ect: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Hi everyone:
"We can then (inductively) experiment with actual diamonds to find out whether,
in fact, this is the case."
Where is genuine doubt?
Thanks,
Jerry R
On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 3:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
mailto:jonalanschm.
Ben, Gary, list,
For an example of hypotheses that remain uncertain I want to mention hypotheses whose conclusions are not yet existing facts, but viabilities in the future. Like: "So this will work: .", like keynesianism in economics, or political decisions meant to solve certain problems. E
Gary R., list,
I agree, a hypothesis may be uncertain yet still be helpful, although
it's important for a contrite fallibilism in any science that the
uncertainty, possible errors, etc., be examined and expressed.
- Best, Ben
On 10/1/2016 12:53 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Ben, List,
Thanks f
Jon S., list,
Thanks, but I need to correct myself. I wrote,
the scientific method is the inquiry method that, by its own
account, can go wrong as well as right
[End quote]
I should say instead that the scientific method is the inquiry method in
which inquiry, by its own account, can
Ben, List,
Thanks for this clarification. You wrote: Researchers need to be able to
state that a hypothesis has been ruled out in plain enough words to keep
communication clear because the scientific method is the inquiry method
that, by its own account, can go wrong as well as right. They don't a
Ben U., Gary R., List:
You have both made some great points today. Peirce clearly considered
economy of research to be an important purpose of methodeutic or
speculative (i.e., theoretical) rhetoric. He even advocated, under certain
circumstances, admitting a hypothesis that we *expect *to fail
Gary R., list,
"Good" is traditionally taken as meaning "valid" or "justified" when
applied to an inference. Valid deductions can conclude in falsehoods by
vice of falsehood among the premisses, and we can see both critical and
methodeutical kinds of justification of an abductive inference tha
Ben wrote: "5.189 can't be regarded as a version, the best as Jerry R. has
been urging, or otherwise, of the pragmatic maxim."
Exactly. As Jon made clear, 5.189 has its value in critical logic and ought
not be conflated with the PM. I have found Jerry's near obsession with
5.189 off putting so tha
Jon S., Gary R., Jerry R., list, I left one point murky; what I had
failed to see clearly, until Jon S.'s remarks, was that 5.189 can't be
regarded as a version, the best as Jerry R. has been urging, or
otherwise, of the pragmatic maxim. - Best, Ben
On 10/1/2016 11:20 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Ben, Jon, List,
Ben, you commented:
"An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the
economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a falsehood, if
it nevertheless helps research by either making it positively fruitful
(think of all the hypotheses that positively help
I left one point murky; what I had failed to see clearly, until Jon S.'s
remarks, was that 5.189 can't be regarded as a version, the best as
Jerry R. has been urging, or otherwise, of the pragmatic maxim. - Best, Ben
On 10/1/2016 11:20 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Jon S., Gary R., list,
Jon, yo
Jon S., Gary R., list,
Jon, you wrote,
CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts,"
yet are /not/ "capable of experimental verification," and thus are
/not/ admissible for subsequent deductive explication and inductive
evaluation. In other words, an abduction t
Dear all,
Perhaps I ought to point out the elephant in the room.
Despite your admission that:
"*any *abduction whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the PM and
(ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry is a *good *abduction"
why do disagreements persist and why are disputants unable
Jon, List,
You wrote: I think that the discussion over the last several days has also
very helpfully clarified the distinction between logical critic and
methodeutic. In particular, CP 5.189 falls under logical critic and
pertains *only *to abduction, while the PM--like pragmat[ic]ism
itself--fal
Jon, Gary, list and friends,
In response to all those words, I say to you:
one two three...
*C A B*...
*CP 5.189*...
*as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions*
STRANGER: That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and does
not set the great above the small, but alway
Gary R., List:
Thanks for your kind words. I think that the discussion over the last
several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction between
logical critic and methodeutic. In particular, CP 5.189 falls
under logical critic and pertains *only *to abduction, while the PM--like
prag
Jon, Helmut, List,
Nice summary statement, Jon, which the quotation brings home.
This discussion has been quite valuable for me as it clarified a matter
which, as I noted in my initial post on the security/uberty question, has
troubled me for some time. Perhaps most helpful was seeing that Houser
Helmut, List:
The justification of abduction/retroduction (by itself) falls under logical
critic, rather than methodeutic. However, pragmat[ic]ism as methodeutic
tells us how abduction/retroduction fits within a complete inquiry--the
justified hypotheses that it produces are admitted or rejected
Supplement: Maybe all about this is said already earlier in this thread. I am slow with catching up.
Jon, list,
yes. So I was wrong assuming, that talking about abduction implies a deduction. Only talking about the justification of abduction (plausibility) does. Obviously abduction is som
Jon, list,
yes. So I was wrong assuming, that talking about abduction implies a deduction. Only talking about the justification of abduction (plausibility) does. Obviously abduction is something personal/individual that escapes methodeutics. So the problem of uberty/security/abduction/deduction/p
Helmut:
I think that you are getting at what Peirce meant by *plausibility*, which
indeed pertains to the justification of abduction. In your example, it is
*plausible* that these white beans are from this bag that contains only
white beans. On the other hand, it would obviously *not *be plausib
Jon, list,
you are of course right. I might replace the conclusion in the second statement with: "So for the observer person it seems possible that...". This would be a true statement, but still not a deduction, because the conclusion is not based on the premisses. I think, a deduction about a
Helmut, list:
I think you’ve said something profound.
You said:
"So making an abduction is not pragmaticism (given that pragmaticism is
deductive). But talking about abduction is, because it includes a
deduction."
I think listers will object to your “abduction is not pragmaticism because
Helmut, List:
I appreciate the comment, but I do not think that your example qualifies as
a genuine deduction. It is not *necessarily* true that "it is possible
that they are from the bag"; it might, in fact, be *impossible *for some
reason, presumably having nothing to do with the color of the b
Dear list members,
I am not sure if this helps: I think, to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are white, so these beans are from the bag" is an abduction. But to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are white, so it is possible that they are from the bag" is sort
Hi everyone:
"We can then (inductively) experiment with actual diamonds to find out
whether, in fact, this is the case."
Where is genuine doubt?
Thanks,
Jerry R
On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 3:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> Clark, List:
>
> As (hopefully) clarified in my subsequent messages, I am
Clark, List:
As (hopefully) clarified in my subsequent messages, I am not saying that
the PM itself is "deductive"; rather, it serves as the rule for admitting
hypotheses to the deductive stage of inquiry once they have been produced
and justified--because they plausibly account for the facts--by
Clark, list:
I've had the same difficulty, myself, except I cannot make up my mind since
I'm not even certain of the maxim to which is being referred.
For instance, here is an even different pragmatic maxim;
one that calls attention to making the speech outside of ourselves:
"I have long ago com
> On Sep 28, 2016, at 7:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), not abduction; which is
> why it contributes to security, but not to uberty. I wonder if another way
> to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to logical critic, but
>
Jon, list:
You pull that quote as if everything is self-evident. Yet, you never
provide that certain maxim that is posed by pragmatism, as if that is
understood.
Yet, if you pose it, state it clearly, say it explicitly, express it out
loud;
you will discover that it is the wrong maxim.
"...if o
List:
This passage conveniently lays out Peirce's views on what we have been
discussing today.
CSP: If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see
that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction. That
is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound
Jon, Gary, list:
I do not see how we're back to anything at all about a complete inquiry
when you have not spoken a whit on "beauty, upon moral virtue, or upon
abstract truth, the three things that alone raise Humanity above Animality'"
Best,
Jerry R
On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 10:39 AM, Jon Alan Sc
Gary R., List:
GR: As for your intriguing suggestion that the PM might better be placed
in critical logic rather than methodeutic, well, I'll have to think about
that. I'd be very interested, meanwhile, in what others on the list may
think of your suggestion, one which I don't recall previously h
Jon, List,
Reading over our several posts on this topic it appears that we are in the
main in agreement that the distinction between the PM and pragmaticism in
its fullness ought not be conflated as, apparently, Houser has to some
extent, for example, in his misquoting Peirce in the essay, replaci
Gary R., List:
GR: But, in fact, Peirce *does* call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the "rule of
pragmatism" in this essay.
Yes, but my point is that he does *not *call the PM the "rule of
abduction"; so again, I am positing a distinction between Peirce's
pragmatism (i.e., pragmaticism) as the "logic
Dear all:
It would help this conversation if you state clearly which maxim of
pragmatism to which you are referring.
Because this one following...there is a severe flaw in it:
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we
conceive the object of our conception to have.
Jon, List,
Jon, I think I am *tending* to agree with your conclusion, that "Houser's
comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the latter is only
one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole."
On the other hand, you wrote: JS: "I have been mulling this over, and I
keep landing on the tho
Jon, list:
You said:
"As you hinted, Houser's comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim,
when the latter is only one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole."
What do you mean by *pragmaticism as a whole*?
Is there a complete maxim of pragmaticism that is
different from a complete maxim of p
Gary R., List:
GR: But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the
pragmatic maxim, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our
approximation to [the] security of reasoning. But it does not contribute to
the uberty of reasoning, which far more calls for solicitous care"
(
t;>> relations between signs, object and interpretants that we need to focus our
>>> attention on in each of these areas of semiotics can be used to help steer
>>> the inquiries. When it comes to matters of the assurance of different forms
>>> of inference, I am d
ion between the dynamical object
>> and sign (typically the focus of inquiry in critical logic) and between the
>> sign and normal interpretant (typically the focus of inquiry in
>> methodeutic). My interpretative suggestion is that the relation between the
>> dynamical obje
y these two relations. As such,
> the mediation involves a triadic relationship between the three dyadic
> relations as well as a triadic relation between three triads. Gary F. has
> indicated that he finds the diagrams I've offered hard to make out, so I
> suspect that others might find the
Clark, Ben, Edwina, list:
From your recent posts, I would say you are brightening the blind spot,
albeit not directly with help of the *lanterna*. To that, your comments
have not been explicit, merely implicit; indexed as “structure pretty
similar to intuitions”, “common sensicalism”, *etc*., f
> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> Clark, list - yes, I agree with you that one's beliefs about religion do
> affect one's interpretation of the NA. After all, as Peirce wrote, we cannot
> begin with an empty mind but begin with our beliefs. Jon, who self-describes
> a
> On Sep 26, 2016, at 1:09 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
> Yes, methodeutical reasoning can itself be abductive, and if one builds a
> house of abductive inferences none of which are quite compelling, then it's
> guesswork, it could be a house of cards.
>
> In the end we base all our reasoning
Clark, list,
I usually worry when I see a quote of myself from 2007 - I was often
very wordy in those days but I didn't do too badly in that one.
I think that I still agree with the things in your quote of me, except
the first thing, that economy is as important as chance in the world.
What
e don't 'begin' our understandings with Peirce.
> Many of us are aware of Plato and Aristotle - and after all, Peirce
> described himself as heavily influenced by Aristotle.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -----
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt
> *To:* Jeffrey
Clark, list,
Yes, methodeutical reasoning can itself be abductive, and if one builds
a house of abductive inferences none of which are quite compelling, then
it's guesswork, it could be a house of cards.
In the end we base all our reasoning on perceptual facts reached by
abduction, insofar a
age -
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2016 2:10 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Jeff, List:
Thank you for this helpful breakdown of different approaches to Peirce's
writings. I
> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:01 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
> Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, "Methodeutic has a
> special interest in abduction, or the inference which starts a scientific
> hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be a
> justifiable
> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:13 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
> I'd like to emphasize again that it's a distinction that makes a difference:
> methodeutical promise is not the same thing as plausibility or (instinctual)
> assurance of truth. Many years ago here at peirce-l, Howard Callaway argued
>
> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> Thank you for this helpful breakdown of different approaches to Peirce's
> writings. I wonder if my dispute with Edwina earlier in this thread was
> rooted in either misunderstanding or genuine disagreement between us about
> whe
ke the diagrams clearer.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________
From: Benjamin Udell [baud...@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 12:15 PM
To:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subjec
essor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> --
> *From:* Clark Goble
> *Sent:* Monday, September 26, 2016 9:37 AM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> On S
the first and second. Having
> said that, he has written quite a lot on what it is to do the first or
> second sort of thing well or poorly.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (
continue to look at
the textual support for this interpretative hypothesis--and I'll see what might
be done to make the diagrams clearer.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________________
From: Clark Goble
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2016 9:37 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
On Sep 26, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce th
> On Sep 26, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
> wrote:
>
> I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we
> variously may think for our own parts.
I do think it’s worth asking how the argument itself fares given the social
changes in the intervening century
nd
that the hypothesis is sufficient to explain all that was, initially, quite
surprising.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Benjamin Udell <mailto:baud...@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 9:5
hat
> the surprising character fades the more worthy it is of our confidence does
> suggest that the fit is one with a large system of our other beliefs that
> are relatively well settled as habits--and that the hypothesis is
> *sufficient* to explain all that was, initially, quite s
is /sufficient/ to explain all that was, initially, quite
surprising.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
*From:* Benjamin Udell
*Sent:* Sunday, September 25, 2016 9:50 AM
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Subject:*
Udell
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 9:50 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Jeff D., Gary R., list,
Your quote from "A Neglected Argument..." bears on plausibility, which Peirce
elsewhere in the same essay discusses as natural, ins
Jeff D., Gary R., list,
Your quote from "A Neglected Argument..." bears on plausibility, which
Peirce elsewhere in the same essay discusses as natural, instinctual
simplicity; it bears upon assurance by instinct; I don't find him
discussing methodeutical justification (e.g., testability) of ab
Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Gary Richmond
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:56 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Ben, Jeff, List,
Ben, I think your '
le to me--so long as we grow to appreciate
the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
____________________
*From: Gary Richmond
Sent: Friday, Septe
> On Sep 23, 2016, at 2:24 PM, Eugene Halton wrote:
>
> And what if you allowed yourself to enter the realm of musement
> and found your Indo-European or related noun-centered language left behind? A
> realm where your noun-God, your concept-God, could not enter? You have
> entere
September 23, 2016 4:24 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> I sent the post below on Sept 19 when there was some discussion of
> musement, but it appears it did not go thru so I'm posting again. Apologies
> if it did go thru the first time. Gene H
Excellent, Eugene - that's exactly how Peirce described the dynamic semiosis of
the universe/Mind.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Eugene Halton
To: Peirce List
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 4:24 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
I sen
-
From: Helmut Raulien
To: jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:28 PM
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Jeff, list,
you wrote: " Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals "Nature&quo
I sent the post below on Sept 19 when there was some discussion of
musement, but it appears it did not go thru so I'm posting again. Apologies
if it did go thru the first time. Gene H
…and musement musings…
Peirce’s “The play of musement” is a beautiful way of putting
it. It is a por
<http://h.raul...@gmx.de>
> *To:* jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
> *Cc:* Gary Richmond <http://gary.richm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L
> <http://peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Friday, September 23, 2016 3:28 PM
> *Subject:* Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinki
Raulien
To: jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:28 PM
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Jeff, list,
you wrote: " Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals "Nature" or "
he latter term
> [divine character] means and the first three - I think need some
> clarification, at least, in my view.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Helmut Raulien
> *To:* jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
> *Cc:* Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L
>
> *Sent:*
frey.down...@nau.edu
Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:28 PM
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Jeff, list,
you wrote: " Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals
"Nature" or "God" matters li
he case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the alternate hypotheses?
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...
Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:56 AM
> To: Peirce-L
> Subj
ese is the case. As such, it is
a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the alternate hypotheses?
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________________________
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
[jonalanschm...@gm
on "The
> Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is
> the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the
> alternate hypotheses?
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Phil
ame
true of the alternate hypotheses?
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016
head>
Dear Ben N., list,
Let's also thank Gary Fuhrman for being more optimistic than I was about
whether past CD-ROM customers could still obtain online subscriptions to
InteLex even today. I subsequently contacted InteLex and the person
there confirmed that that is still the policy.
Quote
> On Sep 22, 2016, at 3:09 AM, Ben Novak wrote:
>
> I went to Craigslist where I found a laptop with a Vista operating system,
> called the seller, and drove 50 miles to test it out. It worked like a charm.
> For $70, and a hundred miles worth of gasoline, I have my Intelex investment
> back.
; to be desired. It is not just that the arguments are bad, but they are bad
> in a particular egregious kind of way--or so it seems to me.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
&g
sity
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Edwina Taborsky [tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 2:53 PM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Jeffrey - I have a few problems with your analysis. I'll c
To: "Peirce-L"
> Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 5:06 PM
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
>
> Hello Jon, List,
>
> The argument you are trying to reconstruct could be fleshed out more fully
> in a number of ways. Here are a few suggestion
Jeffrey - I have a few problems with your analysis. I'll comment below:
- Original Message -
From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard"
To: "Peirce-L"
Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 5:06 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Hello Jon, List,
Edwina, List:
ET: The format of the argument may be logical but its conclusion may be
irrelevant; i.e., it may be logical but its content may be false.
Of course--just like every scientific hypothesis.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher,
osophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 12:24 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
List:
Based on what Peirce wrote in R 842 .
er 21, 2016 3:24 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
List:
Based on what Peirce wrote in R 842 ...
CSP: Taking the general description of it as a minor premiss, and a
certain theory of logic as a major premiss, it will follow by a simple
syllogism that
List:
Based on what Peirce wrote in R 842 ...
CSP: Taking the general description of it as a minor premiss, and a
certain theory of logic as a major premiss, it will follow by a simple
syllogism that the humble argument is logical and that consequently whoever
acknowledges its premisses need hav
.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Ben Novak
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Sent:* Tuesday, September 20, 2016 6:09 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> Dear List:
>
> Fifteen or sixteen years ago, I had the Intelex Past
Ben N., list,
Ben N., you wrote,
It is not worth going further into why--unless someone knows a way
to get around the disabling of Intelex CDs as a result of their change.
[end quote]
The old InteLex CD-ROMs became unusable not because of being disabled by
InteLex but because of chang
, September 20, 2016 6:09 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Dear List:
Fifteen or sixteen years ago, I had the Intelex Past Masters version of the
works of Peirce, and often have reason to recall a passage where Peirce
explicitly talks about the importanc
--- Original Message -
From: Ben Novak
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, September 20, 2016 6:09 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Dear List:
Fifteen or sixteen years ago, I had the Intelex Past Masters version of the
works of Peirce, and often have reason
…and musement musing…
Peirce’s “The play of musement” is a beautiful way of putting
it. It is a portal to a way of opening one’s body soul mind to experience.
But what if, on entering that realm of spontaneity and freedom through the
“play of musement” portal, one begins to realize the
ginal Message -
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Clark Goble
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, September 19, 2016 2:52 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Dear list:
What you say sounds all well and good but I’m confused.
m your browser to your
clipboard and paste it into an email message (if the message will get sent in
HTML format).
Gary f.
From: Ben Novak [mailto:trevriz...@gmail.com]
Sent: 20-Sep-16 06:10
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Dear List:
Fifteen
gt;>
>> Edwina
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Jerry Rhee
>> *To:* Clark Goble
>> *Cc:* Peirce-L
>> *Sent:* Monday, September 19, 2016 2:52 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>>
>> De
it Tolstoy who said that 'wrong does not cease to be wrong just
> because the majority shares in it'...
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Jerry Rhee
> *To:* Clark Goble
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Sent:* Monday, September 19, 2016 2:52 PM
> *S
Clark, Edwina, list,
Clark, you wrote, "Later process theologians were explicitly influenced
by Peirce despite many of Peirce’s writings being difficult to find at
the time."
It seems a good bet that this was because Charles Hartshorne, who, along
with Paul Weiss, edited the Collected Papers
ase to be wrong just because the
majority shares in it'...
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Clark Goble
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, September 19, 2016 2:52 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Dear list:
What you say so
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