*Hardware, Software, Humans: Truth, Fiction, and Abstraction*
Graham White [ http://www.eecs.qmul.ac.uk/profiles/whitegraham.html ]
pdf:
https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/11717/White%20Hardware,%20Software,%20Humans%3A%20Truth,%20Fiction%20and%20Abstraction%202015
gt;>
>>>>> According to the Context Principle, the basic unit of sense is the
>>>>> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language
>>>>> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and
>
t;> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and
>>>> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also
>>>> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object,
>>>> then, is a matter of th
nse is the
>>> proposition, or sentence. The sentence is the smallest unit of language
>>> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and
>>> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also
>>> whether th
at all. The
meaningfulness of names and predicates is a matter of the
place they occupy in the sentence, and also whether the
sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object,
then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the
truth of the
hey occupy in the sentence, and also
>> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object,
>> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the
>> whole sentence.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> This leads me to a
the smallest unit of language
> which can be used to say anything at all. The meaningfulness of names and
> predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the sentence, and also
> whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object,
> then, is a matter of the co
her or not a name refers to an object,
> then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the
> whole sentence.
>
>
> Is that true? Doesn't the sentence have different truth values depending
> on what object a name refers to? not just whether it refers
meaningfulness
of names and predicates is a matter of the place they occupy in the
sentence, and also whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name
refers to an object, then, is a matter of the contribution the name
makes to the truth of the whole sentence.
Is that true? Doesn't the sentence
place they occupy in the sentence, and also
whether the sentence is true. Whether or not a name refers to an object,
then, is a matter of the contribution the name makes to the truth of the
whole sentence.
@philipthrift
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You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
He might have been listening to The Rolling Stones, "I can't get no
satisfaction." Hamkins is pretty reliable though.
LC
On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 1:39:54 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> I wonder if Bruno is familiar with this paper?
>
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.0670.pdf
>
> Brent
>
--
You
Mechanism is a theology, a risky invitation of an unknown at the table, which
looks strangely like yourself.
The Model of Set Theory have too much imagination. I am already happy that ZF
and ZFC captured the same arithmetical truth.
The paper does not illustrate that the notion of arithmetical
I wonder if Bruno is familiar with this paper?
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.0670.pdf
Brent
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On Sun, Jun 4, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Anything that can be done a Turing Machine can do, if it can't be done
>> then a Turing Machine can't do it, and neither can anything else.
>
>
>
> If "can be done" means "can compute or emulate", I am OK. That is
> basically Chur
within
>> the domain of an epistemology, not an ontology, and as such are more
>> tractable in terms of an adequate theory of knowledge.
>>
>> If the foregoing is valid (and obviously I think it may well be) then a
>> more illuminating criterion to be applied in matters
dequate theory of knowledge.
>
> If the foregoing is valid (and obviously I think it may well be) then a
> more illuminating criterion to be applied in matters within the observable
> or perceptual spectrum is not whether they exist in an ontological sense
> but rather whether th
rue I don't
mean necessarily "veridical" in the conventional sense that all, or indeed
any, inferences that might be drawn from them are thereby accurate. The
sense of truth I'm using here is more or less equivalent to Descartes'
realisation that the primary characteristic of exper
uch a "Platonic hyperspace"?
But if computationalism is right, you need no more than the sigma_1
truth, for what will be said to exist, and the usual second-order
arithmetic, analysis, for studying the statistics of the relative
state of the sigma_1 observers, which usually will hav
Physical is good, that means, in principle, we can interact with it.
-Original Message-
From: John Clark
To: everything-list
Sent: Fri, Jul 1, 2016 2:57 pm
Subject: Re: The search of truth
On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 11:32 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List
wrote:
>
To
On Friday, July 1, 2016 at 8:57:31 PM UTC+2, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 11:32 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
> >
>> To my ignorant brain, the very definition of matter needs, somehow, to be
>> precisely, described,
>>
>
> Mat
On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 11:32 AM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
> To my ignorant brain, the very definition of matter needs, somehow, to be
> precisely, described,
>
Matter is everything that is not nothing. Nothing is infinite unbounded
homogeneit
On Thu, Jun 30, 2016 at 10:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Forget the "primary" crap. Matter is needed for the existence of
>> computations period.
>
>
> >
> No, matter is needed locally to make a calculation relative to you in the
> physical reality.
>
OK fine, but then by your own ad
memorizing computer networking, let,
alone, join discussions of the Cosmos, yet, here I write.
-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal
To: everything-list
Sent: Thu, Jun 30, 2016 10:54 am
Subject: Re: The search of truth
On 26 Jun 2016, at 00:04, John Clark wrote:
Forget the &quo
On 26 Jun 2016, at 00:04, John Clark wrote:
Forget the "primary" crap. Matter is needed for the existence of
computations period.
No, matter is needed locally to make a calculation relative to you in
the physical reality.
But the relative computations exist, provably so in any sigma_1
c
yes but not
totally irrelevant,
in fact that impossibility is saying something of vital importance about
the nature of our world and it might be wise to listen to what it's saying.
>
> "primary matter is needed for having the existence of computations in
> general&
ed to some computational relations, which are
actually already provable by RA, we explain the appearances of matter
by the necessity of restricting/enlarging the measure by invoking
truth or consistency, (or both), and, surprise, it works, in the sense
of providing a type of quantum logic
On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 2:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> In this case even mathematicians, even mathematicians who specialize in
>> number theory, would give physics the last word in determining what is true
>> and what is not,
>>
>
> >
> It would not be physics that showed the proof incor
On Sun, Oct 18, 2015 at 12:34 PM, John Clark wrote:
> Fermat proved 350 years ago that no three integers exist that satisfy the
> equation X^4 + Y^4 =Z^4 and since that time few have bothered to look for
> such numbers because they knew it was a fool's errand; but suppose
> Professor Bozo, a ecce
Fermat proved 350 years ago that no three integers exist that satisfy the
equation X^4 + Y^4 =Z^4 and since that time few have bothered to look for
such numbers because they knew it was a fool's errand; but suppose
Professor Bozo, a eccentric computer scientist, decided to look anyway and
suppose h
An interesting approach to knowledge as coherence. Still has problems to be resolved as
noted in the paper http://arxiv.org/pdf/1502.03519v1.pdf.
Brent
On 3/1/2015 11:36 AM, :
Google has created an automated system for collecting facts:
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22329832.700-goo
Google has created an automated system for collecting facts:
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22329832.700-googles-factchecking-bots-build-vast-knowledge-bank.html#.VPNoW3zMSSo
as interesting as this is towards the creation of an AI (as something that
learns more and gets smarter when provid
On 14 Mar 2014, at 06:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/13/2014 9:54 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
which was my objection to writing <>t. In such a formula, t can
only be regarded as shorthand for some tautology.
If you want. Any simple provable proposition would do.
Then f also occurs in every world s
On 3/13/2014 9:54 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
which was my objection to writing <>t. In such a formula, t can only be regarded as
shorthand for some tautology.
If you want. Any simple provable proposition would do.
Then f also occurs in every world since (p & ~p) can be formed in every world. B
On 14 Mar 2014, at 01:49, Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10:45AM +1300, LizR wrote:
(Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊ ?)
Yes I do!
Not me (alas).
Damned. I will need to use the more ugly <> instead of the cute ◊ !
No problem.
Bruno
Although it is visible when
On 13 Mar 2014, at 22:10, LizR wrote:
> (Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊ ?)
Yes I do!
Nice, I hope everyone see it. Does someone not see a lozenge? Here: ◊
Do someone not see Gödel's second theorem here: ◊t -> ~[]◊t ?
Bruno
--
You received this message because you are subscrib
at confuses me in trying your exercises (which
I'm attempting to do without reading your exchanges with Liz).
There you refer to a formula being "respected" when it is true in
all worlds for all valuations. But does "all valuations" of a
formula A include f when
On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10:45AM +1300, LizR wrote:
> > (Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊ ?)
>
> Yes I do!
>
Not me (alas). Although it is visible when typing my response.
Cheers
--
Prof Russell Standish
> (Do everyone see a lozenge here: ◊ ?)
Yes I do!
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To post to t
uses me in trying your exercises (which I'm attempting to do
without reading your exchanges with Liz). There you refer to a formula being
"respected" when it is true in all worlds for all valuations. But does "all
valuations" of a formula A include f when A=p->p?
No
efer to a formula being "respected" when it is true in all
worlds for all valuations. But does "all valuations" of a formula A
include f when A=p->p?
No, the valuations are defined only on the atomic p, q, r, (in
modal propositional logic).
Then the arbitrary f
ally are.
Somehow, for the machine talking in first predicate logic, like
PA and ZF, more can be said, once we interpret the modal box by
the Gödelian "beweisbar('p')", which can be translated in
arithmetic.
First order theories have a nice metamathematical property,
nges with Liz). There you refer to a formula being "respected"
when it is true in all worlds for all valuations. But does "all valuations" of a formula
A include f when A=p->p? Are we to assume that "t" is a formula in all worlds and it's
value is alway
refer to that (mathematical) reality.
This, Aristotle and Leibniz understood, but Kripke enriched the notion of
"possibility" by making the notion of possibility relative to the world you actually are.
Somehow, for the machine talking in first predicate logic, like PA and ZF, more
cal propositional logic, and t is
verified in all worlds. So, if alpha verifies <>t (if <>t is true in
alpha), then <>t means simply that there is some world beta accessible
(given that t is true in all world).
<>t = "truth is possible" = "I am
(mathematical) reality.
This, Aristotle and Leibniz understood, but Kripke enriched the
notion of "possibility" by making the notion of possibility
relative to the world you actually are.
Somehow, for the machine talking in first predicate logic, like PA
and ZF, more can
On 13 March 2014 04:33, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hello Terren,
>
> On 12 Mar 2014, at 04:34, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> Thanks, that helps. Can you expand a bit on <>t? Unfortunately I haven't
> had the time to follow the modal logic threads, so please forgive me but I
> don't understa
terpret the modal box by the Gödelian "beweisbar('p')", which can be
translated in arithmetic.
First order theories have a nice metamathematical property, discovered by Gödel (in his
PhD thesis), and know as completeness, which (here) means that provability is equivalent
with
nce we interpret the modal box by the Gödelian
"beweisbar('p')", which can be translated in arithmetic.
First order theories have a nice metamathematical property, discovered
by Gödel (in his PhD thesis), and know as completeness, which (here)
means that provability is equiva
e question if we are dreaming or not, or more generally,
> if we are wrong or not.
>
>
>
>
> Brains that are defective in this manner result in schizophrenia and
> presumably other dissociative pathologies.
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>
> For me it all casts doubt
ive in this manner result in schizophrenia
and presumably other dissociative pathologies.
OK.
For me it all casts doubt on whether Bp & p is an accurate
formalization for experience, but I might be missing something.
As I said above, it is a simplest "meta" definition which
ories about such 1p things, like consciousness,
>> we can decide to agree on some "property" of the notion. Then,
>> "consciousness-here-and-now" might be a candidate for a possible true
>> reference, if you agree consciousness-here-and-now is undoubtable or
"consciousness-here-and-now" might be a candidate for a possible true
> reference, if you agree consciousness-here-and-now is undoubtable or
> incorrigible.
>
> Then we can approximate many sort of truth, by the very plausible, the
> probable, the relatively expectable, etc.
is true, but the machine does not know
that, and for correct machine, this change nothing. We have Bp -> p
(as a theorem of G*, not of G).
Bruno
Brent
On 1/8/2014 2:11 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno and Brent:
did you agree whether "TRUE BELIEF" means in your sentences
1. one
On 08 Jan 2014, at 23:11, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno and Brent:
did you agree whether "TRUE BELIEF" means in your sentences
1. one's belief that is TRUE, (not likely),
It is that one. "Bp & p" means that p is believed (by some machine)
and that it is the cas
ence of some (Peano's) axioms", which is not
necessarily the same as "expresses a fact".
Brent
On 1/8/2014 2:11 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno and Brent:
did you agree whether *"TRUE BELIEF*" means in your sentences
1. one's belief that is TRUE, (not likely), or
2.
Bruno and Brent:
did you agree whether *"TRUE BELIEF*" means in your sentences
1. one's belief that is TRUE, (not likely), or
2. the TRUTH that one believes in it (a maybe)?
(none of the two may be 'true').
JM
On Wed, Jan 1, 2014 at 5:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Dec 2013, at 21:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/31/2013 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
only rules to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs.
?
I answered "no" to your question. Knowledge is not extracted in any
way from belief (assumed or not). knowledge *is* belief, when or in
the world
On 12/31/2013 1:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
only rules to extract knowledge from assumed beliefs.
?
I answered "no" to your question. Knowledge is not extracted in any way from belief
(assumed or not). knowledge *is* belief, when or in the world those beliefs are true,
but this you can never
ailable portion - and that
transformed into human belief - with the entirety of the infinite
complexity so I would not mention "truth". Again: compare your
contemporary 'truth' concepts with a similar stance - say - of 3000
years ago. Did Ishtarians have the same 'tr
On 30 Dec 2013, at 20:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
To summarize, there is no possible pure knowledge,
Why? On the contrary, beliefs can intersect truth, sometimes, and
provably so for simpler machine than us.
What happens is that only God knows when your beliefs are genuine
knowledge
portion - and that transformed
into human belief - with the entirety of the infinite complexity so I would
not mention "truth". Again: compare your contemporary 'truth' concepts with
a similar stance - say - of 3000 years ago. Did Ishtarians have the same
'truth'?
#5
Right y
ledge, only rules to extract
>>> knowledge from assumed beliefs. Thanks. But I already knew so.
>>>
>>> But i the realm of reality,
>>>
>>
>> And where may one find this realm of realms?
>>
>>
>>> i.e. sensible experience, Edgar i
here may one find this realm of realms?
>>
>
> Is the realm where you pay taxes.
>
>>
>>
>>> i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here.
>>>
>>
>> The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is:
>>
>> You can enlist entire mailing lists a
the realm of reality,
>>
>
> And where may one find this realm of realms?
>
Is the realm where you pay taxes.
>
>
>> i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here.
>>
>
> The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is:
>
> You can enlist entire mailing
gt; But i the realm of reality,
>>
>
> And where may one find this realm of realms?
>
>
>> i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here.
>>
>
> The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is:
>
> You can enlist entire mailing lists as free reviewers for an
On 12/30/2013 3:39 AM, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
All,
In response to the discussion of the possibility of a "Final Theory" I'm starting a new
topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important and separate issue from previous
discussions.
1, it is impossible to directly kn
gt; i.e. sensible experience, Edgar is right here.
>
The only truth Edgar is unearthing for me is:
You can enlist entire mailing lists as free reviewers for any book project
you may have, without paying them one cent for doing so. Vanity and
altruism make good bedfellows. PGC
>
>
>
wrote:
>
>
>
>
> 2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal
>
>>
>> On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>>
>> All,
>>>
>>> In response to the discussion of the possibility of a "Final Theory" I'm
>>> starting a new to
On 30 Dec 2013, at 15:25, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal
On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
All,
In response to the discussion of the possibility of a "Final Theory"
I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an
2013/12/30 Bruno Marchal
>
> On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
>
> All,
>>
>> In response to the discussion of the possibility of a "Final Theory" I'm
>> starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important an
On 30 Dec 2013, at 12:39, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
All,
In response to the discussion of the possibility of a "Final Theory"
I'm starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an
important and separate issue from previous discussions.
1, it is impossible to di
All,
In response to the discussion of the possibility of a "Final Theory" I'm
starting a new topic on the Nature of Truth since this is an important and
separate issue from previous discussions.
1, it is impossible to directly know the external fundamental reality, we
know e
On 23 Nov 2013, at 16:47, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
the factual notions of truth and existence are linked by the notion
that what is true kick back and what kick back can render you
nonexistent at the moment `t +1` if you negate its truth at the
moment `t`.
Now natural selection can
: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth
On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno:
Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may
go deeper in my opinion:
If we THINK of something: it DOES exist indeed (in our mind) but
may not be true. I refrain
the factual notions of truth and existence are linked by the notion that
what is true kick back and what kick back can render you nonexistent at the
moment `t +1` if you negate its truth at the moment `t`.
Now natural selection can make the units of time really really long. So it
is not a
erything-list@googlegroups.com
> *Subject:* Re: Belief vs Truth
>
> On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote:
>
> Bruno:
> Brent's dichotomy - as you pointed out - about exist and true may go
> deeper in my opinion:
> If we *THINK *of something: it DOES *exist* indeed *(in our mi
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Saturday, November 23, 2013 1:14 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth
On 23 Nov 2013, at 07:09, Chris de Morsella wrote:
From
On 23 Nov 2013, at 07:09, Chris de Morsella wrote:
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com
] On Behalf Of meekerdb
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2013 9:11 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth
On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb
Sent: Friday, November 22, 2013 9:11 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Belief vs Truth
On 11/22/2013 3:24 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno:
Brent's dichotomy - a
icted (partial) knowledge
capability. "WE THINK IT IS TRUE" is in our belief system.
Now it is up to you to call the "EXISTING" thought as 'truly existing' We fabricate
'truth' in this respect but only in this respect. Otherwise I am just waiting for
ad
on't separate them. True is only an assertative variant of real,
and both reality and truth concerns the many form of existence. Atoms
exists, temperature exists, countries exist, persons exist; all in
different true senses, for example.
Now it is up to you to call the "EXISTING&q
HINK IT IS TRUE" is in our belief
system.
Now it is up to you to call the "EXISTING" thought as 'truly existing'
We fabricate 'truth' in this respect but only in this respect. Otherwise I
am just waiting for additional input disproving what I 'beleived-in
On 21 Nov 2013, at 19:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/21/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Let´s go to a human level:
in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief
hardcoded by natural selection.
This is self-defeating or circular. You need the "truth" of natural
se
On 11/21/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Let´s go to a human level:
in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded by natural
selection.
This is self-defeating or circular. You need the "truth" of natural selection to make
sense of it.
That seems to confo
On 21 Nov 2013, at 12:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Nov 2013, at 11:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
The material phenomena are events in the mind.
That is partially true in the comp theory. But mind and matter
emerges from the existence of [READ OR] absence of solution(s) to
Dioph
On 21 Nov 2013, at 11:29, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2013/11/21 Bruno Marchal
On 20 Nov 2013, at 21:57, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
To say that F = m . a or e= m c2 as truth it is necessary to
accept certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws
will not change for example
2013/11/21 Bruno Marchal
>
> On 20 Nov 2013, at 21:57, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>
> To say that F = m . a or e= m c2 as truth it is necessary to accept
> certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws will not change
> for example.
>
>
> e=mc^2 is an inte
On 20 Nov 2013, at 21:57, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
To say that F = m . a or e= m c2 as truth it is necessary to
accept certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws will
not change for example.
e=mc^2 is an interesting theory (belief), or an interesting theorem in
an
To say that F = m . a or e= m c2 as truth it is necessary to accept
certain beliefs. Belief that at the next moment the laws will not change
for example.
Let´s go to a human level:
in evolutionary terms, I would say that truth is a belief hardcoded by
natural selection. Truth would say, is
Him: God has shown me all truth, but your love is beauty beyond
comprehension.
Her: God has shown me all beauty, but your love is truth beyond imagination.
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On 03 Jun 2013, at 01:41, Stephen Paul King wrote:
How do we integrate empirical data into Bp&p?
Technically, by restricting p to the "leaves of the UD*" (the true,
and thus provable, sigma_1 sentences).
Then to get the physics (the probability measure à-la-UDA), you can do
the same wit
ying and
the original images.
Excellent point.
Same difficulty as in judging "proof".
Formal, first order proof can be verified "mechanically", but they
still does not necessarily entail truth, as the premises might be
inconsistent or incorrect.
"Scientific knowl
nt Aristotelianism. Some people believe that math
>> is not a science, like David Deutsch. That makes no sense for me. Like
>> Gauss I think math is the queen of science, and arithmetic is the queen of
>> math ...
>>
>>
>>
>> - also in falsifiability, that
How do we integrate empirical data into Bp&p?
On Saturday, June 1, 2013 3:41:56 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote:
>
> Russell wrote:
> *"...When it comes to Bp & p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see it
> captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as opposed
> to true conject
bility, that does not automatically escape the agnostic
> questioning about the circumstances of the falsifying and the original
> images.
>
>
> Excellent point.
>
>
>
> Same difficulty as in judging "proof".
>
>
> Formal, first order proof can be verifi
e circumstances of the falsifying and
the original images.
Excellent point.
Same difficulty as in judging "proof".
Formal, first order proof can be verified "mechanically", but they
still does not necessarily entail truth, as the premises might be
inconsistent
Brent,
thanks for your clear ideas - not controversial to what I try to explain in
my poor wordings.
No proof is "valid", or "true". Applicable, maybe.
In our 'makebilieve' world-model many facets SEEM true in our terms of
explanation, i.e. using conventional science and wisdom. Mathematicians are
Russell wrote:
*"...When it comes to Bp & p capturing the notion of knowledge, I can see it
captures the notion of mathematical knowledge, ie true theorems, as opposed
to true conjectures, say, which aren't knowledge.
But I am vaguely sceptical it captures the notion of scientific knowledge,
which
On 31 May 2013, at 19:43, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/31/2013 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 May 2013, at 01:19, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/30/2013 3:43 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, May 30, 2013 at 12:04:13PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
You mean unprovable? I get confused because it seems tha
On 01/06/2013, at 3:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> All humans have many beliefs. A genuine scientist just know that those are
> beliefs, and not knowledge (even if they hope their belief to be true). So
> they will provides axioms/theories and derive from that, and compare with
> facts, in cas
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