a delusion as the luminiferous
aether and could be a logical extension of Kant's subjective definitions
of space and time? And the splitting of the MWI is just permutations of
equations? Gosh.
On 18 Nov 2008, at 15:30, m.a. wrote:
So you're saying that matter is as much a delusion as the
luminiferous aether
Yes. If you mean matter by fundamental matter.
It does not mean the Higgs boson is an illusion (in case the LHC
shows it). It means that the idea that there are
Hi m.a.
On 18 Nov 2008, at 20:18, m.a. wrote:
Dear Bruno,
Needless to say I feel honored that you've
taken the time to answer my naive questions.
Naive questions I love.
But since you invite such questions, I do have a problem with the
phrase highlighted
the arithmetic truth by looking inside' (pardon
my poetic
distortion). How close can we look? The light is on but nobody's
home?
Gordon
--- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon
On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to
implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what
Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully conscious
like you or me, even when implemented
On 16 Nov 2008, at 11:20, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote:
Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event,
whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that
substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called
physical
On 16 Nov 2008, at 09:52, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It's computations supporting consciousness that makes this idea
interesting. Otherwise, it's like claiming that a block of marble
contains any given statue: in a sense it's true, but you need a
sculptor to allow the statue to interact
On 17 Nov 2008, at 16:22, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 16, 2008, at 6:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Some believe that for having a real conscious person, you have to
implement it in a real primary material universe. It is clearly what
Peter Jones thinks. I am saying that a person can be fully
2008/11/16 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
the null state?
I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any
computation can be mapped
2008/11/16 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
the null state?
I'm not sure that works. In the original idea the mapping was to be
one-to-one (which is
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:22 PM, m.a. wrote:
Isn't some sort of substrate necessary for any mathematical event,
whether it be a brain or a screen or a universe? And isn't that
substrate sufficiently different from the math to be called physical
existence?
That's certainly the prevailing
On 15 Nov 2008, at 12:12, Michael Rosefield wrote:
Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness,
racketeering, or just an attempt to push his own reality in a
certain direction on the character's part.
For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible
Hi Kory,
nicely put (the below), it captures my current metaphysical position
quite accurately :-)
Cheers,
Günther
Imagine again the mathematical description of Conway's Life applied to
the binary digits of PI. Somewhere within that description there may
be descriptions of beings who
Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or
just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the
character's part.
For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible
computations is that you end up with no possible way of knowing
2008/11/15 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory
outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that
reality in PC is still materialist, in the sense that at the root
there still is material stuff which is
2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Yeah, I think that was meat to be either short-sightedness, racketeering, or
just an attempt to push his own reality in a certain direction on the
character's part.
For me, though, the thing about a stone implementing all possible
computations
2008/11/15 Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
2008/11/15 Michael Rosefield [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
'Nothing' := 'Something' - 'Everything'
Just what I was saying!
I was about to say that...
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are
is on but nobody's home?
Gordon
--- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM
On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 12
*Is it wrong to ask what the lattice is made of? Isn't some sort of
substrate necessary for any mathematical event, whether it be a brain or
a screen or a universe? And isn't that substrate sufficiently different
from the math to be called physical existence?
m.a.
*
Kory Heath wrote
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
the null state?
I guess I don't really have a clear picture of why the fact that any
computation
If you look at the structure and relationships of maths, it's all rather an
incestuous family tree anyway. You can get from any one point to another if
you try hard enough. It's like 6 degrees of Kevin Bacon. Now think of any
physical system embedded in the maths. It's easy enough to get to other
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 15, 2008, at 5:12 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But if any computation can be mapped onto any physical state, then
every computation can be mapped onto one physical state; and why not
the null state?
I'm not sure that works. In the original idea the
2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be
interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the
conclusion. So ...
Yes, I'd be interested in an explanation of the MGA in English; I read
French only with
On 14 Nov 2008, at 11:54, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2008/11/14 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be
interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the
conclusion. So ...
Yes, I'd be interested in an
On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not
Bruno Marchal skrev:
For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me,
i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness.
There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a
materialist can and even should interpret this as a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
that only *person* are
On 14 Nov 2008, at 18:43, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and
me,
i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness.
There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material.
Now a
On Nov 14, 2008, at 9:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Now a computationalist cannot say I believe that persons represented
by unimplemented computations are conscious for the reason that all
computations have to be implemented.
Ok, I see your point. Computations are actions that people (or
Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have essentially is
the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City.
--
- Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven?
- Mmm.
- That was me... and six other guys.
2008/11/15 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Nov
On Nov 14, 2008, at 5:09 PM, Michael Rosefield wrote:
Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have
essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City.
Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory
outlined in PC. Although it's a
2008/11/13 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
tell us what he means by a physical universe.
I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say,
What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's
On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the
argument
with people interested in the matter.
True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.)
Second, it happens that sometimes
PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM
On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
First, I have never stop to work
On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be
it soft or hard wired).
Good point.
On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for
granted.
I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why
we can't take physical reality for granted. I've never seen the
arguments laid out quite clearly
I think the most compelling arguments against a fundamental physical reality
go along the lines of starting with one, and showing you can abstract away
from it until it becomes just another arbitrary perspective.
--
- Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven?
- Mmm.
- That
On 12 Nov 2008, at 12:11, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for
granted.
I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why
we can't take physical reality for granted.
On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument
with people interested in the matter.
True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.)
Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
tell us what he
On Nov 9, 2008, at 3:24 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
I'm with you and Dennett - except I'm reserved about the use of
logical
possibility.
Fair enough. I might be misusing that term. Maybe a better way to
state my position would be that I think the standard conception of
philosophical zombie
On Nov 7, 2008, at 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Do you understand that if comp is false, then arithmetical truth
contains (immaterial) zombies (because it contains already the
relative implementations of all solutions of Schroedinger equations
and variant, if only that for example ...)?
On Nov 7, 2008, at 9:34 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think I agree with Bruno that it is *logically* possible, e.g.
accidental zombies. It's just not nomologically possible.
I'm not sure what counts as an accidental zombie. Do you mean
something like the following:
I can write a very short
2008/11/9 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Yes, I do see what you mean, and in fact I agree with you. The point I
was making was that most philosophers - including those like Dennett
who believe in the logical impossibility of zombies - believe that
(for instance) you would have to implement a
On 07 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
It's easy enough to agree with describes, but is describing
something
the same as creating it?
Yes, for effective things like numbers and programs, (machines, or
finite pieces of computations).
How can we decide these entities (what makes
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
It's easy enough to agree with describes, but is describing something
the same as creating it?
Yes, for effective things like numbers and programs, (machines, or
finite pieces of computations).
How can we decide
On Nov 9, 2008, at 9:56 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
It's sort of what I meant; except I imagined a kind of robot that,
like your
Turing test program, had it's behavior run by a random number
generator but just
happened to behave as if it were conscious.
Ok. That works just as well for me.
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 9, 2008, at 9:56 AM, Brent Meeker wrote:
It's sort of what I meant; except I imagined a kind of robot that,
like your
Turing test program, had it's behavior run by a random number
generator but just
happened to behave as if it were conscious.
Ok. That works
Hi Bruno,
I can agree for all computational states of some (universal) machine.
If you don't precise what you mean by state it is a bit too much
general. Imo.
I mean either: all computational states OR all physical states -
depending on whether comp or phys is true. Where the difference
On 07 Nov 2008, at 03:27, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Hi Jason,
Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit :
although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the
computer is
entirely cut off from causal
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the
Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
times) in the
On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in
the
Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Nov 2008, at 08:51, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in
the
Universal Deploiement,
Bruno,
Thanks for your answers, I think it is safe to say we are on the same page
with the UDA. I accept mathematical realism and therefore the existence of
abstract Turing machines defining the computational histories of all
programs, or the equations of string theory defining all true
Hello Bruno,
More exactly: I can conceive fake policemen in paper are not conscious,
and that is all I need to accept I can be fail by some zombie.
Thus I can conceive zombies.
Ok, but conceivability does not entail possibilty. I think philosophical
zombies are impossible (=not able to
Isn't a zombie equivalent to, say, a spreadsheet that doesn't really perform
the proper calculations, but produces all the right answers for all the data
and functions you happen to put in?
It seems like such an elaborate con-job is far more inefficient and
intensive (and pointlessly so) once you
On Wed, Nov 5, 2008 at 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Jason,
Le 04-nov.-08, à 23:21, Jason Resch a écrit :
although I agree with Brent, if the simulated world in the computer is
entirely cut off from causal effects of the physical world where the
computer is
On Nov 5, 2008, at 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Just consider the computation which correspond to your actual real
life. That computation is encoded (indeed an infinity of times) in the
Universal Deploiement, which is itself encoded (indeed an infinity of
times) in the set of all
Hi Günther,
unfortunately I can't participate a lot at the moment because I'm quite
busy, but I try to follow some of the discussion, and would like to
pose
a question (to Bruno):
Which is why I think philosophical zombies
are impossible.
I also think they are impossible, and you
Le 03-nov.-08, à 08:32, Brent Meeker a écrit :
I have reservations about #6: Consciousness is a process, but it
depends on a context.
That is why I use the notion of generalized brain. I take into account
the possible need of a context. The argument would break only if you
stipulate that
On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
To accept this I have to assume I = the world, and that world is not
turing-emulable. But then comp is false.
Bruno,
I have seen you say this many times but I still don't understand why it is
so, perhaps I don't know
On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 11:10 AM, Jason Resch [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
To accept this I have to assume I = the world, and that world is not
turing-emulable. But then comp is false.
Bruno,
I have seen you say this
On 03 Nov 2008, at 18:10, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Nov 3, 2008 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
To accept this I have to assume I = the world, and that world is not
turing-emulable. But then comp is false.
Bruno,
I have seen you say this many times but I still
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